



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

CAPSTONE

**THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SMALL-STATE
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) AS
INFORMATION COLLECTORS TO SUPPORT
NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING**

by

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December 2018

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2018	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Capstone		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SMALL-STATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF) AS INFORMATION COLLECTORS TO SUPPORT NATIONAL DECISION-MAKING			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Flemming Elkjaer Haar and Bernardus Haspels				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Small European states such as the Netherlands and Denmark, which face increasingly complex security challenges, lack the capacity to meet increasing intelligence requirements. Since intelligence is vital to counter or prevent threats to national interests, small-state leaders must reduce these current intelligence gaps. This study focuses on how small European states' SOF can contribute most efficiently and effectively to the national intelligence capacity to anticipate and counter threats from foreign regions. Based on literature and interviews with Dutch and Danish civil and military officials, this study identifies ways in which SOF can contribute to national intelligence capacity. The options include: SOF training the military intelligence service, SOF enabling military intelligence operations through integrated support, and SOF operating independently as an information provider for national decision making. This study, based on analysis of these options, suggests that a combination of integrating SOF into intelligence operations and allowing SOF to conduct information collection operations independently represents the most effective and efficient way to contribute to the national intelligence capacity. In that regard, the integrated option is more congruent with operations in non-permissive areas, and SOF as independent collectors with permissive areas.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Special Operations Forces, intel, intelligence, national decision-making, Denmark. the Netherlands			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 97	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	

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FORCES (SOF) AS INFORMATION COLLECTORS TO SUPPORT
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS
(IRREGULAR WARFARE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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Small European states such as the Netherlands and Denmark, which face increasingly complex security challenges, lack the capacity to meet increasing intelligence requirements. Since intelligence is vital to counter or prevent threats to national interests, small-state leaders must reduce these current intelligence gaps. This study focuses on how small European states' SOF can contribute most efficiently and effectively to the national intelligence capacity to anticipate and counter threats from foreign regions. Based on literature and interviews with Dutch and Danish civil and military officials, this study identifies ways in which SOF can contribute to national intelligence capacity. The options include: SOF training the military intelligence service, SOF enabling military intelligence operations through integrated support, and SOF operating independently as an information provider for national decision making. This study, based on analysis of these options, suggests that a combination of integrating SOF into intelligence operations and allowing SOF to conduct information collection operations independently represents the most effective and efficient way to contribute to the national intelligence capacity. In that regard, the integrated option is more congruent with operations in non-permissive areas, and SOF as independent collectors with permissive areas.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

C2	Command and Control
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)
DA	Direct Action
DDIS	Danish Defense Intelligence Service
DOD	Department of Defense
DPIS	Danish Police Intelligence Service
EU	European Union
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GEOINT	Geospatial Intelligence
GISS	General Intelligence and Security Service (the Netherlands)
GO	Governmental Organization
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
ISIS	Islamic States of Iraq and the Levant
MEDINT	Medical Intelligence
MA	Military Assistance
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MISS	Military Intelligence and Security Service (the Netherlands)
MoD	Ministry of Defense
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSINT	Open Source Intelligence
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SR	Special Reconnaissance

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to our advisors, Hy Rothstein, John Tullius, and Leo Blanken, for their useful and extensive remarks, engagement, comments, and discussions throughout this project. Their attention to detail and critical review kept us focused on the essentials of our research. We would also like to express our gratitude to Kalev I. Sepp and Ian Rice for their help in transforming our initial ideas into a research project. We also extend our gratitude to the Naval Postgraduate School and, in particular, the professors and staff of the Department of Defense Analysis for challenging us and providing a framework, not just for our academic performance and research, but also for our future military careers. To Colonel Michael Richardson we owe special thanks for his support in matters that were not directly related to our studies, but were of great importance to us and our SOF communities in the Netherlands and Denmark. Additionally, we thank our fellow students at the Naval Postgraduate School, both American and international, for the many discussions we enjoyed and for sharing their personal experiences and views. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our families for their support. By carrying the majority of the workload on the home front, they have made it possible for us to focus on our studies and this capstone.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

Europe has been witnessing an escalation of threats on its eastern and southern flanks, which increases regional instability and, consequently, European states' need for intelligence.¹ As pernicious actors exploit Europe's deteriorating security environment, small European states such as the Netherlands and Denmark have changed their foreign security policies, emphasizing national interests through preventive, integrated strategies in foreign regions.² At the same time, their governments have sought to enhance intelligence self-sufficiency to decrease reliance on NATO partners such as the United States. These policy shifts have significantly increased national-level intelligence requirements, exacerbating existing intelligence "gaps" given their limited intelligence capabilities. Yet, because Special Operations Forces (SOF) are accustomed to information gathering and have distinct capabilities, some Dutch and Danish military leaders and civil officials seek to know whether SOF can augment intelligence capabilities.

B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The primary purpose of this study is to explore how SOF from small European states such as Denmark and the Netherlands, which possess unique capabilities and access to foreign regions, can best contribute to the strategic intelligence capacity. This study may also provide senior-level leaders with new insights for employing SOF as a strategic intelligence instrument.

¹ Dutch Ministry of Defense, *MIVD Jaarverslag 2017* (The Hague, NL: MIVD, 2018), 16, <https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/jaarverslagen/2018/04/26/jaarverslag-mivd-2017>; Elizabeth Oren, "A Dilemma of Principles: The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare from a NATO Perspective," *Special Operations Journal* 2, no. 1 (2016): 60. doi:10.1080/23296151.2016.1174522; Rasmus A. Boserup, Luke Patey, and Hetav Rojan, *In a Time of Crisis: Danish Foreign Policy in the Middle East and North Africa* (Copenhagen, Danish Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), 18.

² Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Update International Security Strategy, *Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving* (The Hague, NL: MoFA, 2014), <https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/brieven/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-veiligheid>

Focusing on the intelligence systems of small European states and, specifically, their military intelligence services, this study provides a brief overview of the Dutch and Danish intelligence services. In Denmark, two intelligence services provide strategic-level intelligence: the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) and the Danish Police Intelligence Service (DPIS). In the Netherlands, the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MISS) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS) provide intelligence to national leadership. In both states, the military intelligence services provide intelligence from foreign regions and function under the Ministry of Defense (MoD). Since this study explores SOF's contributing role to national-level intelligence in foreign regions, its scope is limited to the military intelligence services due to their foreign focus and, like SOF, their functioning under the MoD. If SOF can contribute to the national-level intelligence system, they will, presumably, collaborate or cooperate with a military intelligence service.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

In the Netherlands and Denmark, many senior-level military and civil officials assume that SOF can significantly enhance the national intelligence capacity.³ SOF, given their experience conducting tactical intelligence during special reconnaissance missions, is well positioned to provide strategic-level intelligence, potentially narrowing the national intelligence “gaps.” With their ability to operate long term under complex circumstances, providing “ground truth,” SOF could contribute to a more complete understanding of local security dynamics. Moreover, they have the ability to support a wide

³ Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview by author, Monterey, CA, 8 August 2018; Head of Commander Advisory Group NLSOCOM, personal interview by author, The Hague, NL, 29 August 2018; Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, personal interview by author, The Hague, NL, 31 August 2018; Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, personal interviews, Roosendaal, NL, 27 and 30 August 2018; Commander Dutch Army SOF regiment, interview by author, Roosendaal, NL, 30 August 2018; Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview, Copenhagen DNK, 03 September 2018.

spectrum of intelligence operations in foreign areas. For this reason, the central question of this study is:

How can SOF from small European states most efficiently and effectively contribute to the intelligence capacity needed to forecast and counter threats from foreign regions?

D. BACKGROUND

Since European states' domestic and foreign security concerns are interrelated, national leaders need to understand the international security dynamic and its components. This section first discusses the key European security issues. Next, shifts in the geopolitical balance of power affecting Europe are reviewed, followed by current policies of small European states. All these factors demonstrate the need for increased intelligence and the strain it puts on the current intelligence system.

1. European Security Issues

In Europe, the primary security issues are hybrid warfare, terrorism, and migration. As hybrid warfare consists of multiple types of threats from numerous instruments of power, ICs currently confront a significantly increased workload. Contributing to this increase is the fact that pernicious actors use a palette of both conventional military capabilities and non-traditional methods and means to advance their objectives. In his paper, "Masters of Chaos," Matthew Lauder describes hybrid warfare as the deliberate, unconventional, and synchronized use of primarily non-military and non-violent military instruments to achieve strategic interests.⁴ Both state and non-state actors recently have blended these instruments into integrated, unconventional approaches, emphasizing indirect strategies.⁵ Malicious actors such as Russia have been using hybrid warfare to

⁴ Matthew A. Lauder, *Masters of Chaos: The Application of Political Warfare by the Russian Federation in the Contemporary Operating Environment*, DRDC-RDDC-2018-L118 (Toronto, CAN: Defense Research and Development Canada, 2018), 20.

⁵ S.G. Chekinov and S.A. Bogdanov, "The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War," *Military Thought*, vol. 4 (October-December, 2013); Oren, "A Dilemma of Principles: The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare from a NATO Perspective," 60; Lauder, *Masters of Chaos: The Application of Political Warfare by the Russian Federation in the Contemporary Operating Environment*, 25.

manipulate European decision-making processes, influence public opinion, increase uncertainty, and disrupt the existing (supra)national cohesion.⁶

Concerning means, adversaries have been using a wide range of non-traditional actors and tools to benefit their interests. Mike Winnerstig in his paper “Tools of Destabilization,” and Merle Maigre, who studied Russian operations in Ukraine, demonstrate that politicians, religious leaders, media, cultural institutions, youth movements, private military corporations, motor clubs, and scholars have been exploited and integrated into unconventional strategies.⁷ Furthermore, aggressors have integrated SOF and hackers into hybrid warfare.⁸ As SOF have operated alongside non-state proxies, state-controlled hackers in troll farms have conducted cyberattacks against the critical infrastructure of competing actors, shaping situations to the aggressor’s advantage. Moreover, malicious actors can use access to energy resources as a relevant instrument in the hybrid toolbox, exerting pressure on political decision makers in energy-dependent states to further weaken them.⁹ All of these non-traditional strategies and instruments have increased the density of the fog of war, requiring better intelligence to clear that fog.

Terrorism emanating from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is also a significant security issue in Europe and its neighboring regions. Terrorist groups such as the Islamic States of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) clearly intend to exploit instability

⁶ Lauder. *Masters of Chaos: The Application of Political Warfare by the Russian Federation in the Contemporary Operating Environment*, 25, 28, 31; Dutch Ministry of Defense, MIVD Jaarverslag 2017, 18.

⁷ Merle Maigre, *Crimea: The Achilles' Heel of Ukraine* (Tallinn, EE: International Centre for Defense Studies, 2008), 10-16; Andis Kudor, “Russian Soft-Power and Non-Military Influence: The View From Latvia,” in *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States*, FOI-R-3990-SE, ed. Mike Winnerstig (Stockholm, SE: Total Defense Research Institute, 2014), 110-111; Mike Winnerstig, “Conclusions and Implications for Further Research,” in *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States*, FOI-R-3990-SE, ed. Mike Winnerstig (Stockholm, SE: Total Defense Research Institute, 2014), 142-143.

⁸ Matthew A. Lauder, “‘Wolves of the Russian Spring’: An Examination of the Night Wolves as a Proxy for the Russian Government,” *Canadian Military Journal* 18, no. 3 (Summer 2018): 7-11.

⁹ Via Ratsiborynska, “Russia's Hybrid Warfare in the Form of its Energy Manoeuvres Against Europe: How the EU and NATO can Respond Together,” no 147, ISSN 2076 0957 (Rome, IT: NATO Defense College, 2018), 2.

in this region to train and launch attacks on Europe,¹⁰ and European states can expect these attacks to increase.¹¹ Moreover, many foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) from Europe, upon returning to their country of origin, have been promoting jihadi ideologies, cultivating terrorism, and planning and executing attacks.¹²

Migration is currently another security issue that destabilizes and threatens states' security, increasing small European state leaders' needs for better intelligence. According to the European Union (EU), more than 1.8 million people illegally crossed the E.U.'s outer border in 2015, more than six-fold the 2014 number.¹³ In 2016, the Danish minister of Foreign Affairs called migration the biggest challenge of the 21st century.¹⁴ Moreover, the Dutch EU commissioner contended that the EU has been experiencing significant pressure from migration.¹⁵ As the northern Africa security situation deteriorates and becomes more complex, European states need to identify the factors generating these migration flows.¹⁶ Furthermore, ISIS and al-Qaida operate in the MENA region and both groups have used

¹⁰ Dutch Ministry of Justice and Security, *NCTV: Chance of Attack in the Netherlands Still Real* (The Hague, NL: National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism, 2018), <https://english.nctv.nl/organisation/counterterrorism/TerroristThreatAssessmentNetherlands/index.aspx>

¹¹ Danish Defence Intelligence Service; *Intelligence Risk Assessment 2017-2018*, (Copenhagen Danish Defence Intelligence Service, 2017), <https://fe-ddis.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/FE/EfterretningsmaessigeRisikovurderinger/Risikovurdering2017EnglishVersion.pdf>.

¹² Foreign Terrorist Fighters: individuals who travel to a state other than their state of residence for the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts. Source: United Nations Security Council resolution 2178 (24 September 2014), http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20%282014%29.

¹³ Frontex is cooperation within EU to strengthen the areas of migration, asylum, and security, and was initiated in 1999.

¹⁴ Kasper Frandsen and Cicilie Gormsen, "Kristian Jensen: Migration er en større trussel end terror" *Altinget*, January 29, 2016, <https://www.altinget.dk/artikel/145764-kristian-jensen-migration-er-en-stoerre-trussel-end-terror>.

¹⁵ Arjan Noorlander, "Timmermans: meer dan helft vluchtelingen heeft economisch motief," *Nederlandse Omroep Stichting*, January 25, 2016, <https://nos.nl/artikel/2082786-timmermans-meer-dan-helft-vluchtelingen-heeft-economisch-motief.html>.

¹⁶ Danish Defence Intelligence Service; *Intelligence Risk Assessment 2017-2018*, (Copenhagen Danish Defence Intelligence Service, 2017), <https://fe-ddis.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/FE/EfterretningsmaessigeRisikovurderinger/Risikovurdering2017EnglishVersion.pdf>.

the migration flows to send terrorists to Europe to conduct attacks.¹⁷ Additionally, according to the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, an influx of migrants in (small) European states correlates to an increase in transnational crime and polarization within societies.¹⁸ In European states, the increasing diversity in the population has fueled right-wing sentiments and other extreme convictions. These developments have further ignited fragmentation within European social systems. The major influx of migrants has been threatening the stability of European states and has further increased politicians need for better intelligence.¹⁹

2. Shift in the Geopolitical Balance of Power

Besides the three European security issues—hybrid warfare, terrorism, and migration—European leaders also need to address shifts in the geopolitical balance of power. Affected by changing U.S. interests and geopolitical priorities, European states presently rely less on intelligence from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners and more on intelligence they produce themselves.²⁰ The current international system can be characterized as a multi order,²¹ with states increasingly seeking new forms of cooperation due to competing ideas and interests. This new multipolar world order is fundamentally changing U.S.-European relationships. In particular, the current U.S. administration's dissatisfaction with NATO-contributions has created tensions between the

¹⁷ Danish Police Intelligence Service, *Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to Denmark* (Copenhagen, DK: Center for Terrorism Analysis, 2018.) <https://www.pet.dk/Publikationer/~media/VTD%202018/VurderingafterortruslenmodDanmark2018pdf.aspx>.

¹⁸ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Wereldwijd voor een Veilig Nederland: Geïntegreerd Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie 2018-2022* (The Hague, NL: MoFA, 2018), 9, 15, <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2018/03/19/notitie-geintegreerde-buitenland-en-veiligheidsstrategie-gbvs>

¹⁹ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Wereldwijd voor een Veilig Nederland: Geïntegreerd Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie 2018-2022*, 15.

²⁰ Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview, Copenhagen DNK, 03 September 2018.

²¹ Stephan de Spiegeleire et al., *Strategische Monitor 2017-2018: Stilte voor de Storm?* (The Hague, NL: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and Clingendael Institute, 2018), 1, 6, <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/strategische-monitor-2017-2018>; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996),

United States and Europe, possibly calling into question the future level of cooperation.²² As a consequence, European states may feel impelled to increase their ability to acquire intelligence independently to advance their own interests.

Given that the United States currently focuses less on Africa, European states may need to increase their intelligence capabilities in this vast region. As stated by Emily Estelle, a senior analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, “Historically, U.S. policy has been treating Africa mostly as a receptacle for development aid and a tertiary theater for counterterrorism efforts, behind the Middle East and South Asia.”²³ Since the deaths of four American Special Forces operators in Niger in October 2017, the U.S. military presence in Africa has come under question by the U.S. public and elected officials. As Estelle contends, “The administration’s reprioritization from counterterrorism to great power competition has left Africa without a coherent [U.S. security] strategy.”²⁴ Due to the U.S. shifting priorities, European states can rely less on U.S. intelligence support, further challenging their intelligence services to meet the new demands.

3. Current Dutch and Danish Foreign Security Policies

To meet current and future security threats, Denmark and the Netherlands have shifted their focus to regions of national interests, using preventive and integrated approaches.²⁵ These approaches demand a wide range of accurate strategic-level intelligence to support programs intended to achieve desired political outcomes. Given increased regional instabilities, small European states need to monitor developments in these areas and proactively anticipate and defuse crises. Cost-efficient preventive

²² Joyce P. Kaufman, “The US perspective on NATO under Trump: lessons of the past and prospects for the future,” *International Affairs*, vol. 93, issue 2 (2017), 251–266, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix009>.

²³ Emily Estelle, “America ignores Africa to its Peril: Washington needs to counter the spread of terrorists and rival powers before it’s too late,” *The National Interest* (Washington, DC: Center for the National Interest, 2018), 201, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/america-ignores-africa-its-peril-26596>.

²⁴ Estelle “America Ignores Africa to Its Peril”.

²⁵ Peter Taksoe-Jensen, *Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: The Way Ahead for Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030* (Copenhagen, DK: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016), 4-5, <http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/dansk-diplomati-og-forsvar-i-en-brydningstid/>; Dutch Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, *Vertrouwen in de Toekomst* (The Hague, NL, 2017), 2, 46-47, <https://www.kabinetformatie2017.nl/documenten/publicaties/2017/10/10/regeerakkoord-vertrouwen-in-de-toekomst>; Spiegeleire et al., *Strategische Monitor 2017-2018: Stilte voor de Storm?*, 17.

approaches need to focus on the breeding grounds of instability and help fragile states avoid being overtaken by events, requiring foresight and a “decision advantage” that intelligence can provide. To anticipate future events, states need more reliable intelligence for proper contextual understanding of a situation within a region of interest. While the current capability of small European states to detect “early” signals in such regions is limited, states need to invest more in anticipating security threats. To establish this strategic anticipation and “early-warning/early-action” capacity, states need understanding derived from accurate intelligence.²⁶ Moreover, presently, Dutch and Danish foreign policies use integrated approaches, optimally mixing available national instruments of power and relevant players—governmental, international, and societal actors—to improve the stability of such regions.²⁷ To develop an effective national integrated approach and better employ national instruments of power, Dutch and Danish leaders require different types of information.

To summarize, the increased instability in and around Europe, the global shifts in the balance of power, and the Dutch and Danish desire for integrated strategies increase the need of both small states for independently generated, national intelligence. European leaders not only need information about activities and locations of, for example, conventional military capabilities or terrorists, they also need intelligence concerning factors causing regional complexity and instability. National-level leaders are interested in aggressors’ efforts to influence public perceptions. Rather than reacting to crises, national leaders desire to act with foresight and prevent crises. These developments demand more

²⁶ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *International Security Strategy: Veilige Wereld, Veilig Nederland* (The Hague, NL, 2013), 14, <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/rapporten/2013/06/21/veilige-wereld-veilig-nederland-internationale-veiligheidsstrategie/veilige-wereld-veilig-nederland-internationale-veiligheidsstrategie.pdf>; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *International Security Strategy: Veilige Wereld, Veilig Nederland*, 1, 8-10, 19-20; Danish Government Foreign and Security Policy 2017-18, <http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitik-strategi-2017-18/>; Taksøe-Jensen, *Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: The Way Ahead for Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030*; Dutch Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, *Vertrouwen in de Toekomst*, 2, 46-47.

²⁷ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *International Security Strategy: Veilige Wereld, Veilig Nederland*, 1, 8-10, 19-20; Danish Government Foreign and Security Policy 2017-18, <http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitik-strategi-2017-18/>; Taksøe-Jensen, *Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: The Way Ahead for Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030*; Dutch Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, *Vertrouwen in de Toekomst*, 2, 46-47.

intelligence, further straining the intelligence system and widening existing intelligence gaps.

E. METHODOLOGY

This study explores literature on the factors that have increased state leaderships' intelligence requirements,²⁸ examining the European security situation, shifts in the global security environment, small European states' shifts in the foreign security policies, those states' intelligence organizations and their challenges, and SOF's potential role in pre-conflict operations.

Furthermore, to obtain insights concerning the current European security environment, the challenges within the intelligence system, and SOF's potential contribution to national intelligence capacity, this study includes interviews with Dutch and Danish military and civil authorities: SOF commanders and their staff-section directors, Dutch MISS and Danish DIS officials, and a Danish politician. The interview questions can be found in Appendix B, divided into four main categories:

- Threats to small European states;
- Small European state foreign security policies;
- Current strategic intelligence capabilities and the associated challenges;
- SOF's potential to contribute to the national intelligence capacity and its challenges.

Based on literature, interviews, and empirical data, the authors have defined three options for how SOF can contribute to the national-level intelligence capacity and narrow the gap between supply and demand. The advantages and disadvantages of each option are analyzed using the following criteria determined and defined by the authors and validated by the aforementioned individuals:

²⁸ Literature review can be found in Appendix A.

- Efficiency and effectiveness: Efficiency is defined as achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense. In comparison, effectiveness is defined as success in producing a desired or intended result.
- Command and control: U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines command and control as “The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.”²⁹ Nevertheless, command and control can be separated, whereas command represents authority and responsibility, and control a steering and supervisory function.
- Suitability: The quality of being right or appropriate for a particular purpose, situation, task, or mission. The definition also includes speed of implementation.
- Availability: The availability of personnel, means, and infrastructure with regards to specific ways in which SOF can be employed.
- Sustainability: The ability to maintain a certain rate or level of capacity and capabilities, and avoiding depletion of resources. The definition also includes, avoiding mission creep in regards to standing NATO SOF tasks.

The analysis compares the SOF options and, based on the analysis results, identifies the most efficient and effective way in which SOF can contribute to the national intelligence capacity.

²⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2018-09-28-100314-687>

F. CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter II addresses the intelligence requirements and concludes with an overview of the challenges facing small European states in meeting them. Chapter III provides insight into small European SOF's capabilities and analyzes three potential options for how SOF can augment national intelligence capabilities. The SOF options are analyzed separately using the defined criteria, interview findings, and the authors' assessment of advantages and disadvantages. Chapter IV presents the research findings, answers the research question, introduces a discussion of implications, and concludes.

G. SOF AND INTELLIGENCE REFERENCES

All references to SOF in the following chapters refer to Dutch and Danish SOF specifically and small European SOF in general. Additionally, references to the military intelligence services are specific to the MISS and the DDIS.

H. TRANSLATIONS

Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Dutch and Danish are by the authors.

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II. INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES FOR SMALL STATES

What is called foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from the men who know the enemy situation.

—Sun Tzu³⁰

A. INTRODUCTION

In a rapidly changing security environment, small European states' leaders increasingly need timely and accurate intelligence to develop preventive, integrated strategies focused on national interests, thus requiring enhanced intelligence capacity.³¹ Intelligence services, already strained due to resource scarcity and increased demands, experience organizational and operational challenges, further widening the gap between supply and demand of national-level intelligence. National leaders from small European states, similar to the Netherlands and Denmark, need to solve these challenges. This chapter, after defining intelligence, focuses on strategic intelligence requirements, the intelligence organization, and the organizational and operational challenges within the small European states' system of national information providers and, specifically, the military intelligence services.

B. WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?³²

Information represents raw data that has not been processed or validated, whereas intelligence is selected, combined, analyzed, and validated information that often originates from multiple sources, but is presented as one coherent product.³³ The

³⁰ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 144-145.

³¹ Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, *Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie: Kwaliteit, Capaciteit en Samenwerking* (Utrecht, Foundation Argus, 2005), 39-40, 42, <http://www.stichtingargus.nl/bvd/publicaties/inlichtingenveiligheid.pdf>.

³² From this point forward, unless otherwise indicated, the term “intelligence” is intended to refer to national-level intelligence used for national decision making.

³³ Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, *Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie*, 22.

processing of basic information includes validating, merging, and analyzing all accessible information, often splintered and conflicting, into intelligence products.³⁴ While pieces of information are integrated into an intelligible whole that subsequently is put into context, Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, in their book *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, contend that intelligence also includes assessments and judgments about its consequences, the “so what,” of the collected information.³⁵ Intelligence is the product of gathering and processing information in a specific way.³⁶ As such, it can be viewed both as information and a process.

Intelligence provides a number of critical advantages for national leaders dealing with security challenges, including tactical and strategic warning. Intelligence also provides a decision advantage for national leaders during all phases of policy development and implementation, thus reducing uncertainty.³⁷ Information can also generate a broader palette of strategic options for decision makers, identifying opportunities that enable them to advance national objectives.³⁸ Therefore, intelligence can be employed both as a guiding instrument for decision making and as a tool for the implementation of strategy or policy. As a guiding instrument, intelligence adds to the policymakers’ knowledge regarding the intentions and capabilities of competitors; information determines threats and favorable circumstances for political activities. As a tool for the implementation of strategy or policy, leaders use intelligence to direct national power.³⁹ With these different roles and functions, intelligence remains vitally relevant for senior leaders.

³⁴ Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, *Intelligence in an Insecure World* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018), 3-4.

³⁵ Gill and Phythian. *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 3-4.

³⁶ Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, *Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie*, 22; Gill and Phythian. *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 30-31.

³⁷ Gill and Phythian. *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 30; Bob de Graaff, “De Nederlandse Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten: Nooit te Oud om te Leren,” in *Groniek; Spionage: de Rol van Spionage- en Inlichtingendiensten*, ed. Nienke de Jong et al., (Groningen, University of Groningen Press, 2013), 250-251, <https://rjh.ub.rug.nl/groniek/article/download/17709/15176>.

³⁸ John Tullius, “Organizing for Sophisticated Analysis: Key Foundational, Procedural, and Bureaucratic Factors,” (unpublished article, September, 2018).

³⁹ Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel. *Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society* (London: Praeger, 2005), 12-13.

Intelligence consists of various types. Intelligence services can generate intelligence in an open manner by merging publicly available data or passively monitoring an environment. They can also gather intelligence in a more intrusive way, violating the privacy of others: the difference between overt and covert intelligence.⁴⁰ Additionally, intelligence can also be classified by source. The collection and analysis of public information is called *open source intelligence* (OSINT), whereas intelligence derived from satellite imagery or aerial weapon systems is known as *imagery intelligence* (IMINT). *Signal intelligence* (SIGINT), *geospatial intelligence* (GEOINT), and *medical intelligence* (MEDINT) are, respectively, intelligence derived from telecommunication and electromagnetic transmissions; intelligence obtained by displaying multiple data on a geospatial map; and intelligence about medical issues, such as epidemics.⁴¹

Lastly, *human intelligence* (HUMINT) is based on information derived from human sources, whereby operators build trusted relationships and recruit assets to provide unique intelligence that is often not available through other means. All these activities require a lot of time and often are inherently risky. Additionally, HUMINT collectors often operate in complex environments with a higher risk to mission and personnel. For this reason, intelligence services exercise caution when employing HUMINT operators. In general, intelligence services preferably use other sources to collect information before resorting to HUMINT.⁴²

C. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Given both the complexity and the rapidly changing international security environment, national decision-makers increasingly need relevant, timely, and accurate intelligence to develop policy and strategy, straining the small-state intelligence services. The growing number of threats to Europe, emanating from denied areas, is providing

⁴⁰ Gill and Phythian. *Intelligence in an Insecure World*, 31.

⁴¹ Dutch Ministry of Defense, *MIVD Jaarverslag 2016*, (The Hague, MIVD, 2017), 9, <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/jaarverslagen/2017/04/24/jaarverslag-mivd-2016>.

⁴² Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie. *Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie*, 128-129.

additional challenges for small European states' intelligence services.⁴³ For example, migration and FTF influxes from Syria, Iraq, and Libya are particularly challenging, and national leaders increasingly need information on these issues to deal with them. As hostilities start, many actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGO) or other civil organizations, have to leave a region because they are neither trained nor equipped to operate under hazardous circumstances, leaving national leadership with only scarce state capabilities to provide essential intelligence. The paucity of intelligence about these denied areas undermines European state leaders' ability to anticipate and counter crises.

Furthermore, their intelligence services need to maintain a regional focus to provide adequate strategic foresight. Military intelligence services are often directed to focus on short-term threats, but also see the need to anticipate and understand future security developments, according to the Dutch commander of the Special Operations Command and the head of his Advisory Group.⁴⁴ To identify these potential, future threats, services need to stay fully connected with a foreign region of national interest. Given that threats are not constant and contemporary security situations shift quickly, intelligence services must focus on regions and monitor their security developments to generate the needed foresight, requiring intelligence services with sufficient resources and personnel.

Moreover, as small European state leaders seek to prevent conflict escalation, they need to employ their intelligence capabilities early and in a flexible manner.⁴⁵ While malicious actors shift methods and means opportunistically, as discussed in Chapter I, intelligence services need to focus on these shifts, identify potential escalations, and provide options to counter these challenges. Through early, persistent presence in nationally selected foreign areas, small European states will not only improve their

⁴³ Denied area: An area under enemy or unfriendly control in which friendly forces cannot expect to operate successfully within existing operational constraints and force capabilities. Source: United States Department of Defense. *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (2018), s.v. "denied areas," accessed November 5, 2018. <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview by author, Monterey, CA, 8 August 2018; Head of Commander Advisory Group NLSOCOM, personal interview by author, The Hague, NL, 29 August 2018.

⁴⁵ B.A. de Graaf, E.R. Muller, and J.A. van Reijn, *Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten* (Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer, 2010), 610, 628.

foresight to prevent regional crises, but they will also enhance their ability to anticipate short-term future regional developments quickly. In the case of an unforeseen event such as the downing of the Malaysian MH-17 in 2014, as a team leader within the Dutch MISS emphasized,⁴⁶ information providers operating in an area of national interest are best positioned to provide both tactical intelligence and longer-term strategic foresight.

Although military intelligence services are primarily strategically oriented and focused on providing information about the security situation and stability within a region,⁴⁷ they also have military-operational and tactical intelligence responsibilities to augment the tactical force protection efforts of conventional and SOF units. While the division between tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence has blurred, small states' policymakers require intelligence derived from all levels. When an unforeseen event occurs, as the downing of the MH-17 has demonstrated, military intelligence services must provide a range of tactical and strategic intelligence to national leaders.⁴⁸

Today, European states are much less reliant on intelligence input from NATO partners because many countries, such as the United States, have shifted their focus to regions that occasionally differ from the small European states' areas of interest. Additionally, intelligence provided by foreign partners has not always been accurate or met European states' requirements,⁴⁹ resulting in the need for independent national intelligence capabilities.⁵⁰ However, small-states' intelligence are struggling to meet these requirements. Consequently, they must work with other information providers, such as NGOs, businesses, knowledge institutions and military units operating in various regions of interest, to fulfill national intelligence requirements. Given the vast range of security

⁴⁶ Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, FaceTime interview by author, Monterey, CA, 6 September 2018.

⁴⁷ Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview; Dutch Ministry of Defense. *MIVD Jaarverslag 2016*, 6.

⁴⁸ Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview.

⁴⁹ Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, personal interview by author, The Hague, NL, 31 August 2018.

⁵⁰ Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview; Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview, Copenhagen DNK, 03 September 2018.

issues, combined with the intelligence services limited capabilities, national leaders must provide clear requirements.⁵¹

To effectively deal with contemporary conflicts, national leaders need intelligence about the plans and intentions of malicious actors, as well as the local perceptions about security situations. During the Cold War, mostly a bipolar security arrangement, the intelligence requirements were much more defined and easier to target and collect, given the nature of the key issues; i.e., the location of critical military and diplomatic installations. However, the current threats or priorities, especially counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, are much more challenging intelligence issues because of their transnational, diffused nature, thus making them increasingly difficult to identify and penetrate.

Nowadays, states' intelligence services also need to focus on information about the motives and future goals of competitors and their influence on local perceptions through, for example, information warfare.⁵² As stated by the head of secret operations within the Dutch MISS and the deputy director DDIS, the necessity of intelligence concerning adversaries' intentions and local perceptions have increased in the post-Cold War period.⁵³ Intelligence about physical threat manifestations, malicious actors' intentions, and local perceptions are necessary ingredients for an adequate intelligence picture that state-level leaders need to counter security challenges. These are particularly difficult requirements for the intelligence services to address, especially given their current limitations.

National leaders require intelligence in all phases of national decision making, a process that is often neither linear nor sequential, and the next section assesses the national intelligence services' abilities to adequately provide the decision advantage required to effectively address these complicated security issues.

⁵¹ Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

⁵² Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview; Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview.

⁵³ Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview; Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview.

D. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS ARE NOT OPTIMIZED TO MEET NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Given the shifting national priorities and push for more independent intelligence capabilities, most small-state intelligence systems undoubtedly face significant challenges meeting these requirements, likely leading to significant intelligence gaps. Most notably, a variety of organizational and bureaucratic factors, the services lack of experience operating in denied areas, and insufficient resources and personnel represent the most significant challenges.

As noted in the introductory chapter, this study is focused on the Dutch and Danish military intelligence services, not the civilian intelligence organizations. Military intelligence services focus on areas outside their national borders and are seeking to enhance their intelligence capabilities to meet national requirements. European states maintain separate military and civil intelligence services. Generally, there is also a division between intelligence and police, but these divisions have blurred.⁵⁴ The intelligence services use their capabilities to collect information based on the intelligence requirements that are assigned to them by interdepartmental steering groups or committees.⁵⁵ This framework prioritizes policy maker requirements and assigns them to the appropriate intelligence services.

A small European state's military intelligence service is typically part of the ministry or department of Defense (see Figure 1) and has its own tasks, means, and methods to fulfill national intelligence requirements. Military intelligence services, contrary to actors outside the state intelligence system, are authorized to apply specific powers. Regulated by a constitutional framework that provides the legal ground, these intelligence

⁵⁴ Bob de Graaff and James M. Nyce, *The Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), xxxix.

⁵⁵ Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, FaceTime interview.

entities are allowed to undertake covert and intrusive intelligence operations.⁵⁶ Furthermore, military intelligence services with their functionalities—HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT etc.—are focused on foreign regions of national interest, reflecting senior leaders’ strategic requirements. To reduce risk to mission and force, a military intelligence service operates from the outside in, which means that it seeks answers to strategic intelligence requirements preferably through an indirect approach and from the greatest (physical) distance possible.⁵⁷ The intelligence services employ HUMINT only as a last resort because such employments are resource intensive and risky. Because small European intelligence services work on a myriad of taskings while contending with limited resources, they presently struggle to meet national intelligence requirements.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview; Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, FaceTime interview; Overheid.nl | Wetten.nl, s.v. “Wet Op De Inlichtingen- En Veiligheidsdiensten 2017,” accessed September 12, 2018, <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0039896/2018-05-01>

⁵⁷ Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

⁵⁸ Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.




Figure 1. Position of Dutch and Danish Military Intelligence Services within their organizations

In addition to the military intelligence services, policy makers often leverage information from a variety of diplomatic and non-government organizations,⁵⁹ creating an ecosystem with myriad actors providing information.⁶⁰ Since there is no clear hierarchical structure within the ecosystem, where actors are interconnected and opportunistically interact with one another (see Figure 2), information by non-state actors is provided on a voluntary, ad-hoc basis. This results in the underutilization of unique information from

⁵⁹ Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, and Safety and Justice. *Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering: De Nederlandse Visie op een Samenhangende Inzet op Veiligheid en Stabiliteit in Fragiele Staten en Conflictgebieden* (The Hague, NL, 2014), 14, <https://www.tweedekamer.nl/downloads/document?id=dee338c4-f5b9-45a6-9eca-164b16bb7acc&title=leidraad%20ge%C3%AFntegreerde%20benadering.%20de%20nederlandse%20visie%20op%20een%20samenhangende%20inzet%20opveiligheid%20en%20stabiliteit%20in%20fragiele%20staten%20en%20conflictgebieden.pdf>.

⁶⁰ The concept of the system of actors providing information for national decision making as ecosystem came from Lcol Nooij, Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF regiment.

Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, personal interviews, Roosendaal, NL, 27 and 30 August 2018.

sources with good placement and access.⁶¹ The global network of state actors for early warning, such as embassies and consulates of small European states, similar to those of the Netherlands and Denmark, is inadequate and needs reinforcements.⁶²




Figure 2. Ecosystem of Actors Providing Information for National Decision Making Concerning a Region of National Interest, Including the State Intelligence System.

This official and non-official intelligence structure is characterized by a lack of cooperation between the different information providers within the ecosystem, compartmentalization, and unintended bureaucratic rigidity, likely contributing to “blind spots” that could lead to intelligence failures. According to a 2005 study conducted by an intelligence and security research group appointed by the Dutch department of Defense, Dutch military intelligence organizations did not have the capacity to independently collect

⁶¹ Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

⁶² De Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, *Veiligheid in een Wereld van Verbindingen: Een Strategische Visie op het Defensiebeleid* (The Hague, NL: WRR, 2017), 12, 133, 181, <https://www.wrr.nl/binaries/wrr/documenten/rapporten/2017/05/10/veiligheid-in-een-wereld-van-verbindingen/R098-Veiligheid-in-een-wereld-van-verbindingen.pdf>.

all information necessary for national security. They increasingly needed other partners, national and international, with whom to cooperate, collaborate, and exchange information.⁶³ Due to their scarce resources, intelligence services require effective cooperation with other national information collectors. More cooperation and collaboration will also result in a wider range of different perspectives that can be incorporated into the intelligence product. According to Barbara Gray, collaboration is “a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible.”⁶⁴ Intelligence that is created from a wide spectrum of available insights will more likely approach the genuine local security situation.⁶⁵ Through cooperation, collaboration, and exchange of information, all participants of the transaction will improve their information positions, resulting in better intelligence for policymakers.⁶⁶

Furthermore, intelligence services and other information providers often have divergent interests and primarily operate in a compartmentalized manner,⁶⁷ potentially undermining cooperation and information sharing.⁶⁸ These compartmentalized approaches together with resource scarcity and inadequate integration within the ecosystem result in a suboptimal national intelligence picture.⁶⁹ As stated by the Dutch head of the department of Secret Operations, it is essential that all identified signals and indicators are integrated.⁷⁰

⁶³ Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie. *Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie*, 148.

⁶⁴ Barbara Gray, *Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems* (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1999), 5.

⁶⁵ De Graaff and Nyce, *The Handbook of European Intelligence Cultures*, xlii.

⁶⁶ Dutch Ministry of Defense. MIVD Jaarverslag 2017 (The Hague, NL: MIVD, 2018), 43, <https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/jaarverslagen/2018/04/26/jaarverslag-mivd-2017>

⁶⁷ Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

⁶⁸ Derek Lothringer et al., “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Preliminary Field Study in Improving Collaboration” (Master’s capstone, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 21-22, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/48551>.

⁶⁹ Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview; Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

⁷⁰ Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

Intelligence services, together with the other actors in the ecosystem, must strive for a more integrated perspective.⁷¹ To generate new facts and optimize intelligence products, information providers need to associate information with other known data in the area of operations and integrate it into a whole.⁷² Unified efforts will generate integrated, higher-quality intelligence that will better feed into national objectives.

The military intelligence services, moreover, struggle with unintended bureaucratic inflexibility due to their size, structure, and multiple standing operating procedures, which likely will hamper their ability to meet the evolving intelligence requirements.⁷³ Frequently, intelligence services have invested in reinforcing existing functional compartments instead of creating new or different capabilities or functionalities,⁷⁴ resulting in rigid organizational approaches that prevent intelligence services from swiftly adapting to adversaries' opportunistic security shifts. As adversaries capitalize on this inflexibility, they also exploit changing circumstances to advance their objectives.⁷⁵ This unintended bureaucratic inflexibility limits the services' ability to quickly adjust to shifting circumstances and generate optimal intelligence products.

In addition to the organizational challenges, the military intelligence services tend to lack the requisite experience to operate in denied areas and have insufficient resources and personnel to meet national intelligence requirements. Given the nature of these requirements, military intelligence services must enhance operations in denied areas; however, they lack adequate capabilities to operate in these areas, according to the 2005 research and the head of plans within the Dutch Army SOF regiment.⁷⁶ While intelligence

⁷¹ Head of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

⁷² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Intelligence*, JP 2-0 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), I-16, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2_0.pdf

⁷³ De Graaff, "De Nederlandse Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten: Nooit te Oud om te Leren," 261.

⁷⁴ Team leader Strategic Warning and Intelligence Response Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

⁷⁵ De Graaff, "De Nederlandse Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdiensten: Nooit te Oud om te Leren," 261.

⁷⁶ Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie. *Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie*, 30-31, 86, 124, 198, 202-203; Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

services are capable of successfully handling their human sources, they need skill sets to access and operate in denied areas and deal with any contingencies found in these areas.⁷⁷ Skill sets such as weapons handling, fire and maneuver, and medical first aid are necessary to conduct intelligence operations in these denied areas; however, small European state intelligence services currently do not adequately possess them.⁷⁸ To address these shortcoming, the military intelligence services require significant training by personnel with experience operating in hostile environments. Moreover, the military intelligence services, already struggling to meet the enhanced operational tempo since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, will need more personnel to fulfill the burgeoning intelligence requirements.⁷⁹

The cumulative effect of the organizational and operational challenges facing the military services result in intelligence “blind spots,” which for this study are defined as geographical or functional areas policy makers are concerned about, but that the current small-states’ intelligence capacities and capabilities cannot adequately cover; specifically, with HUMINT, but also other types of intelligence, e.g. OSINT, SIGINT etc. Intelligence blind spots exist in areas with and without national representation such as embassies and consulates and denied areas, requiring strategies to augment intelligence capabilities. The existence of these blind spots hampers national leaders’ knowledge of critical areas, significantly increasing the potential for intelligence failures.

To summarize, the key challenges to small-state intelligence services are:

- Organizational issues, including lack of cooperation and the need for, specifically, national information providers, compartmentalization, and bureaucratic rigidity.
- Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas.

⁷⁷ Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview; Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF Regiment and former senior Leader of the Department of Secret Operations Dutch Military Intelligence and Security Service, interview.

⁷⁸ Commander Dutch Special Operations Command, interview.

⁷⁹ Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie. *Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie*, 30-31, 72, 198-199.

- Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence requirements.
- Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the above-mentioned challenges.

Given the imperative of meeting intelligence requirements, and considering the current military intelligence services’ limitations, the next chapter will assess SOF’s potential ability to address these challenges, augment current intelligence capabilities, and minimize “blind spots” that could lead to intelligence failure.

III. ANALYZING THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES’ OPTIONS TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC INFORMATION COLLECTION

SOF’s greatest value to the Nation...lies in [their] global perspective, coupled with the ability to act early with partners to ... create decision space and strategic options for National Leadership.

—Joseph L. Votel, Commander USSOCOM.⁸⁰

Chapter II examined the intelligence system of small European states and determined that the military intelligence services have both capacity and capability shortfalls. Furthermore, a rigid and compartmentalized intelligence system limits cooperation and creates blind spots that prevent a deeper understanding of the dynamics in critical areas. Though SOF potentially can fulfill a constructive role, organizational challenges such as compartmentalization and bureaucratic rigidity within intelligence services, go beyond SOF’s ability to resolve. SOF with their unique capabilities and their familiarity with information gathering operations might be able to contribute to the following challenges: (1) Need for additional information providers; (2) Lack of operational flexibility within the information ecosystem; (3) Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas; (4) Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence requirements; (5) Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the aforementioned challenges. This chapter begins with a review of SOF characteristics that suggest small European states’ SOF are suitable strategic information collectors. Then it analyzes three distinct options by which SOF can potentially strengthen the collection of information, and assesses each option.

⁸⁰ USSOCOM, Directorate of Force Management and Development Concept Development and Integration Office. *Special Operations Forces Operating Concept: A Whitepaper to Guide Special Operations Force Development*, 2016 (Tampa, Florida).

A. SOF CHARACTERISTICS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC INFORMATION COLLECTION

SOF have the potential to support the intelligence system, but are neither the *Silver Bullet* nor the *Golden Hammer*⁸¹ solution. Nonetheless, SOF remain a highly trained and flexible instrument that can operate under the most difficult circumstances.

1. Characteristics that Make SOF Suitable as Information Collectors

SOF are engaged in information collection at the tactical level when executing Special Reconnaissance (SR) missions. Furthermore, NATO SOF doctrine defines a number of SOF characteristics highlighting a potential role for collecting strategic information in denied areas. The following list presents several of these characteristics:

- Special operations are normally conducted in uncertain, hostile, or politically sensitive environments to create effects that support achievement of strategic or operational objectives. These operations may be conducted using discreet or covert capabilities/techniques and require mature and highly trained operators.⁸²
- Special operations are joint by nature and can be conducted independently or in conjunction with other forces. They may include combined and interagency operations with or through indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations can produce political, psychological, informational or economic impacts.⁸³
- The successful conduct of special operations relies on individual and small unit proficiency in a multitude of specialized, often unconventional

⁸¹ Silver Bullet: a simple and seemingly magical solution to a long-standing and complicated problem; Golden Hammer: excessive dependence on a specific tool to perform many different functions.

⁸² NATO, *Doctrine for Special Operations Forces*, Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.5 (Belgium: 2014).

⁸³ Ibid.

operational skills applied with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation, by self-reliant operators.⁸⁴

- SOF can operate independently in small groups for extended periods, and the command and Control (C2) structure of SOF enables them to operate disconnected from higher headquarters, in flexible and task-oriented structures.⁸⁵
- Older and more experienced special operators possess a calmness and composure that enables them to collect strategic-level information in both denied and permissive areas.

SOF can be employed across the peace-war continuum in support of tactical, operational, and strategic level collection in both permissive and denied areas. As stated by the head of plans within the Dutch Army SOF, “contrary to other strategic information collectors who have to depart an area of national interest if it turns hostile, SOF have the skill sets to function in denied and politically sensitive areas, gathering valuable information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain.”⁸⁶ Additionally, SOF typically work with other military entities and civilian organizations, and can even work under the command and control of non-military organizations. Furthermore, SOF’s small footprint significantly limits unintended effects and risks.

Conducting information-gathering or intelligence missions demand additional skill sets and a different mindset from most doctrinal NATO SOF tasks. The selection of experienced and mature operators who have the ability to blend into the operational environment is essential. SOF operators—with additional training— will possess the skills and intellect to be information collectors and produce the needed information for analysts at higher headquarters.⁸⁷ In other words, SOF’s personnel, organizational flexibility,

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Head of Plans Dutch Army SOF. Personal Interview. AUG/SEP 2018.

⁸⁷ Commander Danish Special Operations Command, Interview 04 September 2018.

regional expertise, interpersonal communication skills, and knowledge of interagency processes, make them a force capable of information collection to contribute to the national decision-making in small European countries.

2. Potential SOF Intelligence Tasks.

As stated in Chapter I, the Danish and Dutch areas of interests in the Middle East and North African regions are characterized by instability and the presence of armed groups that are not necessarily under government control. The military intelligence services are hampered by a lack of paramilitary capabilities to operate in these areas, which limits their information collection. The following is an incomplete list of possible activities that SOF can conduct in support of the military intelligence services to enhance knowledge about denied areas:

- Help the military intelligence services build capabilities to operate in denied areas.
- Provide situational awareness for other actors within the information ecosystem based on knowledge gained from being on the ground during missions in foreign regions.
- Select safe houses and develop the security infrastructure to support intelligence officers.
- Help the intelligence services in the identification and recruitment of HUMINT sources.
- Contribute to SIGINT, IMINT, GEOINT, and other technical intelligence operations by assisting in emplacing technical devices in denied areas using overt, covert, or discreet means.
- Support a wide range of intelligence operations to confirm or deny assumptions or information collected by other means within the information ecosystem.

In addition to supporting the military intelligence services, SOF can potentially operate as an independent entity outside the current intelligence system so long as they are linked into the intelligence network, and thereby contribute to the information ecosystem in ways that may address the challenges identified in chapter II (see page 24–26). Through a (semi-)permanent presence⁸⁸ in regions of national interest, SOF can obtain situational awareness and gather information revealing the “ground truth” or gain the perspective of the locals and derive their perceptions of reality. In turn, SOF can potentially glimpse adversaries’ future intentions and thereby contribute to generating more foresight for national decision-making. The (semi-) permanent presence within a local area, contributes to greater cognizance of indigenous conditions, and thereby adds to the foresight necessary to effectively deal with emerging security issues. By maintaining a local presence, SOF can identify critical local power brokers, their potential vulnerabilities, and the psychological factors shaping their perceptions and behavior.⁸⁹ Through strong regional relationships, SOF can contribute to a national-level situational awareness of indigenous perspectives and future developments. Additionally, to generate an intelligence picture as genuine as possible, states should view the regions of national interest from as many different perspectives as possible. Utilizing SOF’s unique network and capabilities will provide additional insights based on a deeper understanding of the regional security situation. Moreover, congruent with statements in the *Strategische Monitor 2017–2018* from The Hague Center for Strategic Studies and The Clingendael Institute, through (semi)permanent presence without making a clear distinction between strategic and tactical information, SOF will be able to continuously scan, monitor, and report security developments in that region to create national-level decision space.⁹⁰ In short, because of their unique capabilities to support the military intelligence services and an ability to operate independently within the information ecosystem, SOF have the potential to

⁸⁸ Forward-deployment of SOF without necessarily being permanently present in an area.

⁸⁹ USSOCOM; *Operating in the Human Domain*, 2015 (Tampa, Florida: 2015), 12–14.

⁹⁰ Stephan De Spiegeleire, Kars De Bruijne, Frank Bekkers, Minke Meijnders, and Tim Sweijts. *Strategische Monitor 2017–2018: Stilte voor de Storm?* The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies/ Clingendael Institute, 2018, 2–4, 9, 69–70. <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/strategische-monitor-2017-2018>.

significantly counter the identified intelligence challenges defined in Chapter II (see pages 24–26).

B. DESCRIBING AND ANALYZING THE SOF OPTIONS

A significant part of the research for this capstone focused on obtaining a valid basis for how SOF can support national intelligence collection. In 2017, the Dutch minister of Defense promoted SOF's relevance in generating adequate information, together with other strategic actors, in the pre-conflict phase to prevent the escalation of conflicts.⁹¹ During their research, the authors forged three options and vetted them during interviews with senior leaders in the Dutch and Danish SOF communities. The authors furthermore introduced the options to leaders in the Dutch and Danish military intelligence services, all of whom confirmed their validity. The following sections describe and analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the *Train and Advise*, *Integrated Support*, and *Independent Entity* options in terms of their ability to address the previously identified challenges in the current information ecosystem. The analysis uses five selection criteria: Efficient & Effective, Command & Control, Suitability, Availability, and Sustainability to assess each option. The analysis and assessments is done by the authors based on their collective judgement derived from decades of experience as special operators. Furthermore, the options are not mutually exclusive. When applicable, national leaders can use SOF under all three options simultaneously.

1. The Proposed Options

SOF can address the defined challenges by any one of the following options: 1) *Train and Advise*, 2) *Integrated Support*, and 3) *Independent Entity*. The options are significantly different, but in practice, there will be overlaps. Likewise, the options are all scalable relative to the availability of SOF.

⁹¹ Dutch Ministry of Defence. *Houvast in een Onzekere Wereld: Lijnen van Ontwikkeling in het Meerjarig Perspectief Voor een Duurzame Gerede en Snel Inzetbare Krijgsmacht*. (The Hague, NL), 2017. 21. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2017/02/14/meerjarig-perspectief-krijgsmacht-houvast-in-een-onzekere-wereld>.

a. *Option One—Train and Advise the Military Intelligence Services*

The Train and Advise option seeks to support the creation of paramilitary capabilities within the military intelligence services, and thus enable them to operate in denied areas. SOF will contribute to this enhancement through the “Train and Advise” concept, which is well-known to SOF. Based on this concept, SOF will train and advise existing intelligence officers or newly recruited intelligence officers to operate in areas under enemy or unfriendly control. The concept will teach intelligence officers the rudimentary skills of SOF, such as weapons handling, fire and maneuver, and medical first aid.⁹² The support is conducted on a case-by-case basis and the skills imparted will enable intelligence officers at minimum cost. The support will not require any change to the C2 structure of either the intelligence services or SOF. Moreover, the legal authorities to execute this option are also already in place. Figure 3 depicts the outside support delivered by SOF to the military intelligence services, enabling them to build a paramilitary capability.




Figure 3. Option 1—Train and Advise.

⁹² Danish SOF has previously provided this type of support to the Intelligence Community

b. Option Two—Integrated Support

The Integrated Support option can integrate SOF into the structure of the military intelligence services, under their command and control, and working under their mandate to support operations in denied areas. In this option, SOF is a part of the military intelligence services, enabling their intelligence operations in denied areas. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (see p. 19) an interdepartmental steering group is already in place to task and supervise the intelligence services including, in this option, SOF. Furthermore, within the intelligence system, the statutory authority to conduct intelligence operations is also already in place, providing not only the intelligence services, but also SOF the legal ground to conduct information gathering missions. To avoid too much dependence on the knowledge of intelligence case officers concerning proper ways to integrate SOF into intelligence operations, both the military intelligence services and SOF must develop a clear understanding on how to use SOF in these operations. In this option, SOF should not be used poorly, providing only force protection for intelligence personnel operating in denied areas. They must be deeply integrated into the information collection process in ways determined by the designated intelligence officer. Moreover, in this option, SOF can also contribute to functional areas of intelligence operations by, for example, discretely or covertly emplacing technical devices (SIGINT/ IMINT) as a part of the overall intelligence mission. In addition, SOF can select safe houses and help the case officer with the identification and recruitment of HUMINT sources. Even though the described support is, to some extent, within the capabilities of SOF, it will most likely require supplementary education and training for the deployed SOF operators, and it will require SOF to select operators that fit the job or mission profile. Figure 4 depicts SOF being integrated into the military intelligence service.




Figure 4. Option 2—Integrated Support.

c. Option Three—Independent Entity

The Independent Entity option utilizes SOF as an independent actor collecting information. In this option, a currently non-existing, interdepartmental steering group should be created to direct SOF's information collection operations to meet national intelligence requirements. This overarching group tasks SOF. To be clear, the group directs operations but it does not command nor control SOF nor the military intelligence services. Both remain under military command and control. At minimum, this group must understand all of the intelligence requirements and SOF capabilities to properly task SOF. Only with this knowledge can this group effectively harmonize intelligence operations for the military intelligence services and SOF. Another issue that needs attention in this option is the statutory authority for SOF to conduct information collection operations in foreign regions. Currently, there are two ways in which small-state SOF can independently operate to collect information: mandated missions or mission readiness exercises such as

Flintlock.⁹³ These two options are insufficient and do not provide SOF the adequate legal authority to conduct information gathering operations in regions of national interest.

As an independent information provider SOF enriches the information ecosystem and thereby national decision making. Moreover, SOF can operate more independently in small groups for extended periods in an austere environment. In this option, SOF is scalable and can, as an example, be utilized to confirm or deny information collected by other intelligence assets. This option often requires a (semi-)permanent SOF presence in an area of national interest reducing SOF's availability for other missions. Through presence, SOF can identify social networks, prominent community influencers and their vulnerabilities, and the local perception of legitimacy. In short, SOF can act as "global scouts" and thus provide decision-makers with strategic insight. This concept has previously been utilized by Belgian SOF.⁹⁴ Figure 5 depicts SOF as an independent entity within the information ecosystem alongside the military intelligence service and the other actors.

⁹³ Head of Commander Advisory Group NLSOCOM, personal interview; Flintlock is an annual regional exercise among African, allied and U.S. counterterrorism forces, directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and sponsored by U.S. Africa Command. Exercise Flintlock is designed to foster regional cooperation to enable African partners to stabilize regions of North and West Africa, while reducing sanctuary and support for violent extremist organizations

⁹⁴ Pierre D. "Sovereignty and Complexity: Strategic Sense for SOF Operations in Niger." (Unpublished article, last modified, 2018.) PDF file.




Figure 5. Option 3—Independent Entity

2. Analyzing the Options

The following sections define the selection criteria and uses matrices to highlight the main advantages and disadvantages of the three options.

a. Selection Criteria

Partially based on feedback obtained from interviewees, who also verified the validity of the three options, the authors chose and defined five selection criteria previously identified and defined in Chapter II:

1. **Efficient and effective:** Efficiency is defined as achieving maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense. In comparison, effectiveness is defined as success in producing a desired or intended result.
2. **Command and Control (C2):** U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines it as “The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the

accomplishment of the mission.”⁹⁵ Nevertheless, command and control can be separated and the definition of command is authority and responsibility, and control a steering and supervisory function.

3. **Suitability:** Suitability is defined as the quality of being right or appropriate for a particular purpose, situation, task, or mission. The definition also includes speed of implementation.
4. **Availability:** Defined as the availability of personnel, equipment, and facilities with regards to specific ways in which SOF can be employed.
5. **Sustainability:** The ability to maintain a certain rate or level of capacity and capabilities, and avoiding depletion of resources. The definition also includes avoiding mission creep that may undermine standing NATO SOF responsibilities.

b. Analyzing Advantages and Disadvantages

Based on the identified challenges and gaps within the intelligence ecosystem, specifically within the military intelligence services, the following section analyzes and lists the advantages and disadvantages of the three options using the selection criteria.

The identified intelligence challenges and gaps are: (1) Need for more cooperation and additional information providers; (2) Bureaucratic rigidity (inflexibility); (3) Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas; (4) Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence requirements; (5) Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the aforementioned challenges and gaps.

The following tables highlight the main advantages and disadvantages when analyzing the three options. The analysis starts with the identified challenges and gaps, and then applies the selection criteria to determine the advantages and disadvantages.

⁹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), <http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2018-09-28-100314-687>

Table 1. Advantages and Disadvantages When Option 1 is Analyzed Using the Selection Criteria.

Option 1—Train & Advise Military Intelligence Services

Challenges & Gaps	Selection Criteria	Advantages	Disadvantages
1) Need for additional information providers	<i>The option does not address this gap</i>		
2) Lack of operational flexibility	<i>The option does not address this gap</i>		
3) Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas	<i>Effective & Efficient</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Least costly option for SOF because it is within SOF's capabilities and requires a minimum of SOF capacity. - Facilities already in place to support the option. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unknown whether the current intelligence officers coming from a different organizational culture and different way of operating will be able to gain the skill sets needed to operate in denied areas. - Operating in denied areas require skill sets that take time to develop. - Does not address systemic issues.
	<i>Command & Control</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No change in C2. Support will be conducted on a case-by-case basis. - The analytical capacity/capability already exists within the military intelligence services. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No unity of command between trainer (SOF) and the military intelligence services.
	<i>Suitability (speed of implementation)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military Intel services will be able to work in denied areas. - SOF and the military intelligence service can implement this option very fast. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unknown whether the current intelligence officers coming from a different organizational culture and different way of operating will be able to gain the skill sets needed to operate in denied areas. - Intelligence personnel capable to operate in denied areas will take considerable time.
	<i>Availability</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SOF is currently available, and it is assessed that this option will not exceed SOF availability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Since not under same C2, if SOF is occupied conducting other operations, this option may not be feasible. - This option will mainly be launched on a case-by-case basis, and therefore relies heavily on SOF availability.
	<i>Sustainability</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Expected to require a minimum of SOF involvement, and therefore sustainable. - Over the long haul, military intelligence services may have 	

Challenges & Gaps	Selection Criteria	Advantages	Disadvantages
		their own trainers and SOF support will no longer be necessary.	
4) Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence requirements	<i>The option does not address this gap</i>		
5) Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the above-mentioned challenges	<i>Efficient & effective</i>	- Training intelligence officers to work in denied areas will enhance their ability to cover the blind spots.	- The capacity of the military intelligence services will not increase, which limits the effectiveness of this option.
	<i>Command & Control</i>	SOF are not a part of the intelligence C2 structure in this option. Support is given on a case-by-case basis.	
	<i>Suitability (speed of implementation)</i>	- The option can be implemented immediately.	- Adequately covering blind spots will take considerable time.
	<i>Availability</i>	- Limited resources required for SOF to train and advise the military intel services. High availability.	
	<i>Sustainability</i>	- If SOF have excess capacity, the support can be easily sustained.	- Since SOF and the military intelligence service are two different organizations, this can potentially cause the support to be terminated due to other priorities.

Table 2. Advantages and Disadvantages When Option 2 is Analyzed Using the Selection Criteria.

Option 2—Integrated Support

Challenges & Gaps	Selection Criteria	Advantages	Disadvantages
1) Need for additional information providers	Efficient & effective	- Integrated SOF expand the numbers of information providers.	- SOF must achieve proficiency (new skill sets) in HUMINT operations through effective selection, education, and training which will take additional time.
	Command & Control	- SOF will operate under the C2 of the military intelligence services. - Unity of command and effort.	- The intelligence requirements will be directed from the existing system. - Limited SOF perspective/insight due to integration within military intelligence service.
	Suitability (speed of implementation)	- SOF can select, train, and educate SOF information collectors to ensure proficiency.	- It will require additional training for SOF to be proficient.
	Availability	- The availability of SOF depends on excess capacity or repurposing SOF.	- SOF have ongoing assigned tasks. This option may undermine ongoing SOF missions.
	Sustainability	- With excess capacity within SOF this option can be sustained.	
2) Lack of operational flexibility	Efficient & effective	- SOF can expand the numbers of information providers and thus enhance flexibility.	- SOF must achieve proficiency (new skill sets) in HUMINT operations through effective selection, education, and training which will take additional time.
	Command & Control	- SOF will operate under the C2 of the military intelligence services. - Unity of command and effort, resulting in more flexibility between SOF and military intelligence service	- The intelligence requirements will be directed from the existing system. No new perspective.
	Suitability (speed of implementation)	- SOF can learn from the intelligence officers which will increase the speed of implementation.	- SOF will integrate into an existing bureaucracy which can hamper SOF's flexibility.
	Availability	- The availability of SOF depends on excess capacity or repurposing SOF.	- SOF have ongoing assigned tasks.
	Sustainability	- With excess capacity this option can be sustained.	
3) Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas	<i>Efficient & effective</i>	- SOF have the skill set to work in denied areas. - SOF operators are often mature individuals with the	- Intel officer will require training on SOF capabilities and limitations.

Challenges & Gaps	Selection Criteria	Advantages	Disadvantages
		ability to adapt to the circumstances. - Minimum training required to implement this option. - SOF can increase the information collection in denied areas.	
	<i>Command & Control</i>	- Unity of command and control which facilitates operations.	- The intelligence requirements will be directed from the existing system. No new perspective.
	<i>Suitability</i> (speed of implementation)	- Analytical capacity already in place. - SOF can operate under existing intelligence statutory authority which will increase the speed of implementation. - By observing intelligence officers and on the job training SOF can learn the skills needed to operate as information collectors.	- The full potential of this option depends on the case manager using SOF to their full potential. - Intel officer will require training on SOF capabilities and limitations.
	<i>Availability</i>	- If SOF have excess capacity, the resources can quickly be used to help IS work in denied areas.	- Risk of mission creep for SOF.
	<i>Sustainability</i>	- With excess capacity this option can be sustained.	- Since SOF and the military intelligence service are two different organizations, this can potentially cause the support to be terminated due to other priorities.
4) Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence requirements	<i>Efficient & effective</i>	- SOF provides more personnel. - Can be implemented on relatively short notice. - Moderate cost if SOF has excess capacity.	- SOF must possess the skill set to conduct the clandestine/discrete operations which might require additional training.
	<i>Command & Control</i>	- Unity of command and control because SOF are integrated into the military intelligence services.	- Possible misuse of SOF.
	<i>Suitability</i> (speed of implementation)	- Analytical capacity already in place. - Will enhance the military intelligence services coverage of blind spots. - SOF can also increase capacity.	- Intelligence officer know how to utilize SOF's full potential. - SOF operators must have the proper characteristics, training, and skillsets to enable and conduct these types of intelligence operations. They need to fit the mission's profile.
	<i>Availability</i>	- If SOF have excess capacity, using SOF will not affect other SOF missions.	- SOF are a scarce resource with ongoing NATO tasks. Prioritization of effort required.

Challenges & Gaps	Selection Criteria	Advantages	Disadvantages
	<i>Sustainability</i>	- Can be sustained if excess capacity exists.	- The support can potentially be terminated due to other SOF priorities.
5) Intelligence “blind spots” as a result of the above-mentioned challenges	<i>Efficient & effective</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Using the full potential of SOF under a knowledgeable intelligence officer will be cost effective - If the military intelligence services are strengthened numerically, SOF can support a more persistent presence in denied areas. - Minimum training required to implement this option. 	- Intel officer must understand SOF capabilities, which will require training on SOF capabilities and limitations.
	<i>Command & Control</i>	- Unity of command and control	
	<i>Suitability</i> (speed of implementation)	- If SOF can work “independently” under an intelligence officer. This option has potential to cover blind spots.	- SOF operators need to have the proper characteristics, mindset, and skill sets to conduct these operations.
	<i>Availability</i>	- The availability of SOF depends on excess capacity or repurposing SOF	- SOF are a scarce resource with ongoing NATO tasks.
	<i>Sustainability</i>	- If SOF have excess capacity, the support can be sustained.	- Since SOF and the military intelligence service are two different organizations, this can potentially cause the support to be terminated due to other priorities.

Table 3. Advantages and Disadvantages When Option 3 is Analyzed Using the Selection Criteria.

Option 3—Independent Entity

Challenges & Gaps	Selection Criteria	Advantages	Disadvantages
1) Need for additional information providers	Efficient & effective	- Limited state actors (embassies) in denied and permissive areas. SOF can potentially contribute to collecting information in these areas.	- SOF must achieve proficiency (new skill sets) in HUMINT operations through effective selection, education, and training. - The creation of SOF as a strategic actor can be costly and take a considerable amount of time.
	Command & Control	- When operating as an independent entity, SOF can remain flexible and bring a new perspective to the ecosystem.	- Currently, there is no steering group that direct SOF in regards to info collection for national decision making. - An interdepartmental steering group to direct SOF must be created at the strategic level.
	Suitability (speed of implementation)	- SOF can select, train, and educate the information collectors to ensure proficiency. This may require intelligence services' assistance.	- Currently, no steering group to direct SOF. The implementation of such a group takes time. - SOF operators, as independent actors, need to possess both the tactical and strategic proficiency to conduct these information gathering operations.
	Availability	- The availability of SOF depends on excess capacity or repurposing SOF.	- SOF have ongoing assigned tasks.
	Sustainability		
2) Lack of operational flexibility	Efficient & effective	- SOF can expand the numbers of information providers and thus enhance flexibility. - SOF will operate independently and thus not be hampered by intelligence services' bureaucracy.	- Flexibility between SOF and the military intelligence services is lost due to the absence of unity of command.
	Command & Control	- SOF are able to operate from normal C2 structures.	- Currently, no steering mechanism to direct SOF, and implementation of such mechanism takes time. - This option will require significantly more coordination and deconfliction between the Intelligence services and SOF to prevent "intelligence failures," thereby reducing tactical flexibility of SOF.
	Suitability (speed of implementation)	- SOF can work proactively to identify emerging threats by being a (semi-)permanent presence in regions of national interest.	- Currently, the legal authority for SOF to work as an independent entity is not clear. - There is political risk in having SOF working proactively in denied areas.

Challenges & Gaps	Selection Criteria	Advantages	Disadvantages
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Determination of the statutory authority for SOF can be time consuming. - Creation of a steering mechanism to direct SOF outside the military intelligence services will most likely take time.
	Availability	- If SOF have excess capacity, this option can be executed within given resources.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SOF have ongoing missions. - SOF are a scarce resource, mission prioritization is needed.
	Sustainability	- SOF have the number of personnel and logistical support to sustain a (semi-)permanent presence in regions of national interest.	- Prolonged (semi-)permanent presence might reduce SOF's capacity to do other tasks.
3) Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas	Efficient & effective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SOF are tactically proficient to operate in denied areas. - SOF can increase the information collection in denied areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Requirement to develop proper legal authority for SOF to operate in denied areas for intelligence missions. - Absence of capabilities within SOF to provide essential prerequisites such as cover for identity and action, and to analyze collected information.
	Command & Control		
	Suitability (speed of implementation)		
	Availability		
	Sustainability		
4) Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence requirements	The option will not strengthen the capacity within the military intelligence services. However, using SOF as an independent entity will increase the overall capacity to collect strategic information.		
5) Intelligence "blind spots" as a result of the above-mentioned challenges	Efficient & effective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In permissive areas use mission readiness exercises or ongoing missions to employ SOF in uncovered regions. - Where the intelligence services lack resources in their functional areas, SOF can conduct HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, etc. - SOF can contribute to the intelligence picture to help operationalize preventive and integrated approaches. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To maintain proficiency SOF must educate and train for Intel tasks and evolve into being both efficient and effective in collecting information from permissive and denied areas. SOF personnel must evolve from a traditional SOF operator to an effective strategic level information collector. For example, SOF must: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Know the roles of NGOs and interagency. • Gain regional and cultural knowledge. Gain cross-cultural and interpersonal communication skills.

Challenges & Gaps	Selection Criteria	Advantages	Disadvantages
		- Through (semi-)permanent presence, SOF can acquire information.	
	Command & Control	- SOF will work under C2 of SOCOM, which will ensure unity of command and effort.	- Currently, no system to direct and supervise SOF for strategic level info collection. - The creation of such a system can take considerable time. - Integrating SOF collected information may be difficult.
	Suitability (speed of implementation)	- SOF are flexible and thus are able to cover the blind spots.	- Currently, no steering mechanism to direct SOF. Implementation of such a mechanism takes time.
	Availability	- The availability of SOF depends on excess capacity or repurposing SOF.	- SOF have ongoing missions. - Risk of mission creep.
	Sustainability	- SOF have the personnel and logistical support to sustain a (semi-)permanent presence in regions of national interest.	- Prolonged (semi-)permanent presence might drain SOF's capacity to do other tasks.

3. Prerequisite Factors Affecting the Results of the Analysis

The preceding matrices highlight the advantages and disadvantages of the various options but there are other factors that affect the results of the analysis. Clarification of these factors enable a sound assessment of the options in Chapter IV.

a. Direction, Processing, and Dissemination

The analysis focuses on how SOF can support national-level information collection. However, to utilize the independent entity option (option 3) requires that processing and dissemination mechanisms must be ironed out to enable a smoothly running intelligence cycle.⁹⁶ To use SOF as an independent entity to support national decision-making seems easy, but in practice it is likely to prove complex. The creation of an interdepartmental steering group with knowledge of national intelligence requirements and capabilities is needed to ensure SOF information missions are properly directed. This interdepartmental group must ensure that SOF operate in conjunction with other intelligence instruments in the system. In practice, the national SOCOM will retain command and control and the interdepartmental steering group will task and direct SOF information collection missions under option 3. Currently, such an interdepartmental steering group does not exist in Denmark nor in the Netherlands. However, to achieve the harmonization needed to effectively utilize SOF as an independent entity within the informational ecosystem, the authors see the creation of such an overarching authority as imperative. While building the structure needed for SOF to operate effectively within the current and future security environments, SOF's operational flexibility within this structure must be maintained. Furthermore, due to a lack of analytical capacity within SOF, decision makers must determine how the collected information will be processed and disseminated. To whom should SOF pass the information and how will future intelligence products be disseminated? Currently, only one option to ensure that SOF collected information contribute to the creation of a better overall intelligence picture exists. The information must be processed and disseminated by the military intelligence services.

⁹⁶ The Intelligence Cycle consists of Direction, Collection, Processing, and Dissemination.

b. Statutory Authority

Currently there are two legal ways in which SOF from the Netherlands or Denmark can obtain information independently.⁹⁷ The currently legal ways are:

- Mandated missions that allow for information collection in the area of operations as a part of force protection.
- Capacity-building exercises like Flintlock⁹⁸ that provide an opportunity to collect information through local partner units.

If one of these ways is not feasible then a new statutory authority for SOF information collecting missions is necessary. If SOF is integrated into the structure of the military intelligence services (option 2) then SOF can operate under their statutory authorities. The legal ground for utilizing the independent entity option (option 3) is problematic.

c. Denied (non-permissive) Areas vs. Permissive Areas

Whereas SOF, obviously, will conduct option one: *train and assist*, in their home countries, they can execute option two: *integrated support*, and option three: *independent entity*, in both permissive and non-permissive environments. Both environments have distinct characteristics. In a permissive environment, information providers such as SOF can operate in an open manner—overt. They have complete freedom of movement and action, and easy access to host nation (military) networks. In permissive environments, information collectors can operate under their own identity, conducting routine actions. They neither have to rely on sophisticated covers for identity nor for action.

Under non-permissive circumstances, information collectors are in constant danger of being “compromised,” risking the entire information collection mission. This forces collectors to operate “under the radar” clandestine or covertly, which significantly limits

⁹⁷ Deputy Director Danish Defense Intelligence Service, interview, Copenhagen, 03 September 2018.

⁹⁸ Flintlock is an annual regional exercise among African, allied and U.S. counterterrorism forces, directed by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff and sponsored by U.S. Africa Command. Exercise Flintlock is designed to foster regional cooperation to enable African partners to stabilize regions of North and West Africa, while reducing sanctuary and support for violent extremist organizations.

their freedom of movement and action. Moreover, when collectors are operating in the open, they cannot use their own identity while conducting covert or discrete information collection operations. They require sophisticated “covers” for identity and actions to operate in denied foreign regions. Information collecting organizations will require adequate knowledge and capabilities to develop and provide these “covers,” and maintain them before, during, and after the operation.

d. SOF Proficiency

Regardless of whether SOF are integrated into the military intelligence services (option 2) or operate as an independent entity (option 3), it is essential that SOF possess the capabilities to operate as a national level information providers. Operating as a strategic instrument, SOF must maintain relations and cooperation with other strategic actors such as ambassadors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, and NGOs. To operate under these circumstances, SOF operators need to possess additional skills. Not all SOF operators will be suitable for information collection missions. To maintain long-term proficiency, SOF need to select, educate and train individuals for this new mission. A trajectory must be in place that transforms selected SOF operators into experienced information collectors that match the needs of information missions. Figure 6 depicts desired characteristics and skill sets for such a transformation.




Figure 6. Trajectory from SOF Operator to Strategic Information Collector.

C. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS

SOF can help fill the intelligence shortfalls either through training of intelligence officers (option 1) or by integrating SOF into the military intelligence services (option 2). In addition, SOF can potentially operate independently outside the intelligence system (option 3) and thereby contribute to the information ecosystem. A narrative of each option’s advantages and disadvantages based on the preceding matrices is found in Chapter IV under “Research Findings” (see pp. 53–55).

IV. RESEARCH FINDINGS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

The primary objective of this capstone is to explore how small European state SOF can complement their national intelligence services, which due to limited resources, small sizes, and limited capabilities, are challenged in several ways. In short, the intelligence services are limited in their ability to meet the intelligence requirements.

A. RESEARCH FINDINGS

This study began with a review of the relevant literature⁹⁹ and current Dutch and Danish security policy documents to determine how scholars and policy-makers from both Europe and the United States assesses the future of special operations and whether SOF can potentially contribute to generating more insight for national decision making. Former USSOCOM Commander General Votel asserted that SOF's greatest value lies in generating more decision space and strategic options for policy-makers.¹⁰⁰ Joseph Nye, an American political scientist, has stated that "contextual intelligence, the ability to understand an evolving environment and capitalize on trends, will become a crucial skill in enabling [political] leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies."¹⁰¹ In sum, the reviewed literature emphasized the importance of information and understanding and the need to meet the intelligence requirements of national leaders.

Chapter I explored the current European security environment and determined an increased instability in the regions surrounding Europe. Russia's renewed aspirations to become a great power once again have led to tensions on Europe's eastern flank, while the ongoing conflicts in the Middle Eastern and North African regions are increasing the threats on its southern flank. Threats such as hybrid warfare, terrorism, and migration directly or indirectly threaten the national interests of small European states and thus affect

⁹⁹ The complete Literature Review can be found in Appendix 1.

¹⁰⁰ USSOCOM, Directorate of Force Management and Development Concept Development and Integration Office. *Special Operations Forces Operating Concept: A Whitepaper to Guide Special Operations Force Development*, 2016 (Tampa, Florida).

¹⁰¹ Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*. Perseus Books Group, 2011, xvii.

their security. The chapter further reviewed the Dutch and Danish security policies,¹⁰² which expressed an increased need for preventive and integrated strategies in the aforementioned regions to advance national security interests. Especially in North Africa, it seems that in the future Europe will need to cope with the security challenges with significantly less help of the United States. Inevitably, the increased instability around Europe, the global geopolitical shifts, and the Danish and Dutch desire for preventive and integrated foreign security policies will increase small European states' need for nationally generated intelligence

Chapter II assessed the small-states intelligence system's ability to meet national requirements, specifically focusing on military intelligence services, to determine what challenges currently exist? The chapter furthermore identified the role of intelligence in the development of national security strategies and how the military intelligence services, as the primary collectors of information from foreign regions, are organized to meet the intelligence requirements. Based on the security issues identified in Chapter I, it was determined that the new intelligence requirements stretch the already limited intelligence resources of the military intelligence services beyond their ability. This creates intelligence gaps that impede the development and implementation of national security strategies. Following a series of interviews, the authors identified challenges: (1) Need for more cooperation and additional information providers; (2) Bureaucratic rigidity (inflexibility); (3) Inadequate capabilities to operate in denied areas; (4) Insufficient numbers of personnel to fully meet intelligence requirements; (5) Intelligence "blind spots" as a result of the aforementioned challenges.

Based on the identified gaps, in Chapter III the authors analyzed how SOF can reinforce the intelligence communities of small states and determined that three distinct options exist.

¹⁰² Danish Government; *Foreign and Security Policy 2017-18*, (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017), <http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitik-strategi-2017-18>; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Update International Security Strategy: Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving*. (The Hague, NL: MoFA, 2014). <https://www.defensie.nl/downloads/brieven/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-veiligheid>.

- Option 1—Train and Advise the Military Intelligence Services
- Option 2—Integrated Support
- Option 3—Independent Entity

Through five selection criteria—1) efficiency and effectiveness, 2) command and control, 3) suitability (including speed of implementation,) 4) availability, and 5) sustainability—each option was analyzed to determine its advantages and disadvantages. The following sections summarize the main advantages and disadvantages of the three options.¹⁰³

1. Option 1—Train and Advise the Military Intelligence Services.

The Train and Advise option, where SOF support developing paramilitary capabilities within the Dutch and Danish intelligence services, enabling them to operate in denied areas, partially meets the intelligence requirement to collect information from the areas of national interest. However, it only addresses one of the five identified challenges. This option's potential consists solely of training and advising the military intelligence services in building a capability to operate in denied areas and therefore only addresses that specific challenge. Training existing intelligence officers to capably work in denied areas, is a feasible option, but it will require time consuming training, which may limit the applicability of the option. Recruiting new intelligence officers with the desirable skill sets and qualifications is possible, but this will also be costly and time-consuming. In other words, although senior leaders can implement this option very fast, the effect of training military intelligence personnel's proficiency to operate in denied areas will require considerable time. The resources needed for SOF to execute this option will be minimal and are assessed to be available within the current SOF structure without undermining other ongoing tasks.

¹⁰³ The complete analysis can be found in Chapter III.

2. Option 2—Integrated Support

The Integrated Support option requires SOF to integrate into the structure of the military intelligence services, fully under their command and control, and thus work under their statutory authority. The option enables the military intelligence services to conduct intelligence operations in denied areas and has the potential to address all the identified challenges. To fully exploit the option, SOF must deeply integrate into the military intelligence service rather than only provide force protection to intelligence officers. The potential can only be exploited if the intelligence officer has the necessary knowledge about the use of SOF. If this is the case, the option will address all the identified challenges of the military intelligence services, and as a result, also have the potential to help cover the intelligence blind spots. To ensure not only tactical but also strategic proficiency, SOF must have the proper capabilities and their operators the adequate characteristics and skill sets to conduct intelligence operations. In other words, SOF need to fit the mission profile. Furthermore, this option enhances tactical flexibility between the military intelligence services and SOF while conducting intelligence operations, reducing the need for significant coordination and risk of intelligence failure. However, it will not improve flexibility on the strategic level between the steering group and military intelligence services. Moreover, due to the level of integration between SOF and the military intelligence service, SOF's distinct angle of insight, enriching the intelligence product, will be limited. With a SOF-knowledgeable intelligence officer, SOF is more likely to receive the freedom of action to operate effectively under the military intelligence services' statutory authorities. With this freedom, SOF will collect HUMINT (situational awareness) and contribute to the intelligence picture. Since SOF will work under the command and control of the military intelligence services, and thus under their statutory authority, one major advantage is that the legal authority for this option already exists. In addition, implementation can take place when the need arises, without wasting valuable time. Depending on the extent and scale to which the support is given, this option might require prioritization of the available SOF resources. The Integrated Support option is likely more congruent with operating in denied areas where the intelligence services are ill-suited to operate alone.

3. Option 3—Independent Entity

The Independent Entity option, in which SOF operate as an independent actor within the information ecosystem, can potentially address all the identified challenges. Furthermore, an independent SOF entity, will add fresh eyes and ears to the ecosystem and thus address the challenge requiring additional information providers. Based on their characteristics and skill sets, SOF, through (semi-)permanent presence in permissive areas of national interests, are able to gain HUMINT and infer public perception based on trusted relations developed over time. Although SOF are already partially proficient to conduct information collecting operations, they still require different characteristics, training, and skill sets to meet the mission profile. Moreover, SOF can be uniquely positioned to discern real intentions of key actors and to predict likely future developments, potentially covering blind spots. SOF will enhance strategic flexibility for the currently existing steering group. However, SOF as an independent information provider will require significant coordination and deconfliction to reduce the risk of intelligence failure. There is a risk that this option can reduce SOF's ability to conduct ongoing missions. Even though the role as strategic information collectors is not yet a doctrinal task for SOF, this option can be implemented quite quickly by repurposing SOF or using existing excess capacity. Additionally, this option requires the creation of a high-level steering mechanism that is knowledgeable about national intelligence requirements to properly task SOF information collection operations and, preferably, military intelligence services' operations as well. The steering group will task and SOCOM will command and control. The legal authorities for SOF to operate as an independent entity will most likely be challenging to obtain if SOF cannot operate under an already existing mandate. Moreover, the full potential of this option will require policy makers to gain knowledge and trust in SOF's ability to accept the risk associated with information operations in non-permissive environments. Gaining the trust of policymakers, creating the interdepartmental steering group, and establishing statutory authorities will be time consuming and are not guaranteed. The Independent Entity option likely applies best to permissive areas.

4. Answers to the Research Question

This study is focused on answering the research question “How can SOF from small European states most efficiently and effectively contribute to the intelligence capacity needed to forecast and counter threats from foreign regions?” Based on the research findings, there are two answers to the research question, depending on the relative value one places on efficiency vs. effectiveness.

a. Most Efficient

The research findings show that when SOF are dedicated to work under the command and control of the military intelligence services, and thus under their statutory authority, the major advantages are that the legal authority to operationalize the option already exists. For this reason, although additional training and integration have to take place, implementation can be almost immediate without wasting valuable time and resources. In sum, the Integrated Support option (option 2) achieves maximum productivity with minimum wasted effort or expense, which is the very definition of efficiency (see Chapter I p. 9).

b. Most Effective

If the desired result of SOF’s contribution to the national intelligence capacity is to counter as many challenges in the current intelligence system as possible, this study shows that both option 2 and 3 address five out of five identified challenges, but in different ways. Accordingly, this study demonstrates that a combination of option 2 and 3 is an effective way for SOF to contribute to national intelligence capacity. Although SOF have value in both options, in permissive areas SOF will have more relative value as an independent entity; whereas in denied areas SOF’s relative value is higher when integrated into military intelligence services’ operations

B. IMPLICATIONS

The research has shown that SOF are capable of information collection at the strategic level, but also that the implementation of SOF as information collectors has implications.

If SOF are to conduct information collection missions in support of the national decision-making three preconditions are essential. First, to establish national-level support for using SOF as strategic information collectors, SOF senior-leaders need to educate national leaders about SOF's capabilities and limitations. The best way of doing this is to include the role as strategic information collectors into national SOF doctrine. With clarity soundly expressed in doctrine, SOF leaders will create a proper foundation for SOF's contributions at the strategic level. The desired outcome of such efforts is to increase national decision-makers' knowledge about SOF and thereby generate political will to utilize SOF strategically. Second, national leaders must recognize the requirement for SOF to enhance national intelligence capacity as a prerequisite to design effective security policies and strategies. Such a sense of recognition increases the likelihood that the necessary statutory authority is created. Third, SOF must be proficient as information collectors. In essence, the use of SOF as strategic level information collectors relies on a trinity of political will, statutory authority, and SOF's proficiency.

Small states, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, acknowledge the relevance of information to enable analysis and national-level decision-making in their policy documents.¹⁰⁴ Information is viewed as a crucial enabler for small states' foreign security efforts by providing understanding of the factors that drive future security threats. Based on the findings, the authors recommend that small states with limited resources pick the low-hanging fruit to improve information collection. Currently, the Integrated Support option (option 2) represents this fruit. The analysis shows that SOF with their existing capabilities efficiently and effectively can add to the information picture in both denied and permissive areas and thereby provide decision makers with more information to design preventive and integrated foreign security policies and strategies. SOF should strive to provide decision makers the ability to look over the horizon for emerging threats. This will require a (semi-)permanent presence in the areas of national interest to collect information.

¹⁰⁴ Danish Government; *Foreign and Security Policy 2017-18*, (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017), <http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-temaer/udenrigs-og-sikkerhedspolitik-strategi-2017-18>; Dutch Ministry of Defence. *Houvast in een Onzekere Wereld: Lijnen van Ontwikkeling in het Meerjarig Perspectief Voor een Duurzame Gerede en Snel Inzetbare Krijgsmacht*. (The Hague, NL), 2017. 21. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2017/02/14/meerjarig-perspectief-krijgsmacht-houvast-in-een-onzekere-wereld>.

A combination of SOF integrated into intelligence operations and operating independently as information providers will meet these requirements. In such a combination, SOF will provide information beneficial to national decision-making using their network and thereby enabling national leaders to act preventively and pre-emptively. However, in both options the information provided by SOF will still be processed and disseminated by the military intelligence services.

Though assisting in filling the identified intelligence gaps is important, SOF must still conduct other missions as part of NATO. SOF leaders should approach the new information collection mission cautiously. When employing SOF as information collectors, national leaders should continuously review which missions provide the most strategic value for their country. Moreover, although small European states have many similarities, their information ecosystems differ and they should utilize the suggested options in ways that best deal with their specific intelligence challenges. Even though the authors assessed option 2 and a combination of option 2 and 3 to be, respectively, the most efficient and effective ways to contribute to the intelligence capacity of small states, decision makers have other options. If opportune, they can implement all the described options simultaneously or create a hybrid version. In short, the options are not mutually exclusive and can be utilized to best fit a nation's security challenges.

Implementation of Option 3 has some inherent challenges associated with the need to create new authorities. Furthermore, because small states' SOF are a scarce resource, SOF leaders must realize that using SOF as a forward deployed network to enhance information collection may result in unintended mission creep¹⁰⁵ and unintentionally degrade other SOF capabilities.

Not only has meeting national intelligence requirements become more urgent, NATO tasks have also gained importance in the current complex security environment. States with limited SOF resources should take a cautious approach when implementing new concepts. Through careful assessment, SOF leaders and decision makers can

¹⁰⁵ A gradual shift in objectives during military missions, often resulting in an unplanned long-term commitment.

determine the strategic value of the options and weigh them against current NATO SOF responsibilities.

In addition, it is important not to overestimate what SOF are able to achieve. In 2016, U.S. Special Operations Command published the “Operating in the Human Domain” (OHD) concept. The concept states that SOF are successful in developing strong partnerships, but there is no guarantee that these associations will result in support for U.S. objectives. SOF and their partners may overemphasize human domain considerations, which could lead to the establishment of unrealistic goals and wasteful programs.¹⁰⁶

Furthermore, some military theorists are particularly skeptical about the strategic use of SOF, and others are generally critical of the quest for information superiority. Eliot Cohen and Samuel Huntington have argued that elite units, like SOF, risk unintentionally and unconsciously conveying an unrealistic picture of the factual situation. Consequently, these outputs may generate inadequate perspectives and thus contribute to wrong perceptions among policy makers regarding the political problems in a region of national interest. By undermining the chain of command and charming the politicians, SOF can disrupt the foundation of professional civil-military relations. Furthermore, Cohen and Huntington have claimed that the disproportionate reliance on SOF occurs under two circumstances. First, when a widely respected political leader shows a personal interest in SOF, and second, when SOF overstate their capabilities and offer politicians a solution to a politically precarious problem.¹⁰⁷

Additionally, Christopher Kirk states that the pursuit of information superiority also has a negative side. It can develop decision paralysis, risk-averse behavior, and overreliance on data analysis, and reduce creative and critical thinking. Moreover, it can centralize control and execution and, most dangerously, create a false belief that the Clausewitzian “fog of war” can be diminished.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁶ USSOCOM; *Operating in the Human Domain*, 2015 (Tampa, Florida: 2015), 40-41.

¹⁰⁷ Eliot A. Cohen and Samuel P. Huntington, *Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies*, (Harvard, Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978).

¹⁰⁸ Christopher J. Kirk, “The Demise of Decision Making How Information Superiority Degrades our Ability to Make Decisions,” *Journal of National Security Studies*, (AUG 6, 2016): 84 – 93.

C. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH

Possible areas of future research related to this study are:

- How SOF select, educate, and train operators for national information collection missions?
- How SOF can be utilized as strategic information collectors and also simultaneously influence the environment preventively and preemptively as strategic shapers?
- How the statutory authority for SOF to operate as an independent entity can be extended, and how an interdepartmental steering group can be created?
- How can the politician's knowledge of the military and SOF be improved?

D. CONCLUSIONS

This capstone has investigated a possible strategic role for SOF as information collectors in support of national decision-making. The analysis has focused on how SOF can most efficiently and effectively complement existing information collection in regions of national interest to forecast and counter threats from foreign regions. The research determined that Denmark and the Netherlands lack sufficient information-collection capacity and capabilities, which primarily are based on an increased need for Denmark and the Netherlands to generate more information from unstable regions. The increased intelligence requirements are a consequence of the complex security situation in and around Europe, and an increased Danish and Dutch political focus on areas of national interest—specifically in the Middle Eastern and North African regions—that does not necessarily coincide with the interests of their strategic partners. In small states, this calls for an efficient and effective use of the limited resources capable of collecting information. The analysis has shown how small European states can use SOF to enhance and improve strategic intelligence enabling decision makers to design better integrated and preventive policies and strategies.

The analysis suggests that using SOF in support of the military intelligence services by integrating SOF into the services structure (Option 2) can be implemented immediately making it the most efficient use of SOF. This option requires little adaptation by SOF; however, SOF must educate and train the selected operators to be proficient. SOF can use excess capacity or repurpose elements of their organization to conduct information collection tasks in support of national decision making. But depending on the extent of such a task, it may have consequences for SOF's ability to conduct their ongoing missions. Moreover, option 2 is likely more congruent with supporting intelligence operations in denied areas because of the intelligence services' capabilities to provide necessary preconditions for operating in these areas.

Additionally, SOF can be utilized as an independent entity (Option 3) operating in permissive areas as part of a forward network to forecast future security challenges. However, creating an independent entity to complement the already existing information ecosystem does have implications that must be addressed before SOF can effectively contribute to strategic level information collection. The two primary challenges associated with Option 3 are establishing the legal authorities for SOF to collect information independently from foreign areas, and creating an interdepartmental steering group that tasks SOF when they operate as an independent entity. This option, however, has the potential for SOF to address most of the identified challenges (see Chapter II pp. 24–26). Option 3 most likely applies best to permissive areas.

The findings of this capstone suggest that small states with limited resources can utilize existing SOF capabilities to improve information collection. The analysis has shown that there is a potential to immediately integrate SOF into the military intelligence services maximizing the efficiency of existing resources. However, the findings have also shown that there is not one clear solution that addresses all the identified challenges and gaps. Which option is most efficient and effective depends on the circumstances. Essentially, the identified options are not mutually exclusive and decision makers can utilize a combination of options to provide the best solution to address the intelligence challenges to better forecast and counter threats from foreign regions. This study does not conclude with one clear solution. To exploit SOF's full potential, a

combination of options 2 and 3 likely represents the most efficient and effective way for SOF to contribute to the national intelligence capacity, in which Option 2 is more congruent with denied areas and Option 3 with permissive areas.

APPENDIX A. LITERATURE REVIEW

This study's research-question led to four scholarly areas of exploration:

- 1) Threats to (small) European states' security,
- 2) Current small European states' security policies,
- 3) The role of intelligence regarding states' security policies,
- 4) SOF's capabilities to contribute to information collection for national decision making.

The first area relates to the threats posed to small European states, and is extensively addressed in the ongoing discussions among Danish and Dutch academics from various research institutions; it is also stated in the annual threat assessments published by the Danish and Dutch intelligence and security services.¹⁰⁹ Among these various scholars, there appears to be a broad consensus that the environment is unstable, unpredictable, and that different threats are rapidly emerging in various areas.¹¹⁰

The second area relates to the security policies of small European states and commonly is seen in official policy papers, articles written by private think-tanks, and publications from independent research institutions. A general theme among the senior political leadership is their focus on the necessity to use all of their instruments of power to preserve and benefit national interests and influence.¹¹¹ In the 2016 review of Denmark's foreign and security policy, former ambassador Taksoe-Jensen assesses that: "the political power is gradually being dispersed to an increasing number of actors, many of them non-

¹⁰⁹ Lauder, *Masters of Chaos: The Application of Political Warfare by the Russian Federation in the Contemporary Operating Environment*; Dutch Ministry of Defense, MIVD Jaarverslag 2016; Dutch Ministry of Defense, MIVD Jaarverslag 2017; Danish Police Intelligence Service, *Assessment of the Terrorist Threat to Denmark*; Lars Findsen, 2017 Threat Assessment

¹¹⁰ Maarten Gehem et al., *Special Operations Forces: schaduwkrijgers in het licht van de toekomst*, (The Hague, NL: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015), https://hcass.nl/sites/default/files/files/reports/Special_Operations_Forces__Schaduwkrijgers_in_het_licht_van_de_toekomstnieuwste.pdf.

¹¹¹ Stephan de Spiegeleire and Tim Sweijjs, *Strategische Monitor 2016-2017: Volatility and Friction in the Age of Disintermediation*, (The Hague, NL: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies/ Clingendael Institute, 2017), 5, <https://hcass.nl/report/hcass-strategic-monitor>.

state. In Europe's periphery, continuous crises are producing instability and migration."¹¹² The former ambassador further argues that, "a changing world demands a focused, well-coordinated and integrated security and foreign policy, based on clear strategic thinking about which national objectives to place at the very forefront of states' international engagements."¹¹³ In addition to this Danish shift toward more emphasis on national interests, Dutch political leaders also have articulated a move in a similar direction. In the government policy accord 2017–2021 of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Dutch leaders emphasize national values and interests.¹¹⁴ In addition, Dutch politicians have stated that active foreign policy is of national interest.¹¹⁵ While international crises directly influence national security, small European states are now focused on conflict resolution and prevention in the regions surrounding Europe.¹¹⁶ Due to political aversion to large-scale reactive (military) interventions, states have begun to prefer an indirect preventive approach to foreign policy. They prefer to prevent conflicts from happening, rather than intervene in conflicts that have escalated to a level that exceeds their ability to effectively respond.¹¹⁷

The third area relates to the role of intelligence in developing national security policies and the ability of the national Defense/Military Intelligence Services to effectively and efficiently provide Danish and Dutch decision makers with the needed intelligence. In

¹¹² Peter Taksoe-Jensen, *Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: The Way Ahead for Denmark's Interests and Values towards 2030* (Copenhagen, DK: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016), 4-5, <http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/dansk-diplomati-og-forsvar-i-en-brydningstid/>.

¹¹³ Peter Taksoe-Jensen, *Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change: The Way Ahead for Denmark's Interests and Values towards 2030*.

¹¹⁴ Dutch Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, *Vertrouwen in de Toekomst*, 2.

¹¹⁵ Dutch Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, *Vertrouwen in de Toekomst*, 46; Dutch Ministry of Defence, *In het Belang van Nederland*, (The Hague, NL: MoD, 2013), 11, 23, [¹¹⁶ Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Update International Security Strategy: Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving*.](https://www.google.com/search?q=in+het+belang+van+Nederland&rlz=1C5CHFA_enUS760US760&oq=in+het+belang+van+Nederland&aqs=chrome..69i57j0l3.5504j0j8&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8; WRR, Veiligheid in een Wereld van Verbindingen, een Strategische Visie op het Defensiebeleid, 11, 19, 21; Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <i>Update International Security Strategy: Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving</i>, 1; Dutch Ministry of Defence, <i>Houvast in een onzekere wereld</i>, 14.</p>
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¹¹⁷ Dutch Government Policy Accord 2017-2021, *Vertrouwen in de Toekomst*, 46; Dutch Ministry of Defence, *In het Belang van Nederland*, 11, 23.

a 2005 research study conducted by an intelligence and security research group appointed by the Dutch MoD, researchers identified several deficiencies within the Dutch MISS.¹¹⁸ In 2010, these deficiencies were again addressed by Erwin Muller in his book, *Intelligence and Security Services*, in which he stated that the findings of the 2005 research were still valid and of vital importance.¹¹⁹ Additionally, the Dutch Minister of Defense stated in the foreword of the 2017 MISS report that reinforcement of the Intelligence and Security Service was of utmost importance.¹²⁰ With this acknowledgement, the Netherlands recognizes the lack of capacity and calls for reinforcement or expansion to increase information collection.¹²¹ In Denmark, no unclassified literature has concluded that gaps in the national intelligence exist; instead, the relevant literature focuses on the changes the national intelligence services have gone through since the end of the Cold War. The director of the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) Lars Findsen, in the foreword to an anthology written by esteemed Danish scholars, wrote:

Changes in alliances and co-operation patterns between states will also affect the threats to Denmark in the coming decades. The same applies to threats from non-state actors in the form of terrorism and cyber-attacks. A solid intelligence will be an integral part of any attempt to control the risks facing Denmark. Many of the issues faced by the DDIS are very complex, and in several areas, our knowledge is so unique and detailed that the recipients of our products will ask for advice on what the most effective policy concerning threats and security challenges will be.¹²²

Joseph Nye further underlines this statement in his 2011 book *The Future of Power*, where he argues that: “contextual intelligence, the ability to understand an evolving

¹¹⁸ Onderzoekgroep Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie, *Inlichtingen en Veiligheid Defensie: Kwaliteit, Capaciteit en Samenwerking*, 39-40.

¹¹⁹ De Graaf, Muller, and Van Reijn. *Inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten*, 624.

¹²⁰ Dutch Ministry of Defence. *MIVD Jaarverslag 2017*, 5.

¹²¹ WRR, Veiligheid in een wereld van verbindingen, een strategische visie op het defensiebeleid, 12; Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, and Safety and Justice, *Leidraad Geïntegreerde Benadering: De Nederlandse Visie op een Samenhangende Inzet op Veiligheid en Stabieleit in Fragiele Staten en Conflictgebiede* Leidraad, 14.

¹²² Kristian Soeby Kristensen and Jens Ringmose. *Efterretningstjenesten fra 1967 – 2017: Fra Tidlig Varsling til Udenrigs Efterretningstjeneste*. (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, 2017), 7-8. [Danish Defence Intelligence Service 1967 – 2017: From Military Early Warning Service to Foreign Intelligence Service.]

environment and capitalize on trends, will become a crucial skill in enabling [political] leaders to convert power resources into successful strategies.”¹²³

The fourth area relates to the strategic role of SOF and their ability to support national policies. Even though the use of SOF has grown considerably during the last decades,¹²⁴ very little scholarly literature relates to the use and development of SOF as a small-state instrument in present complex security environments.¹²⁵ The existing literature is primarily focused on SOF from states with substantial military power, which to some extent may be of limited value for small European states. However, in the absence of literature that is primarily focused on small-state SOF, the next four paragraphs will review theories of scholars from large states.

Christopher Lamb, a well-known American scholar, has contributed significantly to the literature on SOF roles. Lamb suggests three factors to assess the roles of SOF. These factors are the nature of the threats, the anticipated future security environment, and national security strategy to deal with these threats.¹²⁶ Furthermore, he argues that, in order to grasp the real strategic value of SOF, leaders should assess the security challenges to the nation.¹²⁷ In other words, SOF’s strategic utility is associated with the national security policies and strategies for countering threats.

Colin Gray, a British strategic thinker and writer about strategy and how it relates to SOF, emphasizes SOF’s strategic utility. Gray argues that SOF can maximize the chance of conflict-prevention and support progress regarding security and stability in regions of national interest. He further attempts to identify the factors leading to successful

¹²³ Nye, *The Future of Power*, xvii, 24.

¹²⁴ James D. Kiras, “A theory of Special Operations: These Ideas are Dangerous,” *Special Operations Journal* 1, no. 2 (November, 2015): 75-88.

¹²⁵ G. Eriksson and Ulrica Pettersson, *Special Operations from a Small State Perspective: Future Security Challenges*, (Basingstoke, UK: Springer Nature, 2017), 1.

¹²⁶ Christopher J. Lamb, “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions,” *Special Warfare* 8 (July 1995): 2.

¹²⁷ David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).

employment of SOF. According to Gray the strategic use of SOF also relies upon the understanding of their potential by decision makers.¹²⁸

Additionally, former USSOCOM Commander General Votel asserted that SOF's greatest value lies in generating more decision space and strategic options for policy-makers.¹²⁹ Whereas, Philip Lohaus discussed in his article: *Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone*, that SOF are best employed in pre-conflict activities,¹³⁰ Broyles and Blankenship stated that SOF should be used as a component of a more holistic approach and that their missions should focus more on the pre-conflict activities (see Figure 7).¹³¹ All these statements support the value of SOF as information collectors in low intensity (pre-) conflict situations increasing the decision space needed for national leaders to develop sound policies and strategies.




Figure 7. SOF's Shift of Focus to the Left Side of the Peace-War Continuum.

As theories coincide with SOF's strategic utility as information collectors, SOF, in this role, have also been mentioned in (Dutch) policy documents alongside the need of

¹²⁸ Gray, "The Strategic Utility of Special Operations," 163-188.

¹²⁹ USSOCOM, Directorate of Force Management and Development Concept Development and Integration Office. *Special Operations Forces Operating Concept: A Whitepaper to Guide Special Operations Force Development*.

¹³⁰ Lohaus, Phillip, "Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational Framework for Employing Special Operations Forces in the Space between War and Peace," *Special Operations Journal* 2, no. 2, (December, 2016), <http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Gray-Zone.pdf>.

¹³¹ David A. Broyles and Brody Blankenship, *The Role of Special Operations Forces in Global Competition*, DRM-2017-U-015225-1Rev (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2017), 28, 30, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/DRM-2017-U-015225-1Rev.pdf.

reinforcing the capacity to generate strategic anticipation.¹³² In 2017, the Dutch Minister of Defense expressed SOF's relevance in generating an adequate national information position together with other strategic actors in the pre-conflict phase to prevent escalation of conflicts.¹³³ Furthermore, in their report *Safety in a World of Connections*, researchers from the Dutch scientific council for government policy have stated that, alongside a clear national prevention policy, additional strategic means are necessary for the following tasks: gather information, shape contextual understanding, and adequately enable national leadership to forecast and respond effectively to security issues.¹³⁴

The reviewed literature indicates an increasing need for intelligence for the development of national security policies within small European states. Moreover, the literature suggests that SOF have capabilities with which they can contribute to small-state information collection for national decision making to advance state interests. However, very little literature exists on how SOF from small states can do more to contribute to national policies. Consequently, this capstone focuses on a role for small-state SOF to enhance information collection for national decision making.

¹³² Dutch Ministry of Defense. *Houvast in een Onzekere Wereld*, 21; WRR, *Veiligheid in een Wereld van Verbindingen*, 11.

¹³³ Dutch Ministry of Defence. *Houvast in een Onzekere Wereld*, 21.

¹³⁴ WRR, *Veiligheid in een Wereld van Verbindingen*, 133.

APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What are the threats Europe is facing/countering?
2. What policy changes/trends in the different European countries have been seen in regards to countering the threats?
3. How do these threats and trends impact small versus large European states differently?
4. How are European states becoming more focused on their national interests?
5. European states' policies seem to be aimed at preventing conflicts from happening; what are the actions of European states regarding this preventive desire?
6. How is the current complex security environment challenging the national decision-making in regards to building effective security strategies?
7. What capabilities provide intelligence to develop the integrated and preventive approaches (who provide the contextual understanding to ensure development of effective strategies)?
8. What are the gaps in the current Intel capabilities/capacities?
9. What are the current/future roles and core tasks for SOF in small European states and what are the capabilities and capacities to meet the requirements?
10. Assuming there is a gap in Intel capabilities; what strategies/options are being considered to help SOF fill that gap.
11. Based on the increase of threats in the world and the intent of states to act preventively, what is the intelligence community's (IC) current

capability to provide intelligence for the development of (bi-)national integrated approaches?

12. Besides using SOF as an extra instrument for information collection for national decision making, what other options can be considered to expand this strategic capacity?
13. While weighing different options or validating the SOF option, which criteria or aspect have been considered?
14. What are the focus areas or areas of tension in regards to using SOF as an information collector for national decision making?
15. In what way do SOF manage a guaranteed sustainability of the concept for information collection for national decision making, besides their doctrinal tasks—MA, DA, and SR, in the future?

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