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THESIS

**A NATION OFFSIDE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DISPARITY
AMONG EAST AND WEST GERMAN SOCCER TEAMS AND
PLAYERS FOLLOWING UNIFICATION**

by

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September 2018

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AND WEST GERMAN SOCCER TEAMS AND PLAYERS FOLLOWING
UNIFICATION**

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Support of a soccer club has become a cultural cornerstone for a significant portion of European society, yet a major portion of the German population has been denied this opportunity to root for a home team or even a local player. The cultural significance of soccer in the region may also have helped fuel societal divisions that extend beyond the boundaries of the soccer pitch, such that the absence of representation may have played at least a small role in the unhappiness with the current political and cultural environment in the former GDR. If those in the East feel that their identity was compromised after unification, and it seems likely that on the soccer pitch it was, it may have played some part in the return of identity politics and the populist nationalist sentiments there. As the security situation in Europe today continues to become more concerning, the lessons of 1789, 1848, and 1932 warrant the resolution of any issue that could even be loosely connected to the explosion of nationalism—and other divisive particularisms—in the region.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative for Deutschland
BSG	Berlin Football Club
BSG	Betriebssportgemeinschaft, or enterprise sports group
DFV	Deutscher Fußballverband, or German Football Association
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FIFA	International Federation of Association Football
GDR	German Democratic Republic
UEFA	Union of European Football Associations

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I. INTRODUCTION

The unification of Germany in 1990 brought the former Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR) together under a common Federal German flag without the socialist hammer and compass. The Europe of a quarter century later seems bent on renationalization, despite the high hopes of the European Union, in which a united Germany has been a driver of multinational progress in security between East and West. How can an American student of European security make sense of this epochal shift of citizenship, nationhood, and security in light of the ongoing U.S.-European defense bond threatened by an integral nationalist challenge of special viciousness?

One place to begin to answer this question lies in the depths of national feeling and regional belonging via society and culture that is central to modern Germany—and especially to Germany since 1990. This common German identity has not translated to equal representation in one of Germany's signature sports, football (soccer). Indeed, clubs and players from the former FRG have dominated the Bundesliga¹ and the German National Team, leaving clubs and players from the former GDR behind. In a country with such a storied past and proud identification with its football identity, how has this disparity contributed to continued social divisions within Germany? Have any policies implemented by the divided governments of the FRG or GDR facilitated this enduring inconsistency?

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Soccer occupies a significant, relevant status as the king of German popular sporting culture. Indeed, the Bundesliga enjoys continuing success, breaking its own attendance record in the 2016–2017 season.² As soccer is the most popular sport in the nation, it would be reasonable to predict somewhat uniform distribution of premier clubs

¹ The Bundesliga is the name for Germany's club (national) soccer league.

² "German Football Sets New Attendance Record," Bundesliga: Official website, June 23, 2017, Accessed October 19, 2017 <http://www.bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/german-football-sets-new-attendance-record-bundesliga-447231.jsp>.

and players from locales across the country. However, in the quarter-century-plus following unification, only five teams from the former GDR have gained promotion to the Bundesliga's top tier.³ In fact, there was a complete lack of representation from the East from 2009 until 2016, when RB Leipzig acceded to the first division.⁴ The situation is much the same for the German national team; both the 2014 World Cup-winning lineup and the 2018 squad that crashed out in the group stage featured just one player from the former GDR.

This Western domination has not always been the case, as evidenced by the year 1974—perhaps the heyday of soccer in the GDR.⁵ During that year's European club campaign, FC Magdeburg won the European Cup as the best club in all of Europe and the GDR's national team defeated the FRG 1–0 on the game's biggest stage during the FIFA World Cup's group stage.

The fact that this disparity has persisted beyond the initial years of unification makes it worthy of further examination. This divide between East and West exists not only on the soccer pitch, but in other realms of daily life as well. In a 2015 study, Gideon Becker observed a “quite substantial” wealth gap between East and West Germans.⁶ Politically, the most recent elections saw the state of Saxony deliver a majority vote for the far-right Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party.⁷ No other region in the country provided this

³ Glen Moutrie, “West German Teams Still Dominate the East in the Bundesliga,” *The Guardian*, October 17, 2014, Accessed October 19, 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/17/west-german-teams-still-dominate-the-east-in-the-bundesliga>.

⁴ “Renaissance in Eastern Germany: Leipzig, Dresden and Aue on the Up,” Bundesliga: Official website, June 24, 2016, Accessed October 19, 2017 <http://www.bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/nobisp-renaissance-in-eastern-germany-leipzig-dresden-and-aue.jsp>.

⁵ “Eastern German Soccer Clubs Struggle to Stay in the Game,” *Deutsche Welle*, September 5, 2010, Accessed October 19, 2017 <http://www.dw.com/en/eastern-german-soccer-clubs-struggle-to-stay-in-the-game/a-5967469>.

⁶ Gideon Becker, “Econometric Analysis of the Wealth Gap between East and West Germany,” *University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics*, no. 87: 37, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-656979>.

⁷ Elizabeth Schumacher, “German Election Results: Disappointing Victory for Angela Merkel as Cdu Sinks, Nationalist AfD Surges,” *Deutsche Welle*, September 25, 2017, Accessed November 11 <http://www.dw.com/en/german-election-results-disappointing-victory-for-angela-merkel-as-cdu-sinks-nationalist-afd-surges/a-40666430>.

level of support for the party, providing another data point for the divisions which remain part of German society. The study of the lack of unity on the soccer pitch sheds some light on the underlying conditions which help Germany's social divisions to endure today.

Support of a soccer club has become a cultural cornerstone for a significant portion of European society, yet a major portion of the German population have been denied this opportunity to root for a home team or even a local player. The cultural significance of soccer in the region has helped fuel societal divisions which extend beyond the boundaries of the soccer pitch, such that the absence of representation likely plays at least a small role in the unhappiness with the current political and cultural environment in the former GDR. Many in the East feel that their identity was compromised after unification, and on the soccer pitch it has been, fueling in some part in the return of identity politics and the populist nationalist sentiments there. As the security situation in Europe today continues to become more concerning, the lessons of 1789, 1848, and 1932 warrant the study of any issue that could even be loosely connected to the explosion of nationalism—and other divisive particularisms—in the region.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

In theory, soccer is nothing more than a matchup of 22 players divided evenly among two squads, both attempting to deposit a ball in the opposing team's net more often than they concede the same act. The impact of the game, however, is not contained to the pitch or even within the walls of stadia across the globe. Indeed, its unrivaled popularity worldwide has ensured that the games impact bleeds beyond merely social events into the political and economic realms of the modern world. Simon Kuper, an award-winning author who has described the game's impact on economics and politics, declares, "when a game matters to billions of people it ceases to be just a game. Football is never just football: it helps make wars and revolutions, and it fascinates mafias and dictators."⁸ Jim Riordan and Arnd Krüger state that "the growing internationalization and politicization of sport

⁸ Simon Kuper, *Football against the Enemy* (London: Orion), 1.

inevitably drew in broader issues, like religion, social class, women, and race.”⁹ In particular, they claim that the ideological enemies of the Cold War era believed that athletic superiority would lead at least in some small way to ideological victory.

Germany, as a majority of nations have done, has historically also placed great emphasis on international sporting success. Before the nation came to dominate on the soccer pitch, gymnastics was the preferred avenue of proving athletic superiority. Heinrich notes the immense power the gymnastic association, the Turnerschaft, held in the German social and political spheres in the early 20th century.¹⁰ Udo Merkel describes an opposing viewpoint from the same era: “there was no coherent and specific set of patriotic and national ideas associated with sport as it was simply perceived as an unhealthy leisure activity without positive virtues and fostering only specialization, exaggerated selfishness, competitiveness and the principle of individual achievement. The narrow and focused training of athletes and the emerging commercialization and professionalization in English football grounds and boxing rings were also criticized.”¹¹

However, this opposition to sport remained a minority, and the sporting landscape was quickly politicized. Hitler’s National Socialist regime worked quickly to enact nationalist regulations on sport and particularly soccer.¹² Yet by attempting to turn football into a political event, the Nazi regime began to lose the support of fans who sought the sport out as a temporary escape from the totalitarian state’s politics. Shortly after coming into power, the Nazis implemented policies which “meant the immediate end of independent working-class organizations, social-democratic and communist football clubs and two years later the abolition of religious football organizations.”¹³ This may have been the first attempt to manipulate the identifying characteristics of German soccer clubs, but

⁹ James Riordan and Arnd Krüger, *The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century* (New York: Routledge), x.

¹⁰ Arthur Heinrich, “The 1954 Soccer World Cup and the Federal Republic of Germany’s Self-Discovery,” *The American Behavioral Scientist* 46, no. 11 (July 2003): 1491.

¹¹ Udo Merkel, “The Hidden Social and Political History of the German Football Association (Dfb), 1900–50,” *Soccer & Society* 1, no. 2 (2000): 170, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14660970008721270>.

¹² Heinrich, 1492.

¹³ Merkel, 182.

it would not be the last. In this manipulation of identity, the Nazis—and later the socialists—made a grave mistake. As Gerry P. T. Finn notes:

Many individuals express strong positive emotions towards ‘their’ own local community. Local football teams have for a long time represented and crystallized that sense of community, which has added to the emotional significance invested in the local football club. For some supporters, the football team has become the most substantial embodiment of the local community, with the affairs of the local club being seen as a crucial determinant of the vibrancy of the local community itself.¹⁴

After coming to power in 1945, the Soviet-installed regime in the GDR implemented a policy which—similar to the restrictions put in place under Hitler—banned all private sports associations and clubs. The government simultaneously formed the German Football association, or Deutscher Fußballverband (DFV) as the regulating body for soccer in East Germany.¹⁵ Communist leadership intended to utilize sport to increase prestige, as Erich Mielke, the Minister of State Security (Stasi), remarked that domination by East Germany national teams and high profile clubs would “highlight even more clearly the superiority of our socialist order in the area of sport.”¹⁶ On the Olympic stage, the GDR was able to showcase this superiority, placing in the top three medal-winning countries in every Olympic Games from 1972 to 1988.¹⁷ The legitimacy of those victories is now widely questioned, as the release of documents following German unification revealed a widespread systematic program of doping undertaken by the East Germans.¹⁸ While

¹⁴ Gerry P. T. Finn, “Football Violence: A Societal Psychological Perspective,” in *Football, Violence and Social Identity*, ed. Richard Giulianotti, Norman Bonney, and Mike Hepworth (New York: Routledge), 100–01.

¹⁵ Mike Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” *German Monitor* 71 (2009): 209, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/762997223?accountid=12702>.

¹⁶ Dennis, 210.

¹⁷ As a show of solidarity with the USSR, the GDR teams did not participate in the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Source for medal counts: James Riordan, “The Impact of Communism on Sport,” in *The International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century*, ed. James Riordan and Arnd Kruger (London: E&FN Spon, 1999), 58–59.

¹⁸ Mike Dennis and Johnathan Grix, *Sport under Communism: Behind the East German ‘Miracle’* (Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 84.

achieved through questionable methods, the impact of these athletic achievements should not be understated. Party Chairman Erich Honecker remarked that “our state is respected in the world because of the excellent performance of our top athletes, but also because we devote enormous attention to sport in an endeavor to make it part of the everyday lives of each and every citizen.”¹⁹ Statements from high-ranking state officials like this clearly demonstrate the emphasis on sport and the resulting political benefits of successful athletic campaigns.

The political benefits of sport are not limited to those on the seat of government. Fans and athletes often find that attendance at sporting events provides a prime opportunity to voice displeasure with their political situation. Bill Buford, in studying fan violence in England, noted that, “it was obvious that the fan violence was a protest. It made sense that it would be: that football matches were providing an outlet for frustrations of a powerful nature. So many young people were out of work or had never been able to find any. The violence, it followed, was a rebellion of some kind—social rebellion, class rebellion...”²⁰ Similarly, in the GDR many fans began to turn to hooliganism and rioting as a means for voicing their displeasure with the socialist government. Especially in the 1980s—the waning decade of the failed socialist experiment—fans began to add their voices to the cacophony of discontent which was sweeping the Second World.²¹ Kuper defines this particular form of “football dissidence” as “expressing dissent against a regime by supporting football teams that play against the regime’s team. Often, in a dictatorship, football dissidence is the only available form of mass dissent. In a football stadium, 80,000 people can gather and shout more or less what they like. It is easy to arrest the writer of a naughty article in a samizdat publication; harder to shut up a football crowd, which in any case has a louder voice.”²²

¹⁹ Riordan, “The Impact of Communism on Sport,”“61.

²⁰ Bill Buford, *Among the Thugs*, 1st American ed. (New York: Norton), 15.

²¹ Dennis, 209.

²² Simon Kuper, “Cheering the Enemy,” *Index on Censorship* 29, no. 4: 79, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03064220008536767>.

Although both the National Socialists and the GDR have been expunged from today's Germany, the legacy of decades of interference and oppression have left soccer in a decrepit state in East Germany. The aforementioned representation gap in the top flight of the Bundesliga began immediately among reconciliation as only two teams from the now-defunct GDR were incorporated into the top tier during the Bundesliga's first unified season, the 1991–1992 campaign.²³ The DFB also missed a major opportunity to level the playing field, when after national embarrassment at the 2000 European Championships, the association undertook a now-famous ten year plan to rehabilitate the nation's soccer arsenal.²⁴ While the plan achieved its main aim and resulted in the German National Team lifting the World Cup champions trophy in Brazil in 2014, it incorporated no provisions aimed at revitalizing East Germany's soccer academy system—a system which is the backbone of player development. Today, just eight of the thirty-six elite German soccer schools can be found in the former GDR.²⁵

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The lack of quality in East German football is likely due to a combination of factors that have hindered the game's development there. It does appear that the quality of clubs and players from the East prior to World War II point to a more level representation prior to the country's division following the Third Reich's defeat. The game's demise began when the communist-led GDR attempted to control every aspect of the game—from regulating where players would be assigned to which team fans could and could not support. The regime removed the joy from the game for many of its subjects and for many former fans, attendance at football matches became more an opportunity to protest communism than to celebrate success on the pitch.

²³ Bernd Frick and Joachim Prinz, "Crisis? What Crisis? Football in Germany," *Journal of Sports Economics* 7, no. 1: 61,

²⁴ Raphael Honigstein, *Das Reboot: How German Soccer Reinvented Itself and Conquered the World* (New York: Nation Books), 13–26.

²⁵ "Eastern German Soccer Clubs Struggle to Stay in the Game."

It would be lax to lay all of the blame of the state of today's game in the East at the feet of Stasi Chief Erich Mielke and the DFV leadership who left a state of ruins behind. It also appears the DFB missed a major opportunity to develop the game after the 2000 European Championship when the nation undertook a major operation to completely overhaul the nation's talent development infrastructure. One generation of German footballers after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there remains a stark difference in football in the East and the West. As societal divisions continue to manifest themselves in everyday life throughout the country—not just in sport but also politics and economics—any issue which allows for continued divisiveness provides an avenue for the return of nationalist sentiments fueled by identity politics and fear-based “us versus them” arguments.²⁶

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

Research supporting examination of this question is centered on examination of historical documents and statistics in order to unearth the underlying causes of the representation discrepancy in German football. In particular, sports policies adopted by the government of the former GDR have been considered. A discussion of broader economic and political divisions within the country nearly three decades after unification provides the foundational elements of social fractures which continue to be present on the soccer pitch.

The divided years provide significant contributions to the analysis, as it was here that football's popularity and quality so severely waned in East Germany. Policies implemented following the merging of the Oberliga and the Bundesliga are also discussed as they initially hampered a level playing field between teams from the East and West. Finally, the failed promotion of the game over the decades following unification provide an opportunity to analyze the continued social marginalization of the game's fans in the East.

²⁶ Ruth Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc.), 20–22.

Evaluation of these broad time periods in concert may help to paint a causal picture as to what the underlying causes of today's domination of German football representation by the former FRG and may point to necessary conditions which would facilitate a future closing of that gap by teams from the former GDR. Once these underlying causes are determined, a discussion of how the divisions on the football pitch fit into the larger

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II. REUNITED IN NAME ONLY: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIVISION IN GERMANY TODAY

To Germans in the GDR, I can say what Prime Minister de Mazière has already emphasized: No one will be worse off than before—and many will be better off. Only the monetary, economic, and social union offers the chance, yes, even the guarantee, of improving living conditions rapidly and thoroughly. Through our joint efforts, we will soon succeed in transforming Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia into blooming landscapes where it is worthwhile to live and work.²⁷

—Helmut Kohl, July 1, 1990

As unified Germany nears the end of its third decade of post-Cold War existence, some critical factors point to a nation that is united in name only. Significant social fissures remain between citizens residing in the former GDR and those inhabiting the former FRG. These divisions have played at least a small part in the recent return of right-wing nationalist parties to the German political landscape—a scene that has similarly played out across much of Europe. For example, the AfD—a German far-right party with an anti-EU, anti-immigrant platform—was able to gain an unprecedented level of support in Germany’s 2017 nation-wide elections.²⁸ Closer analysis reveals that the party was nearly twice as popular in the East, where it gained 20.5 percent of the vote, as it was in the West, where only 10.5 percent of citizens cast votes in favor of the party. In the region of Saxony alone, the party was able to garner nearly one-third of the total vote. These political rifts are indicative of the broader social divisions that continue to divide Germany today. This chapter examines the roots of the enduring invisible wall between East and West Germany and discuss the broad social divisions that the country is still grappling with—problems which are further exacerbated by feelings of East German inadequacy in other social areas including the realm of sport.

²⁷ Helmut Kohl, “Blooming Landscapes,” German History in Documents and Images, July 1, 1990, Accessed March 11, 2018 http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3101.

²⁸ Schumacher.

A. FROM SOCIALIST AUTHORITARIANISM TO CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY

Certainly, the reunification of divided Germany involved more than simply tearing down the Berlin Wall and proclaiming the two would become one again. Germany had been pitched in an ideological battle between West and East since the Allied forces converged there in the waning moments of World War II. Ultimately, it was the socialist government of the GDR that was forced to yield. Capitalism had overcome socialism. The FRG had scored an ideological victory. The capitulation of the socialism did not happen overnight, however, as four decades of Soviet-inspired living had firmly ensconced the socialist ideal in every aspect of everyday life within the GDR. Facing the haunting specter of a regression down Marx's natural order of life and returning to capitalism from socialism instead of achieving the communist utopia was sure to cause a certain amount of discomfort among the true believers in Marx's ideal.²⁹ Convincing many citizens of the GDR that capitalism and a market economy were preferable took a significant amount of effort. Fortunately, many of the necessary reforms began prior to the collapse of the GDR.

Such groups as Democracy Now and New Forum led the social organization of the GDR's hopeful democratizers. The state's newfound reluctance to quiet the voices of social reform allowed the hopeful citizens to gain the acceleration necessary to propel democracy from its inert state towards the terminal velocity it achieved on November 9, 1989. This monumental date marked the opening of checkpoints which restricted the flow of the people of Berlin between the Eastern and Western sides of the city. From this point forward, it seemed the reunification of Germany and the installation of a democratic government were almost inevitable. Along its path to democracy, and prior to the official reunification—which occurred on October 3, 1990—the GDR held its own elections. This March 1990 referendum would install the government which would direct the reunification efforts. In the end, the voices of the citizens ended up being a resounding denouncement of the communist cause, a chorus of change which would resonate throughout Eastern Europe. As Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen notes:

²⁹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," in *The Political Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions*, ed. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel (New York: Routledge), 41–62.

The results were a blow to the Communist hold on power everywhere in revealing how narrow its popular base had actually been despite all its assumptions and pretensions. The stark revelation of how small a minority had repressed the will of a vast majority shook the Communists clinging to the remnants of their authority and credibility in Europe. Wherever they faced free elections, the East German precedent sent shivers through them. Next in line was Hungary, where elections were scheduled for 25 March 1990, when a center-right party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, imitating the success of the Alliance for Germany, and other democratic forces buried Communism.³⁰

While the push for democracy was met with swift acceptance and implementation, the transition to capitalism would be marked by much more significant challenges—some of which remain to this day. Four decades of division fueled an economic divide between the two Germanys which would not be destroyed by belief and bulldozers, as the physical barriers had been. In fact, the opening of the borders created an opportunity for a sort of German carpetbagger—as many from the West began to take advantage of the situation in the East in an attempt to fill their own coffers.³¹ It seems that unlike the political bridging, those on either side of the economic divide held to their long-held stereotypical views, as noted by Hämäläinen:

The East Germans had lived in an authoritarian command system which had ingrained into them the habit of waiting for orders telling them what to do. Some were used to sliding by with less than a full effort in their daily jobs and doing their private errands during work hours. West Germans complained about the East Germans' work habits, accusing them of keeping short hours, slowness and absenteeism. They also thought that the East Germans needed improvement in such traditional Germanic virtues as being reliable and punctual in their work. These complaints and accusations did not go down well with many East Germans who had a reputation in the former Soviet sphere of possessing the very qualities which they now were said to lack.³²

³⁰ Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany : Actions and Reactions* (Boulder: Westview Press), 145.

³¹ Hämäläinen, 167–69.

³² Hämäläinen, 168.

Workers in the East received about one-third of the wages of their counterparts in the West did. They had also been stripped of the socialist assurance of a state-delivered pension. As the governments in Bonn and Berlin worked feverishly to enact policies to overcome the long-standing differences, uncertainty fanned the flames of fear in the hearts and minds of many in the East. The capitalist system brought a distinct sense of uncertainty on the individual level, as East Germans fretted over how “they would measure up to the free market demands of working pace, efficiency and production.”³³ These economic differences were significant pieces of the larger puzzle of German unification. That Western affluence and Eastern destitution did not always fit together in an ideal manner likely helped reinforce the invisible divide that remains today. In fact, these divisions continue to manifest themselves in everyday German life—politically, economically, and socially.

B. A WORLD WITHOUT A WALL—POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN GERMANY TODAY

After the fall of the Third Reich, parties on the far right of the political spectrum remained dormant throughout Germany. However, the recent emergence of parties such as the AfD reveals a tangible unhappiness with the status quo. That the party enjoys significantly higher levels of popularity in the former GDR demonstrates large portions of East Germans feel some level of social and political marginalization. Reflecting on the twentieth anniversary of German unification, Jeffrey Anderson presents a grim picture:

Germans appear to have arrived at a much more nuanced and far less euphoric conclusion about the state of union. Everywhere they look, they see a persistent East-West divide. In social relations, Eastern and Western Germans are separated to this day by the “wall in the head” (*Mauer im Kopf*). The economy is a tale of two Germanys, one rich and prosperous—the other essentially a ward of the state. And in the political realm, citizens and their representatives seem to operate within different

³³ Hämäläinen, 175.

coordinate systems and seek to realize very different visions, depending on whether they hail from one side or the other of the former wall.³⁴

The roots of today's political unhappiness can be traced back to the previously discussed social and economic divisions between residents of the former GDR and FRG. In fact, right-wing parties seized the opportunities provided by this unhappiness to make an almost immediate return to the political scene after reunification. As John Rodden notes:

Particularly for Eastern German educators, the most unexpected and frightening development in the immediate aftermath of reunification was the increase of xenophobia, dramatically manifested in the growth of anti-foreigner violence. Although the entire nation numbers no more than 50,000 active neo-Nazis, right-wing political parties have exploited the continuing high unemployment rates and perceptions of 'second-class' status among Easterners. Polls show that only one-third of Eastern Germans consider Germany's Western-style democracy 'defensible'; right-wing parties have attracted up to 13 percent of the vote—and up to a third of all voters under 30—in various eastern state elections since 1990. With a population only one quarter that of Western Germany (16 million v 65 million), Eastern Germany nevertheless harbors about 75 percent of the nation's right-wing radicals.³⁵

While numerous right-wing parties have come and gone in the decades following unification, the present iteration—the AfD—has reached a level of popularity not achieved by any of its predecessors. The party first participated in elections in 2013, and subsequently received 4.7 percent of the popular vote.³⁶ In a trend which would continue through the most recent elections, the party was most popular in regions which formerly fell within the borders of the GDR. In the 2017 general election, the party won 12.6 percent of the popular vote—becoming the third-largest party in the Bundestag.³⁷ While the AfD did perform well in some regions of the former FRG, the fact that it remains so

³⁴ Jeffrey J. Anderson, "The Federal Republic at Twenty: Of Blind Spots and Peripheral Visions," *German Politics and Society* 28, no. 2: 18, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/612722404?accountid=12702>.

³⁵ John Rodden, "Reeducating Reunified Germany?," *Society* 38, no. 5: 66,

³⁶ Robert Grimm, "The Rise of the German Eurosceptic Party Alternative Für Deutschland, between Ordoliberal Critique and Popular Anxiety," *International Political Science Review* 36, no. 3: 265,

³⁷ Carl C. Berning, "Alternative Für Deutschland (Afd)—Germany's New Radical Right-Wing Populist Party," *ifo DICE Report* 15, no. 4: 18,

disproportionately strong in the former GDR should not be discounted. This popularity discrepancy is likely due to a multitude of factors, as Berning notes:

The regional divide in AfD support is more than obvious. The AfD's heartland is Eastern Germany, while it also did very well in some areas of Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg. The AfD performed so strongly in Eastern Germany due to a combination of attitudinal resentments, socio-demographic composition and structural factors.³⁸

Economically, the disparity between the former ideological rivals in the GDR and FRG remains strong. Unfortunately, it appears that over two decades of capitalism simply has not provided the economic windfall to Eastern Germany that many predicted unification would provide. As Anderson observed of the former GDR in 2010:

The region remains a net exporter of inhabitants; since 1991, approximately 1.1 million people (almost 6.5 percent of the original East German population) have left for Western Germany. After making up considerable ground in the early years after unification, labor productivity languishes at around 70 percent of the Western German average. Unemployment rates are twice those registered in the West.³⁹

Gideon Becker traces the roots of this inequality to the foundational economic principles of the formerly socialist GDR.⁴⁰ He argues that wealth accumulation in the Second World was so difficult that private citizens rarely even sought the capitalist's dream of fortune. The restrictions on ownership of private property and fixed wage levels helped to reinforce the unimportance of capitalist pursuits. As such, generation upon generation passed these economic beliefs on to their children, further reinforcing social norms which flew in the face of traditional Western visions of economic prosperity. Only now is the former GDR seeing a coming of age of a generation that has lived its entire life under capitalism, so perhaps there is some chance for future optimism.

³⁸ Berning.

³⁹ Anderson, 22.

⁴⁰ Becker, 2–3.

In fact, despite lagging behind Western Germany in many economic indicators, Eastern Germany should be applauded for its efforts to lead German efforts in a few key areas. One of key components of the Democracy Now platform during its campaign to banish the authoritarian GDR government from Berlin was the protection of the environment from the destructive forces of industrialism.⁴¹ The principle of environmental protection has endured, and now the region leads German efforts on environmental security and renewable energy efforts.⁴² Anderson also points to the growing economic might of Dresden, Leipzig, and the Berlin-Brandenburg ring as reasons to hope that the East is beginning to gain some economic momentum

C. CONCLUSION

The societal divisions between East and West continue to manifest themselves both politically and economically. In his assessment of the wealth disparity within Germany, Gideon Becker found that “vastly different living conditions between East and West Germany still remain. This is particularly true for the distribution of net wealth which is of special importance for the well-being of individuals.”⁴³ Jeffrey Anderson adds that when looking back on German unification “the dominant impression is naturally one of shortfall, even failure, whether the metric is economic, political, or even moral.”⁴⁴ For the foreseeable future, Germany will continue to be challenged to address the East-West fractures existing within its own borders. Sutton and Rookwood “suggest that in the future, the experience of further equity in socio-political terms would help reduce the prevailing cultural differences (and related sense of injustice) between the two.”⁴⁵

⁴¹ “A Plea to Get Involved in Our Own Cause: Flier of the Citizens’ Movement “Democracy Now,”” in *When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification*, ed. Harold James and Marla Stone (New York: Routledge), 123.

⁴² Anderson, 22.

⁴³ Becker, 3.

⁴⁴ Anderson, 31.

⁴⁵ Neal Sutton and Joel Rookwood, “‘From Rotterdam to Rio’: Investigating Perceptions of Sporting, Socio-Political and Cultural Developments in Germany between 2000 and 2014,” *International Journal of Social Science Studies* 3, no. 4: 129, <http://dx.doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v3i4.899>.

Overcoming these differences will surely be difficult, but it will not be impossible. Perhaps sport will provide an avenue for bridging the social divides that remain between the two sides. Soccer, unquestionably the most popular sport in Germany, is uniquely positioned to assist in that realm. In fact, Sussmuth, Heyne, and Maennig argue that events such as the 2006 FIFA World Cup, which was held in Germany, appreciably helped to further a common German identity, bringing East and West closer together.⁴⁶ However, the East-West gulf has permeated even the soccer pitch, making that unifying ability significantly weaker than if the field were leveled across Germany.

⁴⁶ Bernd Sussmuth, Malte Heyne, and Wolfgang Maennig, "Induced Civic Pride and Integration," *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 72, no. 2: 202,

III. ROTTEN ROOTS: THE DECIMATION OF SOCCER IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

The second-rate nature of East German soccer has its roots in the policies and actions of the GDR. The government there utilized sport for international acclaim, but its focus seemed to be on individual events, and thus soccer took a back seat to such events as weightlifting. Domestically, the sport was subject to political manipulation, erasing the suspense—and the resultant feelings of agony and joy—that a truly open competition can bring. The opportunity to invigorate an attentive population was squandered by decisions made off of the pitch, outside of competition, which impacted the product on the field. This chapter demonstrates the practices and policies implemented during the socialist GDR's existence which formed the foundation for today's fractured state of soccer in Germany.

While the GDR was struggling to gain international recognition in the decade following its inception, it was sport that helped the socialist nation achieve symbolic acceptance in the eyes of the world. Following the 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, the GDR's National Olympic Committee was accepted by the International Olympic Committee as a member organization, paving the way for athletes to compete under the GDR's flag at the 1972 Games—which were to be held in Munich.⁴⁷ The GDR would arrive on the international sporting scene at one of the world's most prominent sporting events. That these events were to be held in the capitalist FRG was a symbolic opportunity that was not lost on the GDR's leadership, which placed a special emphasis on succeeding at the Munich games. These efforts paid off, as GDR athletes brought home the third-largest haul of medals, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union. With this event, Hesselmann and Ide argue that sport brought the GDR international recognition and thus became an integral part of East German identity.⁴⁸ Riordan echoes those claims, remarking that international sporting success helped the government emerge from political darkness

⁴⁷ Markus Hesselmann and Robert Ide, "A Tale of Two Germanys: Football Culture and National Identity in the German Democratic Republic," in *German Football: History, Culture, Society*, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (New York: Routledge), 36–37.

⁴⁸ Hesselmann and Ide, 37.

and improved the recognition, credibility, and influence of the socialist government both domestically and internationally.⁴⁹

In pursuit of athletic glory, the GDR's ministry of sport found it much easier to set the conditions of success in individual events. These events largely provided greater opportunity for doping, steroid use, and other forms of manipulation than team-based sports which relied not only on athletic prowess but also upon skill and teamwork—attributes which cannot be intravenously introduced to competitors via needle.⁵⁰ These individual successes did prove to be “an important element in cultivating the national consciousness through the construction of traditions and symbols” which helped to rally the citizenry behind their East German identity.⁵¹ In fact, the socialist government—always in search of heroes from the proletariat—frequently elevated successful members of the working class to the pantheon of national heroes. One of the most prominent examples of this adoration is the case of Gustav-Adolf “Täve” Schur, a cyclist who won multiple cycling championships in the 1950s.⁵² Schur's “working-class roots, steadfastness, and political participation” made him the ideal subject of the socialist society, and he was held up as an example for all of his fellow countrymen to emulate.⁵³ Schur became such a beloved figure that he was able to remain popular even after the GDR collapsed decades later.

On the soccer pitch, the GDR found only fleeting success, despite the opportunity the game provides to unite the working class—that key cog of socialism's success. As Markovits and Hellerman argue, “In every country where soccer developed into the premier occupant of the country's sport space, the game became inextricably identified with a ‘proletarian’ culture.”⁵⁴ The game had occupied that preeminent position in

⁴⁹ Riordan, “The Impact of Communism on Sport,” 61–62.

⁵⁰ Dennis and Grix, 156.

⁵¹ George N. Kioussis and Thomas M. Hunt, “Projection and Reception: The American(Ized) Other in East German Elite Sport, 1966–77,” *Journal of Sport History* 42, no. 2: 170, muse.jhu.edu/article/594216.

⁵² Kioussis and Hunt, 170.

⁵³ Kioussis and Hunt, 170.

⁵⁴ Andrei S. Markovits and Steven L. Hellerman, *Offside : Soccer and American Exceptionalism* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press), 28.

Germany prior to World War II, yet that momentum was squandered by political meddling. Throughout the GDR's existence, only one East German club, FC Magdeburg in 1974, ever won the prestigious European Cup—a competition held among the top clubs from throughout European domestic soccer leagues.⁵⁵ Yet, that championship, which should have provided a major boon for soccer in the GDR, was characteristically bungled by the government. Fans of the team who had celebrated the achievement in the moment and likely could hardly wait to read about it in the next day's paper were greeted instead with a politically-dictated headline.⁵⁶ The “Heroes of Rotterdam,” as the Magdeburg players became known, were absent from the front page. Instead, the paper celebrated the 29th anniversary of the Day of Liberation by featuring photographs and stories of party leadership at a Soviet monument in Berlin.⁵⁷ The momentum of one of East Germany's greatest soccer achievements was squandered mere hours after it occurred.

A. SOCCER IN THE GDR: MEDDLING AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

That individual athletic achievements often overshadowed those of GDR team events should not suggest that the government did not attempt to manipulate those sports as well. However, in stark contrast with the achievements in individual competitions, the attempts at engineering success in team sports, and particularly soccer, were often unsuccessful. In fact, these efforts often proved detrimental to the success of soccer in the GDR by alienating large swaths of the population and depriving the system of potential players for development—obviously a necessary component of any successful soccer program. Manfred Ewald, a key figure in the successful development and of East German athletes participating in individual sports, “attributed the mediocrity of GDR football to undue interference by political and economic functionaries at both central and regional level, an opinion which was shared by the DFV.”⁵⁸

⁵⁵ The European Cup was the predecessor to today's Champions League.

⁵⁶ Hesselmann and Ide, 39–41.

⁵⁷ Hesselmann and Ide, 39–41.

⁵⁸ Dennis, “Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” in *German Football: History, Culture, Society*, edited by Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 55.

It was the nature of socialist regime to attempt infiltration into every aspect of life in the GDR, and soccer was no different.⁵⁹ Political manipulation occurred throughout the game, and even the names of clubs were subject to reconfiguration. As Dennis describes:

in accordance with notions of socialist sport culture and the primacy of the collective, teams like Zwickau received a prefix, the most common one being BSG (Betriebssportgemeinschaft—enterprise sports group), and linkage to an economic sector was underpinned by the renaming of clubs. Thus, “Chemie,” “Lokomotive” and “Stahl” denoted the chemical industry, the railways and the steel industry respectively. The term “Dynamo” was associated with the Ministries of State Security and the Interior and “Vorwärts” with the army.⁶⁰

Thus, supporters who arrived to the stands to cheer on their favorite team now found themselves cheering for teams that hearkened back not to the sense of local identity and pride, which was rooted in generations of familial existence in a place, but rather to a political system that some citizens still regarded as alien and imposed.⁶¹ As a result, faced with the choice of cheering for a politicized product on the pitch or abstention, many would-be fans simply stayed away from the game. The complete disregard for significance of soccer’s cultural history torpedoed most of the opportunities for wide-spread success of the game.

In addition to renaming clubs, most of their prior successes were forcibly abandoned as well in attempts to remove any connections to the perceived evils of a bourgeois past.⁶² VfB Leipzig, proud champions of Germany’s first soccer championship in 1903, lost this title in an attempt to erase a history that the socialists proclaimed never happened. As part of the same effort, Dresdner SC similarly was forced to abandon its back-to-back championships in 1943 and 1944, the last two titles of the war era. As Hesselmann and Ide succinctly summarize, “identification with the local football club, the

⁵⁹ Hans-Joachim Maaz, *Behind the Wall: The Inner Life of Communist Germany* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co.), 5–6.

⁶⁰ Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 211.

⁶¹ Maaz, xi-xii.

⁶² Hesselmann and Ide, 41.

traditional basis of all football supporting, was not made easy in the days of the GDR Oberliga.”⁶³

The political infiltration of the game did not stop with simply renaming teams and stripping them of their heritage. The structure of the Oberliga’s governing body was frequently overhauled as the government worked on tightening its control of the game.⁶⁴ These controls were sometimes aimed at improving the performance on the field, but were more frequently designed to limit actions on the periphery such as regulation of supporter groups and crackdowns on decidedly anti-socialist illicit payment of players.⁶⁵ There were also great lengths taken to ensure no significant talent drain the limited supply of quality players available within the GDR. As was the case with ordinary citizens, the emigration of soccer players was strictly forbidden and their actions were closely monitored. However, while ordinary citizens could be forcibly held in place, the soccer team was occasionally afforded the opportunity to travel abroad to participate in international competitions. As such, the state security apparatus developed an extensive program of control to ensure players did not attempt to flee to the capitalist west.⁶⁶

Anderson details the questionable case of Lutz Eigendorf, an East German soccer player who defected to the FRG in the 1980s and died shortly thereafter.⁶⁷ During a trial for an unrelated crime in 2010, Karl-Heinz Felgner, a title-winning former East German boxer, claimed that after Eigendorf fled to the West that he (Felgner) had crossed into the FRG with orders from the Stasi to execute Eigendorf. Eigendorf died in an automobile accident with a significant amount of alcohol in his blood, but the amount of information available on his defection in Stasi files uncovered after German unification has led many to theorize that the Stasi may have played a role in his death. Either way, the effort exerted toward keeping Eigendorf and other East German soccer players behind the Iron Curtain demonstrates the socialist regime’s commitment to avoiding political embarrassment. The

⁶³ Hesselmann and Ide, 41.

⁶⁴ Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 210.

⁶⁵ Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 210.

⁶⁶ Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 211.

⁶⁷ Anderson, 24–26.

GDR's government clearly understood that a mass migration of soccer talent could have the effect of catalyzing exit attempts of many other citizens. The government's influence, however, did not stop at simply restricting the emigration of players from East Germany. The Stasi in fact became so embroiled in the governance of German soccer that they began actively conspiring to ensure the success of the leadership's favorite clubs.

B. BFC DYNAMO: DARLING OF THE STASI

Perhaps no soccer club embodied the interconnected nature of state and society better than Berlin Football Club (BFC) Dynamo. Erich Mielke, the Minister of State Security, made this club his personal project. Mielke went to great lengths to ensure the superiority of the team, as he intended to use the club to "highlight even more clearly the superiority of our socialist order in the area of sport."⁶⁸ Seeking a Berlin-based team to rival Hertha Berlin in the West, Mielke uprooted SC Dynamo Dresden in 1954 and declared the club would now be based in Berlin and called SC Dynamo Berlin, the name it retained for a decade before switching to the BFC Dynamo moniker. Despite protests from Dresden representatives, who appealed to First Secretary Walter Ulbricht, the powerful secret police chief prevailed, and the club relocated without any significant challenge.⁶⁹

After securing his team in the capital, Mielke went about ensuring its success on the pitch. He frequently intervened on personnel matters related to the club, forcing transfers of top-flight players to the club and ridding the roster of those who were past their prime.⁷⁰ These policies appeared to have their intended impact, at least within the domestic league. Following Dynamo Dresden's championship in 1978, BFC Dynamo went on to win the next eight championships with relative ease.⁷¹ In fact, during Dresden's celebrations in 1978, Ulbricht is alleged to have entered the locker room to tell the players that the time had come for BFC to ascend to the top of the league. In addition to the forced transfers of players, Mielke also used his influence to gain favor with the officiating corps

⁶⁸ Dennis, "A People's Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic," 210.

⁶⁹ Dennis, "A People's Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic," 211.

⁷⁰ Dennis, "A People's Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic," 211–13.

⁷¹ Dennis, "A People's Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic," 212.

of the Oberliga. Stasi-linked referees were used for most games of consequence; not surprisingly, many questionable decisions went BFC Dynamo's way at the end of tight matches.⁷² As a result, BFC Dynamo became perhaps the most hated team in the Oberliga among rival clubs. It was during BFC Dynamo's matches that the most significant levels of protest emerged, and arrests were always higher than during matches involving other clubs.⁷³

C. DISGUST AND DISSENT: THE EMERGENCE OF PUBLIC PROTESTS

By the 1980s, the regime's totalitarian grip on society began to loosen and soccer fans began to express their displeasure with the political interference in the beautiful game. Although there are notable events of violent opposition to state interference prior to the 1980s, those events were usually one-off occurrences and did not become commonplace until the GDR's waning decade. As Dennis notes, "club officials and supporters objected bitterly to politically-inspired discrimination against their own team; and by the 1980s hooliganism poised a growing threat to public order."⁷⁴ In a system built on regulation, any popular expression of discontent was a direct threat to the state's survival. In order to counter this threat, the state tried to infiltrate supporter groups in order to intimidate, isolate, and eventually remove dissidents from the groups. Union Berlin, the rival club of Mielke's beloved BFC Dynamo, created a natural cross-town rival for anti-state protestors to support.⁷⁵ As such, the Union fans often rioted, especially during the Berlin derbies against BFC Dynamo. The Stasi attempted to infiltrate the Union Ultras but in perhaps a sign of their declining power, they were unable to make any significant impact on the group's behavior.

⁷² Dennis, "A People's Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic," 212.

⁷³ Dennis, "Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic," 53–55.

⁷⁴ Dennis, "A People's Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic," 209.

⁷⁵ Dennis, "A People's Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic," 214.

The 1980s also saw an emergence of a “more militant, openly racist” skinhead culture among some supporter groups.⁷⁶ This was a phenomenon not confined to Germany, as skinheads began to similarly appear in supporter groups in England and elsewhere in Europe.⁷⁷ In Germany, however, this development was obviously troubling from a historical standpoint, but it also introduced more politically-charged violence into the realm of sport. Stasi documents reveal numerous arrests for fans who chanted anti-Semitic and xenophobic phrases such as “‘Jewish pigs’, ‘Berlin Jews’, and ‘leaders of Turks’” at opposing teams and players.⁷⁸ One Berlin supporter group, Berlin Anale, openly embraced fascism and in August 1985 they took part in major brawls in the city of Dresden while singing “My father was an SS-soldier” and other traditional fascist songs.⁷⁹ Dennis reveals the lack of control that the state was able to maintain over soccer supporters:

These incidents testify to the overall failure to suppress the hooligan element by the deployment of more informers, the segregation of fans, restrictions on the sale of alcohol, fines and arrests. 960 disturbances were recorded in the 1986–87 season and 1,099 in the following year. In the latter period, more than half of the offences were committed by Halle, Union Berlin, Rostock and Erfurt fans. Magdeburg and Dynamo Dresden lagged some way behind. These figures should be regarded as indicative rather than definitive in what is a notoriously grey area. Numbers may well have been massaged before their dispatch to higher authorities and, furthermore, racist chants such as ‘Jewish pigs’, vandalism and many other incidents simply went unrecorded as stewards and police, whether in the grounds or outside, were sometimes overwhelmed by the sheer scale of disorder. A supporter of Chemie Leipzig recalls that the police hardly dared intervene when brawls broke out in the Georg-Schwarz-Sportpark for fear of having thousands of spectators at their throats.⁸⁰

As German youth were continuing to find their political voice and express their will through violence and other means, the government remained in denial. Internal memorandums released after the collapse of the GDR show the government blamed the

⁷⁶ Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 214.

⁷⁷ Buford, 131–58.

⁷⁸ Dennis, “Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” 57.

⁷⁹ Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 214.

⁸⁰ Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” 214.

root of violent hooliganism on the West, turning a blind eye to the true source of the discord. All of this occurred despite mounting evidence to the contrary, including more records which showed arrests for fans chanting “‘Stasi out!’ and ‘The fuzz are work-shy’” during games.⁸¹

It seems the skinheads understood the recruitment opportunities afforded to them at soccer stadiums, for club matches became one of the most frequent meeting grounds of the outlawed groups.⁸² The groups often infiltrated the ranks of the GDR’s stewards—state-designated personnel assigned to keep the peace. As disillusionment with the socialist state spread throughout society, the skinheads found it easier to have their men acting as the stewards who allowed or denied access to sporting matches and other public events. By controlling access, the skinheads were ensured that their access to popular meeting spots—such as soccer matches—would not be revoked.

D. CONCLUSION

Cold War-era policies toward soccer within the GDR are at the root of the current poor state of soccer in East German. Soccer maintained its position as the most popular sport in East Germany throughout the existence of the GDR. But, as Hesselmann and Ide argue, “The communist leaders never really managed to develop a successful strategy for using that popularity for the national and socialist cause. East German football could have flourished...but the leaders continually alienated the supporters.”⁸³ This alienation is perhaps similar to the marginalization felt today by East German soccer supporters whose teams struggle to compete in the Bundesliga’s top divisions.

⁸¹ Dennis, “Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” 57.

⁸² Dennis, “Soccer Hooliganism in the German Democratic Republic,” 61.

⁸³ Hesselmann and Ide, 40.

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IV. FAILED RECOVERY: THE CONTINUED MALAISE OF EAST GERMAN SOCCER

In today's Germany, it appears that a significant portion of the population has cause to feel continued marginalization rooted in last century's ideological Cold War. Although the physical barriers between East and West Germany were long ago removed, psychological barriers remain in place even today. East Germans remain economically behind their Western brethren. Significant political divisions can be observed. Socially, the country remains divided. These divisions are particularly prevalent on the pitch of Germany's most popular sport—soccer. As part of the reunification process, the German Football Association (DFB) absorbed the East's perceived lesser teams and proceeded to cleave them from the newly unified Bundesliga's top ranks.⁸⁴ Afterward, the association never truly embarked on a mission of leveling the playing field, despite a concerted campaign to improve player development in support of the national team. As a result, much of the country has lost an outlet for local pride and the chance to prove their mettle against the traditionally stronger teams from the West, despite consistent support of the game in the East. While the national teams were awaiting official unification, East German citizens took to the streets to celebrate West Germany's 1990 World Cup victory as their own.⁸⁵ In 2006, East German cities were largely disregarded as potential hosts for World Cup games or peripheral events, despite an overwhelming willingness and desire to be involved.⁸⁶ This loss of representation has likely helped to further the marginalization of East Germans, who have unfortunately sometimes turned to violence as a result.

⁸⁴ The Bundesliga is Germany's national soccer league.

⁸⁵ Kay Schiller, "Siegen Für Deutschland? Patriotism, Nationalism and the German National Football Team, 1954–2014," *Historical Social Research* 40, no. 4: 187, <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/45532>.

⁸⁶ Ingeborg Majer-O'Sickey, "Out of the Closet? German Patriotism and Soccer Mania," *German Politics and Society* 24, no. 3: 93–94, https://nps.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=gale_ofa160417524&context=PC&vid=01NPS_INST:01NPS&search_scope=MyInst_and_CI&tab=Everything&lang=en.

A. CONTINUED POOR PERFORMANCE

In the three decades following unification, economic and political disparities are not the only remaining signs of Germany's internal division. On the soccer pitch, the East trails the West significantly in terms of both players and teams in Germany's top division. The impact of policies in the GDR was certainly damaging to football during and immediately after the reign of communism, and the perceived lack of quality from the formerly socialist region's players and squads is not unique to East Germany. Across Europe, no club from a nation that was formerly part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) has won the UEFA Champions League or its predecessor, the European Cup, since Bucharest's FCSB did so in 1986—while Nicolae Ceausescu was still the leader of socialist Romania. Internationally, the last significant victory from a WTO nation came in 1976 when Czechoslovakia won the European Championship.⁸⁷ None have ever lifted the FIFA World Cup.⁸⁸

The DFB, which absorbed the GDR's clubs and players following unification, deserves its share of the blame for the post-unification discrepancies. While teams from West Germany were likely superior—the nation had, after all, just claimed the 1990 World Cup championship—it appears East German sides were not given a fair chance from the outset. As Frick and Prinz described the club integration into the Bundesliga, “following the unification of East Germany and West Germany, the first Bundesliga in 1991–1992 was expanded to 20 teams to integrate the top two teams from the former first division in East Germany (Dynamo Dresden and Hansa Rostock).”⁸⁹ That only 10 percent of the top flight was made up of teams from East Germany likely helped to perpetuate the quality discrepancy, as teams in the top league's gain more access to money which they can reinvest to help ensure future quality at the club.

⁸⁷ “Uefa Euro 2016 - History,” UEFA, August 16, 2018, Accessed August 16, 2018 <https://www.uefa.com/uefaeuro/history/index.html>.

⁸⁸ “Statistics and Records - Fifa World Cup - Teams,” FIFA, August 16, 2018, Accessed August 16, 2018 <https://www.fifa.com/fifa-tournaments/statistics-and-records/worldcup/teams/index.html>.

⁸⁹ Bernd Frick and Joachim Prinz, “Crisis? What Crisis? Football in Germany,” *Journal of Sports Economics* 7, no. 1: 61,

The disparity in representation which began in the 1991–92 season is still present and observable today, a testament to East German teams’ lack of ability to overcome the remaining obstacles to success. In the 2018–19 Bundesliga season, only one club, the internationally funded RB Leipzig, is participating in the Bundesliga’s top division.⁹⁰ The hope for future promotion is perhaps less bleak, with five clubs from the former GDR—FC Union Berlin, Dynamo Dresden, SSV Jahn Regensburg, FC Magdeburg, and FC Erzgebirge Aue—participating in the 18 team second division, from which the top three teams are promoted to the top flight at the end of each season.⁹¹

The funding available to teams in the Bundesliga first division is a significant boon, for in the German system it is the local clubs that are often responsible for finding and developing local talent. Monetary issues have haunted East German teams since the fall of the Berlin Wall, as many key East German players quickly orchestrated transfers to the more wealthy West German teams where they were able to obtain more lucrative contracts for their play.⁹² This flight of talent exacerbated the lack of East German top flight Bundesliga representation by draining clubs there of talent which may have helped to secure promotion at a time when the GDR’s development system appears to have been producing perhaps its finest crop of young talent. In fact, almost a third of the German national team was made up of East Germans as the millennium turned.⁹³ Among these players who learned the fundamentals of the game as boys in the GDR were Matthias Sammer, the linchpin on Germany’s 1996 European Champion squad, and Michael Ballack, perhaps the most impactful player for Germany from 2002–2006. Sammer developed his game in the Dynamo Dresden youth system and Ballack was born in the East

⁹⁰ “Bundesliga Club Overview Season 2017/18,” Bundesliga, August 16, 2018, Accessed August 16, 2018 <https://www.bundesliga.com/en/league/>.

⁹¹ “German 2. Bundesliga Table - 2018–19,” ESPN, August 16, 2018, Accessed August 16, 2018 http://www.espn.com/soccer/standings/_/league/ger.2.

⁹² Mike Dennis, “A People’s Game: Football in the German Democratic Republic,” *German Monitor* 71 (2009): 218–19, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/762997223?accountid=12702>.

⁹³ Markus Hesselmann and Robert Ide, “A Tale of Two Germanys: Football Culture and National Identity in the German Democratic Republic,” in *German Football: History, Culture, Society*, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (New York: Routledge), 47–48.

German region of Saxony.⁹⁴ Yet after that heyday, representation by East German players quickly waned and the two most recent World Cup squads, the 2014 and 2018 editions, featured just one player who was born in the East. Hesselmann and Ide point to the nexus of the current development problems: “The reason for this is simple. In order to survive in the short term, [East German clubs] buy mediocre but experienced foreign players rather than take the risk of training and fielding their own youngsters.”

It appears the DFB missed a major opportunity to grow the game in the East when, after a disastrous European Championship campaign in 2000, the nation’s collective football organizations began a complete overhaul of the German youth development system aimed at ensuring future success. The Bundesliga implemented a policy which required top tier teams to provide football development academies to help develop young players both athletically and academically. As Price describes, “The provisos laid down in the licensing from the sporting, medical, and pedagogical fields, combined with a unique philosophy for every academy, guarantee an integral education of young players—and ensure that these youngsters also have a future outside of football.”⁹⁵ Today this development process is spurred by 36 of these so-called elite academies, of which only eight are in the former GDR.⁹⁶

In addition to the collapse of the talent development infrastructure, supporters of teams from the former GDR struggled with their identities following unification. As Braun notes, fans of the Stasi-run BFC Dynamo struggled with the best means to honor the club’s storied yet checkered past:

In face of that image the BFC quickly tried to get rid of all symbols of the past after the fall of the wall. The club was in 1990 renamed in “FC Berlin.” Yet the club never could repeat its success and got stuck in the regional league. But in 1999 there was a change of mind: the officials decided that taking the emergency exit out of the club’s history perhaps

⁹⁴ Ibid., 48.

⁹⁵ Lee Price, *The Bundesliga Blueprint: How Germany Became the Home of Football* (Oakamoor, England: Bennion Kearny Limited), 11.

⁹⁶ “Eastern German Soccer Clubs Struggle to Stay in the Game,” *Deutsche Welle*, September 5, 2010, Accessed October 19, 2017 <http://www.dw.com/en/eastern-german-soccer-clubs-struggle-to-stay-in-the-game/a-5967469>.

had been a bit overhasty—and so the old name Dynamo was adopted again. 125 out of 135 possible votes followed this decision, there was cheering in the club house when the result was announced. Jürgen Bogs, a former coach, commented: “We did achieve a lot back then and should stick to this tradition.” But a new discussion about the club’s controversial past was just around the corner: It started when in 2005 Dynamo requested to decorate its jerseys with three stars—an honor reserved for those clubs who held a perennial championship. Up to then only the FC Bayern München was granted the privilege of wearing the stars. But the German Football League refused Dynamo’s demand, arguing that only championships after the introduction of the “Bundesliga” would count—a decision that excluded not only the West German champions prior to 1963 but also all East German champions. Although the League tried to assure the public that there had been no “political considerations,” an immediate storm of protest by East German fans moaned about a severe case of deception of the “East German people.” Even the press speculated that the crucial but not openly discussed point in the whole “Star Wars” affair had been the question if championships “gained with the assistance of the Ministry of State Security should be rewarded at all.”⁹⁷

Adding to the post-unification East-West divisions were some of the decisions made regarding the German-hosted 2006 World Cup. It appears that the East was ready to take on a greater role in showcasing Germany’s footballing resurgence but were denied the opportunity. As part of the month-long competition, only one city in East Germany, Potsdam, was selected as a base for a competing national team and only one city, Leipzig, was granted the opportunity to host a match.⁹⁸ This dearth of East German presence in the world’s premiere soccer competition was not due to a lack of interest. Among the towns vying to host squads during the competition was Neuruppin—a beautiful lake-side town with a world class hotel located near enough to Berlin to make it a seemingly perfect candidate.

Yet, the Neuruppiners, like most of their neighbors in the East, were not afforded the opportunity to showcase themselves. Perhaps the fact that half of the country was absent from the game’s biggest stage, coupled with a complicated footballing past and lack of

⁹⁷ Jutta Braun, “‘Very Nice, the Enemies Are Gone!’ : Coming to Terms with Gdr Sports since 1989/90,” *Historical Social Research* 32, no. 1: 181, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ss0ar-62504>.

⁹⁸ Majer-O’Sickey, “Out of the Closet? German Patriotism and Soccer Mania,” 93–94.

modern player development have continued to fuel the downtrodden state of the game in the former GDR. After failing to emerge out of the opening group stage of the 2018 World Cup, the DFB will likely turn its eye again to the domestic youth development machine. There are opportunities to bring more East German quality into the fold by improving the long-neglected youth infrastructure there. An integration of a higher quantity of quality East German players could help the German squad's performance on the pitch and the German social predicament off of it.

B. RACISM AND THE FAR RIGHT

Unfortunately, the fall of the Berlin Wall did not bring an end to the violence which sometimes accompanied play on the pitch during the life-span of the GDR. Hooliganism accompanies soccer fandom across Europe, Germany is certainly not alone in that realm.⁹⁹ The aforementioned decrepit state of the game in East Germany has continued to support feelings of marginalization amongst club supporters there. Fanning the flames, the tight-knit nature of the groups makes them ripe for the spread of extremist views, and there is evidence that some Ultra groups openly support Nazism.¹⁰⁰ The club Dynamo Dresden is known more for its violent and racist fan sections than for its success on the field.¹⁰¹ The group is frequently involved in clashes with police and rival fan groups, and they are known to deliver racist chants during games and they have even garnered the nickname "Fist of the East" as a testament to their violent nature.¹⁰²

Germany's recent struggles—along with its fellow European Union member states—in dealing with Europe's migrant crisis have done nothing to assuage the white

⁹⁹ Bill Buford, *Among the Thugs*, 1st American ed. (New York: Norton).

¹⁰⁰ "Dynamo Dresden Struggles to Shake Off Hooligans," Deutsche Welle, October 27, 2011, Accessed June 13, 2018 <http://p.dw.com/p/130Hc>.

¹⁰¹ Daniel Ziesche, "'The East' Strikes Back. Ultras Dynamo, Hyper-Stylization, and Regimes of Truth," *Sport in Society* 21, no. 6: 890–91, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2017.1300389>.

¹⁰² Tim Hume, "A Lit Fuse," Vice News, March 5, 2018, Accessed June 13, 2018 https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/zmwvb3/freital-group-far-right-terrorism-germany.

supremacist views of some soccer supporters.¹⁰³ As a result, some organized supporter groups have spawned sinister splinter cells. In the town of Freital, “what started out as a loose association of far-right activists, football hooligans, and hate-filled anti-migrant Facebook groups soon spawned a terror organization.”¹⁰⁴ In Cologne, “right-wingers and soccer hooligans banded together...and overran police officers in violent protests they said were aimed at Islamic extremism.”¹⁰⁵ The influx of migrants, and other factors, have helped fuel political resurgence of far-right parties in Germany. The reemergence of legitimate far-right political groups may also be inciting those on the extremes as well. In a 2017 international match in Prague against the Czech Republic, German supporters belted out Nazi chants throughout the game, even interrupting a designated moment of silence.¹⁰⁶ The fans also jeered during both national anthems, prompting rebuffs from team management and the German squad itself.

As these incidents of racism continue to flare up, the German soccer system may provide fuel for those xenophobic citizens who let their hatred of outsiders guide political decisions. The Bundesliga has increasingly become a proving ground for international players, as the number of non-Germans on top flight teams skyrocketed from just 17 percent in 1993–94 to 49 percent in the 2003–04 season.¹⁰⁷ As Germany continues to take on migrants from war-torn regions, those displaced youth will continue to seek ways to assimilate into German society. Sport, as argued by Dirk Halm, provides a unique

¹⁰³ “The Eu and the Migration Crisis,” European Union, July 2017, Accessed August 16, 2018 https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/e9465e4f-b2e4-11e7-837e-01aa75ed71a1/language-en?WT.mc_id=Selectedpublications&WT.ria_c=677&WT.ria_f=664&WT.ria_ev=search.

¹⁰⁴ “A Lit Fuse.”

¹⁰⁵ Alison Smale, “In German City Rich with History and Tragedy, Tide Rises against Immigration,” *New York Times*, December 7, 2014, Accessed June 13, 2018 <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/08/world/in-german-city-rich-with-history-and-tragedy-tide-rises-against-immigration.html>.

¹⁰⁶ Jonathan Harding, “German Players Snub Fans after ‘Terrible’ Chants During Czech Republic Match,” *Deutsche Welle*, September 1, 2017, Accessed June 13, 2018 <http://p.dw.com/p/2jF9g>.

¹⁰⁷ Raphael Honigstein, *Das Reboot: How German Soccer Reinvented Itself and Conquered the World* (New York: Nation Books), 17.

opportunity for multi-cultural youth to interact and integrate with each other.¹⁰⁸ Yet there are a fixed number of positions on the field and thus any player given a first team assignment will likely leave another on the bench pining for an opportunity. If the player left behind is a citizen with multiple generations of German ancestors, there is another opening for a feeling of marginalization to creep in. Here again, soccer provides an opportunity to both integrate and incense.

Most recently, following the 2018 World Cup, Mesut Özil, a key player on the German national team who happens to be of Turkish descent, retired from the national team as a result of racist attacks aimed at him. Özil controversially posted an image to social media of himself with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the months leading up to the tournament, and he was subject to heavy criticism from the media and the public at large.¹⁰⁹ In his retirement announcement, Özil described the difficulties associated with his Turkish ancestry and his German identity:

In the eyes of [DFB President Reinhard] Grindel and his supporters, I am German when we win, but I am an immigrant when we lose. This is because despite paying taxes in Germany, donating facilities to German schools, and winning the World Cup with Germany in 2014, I am still not accepted into society. I am treated as being “different.” I received the “Bambi Award” in 2010 as an example of successful integration into German society, I received a “Silver Laurel Leaf” in 2014 from the Federal Republic of Germany, and I was a “German Football Ambassador” in 2015. But clearly, I am not German...? Are there criteria for being fully German that I do not fit? My friend Lukas Podolski and Miroslav Klose are never referred to as German-Polish so why am I German-Turkish? Is it because it is Turkey? Is it because I’m a Muslim? I think here lays an important issue. By being referred to as German-Turkish, it is already distinguishing people who have family from more than one country. I was born and educated in Germany, so why don’t people accept that I am German? ...

It is with a heavy heart and after much consideration that because of recent events, I will no longer be playing for Germany at international level whilst I have this feeling of racism and disrespect. I used to wear

¹⁰⁸ Dirk Halm, “Turkish Immigrants in German Amateur Football,” in *German Football: History, Culture, Society*, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (New York: Routledge), 72–92.

¹⁰⁹ Ed McCambridge, “Mesut Özil and Ilkay Gündogan Criticized for Erdogan Meeting,” *Deutsche Welle*, May 14, 2018, Accessed August 16, 2018 <https://p.dw.com/p/2xhJF>.

the German shirt with such pride and excitement, but now I don't. This decision has been extremely difficult to make because I have always given everything for my teammates, the coaching staff and the good people of Germany. But when high-ranking DFB officials treat me as they did, disrespect my Turkish roots and selfishly turn me into political propaganda, then enough is enough. That is not why I play football, and I will not sit back down and do nothing about it. Racism should never, ever be accepted.¹¹⁰

Schiller argues that although throughout Özil's international career his dedication to the German team has been unquestionable and unwavering, his unique situation details the extent to which non-German cultures are resisted in Germany today.¹¹¹ Özil, a German by birth who renounced his Turkish citizenship well before it was required by law, was accepted because he integrated himself into German culture, instead of having his culture integrated into Germany. As Schiller remarked in 2014, "in line with current policies and those of national governments in the recent past this does not imply that all cultures are valued equally but prioritizes assimilation into German culture and suggests no more than cultural peculiarities are tolerated as long as they do not threaten the predominance of German culture."¹¹²

C. CONCLUSION

In Germany, soccer-related turmoil today remains prevalent and pertinent. The East-West gulf in performance on the pitch and development of players off of it remains vast. On top of the feelings of inadequacy compared to their Western counterparts, would-be East German soccer players are now also faced with competition from Germany's migrant population. This migrant population is also a target of right-wing populist rhetoric, perhaps indicating that the popularity of the AfD in the former GDR is not a complete surprise.¹¹³ To this end, the DFB faces an uphill battle if it decides to undertake a program

¹¹⁰ Mesut Özil, "Iii/Iii," July 22, 2018, Accessed August 16, 2018 <https://twitter.com/MesutOzil1088/status/1021093637411700741>.

¹¹¹ Schiller, "Siegen Für Deutschland? Patriotism, Nationalism and the German National Football Team, 1954–2014," 189–90.

¹¹² Ibid., 190.

¹¹³ Ruth Wodak, *The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc.), 7.

aimed at leveling the playing field across Germany. Yet Germany itself provided the blueprint for developmental overhaul less than two decades ago. If the association sets in motion another program of reform as a result of the unacceptable exit at the 2018 World Cup, Germany may have an avenue to better incorporate both the soccer-dejected population of the former GDR and its ever-present immigrant population into the national soccer landscape.

V. CONCLUSION

Soccer is not only better than real life, but able to drag real life with it to a better place.¹¹⁴

—Daniel Harris, July 13, 2018

Soccer maintains a prominent position in the German social landscape. As such, the game's impact on German life, including the political realm, is likely to remain significant for the foreseeable future. While the game retains its place as the most popular sport throughout Germany, the quality of the product on East German pitches continues to lag behind the Western product and the development systems meant for East German players remain woefully inept. Unfortunately, the chasm on the soccer pitch is just part of a larger set inequality that continues to divide the former GDR and FRG. Lingering economic differences have created significant wealth disparities between West and East.¹¹⁵ Politically, right-wing populist parties have consistently been more popular in the former GDR, where politicians are able to capitalize on messages emphasizing the voice of “the pure people” who have been marginalized at the hands of “the corrupt elite.”¹¹⁶ On the soccer pitch, populists have found fuel for their xenophobia as immigrants are participating in the German developmental system in greater numbers—drawing the ire of racist fans who feel that “native Germans,” a term usually defined in neo Nazi terms, are being left behind.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Daniel Harris, “The Most Important Soccer Game Ever Played,” *The Ringer*, July 13, 2018, Accessed August 23, 2018 <https://www.theringer.com/soccer/2018/7/13/17568582/world-cup-most-important-game-1954-final-hungary-west-germany>. Emphasis added.

¹¹⁵ Becker, 2–3.

¹¹⁶ Cas Mudde, “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe Today,” in *Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas: History and Recent Tendencies*, ed. John Abromeit et al. (New York: Bloomsbury Academic), 296.

¹¹⁷ Kay Schiller, “Siegen Für Deutschland? Patriotism, Nationalism and the German National Football Team, 1954–2014,” *Historical Social Research* 40, no. 4: 189–90, <https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/45532>; Dirk Halm, “Turkish Immigrants in German Amateur Football,” in *German Football: History, Culture, Society*, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (New York: Routledge), 72–92.

When one considers the evolution of German nationalism, sports and nationalism were joined from the early 19th century and without pause until today. Ergo, the purpose of this examination of sport at a time of renationalization in Europe which is bringing about serious implications for the role of the U.S. in European security. Since 1945, soccer and politics have been intertwined in the Germany's return to the rank of the nations and as means to channel energies that formerly ended in armed conflict into a peaceful Europe. When the FRG won the 1954 World Cup—a victory dubbed The Miracle of Bern—it signified “something like a re-entry into the world” for the nation which was still recovering from a half-century of war and devastation.¹¹⁸ That championship was of such importance that “the World Cup title of 1954 is an indelible part of postwar federal German democracy's success story.”¹¹⁹ Bern became a victory for West Germany in the system of the cold war, where German-German hostility was uppermost.

Likewise, the leadership of the GDR understood that sporting success would lead to international recognition and they sought about attempting systematic manipulation of sport to meet their political aims.¹²⁰ If anything, in the GDR, sport and nationalism exceeded the pinnacle achieved in Nazi Germany and surely in the Bonn Republic. Together with the armed forces, organized sports in the SED state manifested a political prestige and organizational refinement as found in few other nations throughout history.

Following unification in 1990, the 2006 World Cup—hosted in Germany—became a symbolic opportunity for all of Germany to prove itself while in the international limelight.¹²¹ The World Cup allowed Germans to be proud of themselves and their country; that is, to show a nationalism of a post modern and friendly kind, which had especially been eschewed in the old FRG as dubious.¹²² While soccer and politics intersect in

¹¹⁸ Heinrich, 1492–93,

¹¹⁹ Heinrich., 1493.

¹²⁰ Hesselmann and Ide, 36–37.

¹²¹ Ingeborg Majer-O'Sickey, “Out of the Closet? German Patriotism and Soccer Mania,” *German Politics and Society* 24, no. 3: 94–95, https://nps.primo.exlibrisgroup.com/discovery/fulldisplay?docid=gale_ofa160417524&context=PC&vid=01NPS_INST:01NPS&search_scope=MyInst_and_CI&tab=Everything&lang=en.

¹²² Majer-O'Sickey., 82–85.

countries across the globe, the game maintains an important place in a German state and society that in 2018 is undergoing a sharp renationalization the contours of which are not wholly clear. As Pyta describes:

German football has a very special attribute that has helped its development into a major cultural phenomenon: the capacity to have symbolic meanings. Symbols play a decisive role in constructing communities. They enrich the interpretation of behavior patterns with a degree of aesthetic condensation that facilitates the communication of shared cultural contents. Symbols act as perceivable expressions of those cultural dispositions that circulate in communities. The development of a long-lasting collective identity is not possible without the use of symbols, which form shared meanings and values and provide it with vital visibility. Germany is probably the only country in Europe where football has managed to gain symbolic qualities in such great measure. The reason for this is the exceptional situation after the Second World War that left Germany in a situation of such symbolic devastation that football could fill the gap.¹²³

The lack of East German representation by either clubs in the top tiers of the Bundesliga or players on the National Team may seem insignificant to an outsider ignorant of German history, society, and culture, but when coupled with the other areas in which East trails West, it becomes part of a legend of how the East has been wronged, a phenomenon which in 2018 in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis has exploded in violence. It is this tale that continues to allow right-wing populists to maintain levels of support in the East, while such political movements are also taking hold in the West, although without quite the phenomena as seen in Saxony since 2013.

These divisions allow the populist discourse to focus on the divisions within German society, evolving ultimately into an “us versus them” situation which, the populists believe, can only be remedied through the implementation of nationalist and neo Nazi racial policies wholly at odds with the German Basic Law.¹²⁴ Soccer supporter groups fit into this puzzle in that they are uniquely organized to support collective political action. Right-wing groups have found supporter associations to be prime opportunities for drawing

¹²³ Wolfram Pyta, “German Football: A Cultural History,” in *German Football: History, Culture Society*, ed. Alan Tomlinson and Christopher Young (New York: Routledge), 2.

¹²⁴ Wodak, 66–68.

impressionable youth to their cause.¹²⁵ Some fans of East German clubs which are struggling to compete in the upper echelons of German soccer have come to collectively identify themselves as a group which has been left behind by a German society after unity and the Hartz IV social welfare reforms where the winners in Munich, Stuttgart, or Silicon Valley take all, and those clinging to dignity and social status are threatened now by refugees in their number. This tight-knit network of supporters lends itself to social cohesion, and perhaps ultimately collective political action.¹²⁶ Indeed, these types of cohesive social networks, as Della Porta argues, “account for the adhesion of a large share (60 to 90 percent) of members of various religious and political organizations.”¹²⁷ From these collective identities and social exclusion, protest can emerge if the perceived or actual slights are nurtured within the group for a significant amount of time.¹²⁸ In fact, Germany—along with much of Europe—has been forced to deal with hooliganism among fans for many decades. Hooliganism is unsurprisingly present in East Germany, where clubs such as Dynamo Dresden have gained reputations for the oftentimes racist, sometimes violent nature of their supporter sections.¹²⁹

Yet despite the concerns related to the popularity of nationalist parties in East Germany and the enduring economic and social divisions between the former GDR and FRG, there may be reason for hope on the horizon. While most Germans likely consider the 2018 World Cup result unacceptable—the squad crashed out in the group stage, Germany’s worst finish ever—the early exit may provide an opportunity to once again revamp the nation’s soccer system. After all, it was Germany that set the world standard for recovery from seemingly disastrous international results when it set in motion the

¹²⁵ Tim Hume, “A Lit Fuse,” Vice News, March 5, 2018, Accessed June 13, 2018 https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/zmwvb3/freital-group-far-right-terrorism-germany.

¹²⁶ Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, *Social Movements : An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing), 36–37.

¹²⁷ Della Porta and Diani, 117.

¹²⁸ Della Porta and Diani, 168–72.

¹²⁹ “Dynamo Dresden Struggles to Shake Off Hooligans,” Deutsche Welle, October 27, 2011, Accessed June 13, 2018 <http://p.dw.com/p/130Hc>; Daniel Ziesche, “‘The East’ Strikes Back. Ultras Dynamo, Hyper-Stylization, and Regimes of Truth,” *Sport in Society* 21, no. 6: 890–91, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2017.1300389>.

famous ten-year plan after the 2000 European Championship.¹³⁰ If the DFB were to reinvigorate that plan and in this iteration place real effort into developing the game in East Germany, an area which was not a significant part of the post-2000 plan, perhaps it would yield results beneficial to Germany on and off of the soccer pitch. Germany, and indeed all of Europe, continues to struggle with renationalization and centrifugal forces poised to undermine or destroy the European Union, diversification of the continental population through an influx of migrants, and economic challenges brought about by multi-national interests within the European Union. As such, Germany must work on all fronts to preserve its own stability domestically and internationally so that it can continue to be a credible leader in Europe. Soccer certainly will not cure all of that ails German society and developing players in the East alone would not result in the defeat of populism there. However, based on the game's cultural importance, leveling the playing field to support greater East German participation in the Bundesliga's top divisions may at least provide hope for citizens of the former GDR by allowing them to escape from the economic and political realities of daily life—if only for the two joyous hours per week, when their favorite teams are in action.

¹³⁰ Honigstein, 13–26.

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