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# **Understanding Civil Affairs Operations: A Qualitative Exploration of Self-Reported Civil Affairs Operational Experiences**

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# **Understanding Civil Affairs Operations: A Qualitative Exploration of Self-Reported Civil Affairs Operational Experiences**

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## 1. Introduction

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The US Army and its supporting research community have struggled since the advent of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan with the ever-present and critical need to understand the civilian populace in the Army's area of operations. Past and current Army leadership have repeatedly stated the need for a robust and competent capability to enhance the relationship between civil and military authorities, coordinate with unified action partners and indigenous populations, and apply specialized skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations, also called Civil Affairs Operations (CAOs) (JCS 2008; JCS 2015).


CAOs provide this Army capability through Civil Information Management/Civil Information Integration (CIM/CII) processes. CAOs and associated CIM/CII play a crucial role within the information warfighting functions to generate critical civil information, yet it is not universally understood outside of the CAO/CII domains (Scribner et al. 2017). Despite almost two decades of war, the Army still lacks a clearly defined mission for Civil Affairs and "(it) remains widely misconstrued as a 'force multiplier' in the pursuit of 'winning hearts and minds' and other public relations gimmickry rather than as a strategic enabler" (Holshek 2016).

In response to this misunderstood Army capability, the US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Complex Ground Systems and Operations (CGSO) research team has conducted a multiyear study on CAOs to better understand it as an enterprise and demonstrate CAO as a "strategic enabler" and the critical role it plays in preventing conflict and win wars.

The research team interviewed over 60 volunteers drawn from the Civil Affairs community, including active-duty Special Operations Forces (SOF) Civil Affairs, active-duty Forces Command (FORSCOM) Civil Affairs, reserve US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command Civil Affairs, and retired Civil Affairs Soldiers and officers. This research effort was executed under a partnership agreement between the current commandant of the John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS) and the CGSO Branch to address several research challenges: 1) investigate individual proficiencies, methods, and tools that Civil Affairs uses to create actionable knowledge through the CIM or CII process for the sociocultural layer of the common operational picture; 2) outline the general capabilities of Civil Affairs using vignettes for broader audience dissemination within the Army, joint services, and other organizations; and 3) understand Civil Affairs and CAOs through the content revealed via interviews from both past and present Civil Affairs Soldiers and officers in their own words. This report focuses



on selected Civil Affairs community of practice vignettes that address research challenges 2 and 3. It is a first step in an overarching reporting process (Fig. 1) that ultimately aims to address numerous aspects of CAO en route to developing and reporting recommended strategies for enhancing the effectiveness of the Civil Affairs Branch, as depicted in Fig. 1.



**Fig. 1 Concept for report topics encompassed by this research effort**

Our goal in this report is to provide summaries, or vignettes, of real operational experiences, as recounted by interview subjects, from various Civil Affairs missions around the globe at the tactical and operational levels, and to use an analytical framework to identify prevailing themes among these experiences. Understanding such themes goes a long way toward understanding the complexities and value of CAOs. Civil Affairs personnel employ a wide variety of interpersonal and socioeconomic strategies to achieve desired effects in support of US objectives. In the best of cases, CAOs can result in better relations with the local populace, more-effective civil response through all phases of operations, and prevention of loss of life, which would be unachievable through traditional use of military force alone. We present the vignettes in this paper to demonstrate how CAOs are a strategic enabler with real world examples.

We have chosen five specific vignettes as strong and complementary examples of the “art and science” of CAOs. CAOs employing skills and deep knowledge of the populace demonstrate the human-centric approach to understanding the complexities of civil information and the Army’s critical need to integrate the skills and science of CAOs into all phases of planning and decision making.

## 2. Background

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Civil information, when well employed within the operational battlespace, produces highly impactful results. Absent such deft use, negative outcomes such as loss of local population support (Scribner et al. 2017), misappropriation of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds (St Benoit and Graffeo 2014b), and increased loss of Warfighter and civilian lives (St Benoit and Graffeo 2014a, 2014b; St Benoit et al. 2016) as casualties or as victims of fratricide, murder, and attempted murder (Bordin 2011) can result.

Before we begin it is important to discuss the terminology used in this report and bring the parlance of our research up to date with current changes within the US Army. Civil Affairs as a branch is referred to as a CAO capability, while the processing of the information generated is addressed as a CIM/CII capability. Current academic and military publications use an array of terms to refer to the consideration of people inhabiting the area of operations. Terms such as human geography, human dimension, human domain, sociocultural, and human terrain, have all been used interchangeably at some point to describe the information that CAO generates, processes, and disseminates. The authors use the term Civil Information for clarity, while acknowledging the nuances among the other terms that are inconsequential within the scope of this report. Our intent is to highlight examples from various CAO missions that demonstrate tangible operational benefits.

The Civil Affairs Branch is doctrinally mandated to work with the local civilian populace and unified action partners to enhance Army operations and support the objectives of the US Embassy (HQDA [ADP 1.0] 2012; Müller 2016; CSIS 2018) depending on the phase of conflict. It is also concerned with the collection, analysis, and dissemination of Civil Information as outlined in *The Army Universal Task List: Army Tactical Task 5.15, Conduct Civil Affairs Operations* (HQDA 2015a). The details of CAOs, organization, and the process of CIM or CII are outlined in FM 3-57 (HQDA 2011). While these documents describe in great detail the process and protocols of how Civil Affairs conducts its missions, it does not give concrete examples as to how Warfighters trained in executing CAOs utilize this cultural knowledge to significantly impact the decision-making cycle (HDQA 2011; TRADOC 2014; JCS 2016).

CAO capabilities enable the Army to perform the following:

- Engage with local and indigenous populations; coordinate with national and local governments, host-nation civil operations, and intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations to obtain Civil Information to identify and

mitigate sources of instability of the civil component of the planning process (HQDA 2011).

- Work through direct oversight by the Department of State (DoS)—specifically an ambassador—to assess sources of instability prior to the presence of conventional military forces (also referenced as the “competition phase”) to maintain peace through stabilization (HQDA 2011; USPKSOI 2018).
- Enhance many of the warfighting functions (HQDA 2011, 2014; JCS 2015; HQDA 2015b) by allowing greater maneuverability and providing additional security apparatus within the forces.

Furthermore, awareness of the indigenous population’s beliefs, values, behaviors, patterns of life, language, and other important cultural aspects can reduce the immediate negative impacts of kinetic-based military activity and the associated second- and third-order effects (Connable 2009; Robinson et al. 2014). The following example vignette, “The Iraqi Village”, related to the CGSO team, describes an operational situation which illustrates the consequences of forgoing Civil Information and cultural understanding in the decision-making process:

During the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there was a remote village in Northern Iraq that was approached for an initial key leader engagement. This village was known for large-scale wheat production. The Sheik of the town was approached by a Civil Affairs Team, or CAT, who were the first Americans in that town during OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] actions. The CAT was asked by the Sheik to come back the next day so that the CAT could be received properly according to the Sheik’s wishes. The Sheik had great influence and was said to be a descendant of Muhammad. He had set up large tents with food and had his family leaders present as well as other tribal representatives to welcome the Civil Affairs Soldiers. In short, agreements were made to allow the U.S. presence in the village and there was very little trouble in that village; it was relatively peaceful. The Sheik had explained to both the CAT and maneuver commander that if you need to go into any home, please let me know and I’ll give you access, please respect our homes and families. This was done. The maneuver force that oversaw this area of operations performed in accordance with the Sheik’s wishes. Later, a new maneuver element of Stryker vehicles rotated into the area to replace the current maneuver element. The new maneuver commander ignored the Civil Affairs guidance on entering homes and approaching females in the village because of their wish to apprehend some individuals associated with organized crime. The new maneuver unit began kicking in doors and searching homes without asking permission or using females within the CATs to coordinate the contact with females in the homes. These actions destroyed the credibility of U.S. forces in the area and

trust was lost. The loss of trust of the Sheik and his villagers created a drastic change in the relationship between US forces and the village members for a considerable amount of time. The entire village became an insurgent hot bed and over the next two years; it was treated as an enemy target zone.

The generation of Civil Information is critical to decision makers, operations planners, and on-the-ground Warfighters (Whitehurst 2002; Picucci and Numrich 2010; Votel et al. 2016). However, it has been a general finding that there is no current standardized dissemination mechanism for the generated Civil Information (Scribner et al. 2017). Researchers within the CGSO team have found that Civil Information and what it provides military decision makers in the decision-making process is not universally understood outside of the CAO and CIM/CII communities (Scribner et al. 2017). To remedy this inconsistent awareness, the authors present and analyze a series of vignettes selected to illustrate the operational and decision-making value of integrating Civil Information.

A thorough discussion of Civil Affairs doctrine is not within the scope of this report; however, it is important to understand the doctrinally defined key capabilities and requirements Civil Affairs provides to foster a rich analytical discussion of the vignettes to follow. In short, our intent was to capture the CAO point of view and better understand the capabilities of CAO units as described from their own perspectives in a series of unclassified vignettes. The relevance of these vignettes and their unique content shed light on many of the unknown capabilities that the audience outside of CAO may not be aware of. These vignettes were chosen to portray the widest possible range of CAO missions and their application of CIM/CII and products in various countries around the world.

### **3. Methodology**

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**Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM).** The authors chose GTM to gain a deeper understanding of CAO and the application of Civil Information processes (Charmaz 2014). Foremost, outside of the Civil Affairs Branch, little is known about the practices, techniques, knowledge, and skill required to “do Civil Affairs”. To address this knowledge gap, GTM afforded the ARL research effort the following advantages:

- 1) Grounded Theory is primarily a qualitative and inductive-to-abductive research framework that allows the development of theory while data collection and analysis is occurring. Inductive reasoning is, by nature, an open-ended and exploratory process that moves from specific observations to broader generalizations and theories. Abductive reasoning is, in short, finding the simplest explanation from observation. This qualitative

approach facilitated the ease of participation for our Civil Affairs collaborators and was the foundation for building a meaningful research product for both ARL and the Civil Affairs Branch.


- 2) Grounded Theory also allowed the ARL team to quickly get “into the data” and learn what Civil Affairs does in in order to gain a rapid working understanding of Civil Affairs and issues facing the branch and Army. A rapid working understanding allowed the team to iteratively scan interviews for subject saturation of emergent themes and refine areas of inquiry for a deeper understanding of these emerging domains as the team’s knowledge of the subject area evolved.
- 3) The phased and iterative analysis and research findings kept Civil Affairs stakeholders, such as the leadership within the JFKSWCS, engaged and updated on evolving themes, which further promoted the collaborative partnership established between ARL and JFKSWCS.
- 4) GTM qualitative research has an advantage over strict quantitative research, particularly when used in an unconventional research environment, in that the research can adapt during data collection and prevents “survey fatigue”. Specifically, using qualitative and inductive GTM allowed the CGSO team to employ an adaptive and flexible means of collecting data without interfering with the units’ operational requirements, adapting to evolving changes in tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as emerging doctrinal changes currently occurring within the CAO community. Semi-structured interviews allowed for the collection of more-meaningful, thoroughly explained data that continued to enhance the authors’ understanding of the research space without overburdening the respondent.

It is important to acknowledge one shortcoming of GTM: the respondent-driven sampling employed is recognized as nonrandom and community biased. The authors countered this shortcoming through a diversity of respondents interviewed to counterbalance within this nonrandom selection.

The team began with open-ended and semi-structured interview instruments. After repeated interview sessions from multiple sites, continuous engagement, and analysis of the data, patterns emerged that assisted in formulating general conclusions or theories about the data.

Specifically, findings from interviews were coded and refined while building a thematic understanding of the sampling space through constant comparisons among respondent input (Charmaz 2014). The iterative nature of GTM allowed for hypotheses to develop and themes to emerge (Hutchison et al. 2010) (Fig. 2),

making patterns visible and understandable (Charmaz 2014) throughout the interview process.



**Fig. 2** Adapted Hutchison et al. (2010) iterative model of GTM

ARL's CGSO Branch assembled a four-person multidisciplinary team to maintain an open-minded and multiple perspective approach to determine how to interpret coding and theme building. The team identified areas of disparity among code meanings and varying understanding through group discussions.

**CAO in Doctrine and in Practice.** Effective use of the selected methodology first required the team to acquire an understanding of how CAO behaves according to US Army and joint publications. Through the interview process, the research team came to understand practical implementation of doctrine in the context of real operations.

**Interview Data Refinement.** By employing the iterative process outlined in the Hutchison Grounded Theory model (Hutchison et al 2010), the research team consensus was that sampling saturation had been reached at a level sufficient to proceed with fully coding and processing the individual interviews. From this thorough sampling the team also arrived at consensus, through the latter stages of the Hutchison model, that they had identified a subset of interviews containing compelling narratives that provide a broad overview of the CAO capability. The following section describes the details of the selection process, presents the selected vignettes, and provides an analysis of each.

## **4. Analysis**

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### **4.1 Vignette Selection**

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The selection of the vignettes included in this report, from among the larger population of vignettes collected during the interview/data collection process, was deliberate: they were chosen to present a cross section of CAOs spanning demographics of the interview subjects, the types of missions represented, and the external entities supported. By first determining the minimal sufficient number of vignettes to ensure full-spectrum coverage across these factors, then by completing initial review and coding of the entire interview dataset in accordance with GTM procedures, each research team member identified exemplary vignettes as candidates for further analysis. Upon reviewing these candidate vignettes and reaching consensus within the research team on the subset of the most-compelling vignettes that achieve the required breadth of coverage, five vignettes were selected for inclusion in this report.

Once in-depth individual analysis of the selected five vignettes had concluded, the emergent themes identified were cross-checked against the coding and memos generated during the initial review of the entire dataset to confirm their universal applicability within the coding and memo records generated to date.

#### **4.1.1 Demographics**

The Civil Affairs Branch is primarily composed of reserve conventional, active-duty SOF, and active-duty conventional personnel. Each of these three groups is represented in the vignettes presented. Additionally, to account for the inherent differences in vantage points, the selected vignettes span a variety of enlisted, noncommissioned officer, and commissioned officer ranks. A natural byproduct of varying the ranks of the storytellers is a diversity in the echelons and levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) represented.

#### **4.1.2 Mission Types**

The missions described in the selected vignettes are categorized based on the core tasks they reflect. The Civil Affairs core tasks, as defined in Army FM 3-57 (HQDA 2011), are

- 1) Populace and Resource Control,
- 2) Foreign Humanitarian Assistance,
- 3) Civil Information Management/Civil Information Integration,

- 4) Nation Assistance, and
- 5) Support to Civil Administration.

Every mission undertaken by CAOs fulfills one or more of these core tasks. These tasks are more akin to strategic objectives than operational- or tactical-level tasks, and they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is often the contextual factors of the operating environment in which a mission occurs that determine the intent or objective, and thus the core task—or tasks—involved. Among these tasks, all but CIM/CII can be described as *purposes* or *objectives* for conducting CAOs, while CIM/CII could be more accurately described as a *process* that may be undertaken during operations supporting these other four core tasks. This is consistent with the distinction between the CAO and the CIM/CII capabilities previously discussed.


In this sense, it is useful to partition these tasks and think of them as a set of 4+1, with CIM/CII representing the distinct, “+1” task. Figure 3 is a Venn diagram depiction of this conceptual relationship among the core tasks, emphasizing the point that any of the four tasks can occur concurrently, and CIM/CII is generally a supporting capability performed in the conduct of these other tasks.\*

It will suffice to say for this analysis that we identify the core tasks represented in each of the selected vignettes to demonstrate the diversity of tasks represented by the collection as a whole.

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\*The figure is intended to identify all possible combinations of core tasks that may arise concurrently, not to portray the proportions in which each combination arises.





**Fig. 3 Relationships among Civil Affairs core tasks**

### **4.1.3 External Entities Supported**

In the course of CAOs, an element of CAO personnel may be commanded by their own Civil Affairs chain of command,<sup>†</sup> or they may be attached to, or under operational control (OPCON) of, a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) (or subordinate command headquarters) or a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC). Within this command structure, the DoS may request Civil Affairs forces to assist with embassy missions, though OPCON of these forces under such arrangements remains with the pertinent Department of Defense commander.

For the purposes of describing the selected vignettes, the categories used to describe the command arrangements and supported entities can be listed as Civil Affairs, a GCC, or a TSOC. Within each of these three categories, a subdesignation identifies whether a DoS arrangement is involved.

## **4.2 Categorical Summary of Selected Vignettes**

Based on the descriptors stated in the preceding section, Table 1 provides an overarching depiction of the coverage across each category represented by the collection of vignettes presented in this report.

<sup>†</sup>This is the case in exercises or support missions, as opposed to operational deployments.

**Table 1      Categorical summary of selected vignettes**

Vignette Title	CA Personnel			CA Core Tasks					Level			OPCON To		
	FORSCOM	SOCOM	USACAPOC	CIM	PRC	FHA	NA	SCA	Strategic	Operational	Tactical	CA	GCC	TSOC
African Sorghum Crop		E-8				✓	✓			✓				✓
Building an Afghan Radio Station	O-4						✓		✓	✓			✓	
Planning for Jakarta Election Security	O-3			✓				✓		✓	✓	DoS		
Implementing a Culture of CIM			O-5	✓					✓	✓			DoS	
Cholera Control and the Iraqi Train System			O-5		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	DoS		

The ranks given in the columns within the CA Personnel heading are the ranks of the interview subjects at the time of the interview. This rank is given to acknowledge that the interviewees’ retellings of these vignettes occurred from their perspective at the time of the interview as opposed to the rank at the time of the vignettes’ occurrence. The significance of the vignettes, and the way they are delivered, are therefore as much a reflection of the individuals’ evolving perspective in the intervening time between its occurrence and its retelling as they are of the perspective at the time.

Under the OPCON To heading, vignettes involving support to the DoS that would occur, as previously mentioned, through an arrangement with the military chain of command, are identified with a DoS designator in the matrix. Those that did not involve a DoS support component are identified with a “✓” in the matrix.

## 5. Civil Affairs Vignettes

The selected vignettes follow, along with a brief explanation analysis highlighting the research team’s significant findings within each. The section concludes with their impact and then a culminating discussion of the collective insights identified by the research team gained through this set of vignettes. In accordance with the GTM framework, these insights represent themes that have been initially recorded as memos, encoded, and refined to ensure broad applicability to the entire pool of collected vignettes.

### 5.1 Vignette 1: The African Sorghum Crop (SOF CA)

#### 5.1.1 Interviewee’s Account

You need to talk to the village elder first, to fill in the knowledge gaps. Not every question will be answered. You may get no information in the first meeting. After your contact gets more comfortable, you will get more information later. In any

Key Leader Engagement (KLE); you need to build rapport. KLEs can't be done in a drive-by. You need time to build rapport; based on building a relationship there are physical and emotional things that come out of that. In many Middle Eastern cultures, a man holding another man's hand is a sign of trust. You need maturity to understand culture. You can't act like a fool; you must have a level of diplomacy. You have to be a people person to be effective, willing to talk to people and to understand their culture. You have to embrace their culture and have a willingness to try their food, and not to offend them.

While in Africa, we had a 3.5-h drive to a village. We, the CA (Civil Affairs) team, saw the construction of wigwam huts in a barren area of Africa. Three classrooms were being built for children's primary education. When you establish secondary education in some countries, it can have second-order negative effects. What happens is that the children might be educated while their families need them to work, and after being educated, they see their situation better, and often have no jobs with which to use their secondary education.

When talking to the village elder, you usually have a list of questions, like "What do you do here?" The answer was "We are farmers." I asked, "What do you farm?" The village elder replied, "Sorghum." The elder then asks me, "Can you make it rain?" I stood up and did a little dance. After that humorous exchange, we were prepared to work. I asked, "What do you need?" The elder stated that they were not getting any food. The elder then showed me a tin building and I asked what it was. He explained that it was an empty food storage building that was empty because USAID [US Agency for International Development] had stopped delivering food. He said they were hoping they would come back. After seeing the empty food hut, I asked, "What do you really need?" The elder said, "We need hoes." I asked the elder if they had seed. He said yes. I asked him to show me the seed. So, while in the process of assessing the civil vulnerabilities of that village, I was tasked by my team leader to build schools there. I said to my team leader that they need food.

In the meantime of working on the food issue, we decided to set up a health clinic with the elder "in charge." Every family member was asked to come in and have a health screening. This is a way to check the local demographics and "who's who in the zoo". So, back to the food issue, the CA team found out the cost of hoes, which was a little over \$1 US each, and we sourced out a supply of hoes, 300 of them for \$350. So, we did another medical clinic two weeks later for all of the pregnant women in the village. We were distributing neonatal vitamins. Following the end of this clinic, all of the hoes showed up. The elder said "give them to me." I said no. I said no because in CA, you learn that everything is about power. The elder would have taken the hoes and sold them for personal profit. So, the elder is in

charge, and I have him sign the military 2062 forms [Department of the Army Hand Receipt form], even though we both know he can't read. However, this gives him ownership in the process. So, as each family or working person received a hoe from me, the elder handed out the sorghum seed. This legitimized us with the village and the village elder while legitimizing both of us to the village population.

About five months later, we went back to the village, and there was no sand to be seen. It was green as far as you could see. The elder said that, "When the trains come, we will take the sorghum to market for sale." The lesson learned is that for not a lot of money, and by identifying the needs of the local population, and thinking through second- and third- order effects of the civil vulnerabilities and the risk mitigation, we were able to create a viable, sustainable solution that created an economy of scale to provide food, income, jobs, legitimacy, and trust in us and our unified action partners.

### 5.1.2 Analysis

The African country team realized that generating Civil Information requires time, patience, and a willingness to understand the culture that is being engaged. Working under an SOF commander and through an arrangement with the US ambassador, the E-8-led country team built rapport with the village elder over time through KLEs (Table 2).

**Table 2 Vignette 1 characteristics**

CA Personnel	FORSCOM SOCOM (E-8) USACAPOC	OPCON To	CA GCC TSOC
Level	Tactical Operational Strategic	CA Core Tasks	PRC FHA CIM NA SCA

A principal objective behind KLEs is to determine needs. The significance of providing *sustainable* food production was identified only upon consistent engagement with the village, to the point of gaining enough perspective to realize that food relief from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) is finite, and self-sufficiency must be the goal. Once needs are thoroughly understood, they can be assessed side by side with US national and military objectives to develop impactful initiatives.

Rapport-building with a village elder may take more time than we as Americans are used to, but it is the cultural norm for that society. Cultural norms and traditions—recognizing the importance of partaking of local cuisine, for example—must be accommodated to demonstrate a cooperative attitude.

Projection of "American" ideologies and social norms onto the host nation's culture must also be avoided. In this example, secondary education was seen more as a

threat than as a benefit: something that could sow dissatisfaction or defection among the highly educated as they come to view their native culture as one without opportunities commensurate with their academic attainment.

The addition of medical clinics is also used to both enhance the local population's health while at the same time getting more-accurate demographics and other population information.

The overall success of this operation was what Civil Affairs personnel sometimes refer to as "working themselves out of a job": providing a sustainable system to meet the US ambassador's strategic goals through these tactical missions. The strategic goals are furthered by building the populace's trust of both the US forces and of the tribal elder, as they are the collective embodiment of the sustainable food production program. Meeting such essential needs is a key element of stabilization, and it engenders resilience among the populace, making them less susceptible to sympathizing with adversarial propaganda and activity.

## **5.2 Vignette 2: Building an Afghan Radio Station (Conventional Forces CA, Active-Duty)**

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### **5.2.1 Interviewee's Account**

A Civil Affairs Operation (CAO) is directed with a reason and meaning behind it. Anyone can build a well, but we look at the people behind it. There's a bigger effect that people don't see. We spoke with the Ministry of the Interior, for example, and developed relationships first. I'm trying to work myself out of a job [by] empowering the locals to do and be connected with the "project".

Because of Iraq and Afghanistan, brigade combat team (BCT) commanders do not know how to use Civil Affairs (CA), how we work. When doing a Civil-Military Operation (CMO), commanders often mimic CA and do "projects." In CA, when developing [an understanding of] the local population, we may build something like a radio station. In one area, we fought every day, but once the radio station was built, the fighting stopped. We focused on [cultivating] a commonality with the people.

We built [the radio station], we trained a crew, developed news, music program, a Koran segment, even a call to prayer. We made it about them, but we had a voice as well. We gave honest announcements also. Knowing that 85% of the population was illiterate, we chose to build the radio medium, which was auditory. I thought, "If I lived here, how would I want to be engaged?" The improvised explosive device (IED) attacks dropped significantly after that radio station was built and running.

The population has a say-so; we can't just force our will onto the population. We must understand their ways, be a guest, and appreciate their culture. A former commander of mine put the idea into my head to plan for civilians on the battlefield. I never lost sight of that. I started doing S-9 [Civil–Military Co-operation] work and worked that information into my reporting. After that, the Infantry commander said that I had a seat at the table. I was threat focused. I tried to erode the threat's capability to use the population against us.

### 5.2.2 Analysis

The Civil Affairs team chief, a full-time active-duty O-4 (major) from FORSCOM, provided support to a GCC (Table 3). This team chief identified a need of the local populace through a series of KLEs that led to a long-term relationship with the Ministry of Interior. In creating this relationship, the chief identified the value of developing an information conduit for the local population. Understanding the high illiteracy rate among the populace, a radio station best met this need.

**Table 3 Vignette 2 characteristics**

CA Personnel	FORSCOM (O-4) SOCOM USACAPOC	OPCON To	CA GCC TSOC
Level	Tactical Operational Strategic	CA Core Tasks	PRC FHA CIM NA SCA

In CAOs, projects are not motivated by charity alone; they are meant to achieve desired effects in the US national interest. The Civil Affairs Team built a radio station based upon the specific engagement needs of the mostly illiterate populace for news, entertainment, and other cultural/religious information. Honesty was—and is always in CAOs—a crucial component of developing the specific radio broadcast programming.

By identifying a means to inform the population through radio, the team forecasted and achieved second- and third-order effects of a more peaceful and informed village, with significantly reduced IED attacks and kinetic engagements afterward. The reduced levels of insurgent attacks created a safer environment for US Warfighters and the local population alike. This radio station led to increased acceptance of the US forces' presence among the villagers, while supporting the commander's force protection and maneuver objectives. The team chief was seen as a valuable asset to the commander, and regularly participated in command staff meetings: a testament to the commander's perception of the value of CAOs.

### **5.3 Vignette 3: Efficient Policing: Deploying Limited Law Enforcement Officers to Support a Smooth Election (Conventional Forces CA, Active-Duty)**

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#### **5.3.1 Interviewee's Account**

I did two CMSE [Civil–Military Support Element] rotations to Indonesia, working out of the embassy in Jakarta. It's a 9-month rotation. We partnered extensively with the Department of Justice—it's called ICITAP [International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program]. It's a police program that partners host-nation police with US police and kind of passes on best practices. Now us, working out of the embassy and having a really good relationship with the ICITAP Director, because he knew of our CIM/CII capabilities, he had a request from the Indonesian government to give them a better understanding of crime in their country. Police practices in Indonesia are kind of developing compared to ours, so they had asked our guys for a lot of assistance.

The summer of 2014 was to be the national elections. The president was going to be elected, and in addition to that, several representatives in their parliament throughout the greater part of Indonesia. Their police forces at the general staff level and above—so we're speaking with like two- or three-star generals generally—asked us to do some mapping of crime in their country, so that they would have a better idea of where to pre-position police forces ahead of the national elections, because it's a cycle in Indonesia of elections and then those who feel that they haven't been represented fully in the elections tend to react violently, and fights break out throughout the country.

So, the country—and the police force in particular—was trying to get a better understanding of where crime happens in their country and how to assign police forces, because they're a pretty limited police force. So, we did that, understanding that there's a lot of sensitivities in them providing us with their internal police reports on crime, but they were willing to participate.

We focused on five provinces throughout Indonesia, and they provided us with mountains of crime data: what happened, where it happened, when it happened. So, time of day, time of month, what type of crime it was, and we categorized it: violent crime, petty crime, crime based on religious conflict issues. We took all that and sorted that out using Palantir primarily, and a little bit of our ANT—Analyst's Notebook—and we put together products that showed them visually where the crime was happening in their country, typically with heat maps. We put together products in those places, provided it to the police forces, so that they knew where the crime was happening. We separated it by day of the week, time of the day. So

[for example,] you notice in this area there happens to be more crime at midnight than the weekends, or close to the bar....so that they could determine where they should surge their forces ahead of the elections to keep violent outbreak at a minimum. Which they did. When we went back there a second time [months later] and received a lot of positive feedback from that.

There was some resistance by, I think, two of the five provinces to provide us with the information. I don't know if there was a trust issue there, because again, it is kind of sensitive information from their perspective. They don't want to show that they're unable to stop certain types of crime in certain areas, and there could be a lot of other issues. There could be a hesitancy...if one of the police chiefs is a Muslim, he may be less likely to show the Muslim/Christian violence that happened in some of the areas, and vice versa. So, you had to be aware of that, but we were able to take—I think it was three—of the five provinces and show them, through our CIM/CII products, what the crime situation would be like in Indonesia ahead of the elections.

It was my team sergeant who went from place to place, different police stations essentially—police headquarters—in the provinces to gather that information. We received it in huge Excel spreadsheets of kind of random information. We dealt primarily with the leadership of the national police, so we spoke several times—through the ICITAP Director—with the leadership of the police. So, it's typically like the two- or three-star level that we would interface with.

At the highest levels, they were very receptive towards it. They obviously wanted to have a better understanding. They didn't do it or couldn't do it themselves, put it all together into one visual picture. And I think a lot of [the cooperation] was due, in part, to the influence of the Director of ICITAP and his close relationship with the Indonesian national police, because he's been there for longer than anyone else in the Embassy—over 10 years, I believe—and just lives there kind of permanently. So, he has a really good relationship with them, and I think because of that relationship, we were treated well, and also through our own efforts and kind of understanding their problem, sympathizing with them, doing our best to assist in any way that we could.



### 5.3.2 Analysis

The government and law enforcement of Indonesia had historical crime data available, but there had been no prior effort to analyze it in-house. The Indonesian national government was intrinsically motivated to be cooperative with US assistance, as

peaceful elections are an indicator of legitimate governance. Government officials astutely recognized their limitations in assuring a peaceable outcome without outside help. The existing rapport between high-ranking Indonesian officials and the longstanding ICITAP director fostered a sense of unified purpose between the Civil Affairs element and the Indonesian government from a strategic planning perspective.

Despite these positive factors, the breadth of success was attenuated by inconsistent buy-in at the provincial level of government, likely arising, at least in part, from cultural pride-based sensitivities. Regions that could have been positively impacted by the effort chose to opt out rather than face the revelations of cultural or societal ills that crime data analysis might unearth. Fortunately, a critical mass of willing provinces participated in the effort, allowing it to proceed.

The success of this operation hinged on the existence of the crime records kept by provincial-and-below law enforcement, as well as the willingness of the provincial-level Indonesian officials to provide this information to the Civil Affairs element in accordance with the national government's request. This accentuates the value of a host nation's predisposition to cooperate. Had this not been the case, achieving the goal of a peaceful election could have required significantly greater effort by Civil Affairs personnel, and likely would have extended beyond the time frame of a single unit's deployment, adding rotation-based personnel turnover to an already complex operation.

**Table 4 Vignette 3 characteristics**

CA Personnel	FORSCOM (O-3) SOCOM USACAPOC	OPCON To	CA (+ DoS) GCC TSOC
Level	Tactical Operational Strategic	CA Core Tasks	PRC FHA CIM NA SCA

## 5.4 Vignette 4: Civil Information Management/Civil Information Integration Chief (Reservist CA)

### 5.4.1 Interviewee's Account

What Civil Affairs can do is to build collaboration. If you start building collaboration between people or organizations, finding common elements, then really all you have to do is step back and let them start working. I had this diagram

to show the intersection of the Treasury and USAID's interaction for a Provincial Reconstruction Team. We just discovered this, and we've synchronized it for a concrete demonstration [of] breaking down the stovepipes and start collaborating. Building collaboration and unity of effort has always been my holy grail, especially in CIM. If you know what they're working on, and you cross a piece of information that you know that they need, you know now how to contact them and give them the information. That's what I'd call "building collaboration."

To build collaboration, I try to envision what information people need. That's my starting point. On a teleconference or VTC [video teleconference], all they have to do is say who they are, where they are, and what they're working on. So, the first step is you got to know 1) where the information is, 2) who's doing what, 3) who needs what information, and 4) a way to share it, and then that develops the collaboration.

The CIM systems that I have used are numerous, but I prefer to remain system-agnostic. Because I have no idea what my assignment's going to be. One day a Colonel looks at me and says, you're in charge of CIM." And I said, "Okay." I'd never done it before. I've used CIDNE [Intelligent Software Solutions (ISS) Inc.'s Combined Information Data Network Exchange] and it's good, but it's stove-piped, because it's up there in the classified world on SIPR [SIPRNet: Secret Internet Protocol Router Network]. You can't share with IGOs [intergovernmental organizations] or NGOs and so forth. Also, there's a reporting requirement, so if you're in USCENCOM [US Central Command] and you're writing a report, it better be in CIDNE [Combined Information Data Network Exchange]; it's an order. If it's marked U [unclassified] or FOUO [For Official Use Only] in CIDNE, it can be pushed down to this lower version of CIDNE that runs on NIPR [NIPRNet: Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network], and it's called INDURE [ISS Inc.'s International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment]. It's essentially an unclassified mirror of CIDNE that runs and is accessible through PiX [Protected Internet Exchange]. It's difficult to learn, but once you start using it, it's really easy. Every report in INDURE can be plotted on a map as a situational awareness tool. I can control who has access to it. So, everyone that has a PiX account can see this COP [common operational picture].

I realized that CIM is a process and that the most difficult part of it is analysis. For unclassified and FOUO processing, there are a number of tools that I only need Internet access to use. The first is APAN [All Partners Access Network] that can translate chat or whole documents. The next one I'd like to discuss is PiX, which is highly useful as well.

PiX is an unclassified website that can also go up to FOUO. So that means that other partner nations' militaries and civilian organizations all have a place where they can share their products, including IGOs and NGOs. So, I'm using PiX to answer RFIs [requests for information] to support a CA Planning Team, which doesn't have any staff, but you can call [ISS Inc, the developer of] PiX because they have a curator staff to whom you can give RFIs. They also host teleconferences. They don't do analysis, but they will aggregate the information and produce a webpage for you. They can even build a map and put icons on it.

Search engines are important, and I like to use [ISS Inc.'s] Topic Builder because it's like Google but more powerful. It has RSS [Rich Site Summary] feeds that match your search terms and it keeps checking them. This is like a social media radar to watch certain hashtags, and it'll never stop looking; when something comes in, it's going to come to the top. Imagine having a CMOC [Civil-Military Operations Center] that has this watching what people are tweeting in the community.

Fixed Focus is a newer program that can be used from a cellphone, and almost all of our coalition partners can use it. You can go out in the world with a cellphone and take pictures which are automatically uploaded to a public or private server. Artificial intelligence software looks at every face and links all of them together. So, you now got part of your analysis regarding who's who. It's got a database that analyzes all the faces like Facebook. So, this is a way that you can do civil reconnaissance, and run a COP, and run a Blue Force Tracker. The key benefit is that you don't need laptops running specific software to use this and it's usable anywhere because it's web-based. Machine-based benefits are good, but people are more important.

There aren't many people available in a CIM cell to perform work. A CIM/CII cell has two officers and three NCOs: one officer in charge, one assistant, and then an NCOIC [noncommissioned officer in charge], a geospatial analyst, and a signals guy. There are no analysts. Intel [intelligence] Soldiers are trained extensively to do analysis. Nobody in CA gets any of that training. There may be hundreds of people doing Intel over there, all doing analysis. I just need to walk in the Intel door and do my Civil Affairs explanation of what I'm doing and make some friends, find all their information, and then compile it on a list. A CIM cell usually is operated out of a CMOC so there's a lot of information that's coming in, and you've got to figure out who needs this information and share it. I would set up sharable libraries, grant my known stakeholders access to them, and start sharing information. In a CMOC, you also have to provide some civil COPs. You need these maps with icons, so that you can develop situational awareness. Our partners can put icons on

the map, and the whole world that belongs to that group can see the icons anywhere in the world. So, in the CMOC, I'm using a situational awareness tool, a shareable library, and translated chat; I've got the tools that I need to communicate anywhere in the world as long as I have access to the Internet. This also provides the commander with information.

Knowing the Commander's Critical Information Requirements [CCIRs] is critical as well. The battle captain is going to be watching this information and he's going to alert the commander when [information pertaining to] a CCIR appears. The first job of the COP is situational awareness so that the commander knows what to do. Sometimes it can be as simple as red, yellow, green gumballs. In PiX, you can actually run a gumball chart, and the commander can wake up at night and just look there and everything's green, that one's yellow, pick up the phone and say, "Hey what's going on here?"

Flexibility is the key, right? Use whatever tool is going to solve the problem. And if something works well, I mean, you got to keep checking stuff out, because you might find something that works better than anything you've ever seen before. If you're married to a system, you might as well just put the blinders on. All the commanders knew how critical Civil Affairs was for day-to-day operations, and they appreciated us. You may not feel appreciated, but you know that somebody's working on it, and that it's all going into a flexible system to develop the situational awareness so the commander can make a decision.

#### 5.4.2 Analysis


**Effective CIM begins with understanding the purpose.** Even before the doctrinally defined steps of the CIM/CII process begin, CIM/CII outcomes can be enhanced by collaboratively engaging with stakeholders/customers to gain a thorough understanding of information needs. This paves the way for directed collection, collation, and processing efforts; purposeful analysis; and targeted, reliable production and dissemination of civil information.

**Table 5 Vignette 4 characteristics**

CA Personnel	FORSCOM SOCOM USACAPOC (O-5)	OPCON To	CA GCC (+ DoS) TSOC
Level	Tactical Operational Strategic	CA Core Tasks	PRC FHA CIM NA SCA

By way of analogy, scientific method is a widely used framework for systematic investigation and insight generation. Data collection does not appear in scientific method until after a specific problem—or investigative purpose—statement has been developed. The subsequent data collection, analysis, and conclusion-making

are all influenced by the stated problem and customized to address it. This speaks to the importance of an implied “CIM/CII Step 0: Define Stakeholders’ Desired CIM/CII Outcomes”, and of conducting each of the six CIM/CII steps in a manner directly traceable to these outcomes (Fig. 4).



**Fig. 4** Analogy of knowledge acquisition processes: alignment of the CIM process and scientific method

**The conduct of CAO often requires adaptability in the absence of standardization.** The operational reality of supporting an array of diverse entities—governmental and NGO; IGO, domestic, and foreign among them—requires a robust, flexible approach to CIM/CII. Civil Affairs personnel must maintain a current knowledge of existing and emerging technological tools at their disposal, be adaptive in implementing CIM/CII solutions that accommodate any of a variety of possible network channels and software systems, and must ensure data collection mechanisms are in place to feed the specific analyses needed.

**There is more to conducting CIM/CII than using analytical software.** The term “CIM/CII” is often used—unfortunately, even among a segment of its practitioners—interchangeably with “a software system that facilitates CIM/CII”. This vignette illuminates the human-based—as opposed to the software-based—essence of CIM/CII: the interpersonal collaboration, awareness, and steering that must occur to give purpose to software-aided processing, analysis, production, and dissemination. The numerous software tools that aid in many, and sometimes all the steps in the CIM/CII process are only invigorated when deftly employed in support of human-defined goals (e.g., CCIRs). Discerning employment of such software and network tools, and opportunistic use of commercial tools (e.g.,

push-based aggregators such as RSS feeds) can assist in improving efficiency at every step of the CIM/CII process.

## **5.5 Vignette 5: Cholera Control and the Iraqi Train System (Reservist)**

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### **5.5.1 Interviewee's Account**

I have two stories: one tactical and one operational that had strategic implications. The first relates to a cholera outbreak in an area of Iraq. I was tasked to find out what caused it. When I got there, I was knee-deep in sewage backup. There was human fecal matter and everything else about a meter deep, with kids going around barefoot in the area. The difficult part was tracing the source of the cholera outbreak. The reason for the outbreak was that the sewage lift pumps weren't cycled to move the water after the rains there. I did research and it turns out that the Baghdad sewage system runs in a clockwise manner. I might have that backward; it might be counterclockwise. However, the power in Baghdad runs throughout the region in the counterclockwise or opposite manner. You have rolling blackouts that lasted four hours. Because of these power outages that run in the reverse cycle of the sewage lift pumps, the lift pumps were never cycled in phase with the power outages. The next logical step was asking if we could reverse the cycle. Well, we found out that the Ministry of Oil makes their deliveries in this same cycle. Therefore, due to the power outage cycles, substations and everything are up during this time because that's how the Ministry of Oil does it in that region. I went to the Ministry of Finance, and we were able to understand the problem to get everything in phase. The sewage system, which was built in the 1950s, was a 1930s design. We determined we couldn't reverse the flow of the sewage lift pump process, so we had to reverse the flow of the electricity. We were then able to control when the sewage pumps would work. A secondary effect of the sewage pumps not working is that it affected the fresh water system as well. They designed the system with the sewage pipes over the fresh water pipes. The sewage pipes were old and required a certain amount of pressure in order to maintain integrity, as to not leak. So, if you don't have pressure, they collapse down, and whatever's in there seeps down into the water pipes, so it was affecting the fresh water, so by getting it back in phase, it became operational again.

We also had the Iraqi national railroad headquarters in my district. So, liking trains a lot—big and small—I say, “Hey, I know the optimal place.” So, I went and I met with the Director of Iraqi Railroads. He stated that they would like to get more commerce going on in their railroad systems. I went and I talked to the United States Army Corps of Engineers, who were the ones that were helping to rebuild

the system. I made some contacts that I had through my civilian railroad expertise and associations. I was in Baghdad at the State Department, at the embassy, and we went out to the headquarters to look at a central traffic control system that recently cost 16 million dollars that displays where the trains are going. Though I like trains, my background is business, finance, and management as a civilian.

I'm looking at these trains going up and down, and I'm like, "What's on them?" The two Iraqis working and the Corps of Engineers guy and the train guy are like, "Yeah, but they're moving." I go, "But what's on them, what are they moving?" I asked, "How are you monetizing that system to be productive?" They said, "We're creating jobs." I said, no, "We're putting American money into having the trains move up and down the line. You're moving people, maybe moving product, but how are you monetizing?" I did some research and realized they had no way because the Iraqi railroad was run by the Ministry of Finance before the war, and the Ministry of Finance had dictated that it is done a certain way. They had no way to monetize the systems before the war, because it was all centrally controlled. I reached an agreement by reaching out to USAID because they have business development resources, and an agreement with the Ministry of Finance to look at ways of monetizing systems. I went into our railroad history; we used to have what was the Railroad Express Agency, and what it was a consortium of railroads that used to get together to do less-than-carload packages.

So, there was a way of shipping. I met with a lot of the local people in all of the local markets there, and I found out that there was a lot of money, but much of the liquidity was frozen. Iraq was actually awash with a lot of private money before the war. When the war happened, it stayed frozen because they didn't have the right access, creating a barrier to freeing up your equity or liquidity. Some had to pay, in a way that was beneficial to you, without paying exorbitant fees.

So, we, with USAID, we formed an Iraqi transportation quote consortium. Within seven months of starting they had 27 million [US dollars] in operating capital, and they were actually able to use the railroad. They were also able to start logistics chains from the port of Umm Qasr up to Baghdad, because it used to take, from Umm Qasr to Baghdad it took two weeks, and you had informal taxation routes. We were able to take that two weeks down to three days from Umm Qasr, a 611-mile trip. We created the ability for the Iraqi railroad to do all the customs and transportation lockdown right there. If they could do that there, then all the customs you pay to Iraq and then you move it all the way up, so you reduce the overhead cost of transportation, formal and informal. It's far more efficient, and again, we freed up 27 million dollars in liquidity. The commander I was serving under was a great guy, really got what I was doing. But he was getting in trouble for not

spending enough CERP—Commander’s Emergency Response Program money. He would get bad ratings because he wasn’t spending enough US money in development.

We metricized the war so much and how people were rated that they just...they didn’t understand about when you’re engaging...when you’re doing civil military operations, a) It takes a lot longer, b) It’s not always about using your money. It’s about understanding their systems, understanding what their problems are, and coming to a solution that meets their requirements and meeting our requirements. It’s taking a business approach, a deal approach, and dealing with civilians.

### 5.5.2 Analysis

The reservist lieutenant colonel (O-5), working out of the US embassy in Baghdad, was in a position not uncommon within Civil Affairs, but unique within the US Army as a whole: to address several civil challenges that would support strategic US objectives in

Iraq. This required cultivating relationships with multiple foreign ministry personnel to facilitate interdepartmental coordination. In both accounts, solutions drew upon the reservist officer’s civilian aptitudes for identifying opportunity and operational efficiency within the business, finance, and management fields.

The officer pulled back the curtain on a cholera outbreak in Iraq and determined it to be a symptom of a greater problem: a lack of synchronicity among multiple public works agencies. The Civil Affairs officer established relationships with the ministers of the departments involved. This led to coordinating the necessary operational synchronization between rolling brownout schedules and sewage pumping cycles.

The second account highlights the ability to analytically recognize an economic development opportunity: to monetize the Iraqi national train system and implement the necessary business operations to bring it to fruition. Through shrewd management, transportation using the existing rail infrastructure was re-envisioned to increase operating efficiency and induce greater patronage. These changes made significant strides toward achieving a self-funding operation.

This train account also sheds light on the challenges faced in developing initiatives at the operational- and tactical-level when the metrics used to measure accomplishment are poor descriptors of actual accomplishments. In this specific

**Table 6 Vignette 5 characteristics**

CA Personnel	FORSCOM SOCOM USACAPOC (O-5)	OPCON To	CA GCC (+ DoS) TSOC
Level	Tactical Operational Strategic	CA Core Tasks	PRC FHA CIM NA SCA



example, the metric of gross expenditures—with higher expenditures seen as indicative of greater impact—failed to account for and reward the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the train system overhaul.

## **6. Summary of Findings and Conclusions**

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Several common thematic threads emerge throughout this collection of vignettes. Their pervasiveness across such a diversity of operations and perspectives underscores their universality.

### **The success of Civil Affairs Operations often hinges on creating a unified sense of cooperation and agency.**

Prioritizing opportunities with readily apparent mutual benefits provides a solid foundation for negotiation and cooperation. In some cases, such as the Indonesian election and cholera outbreak, the supported nation is reaching out for assistance, indicating a preexisting motivation to cooperate. In other instances, such overt motivation is absent. It is then incumbent upon Civil Affairs personnel to devise ways of stimulating or inducing cooperation. This is best achieved by astute identification of potentially latent wants or needs to devise a compelling method to incentivize potential partners and ensure that an operation will be mutually beneficial. As in the sorghum crop example, strategies that include local leaders as stakeholders increase the sense of ownership and agency felt by the local populace.

### **The ideal solution to a problem is a self-sustainable one.**

Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime. Although not always an attainable outcome, those operations that culminate in the handoff of a sustainable operational or infrastructural improvement to the local government or populace tend to have a greater impact than those that do not. At the least, “degree of sustainability” is a necessary planning consideration that should be weighed during Course of Action development. In the railroad, sorghum, and radio station examples, the projects conclude with a functional operation that can be sustained by the local population or government. Perhaps more importantly, the local population reaps sufficient benefits that they are intrinsically motivated to keep the operations running following handoff.

### **A thorough threat analysis can improve success rates (i.e., viability) of operations improvement and infrastructure projects.**

There are many pitfalls to navigate when choosing impactful missions. While not evident in the vignettes included in this report, additional interview subjects and popular media are rife with stories of improvement projects that were destroyed or

negated: schools rebuilt only to be taken over by insurgents; the inability to discern well-meaning citizens from those who seek to profit from US beneficence or are insurgency sympathizers; lucrative poppy harvests replaced with subsistence agriculture that fueled black markets; and the like. Even relatively minor disturbances to a population's status quo can lead to unintended consequences. A holistic planning perspective is necessary to ensure that the livelihoods and standards of living of most, if not all the individuals in the community are preserved or improved following a new initiative. To borrow a page from the tenets of Lean and Six Sigma philosophies, people should be viewed as resources whose talents must be put to effective use, not as expendable. Any who are left without a satisfactory role to play are at risk of acting with increased desperation and potentially undermining the success of the initiative. Other considerations, such as the ability of the community to protect systems and structures from hostile actors, also impact the achievability of a desired end state and must be considered.

**Effective CIM draws upon many of the same aptitudes that enable successful conduct of the other four Civil Affairs core tasks.**

Apart from the technical—and technological—facets of CIM, many skills mentioned in the non-CIM aspects of these vignettes play a significant crossover role in CIM as well. The Jakarta elections vignette is an archetypal example of CIM operations supporting another core task: support to Civil Administration. This vignette highlights the notion that while CIM is a common mechanism for achieving desired effects, much of the activity surrounding its use is rooted in the aptitudes and proficiencies exhibited by Civil Affairs personnel in the conduct of their other core tasks. The following three specific examples, drawn from the presented vignettes, support this view.

- 1) As observed in the CIM Chief's vignette, effective CIM begins with cultivating coordination and collaboration: a familiar theme among the other CA core tasks.
- 2) Recipients of CIM products must have their information needs understood and accommodated by Civil Affairs personnel, which often involves building rapport to coax out the objectives underpinning these information needs, and to develop a cohesive CIM strategy therefrom. This mirrors the relationship-building skills observed in conducting the other four Civil Affairs core tasks.
- 3) CIM operations must be expeditious due to the relatively modest staffing level of CIM Cells. The necessity of operational efficiency in CIM parallels

and involves employing similar proficiencies seen in the previous thread: striving for self-sustainable operations.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Understanding these themes goes a long way toward understanding the complexities and value of CAO. Recognizing that there are alternative approaches to military force, Civil Affairs personnel employ a wide variety of interpersonal and socioeconomic strategies to achieve desired effects in support of US objectives. Indeed, in the best of cases, CAO can result in end states unachievable through traditional use of military force alone.

Subsequent papers from this research data set will expound on 1) the unique skill sets Civil Affairs personnel are selected and trained for, 2) the CIM process, and 3) internal and external perceptions of CAO capabilities within the Army.

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## List of Symbols, Abbreviations, and Acronyms

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ANT	Analyst's Notebook
APAN	All Partners Access Network
ARL	US Army Research Laboratory
BCT	brigade combat team
CA	Civil Affairs
CAT	Civil Affairs Team
CAO	Civil Affairs Operation
CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CGSO	Complex Ground Systems and Operations
CIDNE	Combined Information Data Network Exchange
CII	Civil Information Integration
CIM	Civil Information Management
CMO	Civil–Military Operation
CMOC	Civil–Military Operations Center
CMSE	Civil–Military Support Element
COP	common operational picture
DoS	US Department of State
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FOUO	For Official Use Only
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GTM	Grounded Theory Methodology
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IED	improvised explosive device
IGO	intergovernmental organization

INDURE	International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment
Intel	intelligence
ISS	Intelligent Software Solutions
JFKSWCS	John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
KLE	Key Leader Engagement
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIPRNet	Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router Network
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPCON	operational control
PiX	Protected Internet Exchange
RFI	request for information
RSS	Rich Site Summary
SIPRNet	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
U	unclassified
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
VTC	video teleconference



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