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CHALLENGES TO REFORMING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN RE-DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF MALI

by

Adama Mahamane Maiga

September 2018

Thesis Advisor: Cristiana Matei
Second Reader: Carolyn C. Halladay

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This thesis aspires to identify how Mali can develop effective agencies without jeopardizing its process of re-democratization. Specifically, it seeks to determine which mechanisms of democratic control and oversight Mali needs to institutionalize in its intelligence sector. Looking at how Romania and Spain—two new democracies that underwent transitions to democracy before Mali—have institutionalized democratic reform of intelligence, this thesis finds that Mali should develop standards, procedures and mechanisms allowing for democratic and civil control, as well as the supervision of intelligence services; promote expertise capabilities for more effective intelligence agencies; and institutionalize specific educational and training requirements, as well as the transparency and cooperation of intelligence services.

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CHALLENGES TO REFORMING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN RE-DEMOCRATIZING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF MALI

Adama Mahamane Maiga
Major, Mali Army
Diploma, Ecole Militaire Interarmes Koulikoro, 2004

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September 2018**

Approved by: Cristiana Matei
Advisor

Carolyn C. Halladay
Second Reader

Mohammed M. Hafez
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFC	Analysis and Fusion Cells
ANI	National Intelligence Academy
ATT	Amadou Toumani Touré
BIT	Technological Investigation Brigade
CAFR	Intelligence Analysis and Fusion Center
CESID	Higher Information Center of Defense
CGI	General Commissariat for Intelligence
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIFAS	Center of Intelligence of Armed Forces
CITCO	Intelligence Center for Terrorism and Organizational Crime
CNI	National Intelligence Center
CSAT	Supreme Council of National Defense
DGIA	Directorate for General Information of the Armed Forces
DGRG	General Intelligence and Territorial Surveillance Directorate
DGSE	State Security General Directorate
DIPI	Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection
DIRM	Directorate for Intelligence and Military Representation
DRS	Department of Intelligence and Security
DSM	Directorate of Military Security
EMAD	General Staff of Defense
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building in Mali
EUTM	European Training Mission in Mali
GDCIA	Delegated Committee for Intelligence Affairs
GTIA	Combined Arms Group
GWOT	Global war on terrorism
HNSC	Higher National Security College
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IC	Intelligence Community
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

MUNISMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Government Organization
SECED	Central Service of Documentation
SGI	Security Governance Initiative
SIE	Foreign Intelligence Service
SIGC	Civil Guard Intelligence Service
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SOCTA	Serious Organized Crime and Threat Assessment
SPP	Guard and Protection Service
SRI	Romanian Intelligence Service
STS	Special Telecommunication Service
SVA	Customs Surveillance Service
USA	United States of America

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2012, a coup by Captain Amadou Sanogo, which overthrew the democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré, abruptly interrupted Mali's nearly two decades of democratic consolidation. A few months later, against the background of international intervention, Mali held free and fair elections in July 2013, and elected Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta as president and marked Mali's return to democracy.[1] While Mali's new democratically elected government has posted certain accomplishments in terms of policy (decentralization) and economic reforms, it has not institutionalized democratic reform of the intelligence institutions.[2]

The democratization of intelligence—a tradeoff between democratic civilian control and effectiveness of intelligence[3]—forms a pressing requirement for the new administration to fulfill the democratic demands for transparency, accountability, and oversight, and to meet the national security requirements for effective intelligence as the first line of defense against security threats and challenges.[4] Nevertheless, democratic reform of intelligence does not seem to interest policymakers in Mali much. This thesis

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[1] In 2012, northern Mali had fallen into the hands of a coalition of rebel and terrorists' groups in the aftermath of a military coup. In January 2013, France, backed by African troops, intervened at the request of the Malian authorities to chase away the terrorist groups. In July 2013, elections were organized, then the United Nations authorized a stabilization force, requested by the Economic Community of West African States and the African Union. Bruno Charbonneau and Jonathan M. Sears, "Fighting for Liberal Peace in Mali? The Limits of International Military Intervention," *Journal of Intervention and State building* 8, no. 2-3 (2014): 192-213, https://doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2014.930221.

[2] In Mali, three structures in charge of intelligence exist, namely the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE), the Directorate General Information of the Directorate of the National Police, and the General Directorate of Military Intelligence. These structures, which date back to the time of socialist style dictatorship Moussa Traoré, in 1968-1991, lack a properly defined set of roles and missions, and thus are lagging behind in terms of effectiveness. "Mali," Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index," accessed December 8, 2017, http://government.defenceindex.org/countries/mali/; Bakary Mariko, "Le Mali: Un pays sans services de renseignements" [Mali: a country without intelligence services],"Maliweb, September 24, 2013, http://www.maliweb.net/contributions/le-mali-un-pays-sans-services-de-renseignements-171535.html.

[3] Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-military Relations," *Democratization* 15, no. 5 (December 2008): 909, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510340802362505.

[4] Paul Shemella and Nicholas Tomb, *Security Forces in African States: Cases and Assessment* (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2017), 115.

seeks to examine the challenges of Malian's democratization of intelligence. It also aspires to identify a model for successful democratic reform of intelligence for Mali.

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

How can Mali develop effective intelligence agencies without jeopardizing the process of re-democratization? Which mechanisms of democratic control and oversight do Mali need to institutionalize over intelligence?

B. IMPORTANCE

Mali's democratic consolidation depends on effective intelligence institutions that also remain under democratic civilian control.[5] So far, while democratic civilian control exists at least on paper, intelligence effectiveness is negligible.[6] This thesis is important for decision-makers in Mali because it exposes the challenges and critical intelligence-transformation issues in terms of transparency, openness, accountability, and effectiveness of intelligence.

This investigation is also relevant to policymakers in countries that undergo similar political transformations as did Mali. It provides them with useful lessons when undertaking intelligence democratization in their countries.

This thesis is also important for Mali's security assistance donors—the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States. The support provided to Malian state falls within the framework of strengthening institutional governance and the rule of law. It focuses on the consolidation of democracy through strong institutions, the security sector reform, and the fight against global terrorism.

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[5] Thomas C. Bruneau and Cristiana Matei, "Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress," *Democratization* 18, no. 3 (June 2011): 602-630, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.586257.

[6] National Democratic Institute, *Strengthening Democratic Control and Oversight of the Security Sector in the Sahel Region* (Bamako, Mali: NDI, 2015), https://www.ndi.org/Sahel-Security-Sector-governance; Eeben Barlow, "Mali - Another Intelligence Failure," Eeben Barlow's Military and Security Blog, March, 25, 2012, http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecurityblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/mali-another-intelligence-failure.html.

The Security Governance Initiative (SGI), an Obama administration initiative, takes these challenges into account in a holistic manner, from the politico-strategic level to the strategic-structural level.[7] Thus, this research is all the more important to the United States and other donors, as it highlights the enormity of the work that remains to be done.

Finally, this thesis is relevant to the literature of intelligence and democracy, which is very scarce in empirical studies of intelligence democratization in Africa.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Although no scientific work on intelligence democratization in Mali exists, the fact remains that a rich literature exists on the role of intelligence in a democracy, which helps to clarify some concepts of this thesis. This section details these foundational concepts.

1. Defining Intelligence

Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O'Brien, and Andrew Rathmell claim, "Intelligence is a special kind of knowledge, a specialized subset of information that has been put through a systematic analytical process in order to support a state's decision and policymakers. It exists because some states or actors seek to hide information from other states or actors, who in turn seek to discover hidden information by secret or covert means."[8] In contrast, Alan Breakspear defines it as "a company's ability to predict change over time to do something about it. Capacity involves foresight and insight, and aims to identify the imminent change that can be positive, representing the opportunity, or negative, representing the threat."[9] Stan A. Taylor, in his concept of definitions and theories of intelligence, states that

> intelligence refers to the needed information policymakers identify to make a better decision regarding any entity they must deal with. It also refers to the prioritization, collection, analysis, production, and use of that

[7] White House, *Security Governance Initiative* (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/254115.pdf.

[8] Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O'Brien, and Andrew Rathmell, *Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform* (Cambridge: RAND Europe, 2005), 1-5.

[9] Alan Breakspear, "A New Definition of Intelligence," *Intelligence and National Security* 28, no. 5 (October 2013): 678-693, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.699285.

> information by the organizations and groups. Finally, it refers to the other activities of several groups who participate in the intelligence cycle and the information and insights that flow from this process.[10]

On the same note, Michael Handel notes that "the proper use of accurate, timely intelligence can significantly reduce uncertainty, thereby enabling political and military leaders to improve the quality of their decisions, develop more effective strategies, or conduct more successful military operations."[11]

Mark M. Lowenthal defines intelligence in a more comprehensive way. For Lowenthal, "intelligence is the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and the information by counterintelligence activities, and the carrying out of the operations as requested by lawful authorities."[12] He adds that intelligence is an organization with units that perform several functions.[13] Other scholars like Loch Johnson define intelligence as having three types of activities carried out by secret agencies: "first and foremost, they are expected to gather and interpret information from around the world.… Second, the agencies are expected to protect U.S. government secret from espionage by other government.… Third, from time to time they have been directed to oppose nation's adversaries through the use of aggressive clandestine operations abroad."[14]

2. On Intelligence Democratization

There is a robust body of literature addressing the challenges/obstacles and triggers for democratic reform of intelligence. For Timothy Edmunds,

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[10] Stan A. Taylor, "The Role of Intelligence in National Security," in *Contemporary Security Studies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 250.

[11] Michael Handel, "Leaders and Intelligence" in *Leaders and Intelligence*, ed. Michael Handel (Totowa NJ: Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1989), 3, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684528708431914.

[12] Mark M. Lowenthal, "What Is Intelligence," in *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, ed. Mark M. Lowenthal (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2016), 6.

[13] Lowenthal.

[14] Loch K. Johnson, *Secret Agencies: U.S. Intelligence in a Hostile World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), ix.

> Democratization in the intelligence sector thus entails reform at three inter-related levels. The first of these concerns establishing the principle and practice of civilian control over the intelligence agencies. The second involves consolidating the democratic nature of this control through the establishment of mechanisms for oversight and scrutiny of the agencies' activities, and developing relevant expertise and capacities to support these activities. The final level concerns organizational reform in the agencies themselves, reorientating and reorganizing for their new roles, and eliminating the most corrosive legacies of the past.[15]

Finally, the need to develop principles and practices that make intelligence agencies much more effective while strengthening and stimulating democratic control and oversight are public interest, civilian expertise, institutionalization of processes, political culture, and the professionalization of intelligence services.[16] In the same context, Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau highlight the factors that can serve as motivation and that support progress when democratizing intelligence in the new democracies. These factors include the

> willingness of the political decision-makers to foster intelligence reform and achieve a balance between effectiveness and transparency; the role and influence of the foreign assistance; awareness of emerging security threats of the twenty-first century and thus the need for increased cooperation and intelligence sharing; and the role of the civil society and the media in advancing democratic reform of the intelligence.[17]

Conversely, Matei and Bruneau point out the most important factors that can stop the progress of the democratization of intelligence in the new democracies are

> the complexity of reform itself; legacies of the authoritarian regime impeding the democratic reform process; resistance and reluctance to reform by the intelligence services; lack of expertise by civilians; lack of support for intelligence and intelligence culture among intelligence outsiders; corruption and organized crime; and, at least hypothetically, the threat of overall democratic regress. All these have negative impact on both

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15 Timothy Edmunds, "Intelligence Agencies and Democratization, Continuity and Change in Serbia after Milošević," *Europe-Asia Studies* 60, no. 1 (January 2008): 30, https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130701760315.

16 Edmunds, 36.

17 Bruneau and Matei, "Intelligence Reform in New Democracies," 615.

> effectiveness and transparency of the newly created, or reformed, intelligence systems.[18]

In the same vein, Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski point out major challenges regarding democratic control in new democracies during reform; they discuss the issue of controlling the intelligence services in the area of civilian control of the armed forces as a subset of civil-military relations. Bruneau and Dombroski point that, "this is due not only to the legacies of the prior, non-democratic regimes, in which the intelligence or security apparatus was a key element of control, and in which human rights abuses often were allowed, but also to the inherent tension everywhere between intelligence and democracy."[19] They mention that these constraints—secrecy—related to the operations carried out by the intelligence services obstruct the democracy, which requires the responsibility of the governors toward the governed, and transparency.[20] They add that intelligence services, to be effective, must operate in secrecy sometimes violating accountability and transparency.[21] "While well-established democracies have developed mechanisms to deal with this dilemma, new democracies are still in the process of creating them."[22]

Furthermore, Loch K. Johnson, a leading intelligence expert, argues that for the new democracies to consolidate, free and fair elections, the establishment of an economic market, and the creation of a civil society are not enough. Moreover, Johnson declares that transforming intelligence services from repressive security apparatus into an effective and transparent democratic community remain a prerequisite.[23] However, he notes that there are challenges ahead of the new intelligence agencies that are generally confronted with

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[18] Bruneau and Matei, 607.

[19] Thomas C. Bruneau and Kenneth R. Dombroski, "Reforming Intelligence, The Challenge Of Control In New Democracies" (Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) Publications, 2014), 2-3, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/41971.

[20] Bruneau and Dombroski.

[21] Bruneau and Dombroski.

[22] Bruneau and Dombroski.

[23] Johnson, *Secret Agencies,* xviii.

- the inheritance of the undemocratic system
- the lack of professionalism
- the transitional government's lack of experience in the conduct of intelligence reform
- the autonomy therefore possessed by the military because of the monopoly they enjoyed during the undemocratic regime[24]

The transformation of intelligence is a difficult process to accomplish, but not insurmountable. The challenges remain are achieving transparency and efficiency. Subsequently, Johnson mentions that if the will to change and the existence of strong external motivation is there, the redefinition of intelligence could succeed. He cites that, in essence, the paths leading to the reformation are twofold: democratic consolidation on the one hand and a contemporary security environment on the other. For Johnson, the transformation focuses on making intelligence accountable, accessible, and transparent while encompassing the creation of a new intelligence system, the establishment of a new legal framework, and subjugating them under democratic control.[25]

3. On Intelligence Democratization in Post-Coup Mali

The literature on Mali's intelligence is rather sparse and mostly highlights the lack of intelligence democratization in the country. Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman note the current state of decay of Malian state apparatus, as well as the causes that led to the multi-dimensional crisis that rages in the country, south of the Sahel.[26] Matei reveals notorious inadequacies related to the democratic control of the armed and security forces including the intelligence community (IC), as well as the lack of

[24] Johnson.

[25] Loch K. Johnson, *Strategic Intelligence: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007).

[26] Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman. *Mali's Next Battle: Improving Counterterrorism Capabilities*. Rand Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1241/RAND_RR1241.pdf.

capabilities of the forces to face the threats.[27] These authors decry that Mali only has human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities.[28] They add that the modern equipment held by the international forces in place in Mali is envied by the ranks of the Malian security forces, which underestimate the HUMINT that represents an important part in the operations against terrorists.[29]

D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES

I hypothesize that Mali is facing several challenges associated to democratic reform of intelligence, such as democratic consolidation, which is reflected in democratic civilian control of armed forces and security forces, Islamist extremism, and "stateness"[30] as well as civil-military relations. These issues are connected to endemic corruption, poverty, and weak state apparatus. All these challenges are exacerbated by the inability for Mali, prior to the 2012 coup, to change the form of secret state-security apparatus, despite two decades of democratization.[31] Subsequently, an outdated intelligence apparatus in addition to fragile civil-military relations in Mali significantly obstructed the country in its move to democratic consolidation, allowing this vicious cycle of coup d'état to happen again.

The inability of some democracies to build strong institutions today presents a major challenge. These young democracies, most of them ethnically fragmented, face serious institutionalization problems that they struggle to overcome. They are often characterized by insider and outsider tensions that are difficult to resolve. In such societies,

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[27] Shemella and Tomb, *Security Forces in African States,* 115.

[28] Shemella and Tomb.

[29] Shemella and Tomb.

[30] Linz and Stepan, in their book on the problems of democratic transition and consolidation, define "stateness" in the five arenas of a consolidated democracy as one of the criteria for consolidating democracy. They claim that democracy is a form of state governance. As a prerequisite for the existence of a consolidated democracy, Linz and Stepan argue that a state must exist. They further assert that the absence of state—stateness—or the envy of a large section of the population, do not recognize themselves to the state and want to create a state or join another are major security issues that are often difficult to resolve. Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition And Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, And Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7.

[31] Roy Pateman, "Intelligence Agencies In Africa: A Preliminary Assessment," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30, no. 4 (December 1992): 569-585, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00011058.

insiders (i.e., the dominant ethnic group) centralize political power at a time when outsiders have no alternative but to try to overthrow the regime. For example in Mali, the Tuareg issue as well as other ethnic tensions are a major source of political instability.[32] Unfortunately, these tensions have not been adequately addressed by democratic institutions or resolved peacefully. My hypothesis is that if Mali is still struggling to find an adequate solution to this threat that has lasted for more than fifty years, it is because policymakers do not have in their possession reliable decision-making tools, including effective intelligence agencies, serving and supporting policymakers while fulfilling their roles such as analyzing and disseminating specific information.[33]

Intelligence services are crucial in such processes. While intelligence serves as a forerunner against all threats, whether internal or external, it is important for decision-makers to be at the leading edge of information, allowing them to assess the current and future security contexts at their true value. Good intelligence would undeniably help them make appropriate judgments pertaining to national security and external relations. Today, Mali has the State Security General Directorate (DGSE), which tends to dominate the other two agencies—the Directorate of Military Security and the General Intelligence of the Directorate of the National Police. The DGSE, with more than 80 percent of its work force being military personnel, has been headed only once by a civilian since its creation in 1989. It is therefore important for policymakers to proceed with the reform of the IC by creating or reorganizing intelligence structures, leading not only to a more equitable distribution of roles but also to the missions devolved to all intelligence services. This measure would allow for a balance between domestic and foreign intelligence, both civilian and military, as well as national defense and state authority. The creation of these new structures should take into account a legal framework that covers all the inadequacies related to legislation

[32] Mali inherited the Tuaregs irredentism in the first years of its independence in 1960. The Tuaregs under the colonial era had always enjoyed autonomy in managing their tribes. After colonization, the country's founding fathers had opted for the constitution of a nation-state, producing an effect contrary to the type of management wanted and in force in the nomadic Tuareg areas. As a result, Tuareg rebellions were successively raised (1963, 1990, 1995, 2006, 2012) against the central state, endangering the very existence of Mali.

[33] Based on Bruneau and Matei, "Intelligence Reform in New Democracies," 602.

so that the intelligence services have roles and missions, reflecting those functioning in democracy.

I also posit that Mali must undertake the following reforms to ensure intelligence effectiveness without jeopardizing the process of democratization: develop standards, procedures, and mechanisms that allow for democratic and civil control as well as the supervision of intelligence services; promote expertise and capabilities for more effective intelligence agencies; and institutionalize specific educational and training requirements as well as the transparency and cooperation of intelligence services when engaging reforms.

Finally, I hypothesize that Mali must make its intelligence apparatus accountable to the citizens by developing strong institutions and mechanisms for control and oversight. These institutions include the executive (ministries in charge of intelligence, heads of intelligence agencies etc.); the legislative (committees); and the judicial (inspectors general). This thesis examines all the institutional incentives that can lead to the intelligence effectiveness at both domestic and international levels (non-government organizations [NGO], free press, and international organizations).[34] My hypothesis is that through these institutions, new principles and practices can be developed to improve the intelligence services' effectiveness. It is clear that the institutionalization of procedures that provide a legal framework for transparency and efficiency, as well as the availability of civilian experts, are essentials that contribute to strengthening democratic control and oversight.

E. METHODS AND SOURCES

The thesis seeks, first of all, to identify the challenges that Mali may encounter by initiating the democratization of intelligence agencies. Second, it aspires to identify and advance a successful model of democratic reform of intelligence. Finally, this thesis aims to assess the challenges and necessary reforms that policymakers in Mali must undertake in regard to its intelligence agencies based on case studies and lessons learned, to ensure

[34] Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas C. Bruneau, "Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence* 24, no. 4 (December 2011): 660, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2011.598784.

that Mali's return to democracy benefits from transparent and effective intelligence services. The thesis further examines the models of two countries—Romania and Spain—on which Malian's policymakers can rely in building an effective democratic intelligence apparatus under civilian control.

Therefore, the primary sources used are documents of governmental and non-governmental institutions as well as the works of scholars with deep insight into the field of security sector governance, such as government of Mali website, U.S. Department of State, RAND Corporation, DCAF, the National Democratic Institute, European Union Training Mission, and United Nation Mission in Mali. The thesis also uses such secondary sources as media reports as well as others experts' examinations of democratizing intelligence.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

The thesis is composed of four chapters, with Chapter I as the introduction. Chapter II examines the historical background of Mali's reform of intelligence, from 1991 to date, and the reasons why all attempts failed as well as the lack of incentives (threats, political will or policymakers lack of expertise etc.). Chapter III provides a comparative analysis between Romania's and Spain's respective roads to democracy. It highlights and the processes undertaken to obtain the transformation needed to meet the democratic principles, upon which Mali can develop its own democratic reform of intelligence. Romania and Spain today have proven to have achieved effective intelligence agencies. Chapter IV analyzes Mali and other cases to find an adequate answer to the research question while testing the hypotheses. It also offers conclusions and recommendations for the development of an effective intelligence agencies under democratic civilian control and contributing to enhance global security.

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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MALI'S INTELLIGENCE REFORM SINCE 1991

A coup d'état perpetrated on March 26, 1991, by Lieutenant-Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré against Moussa Traoré's military regime (1968-1991) marks the beginning of the democratic transition of Mali. In 1992, the first democratically elected president, Alpha Oumar Konaré, inaugurated the democratic era. However, the government did not seize this opportunity to initiate the necessary reforms for the consolidation of democracy through civil-military relations, specifically between leaders and intelligence services—tools necessary for political decision-makers for democratic consolidation. Instead, the newly elected authorities relegated the institutions in charge of intelligence services to the background, whether because of ignorance, poor knowledge or understanding of the country's security challenges, or a lack of political will that could be motivated by personal reasons and external incentives. This neglect hampered the necessary democratic reform of intelligence, contributing in turn to grave security consequences that Mali has faced since 2012.

For more than half a century, security issues in Mali have been perceived as challenges for the armed forces and security forces alone. Nevertheless, timid attempts by the democratic government to reform the defense and security forces were initiated successively between 1997 and 2012; the restructuring focused on the defense and security forces as a whole, without necessarily specifying the intelligence services. In the aftermath of the 2012 crisis, however, a number of minor reforms were initiated within the intelligence community to address the country's multiple challenges—armed rebel groups and terrorism, as well as economic, social, and political struggles—and the inherent weaknesses in the functioning of intelligence services. This approach focused on the internal restructuring of the Military Intelligence Directorate, through the creation of an internal fusion unit at regional and central levels and then the creation of an ad-hoc fusion center of the intelligence community. This chapter examines the Malian intelligence community and concludes that, despite some attempts to reform the intelligence services,

the country is in dire need of deep democratic reform of its intelligence services; a balance between democratic civilian control and effectiveness.[35]

A. MALI'S CURRENT INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

In Mali, there are currently three main intelligence services: the State Security General Directorate,[36] the Directorate of Military Security[37] (DSM), and the General Intelligence and Territory Surveillance Directorate of the National Police[38] as well as an Intelligence Analysis and Fusion Center, created in March 2017.[39] The main tasks of the intelligence services are the collection, management, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence to policymakers.

Today, these intelligence agencies report to the President of the Republic, the Minister of Defense, and to the Minister of Security and Civil Protection (General Intelligence and Territory Surveillance Directorate of the National Police, and Intelligence Analysis and Fusion Center). The organizational chart, in Figure 1, illustrates the intelligence community in Mali as a whole, as well as its link and level of strategic and operational intervention.

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[35] Bruneau and Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-military Relations," 921-923.

[36] Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM du 1er Mars 1989 Portant Création de la Direction Générale de la Sécurité d'Etat. [State Security General Directorate Act of 1989, Pub. L No. 89-18 / P-RM (1989)]. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1989/mali-jo-1989-05.pdf.

[37] Loi n°095-38/ du 20 Avril 1995 portant création de la Direction de la Sécurité Militaire. [Directorate of Military Security Act of 1995, No. 095-38 (1995)]. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1995/mali-jo-1995-10.pdf

[38] Loi n°05-020/AN-RM du 30 mai 2005 portant ratification de l'ordonnance n°04-026/P-RM du 16 septembre 2004 portant création de la Direction Générale de la police nationale. [General Directorate of the National Police Act of 2005, Pub. L No. 05-020/AN-RM (2005) ratifying Act of 2004, Pub. L No. 04-026 / P-RM (2004)]. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2005/mali-jo-2005-19.pdf

[39] Arrêté n°2017-0505/MSPC-SG du 7 mars 2017 portant création, composition et fonctionnement du Centre d'Analyse et de fusion du renseignement. [Exec. Order No. 2017-0505/MSPC-SG (2017)]. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2017/mali-jo-2017-43.pdf



Figure 1. Malian Intelligence Community Organizational Chart[40]

1. The Presidency Intelligence Service

The presidency is one of the institutions that possess an intelligence agency. The DGSE is the main intelligence service of Mali. In Mali there is no proper intelligence fusion structure at the national level. The fusion center housed in the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection is more like an ad-hoc structure than permanent, because it is mainly composed of representatives of several structures other than those in charge of intelligence. The DGSE was born from the ashes of the State Security Service created by Law No. 02-10 of January 1962. In January 1989, Law No. 89-18 / AN-RM created the DGSE.[41] This law stipulates that "the DGSE is a public service whose mission is the protection of the institutions of Republic of Mali, including the monitoring of all the activities that take in

[40] "G2" stands for military intelligence at the headquarter level (General Staff or branches such as Army or Air-force).

[41] Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM.

the country, and by gathering all the information, and all the intelligence on the political, economic, social, cultural, military and scientific life of the country."[42] In addition, the law mentions that the activities of the DGSE are carried out both inside and outside the national territory.[43] Moreover, it specifies that in compliance with the laws in vigor, the DGSE agents have the right of access in all public and private institutions and cannot be refused the communication of any document, file, or testimony.[44] The DGSE is headed by a Director General appointed by decree of the President of the Republic and is assisted by a Deputy Director appointed under the same conditions.[45]

Presidential Decree No. 89-0114/P-RM, dated April 30, 1989, sets the general organizational framework of the DGSE.[46] It stipulates that the DGSE functions under the direct authority of the President of the Republic; comprises departments at the central level and branches abroad; and is supported by a staff (permanent and temporary) comprised of civil and military.[47] The decree also includes career path requirements for the DGSE personnel, including promotions and disciplinary actions, education, training and the like.[48]

In June 1992, Decree No. 92-012/P-RM, issued by the first democratically elected president, Alpha Oumar Konaré, placed DGSE directly under the President of the Republic.

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[42] Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM.

[43] Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM.

[44] Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM.

[45] Ordonnance n°89-18/P-RM.

[46] Décret n°89-0114/P-RM du 22 Avril 1989 fixant le cadre général de l'organisation de la Direction Générale de la Sécurité d'Etat. [Exec. Order No. 89-0114/P-RM (1989)]. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1989/mali-jo-1989-08.pdf.

[47] However, recruiting at the DGSE is only at the request of the Director of the DGSE among the agents (category A, B, C) of the civil service and military placed as the Presidency personnel to serve the DGSE) Hence, the agents admitted to perform at the DGSE are sworn in before taking office and benefit from the settlements provided by the regulations (risk premium, special duty bonus, personal and residence allowance, etc.). Décret n°89-0114.

[48] The Director of the State Security General Directorate is responsible for the study of all matters relating to the organization and operation of the service; budget preparation; recruitment, training, and education of staff; management of personnel, equipment, and credits; the coordination of the different departments of the service; the preparation of summary reports on all aspects of the life of the nation; the transmission to the Government of all information collected; the organization of periodic meetings with the staff of the service. Décret n°89-0114.

While there had been some other decrees placing it under the Prime Minister (Decree No. 93-009/P-RM of January 1993),[49] it currently functions under the direct authority of the President (Decree No. 016-0863/P-RM of November 2016).[50]

The DGSE was reorganized once more in 2014 and has received significant funds, but unfortunately, no documents are available to assess the reform undertaken.[51] As such, in February 2015, the DGSE received $3 million in special interest accounts. This special authority was established by Order 2015-0040 / MEF-SG of February 2015 by the Ministry of Finance.[52] Its purpose is real-time cash payment for specific expenses, for the agency staff allowances, day to day operations and other expenses.[53] DGSE reportedly benefits more in terms of budget, equipment, and personnel than any other intelligence service.[54] However, the structure escapes not only to the civilian control of government branches but also to the judicial and legislative oversight. These shortcomings mean that the DGSE, as well as its counterparts in the Ministry of Defense and Security, do not contribute effectively to the consolidation of Malian democracy.

2. Ministry of Defense and Veterans Affairs

The Directorate of Military Security—in charge of military intelligence, is housed in the Ministry of Defense and reports to the Department Minister. The Directorate of Military Security, although having undergone a slight restructuring to respond the terrorist

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[49] This new reorganization led to the amendment of Exec. Order No. 89-0114/P-RM. In so doing, Articles 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7 of the Exec. Order were amended replacing the President of the Republic by the Prime Minister. http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1993/mali-jo-1993-02.pdf.

[50] Décret n°2016-0864/P-RM fixant l'organisation de la Présidence de la République [Exec. Order No. 2016-0864/P-RM (2016).], http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2016/mali-jo-2016-49.pdf.

[51] A. Coulibaly, "Mali. : Assemblée Nationale, La Commission Défense et Sécurité reçoit le patron de la Sécurité militaire" *le Malien*, 22 Février 2016. [National Assembly, Defense and Security Commission receives the patron of Military Security, Malian, February 22, 2016.], http://maliactu.net/mali-assemblee-nationale-la-commission-defense-et-securite-recoit-le-patron-de-la-securite-militaire/.

[52] Arrêté N°2015-0040/MEF-SG du 04 Février 2015 Portant Institution d'une Régie Spéciale d'Avances à la Direction Générale de la Sécurité d'Etat. [Order 2015-0040/MEF-SG (2015)], http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2016/mali-jo-2016-11.pdf.

[53] Arrêté N°2015-0040/MEF-SG.

[54] Coulibaly. "Mali."

threat[55] in the aftermath of the coup, is not immune to the same shortcomings faced by other intelligence services."

a. Directorate of Military Security

The DSM, created in April 1995 by Law No. 95-038, is the structure in charge of military intelligence within the armed forces. DSM's mission is the development and implementation of the National Military Intelligence Policy. Thereby, its main roles are to prepare the intelligence requirements plans of the Department of the Armed Forces; search, centralize, exploit, and synthesize military intelligence as well as those transmitted by other sources or intelligence services; coordinate the action of the various sources of military intelligence and prepare comprehensive documentation of the various threats; and participate in the implementation of the provisions relating to the prevention of the illicit trade in war materials, arms, and ammunition.[56]

Presidential Decree No. 95-251 of June 1995 establishes the organization and functioning of the Directorate of Military Security. This decree stipulates that the DSM is placed under the Minister of Defense direct authority.[57] The document organizes the DSM into several divisions including the research, prevention, and protection division; the technical division; as well as an administrative center, a general, and personal secretariat to the director.[58] Order No. 97-006/MFAAC-SG sets out the details of the organization

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[55] In September 2014, a restructuring within the Directorate of Military Security was authorized, through a directive relating to the creation and use of intelligence cells, by the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces. This reorganization took place in a context of instability in the Sahelo-Saharan region and the complexity of the threat posed by terrorist and insurgent groups; trafficking and organized crime, the document states. These cells are resolutely involved in researching and rapidly disseminating information to authorities at all levels by identifying factors of hostility toward the forces; identifying potential menace; and analyzing these threats, and providing the intelligence to carry out appropriate actions against them. Directive relative à la création et à l'emploi des cellules de renseignement n°00136/DSM du 15 Septembre 2014. [Directorate of Military Security, Directive on the creation and use of Intelligence Units, DSM No. 00136/DSM. Bamako, Mali 2014].

[56] Loi n°095-38.

[57] Décret n°95-251/P-RM du 30 Juin 1995 fixant l'organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement de la Direction de la Sécurité Militaire. [Exec. Order No. 95-251/P-RM (1995)], http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1995/mali-jo-1995-10.pdf.

[58] Décret n°95-251/P-RM.

and operating procedures of the DSM.[59] In its articles (2, 3, 4, and 5), the order provides for finance and general administration sections.[60] Whereas the finance section is responsible for the preparation of the budget and its execution, the general administration section is in charge of the management of the military and civilian personnel.[61]

The DSM' is made up of military seconded by other armies such as the Army, Air Force, Gendarmerie, and National Guard. Their career plans depend administratively on their original organization.[62] The Directorate of Military Security works in close collaboration with the intelligence structures placed at the various levels of military command, such as the documentation division at the level of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, the military intelligence offices (G2) at the level of staffs and services (Army, Air Force, Gendarmerie, National Guard etc.), and intelligence cells in defense zones and air bases.[63]

One of the most recent reforms of the Directorate of Military Security took place in 2014, in the wake of the 2012 crisis. The aim of this reform was to respond effectively to the need for territorial networking as well as the coordination and revitalization of an integrated intelligence chain for the success of military operations. In this vein, intelligence cells in charge of merging and analyzing the data were created. The Analysis and Fusion Cells (AFC)[64] are permanent structures commissioned by the Director of Military Intelligence. These cells, led by DSM personnel, gather daily with representatives of other intelligence services on the theater of operations. Accordingly, the cells of analysis and

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[59] Order No. 99-006/MFAAC-SG setting out the details of the organization and operating procedures of the Directorate of Military Security. "Arrêté n°97-006/MFAAC-SG du 29 Janvier 1997 fixant les détails de l'organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement de la Direction de la Sécurité Militaire."

[60] Décret n°95-251/P-RM.

[61] Décret n°95-251/P-RM

[62] Décret n° 2013-4751/MDAC-SG Portant Détachement d'Officier à la Direction de la Sécurité Militaire. [Exec. Order No. 2013-4751/MDAC-SG (2013).], http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2014/mali-jo-2014-39.pdf, http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2015/mali-jo-2015-42.pdf.

[63] The intelligence offices in the General Staffs and certain services-Army, Air Force, Gendarmerie, National Guard, etc.-operate under the G2 operations cells [Exec. Order No. 365-366/P-RM (1999)]. They are an integral part of these G2 cells whose mission is to organize the research and dissemination of intelligence, http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/1999/mali-jo-1999-33.pdf.

[64] DSM n°00136.

fusion are organized in three levels: central, zonal, and sector. These AFCs may be split up to the Combined Arms Group (GTIA) level, which has an S2[65] composed of an officer, a noncommissioned officer, and two enlisted.[66] The organizational chart in Figure 2 illustrates the different levels of intervention of the military intelligence component.



Figure 2. Military Intelligence Reporting Channel

An embryonic interagency coordination between ministerial intelligence services—defense and security—in addition to other departments and international partners, exists today, but could be strengthened or restructured and elevate at a national level.

3. Ministry of Security and Civil Protection

The General Intelligence and Territorial Surveillance Directorate is a service within the General Directorate of the National Police—under the authority of the Ministry of

[65] "S2" stands for the intelligence section at the tactical level (Battalion).

[66] Directorate of Military Security, Directive on the creation and use of Intelligence Units.

Security and created by Law No. 04-026/P-RM. This intelligence agency experienced several changes in the 1990s to 2000s, the last transformation occurring in October 2004, under Decree No. 04-470/P-RM by the council of ministers. The General Intelligence and Territorial Surveillance Directorate is responsible for

- the search, centralization, and exploitation of all kinds of intelligence necessary for government information
- the coordination of the intelligence activity at the level of all the police services
- the surveillance of foreigners' activities[67]

The General Intelligence and Territorial Surveillance Directorate comprises several divisions in charge of political, social, and cultural issues; economic; territory monitoring; documentation; and technical services.

In addition, the Ministry of Security houses the brand-new Center for Analysis and Fusion of Intelligence, created by Order No. 2017-0505/MSPC.[68] The Intelligence Analysis and Fusion Center is responsible for collecting and analyzing intelligence from national services and partners to facilitate decision-making. As such, it is composed of a permanent head of a center, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Police, the Gendarmerie, National Guard, Civil Protection, DGSE, DSM, the General Directorate of Water and Forests, and the General Directorate of Customs as well as a representative of the EUCAP Sahel Mali Mission, and MUNISMA on a temporary basis. The center meets at least once a week—or more often if necessary. However, in June 2017, the Order was amended by Order No. 2017-1843/MSPC-SG,[69] which added a representative of the Central Office of Narcotic Drugs to the composition of the center on a permanent basis.

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[67] Décret n°04-470/P-RM du 20 octobre 2004 fixant l'organisation et les modalités de fonctionnement de la Direction Générale de la Police Nationale. [Exec. Order No. 04-470/P-RM (2004)], http://sgg-mali.ml/JO/2005/mali-jo-2005-05.pdf.

[68] Arrêté n°2017-0505.

[69] Arrêté n°2017-1843.

B. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MALIAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Only the General Directorate of State Security and the Military Intelligence Service have both intelligence and counterintelligence functions. Although Mali has a solid framework of statutory regulations for intelligence institutions, roles, and missions, in addition to a budget for intelligence, it seems that in Mali, the intelligence community is struggling to deal effectively with the threats that the country faces after more than two decades of democratic experience. Intelligence in Mali has lost credibility not only inside but also outside the country. As an illustration, despite the information obtained by the DGSE on both sides—by their counterpart of Algeria (Department of Intelligence and Security [DRS]) and its informants in within the Tuareg community on a potential rebellion in the northern part of the country—the DGSE and the two other intelligence agencies (DSM and DGRG), failed to assess the threat that led to Malian state disruption in 2012. This failure provides ample evidence that the intelligence services in Mali needed to be rebuilt.[70]

The Malian intelligence services have in the past maintained close relations with their French, German, and American counterparts. Relations with the latter, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), go back to the 1990s and 2000s, in the context of the war against terrorism and drug trafficking transiting through northern Mali. The unorthodox practices of the intelligence services pushed the CIA, which has a significant representation in Bamako, to be wary of the IC.[71] The nature of the operations carried out by the DGSE—countering Tuareg rebellions, terrorism, traffickers, and bandits—was a catalyst for the involvement of the department's personnel in networks of dirty money, corruption, and criminal complicity.[72] For example, a senior officer was killed by al-Qaeda

[70] Touchard Laurent, "Mali: des services de renseignement à reconstruire," *Jeune Afrique,* 2013, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20130408112618/.

[71] Laurent.

[72] Laurent.

in the Islamic Maghreb in 2011 because he was suspected of being in league with the terrorists.[73]

In addition, if Mali had an effective intelligence service, there would have been no negative consequences during the protests against the Code de la Famille[74] or the outcome of the Mali-Togo soccer game in 2011,[75] which caused violent protests in the Malian capital of Bamako.

Interagency IC in Mali is difficult to achieve. The legal vacuum with regard to the intelligence services considerably hinders the necessary synergy of action that these structures must undertake. The reporting channels of each intelligence service, a stove-pipe system, speaks volumes about the nature of cooperation between the major intelligence agencies.

C. MECHANISMS FOR INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT

Democratic control and oversight of Mali's intelligence agencies—exercised by the executive and legislative branches of the government, as well as by the intelligence services themselves—exists on paper.

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[73] *Jeune Afrique*. "Politique Mali: Meurtres au Sahel," 23 juin 2009, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/202753/politique/meurtres-au-sahel/.

[74] In August 2009, the National Assembly largely adopted a new family code designed to create equality between men and women in terms of inheritance rights. The adoption of this new "Family and People Code" in Mali provoked serious protests from leaders and young Muslims who vowed to prevent this code from being enacted.

[75] The Africa Cup of Nations playoff game between Mali and Togo, in which Mali was defeated, was the event that triggered the debate on security sector reform. That day, young people unhappy with the defeat of the national football team turned into hooligans, attacking peaceful citizens in the capital, in front of security forces unable to control them. As a result, sanctions were imposed on security forces including intelligence services heads, while civil society demanded the establishment of a strong state authority. Subsequently, national meetings were held in all regions of the country. In the end, recommendations were made to require good governance of the security sector. Zeïni Moulaye and IGP Mahamadou Niakaté, *Shared Governance of Peace and Security: The Malian Experience* (Bamako: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2011), 5-10. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/nigeria/08972.pdf.

1. Oversight and Its Discontents

Executive control involves direction and guidance by the President, the Prime Minister, and the ministries in charge of intelligence agencies—the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. What remains controversial is the blurring of shared responsibilities between the president as a commander in chief, the prime minister in charge of implementing the national defense policy, the Supreme Defense Council, which operates occasionally, and the other ministries in charge of intelligence domain.

Legislative control and oversight in Mali is exercised by the National Assembly's Defense and Security Committee. In practice, it is less than perfect. Essentially, the legislature does not have any control over the security force's budget, where a system of checks and balances must be considered and fully implemented for more transparency. Also, a constitutional vacuum exists in the legislative control and oversight of the intelligence services.[76] This gap reflects the lack of expertise and importance given to the intelligence agencies, which remain fundamental to the consolidation of democracy.

Although little research is available, it appears that, from the author's observations, the judicial branch of the government has not fulfilled its roles in interceding and providing a legal framework in the Malian security sector. As a result, the few allocated resources for the security sectors, which are sufficient to be effective and efficient at a certain level, are inappropriately managed, due to the lack of control. The result of the judiciary failing to play its role has allowed the security forces to act independently. The aim is to avoid any conflict with the civil hierarchy and security actors and to prevent any legal institutions within the ministries in charge of security sectors from shedding light on cases of violation of laws. These institutions—Inspector General and Military Justice—have been undermined intentionally to make them ineffective for decades.

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[76] While there is a Parliamentary Committee in charge of defense and security issues, there is no standing committee specifically dedicated to intelligence services to oversee operations, budget or DGSE any other activity. "About Defence and Security," Transparency International, accessed September, 6, 2018, http://government.defenceindex.org/generate-report.php?country_id=6312; http://www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/mali.pdf.

In addition, the informal oversight of the intelligence agencies in Mali by media and civil society has been faulty. At a minimum, the media has only occasionally reported on wrongdoing or ineffectiveness of the intelligence sector in preventing security threats. Still, there have been instances in which media reports have elicited no meaningful government response. For example in 2013, TV5 Monde, a French television channel, noted the kidnapping and forcible confinement of a member of the Malian National Assembly—an opposition party leader, in fact—by the DGSE.[77] The victim lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court against the intelligence service. The representative stated that he was brutally arrested in the offices of the NGO he runs because of his relationship with the Red Berets (the presidential guard under Amadou Toumani Touré) and his interactions with the Islamists who had controlled the northern regions of Mali.[78]

Recently, the journal *le Sphinx* reported on the disappearance of a journalist, which involved a senior dignitary of the National Assembly and a senior officer of the DGSE.[79] This case, dating back to January 2017, was reported after two years of investigation and accused the so-called dignitaries of contributing to the disappearance of the journalist. Unfortunately, the journalist had died during the nine months of illegal detention. No legal action has yet been filed either against the alleged accused or the DGSE.[80]

2. Assessing Malian Intelligence

In light of Bruneau and Matei's criteria, it appears that Malian intelligence agencies' civilian control and effectiveness remain weak, as shown in Table 1.

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77 *Jeune Afrique,* "Politique Mali: Un Homme Politique Porte Plainte Contre les Services de Renseignement, AFP." [A Politician Complains Against the Intelligence Service, AFP]. March 25, 2013.], http://www.jeuneafrique.com/depeches/37943/politique/mali-un-homme-politique-porte-plainte-contre-les-services-de-renseignement/.

78 *Jeune Afrique.*

79 *Jeune Afrique.*

80 Maliactu. "Mali: Des Révélations sur la Disparition d'un Journaliste d'Investigation," [Revelations about the disappearance of an investigative journalist], *Journal Le Sphinx* du 25 Juillet 2018. https://maliactu.net/mali-des-revelations-sur-la-disparition-dun-journaliste-dinvestigation/.

Table 1. Requirements for Intelligence Control and Effectiveness.

Requirements	Control			Effectiveness		
	Institutional Control Mechanisms	Oversight	Professional Norms	Plan or Strategy	Institutions	Resources
	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Low

The result for institutional control mechanisms in Mali is "low." Although it is part of the legal framework, the institutional control mechanism of intelligence agencies has barely translated into reality. The worst effects of this lack of control are illustrated by the involvement of intelligence services in illegal activities—organized crime groups—as well as the unorthodox behavior of their personnel, such as cronyism and nepotism.[81] Disinformation practices are the focus of intelligence services, rather than national security intelligence. Meanwhile, Mali remains plagued by increasing insecurity in the north and central regions of the country, despite the help of partners in the re-founding of security forces (EUTM, EUCAP, MUNISMA, and the United States).

Mali's oversight category in requirements for control is also "low." In Mali, there is no permanent parliamentary commission or judicial body with powers and responsibilities to oversee the IC in general, and in particular the operations, organization, budget, or activities of the DGSE, which reports only to the President of the Republic.[82] A Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee exists in the National Assembly; however, no meaningful information is available on the monitoring or management of Malian national intelligence agencies in the public domain. The media on the other hand, as an informal watchdog, has repeatedly criticized the misuse of intelligence services and the lack of IC, without reaching significant results from policymakers, bringing about the entire IC reforms. Before the coup, Freedom House ranked media in Mali as fully free.[83]

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81 Shemella and Tomb, *Security Forces in African States,* 114.

82 Transparency International, "About Defence and Security."

83 "Freedom in The World: Mali," Freedom House. 2011. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2011/mali.

In the professional norms classification, Mali still rates a "low" mark. The professionalization of intelligence agencies has to overcome major challenges. This assessment is due to the fact that there is a lack of a proper career plan for officers or other personnel serving in the intelligence services. "These personnel have yet to obtain the education, training and equipment necessary to perform the necessary bureaucratic tasks and expected operational missions,"[84] said Matei. The fragile nature of civilian governance in Mali recommends adequate civilian oversight of intelligence services, as enshrined in the constitution.

In terms of requirements for effectiveness, Mali's score is "low" in the plan category. In Mali, while recent innovations in coordinating intelligence structures have been initiated, there are no strategic intelligence documents or doctrines that identify priorities and guidelines, aligned with resources. In contrast, the DGSE, for example, in its fight against terrorism, contributed to the arrest of several terrorists involved in the attacks—Terrasse[85] and Grand Bassam[86]—of Bamako and Abidjan, despite the absence of a plan on the role and the place of intelligence services in Malian democracy.

For efficiency requirements, the institutions category turns out also to be "low." The post-2012 crisis has resulted in a timid re-foundation of intelligence structures at the strategic level. This restructuring has allowed the creation of such organizations such as the National Intelligence Council, though it remains inoperative today.[87] More importantly, Mali does not have a civil intelligence agency as such. Also, the lack of a permanent and effective mechanism at the strategic level for intelligence structures obstructs the interoperability and effectiveness of these institutions. However, the creation of an

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84 Shemella and Tomb, *Security Forces in African States*, 115.

85 "Mali : L'Auteur Présumé des Attentats de La Terrasse à Bamako arrêté," Ouest-France. 22 Avril 2016, https://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/mali/mali-lauteur-presume-des-attentats-de-la-terrasse-bamako-arrete-4179482.

86 *Jeune Afrique*. "Sécurité Mali : Un des Organisateurs Présumés de l'Attaque de Grand-Bassam Arrêté, AFP." [One of the Presumed Organizers of the Great-Bassam Attack Arrested,] AFP. January 12, 2017, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/392251/politique/mali-arrestation-dun-organisatFeurs-presumes-de-grand-bassam/.

87 In fact, a National Intelligence Council has been created, but is struggling to function, certainly because of the rivalries between the existing intelligence services. Moreover, this council uniting the so-called intelligence services had not met yet. Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman. *Mali's Next Battle*.

intelligence fusion center—an ad-hoc body—involving all national and international actors in the intelligence sector, represents signs of hope for a profound reform of the intelligence community.

The allocation of resources to the intelligence sector shows, in principle, the interest the authorities have in this sector. Intelligence services in Mali are considered to be a privileged policy-making tool and are less well-off in terms of budget. With the exception of the DGSE, which enjoys its presidential status, benefiting from millions of dollars of funds,[88] the DSM had a budget of $34,000 equivalent in the law of orientation (five years Planning-Programming-Budgeting) and military programming, extending over a period of five years.[89]

Therefore, Mali's intelligence services remain both ineffective and democratically uncontrolled despite the very few achievements in the fight against terrorism. To reverse the balance, policymakers must initiate the necessary reforms and translate the existing theoretical democratic civilian control and oversight into practice, enabling a rigorous code of ethics in the intelligence sector.

D. CONCLUSION

Mali has a long way to go in terms of reforming its institutions in general and its intelligence services in particular. Democratic governance—control and effectiveness—of intelligence services remains an important challenge to be addressed. While civil and democratic control exists legally through formal oversight—executive, legislative, and judicial mechanisms—actual oversight of the intelligence services remains virtually nonexistent, negatively affecting the performance of the intelligence community. Despite the various calls to reform the intelligence services—balancing transparency and effectiveness—before the events of March 2012, policymakers have remained unresponsive to this demand, which has potentially led to the multi-dimensional crisis that the country has been going through since 2012. The 2012 crisis that ended in a coup d'état

88 Coulibaly, "Mali."

89 Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman. *Mali's Next Battle*.

was a trigger for the timid reform undertaken in the aftermath of the re-democratization. Indeed, the state of degeneration of the security forces in general and the intelligence services in particular, decried by some scientists, sufficiently proves the lack of democratization of the intelligence services in the country. The authors Michael Shurkin, Stephanie Pezard, and Rebecca Zimmerman have irrefutably pointed out deficiencies in certain intelligence functions in Mali.[90] These functions are mainly related to human intelligence (HUMINT)—a realm of intelligence that is underestimated by intelligence officers in Mali, who tend to favor aerial surveillance and signal intelligence (SIGINT) methods operated by the partners. As a result, Mali's intelligence services remain both ineffective and democratically uncontrolled, given the ongoing challenges, particularly in terms of intelligence transparency vis-à-vis citizens and the fight against terrorism. Policymakers must undertake the necessary reforms to reverse this trend and translate into practice the theoretical democratization of existing institutions, thus enabling a rigorous code of ethics within the intelligence services. In the end, if Mali's democratic consolidation is struggling to reach fruition after two decades of practice, it is because it has not initiated the necessary reform of the intelligence services.

[90] Shurkin, Pezard, and Zimmerman. *Mali's Next Battle.*

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III. INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN ROMANIA AND SPAIN

Since Romania and Spain transitioned to democracy in 1989 and 1975, respectively, these two countries have undergone notable reforms of their intelligence apparatus as part of their wider processes of democratic consolidation. Both Romania and Spain have succeeded in establishing renowned intelligence agencies, serving as models within Europe and the rest of the world. These successes were made possible because of the involvement of all the components of society, namely the media (which played a leading role in Romania), civil society, as well as the political will of decision-makers in Spain, but especially the desire to integrate the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which required criteria for political, economic, and security membership.

Nevertheless, the Romanian and Spanish paths to success were not without pitfalls. The consolidation of their democracies, even if they still face enormous challenges today, did not happen overnight. As such, the main obstacles facing these two countries are economic, internal conflicts, terrorist threats, as well as endemic corruption. The two countries were successively confronted with ethnic tensions, bringing a blow to the consolidation of their democracy. While Romanian democracy is facing its greatest crisis since 1990,[91] Spain, meanwhile, continues to struggle with the separatists in Catalonia.[92]

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[91] Romanian democracy is facing one of the worst crisis in a decade. It was after an attempt to enact controversial laws, which placed the judicial branch under political control, as well as anti-corruption laws, in 2017, that national and diaspora protesters sent a mail to the European Union to express their disagreement on what could be a decline of democracy, to their understanding. The authors of the letter believe that there is a risk of deterioration of European democracies into pseudo-democracies, inviting other European states to unite, in order to lead the fight for the restoration of Romanian democracy. Chris Harris, "Romania: Democracy in Romania Facing Its 'Gravest Danger since 1990,'" Euronews, 17 February 2017, http://www.euronews.com/2017/12/17/democracy-in-romania-facing-its-gravest-danger-since-1990-.

[92] "Spain Profile - Timeline," BBC, June 1, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17955805.

For the latter, the nature of the threats—coup d'état, and stateness[93] issues—that existed and continue to rage in this country, shows that democracy is a process that takes a long time to strengthen. As far as Romania is concerned, the extent of the protests, Bucharest against Romanian government since early 2017, prove to the fullest that there are many hard steps to go through in order to consolidate democracy. Therefore, these states make a good comparison to Mali because they are relatively new to the full-on democracy game, and the edges are still a little rough amid various domestic and regional tensions.

This chapter compares and contrasts democratic reforms of intelligence in Romania and Spain after their transitions to democracy.

A. BACKGROUND ON THE NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS IN ROMANIA AND SPAIN

Romania (1965-1989) was a highly repressive Communist regime,[94] while Spain (1936-1975) was a dictatorship regime.[95] Both non-democratic regimes in Romania and Spain were characterized by exaggerated corruption, suppression of liberties, and other human rights abuses.[96]

Romania and Spain, under their respective dictatorial regimes, have used their repressive intelligence agencies—the Securitate and the Central Service of Documentation (SECED)—to bolster their governments. These two intelligence agencies served as

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[93] Linz and Stepan, in their book on the problems of democratic transition and consolidation, define *"Stateness"* in the five arenas of a consolidated democracy, as one of the criteria for consolidating democracy. They claim that democracy is a form of state governance. As a prerequisite for the existence of a consolidated democracy, Linz and Stepan argue that a state must exist. They further argue that the absence of a state—stateness— or the envy of a large section of population, not recognizing themselves to the state, wanting to create a state or join another are major security issues that are often difficult to resolve. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 7.

[94] Cristiana Florina Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community: From An Instrument Of Dictatorship To Serving Democracy, *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 20, no. 4 (2007): 631.

[95] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.*

[96] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 631.

political polices[97] for Nicolae Ceausescu and, respectively, Francisco Franco. These intelligence services' practices of internal and external espionage, physical torture, or imprisonment played decisive roles leading not only to creating an atmosphere of fear and intimidation but also an impression of suspicion and mistrust between these dictators and their people. In Spain, for example, the establishment of concentration camps with the help of SECED, resulted in the death of about 400,000 people.[98] As a result, Romania and Spain both became surveillance states, creating psychological fear within the population through rumors or misinformation.[99]

While Romania's transition to democracy in 1989 was bloody, including the deaths of dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena,[100] General Francisco Franco's death in 1975 marked the beginning of a peaceful and democratic transition in Spain.[101]

On their path to democratization, Romania and Spain established new democratic intelligence agencies under legal bases—rule of law, human rights, checks and balances—and supported by monitoring and supervision mechanisms.[102] Moreover, they also defined their new intelligence structures' roles and missions based on their own security challenges and threats.

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[97] The so-called "Political Police" is any intelligence structure that operates covertly against politicians opposed to the government or conducts political operations using extreme methods for the benefit of the government. *Merriam-Webster*, s.v. "political police," https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/secret%20police.

[98] For detailed information on the Franco regime's human rights abuses, see: Javier Rodrigo. "Exploitation, Fascist Violence and Social Cleansing: A Study of Franco's Concentration Camps from a Comparative Perspective." *European Review of History: Revue européenne d'histoire*, 19:4 (2012): 553-560. https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2012.697871. Cristiana F. Matei, Garcìa Adrés de Castro, and Carolyn Halladay, "On Balance: Intelligence Democratization in Post- Francoist Spain," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* (forthcoming): 4.

[99] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 631.

[100] Matei.

[101] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.*

[102] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 631; Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 11-15.

B. DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE

From the beginning, both Romania and Spain struggled in the transitional process of reforming their intelligence services. The legacy of their former intelligence agencies—the Romanian Securitate, and Spain's Central National Office[103]—have severely hampered their efforts to reach a compromise between intelligence effectiveness and democratic civilian control. On the one hand, these challenges were due to the population hostility toward the agents (from former repressive intelligence agencies) and institutions in charge of intelligence; and on the other hand, the lack of transparency and some fallacious legal malfunctions during the first years of the transformation. Over time, the efforts made on both sides have led to successes, favoring the democratization of the intelligence services, which is subject to the institutionalization of civilian democratic control and oversight, the modernization of personnel management (recruitment, education, and technical training), as well as the relationship between intelligence services and civil society.

In general, media, European and Euro-Atlantic security institutions, as well as national security threats have been catalysts for intelligence reforms in both countries. The types of national security threats[104] in the two countries have triggered reforms encompassing new effective and modern intelligence systems that could adequately address security challenges. In addition, such threats required intelligence services that have a legal framework, training, and enhanced education, allowing them to delineate criminal actions, understand unbalanced markets, promote growth and innovation, and control increased loss of sovereignty.[105] The determining factors that have contributed to

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[103] Carlos Barrachina Lisón, "El regreso a los cuarteles: Militares y cambio político en España (1976-1981)." [The return to the barracks: Military and political change in Spain.] Resdal. January 3, 2002. http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/d0000195.htm.

[104] The two countries share similar security challenges related to: terrorism, organized crime, corruption, and political patronage in the government. Today, taking into account the security context, Spain is on alert level 4 for counter-terrorism, on a maximum of 5; whereas, Romania could be a terrorist target because of its geographical position in the Balkans, as well as its strategic partnership with the United States, and the large number of Muslims and Arabs in Romania, exceeding more than 200.000. Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 632.

[105] Matei, 632.

the transformation and democratization with regard to these countries—Romania and Spain—first and foremost, the desire to belong to the European Union through the integration into NATO. Second, there is the desire of state leaders (more prominent in Romania than in Spain) to obliterate the stigma left by the intelligence agencies, the role played by the media in calling secret services whenever necessary, the will of the civilian elite to reform the intelligence community in order to face such threats to the national security as terrorism.

After several reforms undertaken in both countries, Romania comprises six intelligence agencies as opposed to that of Spain, which contains nearly a dozen bodies. Together, Romania and Spain have ministerial agencies, while Spain lacks any independent intelligence organization. The intelligence services that replaced the Securitate[106] in Romania encompass four independents agencies and two ministerial agencies. Conversely, Spain intelligence community is mainly composed of ministerial agencies.[107]

1. Romanian Intelligence Agencies

Romania currently has six intelligence services—the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), the Guard and Protection Service (SPP) and the Special Telecommunication Service (STS), the Ministry of Defense's Directorate for General Information of the Armed Forces (DGIA), and the Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection (DIPI)—all of which originated from the former Securitate.[108]

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[106] Larry L. Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania," in *Democratic Control of Intelligence Services* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 69-86.

[107] The main consumers of intelligence are the Prime Minister and selected Ministers (e.g., the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of Interior), as well as other Government institutions, including the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies. Accessed August, 2018. At: https://www.cni.es/en/howdoesthecniwork/; https://www.cni.es/es/queescni/historia/elcni/. Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 5-6.

[108] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 633-634.

a. Independent Agencies

The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) is responsible for collecting and analyzing information related to corruption and national security issues. These powers are devolved to the SRI by Decree No. 181 of March 1990, under Law No. 14 of 1992, on the organization and functioning of the Romanian Intelligence Service.[109] It should be noted that the SRI has no powers of arrest and detention.

The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE), acting within the legal framework of the National Security Act No. 51/1991, is in charge of external intelligence. Their activities focus on safeguarding national interests as well as Romanian national security.[110] Various basic acts (Law No. 415/2002, Law No. 182/2002, and Law No. 1/6 January 1998) regulate the organization and functioning of the CSAT as well as the protection of classified information of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

Established by Decree No. 204 in May 1990, under the Law No. 191 of October 1996, the Guard and Protection Service (SPP) role is to guaranteeing the protection of the President, the political leaders, and foreign diplomats.[111] In 2002, Emergency Ordinance No. 103 increased the powers of the SPP to organize and conduct clandestine operations.

The Special Telecommunication Service (STS) deals with telecommunications activities as well as their organization and coordination regarding public authorities. These missions are attributed to them, in accordance with the Law No. 229 of May 1993.[112] The STS has agents operating undercover and contributes within the framework of signals intelligence.

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[109] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 632-634.

[110] Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania."

[111] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 632-634.

[112] Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania."

b. Intelligence Agencies in Other Agencies

Under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate of Intelligence and Internal Protection (DIPI) created in 1999, is tasked with counter-espionage.[113] DIPI, also known as UM 0962, collects and analyzes intelligence related to terrorism and organized crime.

The Directorate for General Information of the Armed Forces (DGIA) is a military intelligence organization under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. The agency, created by Act No. 14 of January 2001, operates undercover and remains in charge of the collection and analysis of military and non-military intelligence both inside and outside Romania.[114] The DGIA includes the Directorate for Intelligence and Military Representation (DIRM); and the Directorate for Military Security (DSM).

2. Spanish Intelligence Agencies

Spain has seven intelligence agencies, as follows: the National Intelligence Center (CNI), the General Commissariat for Intelligence (CGI), the Technological Investigation Brigade (BIT), the Civil Guard Intelligence Service (SIGC), the Center of Intelligence of Armed Forces (CIFAS), the Customs Surveillance Service (SVA), Intelligence Unit (SEPBLAC), and the diplomatic intelligence functions within embassies.[115]

a. The National Intelligence Center

The National Intelligence Center (CNI) is the main Romanian agency created by Act No. 11 of May 2002 and is in charge of safeguarding classified information through the National Center of Cryptology. The CNI's main mission is to analyze and provide information to the Prime Minister and make proposals that avoid any threats or aggression against the territorial integrity of Spain, the stability of its institutions, and all other national interests. The CNI benefits from a secret budget in accordance with Act No. 11/95 of March 11, 1995, as well as representation at home and abroad, which includes a general secretary

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[113] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 634.

[114] Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania."

[115] Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 5.

and three directorates—Operations, Analysis and Resources—for an officer staff estimated at 3,500.[116]

b. Spanish National Police Intelligence Agencies

Under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, the roles and missions of the Office of the Commissioner General for Intelligence (CGI) concern the collection, process, and development of public and security intelligence. In accordance with the Royal Decree No. 400/2012, which created the CGI, the agency proceeds with the operational exploitation of intelligence in the framework of national and international terrorism. Intelligence related to the surveillance of networks, precluding cybercrime and terrorism, or the protection of minors as well as intellectual and industrial property, are devolved to the Technological Investigation Brigade, created in 2002.[117]

Moreover, in 2014, Royal Decree No. 873/2014 created the Intelligence Center for Terrorism and Organizational Crime (CITCO). This agency serves as a fusion center, fighting crime and terrorism. This new structure is the result of the merger of two intelligence services, namely the National Center for Anti-Terrorist Coordination and the Intelligence Center for Organized Crime. Today, the Center has around 190 personnel from different structures (National Police, Prison Authority, CNI, customs, etc.). CITCO remains an important structure considering not only the current terrorist threat but also the external role in which it operates by participating in international institutions—EU's Serious Organized Crime and Threat Assessment (SOCTA), the international coalition against ISIL etc.[118] The CNI, together with CITCO, has a task of vetting refugees.

c. The Civil Guard Intelligence Service

The Civil Guard Intelligence Service (SIGC) is a paramilitary force with a double hat because it operates under the control of both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry

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[116] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 634.

[117] "Policía Nacional Española," Policia, accessed August 8, 2018, http://www.policia.es/org_central/judicial/udef/bit_alertas.html; Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 8.

[118] Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, 8-9.

of the Interior. Created in 1941, the SIGC provides public security intelligence and, if necessary, conducts operations for this purpose. IACS is in charge of patrolling rural areas and also has missions that involve the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration, and crime of all kinds.

d. Center of Intelligence of the Armed Forces

The Intelligence Center of the Armed Forces is the main Spanish military intelligence agency. It was created by a Royal Decree No. 1551 of June 2004 and placed under the authority of the General Staff of Defense (EMAD). The roles and missions of CIFAS are as follows:

- Develop an intelligence strategy for all military structures;
- Guide and coordinate all military intelligence;
- To warn decision-makers on potential crises looming on the horizon;
- Maintain connections with counterparts, nationally and internationally.[119]

Furthermore, other military services such as Air Force, Army, and Navy are component of the Intelligence System of the Armed Forces (SIFAS). They are guided by a Joint Military Intelligence Plan generated by both the EMAD and military services' General Staffs. More importantly, SIFAS manages military counterintelligence activities.

In addition to the Ministries of the Interior and Defense, other departments such as the Ministry of the Economy created two intelligence agencies in 1997 and 2014. Their mission is not only the fight against drugs, money laundering, smuggling and financial escapes (Customs Surveillance Service)[120] but also financial intelligence related to the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing (Financial Intelligence Unit). Furthermore, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has intelligence structures in the embassies.

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[119] Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, 10.

[120] Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, 10.

C. EFFECTIVENESS OF REFORM IN ROMANIA AND SPAIN

If the high number of intelligence agencies is a hindrance to the effective operation of and monitoring of these services, the fact remains that neither Romania nor Spain is an exception. Unlike Spain, which has almost a dozen intelligence services, Romania has repeatedly been—and continues to be—criticized by its European peers for its large number of intelligence agencies, although they have been reduced to six.

The professionalization of intelligence services is one of the requirements and best practices to make secret services much more effective while stimulating democratic control. Failure to comply can set back the process of professionalization, which includes personnel and career development. In the same context, job opportunities by intelligence agencies are offered to young academics and representatives of civil society. The criteria for Romania varied according to the tasks. A thoughtful and introspective person could potentially become an analyst, while a dynamic person, probably a collector. As far as Spain is concerned, the government plans to recruit 500 people by 2020. The special needs concern political science, international relations, mathematicians, computer scientists, engineers, analysts, management, etc.[121]

Staff management is an important part of the intelligence reform process. The primary goal is to strengthen the links between different layers within the structures. With mutual trust between superiors and subordinates, advancement or career issues are effectively managed according to merit and performance.[122] To require such criteria, it is imperative that the education and professional training conditions of cadres correspond to the needs of intelligence agencies.

Romania and Spain have both strengthened the performance of their intelligence agencies through academic institutions dedicated to professional training and education of intelligence actors. For example, in 2005, the Spanish CNI in partnership with Spanish universities launched an initiative that could lead to an intelligence culture. This initiative

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[121] Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, 29-30.

[122] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 643-644.

contributed a few years later to the creation of a university program in intelligence, making intelligence an academic discipline leading to the sector's professionalization. As far as Romania is concerned, the National Intelligence Academy (ANI), and the Higher National Security College (HNSC), created by the SRI, are the academic institutions through which Romania has gone to professionalize its intelligence community.[123] Compared to the HNSC—which receives public and parliamentary authorities, journalists, independent analysts, as well as educators in the field of security and intelligence—the ANI is responsible for the training and education of future intelligence officers in the field of religion, foreign cultures and languages, legal affairs, and technical skills. These academic institutions, in addition to their contribution to the development and expertise of the actors in charge of the control and oversight of information services, use Western faculties or organizations to align with international standards, while effectively dealing with current threats.

In addition, these institutions have internal structures dedicated to specialized training depending on the types of threats such as organized crime, the fight against terrorism, etc. For instance, the Center for Intelligence Against Terrorism (CITCO), was created in Spain. CITCO has proved to be one of the most effective anti-terrorist centers in Europe. Romania, meanwhile, has military battalions within the DGIA in charge of human intelligence (HUMINT), as well as centers for fighting against terrorism and organized crime within the SPP and the SRI.[124]

D. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND COOPERATION IN ROMANIA AND SPAIN

In Romania, interagency cooperation is coordinated by the National Intelligence Community (CNI), created in November 2005 under the umbrella of the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT).[125] The CNI is an analytical structure designed to strengthen information and to merge the intelligence of all intelligence services, while taking into

[123] Matei, 643.

[124] Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania."

[125] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 650.

account the principles governing the spread of intelligence. The CNI is provided with the National Doctrine on Intelligence Security, which defines the legal framework and guidance on the collection, dissemination, and analysis of domestic and international intelligence activities. The CNI's goal is to professionalize the intelligence community in promoting interagency cooperation and coordination. By receiving intelligence summaries, from both the domestics actors and at the international level, the CNI could effectively play its role not only in producing the right intelligence for policymakers but also by participating profoundly in international bodies facing financial terrorism or money laundering.

The Spanish intelligence community activities coordination is done through the National Intelligence Center (CNI),[126] which reports to the Government Delegate Commission for Intelligence Affairs, and is similar to the National Security Council in the United States. The National Intelligence Center is under the authority of the Deputy Prime Minister. In addition, the CNI and other ministerial agencies maintain an exemplary relationship of cooperation and collaboration not only with each other but also with their counterparts abroad.

E. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT IN ROMANIA AND SPAIN

Both Romania and Spain have striven to develop the required mechanisms—executive, legislative, judicial, and informal control and oversight—for controlling and overseeing the activity of their post-dictatorship intelligence agencies.

1. Executive Control

Executive control of intelligence in Romania and Spain involves guidance and direction from various institutions. In Romania, it is the National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT), created in December 1990 under Law No. 39, which exercises executive control over intelligence agencies; while in Spain, it is the Government's Delegated Committee

[126] Romanian's National Intelligence Community and Spanish National Intelligence Center have the same acronyms (CNI). Florina Cristiana Matei, "The Challenges Of Intelligence Sharing in Romania," *Intelligence and National Security* 24, no. 4 (2009): 578-580.

for Intelligence Affairs (GDCIA), founded under the National Intelligence Center (CNI) Law, and complemented by the National Defense Council (CDN) successively created in 2002 and 2005. Both CSAT in Romania and the CNI/GDCIA in Spain organize and coordinate all related intelligence activities.[127] However, the executive directions of Higher Information Center of Defense (CESID) in Spain, for example, were informal between the Minister of Defense and the Director of CESID, contrary to established practices between producers and consumers. While in Romania, the Ministry of Public Finance audits the financial activities of the agencies by delegating its power of pre-emptive financial verification and by authorizing the legality of certain collection activities.[128]

In sum, both Romania and Spain's executive branches conduct a strong control over their intelligence actions.

2. Legislative Oversight

Both Romania and Spain created intelligence oversight bodies in their legislatures. In Romania, the legislative oversight of ministries in charge of intelligence is stipulated in the constitution and their heads are accountable to that branch of government; intelligence agencies report directly to their respective ministries, which in turn are accountable to parliament. In Spain, legislative control and oversight formally exist but does not function adequately, and is performed—under the CNI Law—by the Congress of Deputies through the Defense Committee.[129] Despite the Committee's tremendous powers—allocation of confidential resources, yearly reporting on CNI activities, CNI leadership hearings—the legislative control remains quasi faulty.[130]

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[127] The CSAT is composed of the President, Prime Minister, the President's National Security Advisor, the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs and Industry, the SRI and SIE directors, and the Chief of General Staff. As for the CNI/GDCIA, it represents a coordinated body for all Spanish intelligence agencies, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister. Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 11.

[128] Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 636.

[129] ACT 11/2002 of 6th May regulating the Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence Center). Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 27.

[130] The legislature not only failed to investigate the 3/11 terrorist attack, but also lacked any expertise in terms of controlling and overseeing intelligence services. Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 27.

Unlike Spain, Romania exerts parliamentary control of intelligence across the legislative committees, which may be permanent or special committees that monitor and oversee both the intelligence and the independent agencies' activities.[131] The committees' prerogatives extend to the formulation of laws, the approval and control of budgetary expenditures, and the appointment and dismissal of state officials in general and the heads of intelligence services. Most importantly, these committees can request periodical reports from the intelligence organizations.

Moreover there's a thread that focuses more on the reactivity of legislative branch. These reactive actions are performed by the parliament's special and standing committees over the intelligence organizations, as noted by Matei:

- Verify Constitutional and legal compliance of the services' activities;
- Investigate allegations of illegal intelligence collection;
- Hold hearings on presidential nominees for director positions;
- Assess the directors' annual reports, submitting their reviews to the Parliament;
- Request SRI and SIE data and information
- Investigate the directors of the agencies and their staff members;
- Conduct unannounced visits to the agencies.[132]

A number of factors on both sides—Romania and Spain—have contributed to the challenges faced by the legislature in carrying out its role. These challenges revolve around the lack of expertise of legislators, the economic reforms, the creation of new institutions, the elections, the lack of cooperation from intelligence services, when needed, as well as the required cooperation within parliamentary committees. Over time, Romania has

131 Watts, "Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania."

132 Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 636.

reversed the trend by investing in the training of parliamentarians through several programs and by initiating debates, drawing legislators' attention to the need to protect classified information.

Conversely, legislative control in Spain not only faces the challenges mentioned earlier, but also continues to suffer from lack of interest and access to intelligence. This is exacerbated by the refusal of the Spanish Ministry of Defense to declassify and share information with the parliament.[133] However, in 2016, the declassification by the CIA of all the CNI's documents related to the case of the suspicious transport of terrorists in Spain has not only re-branded the Spanish intelligence agencies but also restored the IC's reputation in terms of human rights and public trust.[134]

In Romania, in addition to legislative control over the budget, parliamentary inquiries remain the most powerful means of control. The perfect example would be the special committee set up to investigate the CIA's operations in Romania. As far as Spain is concerned, efforts must be made in this area to improve legislative control.

Although legislative oversight has proven to better control intelligence institutions, it still faces challenges. These challenges extend to the responsibility of elected officials to citizens, who require transparency, and the functions of intelligence services, which require secrecy. It must be recognized that the sense of responsibility and confidence in the disclosure of confidential information undermine democratic consolidation. Yet, as Matei notes, in established democracies like the United States, it is the executive branch that has violated this rule more than the legislative since the application of legislative control in 1970.[135]

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133 Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 11.

134 Fernando Reinares, "After the Madrid Bombings: Internal Security Reforms And Prevention Of Global Terrorism in Spain." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 5 (2009): 367. https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100902836767.

135 Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 638.

3. Judicial Review

Despite the legal existence of judicial control in Romania and Spain, the fact remains that this mechanism remains very weak and ineffective in both countries. It is by a CNI Act 11/2002 of May 6, 2002 that the Spanish intelligence judicial control is exercised. The weakness of this type of surveillance is due, on one hand, to a fragile legal framework with regard to judicial control[136] in Romania, and on the other hand, to the failure to comply with the legislative rules governing the Spanish intelligence apparatus in this specific area.[137] Between 1989 and 2002, for example, the Romanian general prosecutor explicitly accorded to the intelligence apparatus 14,267 warrants for wiretapping. However, only few cases had been investigated. While in Spain in 1990, the CESID refused to grant access to the Spanish High Court on classified documents during a wiretapping investigation involving the King and other leaders.[138]

4. Informal Oversight

The media and the NGOs have contributed considerably to the reform of Romanian and Spanish secret services. The media, in its role of strengthening democracy, is a watchdog in helping to protect citizens from abuse and human rights violations. In Spain, for example, 89 percent of abuses committed by the intelligence services are reported by the press.[139] As for Romania, internal and external mechanisms, such as the Council for the Study of Securitate Archives and the European Court of Human Rights, ensure the protection of citizens against abuses.[140]

In sum, executive control centers primarily on efficiency issues that allow intelligence services to perform more productively. Judicial oversight focuses on issues of

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136 Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 12.

137 Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) [About National Intelligence Centre in Spain (CNI).] Accessed August 10, 2018. https://www.cni.es/en/welcometocni/.

138 The council of ministers also refused to declassify information pertaining to the wiretappings. Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, "Halfway Down The Road To Supervision Of The Spanish Intelligence Services," *Intelligence and National Security* (21, no. 3, 2006): 440-456.

139 Antonio M. Díaz Fernández, personal communication, June 2010.

140 Matei, "Romania's Intelligence Community," 641.

ownership and legality. Legislators monitor both branches by combining the effectiveness and relevance of intelligence activities. This practice is now underway in many new democracies, which focuses on the legislative oversight functions. Largely, notwithstanding some challenges, the legislative oversight mechanism, which is a subset of democratic control, seems to be an adequate tool for new democracies. As proof, the Romanian parliament effectively exercises legislative control by keeping the intelligence agencies in a regulatory framework corresponding to the standards of responsibility and efficiency. Some well-established democracies such as the United States have democratic institutions, namely Congress, to render their intelligence organizations more effective.

F. CONCLUSION

Staff inherited from a former undemocratic regime creates challenges and obstacles faced by policymakers in the face of intelligence resistance to reform. These personnel continue with practices that go against the professional code of ethics, such as the illegal surveillance of political leaders, corruption, cronyism, drug trafficking, crime, etc. The lack of expertise in the implementation of reform added to political quarrels, which has impeded effective democratic control of intelligence and reform. In this case, at the dawn of intelligence agencies' democratization in Romania and Spain, both countries have encountered great challenges using employees from undemocratic agencies under dictatorial regimes. Over time, as a result of the media and Western criticism, Romania and Spain countries have progressively reduced their staff either by retiring them or by dismissing them, thus averting a serious breach of intelligence services' democratic principles.

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IV. ANALYSIS, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The case studies of Romania and Spain show that it is possible to achieve intelligence accountability while maintaining operational effectiveness in a democracy. These countries seem to have gone through the same challenges and threats that Mali is currently facing. This chapter analyzes the challenges of democratic intelligence reform in Mali and compares them to other cases such as Romania and Spain, while adequately addressing the main research question. It also provides a model of democratic reform of intelligence for Mali, based on the lessons learned and best practices of the case studies of Romania and Spain.

A. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN MALI

In spite of the free and fair elections in 2013 and 2018—the latter election resulting in the generation of new policies and the establishment of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches—Mali is still facing a series of both external and internal threats. Mali is a transitioning democracy; free elections in 2013 and 2018 have not been sufficient to reestablish full Malian democracy. Weak institutions, as well as leadership corruption and lack of vision, are the most determinant factors contributing to the situation of unrest in the present day.[141] The ongoing instability in the country, in addition to criminal activities and terrorism, originated from the government failing to protect the country against both internal and external threats. Furthermore, the lack of minimum infrastructure in the northern part of the country, as well as the oppression and marginalization of Tuareg people, have caused a sovereignty issue, which remains a prerequisite to achieve any modern democracy.[142]

Today, the northern part of Mali has escaped the government's control, leaving room for a multitude of violations of human rights, including violations against women, girls, and children, related to the conflict, despite the various peace agreements signed

[141] Shemella and Tomb, *Security Forces in African States*, 106.

[142] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 17.

between the protagonists, namely the government and the armed groups. This turmoil constitutes a significant threat from the rebels' groups in coalition with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which for decades, has fought for the northern regions' autonomy. The overall uproar creates a lack of trust not only between the elected officials and the security forces but also between the security forces and the citizens.

Greg Hannah, Kevin A. O'Brien, and Andrew Rathmell claim that, "in the situation where conflict has not yet ended but parties wish to conduct initial negotiations towards a potential settlement, the secrecy involved in intelligence circles means that intelligence services can be used to make overtures to former enemies who are not yet trusted by the wider population."[143]

While reforming intelligence services remains a long-term process, the fact remains that political will is a prerequisite for achieving reform. Based on the two countries studied—Romania and Spain—it is clear that policymakers have played an important role in motivating the reform of intelligence services. While motivations may be multiple—external or internal—as mentioned by Bruneau and Matei, political will without the necessary expertise of policymakers could lead to ineffective reform of intelligence services.[144] First, the two case studies—Romania, and Spain—revealed both internal incentives (threats, crises, abuse of the old regime, etc.) and external ones (integration into regional institutions like EU or NATO) for the success of their reforms. Second, to avoid practices that could lead to the deconsolidation of democracy, Romania and Spain have systematically opted for intelligence services under democratic control while developing the transparency of intelligence structures during the reform. For Mali, neither internal nor external incentives prevailed to initiate a steady reform. The types of threats, as experienced by Romania and Spain, which have existed for a long time may be valid motivations to proceed with Mali's intelligence reform.

In Mali, despite the existence of a legal framework for the three major intelligence services, there is still no clear mandate for the entire intelligence community. For example,

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[143] Hannah, O'Brien, and Rathmell, *Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform*, 8.

[144] Matei and Bruneau, "Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies," 686.

the DGSE and the General Intelligence Directorate of the Police have redundant missions and roles such informing the government on political, economic, social, and cultural intelligence aspects. Unlike its Romanian and Spanish counterparts, Mali does not have a national doctrine on intelligence security with guidance and legal framework on the collection, dissemination, and analysis of domestic and international intelligence activities.

Unlike Romania and Spain, which from the beginning of their democratic transitions established new intelligence structures while maintaining boundaries between military, domestic, and foreign intelligence, Mali has not enacted a legal basis for its intelligence structures to reflect those that exist in democratic countries. Romania and Spain both have an intelligence coordinating body, which so far does not exist in Mali. In addition, Romania has independent and ministerial intelligence agencies, unlike Mali and Spain, which have only ministerial agencies. Furthermore, the current context of Mali requires the country to acquire military and civilian intelligence apparatus; independent and ministerial intelligence structures as well as a strategic intelligence fusion agency to properly contribute to national and international security.

Professionalization remains a major challenge for Mali's intelligence. The lack of professionalism is due to the absence of a career plan for all intelligence staff and training, education, and equipment for bureaucratic tasks and operational missions. As for Romania and Spain, these countries proceeded with their intelligence professionalization by offering education, professional training, and job opportunities in the field of intelligence (computer science, mathematics, political science, etc.). They also strengthened their intelligence effectiveness through academic institutions by the creation of university programs in intelligence. These academic institutions, whether internal or external, contributed not only to the education of intelligence officers (terrorism, crime, HUMINT, SIGINT, etc.) but also to the training of the public, parliamentary authorities, journalists, and independent analysts; more importantly, leading to establishing an intelligence culture.

Unlike Romania and Spain, which have worked to promote the mechanisms required to control and monitor the activities of their intelligence agencies, Mali has only created such mechanisms on paper.

In Mali, a permanent parliamentary intelligence oversight commission with clear responsibilities and power does not exist, notwithstanding the existence of a Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee in the National Assembly. This committee is literally limited to voting laws without having any control over intelligence services' budgets, activities, or organization.[145] In Romania, activities pertaining to both intelligence and independent agencies are controlled and overseen across the permanent and ad hoc legislative committees. Their prerogatives range from voting laws, approving budget expenditures, and appointing or dismissing intelligence services heads. But the Spanish case has similarities to that of Mali; although legislative control is mentioned in the law, it remains ineffective due to lack of interest and access to intelligence.

In the field of intelligence, the involvement of the judicial branch, which has a regulatory role is almost non-existent in Mali, yet both Romania and Spain are much different from Mali. In Mali, despite the inclusion of individual rights in the constitution, the DGSE derogates from this rule, in the name of raison d'état, to initiate intrusive surveillance without any authorization (warrants) from the judiciary.[146] In all fairness, whether in Romania or Spain, the judicial review, even mentioned in a legal framework, did not bring any convincing results. It appears that these shortcomings are due not only to the weakness of the laws in this specific area but also to the non-respect of the legislative rules governing the intelligence services.

The informal oversight of intelligence services by the media and civil society has proven to be an effective means of democratizing intelligence in both Romania and Spain, while Mali has followed closely.

In sum, the intelligence agencies in Mali remain ineffective and democratically uncontrolled with respect to current challenges, and in particular in terms of transparency toward citizens. There is a need for policymakers to undertake the necessary reforms to reverse this trend and act more practically on intelligence democratization. If this does not

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145 Shemella and Tomb, *Security Forces in African States*, 110.

146 Abdrahamane Dicko, "Sécurité d'Etat: le Directeur Général Relevé, " Maliactu, du 21 octobre 2013, https://maliactu.net/securite-detat-le-dg-releve/.

happen, the inadequacies noted in the current democratic reform of Malian intelligence will have had significant consequences in the consolidation of democracy.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS: A MODEL OF REFORM

To meet the requirements of national security, it is imperative that new democracies carry out the democratization of intelligence through a compromise between democratic civilian control and the effectiveness of intelligence, even if this does not seem to be a priority for policymakers in Mali. For Mali to effectively use its intelligence apparatus to change the course of its history forever, it must undeniably proceed to the reform of its intelligence structures. Romania and Spain have indeed begun the reform of their intelligence services from the beginning of their democracies to annihilate the threats that existed in their countries.

First, the roadmap for Mali's intelligence democratization should include a strategic plan—including a robust legal framework and solid policies and practices—for the effectiveness and control of Malian intelligence agencies, as well as institutions capable to implement this strategic plan. Specifically, this plan should include redefining the roles and missions of the intelligence services, functioning inter-agency coordination and cooperation (including a mechanism under the aegis of the very next structure of the National Security Council)[147], democratic control over the intelligence in terms of budget, transparency, IC activities, de-politicization of intelligence, and professionalization of intelligence, which should crown the reform process to ultimately create a culture of intelligence.

This reform requires the involvement of all stakeholders, namely the executive, legislature, and judicial branches; reform through parliament must be favored. Therefore, the mandate and roles of the intelligence services are defined in accordance with those branches as well as other informal bodies such as the media, NGOs, and civil society. The level of threats, risks, and financial resources are critical factors to consider in the

[147] Bamako is in the process of establishing a National Security Council as part of the Obama Administration's Security Sector Governance Initiative. Already, military and civil cadre are at the end of academic study at the Naval Postgraduate School. These cadre are destined to staff the future structure.

intelligence reform process. These key elements make it possible to determine not only the number of intelligence services to be established but also their size in terms of personnel, while preventing their mandates from overlapping, avoiding redundancy.

1. Legal Framework

The intelligence services in Mali have so far escaped democratic control, although they are part of the legal framework. The laws governing intelligence services in Mali have hardly ever changed since their development. These structures, which face historical challenges, operate in an outdated legal framework. For example, the DGSE responsible for both internal and external intelligence contributes significantly to its inefficiency. For this reason, the application of regulatory texts in accordance with democratic practices is more than necessary for the success of the reform. This is all the more relevant as intelligence services are generally criticized for their unorthodox practices in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. To this end, the reform would serve to develop new laws in line with existing threats, so as to frame the activities of the intelligence services in every detail.

2. Parliamentary Oversight

While Parliament remains the privileged arm for better control of intelligence services, the fact remains that in the context of Mali, there is a need to establish significant modifications so that it can successfully fulfill its control mission. Therefore, the legislature should start by creating permanent, temporary, and investigative committees, able to approve not only the strategies and doctrines of intelligence, but also the budgets and appointments of intelligence heads, while exercising parliamentary control over the activities of these structures. The lack of expertise of the control committee members in charge of security and intelligence requires that parliamentary subcommittees be created to address these shortcomings.

3. Executive Accountability

Although the intelligence services report directly to the various government structures—presidency, defense, security—to which they are subject; in Mali, the

responsibilities—guidance and direction—on both sides between the President (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed and Security Forces), the Prime Minister in charge of the application of the defense policy and the other bodies (High Council of Defense, and ministries in charge of the field of intelligence) are not clearly defined. The DGSE reports directly to the President, while it is the Prime Minister who is responsible to the National Assembly for government action. Neither a national security policy nor a doctrine defining intelligence roles exists to this day.

In this regard, the very first recommendations focus on two aspects: the creation of a national intelligence coordination structure and/or the establishment of a government-level intelligence committee. These structures will be responsible not only for coordinating all activities pertaining to the field of intelligence with the appropriate departments but also for supervising and disseminating the correct information.

The new intelligence coordination structure could be established under the auspices of the newly created National Security Council, serving as an analytical structure designed to strengthen intelligence, merge intelligence gathered from different intelligence structures both internally and externally, and oversee the principles of governance and intelligence dissemination. This new structure, acting in accordance with the national intelligence doctrine, will have the mission of professionalizing the intelligence community while promoting interagency cooperation and coordination.

4. Judicial Supervision

The unorthodox practices of the intelligence services in Mali, in regard to respecting individual rights and freedoms, require that succinct provisions be included in the field of law. For example, the creation of inspector general positions within the intelligence services will limit the harm and especially reduce these structures to act within a legal framework.

5. Media and Civil Society

Malian media continues to play a prominent role in the informal control of intelligence agencies. Since the advent of democracy, the media has never stopped

criticizing the excesses of the intelligence services. It should be pointed out that the secret police practices of these services prompted the civil society, at the 1991 national conference, to ask that the DGSE be purely and simply dissolved.[148] Unfortunately, although the media and civil society play their roles in controlling intelligence, they are still struggling to achieve the desired results. Moreover, the desired end state is to get the intelligence services to act in accordance with individual rights and freedoms. Thus, public transparency remains a key element in the reform process as it contributes to improving the image of intelligence services.

6. Mali's Intelligence Services Structure

Today the organization/structure of the three intelligence services of Mali—DGSE, DSM, and DGRG—is not properly configured to cope with the security environment effectively. It is important that the laws governing intelligence agencies in Mali be thoroughly reviewed so that these structures can properly perform their roles and missions. Given the many reforms underway since the 2012 crisis, intelligence reform must take into account future changes in terms of national security, in particular the creation of the future National Security Council, to avoid any redundancy, and lessons learned from errors committed in the past, especially those that could be a blow to the success of the reform. The major effect of the reform is the creation or reorganization of the structures in charge of intelligence in order to face security issues at national and international levels. It is imperative that the reform take into account a better organization of the intelligence structures according to the threats, and the country's National Strategy. To avoid falling into the trap of some democratic countries—those with too many intelligence agencies—Mali should reorganize its intelligence structures with the creation of the following agencies:

- A National Directorate of Intelligence Coordination
- A General Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (Foreign)
- A General Directorate of Internal Security (Domestic)

[148] Dicko.

- A Directorate of Military Security (Military)

Intelligence units at the Ministry of Finance or Foreign Affairs can be created to address the critical need in these specific areas.

The creation of a central coordination structure would not only facilitate cooperation between intelligence institutions but also avoid redundancies and rivalries in terms of roles, missions, and budget allocation, allowing for adequate responses to the country's internal and external threats. The establishment of these new structures should take into account a legal framework covering all the shortcomings regarding legislation so that the intelligence services have roles and missions reflecting those that function in a democracy.

While the National Directorate of Intelligence Coordination would serve as a center for coordination, collection, and intelligence analysis, the General Directorate of Foreign Intelligence would function as an alert by obtaining and evaluating intelligence related to external security. The General Directorate of Internal Security would be responsible for obtaining and evaluating all information pertaining to internal security while protecting the country against all threats related to espionage, terrorism, crime, and it also law enforcement roles. Finally, the Directorate of Military Security would aim to detect any military intelligence related to the capabilities of opposing and foreign armies. Other challenges that Mali could face is the reform itself so it ensures the effectiveness of intelligence services without compromising its re-democratization. While intelligence agencies demand frequent reforms based on national security priorities, the most pressing issues that need to be addressed include maintaining the balance between transparency and secrecy, the creation of control and supervision structures to maximize the IC overall effectiveness, budget control of intelligence services and use of intelligence-gathering methods, and the ethics or probity of intelligence personnel and their professionalism.[149]

[149] Hannah, O'Brien, and Rathmell, *Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform*, 9.

7. Professionalism of Intelligence Services

The professionalization of the intelligence services during the reform process inevitably requires the attention of decision-makers to the training and recruitment of intelligence executives. Malian intelligence reform should have no other purpose than to contribute not only to the consolidation of democracy but also to the creation of a new intelligence community that contributes effectively to national and international security. This reform should also focus on creating an intelligence corps with legitimate leadership that meets the democratic criteria of selection. From there, it would be possible to establish a personnel management system based on well-defined criteria, allowing the intelligence services to fully fulfill their contract. Such efforts will ultimately lead to an intelligence culture.[150]

To sum up, though Mali was once considered one of the best countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it must reverse the cyclical course of its history of deconsolidating its democracy by studying the experiences of new democracies, such as Romania or Spain, to consolidate democracy. If reforming the intelligence services appears to be a difficult and long-term process, its success allows for guaranteed national stability and potential international security. By remaining in a democratic and international context that meets the standard of use of the intelligence services, the reform of the intelligence services of Mali will contribute considerably to counter the real threats of separatism, terrorism, organized crime, and corruption. Consequently, these recommendations must be implemented to achieve the expected results.

[150] Matei, de Castro, and Halladay, "On Balance," 28.

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