

# The Evolution of Canada's PME after Afghanistan

## From Counterinsurgency Back to High-Intensity Conflict

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**Abstract:** Professional military education (PME) in Canada at the staff and war college levels needs to refocus its curriculum on high-intensity conflict. Unfortunately, unlike during the Cold War when the focus could be entirely on high-intensity conflict, today's security environment requires Canada's PME system to continue covering counterinsurgency operations as well. What is the correct balance and who should decide are some of the issues dealt with by the author. There are many interested parties, but the faculty actually involved in delivering the curriculum are arguably the best ones to decide how to achieve the balance. They have the knowledge and expertise in both curriculum design and delivery.

**Keywords:** professional military education, PME, Canada, War College, Command and Staff College, War College, high-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, COIN

**T**he election of a new government in the fall of 2015 and the announcement to the United Nations (UN) by the new prime minister, Justin Trudeau, that Canada was back, combined with a variety of changing global security requirements, a critical report on sexual assault in the Canadian

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Forces (CF), and failures in some major procurement projects, have led Canadian Forces to revisit what needs to be included in its professional military education (PME) programs.<sup>1</sup> Although not the first time significant internal and external events have caused serious institutional reflection on the content of PME, the challenge today is finding the correct balance among the multitude of competing topics that need to be covered in a finite amount of time.

In 1997, Professor Jack L. Granatstein wrote in a report to the minister of national defence that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had a “remarkably ill educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western World.”<sup>2</sup> At that time, 53.3 percent of officers had university degrees and only 6.8 percent had a graduate degree, mainly in technical areas.<sup>3</sup> Granatstein argued that, compared to many of Canada’s allies, the CF lagged far behind in levels of education.<sup>4</sup> Much has changed in the intervening years, particularly for senior officers.

Since the 1997 report, senior officer PME provided by the Canadian Forces College (CFC) has evolved from one command and staff program focused at the major and lieutenant commander rank level to four major programs focused across a spectrum of professional military and civilian government education activities, from the command and staff level to the general and flag officer level.<sup>5</sup> More important, the CFC added PhD-qualified faculty from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) as part of its teaching and curriculum development, thereby allowing the more significant yearlong programs to be focused on the education and critical thinking required for the graduate degrees now offered by RMC to those individuals prepared to complete the additional work associated with the master of defense studies or master of public administration.

Additionally, the security environment has changed significantly during the past two decades, and the faculty at CFC, both military and civilian, have adjusted the curriculum to reflect this changing environment and to respond to the needs of the profession of arms. Canada’s military, like most of its key allies, has spent more than a decade focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) as part of its contribution to Afghanistan and other events in the Middle East. The current security environment continues to require military forces skilled in COIN operations, but activities in the South China Sea, North Korea, and the Ukraine have brought the issue of being prepared for high-intensity conflict back into the discussion.<sup>6</sup> Should the focus of professional development switch to high-intensity conflict or continue with COIN? Does PME need to cover both and, if so, what is the correct balance? A recent Rand study on trends in armed conflict suggests that the U.S. Army must be prepared for both.<sup>7</sup> John Deni’s examination of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Article 5 also indicates a need for NATO nations to shift emphasis from crisis management back to Article 5 and collective defense against Russia.<sup>8</sup> Does the

need to be prepared for high-intensity conflict apply to smaller armed forces like Canada?

The intent of this article is to examine what, if anything, needs to change in PME with the staff and war college curriculum. Is the CAF expecting too much from its people and its military schoolhouses? Does the existing curriculum need tinkering with or are significant changes required? Are current issues of the day usurping the longer-term requirements of the profession? Anyone in the PME business will know there are no easy answers to any of these questions.

This article begins by providing a general understanding of the curriculum-development process and how Canadian staff and war college programs decide what must be taught. It continues with a summary of how some of these issues have evolved with a focus on the changes that may now be required post-Afghanistan. The multiple competing demands facing curriculum developers are also discussed, and the article concludes by providing some thoughts on what might be appropriate for further study.

## **Curriculum Development at the Canadian Forces College**

Professional military education requirements for the CAF officer corps is articulated in the *Officer General Specifications* (OGS). The OGS

outlines the breadth and depth of requirements for CAF officers and reflects the demands the CAF places on its Officer Corps. It lays out the requirements for individuals wishing to join the Corps, as well as for those who strive to rise in its ranks. This document contains the essential requirements that officers are expected to meet and maintain during their military careers and provides the framework for the development and support of CAF officers in their roles as military leaders. We expect that this OGS will be used as the cornerstone of the military personnel system with respect to the selection, training, education, development, management, and support of CAF officers.<sup>9</sup>

The OGS is designed to provide the performance requirements for officers at specific ranks and includes information applicable to all officers in the CAF, along with information applicable to each of the Services in the CAF.<sup>10</sup> It provides guidance on the profession of arms, leadership, and the fundamentals of officership within the CAF. The OGS is the foundation document from which the curriculum for war and staff colleges comes.

Although the bureaucratic structure for how guidance is received by the CFC for curriculum development is not important to this discussion, there is a

chain of command and approval process for the development of program goals, outcomes, and objectives to be achieved by officers attending CFC. Modifications and adjustments to reflect the changing security environment and the requirements of the CAF are approved and updated on a regular basis.

A recent internal audit of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), of which the Canadian Forces College is part, noted that the CDA had undertaken a review of the entire professional development system with substantial changes required.<sup>11</sup> How much of this change applies to the staff and war college remains to be determined because final approvals of the recommended changes have yet to be accepted by the senior leadership of the CAF. Nevertheless, the audit report did note that the CDA review proposed

a greater emphasis on career-long self-development in various subject areas, such as communications, psychology, sociology, politics, history, and anthropology. The content of mandatory PD [professional development] will need to be modularized further, and a system needs to be put in place to facilitate linkages between prior learning, PD requirements, and career management.<sup>12</sup>

This would imply that some review of the curriculum at the staff and war college level needs to be conducted to determine whether these issues are being addressed. The challenge for curriculum development is that there are always trade-offs. These include decisions that must be made to balance the multiple areas of study desired by all those with input into the process and those with the actual time available to deliver curriculum that allows individuals to improve their critical thinking skills and master elements of their profession.

The audit highlights one of the challenges for curriculum development at CFC and most staff and war colleges. In reality the OGS or another nation's equivalent policy document is only one of the mechanisms that provides guidance for PME by articulating a core set of technical job requirements. But the audit illustrates that senior leaders as well as other agencies and events influence the development of curriculum at the staff and war college level. The faculty have to be aware of strategic direction from the chief of the defense staff, desires of the Service commanders, other institutional guidance on the broad responsibilities of senior leaders at the colonel and flag rank level, and other policy guidance or direction within the broader machinery of government.<sup>13</sup> Benchmarking with allies is also an important consideration to ensure that the military maintains consistency in its ability to recognize the others' qualifications and, more important in today's environment, that interoperability in or on operations does not suffer.

## **The Programs at CFC**

Each of the programs at CFC has a syllabus that outlines its goals, learning outcomes, and learning objectives, along with how the program is structured and delivered, how student assessment is completed for both academic and professional requirements, and an indication of how the program is connected to a graduate degree at the RMC of Canada, the degree-granting institution for the programs. Faculty, both military and academic, are organized into departments covering the broad areas of military planning and operations, command leadership and management, and security and international affairs. Not unlike our traditional allies, the development and delivery of curriculum is a shared responsibility that balances both the professional and academic requirements of a graduate-level learning experience.

The connection to graduate degrees means that curriculum is organized into courses, some mandatory and some elective. Course names and requirements are outlined in both the syllabus for the PME program on the CFC website and in the graduate studies calendar on the RMC website. This linkage between the professional requirements and the academic requirements ensures that changes to curriculum are not done on a whim and are approved through the formal processes for both the profession of arms and the university. This connection between the profession and the university is important when changes are made to curriculum to reflect new requirements for the profession based on changes in the security environment and in government priorities, both domestically and internationally.<sup>14</sup>

Faculty at CFC make incremental changes every year to reflect the ongoing changes in the professional requirements and new research in the academic literature. Curriculum for both the staff and war college level programs is developed and delivered to meet the needs of broad program goals and more specific learning outcomes (tables 1 and 2). The tables provide the program goal, the intended aim of the goal, and the associated learning outcome. Not provided but available in the syllabus documents are the more detailed objectives associated with each outcome. For example, the six learning outcomes associated with the staff college leads to 23 learning objectives, while the nine outcomes for the war college leads to 40 learning objectives.

Faculty then develop courses with individual lectures, seminars, case studies, and exercises with specific items or teaching points that must be covered in the activity to achieve the overall outcomes and objectives either by the end of the course or, in some cases, by the end of the actual program.

What is obvious when looking at the material in the tables is how generalized the language is. This allows faculty significant flexibility in choosing the most effective teaching and assessment methods to meet the needs of the profession and the university in such a complex security environment. Note, how-

**Table 1.** National Security Program goals and outcomes

Program goal	Goal aim	Learning outcomes
Institutional leadership, strategic command, and strategic resource management	To further develop the participants' ability to evaluate and apply the principles of command, leadership, and management at the strategic level in leading the institutions of defense and national security, and to evaluate institutional policies and decision-making constraints and dynamics in the generation, employment, and sustainment of a national capacity to meet Canada's security needs.	Institutional leadership: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have examined the concepts, theories, and techniques of executive leadership; analyzed their effective application at the strategic and institutional levels; and conducted self-assessment feedback to enhance their personal leadership styles.
		Strategic command: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have explored the theories and concepts of strategic command and the key constraints and dynamics affecting strategic military decision making within the context of comprehensive approaches within an environment of ambiguity.
		Strategic resource management: at the end of the relevant courses, students will have examined strategic management theories and managerial approaches; evaluated the resource management systems used within the federal government with emphasis on defense; and analyzed complex managerial planning, decision-making, and organizational components at the strategic level to generate and sustain institutional capabilities.
Canadian governance and national security policy development	To further develop the participants' understanding of how nations develop and implement national security policies and how states interrelate regionally, globally, and with international organizations and other nongovernmental actors. Using comparison with other nations, the program will focus on Canadian government decision making; national security policy development; the factors, both internal and external to Canada, that influence the implementation of Canada's national security policy; and the geostrategic influences related to the potential tensions between Canada's national interests and the promotion of Canada's values.	International relations and the contemporary security environment: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have examined how nations develop and implement national security policy; the relationship between states, international organizations, and other nongovernmental actors; and the contemporary international security environment.

Program goal	Goal aim	Learning outcomes
		Canadian governance and national security policy development: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have examined the important influences on how the Canadian government operates and makes decisions and will have gained a comprehensive understanding of how it develops and implements national security policies.
Strategy formulation and the application of national powers	To further develop the participants' understanding of the elements of national power through an examination of its diplomatic/political, informational, sociocultural, military, and economic determinants; to analyze their influence on Canada's strategic options; and to evaluate the controls on their implementation in intra-, inter-, and nongovernmental environments.	Geostrategic security environment: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have distinguished and applied the elements of national power; examined the geostrategic environment including state, nonstate, and interstate actors; analyzed regional security issues and their effect on the development of Canadian international policy; and examined the roles and functions of international political, economic, trade-related, and military institutions that are specifically important to Canada.
		National security strategy formulation and application: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have examined the processes and environments that influence the development of national security policies; assessed how national security strategies are derived from those policies; and analyzed how global and domestic environments affect those strategies.
Operations in complex environments	To develop the participants' capacity to examine and design comprehensive approaches to operations in the context of current and future defense and security environments to generate strategic effects in complex security environments.	Operations in complex environments: at the end of the relevant courses, participants will have examined the impact of complexity in the operational environment, institutional rigidity in appreciating that environment, and the application of design thinking in the conception of comprehensive approaches to operations in the context of current and future defense and security environments.
Communications skills and analytical thinking	To develop students' ability to research, think critically, apply problem-solving techniques, and communicate effectively with internal and external audiences.	Communications skills and analytical thinking: through each of the courses and at the end of the program, participants will have applied research, critical thinking, problem-solving, and decision-making techniques to address issues and defend positions and will have used effective oral and written communication skills to present their analysis and message.

Source: RAdm L. Cassivi, "Syllabus: Canadian Forces College (CFC), National Security Programme (NSP)."

**Table 2.** Joint Command and Staff Course Program goals and outcomes

Program goal	Goal aim	Learning outcomes
Command and leadership	To develop in each participant the requisite level of understanding of the conceptual foundations of leadership and command required to be effective in the institutional, operational, and cross-cultural contexts across national and international settings.	At the end of the program, students will be able to apply the conceptual foundations of leadership and of command required to be effective in the institutional, operational, and cross-cultural contexts across national and international settings.
Communications skills	To develop students' ability to research, apply problem-solving techniques, and communicate effectively with internal and external audiences.	At the end of each course, students will have applied research, problem-solving, and decision-making techniques to defend a position or point of view using the professional oral and written communication skills and public affairs skills required to be effective in the institutional, operational, and cross-cultural contexts across national and international settings.
Military operations planning	To develop students' ability to plan joint and combined operations at the operational level across the spectrum of conflict in support of federal government direction.	At the end of the program, students will be able to lead an element of an operational-level planning group in planning a military operation within the contemporary operating environment.
Component capabilities	To develop students' understanding of component capabilities in joint and combined force operations.	At the end of the program, students will be able to apply capabilities of component power in a contemporary operating environment.
National security and defense studies	To develop students' ability to analyze Canadian national security, foreign, and defense policies, and the internal and external factors that influence them.	At the end of the program, the students will be able to translate national security strategy into military responses in the contemporary operating environment.

Source: MajGen J. G. E. Tremblay, "Syllabus: Canadian Forces College (CSC) Joint Command and Staff Programme Residential (JCSP RESID) and Joint Command and Staff Distance Learning (JCSP DL)."

ever, that the generalized language also makes establishing clear measurement criteria more difficult. Nevertheless, it allows for adjustments to the material each year to reflect contemporary issues without having to change the broad set of goals, outcomes, and objectives. Unfortunately, at times, it also allows critics to view the generalized language and criticize what the college is doing without a clear understanding of how the outcomes and objectives are actually met. So what adjustments, if any, need to be made in the balance between high-intensity conflict and COIN? Is this even the correct question? In this context, it would be useful to understand what changes were made to the curriculum since the last major revision in the late 1990s that was referred to in the opening section.

The main driver for change prior to Minister of National Defence M.



Douglas Young's era can be traced to the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and Canada's decision to engage in Afghanistan. Although Canada's engagement in Afghanistan has ended, its military remains engaged in operations against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East and in NATO operations in Latvia, and it awaits a decision from the government for deployment on a UN mission to Africa. All of this creates some challenges for finding the correct balance in the curriculum moving forward.

## **The Challenges Moving Forward**

Prior to Afghanistan, the focus of both the staff and war college level curriculum was not on the whole-of-government engagement that is found in today's curriculum. For example, one of the staff college goals in the early 2000s was joint and combined operations aimed at developing an ability to plan and conduct joint operations but without any articulated reference to whole-of-government operations.<sup>15</sup> It was military centered and aimed at providing education at the operational level of war. The program goal of military operations planning in table 2 has added the whole-of-government context when indicating "across the spectrum of conflict in support of federal government direction."<sup>16</sup> The phrase "across the spectrum of conflict" allowed faculty members to develop curriculum that included more emphasis on *military operations other than war*.<sup>17</sup> The phrase "in support of federal government direction" allowed faculty to set the curriculum within the broader whole-of-government context. These adjustments were made gradually, leveraging lessons from operations in Afghanistan, discussions with our traditional allies, and in the case of the war college level program, input from our civilian colleagues.

The war college program has perhaps changed the most since Young's direction. Originally delivered as a three-month program focused on warfighting and a six-month program focused on national security, the war college program was changed to a 10-month program in 2008.<sup>18</sup> This new National Security Programme (NSP) includes civilian participation from other government departments and has a much more deliberate focus on how the government engages in complex security environments to achieve strategic effect. For example, the articulated aim in the 2017 syllabus indicates the NSP is "designed to prepare selected military, public service, international and private sector leaders for future strategic responsibilities within a complex and ambiguous global security environment."<sup>19</sup> As with the staff college program, college faculty have adjusted the curriculum to reflect the lessons during the past decade and the need for military effects at the strategic level to be part of the broader whole-of-government intentions. The creation of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan with representation from multiple government organizations is an example of this whole-of-government approach.

More problematic is trying to find the correct balance between the war-fighting requirements of higher-level military command and the broader institutional requirements that most general and flag officers in a smaller middle-power military must master.<sup>20</sup> Smaller militaries will work as part of larger coalitions, so there is room for a discussion about how much focus needs to be placed on the skills required of a force commander versus how much focus there needs to be on the corporate systems that support getting military capability to the fight.<sup>21</sup> Canada is in a position today where there is a clear requirement for a program that touches the full range of responsibilities for the national security professional, military and civilian. What remains to be clarified moving forward is how broad this education must be versus which specific areas require more depth and expertise. This is a trade-off between a mile wide and an inch deep versus a mile deep and inch wide.

The other major change for both the staff and war college programs since Young's direction is the connection of the programs to graduate degrees and the requirement to deliver professional military education at the graduate level. Here, the competing requirements of the profession of arms and academic credibility create challenges for how best to achieve the correct balance. Does the requirement to deliver PME at the graduate level mean that a graduate degree is required? Or is the real intention to create a leadership cohort that is capable of critical thinking, dealing with uncertainty, and demonstrating an intellectual capacity that allows officers to understand and work in a challenging, complex security environment with multiple actors, multiple agendas, and multiple priorities? The academic desire is for education at the graduate level to have the rigor needed to ensure that the individual has demonstrated the ability to integrate theories, conduct independent research of complex issues, and demonstrate coherent justifications of arguments presented. There are mixed messages within the profession as to whether this higher level of development is required or whether the requirement is that all courses must be taught at the graduate level. And even if it is the latter, the difficulty is that arguing that your curriculum is at the graduate level is only valid if a university is prepared to give you graduate credit for what you are doing. The balance is perhaps best articulated by Paul Mitchell:

CFC is not a university in function. It has a pragmatic and focused professional purpose which limits, to a degree, the free pursuit of knowledge: education must have concrete military and strategic utility. . . . Our mission is to help them think critically about their job, to more fully understand the larger political and strategic context in which they are embedded and the ways it influences how they act.<sup>22</sup>

Once again, benchmarking with our traditional allies is important, and most staff and war colleges have connections to graduate degrees. Without a mechanism for achieving a graduate degree, international officer exchanges may be more difficult.<sup>23</sup>

The release of the new defense policy in June 2017 is also critical in determining what needs to be changed moving forward. This is the “in support of federal government direction” piece of the staff college’s military operations goal and the war college program’s “future strategic responsibilities within a complex and ambiguous global security environment.” One of the most significant issues from the new defense policy is the concurrency of operations concept and the requirement for CAF to conduct a variety of missions across the spectrum of conflict. The new policy defines the core missions and what the government expects CAF to do concurrently, to include “lead[ing] and/or contribut[ing] forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global security.”<sup>24</sup> This is a clear indication that staff and war college curriculum needs to cover both COIN and high-intensity conflict as well as a variety of other activities, such as disaster assistance and peace operations.

Peace operations in today’s environment bring a more challenging set of requirements that need to be considered for a middle-power nation like Canada. Perhaps one of the more significant challenges moving forward will come from the shift required for modern peacekeeping operations. In addition to the acceptance that UN missions today are peace support operations versus peacekeeping operations, most missions have the protection of civilians as a key objective; this includes preventing conflict-related sexual violence and dealing with child soldiers.<sup>25</sup> Following a decade in Afghanistan, the military may find itself unprepared at this point in time for the demands of modern peacekeeping missions. This is just one issue in a long list of operational and institutional issues that faculty are being asked to deal with in a short, 10-month program of study.

Letting the faculty decide is probably the most pragmatic answer to trying to find the correct balance to these competing demands. But it is at the same time an unsatisfactory answer. Guidance on what the priorities are for both the staff and war college would be useful. Ideally, that guidance would also be informed guidance because the faculty will continue to adjust the actual content of lectures and case studies to reflect the political and operational realities that face the CAF.

Faculty know that, in 2018, military members are deployed in areas requiring knowledge of both high-intensity conflict and COIN and that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Faculty know that the curriculum must cover both areas and that, for a smaller military such as Canada’s, there are significant numbers of general and flag officer positions engaged in the broader

national security enterprise, for government and institutional expertise will be just as important as military expertise. The curriculum must cover these issues in the correct balance to ensure the longer-term success for both the profession and the institution.

This is hardly a satisfactory answer for those expecting clarity in what is to be covered and how it is to be assessed. It is, however, likely the best of the worst options in an environment full of uncertainty and constrained resources. Faculty would benefit from clear and informed guidance that articulates the balance sought between warfighting, institutional excellence, academic rigor, and the priorities of government.

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## Notes

1. “Justin Trudeau: Canada ‘Back on World Stage,’” BBC News, 20 October 2015.
2. Dr. J. L. Granatstein, “A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence: For Efficient and Effective Forces, The Honourable M. Douglas Young, Report to the Prime Minister” (unpublished paper, Ottawa, Public Works and Government Services Canada, 25 March 1997), 19. This was one of a number of papers written for the minister as a result of the CF engagement in Somalia and the death of a Somali teenager. There were significant changes made to the staff college curriculum as a result of the direction that subsequently came from M. Douglas Young. The key document came from Young, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997).
3. Up until this time, it was possible to join the Canadian Forces under the Officer Candidate Training Plan, a plan that allowed individuals to join the operational classifications (e.g., pilot, infantry, maritime surface) without a university degree. The key leaders in the Somalia incident did not hold university degrees.
4. One additional difference for the CF is the requirement to be able to work in English and French at the senior levels. You cannot be promoted to colonel without being able to work in both languages and language ability is a rated factor in the promotion process prior to that rank level. This adds a significant amount of additional training and education for an officer during their career.
5. The programs for 2017 included the Joint Command and Staff Programme (a yearlong residential version and a two-year distance learning version), the National Security Programme, and the Executive Leadership Programme. Note that the CFC also runs a two-week Canadian Security Studies Programme and a two-week Joint Command and Staff Programme.
6. For the purposes of this discussion, the term *high-intensity conflict* refers to warfare characterized by rapidly evolving, highly lethal, multidomain operations. For example, as far back as 2008, Maj Warren E. Sponsler, USA, wrote that the U.S. Army had been successfully fighting COIN wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that units had “lost many of the full spectrum core-competency warfighting skills that make our Army the most formidable in the world.” See Maj Warren E. Sponsler, “Striking the Balance between Training High-Intensity Conflict and Counterinsurgency [*sic*]: Maintaining Full Spectrum Dominance in the US Army” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, 2008), ii.
7. Thomas S. Szayna et al., *What Are the Trends in Armed Conflicts, and What Do They Mean for U.S. Defense Policy?* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2017), 9.
8. John R. Deni, *NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challenges of Collective Defense* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).
9. *Officer General Specifications*, A-PD-055-002/PP-003 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2009).

10. *Officer General Specifications*, 1.3. Additional detail is provided by documents detailing the occupational specifications and specialty specifications.
11. *Evaluation of the Canadian Defence Academy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, Chief Review Services, 2015), 8.
12. *Evaluation of the Canadian Defence Academy*, 8.
13. For example, the chief of defense staff's direction on Operation Honour to deal with sexual misconduct and harassment; the government's agreement on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325) for women, peace, and security; and the development of Joint Doctrine Note 2017-01 *Child Soldiers* are contemporary examples of policies, direction, and guidance that must be included in curriculum above and beyond the technical aspects in the OGS.
14. The Canadian government's agreement to S/RES/1325 on women and gender is an example of an international agreement that then must be considered in the delivery of PME, while the post-9/11 decision by the government to engage in Afghanistan created a need to ensure that counterinsurgency was more deliberately covered in curriculum.
15. For example, the Command and Staff Course syllabus in 2000 indicated "the aim of area goal #4 is to develop the student's ability to plan and conduct joint and combined operations." MajGen J. G. E. Tremblay, "Syllabus: Canadian Forces College (CSC) Joint Command and Staff Programme Residential (JCSP RESID) and Joint Command and Staff Distance Learning (JCSP DL)," 1-E-2/3.
16. Tremblay, "Syllabus," 1-3/19.
17. *Military operations other than war* is the contemporary term from the early 2000s to deal with operations that were not defined as high-intensity conflict.
18. The reader should be aware that this three-month and six-month structure began in 1998. In years prior, there was a yearlong program called National Defence College, but it was cancelled as part of budget reductions implemented in the mid-1990s.
19. Cassivi, "Syllabus: Canadian Forces College (CFC), National Security Programme (NSP)," 1.
20. In the context of this discussion, the term *middle power* refers to a state that holds a position in the international power spectrum below that of a superpower, which wields superior influence over all other states, or of a great power, but with sufficient ability to shape international events.
21. For example, in the Canadian case, could those officers selected for higher operational command attend an allied nation's course like the United Kingdom's Higher Command and Staff Course, or could CFC run a specifically designed and tailored program of study when the need arises?
22. Paul Mitchell, "Mitchell on Building the Bridge to Tomorrow: Canadian Forces College," *CDA Institute* (blog), 31 August 2017.
23. It is important to note that the master's of defense studies associated with JCSP is a professional degree that would prepare an individual to undertake a professionally based doctorate in defense studies but would not prepare an individual to undertake a doctoral program in a more traditional discipline-specific academic program. The master's of public administration associated with the NSP is an academically based program at RMC and NSP students receive up to 9 of the 12 credits required for the degree.
24. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 17.
25. Canada has recently developed specific doctrine for dealing with child soldiers. Released as a Joint Doctrine Note in March 2017, the CAF is setting an important precedent for military forces on UN missions. See *Child Soldiers*, JDN 2017-01 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017).