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<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> Australia's national security depends on the strength of the alliance with the United States both for prosperity and security. This alliance has underpinned Australia's security and prosperity in the rules-based order that was established in 1945 and later solidified in 1972 when Nixon visited China. However, there are indications that Australia may have over emphasized the importance of the Alliance while U.S. leadership and predominance has eroded in the Indo-Pacific. Australia's over-reliance on the U.S. is placing Australia's security at risk and Australia must seek a more independent security strategy and a broader alliance network. Australia must adapt to the changing rules in the new regional order, with China as the future predominant power. While the importance of the Australia-U.S. alliance should not be understated, it may be dangerous to over state it. This paper will compare the Australian and United States' security strategies and determine any strategic misalignment before offering a new path for the Australia - U.S. alliance in the Indo-Pacific.						
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Dependence on American Security,  
Australia's Strategic Miscalculation

David P. Landon

Following the end of World War II Australia moved away from the waning protection of Imperial Britain and under the security umbrella of the United States..<sup>1</sup> The ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and United States) alliance in 1951 formalized this relationship. Later, in 1972 when President Nixon traveled to China and convinced Chairman Mao Zedong that the United States would side with China over any conflict with the USSR, China accepted American hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region. Since then Australia's security and prosperity has largely depended on American hegemony and leadership, and the rules-based order this has provided. But in the Twenty-First Century, as China's leadership and influence in the Indo-Pacific grows, there are many indications that the rules-based order and American leadership are in relative decline. Australia's over-reliance on American security is placing Australian security at risk, and Australia must seek a more independent security strategy in a new regional order where United States' leadership, influence, and commitment are questionable. Australia must adapt to the changing rules in the new regional order, with China as the future predominant power.

There are several key reasons this over reliance is placing Australia's security at risk; First, U.S. vital interests do not fully align with Australia's in the Indo-Pacific;<sup>2</sup> Second, U.S. influence and leadership in the region is in gradual and relative decline; Third, the U.S. is no longer prepared to underwrite the security of allied partners in the region in the current geopolitical and economic environment; Fourth, China is no longer under the influence of the international order established by the United States; and Finally, cognizant of the risk of escalation the United States lacks the will to enforce China to comply with the established rules-based order. This should be concerning for Australian security predicated on American

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<sup>1</sup> The author uses United States, America and US interchangeably throughout.

<sup>2</sup> The Indo-Pacific refers to the area bounded by mainland United States and Central America to the east and India to the West. It includes the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the South and East China Seas and waters surrounding Australia.

predominance and begs the question, is Australia's security strategy misaligned with American strategy in the Indo-Pacific? This paper will provide an answer to this question by comparing Australia's and the United States' security strategies and examining United States' leadership in the Indo-Pacific. Finally, the paper will propose an alternative for Australia's security strategy into the future.

### Australia's Security Strategy - The Fear of Abandonment

Professor Allan Gyngell of the Australian National University opines that a fear of abandonment has focused Australia's foreign policy since the earliest days of the British colony, and that to overcome this fear Australia sought security assurance from larger powers.<sup>3</sup> Following Australia's Federation in 1901 security was guaranteed by Great Britain, then the most powerful nation in the world and the governor of Australia's foreign policy. But in 1931 following economic decline and flagging power Britain passed the Statute of Westminster into law. This enabled former colonies, such as Australia to formulate independent foreign policy for the first time.<sup>4</sup> In 1942, and in the face of advancing Japan on the Malay Peninsular, the Australian Parliament determined an independent foreign policy was warranted.<sup>5</sup> Thus Australia looked to America.

Australia's security and prosperity has depended on a rules-based order established under the leadership of the United States ever since 1945 and allied victory in World War II.<sup>6</sup> Later, Australia's commitment to the Korean War was in part to demonstrate to the US, Australia's credibility as an ally and to encourage the subsequent signing of the ANZUS alliance

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<sup>3</sup> Gyngell, Allan *Fear of Abandonment, Australia in the World Since 1942*, (La Trobe University Press, Carlton, 2017): 5-8

<sup>4</sup> *Statute of Westminster 1931*, [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga\\_19310004\\_en.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1931/4/pdfs/ukpga_19310004_en.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> Richard Fidler, "Australia's fear of abandonment: Allan Gyngell on foreign policy," *Conversations*, ABC Radio podcast audio, April 20, 2017. <http://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/conversations/conversations-allan-gyngell/8450604>

<sup>6</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper* (Canberra, ACT, 2016), 14.

in 1951.<sup>7</sup> Australia has since paid for the security and deterrence provided by the alliance with national blood and treasure, fighting alongside the United States in every major conflict since World War II. In return, Australia has never been directly threatened by an adversary and has prospered under the relative stability and the associated economic advantages provided by the alliance.

Australia's national security strategy can be described as resting on the fact that the United States will act to defend Australia's vital strategic interests. This is demonstrated in Australia's most recent security strategy, outlined in the Australian Defence White Paper and Foreign Policy White Paper published in 2016 and 2017 respectively. They both place an unambiguous emphasis on the fact that Australia's security rests on the strength of the alliance with the US. The Defence White Paper states, "The Government's highest priority will continue to be our alliance with the United States" and "Australia's security is underpinned by the ANZUS Treaty...".<sup>8</sup> The Foreign Affairs White Paper describes the reliance on the United States in terms of sustaining a rules-based order and that Australia's security rests on the fact that, "[T]he Australian Government judges that the United States' long-term interests will anchor its economic and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific."<sup>9</sup> Highlighting this further both Papers list the sustained alliance with the United States as second in priority to the protection of the homeland. This reliance is predicated on the fact that the United States will act to defend Australia's vital strategic interests.

The Defence White Paper and Foreign Policy White Paper define Australia's vital strategic interests as; security of the homeland, the sustained alliance with the United States, the

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<sup>7</sup>Nicole Brangwin, Nathan Church, Steve Dyer, and David Watt, "Defending Australia: a history of Australia's Defence White Papers," *Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section Parliamentary Library Research Paper Series*, (August 2015), <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au>.

<sup>8</sup> Australian Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper*: 121

<sup>9</sup> Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, *2017 Foreign Policy White Paper* (Canberra, ACT, 2017): 26

maintenance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific, and stability in the Indo-Pacific..<sup>10</sup> The Australian security strategy has “bet the house” that Australia’s vital strategic interests align with the vital interests of the United States sufficiently for the US to defend Australia from a would-be aggressor. Australia’s strategic assumption is flawed. The 2017 US National Security Strategy (NSS) and President Trump’s rhetoric echoing Nixon Doctrine make this apparent.

The Nixon Doctrine encouraged a focus on self-reliance. It emphasized a need for individual nations in the Indo-Pacific to do more for themselves, essentially to lift their own weight in treaty obligations and not rely solely on U.S. support..<sup>11</sup> President Trump’s rhetoric regarding alliances echoes this sentiment..<sup>12</sup> The current Australian security strategy does not recognize this fact and clearly states the foundation of Australia’s national security is the alliance with the United States..<sup>13</sup> Additionally, Australia’s security strategy does not recognize the reduced emphasis that the United States places on leadership in the 2017 NSS. This means Australia needs to emphasize greater independence in its security strategy and less emphasis on the ANZUS alliance. The ANZUS alliance has been a common theme in each White Paper since the first in 1976. However, the notable difference between the 1976 and the 2016 White Paper is the reduced emphasis on self-reliance that was the predominant theme of the 1976 White Paper..<sup>14</sup> A greater emphasis on independence would be prudent in case of misaligned vital strategic interests between Australia and the U.S.

### The United States Security Strategy – America First

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<sup>10</sup> Australian Defence White Paper: 17 and Foreign Policy White Paper: 3

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, *Foreign Relations Of The United States, 1969–1976, Volume I, Foundations Of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972*, <https://history.state.gov>.

<sup>12</sup> U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “May25: President Trump’s Remarks at 9/11 and Article 5 Memorial Unveiling,” <https://nato.usmission.gov/may-25-2017-president-trumps-remarks-911-article-5-memorial-unveiling>.

<sup>13</sup> Australian Defence White Paper (2016): 121

<sup>14</sup> Brangwin, et al, “Defending Australia,” (2015): 11

The 2017 National Security Strategy outlines four vital interests “protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life, ... promote American prosperity, ...preserve peace through strength,...[and] advance American influence.”<sup>15</sup> These in one form or another are enduring vital interests and the Indo-Pacific region has been central to this. Since the Nineteenth Century the need for a strong economy has focused U.S. security strategy in the Indo-Pacific region..<sup>16</sup> The “Open Door” concept of economic engagement with the Indo-Pacific was adopted to ensure economic independence and prosperity for the United States;

“...Open Door was more than an economic theory. It was the Pacific component of an American grand strategy of balance of power—a commitment to resist efforts by any European or Asian nation to achieve regional hegemony as a step toward global dominance.”<sup>17</sup>

Thus, the Indo-Pacific region has been a significant factor in the US’ national security strategy and underpinned the growth of Australia as an independent country. Therefore stability in and the economic vitality of the Indo-Pacific is a strategic interest for the U.S. This is demonstrative of a broad alignment with Australia’s vital interest in respect of the Indo-Pacific.

To determine any misalignment between security strategies the U.S. National Security Strategy must be compared with Australia’s. A diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) approach provides a means of comparison. Diplomatically, both America and Australia share similar values and a like-minded approach to security. The NSS makes this point with the acknowledgement that American influence through investment and cooperation with extant and emerging multi-lateral regional institutions (otherwise known as the hub and spoke alliance system) will persevere as an alternative to China’s influence and investment..<sup>18</sup> Importantly for Australia’s security, Australia is a central enabler of this system of regional and multi-lateral

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<sup>15</sup> United States, and Donald Trump, 2017. National Security Strategy of the United States: the White House: 4

<sup>16</sup> Douglas T. Stuart. “The Pivot To Asia: Can It Serve As The Foundation For American Grand Strategy In The 21st Century?” *Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press*, August (2016): 5-6, <http://navwc.sirsi.net/>

<sup>17</sup> Ibid:4

<sup>18</sup> United States, and Donald Trump. “National Security Strategy” (2017): 13, 17, 23

engagement for the U.S..<sup>19</sup> Therefore, Australia and the hub-and-spoke system of alliances will remain fundamental to the interests of the United States in the Indo-Pacific. Australia's security interests align with the United States' in a diplomatic sense.

Messaging in the U.S. strategy is more difficult to reconcile. The NSS, the Administration and the President have pinned economic prosperity to national security. The implementation of a foreign policy pinned to economics has the potential to be confounded domestically. The merging of domestic economic issues with foreign policy enables Congress to take a more active role in foreign policy, which as previous Presidents have discovered, can significantly weaken a traditional area of strength for a U.S. President..<sup>20</sup> President Trump faces this risk in implementing the "America First" strategy, which may resonate with his domestic audience but poses concerns for an international audience including Australia.

The symbolism and reassurance provided by Secretary of Defense Mattis and Secretary of State Tillerson during a visit to Australia, where the two secretaries addressed Australian concerns regarding American isolationism is symptomatic of the NSS messaging issues. In the visit both Tillerson and Mattis reaffirmed "the relationship [between the US and Australia] will remain strong."<sup>21</sup> President Trump's statement at the 5<sup>th</sup> U.S.-ASEAN Summit in the Philippines; however, emphasized the importance of strong partners, where he described a free and open Indo-Pacific as comprised of "partners in the region [that are] strong, independent, and prosperous, in control of their own destinies, and satellites to no one."<sup>22</sup> This statement is similar to the messaging of the Nixon Doctrine. In this sense the strategic information component of national power in the NSS is not wholly aligned with Australia's. Australia does

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<sup>19</sup> Stuart, "The Pivot To Asia,"(2016): 29-30

<sup>20</sup> Ibid: 6

<sup>21</sup> Dan Lamothe, "In Australia, Mattis and Tillerson address growing concerns about American isolationism," *The Washington Post*, June 5, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/>

<sup>22</sup> Donald Trump, "Remarks by President Trump at 5th U.S.-ASEAN Summit," Accessed: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-5th-u-s-asean-summit/>, 13 Nov 17

not emphasize a strong independence; rather the emphasis for Australia is on a strong alliance with the United States.

The military element of U.S. national power is relatively easy to identify. The American military remains the largest in the world by some margin. In fact U.S. military expenditure in terms of expenditure combined is greater than the expenditure of the next seven countries combined.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, Australia's national security strategy looks out to 2035 and based on current trends, by 2035 China will surpass American military expenditure in real terms.<sup>24</sup> The preeminent strength of U.S. national power remains a strong military. However, there are some such as Professor Hugh White from the Australian National University that argue, the comparative advantage of the U.S.' overwhelming military power within the East and South China Sea (China's backyard) has significantly diminished. He further argues that this power may have diminished to the point that China's anti-access and area denial strategy is a significant threat.<sup>25</sup> This is a concern for the Australian security strategy, particularly with Australia's reliance on American military dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

The Australian security strategy emphasizes the economic strength of the U.S. as essential to Australia's security. The U.S. also emphasize a strong economy as essential to national security. In this sense both strategies align. However, the emphasis on U.S. economic strength in the Indo-Pacific for Australian security is misplaced. Economically U.S. strength has declined in the Indo-Pacific region compared with China's growing economy and regional influence. By most measures China's investment in the region has significantly surpassed American investment. As Professor David Shambaugh highlights China is investing \$156 billion

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<sup>23</sup> Peter G Petersen Foundation, "US Spends more on defense than the next seven countries combined," (2017), <https://www.pgpf.org>.

<sup>24</sup> Stuart, "The Pivot To Asia" (2016): 14

<sup>25</sup> Hugh White, "Without America Australia in the New Asia," *Quarterly Essay*, November (2017), <https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/>.

US dollars in the region, which represents an amount of money far greater than any comparative investment, made by the USSR or America during the height of the Cold War.<sup>26</sup> This demonstrates the economic strength and influence China sustains in the region compared to a globally focused United States. Economically, American influence has been subverted by China in the Indo-Pacific. Australia's security strategy does not recognize this, in fact it states, "the strategic and economic weight of the United States will be essential to the continued stability of the rules-based global order on which Australia relies for our security and prosperity."<sup>27</sup> This misjudgment is alarming for Australia.

### The Erosion of Leadership

Australia's Defence and Foreign Policy White Papers published in 2016 and 2017 respectively describe Australia's security and prosperity as being underpinned by sustained U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific. The recently published NSS should allay any concerns for Australia regarding this leadership. On the surface the NSS differs little from previous NSS. However, on examination the omission of the word "leadership" should be stark for Australia's strategists. The previous NSS, published in 2015 mentions "leadership" more than 30 times in 29 pages. This compares with the 2017 NSS that, despite being almost twice as long, mentions leadership 11 times in 55 pages. This lack of emphasis on leadership should cause a re-think of Australia's national security policy, particularly if "America First" means that America's vital interests in the Indo-Pacific no longer align with Australia's. Australia has an over reliance on the United States to deter adversaries and guarantee security. This over reliance is placing Australia's security at risk.

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Australian Defence White Paper (2016): 41

The Indo-Pacific now regards US leadership in the region as contested. Diplomatically, militarily, economically and in the information campaign the influence of the United States in the Indo-Pacific has eroded. Diplomatically the United States are at a disadvantage. China sustains an unrivaled presence through their geographic proximity. To their credit the Trump administration's visits to the region at the beginning of the President's term emphasized a shift in diplomatic effort to the region. However, the failure of President Trump to appoint a number of ambassadors in the Indo-Pacific region highlights the fact that the U.S. is only visiting and reduces diplomatic influence.<sup>28</sup> China has geographic proximity and their influence through state funding is far greater than anything the U.S. is investing. The withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnership trade agreement also damaged American diplomatic standing and in a nod to the diplomatic power of the region, it was widely reported that China was touted as a possible replacement at one stage.<sup>29</sup> The 2017 NSS acknowledges this loss of diplomatic primacy by emphasizing the need for US leadership in extant multilateral regional organizations rather than direct regional leadership. This is further emphasized in nested security documents such as the unclassified National Military Strategy. Diplomatically, in the Indo-Pacific America's influence is eroding.

Militarily U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific has eroded. Following the Obama 'pivot' the U.S. provided 2,500 marines on a rotational basis in Australia; is planning four littoral combat ships in Singapore; and committed to increased training and exercises in the region.<sup>30</sup> However, regionally this military commitment is second to the size and asymmetric capability of China's military. While it is not questioned that the U.S. military is by far the larger and more capable, U.S. global military commitments spread this capability. Contrary to this China have

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<sup>28</sup> American Foreign Service Association, *Appointments – Donald Trump*, <http://www.afsa.org>

<sup>29</sup> Joe Kelly. "Malcolm Turnbull opens door to China to join TPP after Donald Trump pulls out," *The Australian*, January 24, 2017, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/>.

<sup>30</sup> White. "Without America", <https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/essay/2017/11/without-america>

realized that they do not necessarily have to have military dominance, they just have to ensure that the U.S. do not, demonstrated through the anti-access area denial strategy. The anti access area denial strategy provides sufficient deterrent so that any strategic miscalculation in the Indo-Pacific to China's dissatisfaction may be very costly for any nation. Militarily within the region America retains primacy; however, this primacy has eroded in the past decade.

Economically in the Indo-Pacific, China has primacy. In her testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senior Vice President Asia U.S. Chamber of Commerce cites three reasons for America's declining economic primacy; the rapid and unexpected growth of China, the paucity of free trade agreements with Asian countries, and the protection of current trade arrangements held by other countries in Asia.<sup>31</sup> Above all else, China is the largest trading partner for all Indo-Pacific countries, including Australia.<sup>32</sup> Economically the U.S. is no longer leading nor influencing the Indo-Pacific the way it has.

### The New Order and Economic Security

China's continued presence at Scarborough Shoal and militarization of man-made islands in the contested Spratly Islands is indicative of the erosion of U.S. primacy in the Indo-Pacific. China recognizes this and is able to push the bounds of and even change the established rules-based order. It is clear that any conflict between the U.S. and China would come at significant cost to both nations and the global balance of power.<sup>33</sup> It is therefore not in America's interests to confront China militarily, and despite a more opaque security strategy it is not in China's short-term interests either. The 2017 NSS recognizes the need to work with China and cooperate

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<sup>31</sup> Tasi Overby. "American Leadership in the Asia Pacific Part 2: Economic Issues," *Statement of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy* (Washington, DC, May 24, 2017): 2-5

<sup>32</sup> Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "China Fact Sheet," (December, 2017). <http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/Documents/chin.pdf>

<sup>33</sup> David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Cristina L. Garafola, "War With China, Thinking Through the Unthinkable," RAND Corporation (2016): 33-60.

where possible to ensure the American economy is not put at risk. This reflects the shift from an ideological strategy to an economic focused NSS. This shift from ideological to an economically based security outlook may place Australian security interests at risk. The erosion of U.S. primacy in the Indo-Pacific means that some of the levers of national power available to China may be greater than those of the U.S. If the U.S. is less than willing to confront China militarily this leaves Australia's security in a precarious position. This is particularly the case if China subverts and reorganizes the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific to their advantage.

### A New Path for Australia

A China that is able to influence the region to contest the combined weight of the Australian and U.S. alliance is a dangerous prospect for Australia's security. That is why, more than any other time it is imperative for Australia to place greater emphasis on a more self-sufficient security strategy, as per the 1976 Defence White Paper. Concurrently Australia must also broaden its alliance partners from one to a number of strong and reliable partners. Australia must follow America's lead in this sense and develop a comprehensive and binding hub and spoke network of alliances to counter China. As a central enabler of the U.S. hub and spoke system Australia is positioned to leverage the benefits of this. This system of alliances needs to be a key part of Australia's national security. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quads) that emerged from the cooperation between the US, Australia, India and Japan following the devastating 2004 tsunami should be key to this system.<sup>34</sup> The resumption of the Quads Dialogue on the sidelines of the 2017 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting demonstrates a realization by member countries that a greater alliance system is needed.<sup>35</sup> This dialogue is a

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<sup>34</sup> Ashok Sharma. "The Quadrilateral Initiative: An Evaluation," *South Asian Survey*, 17:2, September 1, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1177/097152311201700204>

<sup>35</sup> Greg Sheridan. "Regional Security: Quad Dialogue is our passage to India," *The Australian*, January 25, 2018 [www.theaustralian.com.au](http://www.theaustralian.com.au).

first step toward a shift from bilateral security alliances toward a more interdependent regional framework to counter China's regional influence and should be forefront of a new Australian security strategy.

The new pathway should seek to leverage the asymmetric advantage that the Quads have the potential to provide. The combined economic and military capabilities of the Quad nations offer a direct offset to China's growing economic and military capability. A short, mid and long-term potential future for the Quads is proposed. Five years from now the Quads will have matured. Annual training exercises will have identified interoperability challenges between respective militaries; trade opportunities will have been identified, and a general agreement reached to sustain the rules based order that has underpinned Indo-Pacific prosperity and peace for the last 70 years. In ten years the Quads may have expanded to include like-minded and capable nations such as Singapore, New Zealand, and Malaysia. In twenty years the inclusion of Indonesia should be considered. Each of these nations represent a part of the Indo-Pacific that relies on the established rules based order to prosper economically and peacefully. The Quads of 2038 offers that opportunity. Australia, as central to the U.S. hub-and-spoke system of alliances and partnerships, needs to focus the next national security strategy in this direction. The next Australian national security strategy should focus on a range of regional allies and partners rather than over-emphasize one. However, some may argue that China is not a revisionist power and does not represent an existential threat to the international order.

#### The Peaceful and Temporary Rise of China?

China faces many domestic pressures in its ambitious rise to become a regional super power and as a result its rise may be both peaceful and temporary. For example, almost 15

percent of the world's population that live in poverty live in China, this is only second to India.<sup>36</sup> This means the increasing prosperity that China is enjoying is not necessarily being spread evenly among its 1.3 billion population. There are other sources of instability for China to manage; including border tensions with India, South China Sea disputes, ethnic unrest in the north-western province of Xinjiang, and issues associated with the One China Policy namely Tibet, Taiwan and Hong Kong. For the moment President Xi Jinping has contained these issues. However, with such a large population to appease or control, China may have more interest in maintaining internal stability than regional and or global growth.<sup>37</sup> However, China continues to challenge the current rules based order where it does not suit their interests. China's reaction to the Permanent Court of Arbitration Ruling on the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal in 2016 is an example. While there are some domestic issues affecting China there are no present indications to suggest the rise of China is temporary.

Australia's security strategy is predicated on a strong America willing and able to protect and deter threats to and attacks on Australian vital interests. The Australian Defence White Paper and Foreign Affairs White Paper make this clear through the prioritization of the US alliance as second to security of the homeland as a vital interest. Australia's strategic miscalculation lies in the assumption of sustained U.S. regional predominance and U.S. willingness to intervene. U.S. predominance has eroded in all respects in the Indo-Pacific. Australia cannot depend on the U.S. to defend Australia's vital interest where they do not align. Therefore, Australia must develop an alternative security strategy to hedge the rise of a revisionist China and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue offers the best alternative. Australia must confront the fact that the rules based order that has overseen Australia's security and

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<sup>36</sup> The Economist, "China's Future, What China Wants." 2018, accessed January 5, 2018, <http://www.economist.com/news/essays/>.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

prosperity since 1945 may be challenged. To counter this Australia should follow America's lead by expanding from bilateral to multi-lateral security alliances while pursuing a more independent security strategy. While the importance of the alliance with the United States cannot be understated it is dangerous to overstate it. Australia must adapt to the changing rules in the new regional order, with China as the future predominant power.

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