



# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**EFFECTS OF COMPETING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAMS ON DEMOCRATIZATION OF  
CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN MALI SINCE ITS  
RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN 2013**

by

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September 2018

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DEMOCRATIZATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN MALI SINCE  
ITS RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN 2013**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Six years ago, a military takeover of Mali's government caused the country's democracy to crumble, creating further regional instability. Once the coup was resolved, Malians and many donors from the international community worked to reinstate civilian control over the military and to improve military effectiveness. This thesis investigated the impact of that aid on civil-military relations, control, and effectiveness. It found that foreign aid has had a low to medium impact so far on civilian control and military effectiveness. Foreign assistance has had only a modest effect on the development of institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms. On the same note, foreign assistance has had a low impact on Mali's capability to devise a security plan or strategy, as well as to develop inter-agency institutions, even if providing resources to train and equip the Malian forces. As violence and terrorism are encroaching, in spite of foreign security assistance, there is little impact on military effectiveness. In this context, this thesis recommends that the foreign donors continue their efforts to provide security assistance to the Malian government, and the Malian elites use the foreign assistance more effectively to build better civil-military institutions.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AFISMA	The African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMA	Arab Movement of Azawad
AU	African Union
CCMR	Naval Postgraduate School Center for Civil-Military Relations
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
HCUA	High Council for the Unity of Azawad
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MOD	Ministry of Defense
NA	National Assembly
NGO	non-governmental organization
NMLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past five years, Mali has experienced political, economic, and security turmoil. It started in January 2012, when the rebel group called National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) allied with terrorist groups in the northern regions of Mali and took up arms against the central government. Some rebels were military while other rebels dressed as military; all took advantage of people through theft and abuse. Before the rebellion, rampant corruption in the highest echelons of military and civilian leadership had created popular frustrations that, in turn, provided support for the rebels—at least at first. Despotism and nepotism were rampant. Unemployment and insecurity were rising, and the economy was in bad shape.

In March 2012, after two decades of transitioning to democracy, Mali's democracy crumbled in a coup that overthrew democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Toure. During this upheaval, Mali saw two-thirds of its territory seized by the combined rebel and terrorist group, increasing tensions between the army and civilian leaders. Thanks to talks that started in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) in 2013 and the efforts of a newly elected officials, the NMLA and the central government in Bamako eventually signed a peace agreement in June 2015.<sup>1</sup> Despite the peace agreement, however, the NMLA has made little effort to respect the accord.

The 2012 military coup revealed that the Malian government badly needed to achieve democratic civil-military relations. Even though Mali had, before the coup, created a reasonably sound political and economic society as well as a healthy civil society, it had failed in developing strong and capable security institutions and competent civilian control of the military.<sup>2</sup> Since 2013, Mali has been receiving a considerable amount of international assistance to rebuild its social, economic, and political society, and to strengthen the control and effectiveness of the security institutions. The assistance also aims to improve the

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<sup>1</sup> Florina Cristiana Matei, "The Case of Mali," in *Security Forces in African States Cases and Assessment*, ed. Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb, (104–105 (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2017)).

<sup>2</sup> Matei, "The Case of Mali," 104–105.

relations between civilians and the armed forces. Foreign assistance has placed Mali at a crossroads in reaching domestic goals while under international pressure. The domestic goals consist of building a lasting peace and consolidating a democratic state through economic and social development. Beside national objectives, Mali also faces the challenge of preserving the donors' interests. Donors' interests are geopolitical, such as free circulation of people, goods and services; strategic, such as stability and the fight against drug and human trafficking, and counterterrorism; and economic security for both parties.<sup>3</sup>

#### **A. THESIS QUESTION**

This thesis, therefore, assesses the following question. How has foreign assistance affected post-2012 Mali civil-military relations, specifically in the areas of democratic civilian control and overall effectiveness of the armed forces?

#### **B. IMPORTANCE**

In a period when international institutions and countries are working together to assist Mali to overcome the challenges it faces after the 2012 crisis, this thesis studies and analyzes the impact of this security and economic assistance despite the ambiguity of the situation. As Mali gains in interest to many countries and institutions, such an analysis will help develop the knowledge of international players and how their assistance can shape civil-military relations in the long term.

Prior to the 2012 coup, Mali was on the path to a successful democracy, and this research hopes to help Mali return to that path.<sup>4</sup> Even though it was not a consolidated democracy before the coup, Mali had already made significant progress in political and institutional reforms to meet democratic conditions. Its three branches of power—executive, legislative, and judicial—had existed for two decades. Mali also excelled in conducting free and fair elections since 1992. It progressively developed a functioning civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucracy, and economic society. As quoted by Florina Cristiana Matei, “Sako notes, after the 2002 elections, it was accepted,

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<sup>3</sup> Alexis Arief, “Crisis in Mali,” *Current Politics and Economics of Africa* 6, no. 1 (January 2013): 40

<sup>4</sup> Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 111–115.

especially among the international community, that democracy was taking root in Mali and the country was well on its way to a mature, self-sustaining and stable western-style democracy.”<sup>5</sup> Mali also strove to institutionalize democratic civil-military relations, yet at a slower pace as compared to the rest of democratic progress.<sup>6</sup> In this connection, Matei notes: “Prior to the coup Mali achieved significant progress in bringing about political and economic reforms, it made less progress in developing robust, democratic civil-military relations (a tradeoff between democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the security sector).”<sup>7</sup> In March 2012, however, Mali’s democratic consolidation was halted by a group of low-ranking soldiers led by Captain Hamadou Haya Sanogo, who staged a coup against the democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Toure (also known as ATT). Since the elections in September 2013, Mali re-embarked on the path to democratic institution building with foreign assistance.

U.S. government assistance to Mali, for example, has focused on several objectives, backed up by education and training, including a Security Governance Initiative (SGI) by President Barack Obama. According to Alexis Arieff, these objectives consist “of promoting stability, democracy, civilian control of the military, and effectively countering terrorist threats in Africa.”<sup>8</sup> In a congressional hearing (Wednesday, December 5, 2012) Senator Christopher A. Coons from Delaware stated that

there are three simultaneous crises occurring in Mali—a security, a political, and a humanitarian crisis—all three of which, in my view, threaten United States interest in Africa and require the attention of the U.S. Government and the world. That’s why we’ve convened this hearing today, to assess developments in Mali and to discuss a path forward to restore democracy, to reclaim the north, to stabilize the security situation, and to address ongoing humanitarian needs.”<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 111–115.

<sup>6</sup> Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 111–115.

<sup>7</sup> Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 103.

<sup>8</sup> Arieff, “Crisis in Mali,” 26

<sup>9</sup> Assessing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the north, Senate, 112<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., December 5, 2012, 1.

In this spirit, this thesis comes out of the SGI program. On the one hand, this thesis reveals insights of Mali's current situation to U.S. officials, so they can have better understand and better assess civil-military relations in Mali. On the other hand, this thesis can help policy makers to adapt Malian civil-military relations to the political, economic, and cultural structures of the country. The author hopes this thesis will also help Malian civilians and military members understand each other and the military role better, which may prevent another coup and promote democracy.

While there is a significant body of scholarship available on civil-military relations in new democracies and on foreign assistance in consolidating democracy, there is limited literature on Mali and the impact foreign assistance on its democracy, especially on civil-military relations. This thesis contributes to understanding this challenge.

### **C. HYPOTHESES**

Despite both political and security institutions having built strong relations with external players, there has been little improvement in civil-military relations. Since the events of 2012, however, Mali's political and security issues have become the concerns of the international community, including the European Union, the United Nations, African Union, France, and the United States. This interplay of various forms and sources of assistance serves different purposes and objectives for the donors. The diverse interests of contributors may weigh on the future of Mali, the region, the African continent, and on a wider level, the whole world.<sup>10</sup> This thesis tests four potential hypotheses regarding foreign assistance and civil-military relations:

1. The foreign security assistance has had little impact on civil-military relations since the 2013 elections.
2. The foreign security assistance has improved civil-military relations, both in terms of effectiveness and control.

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<sup>10</sup> European Commission, "Donor Conference on Mali," Support and Development of Mali, press release, Brussels, May 15, 2013, <http://donor-conference-mali.eu/>.

3. The foreign security assistance has improved democratic civilian control of the military but not military effectiveness.
4. The foreign security assistance has improved effectiveness but not democratic civilian control of the armed forces.

## **D. LITERATURE REVIEW**

Much like Bobby Chand found in his Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis on Nepal,<sup>11</sup> there is a lack of literature regarding civil-military relations in Mali or on the role of foreign aid on civil-military relations in the country. However, Mali has received substantial assistance, particularly since 2013, and there is evidence that that assistance has impacted both civil-military relations and military effectiveness. The following thesis adapts Chand's structure and discusses Malian civilian control and military effectiveness in terms of "theoretical aspects," and "foreign security assistance" to set the stage for further analysis.<sup>12</sup>

### **1. Democratic Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness**

Samuel P. Huntington's core theory on civilian control of the military is based on military "professionalism." Huntington posits that the mechanisms of "subjective" and "objective" control are the components of subordination of the military in civil-military relations.<sup>13</sup> He describes "subjective" and "objective" control in the context of civil-military relations in democracy. According to him, subjective control is the power of the executive, the legislative, and judicial branches on the armed forces.<sup>14</sup> The objective civilian control encompasses military professionalism, in that sharing power between both civilian and military is essential in shaping the professional attitudes and behavior among

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<sup>11</sup> Bobby Chand, "Foreign Assistance and Its Impact on Civil-Military Relations: A Case Study of Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 3–4, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41357>.

<sup>12</sup> Chand, "Foreign Assistance."

<sup>13</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 1957), 83.

<sup>14</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 83.

the members of the defense forces.<sup>15</sup> Huntington emphasizes that, in civil-military relations, the structural position of the military within the governing body, the nature of the ideologies of the armed forces, and the informal role and influence of the officer corps are the main interdependent elements of civil-military relations. Nevertheless, the complex balance between authority, influence, and ideology of the military and civilian is measured against a particular explanation.<sup>16</sup>

Huntington suggests that military autonomy, professionalization, political neutrality, and voluntary subordination are dependent variables in democratic civilian control. His concept of objective civilian control claims that officer corps should be completely autonomous to manage public order, which leads to professionalization, which proceeds to voluntary subordination and political alienation, which leads to secure civilian control.<sup>17</sup> Huntington's civilian control theories help explain civil military relations in mature democracies because they emphasize the United States as an example of the process. Contrary to a country that is in the process of rebuilding its democratic institutions, such theories are inadequate to explain the complexities of civil-military relations. Mali is in the process of reconstructing its democratic civilian control of the armed forces and reforming its institutions after a period of upheaval that has affected the country's civilian-military relations. Thus, this thesis examines the relations between civilian elites and the military for the purpose of understanding civil-military improvement in a new democracy.

Thomas C. Bruneau criticizes Huntington's approach in explaining civilian control of the military. He states that Huntington is biased in selecting data to support his theory of the military as a profession, as a variable to explain democratic civilian control.<sup>18</sup> According to Bruneau, "professionalism," similar to "culture," is not a concept to rely on. He notes "the qualities that make up professionalism, just like culture, are subjective,

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<sup>15</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 83.

<sup>16</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 83.

<sup>17</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 83.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas C. Bruneau, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2015), 16–18.

dynamic, and changing.”<sup>19</sup> He argues that the United States adopted joint professional education long after Huntington wrote his book. Furthermore, he considers that military education “changed the culture of the U.S. armed forces, something that Huntington assumed to be largely static.”<sup>20</sup> Another point that Bruneau deems a flaw in Huntington’s theory is the latter’s focus on only “objective and subjective models” of democratic civilian control of the officer corps.<sup>21</sup> As Bruneau insinuates, however, democratic civilian control also encompasses effectiveness and efficiency. Bruneau posits that the effectiveness of the military consists of fulfilling several roles and missions, which are fighting wars, participating in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance, fighting terrorism, and fighting against drugs and human trafficking. He states that efficiency is to fulfill these roles and missions at a low cost. Although Bruneau’s emphasis on flaws in Huntington theories is relevant, it does not suffice to explain civil-military relations in Africa where interstate conflicts do not exist, and internal conflict is the main challenge. This thesis analyzes the specific mechanism of effectiveness in Mali.

Rocky Williams, in his article “Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition,” refers to Huntington’s “objective” and “subjective” control as the forms of civil-military relations mechanisms.<sup>22</sup> Like Huntington, Williams states that objective control encompasses the constitutional, the executive, and the judicial mechanisms in democratic civil-military relations in most liberal democracies. Further, he clarifies that the efficacy of these formal mechanisms depends on the distribution of power among social classes, state elites, and individuals in the given organization. According to Williams, objective forms refer to the structure, roles, and the culture of each country. He argues that the level of oversight within government, constitutions, and judicial determines the acquiescence and monitoring of the armed forces.

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<sup>19</sup> Bruneau, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 16–18.

<sup>20</sup> Bruneau, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 16–18.

<sup>21</sup> Bruneau, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 16–18.

<sup>22</sup> Rocky Williams, “Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition.” *African Journal of Political Science*, no. 3 (June 1998): 20–41.

Williams identifies the subjective measures as another form of civilian control of the armed forces. According to him, subjective consists of arranging a developing partnership between the military, political, and civil society. He implies that partnerships among these institutions can facilitate the penetration of the officer corps. He also suggests that ethnic and military mission manipulation ensure loyalty of the armed forces to the constitution, and prevent their intrusion on the non-military terrain. Williams insinuates that monitoring of the military can be established through “counter balances” of civilian involvement in the police, intelligence, and para-military agencies. He also proposes the creation of a joint political-military management of the defense policy and planning process and the involvement of civilian officials in the formulation of security policy.

Williams adds that subjective forms of civil control of the military include the composition of the officer corps.<sup>23</sup> He states that balance of power, social and class structure of the defense personnel, their corporate identity, their skills patterns and operational experiences, and the relations between services in the armed forces are relevant to the control and effectiveness of the military. Moreover, he mentions that these will vary according to the mode of civil-military relations under scrutiny, and the inter-relationships between instances. These relations depend on the political and social culture of the country.<sup>24</sup>

Karen Guttieri describes the subordination of the armed forces by civilian leaders as the prerequisite for civil-military relations.<sup>25</sup> According to Guttieri, an elected civilian official ordering the military and military alienated from political spectrum are indicators of civilian control of the armed forces. Guttieri goes on to note that the respect of the military for their civilian counterpart develops expertise in security issues, oversight of armed forces capacity, and ensure subordination.<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, Guttieri emphasizes

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<sup>23</sup> Williams, “Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition,” 20–41.

<sup>24</sup> Williams, “Towards the Creation of an African Civil-Military Relations Tradition,” 20–41.

<sup>25</sup> Karen Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 236–243.

<sup>26</sup> Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243.



the criticism that “civilian high dependence on the military to maintain civil order and protect against internal and external threats can reduce its control over the armed forces.”<sup>27</sup> She rejects the view that the powerful and competent the military becomes, as a result of procurement of weapons or education programs, the more civilian rule becomes vulnerable to military intervention in politics.

In addition, Guttieri acknowledges that education encompassing military norms and beliefs in relation to the executive, the legislative, and civil society is the key to civilian military relations.<sup>28</sup> According to her, “education of military officers is particularly significant in states in transition to democracy. The uncertainties that characterize the first steps toward democracy can give false appeal to the apparent certainty of military rule; education mitigates the uncertainty that derives from not knowing or understanding.”<sup>29</sup> Yet Guttieri agrees that education and indoctrination are relevant to civilian control of the armed forces. She also states that professionalism of military officers can be relied on to guarantee civilian control of the military. In fact, Guttieri suggests several ways of achieving military subordination and ensuring obedience.<sup>30</sup>

According to Narcis Serra, control is obtained “by observing who takes decisions in the field of military policy and by checking the execution of these decisions.”<sup>31</sup> Serra identifies this process as an element of measuring civilian control of the military. He asserts that scrutinizing and containing the military is a restrictive task of civil-military relations.<sup>32</sup> It has a much broader meaning. Serra emphasizes indoctrination of nationalism as an important element of control and effectiveness. He draws attention to peace missions, disaster relief operations, or collaboration in the struggle against drug-trafficking and inter-ministerial cooperation as relevant to control and effectiveness. He further argues that

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<sup>27</sup> Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243.

<sup>28</sup> Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243.

<sup>29</sup> Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243.

<sup>30</sup> Guttieri, “Professional Military Education in Democracies,” 236–243.

<sup>31</sup> Narcis Serra, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 244–247.

<sup>32</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 245.

“civil control of the military is not a set of measures and techniques oriented to prevent coup d’état. That would be to restrict this broad concept to a specific, extreme situation in civilian-military relations.”<sup>33</sup> Serra suggests that limiting civilian control to government and the armed forces is narrow.<sup>34</sup> He believes that civil society should participate in the process. Serra adds that “military must have a margin of autonomy in consistence with the role society wants them to perform.”<sup>35</sup> Overall, he states that loyalty to the constitution is a key element in the control of the armed forces in consolidated democracies.<sup>36</sup> All these elements contribute to control and effectiveness; however, Serra fails to address the cultural and ethnic roles that Williams mentions in explaining control and effectiveness on civil military relations in African States. In addition, Serra’s conception of giving a margin of autonomy to the military is not suitable in the case of Mali. Because military discussing their own budgets in Mali may lead to corruption among high ranking officers who may already be corrupt The review will discuss Serra view about control and effectiveness of the military and how it has affected Mali’s civil-military relations.

According to Matei, control is one element of the trinity of civilian leaders over security forces.<sup>37</sup> Matei agrees with Serra and Williams that a formal mechanism of checks and balances contributes to control and effectiveness of the military. Matei asserts that control includes institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and accommodation and development of professional norms, which may contribute to effectiveness.<sup>38</sup> According to Matei, “an institutional control mechanism consists of steering security forces by civilian leadership in various institutions and organizations managed by professional staff. These organizations consist of a civilian ministry of defense for the military, a police led civilian

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<sup>33</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 245.

<sup>34</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 246.

<sup>35</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 246.

<sup>36</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 246.

<sup>37</sup> Florina Cristiana Matei “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristina Matei (New York: Routledge, 2015), 29–32.

<sup>38</sup> Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 29–32.

in an interior ministry, and a civilian as the head of the intelligence agency.”<sup>39</sup> Moreover, control includes committees to decide on policies and budgeting, and a civilian chain of command to define roles and missions, such as National Security Council. Second, oversight is the follow-up by civilian leaders on security forces activities in the cadre of legal basis; it makes sure that security forces act in respect and obedience to the civilian leaders.<sup>40</sup>

Matei suggests that in a consolidated democracy, oversight is not merely limited to executive, legislative, and judicial branches; it is also exercised by independent organizations such as media, non-governmental organizations (NGO), think tanks, and other forms of civil society as well as international organizations as Human Rights Courts.<sup>41</sup> Last, professional norms involve transparency in the processes of “recruitment, education, training, and promotion,” that match the objectives of the democratically elected officials, therefore embedding the mechanisms of institutional control and oversight.<sup>42</sup> Some of these ideas are relevant to the situation in Mali. However, transparency in the process of recruitment, education, training, and promotion is influenced by the individual’s adherence to the government in power, or relationship to decision makers in the political elites or high rank military.

Moreover, Matei and Serra share the view that to measure the control level exercised by national and international authorities, security forces have to fulfill six major security roles: wars, internal wars, terrorism, crime, humanitarian assistance, and peace. These roles are exercised at the national level; however, an international level also defines the roles, but focuses mainly on wars, terrorism, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations.

While control focuses on the civilian authorities, a mechanism of effectiveness complements civil-military relations in a consolidating democracy. According to Matei,

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<sup>39</sup> Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 29–32.

<sup>40</sup> Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 29–32.

<sup>41</sup> Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 29–32.

<sup>42</sup> Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 29–32.

“effectiveness is best determined by whether or not the security institutions are prepared to fulfill any of the previously introduced six roles assigned to them.”<sup>43</sup> Effectiveness, however, cannot be measured on military success in war fighting. For instance, “while the United States was successful during the initial wars against the Taliban and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, it was not successful at the post conflict stages.”<sup>44</sup> The effectiveness requirement includes the outcome of all other roles and missions mentioned earlier.

According to Abbas Kadhimi, who argues based on the case of Iraq on effectiveness of the military, “effectiveness of the defense forces is not measured by the armed forces strength to conduct their duties and carry out the missions that the civilian leaders assigned to them, which involve defending the country against external and internal threats.”<sup>45</sup> He says, “Doctrine and training are not sufficient in effectiveness, but also equipment necessary, logistic, and other forms of support to combat units; and provide the ability of coordination to succeed in a large-scale conflict.”<sup>46</sup> Kadhimi’s argument about logistics and equipment support to the armed forces mirrors the case of Mali where the military lacks equipment and logistics to fulfill their roles and missions. In addition to what was emphasized as effectiveness are the scale of motivation of the defense forces and the desire to serve and to protect the civil society. Thus, this research measures the effectiveness of the armed forces as a servant of the civil society, as well as the military’s degree of motivation.

## **2. Civil-Military Relations and Foreign Security Assistance**

Serra mentions in his book *The Military Transition* that external players can have both negative and positive impacts on civil-military relations.<sup>47</sup> According to him, this

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<sup>43</sup> Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 29–32.

<sup>44</sup> Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 29–32.

<sup>45</sup> Kadhimi, Abbas, “Rebuilding the Military under Democratic Control Iraq,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristina Matei, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 139.

<sup>46</sup> Abbas, “Rebuilding the Military under Democratic Control Iraq,” 139.

<sup>47</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 68–69.

impact depends on “their importance or the direction in which they might be pushing.”<sup>48</sup> He notes “the twentieth century illustrates examples of experiences that lead in every possible direction.”<sup>49</sup> In quoting Laurence Whitehead, Serra observes “in peacetime external factors can only play a secondary role in re-democratization.”<sup>50</sup> Serra emphasizes that Whitehead refers to the negative and ambiguous roles played by the United States in Latin American. Conversely, Serra states that European countries’ democratic support during the 1970s in the transition in the three southern European countries was successful in the process of democratic consolidation. Moreover, Serra asserts that NATO contributed significantly to the political construction during the early stage of democratic consolidation, which he notes that was the goal desired by citizens in these countries.<sup>51</sup>

In civil-military relations, foreign security assistance can be effective in some sectors while in others it can be ineffective, as Diana Molodilo and Valeriu Mija emphasize in the case of the Republic of Moldova.<sup>52</sup> According to Molodilo and Mija, Moldova’s partnership with the European Union has helped the country in the process to consolidated democracy and civil-military relations. They state that the Moldovan parliament adopted “the key normative acts that regulated the system.”<sup>53</sup> Nonetheless, civil-military relations in Moldova are still far from being effective, particularly in civilian control.<sup>54</sup> For example, consider that the constitutional court ruled against the president’s decision ( 1994 - 1996), after he fired Division General Pavel Creanga for “incompetence and corruption.”<sup>55</sup> For Molodilo and Mija, this case revealed the weakness and fragility of democratic civilian control and oversight. While foreign assistance was not effective in civilian control of the

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<sup>48</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 68–69.

<sup>49</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 68–69.

<sup>50</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 68–69.

<sup>51</sup> Serra, *The Military Transition*, 68–69.

<sup>52</sup> Diana Molodilo and Valeriu Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on Civil-Military Relations,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristina Matei. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 331–335.

<sup>53</sup> Molodilo and Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on Civil-Military Relations,” 331–335.

<sup>54</sup> Molodilo and Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on Civil-Military Relations,” 331–335.

<sup>55</sup> Molodilo and Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on Civil-Military Relations,” 331–335.

armed forces, it was effective in 1997 with the appointment of the first civilian Minister of Defense. According to the authors, this “was a positive breakthrough in democratic civil-military relations.”<sup>56</sup> Moreover, they state that contributions from international experts such as those from the NPS Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) in Monterey, California, helped Moldova in its civil-military relations. “For the first time, representatives from civil society were invited to participate” in defense commissions review.<sup>57</sup> In addition, they observe “civilian and military advisors from NATO and its partner states have provided assistance to Moldova in its reform efforts.”<sup>58</sup> According to Molodilo and Mija, this enabled Moldova to participate in exercises in peacekeeping missions and humanitarian relief actions.<sup>59</sup> They argue that this assistance has had positive impact on Moldova civil-military relations. Thus, foreign security assistance can improve or deteriorate democratic civil-military relations.

Foreign security assistance is driven by certain factors that can influence the amount of aid provided by the donors. According to Piotr Lis, “foreign aid is often claimed to serve as a tool to promote social and economic development, which may be hindered if a country experiences an episode of armed conflict or increased terrorist activity.”<sup>60</sup> He goes on to say violence and instability can impede donors’ aims for assistance due to many reasons. The first motive concerns the destruction of human and tangible assets, which may impede the recipient’s strength, and affect donors’ interests. In addition, domestic tensions, corruption, and misuse of aid funds can discourage donors from providing assistance.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, Lis asserts that the presence of adverse groups within the recipient state may affect donors’ action for the fear of supporting one group rather another. On one hand, this situation may hinder the engagement level of donors who are committed to non-involvement in foreign countries’ internal affairs; on the other, it may push other donors to

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<sup>56</sup> Molodilo and Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on Civil-Military Relations,” 331–335.

<sup>57</sup> Molodilo and Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on Civil-Military Relations,” 331–335.

<sup>58</sup> Molodilo and Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on Civil-Military Relations,” 335.

<sup>59</sup> Molodilo and Mija, “The Impact of the Partnership for Peace on Civil-Military Relations,” 331–335.

<sup>60</sup> Piotr Lis, “Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Foreign Aid,” *Peace Economics. Peace Science and Public Policy* 20, no. 4 (October 2014): 655–667.

<sup>61</sup> Lis, “Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Foreign Aid,” 655–667.

increase their assistance if it serves their strategic interests.<sup>62</sup> According to Lis, while multilateral donors focus on government quality, policies, and reduced military budgets, bilateral donors are more prone to provide additional assistance for geopolitical concerns, strategic alliances, and colonial history.<sup>63</sup>

Lis also emphasizes security issues as another factor that drives allocation decisions. Lis argues that states with a global interest in their effort to fight terrorism provide security assistance to avoid terrorism spreading to their homeland. This assistance may be direct or indirect,<sup>64</sup> including to “other areas such as education or healthcare,” or agriculture, which in turn may free up monies to fight terrorism.<sup>65</sup> Thus, security factors may initiate aid flows.

Furthermore, Lis considers that the role of religion is relevant to how aid gets allocated. Since “a large share of terrorism has been driven by Muslim”<sup>66</sup> fundamentalists, it can affect foreign donors’ decisions. Although Mali is approximately 95 percent Muslim, the country receives a large amount of assistance from diverse donors.

In his testimony, Dr. John Hillen, the Assistant Secretary for the U.S. notes, “Security assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that allows ... promoting key American values with respect to democracy, human rights, and civilian rule of the military.”<sup>67</sup> According to Chand, Hillen also mentions “The United States provides training, advice, and assistance to the militaries of developing countries as a security assistance to further its foreign policy goals. Washington asserts that employment of such instruments helps to achieve the goals in a cost-effective way. It allows the U.S. to have political influence and encourages attitudinal changes in the host country.”<sup>68</sup> This emphasizes what Lis points out about multilateral donors being more prone to provide additional assistance for geopolitical

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<sup>62</sup> Lis, “Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Foreign Aid,” 655–667.

<sup>63</sup> Lis, “Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Foreign Aid,” 655–667.

<sup>64</sup> Lis, “Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Foreign Aid,” 655–667.

<sup>65</sup> Lis, “Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Foreign Aid,” 655–667.

<sup>66</sup> Lis, “Terrorism, Armed Conflict and Foreign Aid,” 655–667.

<sup>67</sup> Chand, “Foreign Assistance..”

<sup>68</sup> Chand, “Foreign Assistance.”

concerns and strategic alliance. This is relevant in explaining the United States security assistance to Mali in many different sectors, such as democracy promotion, inter-ministerial relations, and the fight against terrorism in the Sahel regions.

For decades, the United States has provided assistance to Mali. “In FY 2016, U.S. foreign assistance to Mali totaled more than \$125.1 million with \$117 million expected for FY 2017.”<sup>69</sup> The U.S aid package aims to support the June 20, 2015 peace accord signed between Mali and armed groups.<sup>70</sup> At the same time, “U.S. interests in Mali include promoting democracy and improved governance; promoting regional security by combatting”<sup>71</sup> terrorism and human and drug trafficking; reducing poverty, improving the quality of life in Mali, and encouraging sustainable economic growth.<sup>72</sup> U.S. assistance in Mali can have both negative and positive effects on civil-military relations.

## **E. METHODS AND SOURCES**

This thesis assesses the impact of foreign security assistance provided to Mali by the European Union, United Nations, African Unions, France, and the United States on civil-military relations. After detailing the current situation and examining the assistance, the thesis uses Matei’s framework as a basis to assess the impact.

The research draws from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources consist of government documents, newspaper, reports, press releases, and the author’s personal experiences. Due to the current and ongoing issues tied to the event, primary resources include recent writings and assessments. Secondary resources dealing with different aspects of civil-military relations include books, journals, other individuals’ assessments, and literature.

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<sup>69</sup> U.S. Department of State, “About the Department of State,” accessed August 9, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/ml/>.

<sup>70</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note,” July 20, 2018, <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Mali-SSR-Background-Note>.

<sup>71</sup> U.S. Department of State, “About the Department of State.”

<sup>72</sup> U.S. Department of State.



## **F. THESIS OVERVIEW**

This thesis has five chapters. Chapter I introduces the problem, background, literature review, and research methods. Chapter II analyzes foreign security assistance to Mali since the re-democratization process began in 2013. Chapter III analyzes the structure of democratic civil-military relations since 2013. Chapter IV assesses how foreign security assistance has impacted civilian control over the military and military effectiveness using the framework developed by Matei. Finally, Chapter V concludes with a synthesis of the research and recommendations.

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## II. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO MALI SINCE 2013

Since its independence in 1960, Mali has depended heavily on foreign assistance. This assistance has come in many forms, including economic, political, security, and humanitarian. In the aftermath of the 2012 political and security upheaval, however, the international donors' conference on Mali held in Brussels, presided over by France and the European Union (EU), pledged the largest amount in terms of dollars in economic, political, humanitarian, and security assistance in Mali's history. Mali received between \$3.5 billion and \$5 billion from diverse donors.<sup>73</sup> According to Christopher Holshek, the amount is more than \$4-billion,<sup>74</sup> which is equivalent to Mali's current national budget. The assistance came over a period of five years to help the economic, political, and security sectors, and essentially aimed "to rebuild a new Mali."<sup>75</sup> This is the first time that Mali has received such a huge sum to reshape its failed institutions and its weak security and economy.

Although this assistance seeks to contribute to strengthening government institutions in Mali, as well as increasing Mali's security and stability, it also aims at developing economic, political, and civil-military relations. Moreover, the assistance reinforces security in the Sahel region. Donors see Mali as a key player in safeguarding the stability of the Sahel region, the African continent, and even the world, particularly against terrorist groups and transnational organized crime.<sup>76</sup> As a strategic state, Mali has become indispensable to the security of its neighbors and in the fights against many illicit activities in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as drug and human trafficking. Mali thus received various types of assistance from players with diverse goals and interests during the international donors' conference. Indeed, while much of the aid has been motivated by the growing

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<sup>73</sup> European Commission, "Donor Conference on Mali, Support and Development of Mali," Press release, May 15, 2013, <http://donor-conference-mali.eu/>.

<sup>74</sup> Christopher Holshek, "Learning from More than Mali: The Primacy of Civil Authority in Security Sector Development and Assistance," *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+ F)/Security and Peace* (2014): 108–112.

<sup>75</sup> European Commission, "Donor Conference on Mali."

<sup>76</sup> European Commission, "Donor Conference on Mali."

importance of the country, particularly the strategic role Mali plays in the region, each donor country or organization has contributed to Mali's foreign assistance efforts according to its own interests and goals. The United Nations (UN), EU, France, the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar all have strategic, economic, security, and political interests in Mali. Both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have regional, strategic, political, and security interests. Post-coup, Mali has also received assistance from hundreds of international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, the Red Cross, the World Food Program, and the United Nations Refugees Program. Thus, foreign aid continues to be a major source of governmental development projects. In fact, for the full year of 2016, foreign aid contributed to 25 percent of Mali's national budget.<sup>77</sup>

This chapter reviews Mali's bilateral and multilateral relations with the EU, AU, the UN, and France, which all contribute to providing personnel skills, training, equipment, and other resources to improve the effectiveness of Mali's security sectors. It also reviews the assistance provided by the United States as support to improve both security and governance in Mali.

## **A. OVERVIEW OF EUROPEAN UNION AID**

There are long and strong multilateral relations between the EU and Mali. These relations are economic, political, and security based. Both Mali and the EU play significant roles in helping each other develop and strengthen their bilateral and multilateral relations.

Mali holds an important place in EU policy as it is an easy access point to Libya and on to Europe for human and drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, and illegal immigration. The EU fears that a weak security force in Mali creates instability in the Sahel regions, therefore creating a flow of immigration to Europe that can threaten European

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<sup>77</sup> C. M. Traore, "Ressources Extérieures," [External Resources] *L'Essor*, September 19, 2016, <http://www.maliactu.net/mali-aide-exterieure>.

security.<sup>78</sup> The EU also fears that an unstable Mali could be a safe haven for terrorists. These are some of the drivers of EU assistance to Mali. The EU also provides economic aid to reduce the vulnerability of indigenous populations to these types of threats, which partially explains the motivation behind the engagement of 22 European nations, including five non-members of the EU, responding quickly to the Malian crisis.<sup>79</sup>

Under these circumstances, since the 2012 crisis, Mali has received much assistance from the EU. Data shows that, post-coup, the EU has provided different sectors in Mali with financial assistance at around 327 million euros.<sup>80</sup> This assistance has aimed to help train and advise the military of Mali in order to increase the Malian security forces' capacity to defend the country's territorial integrity and to combat terrorism. In addition, the assistance aimed to build a strong and professional security force capable of launching operations against internal and external foes, to restore territorial integrity, and to face threats posed by terrorist groups.<sup>81</sup> The aid, largely allocated to investment in infrastructure development projects, also aimed to help the Malian economy to bounce back.

The courtship between the EU and Mali has gained momentum since 2013 as the assistance has increased, which, therefore, expanded the EU's mission. At first, the mission called the first Malian Battalion was under the command of French Army Brigade General Francois Lecointre. The Battalion was named "Waraba" ("The Lion" in Bambara), a name chosen by Malian Soldiers themselves as the official name.<sup>82</sup> After, there were a second and third Battalion, named "SAMA" and "ELOU," meaning "Elephant" in Bambara and

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<sup>78</sup> Simon, Luis, Alexander Mattelaer, and Amelia Hadfield. *A coherent EU strategy for the Sahel*. EUR-OP, 2012.  
[https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as\\_sdt=0%2C5&q=louis+simon%2Calenxander+mattelaer%2C+and+amelia+hadfield&btnG=](https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=louis+simon%2Calenxander+mattelaer%2C+and+amelia+hadfield&btnG=)

<sup>79</sup> Juan Carlos Castilla Baer, "The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM," *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos* 7 (2013), [www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_opinion/2013/DIEEEE093-2013\\_EUTM\\_Mali\\_CastillaBarea\\_ENGLISH.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2013/DIEEEE093-2013_EUTM_Mali_CastillaBarea_ENGLISH.pdf)

<sup>80</sup> Laura Davis, "Reform or Business as Usual? EU Security Provision in Complex Contexts: Mali," *Global Society* 29, no. 2 (2015): 260–279.

<sup>81</sup> Jan-Uwe Pettke, "European Union Training Mission Mali as an Example of the European Union's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management," June 2013, 22, <https://europa-kolleg-hamburg.de/en/new-study-paper-online/>.

<sup>82</sup> Pettke, "European Union Training Mission Mali."

Tamashek, respectively. Later, the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) agreed with the government of Mali to expand and extend their mission to other activities besides training and advice.<sup>83</sup> “After France and Germany, Belgium became, in 2016, the leading nation of this mission.”<sup>84</sup> With the expansion of the EUTM mandate, the mission focused on the river Niger loop and the areas of the municipalities of Gao and Timbuktu.<sup>85</sup>

In addition to assistance related to the security sector, the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) is intended to improve command and control, logistics, human resources, the respect of the international humanitarian law, the protection of civilians, and the understanding of human rights in the Malian armed forces. Furthermore, the EUTM role is also to strengthen the conditions for adequate control over the military by legitimate civilian authorities.<sup>86</sup>

In addition to this assistance, the EU participated in Mali’s peace process, which resulted in a signed agreement on June 18, 2015, between Mali and different groups in the country’s northern provinces; however, the agreement’s goals have not been implemented. Moreover, the EU played a major role in helping Mali organize free, fair, and transparent presidential and legislative elections in 2013. In addition, upon request from Malian authorities and in coordination with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), EUTM contributed to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process of ex-combatants; framed by the peace accord, EUTM provides training sessions in order to build a strong and coherent Malian military.<sup>87</sup> The DDR process, however, still has not been implemented by any of the participants of the accord.

The EUTM also supports the five Sahel Joint Forces (G5) that consist of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Chad. The EUTM aim is the enhancement of

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<sup>83</sup> Barea, “The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM.”

<sup>84</sup> Barea, “The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM.”

<sup>85</sup> Barea, “The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM.”

<sup>86</sup> Barea, “The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM.”

<sup>87</sup> Pettke, “European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali).”

coordination and interoperability within the G5 Sahel national armed forces to secure the Sahel region in Africa.<sup>88</sup>

## **B. AFRICAN UNION ASSISTANCE**

Mali is among the founding nations of the African Union, which is headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. African Union interests in Mali include security, political, and economic ones. Concerns as an important player in the stabilization of the continent, Mali's security is relevant to the African Union because it can affect the security of the whole continent. An unstable Mali has critical ramifications for the economic, political, and security aspects of the continent. Instability in Mali can also hinder the economic activities. Moreover, it can destabilize the continent from the spillover of growing terrorism and illicit activities.

As a continental player, the African Union provides aid to Mali focused primarily on security, political, and economic frameworks. Since 2013, however, the AU has operated as a mission under the umbrella of the United Nations to support Malian democracy and crack down on terrorism and human rights abuses. As a key player in the early stage, in its effort to help Mali regain its territorial integrity and to organize a free and fair election, AU assistance to Mali since 2013 has also focused on humanitarian relief missions.<sup>89</sup> Moreover, the African Union mission in Mali has also consisted of investigating any human rights violation by both the Malian security forces and the separatist groups allied with terrorist groups.<sup>90</sup> Over time, the AFISMA mission changed to a peacekeeping mission operating under the name of the United Nations Multi-Dimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali, or MINUSMA.<sup>91</sup> According to Christopher

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<sup>88</sup> Barea, "The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM."

<sup>89</sup> Abebe Wolkanto, "Responsibilities and Challenges of the African Union in Maintaining Continental Peace and Security: A Case Study of the Malian Crisis," July 20, 2016, <https://www.omicsonline.org/peer-reviewed/responsibilities-and-challenges-of-the-african-union-in-maintainingcontinental-peace-and-security-a-case-study-of-the-malian-crisi-77853.html>.

<sup>90</sup> Wolkanto, "Responsibilities and Challenges of the African Union in Maintaining Continental Peace and Security."

<sup>91</sup> Wing, Susanna D. "French Intervention in Mali: Strategic Alliances, Long-term Regional Presence?" *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 27, no. 1 (2016): 59–80.

Holshek, “The African-led International Support Mission to Mali ( AFISMA) of over 8,000 troops, mostly from ECOWAS countries under Nigerian command, will give way to the MINUSMA of 11,200 troops and 1,440 police in time for the elections.”<sup>92</sup>

### **C. UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE**

UN assistance has been significant in Mali since the beginning of the crisis in 2012. Different from the previous two, the UN assistance programs to Mali have involved humanitarian relief, peacekeeping missions, and civil-military relations.<sup>93</sup>

Besides the vote on Resolution 2085 at the United Nations in 2012, which helped Mali in regaining its territorial integrity, the UN missions also focus on participating in humanitarian relief, on civil-military relations, and on peacekeeping in Mali.<sup>94</sup> Humanitarian relief assistance helps populations in the northern regions of Mali (Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal) and central regions (Mopti and part of Segou) affected by the crisis get access to food and clean water. This aid also facilitates the transportation of logistics between the supplier and the beneficiary, and enables those populations to participate in infrastructure work such as building roads and health facilities. Moreover, the UN also contributes to maintaining peace between those supporting the unity of Mali, which include such pro-government groups as Gatia, Ganda Koy, Ganda Izo (in the local Songhai language) and the separatist groups favoring the division of Mali, such as the NMLA, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), and the Arab Movement of Azawad (AMA). Further, the UN contributes to maintaining peace between the secessionists and the Malian Army. UN assistance to Mali also includes civil-military coordination through the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) program.<sup>95</sup> The civil-military coordination program requires military intervention by the

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<sup>92</sup> Holshek, “Learning from More than Mali: The Primacy of Civil Authority in Security Sector Development and Assistance.”

<sup>93</sup> Boly Diene, “United Nations Civil-Military Coordination in Mali,” UNOCHA, July 22, 2013, [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/2013\\_07\\_22\\_UN\\_Coordination\\_civil\\_militaire\\_UN\\_CMCOORD.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/2013_07_22_UN_Coordination_civil_militaire_UN_CMCOORD.pdf).

<sup>94</sup> Diene, “United Nations Civil-Military Coordination in Mali.”

<sup>95</sup> Diene, “United Nations Civil-Military Coordination in Mali.”



Blue Helmets to provide direct assistance to populations affected by the crisis by distributing food and sanitary equipment. The program also offers indirect assistance and infrastructure rescue, which consists of repairing roads and rescue relief.

The ultimate purpose of these programs is to develop better civil-military relations, so that civilians do not perceive the military as a threat to their lives. As stated by Boly Diene (UN-CMCoord), “the interaction and dialogue between civil actors of humanitarian relief and military in emergency assistance situations is indispensable in order to protect, and to promote humanitarian assistance, to avoid rivalry, to reduce a possible incompatibility, and nevertheless, pursue the commons objectives of the aid or assistance.”<sup>96</sup> These activities relieve tensions between populations in the north and the military, tension created by the rebellion that led to many deaths of both soldiers and civilians. Such actions would also enable the military to focus on their main mission in order to reach a common ground for the betterment of Mali, and on civil-military relations.

#### **D. FRENCH ASSISTANCE**

France and Mali have had historical, political, and economic relationships. Mali achieved its independence from France on September 22, 1960, after the dissolution of the Malian Federation, composed of French Sudan (the former name of Mali) and Senegal. As a former colonial power, France’s rules influenced Mali in many ways,<sup>97</sup> including the adoption of the French language and the use of a currency (Francs CFA) pegged to the Euro currency and guaranteed by the French treasury. Moreover, many laws in the Malian constitution emanate from the legacy left by French rule. France and Mali have bilateral and multilateral relations. Both countries belong to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie. In addition, there are an estimated 120,000 Malians living in France and an

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<sup>96</sup> Diene, “United Nations Civil-Military Coordination in Mali.”

<sup>97</sup> U.S. Department of State “A Guide to the United States’ History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Mali,” Department of State, August 28, 2018, <https://history.state.gov/countries/mali>

estimated more than 5,000 French citizens living in Mali.<sup>98</sup> These relations explain part of the French military's intervention in Malian conflicts.

In this context, it should not come as a surprise that, among all donors, France has the biggest interest in Mali. These interests are economic, security, political, and geostrategic. As the interests of a former colonial power toward Mali have been continually unclear since the 2013 intervention, however, Mali could be a center of gravity for France to get its hands back on sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, its natural resources.<sup>99</sup> So far, France's mission to protect its economic interests in Mali has been successful because France has been so far able to stop the advancement of terrorist groups.

Moreover, France has done well in protecting its assets as well as its citizens. France's economic interests rely on huge investment by French companies in Mali and neighboring Niger (where the French energy company Areva has been extracting uranium for decades).<sup>100</sup> These companies include the giant petroleum company Total, Bolloré African Logistics (Manutention Mali), the communication and telephone companies RFI and Orange, respectively, and the infrastructure enterprise SATOM. Other small companies, such as CFAO MOTORS and SECURICOM, are also present in Mali. From the author's experience listening to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius, who gave a speech in 2015 in Mali, French companies in Mali made revenues of over 500 million Euros in 2014 alone. Thus, an unstable Mali would threaten French interests in both Mali and Niger. Yet, these are not the only interests that France holds in Mali. There are currency ties between France and Mali that play a big role in why France intervened in Mali in 2013: specifically, the CFA (French Colonies in Africa, currently called Community of French in Africa). A strong economy in Mali would be an advantage for France because France guarantees the CFA.

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<sup>98</sup> Rachel Baig, "The Interests behind France's Intervention in Mali," *Deutsche Welle*, January 16, 2013, <https://www.dw.com/en/the-interests-behind-frances-intervention-in-mali/a-16523792>.

<sup>99</sup> Wing, "French Intervention in Mali."

<sup>100</sup> Baig, "The Interests behind France's Intervention in Mali."

The security interests that France has in Mali involve combating terrorism, immigration, drug and human trafficking, kidnapping of French citizens in northern Mali, and protection of French companies' assets in Mali. Fear from the spillover of growing terrorism in Mali may affect French citizens living in Mali or even transcend boundaries to the French territory. France backed Mali in 2013 in order to thwart the spread of terrorism. When it comes to immigration, over the past decades, the instability in Africa has driven many refugees and immigrants into exile in Europe, particularly in France. This massive movement toward Europe carries with it the risk of terrorists as well as drug and human traffic. Immigration threatens the security of France, and a stable Mali can play a significant role in slowing down their refugee crisis. Moreover, kidnapping of French citizens in northern Mali in exchange for ransom by terrorists and human traffickers had grown rampant.<sup>101</sup>

Another aspect of French security interest is the signing of the defense accord between Mali and France, which the French signed partially to justify their military presence in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>102</sup> This military presence in Mali enables France to control resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. Installing their military base in Mali gave the French an opportunity to defend their interests in the Sahara region and further into African continent. According to one Malian officer, "the military materials and other types of materials brought by the French in Tessalit proves that they are not about to leave anytime soon ... [S]ince the beginning, the French had a hidden agenda to Malians.... They came in submarines."<sup>103</sup> Taking that officer's words into account, France does seem to have reached a long-standing objective in controlling Tessalit, in the Kidal region of Mali; as he states, Tessalit is the icing on the cake for the French, as many doors are now opened for them in Mali. France's military presence now seems pervasive in Mali, and France has access to Malian defense systems.

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<sup>101</sup> Wing, "French Intervention in Mali."

<sup>102</sup> Wing, "French Intervention in Mali."

<sup>103</sup> L'Aube, "Serval: Objectif Final: Une Base Française à Tessalit," [Serval: Final Goal: A French Base in Tessalit] Maliweb.net, March 20, 2014, <https://www.maliweb.net/armee/serval-objectif-final-base-francaise-tessalit-203351.html>.

After 15 months of intervention, France has partially accomplished some of its missions. French forces have freed all the French hostages; they defeated the terrorists; and they have established their military base in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>104</sup> They seem to have accomplished a long-standing objective and can now sit back and enjoy the ride in terms of harvesting natural resources, thus, keeping their hands on Africa through the geostrategic location that is the northern regions of Mali, especially Kidal. Hence, all these factors could explain the importance of Mali for France in economic, political, security, and geostrategic terms.<sup>105</sup>

Given this background, as a former colonial power, France has taken the lead in the Malian crisis with their intervention to liberate Malian territory from terrorist groups, drugs, and human traffickers. This assistance, however, was not the only aid that Mali received from its former colonizer. Mali also receives official developmental assistance from France. Moreover, France provides every year in a bilateral relations, a budgetary complement to Mali. The multilateral type of economic assistance came when the French led the donors' conference to help Mali receive significant financial support from various global partners for Mali's recovery from its economic crisis post-coup in 2013. In terms of security, France is the main actor in mobilizing funds for the G5 Sahel, which is composed of security forces from five Sahel countries: Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania.<sup>106</sup> These organizations have been operational since 2017 with France as the main coordinator. At the same time, Mali continues to receive security and economic assistance from France.

## **E. U.S. ASSISTANCE**

For decades, U.S.–Mali relations have been based on mutual support of promoting democracy, reducing poverty through economic growth, building effective security forces,

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<sup>104</sup> L' Aube, "Serval : Objectif Final : Une Base Française à Tessalit."

<sup>105</sup> L' Aube, "Serval : Objectif Final : Une Base Française à Tessalit."

<sup>106</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

and developing more secure governance.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, both the United States and Mali are members of many “international organizations, including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World Trade Organization. Also, Mali is one of twelve member countries of CILSS (Permanent Interstates Committee for drought Control in the Sahel) of which the U.S. is one of the sponsors.”<sup>108</sup>

In this context, the United States aims to help Mali build a secure, peaceful, prosperous, and democratic state that can contribute to regional development.<sup>109</sup> On December 5, 2012, according to the Opening statement of Hon. Christopher A. Coons, US. Senator from Delaware who Stated that “ Today’s focus is on Mali, and as we speak, there are three simultaneous crises occurring in Mali- a security, a political, and a humanitarian crisis—all three of which, in my view, threaten United States interests in Africa and require the attentions of the U.S. Government and the world. That’s why we’ve convened this hearing today, to assess developments in Mali and to discuss a path forward to restore democracy, to reclaim the north, to stabilize the security situation, and to address ongoing humanitarian needs.”<sup>110</sup>

At the same time, the United States also has geostrategic interests in Mali. These interests are motivated by the United States’ commitment to combat terrorism, drugs, and human trafficking in the world.<sup>111</sup> “Mali plays a significant role in fighting against these threats where they are growing.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, Africa is the center stage of world attention, where Mali plays a significant role.

While after the 2012 military coup the United States had suspended its assistance to Mali for a short time, U.S. multilateral and bilateral assistance to Mali has remained

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<sup>107</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Mali-Political Environment,” Department of State, 2017, <https://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/ml/>.

<sup>108</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Mali-Political Environment.”

<sup>109</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Mali-Political Environment.”

<sup>110</sup> Assessing Developments in Mali: Restoring Democracy and Reclaiming the North: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 112<sup>th</sup> Cong, 2<sup>nd</sup> Session, December 5, 2012, 1.

<sup>111</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Mali-Political Environment.”

<sup>112</sup> Holshek, “Learning from More than Mali: The Primacy of Civil Authority in Security Sector Development and Assistance,” 108–112.

strong. The assistance was linked to the 2013 elections, which ended with the election of a democratic president and a legitimate National Assembly. Notably, the United States' commitment to assist Mali was demonstrated during the international donors' conference in Brussels in 2013 by Christopher Holshek, who declared:

“The United States has no choice but to embrace the sound underpinnings” of ‘leading from Behind.’ (Like “containment” at its start or “restraintment” now, it’s better than it sounds.) Of the more than \$ 4 billion pledged in Brussels by over 80 countries, the U.S. anted up about \$200 million, which will not come until after the election at the end of July.”<sup>113</sup>

In addition to humanitarian, security, and economic assistance, the United States has increased its aid to Mali over the last few years, expanding its assistance into other areas. Thus, with a view to helping Mali recover from the 2013 crisis, the Obama administration increased security assistance to Mali. In an effort to improve civil-military relations, the U.S. Government, in cooperation with the Malian government, created the Security Governance Initiative program, or SGI. The goal of the program is to create a national security council composed of civilians and military who are currently studying for a master’s degree in Strategic Studies. This program will develop inter-ministerial coordination in Mali. The program is inspired by the U.S. system; allowing greater understanding of civilian military relations, contributing to responsible governance, improving the security system, respecting and recognizing international laws on human rights.<sup>114</sup> So far, it is not suitable to assess the impacts of the program because it has just begun; however, the objective is that through such programs there will be improvements in civil-military relations, in civilian control of the armed forces, and in military effectiveness in Mali.

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<sup>113</sup> Holshek, “Learning from More than Mali: The Primacy of Civil Authority in Security Sector Development and Assistance,” 108–112.

<sup>114</sup> Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 114.

### **III. DYNAMICS OF DEMOCRATIC CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN MALI SINCE 2013**

Since the return to democratization in 2013, civilian elites in Mali have endeavored to bring about democratic civil-military relations, in terms of democratic civilian control and oversight of the military as well as effectiveness of the armed forces. Since the election in 2013, members of the military returned to the barracks, and the armed forces are under civilian authority. The armed forces remain neutral.

Each of the four sections of this chapter examines individual control and oversight aspects of civil-military relations since Mali's return to democracy in 2013. Specifically, each section explains the role played by different branches of power to strengthen civilian supremacy over the military. This chapter also analyzes the political neutrality and the effectiveness of the armed forces since the country's return to the re-democratization phase. Moreover, the discussion examines the role of foreign actors in shaping the relations between civilians and the military during the period of Mali's post-coup transition and re-democratization.

#### **A. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT OF THE MILITARY**

In Mali, democratic civilian control of the security sector is rooted in the 1992 constitution. Control and oversight are exercised by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Additional oversight is exercised by the media and civil society.<sup>115</sup>

##### **1. Executive Control**

Executive control involves shared responsibilities between the president and the prime minister. The president is the supreme commander of the armed forces and guarantor of the constitution. The prime minister and cabinet oversee the implementation of the defense and security-related policies. The executive branch oversees the direction and guidance of major parts of the security sector. The executive branch also includes the

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<sup>115</sup> Matei, "The Case of Mali," 111–115.

Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, who is in charge of the land forces, air forces, gendarmeries, and the Coast Guard. Prior to the elections in 2013, a military leader was the head of the Ministry of Defense (MoD). However, this changed after the presidential election. Since the country's return to a democratic regime in 2013, "Mali's MoD has been led by a civilian. The civilian-led Ministry of Defense is in charge of recruitment within the defense sector as well as of providing the military with the required equipment, logistics, and training related expenses. The Ministry of Interior and Civil Protections is in charge of the police and civil protections (which is the combined fire department and paramedics) and the president's cabinet is in charge of the intelligence community."<sup>116</sup>

Under these circumstances, after the 2013 elections, with the assistance of the international community, the defense sector came back under civilian control. The country returned to a democratic path where a civilian was appointed as Minister of Defense. Thus, when a civilian Minister of Defense, Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga, was appointed, all the powers and responsibilities were shifted from the garrison of Kati where the junta was headquartered to the MOD. The chief of the army reported to the Defense Ministry instead of the chief of the junta, Sanogo. The MOD regained its full functionality with civilians in control of the armed forces. Although a civilian was the head of the MoD and Veterans Affairs, there was still imbalance in terms of management. Even today, the military dominates by the defense staff that has only five civilian personnel, who are in charge of the procurement of military hardware, policy, budgeting, and recruitment. Civilians remain the decision makers in terms of management, but the advisors to the MoD are all military. Civilian control of the armed forces is strong but military effectiveness still weak.

## **2. Legislative Control and Oversight**

Legislative control and oversight of the security sector in Mali is executed by the Defense and Security Commission in the National Assembly. The members of the Defense and Security Committee are mostly civilians with one retired general from the national police. The commission is in charge of all defense-related issues.<sup>117</sup> It analyzes the defense

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<sup>116</sup> Matei, "The Case of Mali," 111–115.

<sup>117</sup> Matei, "The Case of Mali," 111–115.



budget before submitting it for a vote in the parliament. Even though the Minister of Economy and Finance defends the national budget in the National Assembly, the defense budget has to be approved by the commission first.<sup>118</sup> The commission also visits the defense headquarters to get knowledge of military living conditions and all other security forces' needs. In case of dysfunction, the MoD, the Joint Chief of Staff, and others in charge of the security sector, particularly high-ranking officers, are often called for parliamentary hearings to explain the reasons for the breakdown. For example, when Prime Minister Moussa Mara visited north Mali in May of 2014 and rebels killed eight government agents, the prime minister, the MoD, and high-ranking military were called for hearings.<sup>119</sup>

Moreover, articles 051 and 052 of the of the reorganization of the security forces were voted in the National Assembly to create crisis management commissions that include all services of the security sector in each region of the country for emergency response to crisis.<sup>120</sup> The assembly voted to authorize auditing by different agencies, including the Comptroller General (General Verification) of defense spending, which seemed to be nonexistent prior to the elections. Before, there was no auditing of defense spending.<sup>121</sup> Prior to the elections, some military expenditures were treated secretly among members of the executive branch; there was no control or oversight on that military spending. Prior to the elections, there were also some loopholes in the military auditing process that allowed military expenditures not vetted by any agency. This violated the financial act of 1995, which stipulates that all government institutions are subject to auditing. In contrast to the civilian sectors, military expenses lacked control and oversight by independent agencies.

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<sup>118</sup> Wuyi Omitoogun and Eboe Hutchful, eds., *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of Control* (Oxford: Oxford University/Sipri Publications, 2006).

<sup>119</sup> Fabien Offner, "Mediapart: L'Armée du Mali, en Progrès mais Peut Mieux Faire," [Army of Mali, in Progress but Can Do Better] April 10, 2018, [http://malijet.com/la\\_societe\\_malienne\\_aujourd'hui/actualite\\_de\\_la\\_nation\\_malienne/208043-mediapart-l-armee-du-mali%2C-en-progrès-mais-peut-mieux-faire.html](http://malijet.com/la_societe_malienne_aujourd'hui/actualite_de_la_nation_malienne/208043-mediapart-l-armee-du-mali%2C-en-progrès-mais-peut-mieux-faire.html).

<sup>120</sup> Malian Department of Defense, *Code De Justice Militaire*, [Military Justice Code] Report No. 95–042/AN-RM (Bamako, Mali: Department of Defense, April 20, 1995).

<sup>121</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

The introduction of auditing in the defense budget, however, was conditioned by foreign donors' pledges. The donors' assistance required transparency in the defense spending. The international community assisted Mali financially as well as in human resources to organize a free and fair legislative election in November 2013. This election helped Mali to establish a legitimate assembly. Assistance from diverse contributors supported the Malian National Assembly to obtain full legitimacy in the eyes of the armed forces. Nevertheless, there were weaknesses in relation to the control and effectiveness of the parliamentary oversight. As Christopher Holshek states, "While the committee on defense has asked members of the military hierarchy security-related questions and attempted to play its oversight role, parliamentary supervision and control over all aspects of the budgetary process is weak."<sup>122</sup>

The legislative control and oversight over the armed forces improved slightly, which contributed to the effectiveness of civil-military relations. To begin with, the relations between legislators and the armed forces—which were tense before and during the coup—have improved. As, for example, in 2014, when then Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara visited Mali's northern regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal, and the government agents were killed. These events happened after foreign military provided training to the Malian troops. Yet, the National Assembly proceeded with the interpellations of high-ranking officers in the armed forces for hearings about the military defeat in Kidal. This happened to be the first time in Malian history that high-ranking officers had been called for a hearing in the parliament. Nonetheless, this is evidence that despite resistance from the armed forces, legislative control and oversight of the armed forces have improved since the 2013 legislative election.

### **3. Judicial Control**

Article 95–042/AN-RM of the 1995 law established the code of military justice in Mali. The National Assembly ratified this law on February 16, 1995, and it was

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<sup>122</sup>Holshek, "Learning from More than Mali: The Primacy of Civil Authority in Security Sector Development and Assistance."

promulgated by the president on April 20, 1995.<sup>123</sup> This code of military justice states that “ in peace time like in war time, military justice has the power to judge any military personnel either an officer or non-officer, who commits a crime at the workplace, barracks, on an airplane, on ship, or in any military establishment while stationed or not.”<sup>124</sup> The code also stipulates that the Minister of Defense is in charge of authorizing any pursuit against the military personnel accused of any criminal action or infraction. Further, the Minister of Defense can work with the Minister of Justice to proceed to the procedural penal according to statutes and regulations of civilian court.<sup>125</sup>

Yet, the military has not made any effort to enforce the law. At present, disciplinary actions are the only sanctions taken against Mali’s military. No trial had taken place in the court martial since the adoption of the law. Military justice is non-existent. The law exists only de jure; de facto, it is never put into use. For instance, in 2016, Amadou Haya Sanogo and 16 other members of the military accused in the deaths of 21 red berets were tried in civilian court.<sup>126</sup>

In all, little improvement has been made in judicial control mechanisms since the 2013 elections. The constitution gives the regular court of justice the competency to review cases regarding military personnel outside of the defense sphere. Any military personnel accused of any criminal act in any context is tried under the jurisdiction of regular courts. Civilians conduct the investigations if any member of the military is charged with breaking the law. New laws have been enacted, however, to enforce the military justice system that can bring military personnel who committed crimes during the coup under the jurisdiction of the military court. With the assistance of and pressure from foreign donors like NGOs and think tanks (Human Rights Watch), so far, a few high-ranking officers are currently on trial and others are under investigation for murders and atrocities committed against

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<sup>123</sup> Malian Department of Defense, *Code De Justice Militaire*.

<sup>124</sup> Malian Department of Defense, *Code De Justice Militaire*.

<sup>125</sup> Malian Department of Defense, *Code De Justice Militaire*.

<sup>126</sup> RFI, “Mali: Le General Sanogo devant la Justice,” [Mali: The General Sanogo before the Justice] November 19, 2013. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131118-mali-sanogo-mandat-amener-general-berets-rouges>

civilians and fellow military involved in a confrontation between the green berets and the red berets during the 2012 coup attempt. This is the first time that high-ranking officers, especially generals, have been brought to regular justice.

#### **4. Civil Society Oversight**

The media and civil society have attempted to step in as watchdogs of the executive and legislative efforts to develop civil-military relations in Mali since the elections of 2013. After the election of the current president, families of red berets who disappeared during their clash with the green berets have demanded justice. Multiple national and international newspapers reported and commented on atrocities and human rights abuses committed by the junta. Thus, the Malian Government opened an investigation in September 2013 on the deaths of the red berets during their confrontation with the green berets during the previous year's coup attempt.<sup>127</sup> A few months later, the investigators discovered 21 bodies in Diago, a village near the garrison where the junta was besieged. The Minister of Defense summoned some members of the junta, such as General Amadou Haya Sanogo, General Yamoussa Camara, and General Dahirou Dembele, for the deaths of the red berets. This happened in September 2013, less than a month after the inauguration of the current President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.<sup>128</sup> Then, they later were indicted for crimes against their fellow service members. The charges are still pending after several appearances in court, which took place in Sikasso, a region located 364 kilometers from Bamako.

This incident heralded the power of civil and political societies control mechanisms such as the media, NGOs, and political parties in controlling the armed forces indirectly.<sup>129</sup> This action from the government sent a strong signal nationally and in the international arena for the willingness of the country to implement democratic rules. This asserts control of the armed forces by civil and political societies. Thus, the relations between the military

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<sup>127</sup> For a detailed discussion on the clashes between the green and red berets, *see* <https://revuedepressecorens.wordpress.com/2013/02/09/beret-vert>.

<sup>128</sup> Le Reporter, "Mali: Procès D'Hamadou Haya Sanogo et Coaccusés a Sikasso: Démarrage Laborieux avant les Vrais Débats," [Mali: Trial of Hamadou Haya Sanogo and Co-defendants in Sikasso: Laborious start before the Real Debates] December 7, 2016, <https://maliactu.net/mali-proces-damadou-haya-sanogo-et-coaccuses-a-sikasso-demarrage-laborieux-avant-les-vrais-debats/>.

<sup>129</sup> Le Reporter, "Mali : Procès D'Hamadou Haya Sanogo et Coaccusés à Sikasso."

and civil societies have improved over the past two years to the point where the national army is getting major support from the national audience as well as the international community, especially in fighting terrorism in the Sahel Region in Africa. Foreign assistance has played a major role in keeping the military under the control of civilians. Together, pressure from international media, civil society, political society, think tanks, and human rights groups, has had a positive influence on civil-military relations.

In addition, there is a new Commission on Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation to investigate the atrocities and human rights abuses committed by the separatist and terrorist groups as well as the military, to situate responsibilities.<sup>130</sup> Moreover, the commission also has the role to reconcile different communities in the North, and to build trust between security forces and the civil population (society).

Recently, NGOs reported many human rights violations. For instance, on February 21, 2018, in the village of Daresalam, nine men were arrested and brought to an undisclosed area where they were later found dead.<sup>131</sup> The local population pointed to the Malian armed forces, which they believed executed the men.<sup>132</sup> This atrocity was discovered after Amnesty International reported on the testimony of a few witnesses.<sup>133</sup> The Amnesty report put pressure on the central government to open an investigation. Similarly, on October 2, 2017, Human Rights Watch met with the Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, Tiena Coulibaly, and other high ranking officers, to discuss their findings on human rights violations by the military. As a result, the minister and his department expressed their intent to investigate these allegations and bring to justice all the perpetrators. As Corinne Dufka, an associate Africa director at Human Rights Watch, states, “the Malian Defense Ministry’s expressed support for investigating alleged military abuses recognizes that counterterrorism operations depend on respect for human rights”<sup>134</sup> She further says, “This

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<sup>130</sup> Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 111–115.

<sup>131</sup> Amnesty International, “Mali. Découverte d’un Charnier et Aggravation de la Crise Sécuritaire,” [Mali : Mass Grave Discovered as Security Crisis Deepens] April 2, 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2018/04/mali-mass-grave-discovered-as-security-crisis-deepens/>.

<sup>132</sup> Amnesty International, “Mali. Découverte d’un Charnier et Aggravation de la Crise Sécuritaire,”

<sup>133</sup> Amnesty International, “Mali. Découverte d’un Charnier et Aggravation de la Crise Sécuritaire,”

<sup>134</sup> Amnesty International, “Mali. Découverte d’un Charnier et Aggravation de la Crise Sécuritaire,”

is a significant step, but for full accountability, the military's disciplinary proceedings should be accompanied by appropriate criminal investigations by the Justice Minister."<sup>135</sup> Besides that, the NGO promises to conduct its own investigations on human rights violations committed against civilians as well as, according to the code of war, the terrorist and Islamist armed groups operating in the northern and central regions.

## **B. MILITARY POLITICAL NEUTRALITY**

Despite distrust in the political environment, the national army remained neutral over the past four years. The military returned to the front to fight against terrorism and to maintain the integrity of the territory. It did not attempt to intervene in the political scene since the elections. For instance, in December 2017, the army remained in its barracks during the national protest against the current government and the parliament during the crucial event of the central government's aim to change the 1992 constitution.<sup>136</sup> The military non-intervention in the protests demonstrated the armed forces are taking positive steps toward civilian control of the national army.

Although the military remained in the barracks during the civil protest, some incidents involving members of the military have caused civilians to view the armed forces as a threat to Malian democracy. As an example, a couple of soldiers were arrested for their recent declarations that they support Amadou Haya Sanogo, leader of the junta, and also for their criticism of the current president by stating that the executive failed to secure the country and the defense institutions. Another incident led to the arrest of 29 gendarmes after they criticized the Director of the Gendarmerie for their living conditions in the central region of Mopti.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> Human Rights Watch, "Mali: Defense Ministry Promises Abuse Inquiry," November 3, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/03/mali-defense-ministry-promises-abuse-inquiry>

<sup>136</sup> "Des Milliers de Manifestants au Mali contre le Referendum Constitutionnel," [Thousand of Protester in Mali Against the Constitutional Referendum] *Le Monde*, June 17, 2017, [https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/06/17/des-milliers-de-manifestants-au-mali-contre-le-referendum-constitutionnel\\_5146315\\_3210.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2017/06/17/des-milliers-de-manifestants-au-mali-contre-le-referendum-constitutionnel_5146315_3210.html).

### **C. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MALIAN ARMED FORCES SINCE 2013**

Grudges and distrust between the national army and the parliament put enormous pressure on the legislative branch in 2013. The parliament and the executive power made little effort to maintain strong and sustaining armed forces in terms of training, equipping, and preparing the security sector against imminent threats the country was currently experiencing. A few reasons explain these perceptions within the military, especially among subordinate soldiers who believed that the military was the last concern of the national assembly because they counted less for their electoral constituency. The view was parliamentarians were more concerned about their political party's survival. Moreover, a few reasons may account for the perceived attitude that parliament was ignoring military issues through its total lack of vision, inadequate security knowledge, and rampant corruption that took over the National Assembly.<sup>138</sup> Therefore, the security sector was at the mercy of the rebels and terrorist groups. These factors played a major role in the relationship between the military and legislators, which eroded not only the control of the military but also its effectiveness.

The military was not a major priority to the executive. Even though it was part of their plan in theory, the armed forces were not their priority in practice as many members of the executive branch were focused on both their personal interests and those of their political party. For instance, in 2015, less than two years after the elections were held, several members of the government were involved in corruption scandals. These scandals related to the purchase of military equipment and led to financial sanctions imposed on Mali by institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As a result, many ministers were excluded from the central government.<sup>139</sup> These scandals also created a lack of trust between the executive and the armed forces. This created tensions between security forces and the executive power.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Matei, "The Case of Mali," 111–115.

<sup>139</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

<sup>140</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

In 2014, when then Malian Prime Minister Moussa Mara visited the northern regions of Mali, in particular Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal, a confrontation occurred between the Malian troops and the rebels of the NMLA allied with terrorist groups in Kidal. The clash started after the rebels and terrorist groups took hostage some Malian officials, including the prime minister in the government building. After the rebels slaughtered eight Malian officials and agents, the Malian armed forces launched an offensive to liberate the remaining hostages. Unfortunately, the Malian military offensive was a strategic failure, following a retaliatory response from the combined groups of NMLA and the terrorist group Ansar Deen and its affiliates. The fight ended with the defeat of the Malian army, which led to the loss of the eighth region of Mali (Kidal) to the rebels.<sup>141</sup> Therefore, the international community stepped in to demand a ceasefire, and ask both the Malian forces and the rebel groups to withdraw their troops from their initial positions. The event heightened tensions in Bamako, where the civil population and some military personnel accused the executive branch of not providing enough resources to the armed forces.

After both the legislative and presidential elections, military effectiveness grew as the security became the priority of both the executive power and the parliament; the newly elected government proposed a budget increase for security forces reform. The new budget program established by the government in 2015 was for an amount of 1,230,000,000,000 CFA (or an estimated 2 billion USD), for a period of five years (2015–2019); the same year it was adopted by the National Assembly on March 2015.<sup>142</sup> The resources allocated for the security forces were to improve the conditions of the armed forces, such as salary increases, allowances, rations, training, logistics, and equipment. The program also involved military education and professionalism. As a result, military effectiveness has improved slightly.<sup>143</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Marina Caparini, “DDR and SSR Challenges in Mali,” October 7, 2015. [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2670212](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670212)

<sup>142</sup> Maliactu.net, “Mali: Défense et Sécurité: La Remarquable Montée en Puissance des Troupes,” [Mali: Defense and Security: The Remarkable Rise in Power of the Troops] September, 4, 2017, <https://maliactu.net/mali-defense-et-securite-la-remarquable-montee-en-puissance-des-troupes/>.

<sup>143</sup> Maliactu.net, “Mali : Défense et Sécurité. “



As of late, foreign assistance has had a positive impact on military effectiveness. After EU assistance to train Malian security forces to be more effective in facing different scenarios, military effectiveness has improved somewhat. In 2017, the armed forces succeeded in an operation in Mopti that led to the freeing of the President of the High Court of Justice who was taken hostage by members of the terrorist group led by “Amadou Kouffa,” a branch of Ansar Deen.<sup>144</sup> Other similar events demonstrating military effectiveness are the terrorist attacks at the Radisson Blu Hotel in 2016 and at encampment Kangaba” in 2017, during which the military conducted successful operations such that the terrorists were neutralized and hostages liberated.<sup>145</sup>

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

Despite the reinstatement of Malian democracy through successful elections and foreign assistance, civil-military relations have made little improvement. Even though, over the past five years, the country saw the signing of a peace agreement, a presidential election, a legislative election as well as some municipal elections, civil-military relations in Mali still need improvement, in particular, in the relations between political leaders and the armed forces.

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<sup>144</sup> L’Indicateur Du Renouveau, “Terrorisme : Le Président de la Haute Cour de Justice Echappe à la Mort,” [Terrorism : The President of the High Court of Justice Escapes to Death] November 1, 2017, <http://malizine.com/2017/11/01/terrorisme-president-de-haute-cour-de-justice-echappe-a-mort/>

<sup>145</sup> CNN, “Deadly Mali Hotel Attack: They Were Shooting at Anything that Moved.” CNN Video, 2:18, November 20, 2015, <https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/20/africa/mali-shooting/index.html>.

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#### IV. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON CIVILIAN CONTROL AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS SINCE 2013

Over the past five years, as Mali has returned to democratic consolidation, foreign assistance has endeavored to strengthen the relations between civilian leaders and the armed forces. This chapter discusses the impact of the foreign assistance on civil control of the armed forces and the effectiveness of the military.

##### A. ASSESSMENT: FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO THE CASE OF MALI

Applying Matei’s control and effectiveness framework to the case of Mali since 2013, this thesis arrives at the assessment shown in Table 1. The qualifier in each cell indicates the present level of each subcategory of control and effectiveness in the context of civil-military relations.<sup>146</sup>

Table 1. Impact of the Foreign Assistance on the Level of Civilian Control and Effectiveness of the Malian Armed Forces

	Control			Effectiveness		
Requirements	Institutional Control Mechanisms	Oversight	Professional Norms	Plan or Strategy	Institutions	Resources
Score	Low-medium	Low-medium	Low-medium	Low-low	Low-medium	Medium-medium

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<sup>146</sup> Florina Cristiana Matei and Andrés de Castro Garcia, “Chilean Intelligence after Pinochet: Painstaking Reform of an Inauspicious Legacy,” *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 30, no. 2 (2017): 340–367.

## **1. Institutional Control Mechanisms**

With regard to the institutional mechanisms subcategory, the impact of the foreign assistance to Mali is “low-medium.” International donors’ contributions have only been partially successful in improving those mechanisms since the country’s return to democratic rule. For example, while foreign assistance to civil-military relations has helped reinstate civilian authority over the military, develop civilian-led security institutions—including a Ministry of Defense—and preserve military neutrality in politics, foreign assistance has not prevented the appointment of military members as heads of both intelligence and the interior security and civil protections departments. Thus, the National Police are militarized and the structure of the defense personnel has not altered despite foreign effort to reshape security institutions. There are only two civilians working in the cabinet, including the MOD, and one as an advisor whose role is to help the defense minister make decisions in respect to the laws. On the other hand, there is a member of the military in charge of military finances. He makes sure military expenses follow the general principle of the 1996 financial law and accounting act.<sup>147</sup> The rest are military.

When it comes to the Ministry of Interior Security, no civilian is working in that department. The intelligence community has both civilian and military working in the institution, but the intelligence agency is led by a military member. As such, Mali still lags behind in terms of institutionalizing de facto democratic civilian control of the armed forces.

One particular area where foreign assistance has dedicated considerable efforts is creating civilian expertise and mutual understanding between the military and civilian elites in Mali. In this connection, the Obama administration’s Security and Governance Initiative program, or SGI, financed ten Malians, civilian and military from different ministries (Defense, Justice, Interior Security, Finances, and Foreign Affairs), in a two-year study and training program at NPS in Monterey, California. The United States showed significant interest in bilaterally assisting Mali in the SGI program. The SGI program

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<sup>147</sup> Omitoogun and Hutchful, Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa.

brought these students to NPS in a Foreign military sale (FMS) program, enabling them to research with both civilians and military personnel. These students graduated from the strategic study curriculum of the NPS National Security Affairs (NSA) Department. According to Matei, this SGI program will help Mali boost its expertise and knowledge in civil-military relations and inter-ministerial coordination.<sup>148</sup> This author believes that the SGI program will lead to the creation of a National Security Council in 2018, which mirrors the one in United States. As of this writing, this is the plan set by Malian authority but has not yet been concretized. The program could result in a big turnaround in the institutional control mechanism, which demonstrates U.S. engagement to support Mali in strengthening its institutional control mechanisms.

Nevertheless, despite major donors' efforts to strengthen civil-military trust in Mali—as a way to strengthen democratic civil-military relations—the arrests of the leaders of the 2012 military coup has fueled tensions within the armed forces and also between civilian authority and those military loyal to Captain Sanogo. The military loyal to Sanogo is still reluctant to heed civilian supremacy. For instance, in January 2018, a young sergeant named Oumar Keita recorded a video on YouTube declaring that leaders and high ranked officers are the reasons that the Malian army is not effective.<sup>149</sup> Thus, another reason for a “low-to-medium” score in this category of the framework corresponds to the poor conditions experienced by the low ranked officers, while high ranked officers and civilians in charge of the defense department are enjoying all the advantages.<sup>150</sup> As an example, in 2017, some soldiers in the frontline complained of not receiving the remuneration to which they are entitled. They felt left out by their hierarchy as well as by the civilian authority. They believed that decision makers are not trustworthy and, most of the time, do not honor their promises. They also believed that corruption has affected the department at a level such that civilian leaders have less concern for the well-being of the armed forces than they

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<sup>148</sup> Matei, “The Case of Mali,” 111–115.

<sup>149</sup> Maliweb.net, “Sergent Oumar Keita: La Détresse de L’Armée Malienne,” [ Sergeant Oumar Keita: The Distress of the Malian Army January 25, 2018. <https://www.maliweb.net/video/divers-videos/sergent-oumar-keita-la-detresse-de-larmee-malienne-2734395.html>.

<sup>150</sup> Maliweb.net, “ Sergent Oumar Keita : La Détresse de L’Armée Malienne.”

do for their personal interests.<sup>151</sup> Such behaviors have affected the military morale and created frustration within the armed forces, with negative consequences for the country's security institutions.

Overall, then, the international arena's contribution to Malian institutional control mechanisms has been moderate.

## **2. Oversight**

Mali scores “low to medium” in terms of impact of foreign assistance on oversight since 2013. While oversight is exercised by the three branches of power—executive, legislative, and judicial—as well as the media, it has been less than perfect, despite international donors' efforts to strengthen it. At the National Assembly, there is a defense commission in charge of defense and security-related issues. Although foreign assistance has not directly contributed to the creation of the commission, the United Nations Mission in Mali (UNMISMA) has been actively engaged in supporting the work of the committee and increasing the expertise and knowledge of the members of the committee. According to an International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) report, the assistance provided by UNMISMA to Mali's defense committee “involves support through workshops and meetings to help members of the National Defense Commission in the parliament exercise their security sector reform monitoring role and strengthen their capacities, in particular by sharing experience with their counterparts in the region.”<sup>152</sup>

In terms of judicial control mechanisms, the United States assisted Mali through U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs in 2015 by launching a five-year plan (2016–2020) of 690 USD to support the re-establishment of the judicial and correctional system.<sup>153</sup> On paper, the Malian civilian court has the authority to try the military. Despite resistance from the armed forces, the court tried military personnel

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<sup>151</sup> AFP, “La Désertion de 36 Gendarmes dans le Centre du Mali,” [Desertion of 36 Gendarmes in the Center of Mali] January 19, 2018, <https://malijet.com/actualite-politique-au-mali/flash-info/202693-desertion-de-36-gendarmes-dans-le-centre-du-mali-sources-de-secu.html>.

<sup>152</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note,” July 20, 2018.

<sup>153</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note.”

involved in crimes, human rights abuses, and atrocities. As for the military justice system, only minor cases are prosecuted, but bigger corruption or criminal cases have not yet been tried. Additionally, the international arena has supported Mali's Commission on Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation, whose role is to investigate atrocities committed by the Malian security forces, the rebel groups, and the terrorist groups during the 2012 rebellion.<sup>154</sup> The commission also has a role to reconcile different factions and groups, including building trust between the populations in the northern regions of Mali and the security forces, a major priority of foreign donors.<sup>155</sup> In order to strengthen the task of the commission, the EU, in cooperation with the central government, has established a program called "the Steering Committee of the Normalization and Resilience," which aims to improve the framework of civil-military relations and build trust between the armed forces and the population.<sup>156</sup> This committee was been created in 2017.<sup>157</sup> So far, little assessment can be made on this committee.

One area of oversight that the international arena has been unable to help strengthen in Mali is budgetary oversight. Despite a robust military budgetary process on paper, comprised of the financial law and accounting act of 1996,<sup>158</sup> parliamentary budgetary oversight has been weak due to lack of expertise and lack of information about military expenditure, despite foreign assistance efforts to increase the knowledge and expertise of civilians. What is more, although there is a defense committee in the legislature, many military expenses are not fully revealed to the parliament. The expenses are categorized under defense secrecy, which plagues parliamentary oversight.<sup>159</sup>

One oversight area where foreign assistance has had a positive impact is the informal oversight by civil society and the media over the defense and security sector in Mali. At the minimum, the international arena has pressed the Malian government to allow

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<sup>154</sup> Matei, "The Case of Mali."

<sup>155</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

<sup>156</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

<sup>157</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

<sup>158</sup> Omitoogun and Hutchful, Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa.

<sup>159</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

freedom of speech, press, and association. At the maximum, the international community has been able to reprimand Mali for violations of these freedoms. In this regard, despite intimidation, arbitrary arrests, manipulation, and kidnapping of public informers for the media,<sup>160</sup> the press in Mali has been able to expose wrongdoing in the government and bring about reforms. For example, the news report by the press on the 2014 financial scandal in the defense sector led to the discharge of several members of the government, including the minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs and the finance minister.<sup>161</sup> When the press informed the public about financial irregularities and violation of the public market code as well corruption within the defense sector, it resulted in international economic sanctions on budget aid provided by the EU, IMF, and WB.<sup>162</sup>

Another incident the media reported on was the MOD's attempt to cover a terrorist attack in the center of Mali that led to the loss of much military equipment and the debacle of the national army.<sup>163</sup> The media investigated the issue and came out with the true version of the attack. This put pressure on the executive (specifically, the president) and ended with the firing of the defense minister.<sup>164</sup> Nevertheless, there are still challenges to the freedom of the press and the power of the press to fulfill its role as Mali's fourth estate. For instance, despite the push in the international arena for the media to act as Mali's fourth estate, the press still faces threats from the central government and the security forces; also some deputies use their legislative power to influence journalists and radio talk show hosts. In 2015, for example, a journalist was arrested for informing the public about the executive cover-up of clashes between Malian armed forces and terrorist groups, and the dysfunction

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<sup>160</sup> Several cases explain this. First, the national TV and national newspaper are both under the control of authority in place. They are manipulated to promote actions of the existing powers. Social networks are blocked on instruction from the executive branch. The press is highly politicized in Mali. The national TV and newspapers praise the president's action and rarely mention action taken by the opposition parties.

<sup>161</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

<sup>162</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

<sup>163</sup> RFI, "Mali : Le Ministre de la Défense Limoge après des Attaques dans le Centre," [The Minister of Defense Fired after Attacks in the Center] September 4, 2016. [www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160904-mali-ministre-defense-limoge-attaques-centre-boni-tieman-coulibaly](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160904-mali-ministre-defense-limoge-attaques-centre-boni-tieman-coulibaly).

<sup>164</sup> RFI, "Mali : Le Ministre de la Défense Limoge après des Attaques dans le Centre."



of the defense department.<sup>165</sup> This information created tension in Mali, and resulted in a public protest ended with two dead, the destruction of the courthouse, the firing of the defense minister, and the resignation of the justice minister.<sup>166</sup>

Moreover, intimidation and death threats targeting members of the media continue.<sup>167</sup> The central government censors social networks, for example, to impede the dissemination of information.<sup>168</sup> Foreign players, though, have addressed these issues, warning the authorities of human rights violations and arguing for the freedom of the press. Amnesty International documented three different cases in Bamako of physical aggression and verbal abuse directed at individuals opposed to the referendum that was supposed to be held in July 2017. As declared by one member of Amnesty International Gaetan Mootoo, “public debate tensely tensed approaching constitutional review must not expose dissenting voices to attacks and verbal threats”<sup>169</sup> Moreover, many other cases of abuse of journalists and bloggers have been condemned by Amnesty International. Among them was “the shooting on July 25<sup>th</sup> at one in the morning of the blogger Madou Kante, who later survived [his] wound. During the same month Salif Diarra, a journalist at Mali Actu, declared (talked) of receiving anonymous death threats.”<sup>170</sup>

### **3. Impacts of Foreign Assistance on Professional Norms**

The impact of foreign assistance on professional norms is “low-medium.” Due to continuous financial support, education and training, as well as advising, Malian security

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<sup>165</sup> Gaetan Mootoo, “Il Faut Annuler la Condamnation d’un Chroniqueur et Ouvrir des Enquêtes sur les Agressions et Menaces contre des Activistes,” [It is Necessary the condemnation of a Chronicler and to Open an Investigation on Agressions and Threats against Activists] Amnesty International, July 28, 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/fr/latest/news/2017/07/mali-il-faut-annuler-la-condamnation-dun-chroniqueur-et-ouvrir-sur-les-agressions-et-menaces-contre-des-activistes/>

<sup>166</sup> Ahmed Baba, “Mali : Qui a Suspendu les Réseaux Sociaux ?” [Who Suspended Social Networks] *Jeune Afrique*, August 18, 2016, <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/350119/politique/mali-a-suspendu-reseaux-sociaux/>

<sup>167</sup> Baba, “Mali : Qui a Suspendu les Réseaux Sociaux ?”

<sup>168</sup> Baba, “Mali : Qui a Suspendu les Réseaux Sociaux ?”

<sup>169</sup> Mootoo, *Il Faut Annuler la Condamnation d’un Chroniqueur et Ouvrir des Enquêtes sur les Agressions et Menaces contre des Activistes.*

<sup>170</sup> Mootoo, “Il Faut Annuler la Condamnation d’un Chroniqueur et Ouvrir des Enquêtes sur les Agressions et Menaces contre des Activistes.”

forces have become more disciplined and have improved their corporateness.<sup>171</sup> There is an improvement in terms of hierarchical chain of command. In addition, foreign assistance has brought about incremental positive changes in the military in terms of the code of military justice.<sup>172</sup> The law consists of giving power to military judges to prosecute any military member who commits a crime.<sup>173</sup> Therefore, the security forces are less involved in atrocities and have better relations with civilians compared to their position during the 2013 pre-elections, and this improvement is due to foreign assistance donors' efforts.

Their efforts to professionalize the Malian military, however, have not been successful in every aspect. For example, as of today, there is no exact known number of Malian soldiers, and the payment of soldiers still uses an old-fashioned method. Most soldiers receive their salary in cash, instead of by electronic transfer that would enable comptrollers from different control agencies to keep track of expenses. These practices can be impediments to the institutional function because even dead and retired military members can be counted as military members. Thus, these practices can affect donors' efforts; it can create highly corrupted institutions and opportunities for corruption to spread in the security forces sphere.

#### **4. Planning and Strategy**

In terms of planning and strategy, foreign assistance has had little impact; the score is "low-medium." Some positive steps have occurred. A defense agreement has been signed between Mali and France to help fight terrorism and human and drug trafficking.<sup>174</sup> With assistance from the EU, France, and the United States, a robust strategy has been

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<sup>171</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Harvard, 1957), 83.

<sup>172</sup> Enacted in 1995 (Law N-95-042/AN-RM of April 20, 1995). Malian Department of Defense, *Code De Justice Militaire*, Report No. 95-042/AN-RM (Bamako, Mali: Department of Defense, 1995).

<sup>173</sup> Code of Military Justice. It was not implemented, however, until 2017. So far, there have been some cases where some military members have been called for hearings, but only disciplinary sanctions have been taken against military members for disobeying orders.

<sup>174</sup> L'Independent, "Mali. L'Accord de Défense avec la France Enfin Signé," [Mali: The Defense Agreement with France Finally, Signed] July 17, 2014, <https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2014/07/17/l-accord-de-defense-avec-la-france-enfin-signe>.

developed to create the G5 Sahel, which is now operational.<sup>175</sup> Although this G5 contributes to regional security, there has been little evidence so far that could demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan.

Despite the developed plan by the Malian security forces and the presence of French troops, there has been an increase in attacks, and insecurity is encroaching on the Mali's central regions, in particular Mopti and Segou. Moreover, there are "low-to-medium" scores in terms of strategy, demonstrated by the May 2014 event in which rebel groups defeated Mali's National Army and took control of the northern region of Kidal during Prime Minister Moussa Mara's visit there.

## **5. Institutions and a Strong Ministry of Defense**

Foreign assistance to Mali has had a "low-medium" effect in the institutions category. EU involvement in the restructuring of the MOD and the support of the in the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) show the donors' willingness to help shape security institutions.

Foreign assistance has led to the creation of the Special Forces for Anti-Terrorism, (FORSAT; Forces Special Anti-Terrorists) a unit that derived from battalions trained by the EUTM. It is a combined force from different security forces corps (police, gendarmerie, National Guard, and red berets) and has been created by the Malian Government to operate under the Ministry of Interior Security.<sup>176</sup> The plan is to help in special operations related to terrorist attacks, drug trafficking, and organized crime. So far, they have been effective during the attacks on Le Campement Kangaba resort in 2017, which resulted in the killing of the attackers, and only two dead recorded on the special forces' and the hostages' side.<sup>177</sup> In comparison to the attack at the Radisson Hotel in Bamako where more than 20 died, this operation demonstrates that military effectiveness has improved.

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<sup>175</sup> Barea, "The Malian Armed Forces Reform and the Future of EUTM."

<sup>176</sup> Maliactu.net. "Mali : Défense et Sécurité : La Remarquable Montée en Puissance des Troupes."

<sup>177</sup> The Guardian, "At Least Two Dead after Attack at Mali Tourist Resort Near Bamako," June 18, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/.../mali-counter-terror-police-tourist-resort-bamako>.

Nevertheless, there is little cooperation between security institutions. For instance, A Seminar Held in Bamako which the author attended; one participant says that “during the attack on the Radisson Hotel Blu, the police, the gendarmerie, and the National Guard had no framework in coordination because they did not know which agency had to lead the operation.”<sup>178</sup> The SGI program can help to close the gap in inter-ministerial coordination and permit the recruitment of more civilians in the defense and interior security areas through the training and formation received at NPS.<sup>179</sup>

## **6. Effectiveness: Resources**

Mali’s contributions from diverse donors have had little impact on the resources category; the score is “medium.” France and the EU co-chaired the donor conference in Brussels in 2013, and France provided logistic and equipment support to Mali’s defense and security forces.<sup>180</sup> “The EU set an emergency trust fund in 2015 to address issues such as unregulated immigration and forced displacement, security and development, and economics which are some of the causes of instability.”<sup>181</sup> Specifically, the UN provided resources to rehabilitate and equip government facilities in the North.<sup>182</sup> The United States mobilized funds bilaterally with the SGI program, and multilaterally through USAID, which funded many training and study programs for Mali’s security forces.<sup>183</sup>

On the other hand, in 2014, with support from the EU, the IMF, and WB, the executive and legislative branches took necessary measures to provide Mali’s armed forces with an adequate budget to increase security forces personnel, equipment, logistics, and training, and to improve military conditions in order for the armed forces to increase their effectiveness. For this reason, in 2014, a new five-year planning, programming, and

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<sup>178</sup> “Seminar in Bamako with SGI group,” June 26–28, 2017.

<sup>179</sup> Matei, “The Case of Mali.”

<sup>180</sup> The French Embassy at Bamako, “La France Equipe L’Armée Malienne dans la Lutte Contre le Terrorisme,” [France Equips the Malian Army in the Fight against Terrorism] November 1, 2017, <https://ml.ambafrance.org/La-France-equipe-l-armee-malienne-dans-la-lutte-contre-le-terrorisme-1er>.

<sup>181</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note.”

<sup>182</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note.”

<sup>183</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note.”

budgeting system (Lois de Programmation Militaire, or LOPM) bill was proposed by the executive branch and passed to the legislature, where the National Assembly approved the bill the same year.<sup>184</sup> The bill aimed to provide an equivalent of 2 billion USD in funding for the security forces over a five-year period. Two years later, the legislature approved another bill establishing an internal security program (LPS), also for a period of five years (2017–2021).<sup>185</sup> This law provides 446 billion FCFA (an estimated 850 million USD). The law consists of closing the deficiencies noted at the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection.<sup>186</sup>

As the previously mentioned ISSAT paper noted, “[T]he adoption of this law is part of the implementation of the Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation resulting from the Algiers peace process,”<sup>187</sup> which is one of the donors’ priorities. Mali’s defense budget continues to increase; according to a 2018 IMF report:

the share of security spending in Mali’s budget has been increasing, making the preservation of much needed spending on social services and development investment challenging. A year before the crisis, military spending, as a share of public expenditure was 8.4 percent (2.1 percent of [gross domestic product] GDP), however by 2013 this has risen to 11.4 percent (about 2.9 percent of GDP), and in 2017 it was 16.5 percent of spending (3.8 percent of GDP). The security needs are part of security planning and public protection act, which provides for enhancing human resources management (recruitment, training, and career path) for police and security staff.<sup>188</sup>

Despite this increase in security spending, this factor earns a “low-medium” score. This “low-medium” score is the result of unlawful use of resources provided by donors to improve the effectiveness of the armed forces. In addition, nepotism and corruption among elites in both civilian and military institutions have hindered effectiveness. Recent scandals about the alleged misuse of resources for other than intended purposes created frustrations

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<sup>184</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note.”

<sup>185</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note.”

<sup>186</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note.”

<sup>187</sup> ISSAT, “Mali SSR Background Note.”

<sup>188</sup> International Monetary Fund, *Mali Selected Issues*, IMF Country Report No.18/142 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2018), <http://www.imf.org>.

on the donors' side. For instance, in 2014, both the minister of Defense and Veterans' Affairs and the financial minister were involved in corruption scandals regarding the purchase of military equipment.<sup>189</sup> These scandals led to the sanctions of Mali by the World Bank, EU, and IMF, and it also created frustration among donors.<sup>190</sup> As a result, the Malian security forces remain inadequately equipped.

## **B. CONCLUSION**

Despite foreign assistance efforts to help Mali develop an interest and expertise in guiding and monitoring the activity of the armed forces, as well as on strengthening civilian-led institutions and boosting civilian knowledge on defense and security, progress in terms of democratic control and oversight remains precarious, in particular due to corruption and cronyism. In addition, Mali is still experiencing terrorist attacks and insecurity, and, therefore, needs continued assistance to be strong and effective against the threat environment.

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<sup>189</sup> ISSAT, "Mali SSR Background Note."

<sup>190</sup> Offner, "Mediapart : L'Armée du Mali, en Progrès mais Peut Mieux Faire."

## **V CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

How has foreign assistance affected civil-military relations and military effectiveness in Mali since 2013?

As Mali continues to go through a series of political, economic, and security crises, its civil-military relations continue to challenge both the civilian authority and the military. Thus, this ongoing situation has triggered foreign donors to help Mali reshape its civilian authority over the armed forces and build from the ground up a security force to fulfill its roles and missions: to defend its territorial integrity and to fight terrorism, internal wars, drug and human trafficking, and organized crime.

### **A. ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN MALI SINCE 2013**

The thesis used the framework set by Matei as a tool to assess the impact of foreign aid on civil-military relations in Mali since 2013. It found that the foreign assistance has had only minimal impact on the “control and effectiveness.” Based on examinations and analyses done by the author, assistance from various donors ranked at different scores for impacting “control and effectiveness.” Despite assistance from donors, Mali’s institutional control mechanisms score “low to medium.” Although there has been some improvement in civilian control over the military, the security forces are still reluctant to accept civilian supremacy. This reluctance relates to the country’s history of military coups since independence in 1960 and the belief that security forces need to take over whenever civilian leadership fails to fulfill its roles and missions or to provide the military with necessary equipment, resources, and living conditions to defend the country. Oversight does happen by the institutions and media; however, this control still scores “low to medium” due to corruption, nepotism, and cronyism in both civilian institutions and the military. These practices have hindered oversight in the military recruitment process, training, and education despite foreign involvement.

The process of oversight has made little progress in Mali. Although states and organizations in the world have provided assistance to help Mali re-establish its already

weak executive, judicial, and legislative branches, these branches have made minimal efforts to improve the mechanism of oversight. Rules and regulations to develop transparency and accountability in the security sector were already embedded in the Malian constitution since 1992; however, foreign efforts to restructure oversight by the three branches of government have made little progress. Although there are agencies in executive, legislative, and judicial institutions as well as an independent general auditor to oversee military budget and expenditures, the process of oversight remains *de jure* because *de facto* these rules and regulations are rarely implemented by any of these branches. Corruption, lack of transparency, cronyism, and lack of accountability seem to spread in the security sector. Authors of these practices act with impunity, and an environment of mismanagement and unlawful expenses is encouraged. This environment also harbors other activities such as nepotism and inefficiency. However, over the past five years, pressure from foreign donors such as the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank led to the discharge of cabinet officials alleged to have been involved in the 2014 financial scandal in defense budget management. Therefore, foreign assistance has influenced control and oversight mechanisms in Mali.

Over the past five years, the media in Mali has made minimal impact in improving control and oversight mechanisms. Furthermore, several challenges have thwarted the media's attempts to play its role as a watchdog in democratic institutional reforms and on the relationship between civilian and security forces. Decision makers seek to influence, intimidate, manipulate, and politicize the media, which may have been relevant to the oversight mechanism in Mali. Lack of professionalism and instances of corruption are common in the Malian press. In many cases, journalists and bloggers do not make any effort to inform the public based on reliable sources. Instead of working to provide the citizens with relevant information, many are at the service of the central government. They are bribed and sometimes blackmailed by officials to keep secret any unflattering or potentially damaging information the press has on them, and officials may even provide journalists with unreliable information. Nevertheless, the few publications that provide relevant and reliable sources of information in order to improve transparency and accountability in government are often under government pressure, threats, intimidation



not to reveal the information. Journalists are sometimes arrested and accused of lack of patriotism. In a democracy these practices hinder the media to fully play its role of public informer. While the first is based on spreading rumors based on reliable sources, the latter is victimized and influenced by the executive branch. Therefore, control and oversight in Mali remain weak.

When it comes to military professionalism, we can assess that foreign assistance has improved the professional norms in the security sector in Mali. This improvement is linked to training and education provided by various donors to the Malian armed forces. Malian security forces are more professional. The military mostly respects international and human rights laws. In contrast to their behavior during pre-elections in 2013, Malian security forces are less involved in abuses and atrocities on the civilian population. In most cases, terrorists and other bandits when arrested are handed over to the justice system. Moreover, the Commission on Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation is operational to bring justice and accountability to those who committed crimes during the 2012–2013 armed conflict. Therefore, foreign aid has influenced professional norms in the security forces in Mali since 2013.

Foreign assistance has had little impact on the plan and strategy for the requirement of military effectiveness. The assistance role in training and setting strategy, however, has helped Mali to develop a regional security force (G5) that operates in the Sahel regions to fight terrorism, human and narcotics trafficking, and organized crime. The assistance has also contributed to train Malian armed forces to defend the country's territorial integrity and secure its borders using the police, gendarmerie, and National Guard. In addition, foreign aid has supported the peace agreement between rebel groups and the central government, which includes the cantonment of the rebel group, and the disarmament, demobilization, and reinstatement of ex-combatants. This is a big step in the stabilization process; nevertheless, there is little effort made by the protagonists to implement the peace agreement. Mali also signed a defense accord with France to help protect Mali's vast territory. Thus, there is also the presence of UN peacekeepers in the north and center of Mali. There is little evidence, though, supporting improvement in the effectiveness of security because insecurity continues to spread in these areas, and there is an increase in

violence and atrocities by the terrorists and bandits on the civil population. Therefore, assistance from various donors has had little impact on the effectiveness of the security plan and strategy.

Diverse donors continue to assist Mali as the country develops its institutional frameworks to improve effectiveness and build better democratic civil-military relations; however, a significant gap remains in this process. In the defense sector, although the military is under a strong and functioning civil authority, military members remain in charge of both the interior security and the intelligence agencies. At the same time, the executive branch strongly influences both the interior security and the intelligence areas. The intelligence apparatus works under secrecy and its budget remains secret. It follows guidance and directives from the president and the agency's inner circle. Moreover, instead of gathering intelligence, the agency relies on spreading rumors and abusing journalists and peaceful citizens. As a result, there is less effectiveness, which is an impediment to institutional development and renders foreign assistance less effective.

In terms of resources, donors have made efforts to support Mali's limited resources with equipment, training, and education to improve its already failed security system. Yet, the assistance has mostly focused on training and education, which is not the only assistance that Mali needs to improve its military effectiveness. In addition to training and education, in order to fulfill its roles and missions, the Malian armed forces need equipment, logistics, and advanced technology to improve the effectiveness of its armed forces. Although France has provided some security materials, this material seems to be insignificant in terms of the size of the armed forces. Moreover, specialists have assisted Mali's government in the recruitment and training processes. Despite this effort from various donors, the Malian recruitment process is still plagued by nepotism, corruption, and cronyism. On a positive note, though, there has been an improvement in resources since 2013. In 2014, the central government proposed a law on planning, programming, and budgeting, which the assembly passed the same year. The law aimed to provide necessary equipment and logistics, and to improve military living conditions over a period of 2015–2019. So far, little improvement has been made in terms of actually equipping the armed forces. Consequently, donors have been frustrated and discouraged.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

After the analysis and examinations made on foreign assistance and civil-military relations in Mali since 2013, this study found gaps and weaknesses that need remediation. Focusing on control and effectiveness, foreign donors and decision makers in Mali need to take further steps to resolve these gaps and weaknesses in civil-military relations in Mali.

First, diverse donors have to identify Mali's goals in improving civilian control of the armed forces, strengthening oversight, and fighting terrorism and organized crime. Moreover, donors have to set a standard for countries to receive aid funds. Donors have to make sure that Mali reaches such expectations in terms of results in all their different assistance programs. Moreover, donors should evaluate their aid, then come out with better tools and approaches to mitigate failure and to improve the effectiveness of this assistance. In addition, Mali's performance handling prior aid should determine subsequent assistance. Further, donors should consider broadening the scope of their assistance. Rather than focusing their aid on training and education only, they should consider providing equipment and logistics that are adapted to the recipient country standards.

Although Mali has received equipment from various donors, these assets have often been limited in quantity; moreover, security forces do not receive training on how to use this equipment. Therefore, the equipment remains unused and becomes a burden for the recipient country. In addition, with its limited resources, Mali cannot afford to maintain the donated equipment and logistics. They are either too costly to repair or there is lack of a qualified personnel to fix the equipment. Therefore, foreign donors should provide assistance that can fit the recipient country's capabilities.

To the government of Mali, this thesis has the following recommendations. Mali needs to use the advisory, logistic, and resource based foreign aid to fight corruption, strengthen democratic institutions, increase professionalism of the armed forces, and boost the expertise of policymakers.

Control and oversight at the institutional level have to be strengthened. Checks and balances have to be re-established and enforced in practice. The executive influence on different institutions must diminish. The three branches of government—executive,

legislative, judicial—have to boost the capabilities of the oversight and control institutions, as well as the expertise and knowledge of those who are conducting oversight. Toward this end, the foreign assistance programs—education, training, exchanges, advisory, equipment—should continue. Independent agencies also must have the freedom to exercise their oversight without outside influence. Moreover, a reduction in political leverage, nepotism, corruption, and cronyism is required. Creating different institutions and agencies to reinforce control and oversight, and making sure they are implemented, can reduce or even eradicate these counterproductive practices.

In addition, the media should have the freedom to inform and educate the public without the meddling of the three branches of government. Most important, journalists should be protected by laws. Mali should continue to train and educate the security forces to respect rules and regulations, as well as human rights. Furthermore, authorities should punish any violation of these rights and regulations. Impunity should not be encouraged, because it erodes trust between civilians and the military.

Moreover, the government of Mali should set a plan to improve military effectiveness by creating barracks in different regions. More recruitment, training, and education should be made on both the security sector and civilian sides. This will enable each to have knowledge of the other's sector. This can improve civil-military relations in Mali. It will also enable the civil population to help the armed forces to fulfill their roles and missions. Both civilian and military institutions should coordinate their efforts better, which the SGI program can improve. This SGI program can also improve interagency coordination with expertise. Further, the government of Mali should consider creating a center of intelligence analysis to assess daily threats at the national and international level. In addition, the government of Mali should consider creating a center for civil-military relations where people can receive training and education on intelligence, security, and civil-military relations.

Malian security forces should be equipped and trained to meet the requirement of effectiveness. The budget allocated to the security sector should be used for its main purpose instead for personal or political interests. In addition, some people seem to be untouchable by the law in the security sector as well as in civilian institutions. These

practices should be remediated because they impede institutional control mechanisms and oversight. The executive branch should let the judicial branch exercise its work without interference. All three powers should respect standards of the code of conduct in practice. The military budget should obey the principle of the 1996 financial law and the 1996 public accounting act. Any violation of these laws should be punished according to the law. Bribes, corruption, and nepotism in all public and security sectors should be discouraged and punished by law.<sup>191</sup> Conversely, transparency and accountability should be promoted and enforced.

Implementing these recommendations can improve civil-military relations, as well as control and effectiveness of the armed forces.

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<sup>191</sup> Anatole Ayissi and Nouhoum Sangaré, “Mali,” in *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of Control*, ed. Wuyi Omitoogun and Eboe Hutchful (Oxford: Oxford University/Sipri Publications, 2006).

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