NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

HOW DOES UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE AFFECT HOST NATION DEMOCRATIZATION?

by

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June 2018

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		*Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*	2. REPORT DATE June 2018	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE HOW DOES UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE AFFECT HOST NATION DEMOCRATIZATION?		**5. FUNDING NUMBERS**	
6. AUTHOR(S) Christopher A. Morton			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		**10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**	

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

　　How does U.S. security assistance affect host nation democratization? This thesis analyzes Department of State and Department of Defense assistance over time to Lebanon and Pakistan to evaluate its effects on the host nation's political rights and civil liberties, measured by Freedom House ratings. In both cases, changes in Freedom House ratings did not correlate consistently with changes in U.S. security assistance. The influence of U.S. security assistance on host nation governance is frequently over-stated. U.S. security assistance has minimal effect on democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform. If the United States wanted security assistance to decisively support democratization, then it would need to design and resource security assistance and security cooperation programs differently. Redesigning U.S. security assistance to supersede the influence of other factors on democratization would require increasing funding toward defense institution building, making security assistance conditional on political rights and civil liberties performance, and consistently integrating security assistance within a whole-of-government strategy toward the host nation for a generation or more.

14. SUBJECT TERMS democracy, democratization, democracy promotion, Freedom House, political rights, civil liberties, foreign assistance, security assistance, security cooperation, building partner capacity, security sector assistance, security sector reform, civil-military relations, CENTCOM, Lebanon, Pakistan			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 149
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

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HOW DOES UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE AFFECT HOST NATION DEMOCRATIZATION?

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH ASIA, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA)**

from the

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AECA	Arms Export Control Act
BPC	building partner (or partnership) capacity
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CMR	civil-military relations
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CSF	coalition support funds
DGM	defense governance and management
DIB	defense institution building
DIRI	Defense Institution Reform Initiative
DoDD	Department of Defense directive
DoDI	Department of Defense instruction
DoS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
E-IMET	expanded international military education and training
EDA	excess defense articles
FA	foreign assistance
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FMF	foreign military financing
GAO	Government Accountability Office
IMET	international military education and training
INCLE	International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
ISF	Internal Security Forces (Lebanon)
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
JP	joint publication
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NDAA	national defense authorization act
NGO	non-governmental organization
NSS	national security strategy
PCCF	Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund

PPD	presidential policy directive
SA	security assistance
SC	security cooperation
SFA	security force assistance
SSA	security sector assistance
SSR	security sector reform
UN	United Nations
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

A. RESEARCH QUESTION, THESIS, AND ROADMAP

How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility? Since democracy promotion is a consistent theme in U.S. foreign policy, it is expected that security assistance (SA) efforts support political objectives to the maximum extent possible. How influential is U.S. SA, and why? What is U.S. SA typically designed to accomplish? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on democratization? How influential are other factors compared to U.S. SA? How did U.S. policies on SA come about in the first place?

In Chapter I, I specify definitions, significance of the research, associated policy implication, scope, research design, and case study selection for this thesis. Next, I conduct a literature review that gives context for the thesis within the democratization, civil-military relations (CMR), foreign assistance (FA), and SA literature. It ends with a summary of the proposed hypotheses and causal mechanisms to be tested by the case studies. In chapters II and III, I will conduct case studies of Lebanon and Pakistan, respectively. In Chapter IV, I will elaborate on how each hypothesis would explain the results of the case study, and I will analyze how the case study findings support or undermine the hypotheses. In Chapter V, I will draw conclusions and discuss policy implications.

B. DEFINITIONS

I constructed the definition of democracy below to be a type of liberal democracy that aligns well with the methodology of Freedom House ratings, which I used to measure the dependent variable.[1] The various definitions for foreign assistance, security assistance, security cooperation, security sector assistance (SSA), and building partner capacity (BPC) frequently overlap or contradict. This is the case because the associated programs arose in response to real-world national security challenges as they occurred, not from a centralized,

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[1] Virginia P. Fortna, "Peacekeeping and Democratization," in *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, ed. Anna Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), – 49–50.

top-down planning process. Therefore, there is no consistent definition for many of these terms between publications of different departments and agencies, though there are some similarities between the different definitions. After reviewing various orders, directives, legal statutes, and research papers, I chose specific SA and security cooperation (SC) definitions for several reasons. First, the usage of security assistance as the conceptual umbrella term that includes both SA programs and SC programs intuitively reinforces the idea of civilian control over the military. Second, there are several SA programs in which the Department of State (DoS) supervises Department of Defense (DoD) execution, but not the other way around. Third, much of the data and analysis prior to the year 2000 does not clearly distinguish between the two. Lastly, for the sake of consistency in style and purpose, a generic SA term gives conceptual simplicity and clarity for the portions of this thesis that analyze the topic of security-type assistance in more general terms. See Figure 1 for a visual depiction of the definition of security assistance, SA programs, and SC programs.

For this thesis, the following definitions apply:

1.   Democracy: a representative system of government that holds open, fair, and competitive elections; upholds the rule of law equitably; and maximizes the political rights and civil liberties of its citizens and legal residents. It is liberal democracy.[2]

2.   Security Assistance (SA): when used as a generic term, security assistance refers to all SA programs and SC programs. It describes "assistance provided to foreign military and security forces, regardless of the agency proving that assistance."[3]

3.   Security Assistance Programs: "a group of programs the USG uses to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to advance national policies

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[2] I intentionally constructed this definition of democracy to align with the U.S. model of liberal democracy, because the main thrust of this thesis is to investigate how U.S. SA aligns with U.S. intentions for democratization in other countries. Therefore, a U.S.-centric definition provides an appropriate foundation for analysis. Fortna stated that to the degree Freedom House may be politically biased toward the U.S., it may "provide a closer measure of what it [the U.S.] is trying to achieve in post-war transitions"; Fortna, "Peacekeeping and Democratization," 50.

[3] Bolko J. Skorupski and Nina M. Serafino, *DoD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues*. CRS Report No. R44602 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44602.pdf.

and objectives."[4] SA programs are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and are Title 22 funded. SA programs are supervised by the DoS, and executed by either the DoS or DoD.

4. Security Cooperation (SC): "All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs."[5]

5. Security Cooperation Programs: "the group of programs or activities employed by the DoD in cooperation with partner nations to achieve U.S. security objectives."[6] SC programs are DoD executed and are funded through Title 10, Title 22, or the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). When SC programs are Title 22 funded, the DoS supervises DoD execution.[7]

6. Foreign Assistance (FA): "a number of legally authorized programs that can be grouped into the general categories of development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and SA with the strategic purpose of promoting long-term host nation and regional stability… Some SC is foreign assistance, but not all."[8]

7. Security Sector: "those institutions - to include partner governments and international organizations - that have the authority to use force to protect both the state and its citizens at home or abroad, to maintain international peace and security, and to enforce the law and provide oversight of those organizations and forces."[9]

8. Security Sector Assistance (SSA): "The policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to: engage with foreign partners and help shape

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[4] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Cooperation*, JP 3–20 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_20.pdf, II-4.

[5] Department of Defense, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, DoD Directive 5132.03 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 17, http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/513203_dodd_2016.pdf.

[6] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Cooperation*, vii.

[7] In the United States Code, Title 10 laws pertain to the armed forces (purview of the DoD), and Title 22 laws pertain to foreign relations and intercourse (purview of the DoS).

[8] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Cooperation*, vii.

[9] "Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy," The White House, 2008, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ssa.pdf.

their policies and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges."[10]

9. Security Sector Reform (SSR): "the transformation of the security system—which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and this contributes to a well-functioning security framework."[11]

10. Building Partner Capacity (BPC): A catch-all term referring to anything from SA and SC programs to state-building efforts.[12] BPC is a poorly defined hybrid of FA, SA, and SC concepts. The term came about from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.[13] It was popularized since then "as a means of achieving U.S. strategic objectives at a lower cost without necessarily using U.S. military forces to achieve the same ends."[14] Because it lacks legal authorities or funding mechanisms, I will use it as infrequently as possible, but some academic analysis of BPC is relevant to this thesis.

11. Civil-Military Relations (CMR): consists of "democratic civilian control of the security forces; the effectiveness of the security forces in fulfilling their assigned roles; and their efficiency, that is, fulfilling the assigned roles and missions at a minimum cost."[15]

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Timothy Edmunds, "Security Sector Reform," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 2012), 50.

[12] Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas, *What Is 'Building Partner Capacity': Issues for Congress*, CRS Report No. R44313 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 6–8, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 8.

[15] F. Cristiana Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 2012), 26.

Security Assistance

Title 22 funding and DoD execution overlap with each other, but neither DoS execution nor Title 10/NDAA funding overlap with each other.

Figure 1.   Security Assistance and Security Cooperation

C.   RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND SCOPE

Since spreading democracy was a frequently stated characteristic of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, it is expected that SA efforts support policy objectives to the maximum extent possible. Funding allocated by U.S. Congress is what enables the executive branch to conduct SA in accordance with applicable laws. If SA supports democratization, then the United States should fund SA liberally if it wants to promote democracy—though it also needs to understand how that mechanism works so it can align funding to the most effective programs. If SA undermines democratization, as some contend,[16] then the policy implication is that the United States should reduce SA funding

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[16] Nancy Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," in *New Challenges to Democratization*, ed. Peter J. Burnell and Richard Youngs (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 76–77.

and increase funding for other programs if it wants to support democratization. This would be a dramatic shift; from 1990–2004, overall congressional funding of SA ranged from ten-fold to fifty-fold that of United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-administered democracy aid.[17] If SA has minimal effect on democratization compared to other factors, then the United States could theoretically pursue its security objectives and democratization agenda somewhat independently. If SA has minimal effect, then the United States also would need to design and resource SA efforts differently in order for them to supersede the influence of other factors on democratization. This research is significant in that it highlights the synergies and tensions between SA and democratization in a way that is policy-relevant. The policy implications of the different answers to this research question are dramatically different and sometimes mutually exclusive.

My analysis will cover 1991–2017 for the case of Lebanon; 1990 is when Lebanon's current system of government and military organization were established. It will cover 1980–2017 for the case of Pakistan, because the two waves of U.S. SA were during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s and after the 9/11 attacks.[18] Analysis of the different forms of democracy (e.g., parliamentary vs. presidential systems) is outside of the scope of this thesis. The focus is on the functions of democracy as defined above and as measured by Freedom House ratings. Though the literature on the effects of foreign assistance on democratization (particularly relating to USAID) is robust, foreign assistance that is not SA is outside the scope of this thesis. The portions of security sector assistance that are not SA (Department of Justice efforts, public health, etc.) are outside the scope of this thesis.

D.   RESEARCH DESIGN

Democracy is the dependent variable. I share Larry Diamond's view that democracy is "a continuum," and I will measure democracy on a scale rather than categorize states as "democratic" or "authoritarian."[19] I will measure changes in host nation

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[17] Ibid.

[18] "Pakistan," Security Assistance Monitor, April 17, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Pakistan/2000/2018/all/Global//.

[19] Larry J. Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), xii.

democratization using Freedom House data on political rights and civil liberties, which Diamond described as "the best available empirical indicator of liberal democracy."[20] A more "free" Freedom House rating corresponds with an increase in democratization, with 1.0 being the most "free" score assigned. A less "free" Freedom House rating corresponds with a decrease in democratization, with 7.0 being the least "free" score assigned. The independent variables are U.S. SA, host nation domestic actors, and regional actors.

I will compare U.S. SA funding data with key domestic and regional events and actions to determine how influential those factors were on changes to host nation Freedom House ratings over time. Data will always be displayed in its measured quantities, such as U.S. dollars (US$). When feasible, SA funding will be analyzed as a share of host nation government revenue or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). I will analyze SA funding by program when data is available, which is typically after the year 2000. This will provide more detailed information as to whether or not U.S. SA accomplished its purported objectives, and to what degree it supported or undermined democratization. By elaborating on which programs received more funding, it can give a better idea as to which programs may be more effective or influential on democratization than can analyzing overall quantities. I will examine three hypotheses. The first is that U.S. SA supports host nation democratization. The second is that U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization. The third is that domestic and/or regional political factors are the primary drivers of host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence.

E.   CASE STUDY SELECTION

I selected the two case studies, Lebanon and Pakistan, for many reasons. First, both are within the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, which is my focus of study. Second, they both have very different regional dynamics given their geographic locations. This means that the results of the case studies are much less likely to be explained by the same regional variable than if I had selected, for example, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (both Gulf Cooperation Council members with a similar security relationship to the United States and to their neighboring countries). In order to

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[20] Ibid., 12.

test the effects of security assistance on democratization, I selected one country receiving a significantly larger quantity of security assistance than the other as measured in overall dollars and as a share of host nation GDP.

The following characteristics of these two countries facilitate isolating the aforementioned variables for analysis. First, neither country is a petro-state, which means that the resource curse/rentier state dynamic typically associated with entrenched authoritarianism in the Middle East is not a factor in undermining democratization in Lebanon or Pakistan.[21] Second, both countries have significant fluctuations in Freedom House ratings and quantities of U.S. SA over time, which gives ample data for analysis of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Third, both countries have histories of democracy before the period of analysis, which removes societal ignorance of democracy (e.g., how to form a political party, or how to conduct elections) as a likely explanation for lack of democratization. In effect, these three characteristics isolate the variables for evaluation.

F.   LITERATURE REVIEW

1.   U.S. Security Assistance Supports Host Nation Democratization

There are four causal mechanisms supporting the hypothesis that U.S. security assistance supports host nation democratization. The first mechanism is that when prosperous democracies set a good example of protecting human rights and individual liberties, it influences other countries to do likewise. Marcin Krol wrote, "The future of democracy in the world—and especially in East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union—depends much more on the state of democracy in the West than it does on developments in the new democracies themselves."[22] His logic was that if established democracies produce unappealing results and lack credibility, then states in transition may

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[21] Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir A. Makdisi, "The Democracy Deficit in the Arab World," in *Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the Deficit*, ed. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir A. Makdisi (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 314–317.

[22] Marcin Krol, "Where East Meets West," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed., ed. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 359.

opt for alternative systems of government.[23] Charles S. Robb argued that U.S. democracy is not perfect, but the manner in which it overcame obstacles to increasingly protect freedom makes it a suitable example to democratizing states—who should mimic the function of U.S. democracy while customizing a locally appropriate form of it.[24] He recommended that "building democratic competence abroad should [be] the central aim of U.S. foreign policy, for in the long run, the best way to promote our national interests is to promote basic democratic values."[25] In his view, implementation includes bolstering the host nation's "democratic center" (whatever it may be); it is a bottom-up approach, because he argued a top-down approach leads to bloated government bureaucracy.[26]

The second mechanism is that aid conditionality incentivizes state elites to democratize to secure the future flow of aid money. Countering the idea that the "inconsistent application of human rights" conditionality undermines the moral force of the United States, Paula J. Dobriansky argued that coercion and aid conditionality are significantly more influential than "moral force" in stimulating liberalism and democratization in repressive governments.[27] Her main argument was that "the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad is not only a moral imperative but also a sound strategic approach to bolster U.S. national security."[28] She detailed how, beginning in the 1970s, U.S. Congress made foreign assistance and security assistance conditional on host nation human rights considerations, but that the enduring dilemma is "how to reconcile human rights considerations with other foreign-policy factors."[29] She reasoned that human rights-guided policy choices must provide tangible results and be actionable within the limits of U.S. resources and capabilities.[30]

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[23] Ibid., 363.

[24] Charles S. Robb, "Developing Democracy at Home and Abroad," in *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 141–143.

[25] Ibid., 141.

[26] Ibid., 141–143.

[27] Paula J. Dobriansky, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy," in *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 155–157.

[28] Ibid., 158.

[29] Ibid., 148–149.

[30] Ibid., 153–154.

The third mechanism is that externally sourced peacekeeping operations, security force assistance, and security sector assistance efforts bolster the security necessary for democratic transitions, consolidation, and all other aspects democratic governance itself. Kristine Hoglund argued that security sector reform—especially civilian control of the military and police reform—delivers the security that is fundamentally necessary for liberal democracy.[31] Jeroen de Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar argued that "domestic political will and commitment to political reform" are influential factors in democratization, but that external democracy assistance can also make a difference.[32] They specified what is required for a successful war-to-peace transition: "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants, the installation of democratic civilian control over the military, and other related security reforms."[33] Particularly relevant is de Zeeuw and L. van de Goor's focus on security sector reform: "Unless security forces are accountable to democratically elected civil authorities and oversight bodies under the rule of law, the sustainability of democratic transitions of postconflict societies will remain fragile."[34] They recommended integrating security sector reform into a comprehensive democracy assistance strategy.[35] In short, they proposed a maximalist approach to support host nation democratization with the view that SA supports democratization.

To put this approach into practice, Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnable advocated for a "gradual process toward more [political] participation" grounded in customized improvements in democracy and liberalism, which are complementary but can change

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[31] Kristine Hoglund, "Violence in War-to-Democracy Transitions," in *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, ed. Anna Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 89–92.

[32] Jeroen de Zeeuw and L. van de Goor, "Findings and Recommendations," in *Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies*, ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2006), 282.

[33] Krishna Kumar and Jeroen de Zeeuw, "Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies," in *Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies*, ed. Jeroen de Zeeuw and Krishna Kumar (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2006), 4.

[34] De Zeeuw and van de Goor, "Findings and Recommendations," 284.

[35] Ibid.

independently in specific host nation circumstances.[36] Schnable argued that external actors are important participants in implementing peaceful transitions and in security sector reform.[37] He said democratization must be top-down to truly succeed, but bottom up efforts are also value-added.[38] Etel Solingen also argued for a top-down, gradualist approach to democratization in the Middle East because that is how previous democratic transitions in the region have succeeded.[39] In sum, the authors proposing this causal mechanism argued that external security support combined with primarily top-down, gradual democracy promotion supports host nation democratization.

The fourth mechanism is that security force assistance supports host nation security sector reform, which improves its civil-military relations (CMR) and democratic governance. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina C. Matei described the evolution of the CMR field of study, detailed a robust conceptualization of CMR, and compiled country case studies based on that framework. Three themes in particular stand out. The first is that effective and efficient security institutions are just as important to good CMR as civilian control of the military.[40] The second is that in politics and academics, CMR is commonly oversimplified to simply mean civilian control of the military.[41] They stated, "neither the scholars working on [democratic] transitions nor the indices and compilations of available data [e.g., Freedom house] deal with the central topics of civil-military relations."[42] Third, robust security sector assistance supports democratization, because security sector

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[36] Albrecht Schnabel, "Nascent Democratization in the Middle East," in *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges*, ed. Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, The Changing Nature of Democracy (Tokyo: United Nations Univ. Press, 2003), 1–5.

[37] Albrecht Schnabel, "Democratization and Peacebuilding," in *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges*, ed. Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, The Changing Nature of Democracy (Tokyo: United Nations Univ. Press, 2003), 30–31.

[38] Ibid., 34–35.

[39] Etel Solingen, "Toward a Democratic Peace in the Middle East," in *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges*, ed. Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, The Changing Nature of Democracy (Tokyo: United Nations Univ. Press, 2003), 47–57.

[40] Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei, introduction to *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 2012), 1.

[41] Thomas C. Bruneau, "Development of an Approach Through Debate," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 2012), 25.

[42] Bruneau and Matei, Introduction, 2.

assistance supports security sector reform, which supports CMR, which is an essential ingredient for good democracy.

The above model of civil-military relations is instructive, but what challenges hinder security sector reform, and how might security sector assistance overcome them? Philippe C. Schmitter argued that in democratic transitions (especially from military dictatorships), the primary challenge is for elected officials to re-integrate and re-task the security sector and military while simultaneously holding them accountable for human rights abuses, all without creating a military backlash.[43] He argued that the police are the face of the state to the populace, and security sector reform under democratic, civilian control boosts state legitimacy.[44] Bruneau argued that civilians have to have some degree of expertise on military affairs to manage it effectively, and NATO's Partnership for Peace (founded 1994) was the only organization that used effectiveness and efficiency as lines of effort in their security sector assistance operations.[45]

Matei explained that the current security environment is complex, interconnected, and dynamic.[46] There is a wide variety of security force mixtures and potential missions, so it is vital to clearly define the roles and missions of the police, military, and intelligence services in order to have a stable democracy.[47] Democratic civilian control includes "institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the inculcation of professional norms."[48] Effectiveness is measured by the ability to: conduct planning, implement those plans, and provide resources and training to make it a reality.[49] Efficiency is "the ability to fulfill assigned roles and missions at the optimum cost."[50] Bruneau and Matei concluded that host

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[43] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed., ed. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 89–92.

[44] Ibid., 90.

[45] Bruneau, "Development of an Approach Through Debate," 23.

[46] Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," 27.

[47] Ibid., 28.

[48] Ibid., 30.

[49] Ibid., 31–33.

[50] Ibid., 32.

nation "political will and interest are vital to institutionalizing civil-military relations," but interest must be coupled with expertise to successfully conduct security sector reform.[51] They also noted that membership requirements for international organizations (e.g., the European Union) and external security threats often incentivized security sector reform, even if state elites would otherwise prefer not to undertake reforms.[52] As theory these concepts offer ideas for consideration, but how has U.S. policy on security sector assistance and security force assistance sought to overcome the challenges confronting host nation security sector reform in the past?

Barack H. Obama wrote, "Defending democracy and human rights is related to every enduring national interest. It aligns us with the aspirations of ordinary people throughout the world. We know from our own history people must lead their own struggles for freedom if those struggles are to succeed. But America is also uniquely situated—and routinely expected—to support peaceful democratic change."[53] Similar language has been a part of national security strategy (NSS) documents since the end of the Cold War. Martin Dempsey described security cooperation and military engagement as the methods by which the United States can build partner capacity, which will support the NSS initiatives of defending democracy and human rights.[54] The 2015 national military strategy was understandably security-focused, but it also acknowledged moral considerations: the strategy "acknowledges our significant advantages, our commitment to international norms, the importance of our allies and partners, and the powerful allure of freedom and human dignity."[55] Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23) *U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy (2013)* identified four goals for U.S. security sector assistance, one being to "promote universal values, such as good governance, transparent and accountable

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[51] Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei, Conclusion, in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 2012), 346–347.

[52] Ibid., 347–348.

[53] Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), 19, http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf.

[54] Martin Dempsey, *National Military Strategy* (Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2015), 12, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

[55] Ibid., 17.

oversight of security forces, rule of law, transparency, accountability, delivery of fair and effective justice, and respect for human rights."[56] This exact language is in U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, PART I, Chap 16, Security Cooperation.[57] Chap 16 also included explicit prohibitions on providing security assistance to entities that violate human rights, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act.

Prominent themes in the *Quadrennial Defense Review 2014* included defense institution building (DIB) activities, the rule of law, respect for human rights, good governance, democratic governance, institutional capacity, and interoperability.[58] The U.S. Diplomacy Center's *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2015* argued that U.S. security depends upon proliferation of liberal democratic values, and actively promoting good governance was its primary initiative.[59] In their view, these are universal values, and long-term commitment to them is required for tangible democratic gains.[60]

DoD Directive 5000.68 *Security Force Assistance (SFA)* described security force assistance as a subset of DoD security cooperation designed to support host nation security sector reform initiatives.[61] It explained that the DoD's "primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or re-establishment of the armed forces and the defense sector across the operational spectrum."[62] DoD Directive 5205.82 *Defense Institution Building (DIB)* stated that "DIB should contribute to the establishment or strengthening of democratic governance of defense and security forces," and it explained in detail the effectiveness, efficiency, and civilian control necessary for good civil-military relations as

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[56] The White House. "Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy," 2013, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ssa.pdf.

[57] Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 16—Security Cooperation, United States Code, §—.

[58] Chuck Hagel, *Quadrennail Defense Review 2014* (Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2014), 5–29, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

[59] U.S. Diplomacy Center, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 2015* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2015), 10–11, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/267396.pdf.

[60] Ibid., 28.

[61] Department of Defense, *Security Force Assistance (SFA)*, DoD Directive 5000.68 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 2, www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/500068p.pdf.

[62] Ibid., 19.

part of DIB's purpose.[63] DIB is designed to enhance capabilities between the service headquarters and ministerial levels of the security sector.[64] In short, DIB is a set of SC programs designed to support democratization.

DoD Directive 5132.03 *Security Cooperation* required Geographic Combatant Commanders' theater campaign plans to have SC plans that synchronized with PPD-23 and the Integrated Country Strategies published by U.S. embassies.[65] Joint Publication 3–20 *Security Cooperation* stated, "Absent a waiver for extraordinary circumstances, units of [a foreign security force] may not receive any training, equipment, or other assistance from DoD if there is credible evidence that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights (Title 10, USC, Section 2249e) [a.k.a. Leahy Law]."[66] According to Security Assistance Monitor, the impetus for the Leahy Law's small unit-centric approach to withholding SA was "due to previous U.S. administrations' reluctance to withhold all security aid to a country's entire armed forces."[67]

The U.S. Government Accountability Office noted that there were more than 100 total authorities for SA and SC programs—a proliferation since 2001 in response to national security objectives—which led to the security cooperation reform in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act.[68] It also described building partner capacity (BPC) as "a key element of the U.S. national security, national counterterrorism, and national defense strategies… a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy in recent years."[69] The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act streamlined funding sources for SA and SC programs and reformed DoD SC operations. Two important initiatives stood out. First, U.S. Congress

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[63] Department of Defense, *Defense Institution Building (DIB)*, DoD Directive 5205.82 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 3, www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/520582p.pdf.

[64] Ibid., 5.

[65] Department of Defense, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*, 14.

[66] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Security Cooperation*, B-14.

[67] "Applying the Leahy Law to U.S. Military and Police Aid" (Security Assistance Monitor, 2014), 3.

[68] Charles M. Johnson, Jr., *Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts*, GAO-17-255R (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 1–4.

[69] Ibid., 3.

expected the DoD to shift away from a tactical "train and equip" approach and "to increase its emphasis on strengthening the defense institutions of friendly foreign nations as it builds security cooperation programs and activities and expects proposals submitted to Congress to include a robust defense institution building component."[70] Second, it centralized authority and responsibility of SC activities under Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) authority, including defense institution building initiatives focused on defense governance and management (DGM).[71]

As the above policy documents make evident, the primary approach of the U.S. government to support host nation democratization by strengthening civil-military relations has included conditionality on respect for human rights, defense institution building, and internal reorganization to synchronize U.S. SC and SA programs pertaining to host nation civil-military relations and good governance. Andrus W. Chaney argued that to operationalize security cooperation in accordance with the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, combatant commander campaign plans must designate a defense institution building line of effort that is separate from building partner capacity initiatives.[72] Boko J. Skorupski and Nina M. Serafino examined key SC programs and determined that the rising prominence of defense institution building reflects U.S. recognition of the importance of defense governance and management to its foreign policy objectives.[73] Specifically, they observed that "addressing deficiencies in foreign defense institutions has been increasingly perceived as an integral part of BPC programs."[74] As previously mentioned, the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act codified this conceptual shift by centralizing these initiatives under DSCA's cognizance, but funding is still a small fraction of the larger SA and SC programs previously mentioned.[75]

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[70] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Report 114–840, 114th Cong. (2016), 1198.

[71] Ibid., 1199.

[72] Andrus W. Chaney, "Implementing Guidance for Security Cooperation: Overcoming Obstacles to U.S. Africa Command's Efforts," *Joint Force Quarterly* 88 (1st Quarter 2018), 94–99.

[73] Skorupski and Serafino, *DoD Security Cooperation*, 12–13.

[74] Ibid., 12.

[75] Ibid., 12–13.

Of note, the policy documents focused on tasks and intent, not on convincing its readers that such efforts will have the intended effects on host nation governance. The policy documents assumed that U.S. security sector assistance and security force assistance can effectively support host nation democratization. Inherent in every argument in this category is the ideas that U.S. influence can be a decisive factor in host nation politics.

2.   U.S. Security Assistance Undermines Host Nation Democratization

In the literature reviewed, there were four causal mechanisms supporting the hypothesis that U.S. security assistance undermines host nation democratization. The first mechanism is that strengthening the security apparatus of a non-democratic state enables them to oppress democratic reformists more effectively. In a quantitative study in 2006, Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson found that "USAID Democracy and Governance [DG] obligations *have a significant positive impact on democracy, while all other U.S. and non-U.S. assistance variables are statistically insignificant.*"[76] Effects of USAID DG lag and are cumulative over time, and "GDP growth and regional democratic diffusion" were stronger predictors of Freedom House scores than USAID DG.[77] In short, the study concluded that the modest gains of USAID DG reflect the modesty of its inputs (as compared to U.S. SA and military expenditures).[78]

However, in 2008, Finkel et al. updated their findings and included 2004 data. They estimated that $10 million of USAID DG equated to an average of 0.29 points "more free" in the host nation's Freedom House ratings.[79] After they controlled for the Iraq War effect, they still found an underlying pattern that "democracy assistance is less powerful when the

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[76] Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, *Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building: Results of a Cross-National Quantitative Study* (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2006), 1; emphasis original.

[77] Ibid., 2.

[78] Ibid., 3.

[79] Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, Mitchell A. Seligson, and C. Neal Tate, *Deepening Our Understanding of the Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building Final Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, 2008), 66.

overall policy toward the recipient country is driven by security concerns."[80] Most importantly, they found the following:

> Democracy assistance, however, is less effective when the U.S. provides larger amounts of military assistance. Our model suggests that, as countries receive larger amounts of U.S. military aid, the impact of USAID democracy assistance matters less and less, and among the few countries that receive larger than 1.1% of U.S. military outlays, the effect of USAID DG assistance is statistically indistinguishable from zero.[81]

Of note, U.S. SA to Lebanon is below the 1.1% threshold of the U.S. SA budget, and Pakistan is above it.[82] Overall, these two statistical studies analyzed 14 years of post-Cold War data and found support for the argument that USAID DG aid supports democratization, but U.S. SA undermined its effectiveness.[83]

Nancy Bermeo argued that "the United States often undercuts its democracy assistance efforts with its military assistance initiatives."[84] Drawing heavily on the work of Finkel et al., her comparative analysis of the military aid to democracy aid ratios covered the time period of 1990–2004.[85] She argued that the United States has favored security considerations over democracy promotion, as evident by its disproportionate provision of military aid to authoritarian governments since 1990.[86] This strengthens an authoritarian state's coercive apparatus, which "is likely to use its coercive apparatus in ways that work against democratizers."[87] She reasoned that in authoritarian states, the only way to improve

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[80] Ibid., 5.

[81] Ibid., 67.

[82] "Security Assistance Monitor Data," Security Assistance Monitor, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard.

[83] Finkel et al., *Deepening Our Understanding of the Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building Final Report*, 67–68.

[84] Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," 73.

[85] In Bermeo's article, her use of the term "security aid" roughly aligns to my use of "security assistance," and her use of "military aid" roughly aligns to my use of "security cooperation," which includes DoD-administered security assistance programs. The main difference is that some programs (e.g., foreign military sales) are not technically "aid," because the host nation purchases U.S. arms with their own money. This thesis includes all programs in its analysis, regardless of whether or not the host nation receives direct material benefit, whereas Bermeo focused specifically on aid. Not all SA or SC is aid.

[86] Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," 78.

[87] Ibid., 77.

the effectiveness of democracy promotion (and democratization) is to decrease military aid relative to democracy aid.[88] The primary causal mechanism is similar to the aid dependency or resource curse dynamic.[89] Despite this negative correlation, she acknowledged that U.S. aid is not *the* decisive factor in another country's democratization, specifically cautioning against an inflated view of U.S. influence.[90]

Kamel S. Abu Jaber, Peter Burnell, Richard Youngs, and Mark Falcoff agreed with Bermeo's assessment. Abu Jaber explained that repeated regional crises in the Middle East mean that "stability has overtaken democracy as a supreme value [which], in turn, has meant the strengthening, indeed enlargement, of the security apparatus and the expansion of its functions."[91] Burnell and Youngs wrote that "military aid will continue to empower hard-liners in non-democracies to quash the very reformists who are receiving support in varying (often modest) degrees by the same or other Western donors."[92] In sum, they argued that democracy assistance has modestly positive impact, and the best approach may be to focus on bolstering states undergoing cooperative democratic transitions and avoid forcing authoritarians to democratize.[93] In their view, the primary motivation for many host nation citizens to democratize is unrelated to U.S. credibility.[94] Mark Falcoff argued that International Military Education and Training (IMET)[95] has either negative or neutral effects on democratization.[96] His supporting evidence includes anecdotes of the many Latin American military officer who became dictators or committed gross violations of

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[88] Ibid., 82.

[89] Ibid., 89.

[90] Ibid., 85–86.

[91] Kamel S. Abu Jaber, "The Democratic Process in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan," in *Democratization in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Challenges*, ed. Amin Saikal and Albrecht Schnabel, The Changing Nature of Democracy (Tokyo: United Nations Univ. Press, 2003), 128–129.

[92] Ibid., 196.

[93] Ibid., 197–200.

[94] Peter Burnell and Richard Youngs, "Addressing Democracy's Challenges," in *New Challenges to Democratization*, ed. Peter J. Burnell and Richard Youngs (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 190.

[95] The IMET program and expanded IMET (E-IMET) program are Title 22 funded, Department of State supervised, and Department of Defense executed.

[96] Mark Falcoff, "The Democratic Prospect in Latin America," in *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 72–73.

human rights after going through IMET programs that were supposed to infuse them with liberal-democratic values.[97] In sum, this causal mechanism supports the idea that host nation institutional structures incentivize elites to resist democratic reform, and U.S. SA gives them a greater capacity to resist.

The second mechanism's logic is this: when prosperous democracies set a bad example domestically and/or support repressive authoritarians abroad, that hypocrisy undermines their moral authority and makes democracy less appealing to would-be host nation democratizers. With enduring U.S. support to Israel while turning a blind eye to the Palestinians' grievances in mind, Bassma Kodmani articulated it this way: "Claiming to empower people and give them a voice, and then doing what infuriates and alienates them, goes a long way in explaining the failure of the democracy promotion agenda."[98] Marian L. Lawson and Susan B. Epstein argued that U.S. moral authority on democracy promotion decreases when it "exerts pressure on some regimes for undemocratic practices while ignoring similar practices among strategic partners against terrorism, or major oil suppliers."[99] In a word, favoritism. She explained how under President Reagan, the 1983 creation of the privately-run National Endowment for Democracy (NED) enabled the United States to avoid the overt appearance of simultaneously supporting dictators with SA and democratic movements (legally speaking).[100] To better support host nation democratization, she recommended aid conditionality and more NED (a non-governmental organization) vice USAID (a government organization) democracy promotion, because there is a lot of anti-Western sentiment in the Middle East.[101]

The third mechanism is that the history of Western foreign policy created a resistance toward Western liberal democracy, and it planted fear of Western-sponsored

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[97] Ibid.

[98] Bassma Kodmani, "Democratization by Whom? Resistance to Democracy Promotion in the Middle East," in *New Challenges to Democratization*, ed. Peter J. Burnell and Richard Youngs (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 169–170.

[99] Marian L. Lawson and Susan B. Epstein, *Democracy Promotion: An Objective of U.S. Foreign Assistance*, CRS Report No. R44858 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 17, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44858.pdf.

[100] Ibid., 5.

[101] Ibid., 18–19.

democratic revolutions into the minds of authoritarians. Heather Deegan argued that hundreds of years of colonial domination and post-colonial influence (i.e., the Cold War containment strategy) in the Middle East and South Asia created a resistance toward Western, liberal democracy and a desire to forge their own political path.[102] She reasoned that as authoritarian countries' economies develop and the populace becomes more educated, increased demand for political participation could de-stabilize autocratic regimes if they do not liberalize.[103] She concluded that "the onus is now on the states of the region to define and determine their political progress in a democratic direction."[104]

Referring to the post-Cold War period, Thomas Carothers observed that some semi-authoritarian states genuinely fear a color revolution, believing that mass protests are often instigated by the United States.[105] He assessed that many view U.S. democracy promotion as "a code word for military intervention and U.S. hegemony," because many of the color revolutions happened shortly after the 2003 Iraq War began.[106] In the post-9/11 context, Edmund Ratka argued that U.S. SA undermines democratization when it is "too aggressive and intransigent"—as in the post-9/11 context about which he wrote—though it could support democratization when the United States is closely partnered with cooperative constituents.[107] In short, they argued that U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization because of a the host nation's rational response to historic Western and U.S. policies.

The fourth mechanism is that U.S. SA creates an aid dependency dynamic, especially when such assistance lacks conditionality related to democratic reform. Timothy D. Sisk argued that security and democratization can work at cross-purpose, especially in war-torn societies, so a comprehensive plan tailored to local circumstances is necessary to

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[102] Heather Deegan, *Middle East and Problems of Democracy*, Issues in Third World Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publ, 1994), 125–135.

[103] Ibid., 130.

[104] Ibid., 135.

[105] Thomas Carothers, "The Continuing Backlash Against Democracy Promotion," in *New Challenges to Democratization*, ed. Peter J. Burnell and Richard Youngs (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 62.

[106] Ibid., 63–65.

[107] Edmund Ratka, "On the Emergence of an Arab Democracy," *International Reports* 33, no. 2 (2017): 49.

effectively manage democratization and peace simultaneously.[108] Virginia P. Fortna argued that stability from peacekeeping can support post-conflict democratic transition in the short-term, but it may undermine democratic consolidation in the long-term.[109] In her view, there is an inherent tension between SA and democratization because of aid dependency and its negative effects on the government's accountability to its citizens.[110]

Sarah Chayes described corrupt governance as the primary cause of citizens' grievances, instability, and terrorism.[111] She described "kleptocratic" governments as "vertically integrated criminal organizations… whose core activity was not in fact exercising the functions of a state but rather extracting resources for personal gain."[112] It is, in effect, corrupt governance, and she assessed them to be inherently untrustworthy with abiding by SA conditionality.[113] She contended for creative SA conditionality custom-designed to incentivize corruption reduction and good governance, ensuring that tactical-level SC programs and strategic-level host nation communication intentionally avoid supporting kleptocratic networks.[114] She argued that correcting corruption in the military and police (i.e., security sector reform) is of prime importance, and multilateral institutions should support reformers and oppose corrupt officials in all tiers of society.[115] She concluded that subordinating security concerns to good governance initiatives is an effective approach to accomplishing U.S. security objectives.[116]

Elliott Abrams explained the evolution of U.S. foreign policy with regards to human rights from the 1970s until present day. His main argument was that democracy

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[108] Timothy D. Sisk, "Peacebuilding as Democratization: Findings and Recommendations," in *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, ed. Anna Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 250–259.

[109] Fortna, "Peacekeeping and Democratization," 64–65.

[110] Ibid., 45–48.

[111] Sarah Chayes, *Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2015), 204.

[112] Ibid., 62.

[113] Ibid., 186.

[114] Ibid., 196–197.

[115] Ibid., 197–202.

[116] Ibid., 202–204.

promotion and defending human rights should be the foundation for U.S. foreign policy, and such a policy is simultaneously idealistic and pragmatic.[117] His logic is that repressive governments inherently lack legitimacy. Therefore, supporting them (e.g., U.S. SA) will make the United States complicit in their repression, undermine host nation democratization, and compromise U.S. security by setting the conditions for violent resistance in its various forms.[118] He recommended to support host nation democratic constituencies, stop aiding autocrats who will not allow political competition, and to condition U.S. SA on security sector reform.[119] Specifically, he listed three goals of conditioning SA: avoiding U.S. complicity in repression, increasing host nation security force effectiveness, and increasing "civilian control of the military."[120] He concluded that U.S. SA in its current form undermines democratization, but it would support democratization with properly designed conditionality. Of note, inherent in every argument in this category is the idea that U.S. influence can be a decisive factor in host nation politics.

3.   **U.S. Security Assistance Has Minimal Influence on Host Nation Democratization; Domestic and/or Regional Political Factors Are the Primary Drivers**

The central idea behind every argument in this category is that other factors decisively supersede U.S. SA in determining democratic outcomes, though SA could still exert some degree of influence in the process (either for or against democratization). Many of the authors relied on historic examples to support this viewpoint, rather than detailing specific causal mechanisms. Nonetheless, I extracted five causal mechanisms supporting this hypothesis.

The first is that host nation elites are inherently more politically influential, and their will to democratize is indispensable for a successful democratic transition. This mechanism is well summarized by key themes from Brad Roberts: first, external powers

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[117] Elliott Abrams, *Realism and Democracy: American Foreign Policy After the Arab Spring* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 214.

[118] Ibid., 201–214.

[119] Ibid., 219–232.

[120] Ibid., 233–234.

can shape the geopolitical environment, but domestic political actors are the dominant influence on the politics of a host nation.[121] Second, democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy has shifted from a "lead by example at home" approach to one of more direct involvement via deliberately funded programs.[122] Roberts explained that democratic peace theory came to dominate foreign policy strategies by the late 1980s.[123] He argued that states with increasingly powerful militaries would be compelled by the international community to govern wisely, and democracy is the most pragmatic way to meet those expectations.[124] Per his logic, security assistance could be a stepping stone toward democratization. In his view, "democracy cannot be exported. Democracy can be encouraged and assisted; but it cannot be imposed."[125] While the proliferation of democracy and human rights in governance results mainly from host nation imperatives, international support is critical to assisting with democratic transitions.[126] He also stated that linkage (i.e., conditionality) can effectively encourage host nation democratization, but that still "the United States must lead by example… the health of the domestic polity is ignored at the peril to the broader democratic cause."[127]

Carl Gershman argued that after Nicaragua's turn to communism, U.S. foreign policy needed a new approach that featured democracy promotion as a national security imperative—this led to the 1983 establishment of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).[128] He described effective democracy promotion as requiring first and foremost the commitment of the host nation, but external assistance in the areas of "institutional pluralism, governance, and democratic culture" can also help.[129] He believed that program

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[121] Brad Roberts, introduction in *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), xii.

[122] Ibid., xii.

[123] Brad Roberts, "Human Rights and International Security," in *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 206–207.

[124] Ibid., 211.

[125] Ibid.

[126] Ibid., 211–212.

[127] Ibid.

[128] Gershman, "The United States and the World Democratic Revolution," 6.

[129] Ibid., 10–11.

funding must be robust to be effective.[130] Hans Binnendijk's main argument was that "internal factors dominate most transition processes. While the role of the superpowers is generally limited, there are critical moments when their actions can make a difference."[131] He argued that engaging with authoritarian states can constructively assist with effectively managing democratic transitions, but assistance must be designed to strengthen civil society, state institutions, and the democratic opposition.[132] He concluded that "successful management of a transition can bring at least a form of democracy to a nation and can in the process enhance U.S. foreign policy interests."[133] Thus, in their view U.S. SA (though not decisive) can add value to democratization if properly designed and implemented along with other forms of assistance.

In Timothy Edmunds' re-conceptualization of security sector reform (SSR), he included its relationship with democratization, security assistance, good governance, human rights, and all institutions involved with security provision.[134] He revealed how the post-Cold War wave of democracy in Eastern Europe, the maturation of the field of security studies, and the development community's newfound appreciation for security's support for economic development all converged to increase emphasis on SSR in the 1990s.[135] In his model, SSR is normatively democratic, and it typically includes conditionality and external SA.[136] Central to his argument is the point that the more the security sector was integrated with the authoritarian regime before democratization, the more they will tend to resist SSR.[137] He claimed that in practice, SSR "complemented and facilitated pre-existing processes of democratization and political change, rather than causing or catalyzing them

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[130] Ibid., 13.

[131] Hans Binnendijk, "Authoritarian Regimes in Transition," in *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 225.

[132] Ibid., 226.

[133] Ibid.

[134] Edmunds, "Security Sector Reform," 48.

[135] Ibid., 49.

[136] Ibid., 51–52.

[137] Ibid.

in and of itself."[138] He noted that SSR can be nearly impossible in some circumstances, prompting many SA initiatives to default to limited "train and equip" missions that have minimal effect on long-term democratization and may even increase the state's repressive capacity.[139] However, when genuine local attempts at security sector reform exist, SA and SC programs can have a positive impact.[140] In his view, host nation political actors primarily determine democratization, but SA also has influence. He concluded that security sector reform can either support or undermine democratization, and it must be customized to fit the needs of the host nation's citizens and institutions.[141]

Diamond described democracy as "inherently limited" if there is not civilian control over the military.[142] Regarding civil-military relations, he argued that "the best way for a democracy to deter a coup is to govern effectively and maintain broad legitimacy."[143] He recommended an incremental reform process to establish civilian oversight, reorient the military toward external defense, slowly remove them from the political realm, and punish human rights abuses only to the extent that it will not risk a coup.[144] In short, "civilian supremacy and democratic legitimacy go hand in hand."[145] Regarding democracy promotion efforts, he contended that the United States must set a positive democratic example and actively promote democracy abroad in order for consolidation to occur and new openings to be exploited, but domestic actors will primarily determine the success of host nation democratization.[146] He also gave credit to economic growth and international institutions as means by which autocrats are pressured to democratize.[147]

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[138] Ibid., 54.

[139] Ibid., 54–55.

[140] Ibid., 56.

[141] Ibid., 57.

[142] Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 47.

[143] Ibid., 113.

[144] Ibid., 113–115.

[145] Ibid., 116.

[146] Ibid., 273–277.

[147] Ibid.

Diamond also argued that U.S. democracy promotion efforts are less effective than they could be, because U.S. foreign policy inadequately integrates foreign assistance, security assistance, and democracy promotion efforts.[148] In short, U.S. foreign policy must be more coherent, but it is not decisive. He said, "The most favorable development for democratization is a firm and forceful commitment to the process on the part of a country's political leadership."[149] On the one hand, he argued that SA can undermine democracy if the level of aid "disproportionately inflates the resources and power of the military in relation to civil and political institutions."[150] One the other, he says that how FA and SA affect democratization depends upon the "type of entity the external actor is, what its real objectives are, how they are perceived within the recipient country, what form the aid takes, and to whom in the recipient country it is directed."[151] He advocated a multilateral approach (to avoid perception of hidden motives),[152] support for democratic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), recognition that true sovereignty belong to the people, and pluralism and the rule of law.[153] In sum, a coherent engagement with all forms of assistance directed to the right recipients can support democratization, though its effects depend heavily upon the commitment of host nation elites.[154]

Jennifer L. Windsor and Amy Hawthorne articulated a trend in post-9/11 thinking about democracy: it is good for preventing inter-state wars *and* eliminating the societal conditions under which terrorism thrives.[155] They reasoned that externally imposed

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[148] Larry Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: Strategies for Democratization," in *The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy*, ed. Brad Roberts (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 247.

[149] Ibid., 237.

[150] Ibid., 239

[151] Ibid., 240.

[152] Hidden motives such as mentioned by Carothers regarding U.S. support for color revolutions. Carothers, "The Continuing Backlash Against Democracy Promotion," 62.

[153] Diamond, "Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism," 240–244.

[154] Ibid., 247.

[155] Jennifer L. Windsor, "Promoting Democracy Can Combat Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 43; Amy Hawthorne, "The New Reform Ferment," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 61.

democratization usually fails, but that targeted support for host nation democrats can accomplish security objectives and support host nation democratization.[156] Regarding SA and FA efforts, Windsor argued that short-term security risks may be necessary to produce long-term democratization, but that it is worth it for both moral and pragmatic reasons.[157]

Carothers and Marina Ottaway expressed the following themes regarding democracy promotion in the Middle East. First, the gradualist, top-down approach to democratization rarely works.[158] Second, democratization requires opposition groups with large constituencies to form political parties that can truly compete with the incumbent for power, and those are typically Islamist groups, not democratic political parties.[159] Democracy's ideological challengers (e.g., Islamism and nationalism) do not have enough mass appeal to replace it as the world's dominant political system.[160] However, democracy's primacy is not assured, and it still faces entrenched political challenges in many countries, which complicate the already complex process of democratization.[161] Third, external actors have minimal influence compared to domestic political power brokers.[162] Fourth, the United States lacks pro-democracy credibility because of its unconditional support for Israel, its neglect of Palestinians' rights, and its consistent support for friendly autocrats in recent decades.[163] They concluded that "outside actors will

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[156] Windsor, "Promoting Democracy Can Combat Terrorism," 50; Hawthorne, "The New Reform Ferment," 61.

[157] Windsor, "Promoting Democracy Can Combat Terrorism," 54–56.

[158] Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, "The New Democracy Imperative," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 11–16.

[159] Marina Ottaway, "The Missing Constituency for Democratic Reform," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 151–169.

[160] Marina Ottaway, "Ideological Challenges to Democracy: Do They Exist?," in *New Challenges to Democratization*, ed. Peter J. Burnell and Richard Youngs (London; New York: Routledge, 2010), 43–58.

[161] Ibid., 56–58.

[162] Amy Hawthorne, "Is Civil Society the Answer?," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 107.

[163] Marina Ottaway, "The Missing Constituency for Democratic Reform," and Marina Ottaway, "The Problem of Credibility," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 163–187.

in most instances not be the primary determinants of change[, but] they can make positive contributions."[164]

Carothers argued that external aid is somewhat influential, but not as much as donors would like to think. He mentioned that the 1991 U.S. Congress requirement for IMET to emphasize to new democracies "civilian control of the armed forces, human rights, and other democracy-related topics."[165] He argued that IMET (including E-IMET) is an ineffective tool for changing civil-military relations, because militaries and government bureaucracies are deeply entrenched and resistant to institutional change, *even if* they favor democratization, which they often do not.[166] It is not a matter of training, but one of incentives. Joshua Kurlantzick concurred that the U.S. IMET program "is not effectively promoting democracy and respect for civilian command of the armed forces."[167] He recommended more rigorous human rights screening as a pre-requisite for funding foreign officer involvement in U.S. training programs. He asserted that "failing to use U.S. training to emphasize respect for democratic institutions sends a message that assistance does not distinguish between abusive and law-abiding militaries."[168]

The second mechanism is that the presence or absence of host nation characteristics, historical experiences, or societal pre-conditions influence democratization more than U.S. SA. Seymour M. Lipset explained how past British rule is highly correlated with

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[164] Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, "Getting to the Core," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 267.

[165] Carothers is referring to the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program, which is a component of the IMET program and pulls from IMET's annual appropriations under Title 22. It is DoD executed, and it also authorized training for civilians, military justice systems, defense management, and others personnel who may contribute to democratization and respect for human rights in accordance with international norms; Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 52.

[166] Ibid., 200–201.

[167] Joshua Kurlantzick, "Reforming the U.S. International Military Education and Training Program," *Council on Foreign Relations*, June 8, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-international-military-education-and-training-program.

[168] Ibid.

democracy.[169] It is a historical, institutional influence that is particularly relevant to the Pakistan case study, and it supports the idea that prior experience with democracy and civil society support democratic consolidation. Stephen M. Walt argued that U.S. democracy promotion is best accomplished by diplomacy and by setting a credible democratic example domestically, not by "foreign-imposed regime change."[170] His logic is that there are many societal pre-requisites for democracy to thrive, and democratization by military intervention "almost always triggers violent resistance."[171] He added that non-military foreign policy tools can be effective when applied to countries who have budding democratic movements and the economic, legal, and social precursors to democracy.

Henry S. Rowen argued that rising incomes and education proliferation will gradually cause democratization, despite any temporal setbacks.[172] Rowen observed that many Islamic and Arab countries are less "free" than they "should be" per their income levels. However, when he excluded oil-rich states, there was "no significant correlation" between being Islamic or Arab and being "less free," which undermines cultural arguments and supports the petro-state explanation for an undemocratic Middle East.[173] Regardless, he encouraged rich democracies to support democratic movements with an eye for long-term success.[174] Georg Sørensen argued that democracy promotion can be effective in spite of barriers.[175] He noted three key domestic precursors for democratic success: "(1) political leaders committed to the promotion of democracy, (2) a politically independent, merit-based state bureaucracy, and (3) a vibrant civil society capable of imposing checks on the

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[169] Seymour M. Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed., ed. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 153.

[170] Stephen M. Walt, "Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries?," *Foreign Policy*, April 25, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/25/why-is-america-so-bad-at-promoting-democracy-in-other-countries/.

[171] Ibid.

[172] Henry S. Rowen, "The Tide Underneath the 'Third Wave,'" in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed., ed. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 307.

[173] Ibid., 311.

[174] Ibid., 317.

[175] Georg Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a Changing World*, 3rd ed., Dilemmas in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 80.

state."[176] Simon Bromley identified two pre-requisites for democratic, capitalist state formation: first, the state's monopoly on coercion; and second, the separation between the political and economic sources of power.[177] These ideas are especially relevant to civil-military relations (CMR) in general and Pakistan's military economy in particular.

Bellin specified per capita Gross National Product (GNP) thresholds over which democracy is more likely to consolidate.[178] She studied a 25-year time span and found that "once a country reaches the threshold of per capital GNP of $4,200, democracy has a better than even chance of surviving. By $6,000, democracy is nearly invulnerable… not a single democracy has ever [as of 2005] collapsed that has achieved a per capita GNP of $6,055."[179] Contrary to Rowen, this does *not* mean that economic growth causes political reform, but that it entrenches democratic gains and diminishes the appeal of political violence to the host nation's citizens, which fosters stable governance.[180] Mancur Olson argued that "the conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the securing of property rights and contract rights that generates economic growth."[181] Thus, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, private property and contract rights, and respect for human rights generally precede democratization.[182] He stated that either stronger foreign governments or internal actors may initiate change, but that certain domestic factors determine the likelihood of success.[183] Essentially, a mixture of liberalism, the absence of a dominant group in society, and intermixed groups that cannot effectively become enclaves sets the conditions for power sharing and democratization.[184]

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[176] Ibid., 98.

[177] Simon Bromley, "The Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East," in *Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West*, ed. David Held (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1993), 380.

[178] Eva Bellin, "The Political-Economic Conundrum," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 141–143.

[179] Ibid., 143.

[180] Ibid., 143–148

[181] Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 567.

[182] Ibid., 572–574.

[183] Ibid.

[184] Ibid., 573–574.

The third mechanism is that donor countries lack the resources or political will to commit a large enough effort for long enough to decisively influence democratization. Carothers argued that external actors must be flexible, adaptable, and make long-term commitments (decades) with overwhelming resources to have a decisive impact on host nation democratization.[185] Samuel P. Huntington's argued that "economic development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real."[186] He believed U.S. military influence abroad could support liberalism and democratization, but he doubted the United States would commit large enough long enough to produce results unless the host nation had already begun a democratic transition.[187] As a result, he contended the influence U.S. democracy promotion was limited to the example it sets domestically.[188]

Carothers highlighted the widely held perception among democracy promotion professionals that police aid, SA programs, and SC programs "may well conflict with democratic and human rights goals."[189] He described the evolution of democracy promotion in U.S. foreign policy from President Clinton's to George W. Bush's administration. One theme was that modest democracy promotion efforts cannot yield decisive improvements in host nation democratization.[190] He attributed the limits of U.S. influence to the host nations' "deeply rooted psychological legacies of dictatorial rule, heavily concentrated economic power structures, and debilitatingly weak governmental institutions."[191] External actors "become the central determinant of political change only if they are willing to intervene massively, impose a de facto protectorate, and stay for an

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[185] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 341–351.

[186] Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed., ed. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 24.

[187] Ibid., 6.

[188] Ibid., 6–7.

[189] Thomas Carothers, *Critical Mission Essays on Democracy Promotion* (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 16.

[190] Ibid., 33–34.

[191] Ibid., 46.

indefinite, long term."[192] He explained that the post-9/11 antidote to terrorism was democratization, because many believed repression and authoritarianism had caused anti-Western extremism.[193] He also argued that U.S. support for authoritarians (in the form of SA and FA) undermined its democracy promotion credibility.[194]

Anthony H. Cordesman advocated an integrated, whole of government approach to implementing SA and SC programs as opposed to a basic "train and equip" approach.[195] He argued that "the host country faces a security threat because it has failed to provide political stability, effective governance, and economic security."[196] In short, the United States should either commit decisively to comprehensive FA, SA, and diplomacy or stay out of a host nation conflict altogether.[197] But how would a head of state decide where to commit its limited resources and political capital? Ottaway assessed that weak governments cannot do wholesale reform (i.e., the maximalist approach) in a short period of time unless they have overwhelming international support, but few countries are willing to dedicate that degree of time and resources.[198] To impose a maximalist model across the world would be cost prohibitive to implement, so the United States must revise the model to be more sensitive to resource constraints.[199] She identified two potential solutions: reduce policy ambitions and settle for imperfect democracies, or abandon some countries in which prospects are particularly dim so as to free up resources to focus on countries that can actually be transformed.[200]

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[192] Thomas Carothers, Marina Ottaway, Amy Hawthorne, and Daniel Brumberg, "Democratic Mirage in the Middle East (2002)," in *Critical Mission Essays on Democracy Promotion*, ed. Thomas Carothers (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 232.

[193] Carothers, *Critical Mission Essays on Democracy Promotion*, 227.

[194] Ibid., 228.

[195] Anthony H. Cordesman, "21st Century Conflict: From 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) to a 'Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs' (RCMA)," (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2018), 21–25.

[196] Ibid., 8.

[197] Ibid., 14.

[198] Marina Ottaway, "Promoting Democracy After Conflict: The Difficult Choices," *International Studies Perspectives* 4 (2003): 317.

[199] Ibid., 318–321.

[200] Ibid.

The fourth mechanism is that failures in state legitimacy may motivate citizens to demand democracy. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi compiled case studies from various Arab and Middle East & North African states. They found that oil wealth and armed conflicts were the two common attributes that undermined democratization.[201] They concluded that due to the nature of the "authoritarian bargain," the two critical junctures most likely to foster democratization are: "the frequency and extent of political instability" and failure in economic diversification, "especially youth unemployment."[202]

The fifth mechanism is a principal-agent problem in which U.S. SA lacks the leverage necessary to incentivize host nation democratization due to stronger influence from regional actors. Stephen Biddle argued that the degree to which the interests of the principal (United States) and agent (host nation) align determines the effectiveness of security force assistance.[203] When the agent spends a sizeable share of U.S. SA funding to support divergent interests, the result is less than optimal for the United States, and "even large investments commonly yield disappointing results."[204] He recommended using conditionality to incentivize the host nation to show expected behavior as an aid recipient, but he also recognized that existential threats can nullify conditionality's influence.[205] Michele Dunne argued that U.S. influence in the host nation short of military force is typically non-determinant of political change, but host nation governments would cooperate in security matters if it was to their benefit, despite pressure to liberalize or democratize.[206] For example, she recommended withholding assistance "if governments are insufficiently active in promoting human rights" per the spirit of U.S. SA laws.[207] She also recommended "to incorporate more engagement with and training of foreign military

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[201] Elbadawi and Makdisi, "The Democracy Deficit in the Arab World," 323.

[202] Ibid., 323–324.

[203] Stephen Biddle, "Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency," *Daedalus* 146, no. 4 (October 2017): 128, https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00464.

[204] Ibid., 134.

[205] Ibid., 135.

[206] Michele Dunne, "Integrating Democracy into the U.S. Policy Agenda," in *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 221–226.

[207] Ibid., 218.

and security officers on subjects related to respect for human and civil rights into its cooperation and assistance programs."[208] In short, the United States could simultaneously pursue security objectives and push for internal reform in authoritarian countries.[209]

Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas researched why U.S. building partner capacity (BPC) does or does not work. They concluded that BPC effectiveness depended upon the strategic rationale chosen (Figure 2), consistency and duration of BPC efforts, and external factors outside of U.S. control (e.g., host nation institutional capacity and alignment of interests).[210] On IMET, they argued that the institutional and interpersonal linkages it creates with host nation personnel do not affect the degree of alignment between U.S. and host nation interests.[211] In short, IMET does not bolster respect for human rights and democratization, because it is designed to enhance host nation military capabilities and interoperability.[212] They also stated, "Little evidence exists to suggest that BPC will be effective without a willing and capable partner on the ground."[213]

Figure 2.   BPC Effectiveness by Strategic Rationale.[214]

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[208] Ibid.

[209] Ibid., 225–226.

[210] McInnis and Lucas, *What is 'Building Partner Capacity'*, 57.

[211] Ibid., 49.

[212] Ibid., 47; McInnis and Lucas did not overtly address E-IMET in their analysis.

[213] Ibid., 4.

[214] Ibid., 3.

4. Funding Authorities, Trends, and Democracy

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (last updated in May 2017) is frequently cited in the democratization literature, DoD directives, joint publications, security assistance, and security cooperation documents. It declared that

> the President is directed to formulate and conduct international security assistance programs of the United States in a manner which will promote and advance human rights and avoid identification of the United States, through such programs, with governments which deny to their people internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in violation of international law or in contravention of the policy of the United States as expressed in this section or otherwise.[215]

Similarly, antiterrorism assistance was designed "to increase respect for human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques."[216] No type of assistance was authorized to be provided to an entity "which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights," but it authorized the President to make exceptions for national security threats with a requirement to notify Congress.[217] In general, the National Security Strategies and all DoS and DoD publications used the same language of human rights-related conditionality for the provision of foreign assistance, security assistance, and security cooperation.

In the *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, U.S. Congress amended and added stipulations to the Foreign Assistance Act. It also established international military education and training under the Secretary of State's cognizance with a programmatic intent to "bolster peace, security, and self-reliance of foreign countries' security forces."[218] IMET and arms exports are both subject to the same human rights-related restrictions. It also defined "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" to include "torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,

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[215] Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 115–31 (2017), 172.

[216] Ibid., 198.

[217] Ibid., 171–172.

[218] International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–329 (1976), 733.

prolonged detention without charges and trial, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person."[219]

A 2016 Congressional Research Service study listed U.S. strategic rationales for foreign assistance as: national security (less so during the 1990s), commercial interests, and humanitarian concerns.[220] The five objectives of DoS and USAID foreign assistance programming are "Peace and Security; Investing in People; Governing Justly and Democratically; Economic Growth; and Humanitarian Assistance."[221] Some important trends from 1985–2015 include the following. First, the shift in away from "traditional FMF [foreign military financing] military aid … [toward] DoD-funded military aid."[222] Second, the sharp increase in FA to South and Central Asia after 9/11. Third, the exception for overseas contingency funds to not count against budget caps established by law, providing flexibility to the executive branch.[223] They said the "DoD implements all traditional aid-funded military assistance programs—foreign military financing, IMET, peacekeeping operations, and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF)—in conjunction with policy guidance of the Department of State. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency is the primary DoD body responsible for these programs."[224] All other SA programs are funded and run by the DoS.[225] SA programs are typically authorized by either the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act, but sometimes U.S. Congress gives special authorizations (e.g., the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009).[226]

Jeremy M. Sharp highlighted that there is a continual debate in U.S. foreign policy between whether or not aid should be conditional on host nation democratization, human

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[219] Ibid., 750.

[220] *Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy*, CRS Report No. R40213 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), 3–4, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40213.pdf.

[221] Ibid., 5.

[222] Ibid., 11.

[223] Ibid., 18–19.

[224] Ibid., 22.

[225] Ibid., 23.

[226] Ibid., 29.

rights record, and civil liberties, or whether it is essential to U.S. peace and security in certain situations.[227] Sharp and Carla E. Humud concluded that "U.S. bilateral assistance to the [Middle East] has remained relatively unchanged since before 2011" in terms of its biggest recipients.[228] However, they note that U.S. Congress boosted the DoD's train and equip funding authorities significantly since 2012.[229] Conor M. Savoy and Erol K. Yayboke noted that 'peace and security' program funding is upwards of 32% of total FA funding, the largest category by percentage.[230] They remarked on the post-9/11 shift toward DoD-funded FA efforts, such as "the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund."[231] They also mentioned that economic development assistance is 9.1% of overall U.S. economic engagement in developing countries, while private capital flows are 49%.[232]

Susan B. Epstein and Liana W. Rosen summarized the legal authorities for SA and SC program—*The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, *The Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, Title 22 and Title 10 of the U.S. Code, and the *National Defense Authorization Act*—and described the shift toward a larger role for DoD implementation of programs since the 1980s.[233] As evidence, they noted that since 2006, the DoD administered and managed 50–60% of the overall SA and SC budget compared to 40–50% by the DoS.[234] See Figure 3.

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[227] Jeremy M. Sharp, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request*, CRS Report No. RL32260 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2010), 6–16, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32260.pdf.

[228] Jeremy M. Sharp and Carla E. Humud, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2016 Request*, CRS Report No. R44233 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44233.pdf.

[229] Ibid., 3.

[230] Conor M. Savoy and Erol K. Yayboke, *Reforming and Reorganizing U.S. Foreign Assistance: Increased Efficiency and Effectiveness* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017), 11.

[231] Ibid., 12.

[232] Ibid., 16.

[233] Susan B. Epstein and Liana W. Rosen, *U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding Trends*, CRS Report No. R45091 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 1–2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45091.pdf.

[234] Ibid., 5.

Figure 3.   DoS and DoD Security Assistance and Cooperation Funding:
Annual Proportions, FY2006–FY2017 (req.)[235]

They also displayed figures of data for SA and SC programs by type, and one evident trend was that from FY2006–FY2017 the overwhelming majority of U.S. SA and SC funding went to these five programs: Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, foreign military financing, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, Iraq Security Forces Fund, coalition support funds, and Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.[236] Of note, these heavily funded SA and SC programs are designed to accomplish security objectives, not to foster democratization directly (as is defense institution building, for example), except perhaps through the use of linkage or conditionality (if you accept that those tools affect democratization).

Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry L. Karl's provided a thorough list of procedures that enable democracy, seven of which are from Robert Dahl's concept of "polyarchy,"—which is similar to the definition of democracy in this thesis—but he adds two others.[237]

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[235] Ibid.

[236] Ibid., 7–8.

[237] Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry L. Karl, "What Democracy is… and is Not," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2nd ed., ed. Larry J. Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 54–56.

The first is that elected representatives cannot be subject to nonelected control.[238] They explained that "democracy is in jeopardy if military officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers retain the capacity to act independently of elected civilians or even veto decisions made by the people's representatives."[239] The second is autonomy to make sovereign decisions.[240]

Sujian Guo and Gary A. Stradiotto's quantitative study analyzed what causes a democratic transition to succeed or fail. They categorized all democratic transitions from 1900–1999 into four types: conversion, cooperation, collapse, and foreign intervention.[241] They argued that "the way states transition from dictatorship has a strong effect on the quality and longevity of democracy."[242] Contrary to conventional wisdom, they found that a "cooperative" transition between incumbents and the opposition determined democratic longevity, regardless of prior regime type.[243] They also identified that "once a state has remained democratic for ten years, the possibility of reversion is significantly diminished."[244] This is a useful tool to inform democracy promotion efforts in terms of the time commitment required to create lasting democracy abroad.

5.   Gaps, Similarities, and Differences

a.   *Gaps*

Of the topics within literature review, democratization has the most robust literature. Nonetheless, its discussion of security factors was minimal. This gap is a bit perplexing. As Robert H. Bates wrote, "Those who engage in politics, rather than

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[238] Ibid., 55.

[239] Ibid.

[240] Ibid., 55–56.

[241] Sujian Guo and Gary A. Stradiotto, *Democratic Transitions: Modes and Outcomes*, Democratization Studies 25 (New York: Routledge, 2014), Appendix A.

[242] Ibid., 12.

[243] Ibid., 121–122.

[244] Ibid., 7.

production, specialize in the use of violence."[245] To study politics (regardless of the system of government in question) without studying the security sector is an oversight, because citizens generally expect modern states to provide external and internal security. Nonetheless, many democratization authors focused almost exclusively on politics and economics, putting security issues outside of the scope of their research. Bates described the relationship this way: "The political roots of development productively join with the economic when specialists in violence realize that they can best survive and prevail by promoting the prosperity of their economic base."[246] Simply put, politics, economics, and security are intertwined.

The current civil-military relations literature is adequate for the purposes of this thesis, though additional case studies using a robust theoretical framework (e.g., the *Routledge Handbook on Civil-Military Relations*) would be useful to draw from, rather than the oversimplified focus on civilian control over the military found in most country-specific literature.[247] Also, CMR literature tends to be "more oriented toward descriptive studies than causal analysis… [not] directly relevant to policy-makers."[248] This thesis draws upon Matei's conception of CMR, two country case studies, and ties them together with the security and democratization literature to increase relevance to policy-makers.

Gaps in the SA and SC literature are more a reflection of the organic evolution of associated programs than they are for lack of study. There are many professional journals of the armed forces, Congressional Research Service reports, Government Accountability Office studies, and security studies that discuss these issues in detail. However, they typically focused on security-specific topics without much concern for democratization. When democratization was discussed by the security community, it was often assumed that SA somehow supports democratization, but there is little empirical evidence, theoretical

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[245] Robert H. Bates, *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development*, 2nd ed., The Norton Series in World Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2010), 9.

[246] Ibid., 85.

[247] Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," 26–35.

[248] Jose A. Olmeda, "Escaping From Huntington's Labyrinth: Civil-Military Relations and Comparative Politics," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 2012), 72.

support, or causal mechanism identified to support that assumption.[249] Nancy Bermeo keenly identified this "seam" in the literature as a symptom of stove-piped research efforts from different professional communities.[250] Specifically, security specialists study military spending, but comparativists study democratization; the DoD studies military aid, but the DoS and USAID study foreign assistance and democracy assistance; and the post-conflict democratization experts "focus on small sets of single countries rather than on aid in general."[251] Simply put, literature that *directly* analyzes the relationship between SA and democratization is sparse and often not policy-relevant. This thesis is intended to help fill that gap.

b.   *Similarities and Differences*

The most important similarity is that the democratization, civil-military relations, foreign assistance, and security assistance literature frequently claim that respect for human rights and support for liberal democracies abroad are the ultimate goal and purpose of U.S. foreign policy. There is notable consistency in the "democratic peace theory" theme in U.S. foreign policy. Though actions may differ from proclamations, U.S. SA is understood to support democratization, and laws and regulations exist to incentivize executive branch compliance with that intent. Furthermore, there is a general consensus that stable democracy is better than other alternative forms of government, especially in the literature of the 1990s (when neoliberal economics became dominant). However, Schmitter and Karl argued that democracy is not necessarily better economically, administratively, more orderly, more stable, or more governable than autocracy.[252]

The democratization and foreign assistance literature focus heavily on political economy, economic development, and democracy assistance. The CMR and SA literature focused heavily on defense institution building and security sector reform. All four shared an underlying theme of good governance, though its emphasis was more assumed than

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[249] McInnis and Lucas, *What is 'Building Partner Capacity'*, 54.

[250] Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," 74–75.

[251] Ibid., 74.

[252] Schmitter and Karl, "What Democracy is… and is Not," 59–60.

explicit in the SA literature. Additionally, all four agreed that the United States should set a good example for fledgling democracies to follow, though they differed sharply on the degree to which the "demonstration effect" influenced host nation democratization. Some authors evaluated credibility on an absolute scale against an ideal standard, while others evaluated its appeal relative to other political systems throughout the world. For example, John L. Gaddis argued, "The key to American influence in the world has always been the hope for a better life that we still, more credibly than anyone else, have to offer."[253]

The democratization and foreign assistance literature overwhelmingly viewed host nation commitment to democracy as the primary determinant of democratization (with economic development a close second), while the CMR and SA literature viewed SA efforts as anywhere from highly influential to modestly influential. Interestingly, each community seemed to evaluate the impacts of their own type of assistance as positively impacting democratization. In general, the democratization and foreign assistance literature viewed democracy promotion as an arduous task requiring robust resources over an extended period of time, but the CMR and SA literature shared a common assumption that SA efforts had the ability to influence host nation actors in most circumstances (as long as it was executed proficiently). They generally agree that the task is hard, but the democratization and foreign assistance literature make it seem nearly impossible and likely to fail without a post-WWII Germany and Japan scale and duration of commitment.

Binnendijk, Guo, and Stradiotto all argued that the cooperative management of a democratic transition is what characterizes increased probability of enduring democracy, not prior regime type. They ascribed an active, but not dominant, role to external support.

A consistent theme was the concept of conditionality (or linkage) as a method of incentivizing democratization. Another was the idea that promoting human rights and democracy is ideologically worthwhile *and* serves U.S. security objectives. To this end, efforts need to be more coherent and synchronized across agencies and in partnership with other countries to effectively promote democracy. The concept of inter-organizational

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[253] John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 117.

unity of effort under civilian leadership was unanimous. The biggest area of disagreement is over the most effective method under which to unify. Top down or bottom up? Security and liberalism before democracy or simultaneously? Elections upon host nation demand or deferred until certain conditions are met? Assistance through the state, the military, NGOs, or directly to the people? Democracy before or after economic development? SA to autocrats or not? Each literature category expressed the full range of answers to those questions, though there was unanimity on civilian control over the military (and thus security sector reform) as a worthwhile effort to improve upon continually.

6.   Critique

Brad Roberts, Larry Diamond, Thomas Carothers, Marina Ottaway, and many other authors argued that the quality of the U.S. democratic example can dissuade countries from choosing democracy. To argue that "strength of example" is a decisive factor while also arguing that "democratic change is produced not by abstract historical and structural forces but by individuals and groups choosing, innovating, and taking risks" is inconsistent.[254] It is also a problem to reconcile the "strength of example" argument with the argument that human rights, liberty, and democracy are universal values. If those values are universal, then the specific example of the United States would have little effect on the desire of the host nation to democratize. Each of these arguments have a certain intuitive logic, but they contradict each other when determining causal influence on democratization. Carothers (2004) consistently argued that foreign influence is marginally influential compared to local political factors, but then he cited the hypocrisy of U.S. support for authoritarian regimes as undermining democracy promotion efforts. If the former argument is true, then the latter argument is overstated. He made a convincing argument that the United States is hypocritical regarding Middle East democracy promotion given its enduring support for numerous authoritarian regimes while preaching democratization. However, if Carothers argues that external actors are only marginally influential in host nation governance, then the alleged negative influence of U.S. hypocrisy on democratization would be marginally negative, not truly undermining host nation democracy. His core viewpoint is that countries

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[254] Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, xii.

democratize for their own interests (political and economic), not because the United States maintains a particular standard of performance with respect to political rights and civil liberties. If it requires such overwhelmingly robust support over a generation (or more) to change foreign institutions toward democracy, then why do the same authors argue that the United States so easily undermines host nation democratization by the "waning" of its democratic example? "Lead by example" arguments lack evidentiary support and have more of a "call to action" tone than that of a substantiated argument.

One of the goals of this thesis is to determine which factor is more influential in democratization: setting an example to follow, incentivizing democratization directly, or the "will of the people" in the host nation to democratize. Diamond primarily argued for the latter, but he undercuts his own argument by claiming that the United States must provide an appealing democratic example or other states are less likely to democratize. On the other hand, these authors gave exhaustive empirical and theoretic support for the argument that externally-fostered democratization requires a large amount of whole-of-government support over an extended period of time in order for democracy to consolidate.

The democratization literature has taught us that robust, long-term support is the best hope for host nation democratization, but resources and political will are scarce. It tells us less about how political leaders can decide where to apply aid. Ottaway's policy-relevant insight was that the United States must choose between spreading itself thin to accomplish mediocre democratic gains, or abandoning aid to most countries in order to focus resources more decisively on a shorter list of recipients.[255] This cuts to the heart of the tough policy choices that politicians are faced with, and this is why it is so important to understand which independent variables are most influential on host nation democratization. It guides the distribution of scarce resources. If the United States must choose which countries to focus on as Ottaway posits, then Sørensen, Olson, Bromley, and Bellin gave guidance (intentionally or not) on how to allocate FA and SA funding by specifying democratic prerequisites.

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[255] Ottaway, "Promoting Democracy After Conflict," 321.

Finkel et al. produced an extremely robust, quantitative review of when U.S. democracy assistance is effective and when it is not.[256] However, measuring the quantity of U.S. SA in relation to other portions of the U.S. government budget says very little about what impact it may have on the host nation. 1.1% of the U.S. SA budget would impact a small host nation (as measured by government revenue or GDP) more dramatically than a large host nation. Some authors, such as Fortna (2008), argued that SA undermines democratization via an aid dependency mechanism, but none of the authors specified a threshold over which that mechanism is active. This thesis analyzes U.S. SA as a share of host nation government revenue or GDP. This is a more accurate way to determine how U.S. SA may affect the political dynamics in the host nation, and it may even reveal an approximate "SA as share of government revenue/GDP" threshold (though that is not my primary goal) over which SA undermines democratization (if one exists).

One could challenge Nancy Bermeo's research design regarding the binary classification of "democratic" and "authoritarian" regimes.[257] If the dependent variable is democratization, then her construct does not allow for incremental progress toward democratization. A change in "political rights" Freedom House rating from 6 (not free) to 4 (partially free) would go unrecognized, but it would be politically significant. Additionally, she studied the relationship between SA and democracy assistance, but she fluctuated between treating democracy assistance as an independent or dependent variable. My thesis research design addresses these potential challenges by using a continuum to measure democratization and by selecting case studies that enabled me to more tightly isolate the variables. One strength of Bermeo's article is that it explained the reason for the SA-democratization literature gap, and it specifies a threshold (1.1% or more of the U.S. SA budget) above which SA "should" undermine democratization.[258] Since this was the

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[256] One might question if the USAID-commissioned report is biased given its finding that security assistance funding undermined its own democracy promotion efforts, which is foundational to the purpose of the organization. However, the report also found a statistically significant correlation between increased human rights aid provision and increased human rights abuses in the host nation, which is the exact thing such aid is designed to prevent. This is evidence that the report was not organizationally biased.

[257] Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," 80–82.

[258] Ibid., 76.

only numerical threshold I could find in the literature, it guided my case study selection—Lebanon is below the threshold, and Pakistan is above it.

One of the most valuable contributions of the foreign assistance literature is the described "militarization" of funding authorities for economic development initiatives, particularly in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The SA literature notes a similar trend in the shift from DoS to DoD in SA program funding patterns. In short, there was a civilian-to-military funding shift. This makes it all the more vital to understand the effects of SA on democratization, because the SA literature revealed little to no critical analysis on such effects; they are assumed to be positive. The SA shift of focus (at least conceptually and organizationally) toward defense institution building indicates an institutional acknowledgement by U.S. Congress and the DoD that tactical level initiatives may not be as influential on host nation stability and democratization as previously assumed. Additionally, the strengthening of civil-military relations embodied in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act reveals one of the shortcomings of the democratization literature: it does not typically acknowledge U.S. domestic improvements in democracy. If civilian oversight, effectiveness, and efficiency equate to good civil-military relations, which is a necessary attribute of healthy democracy, then the 2017 NDAA means that the United States has taken positive steps in demonstrating good democracy. This example undermines the argument that the United States' democratic example is waning.

Lastly, Biddle's contribution using the principal-agent concept was an excellent theoretical framework to evaluate the merit of arguments based on conditionality, which was lacking in the democratization, FA, and CMR literature. Under his construct, an existential threat would prevent SA from affecting democratization, while its absence would allow SA to affect democratization (if such effects do exist). Diverging interests would prevent SA from affecting democratization, while converging interests would allow SA to affect democratization (if such effects do exist). Combining these dynamics with the seven strategic rationales of building partner capacity analyzed by McInnis and Lucas provides a theoretical foundation for qualitative analysis of conditionality's influence. This is highly valuable, because every category of literature I reviewed contained recommendations for aid conditionality. Also, Carothers' argument about IMET's lack of

influence was essentially based on a principal-agent problem of divergent host nation incentives.[259] Falcoff's argument that IMET did not work in certain cases does not prove that it fails to work in all cases. He failed to address that even a small degree of success may be worth the investment if it accomplishes political objectives.

7.   Summary of Hypotheses and Causal Mechanisms

The first hypothesis is that U.S. security assistance supports host nation democratization. Inherent in every argument that supported this hypothesis is the idea that U.S. influence can be a decisive factor in host nation politics. The literature review offered four causal mechanisms. First, when prosperous democracies set a good example of protecting human rights and individual liberties, it influences other countries to do likewise. Second, aid conditionality incentivizes state elites to democratize to secure the future flow of aid money. Third, externally sourced peacekeeping operations, security force assistance, and security sector assistance efforts bolster the security necessary for democratic transitions, consolidation, and all other aspects democratic governance itself. Fourth, security force assistance supports host nation security sector reform, which improves its civil-military relations and democratic governance.

The second hypothesis is that U.S. security assistance undermines host nation democratization. Inherent in every argument that supported this hypothesis is the idea that U.S. influence can be a decisive factor in host nation politics. The literature review offered four causal mechanisms. First, strengthening the security apparatus of a non-democratic state enables them to oppress democratic reformists more effectively. Second, when prosperous democracies set a bad example domestically and/or support repressive authoritarians abroad, that hypocrisy undermines their moral authority and makes democracy less appealing to would-be host nation democratizers. Third, the history of Western foreign policy created a resistance toward Western liberal democracy, and it planted fear of Western-sponsored democratic revolutions into the minds of authoritarians. Fourth, U.S. security assistance creates an aid dependency dynamic, especially when such assistance lacks conditionality related to democratic reform.

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[259] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 199–204.

The third hypothesis is that U.S. security assistance has minimal influence on host nation democratization; domestic and/or regional political factors are the primary drivers. A recurring idea behind arguments in this category is that other factors decisively supersede U.S. security assistance in determining democratic outcomes, though it could still exert some degree of influence in the process (either for or against democratization). One of the policy implication is that the United States could pursue its security and democratization objectives more-or-less independently without decisively affecting democratization. The literature review offered five causal mechanisms. First, host nation elites are inherently more politically influential, and their will to democratize is indispensable for a successful democratic transition. Second, the presence or absence of host nation characteristics, historical experiences, or societal pre-conditions influence democratization more than United States. Third, donor countries lack the resources or political will to commit a large enough effort for long enough to decisively influence democratization. Fourth, failures in state legitimacy may motivate citizens to demand democracy. Fifth, a principal-agent problem in which U.S. security assistance lacks the leverage necessary to incentivize host nation democratization due to stronger influence from regional actors.

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II.   LEBANON

A.   INTRODUCTION

How has U.S. security assistance affected democratization in Lebanon? What was U.S. SA to Lebanon designed to accomplish? Did it support, undermine, or function independently from democratization? How influential were other factors compared to U.S. security assistance? How did the particular policy approaches come about in the first place? My analysis covers 1991–2017, because 1990 is when Lebanon's current system of government and military organization was established. First, I will review the literature on Lebanon's military and government. Second, I will describe U.S. SA to Lebanon, its intended purpose, and its effect on democratization. Third, I will analyze the evolution of U.S. foreign policy toward Lebanon, who was behind those decisions, why they chose that specific approach, and to what degree U.S. SA accomplished U.S. foreign policy objectives.

B.   LEBANON'S MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT

Why did Lebanon's military need external assistance? Upon gaining independence in 1943, Lebanon used the 1932 census to establish a power-sharing political system based on religion.[260] The 'confessional' system was designed "to prevent any one group from dominating the others," but it often led to political deadlock.[261] After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, individuals affiliated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization residing in Southern Lebanon attacked Israelis across the border, who retaliated and killed many Shia in the process.[262] Since the Lebanese government did not provide adequate protection, the Shia-majority south created militias for self-protection, which set the conditions for the

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[260] Anne Marie Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and F. Cristiana Matei (London: Routledge, 2012), 243.

[261] Carla E. Humud, *Lebanon,* CRS Report No. R44759 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), 5.

[262] Deegan, *Middle East and Problems of Democracy,* 110.

Lebanese Civil War in 1975.[263] Before the civil war, military units were ethnically homogenous and served near their hometowns, so when the civil war began units as large as brigades abandoned the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in favor of sectarian militias.[264]

After 15 years of war within sects and between sects, the 1989 Taif Accords initiated the reconciliation process, and the constitutional amendments of 1990 formalized a more equitable sectarian distribution of power.[265] Per the Taif Accords, all militias were to disarm and be absorbed into the LAF, but Hezbollah used Israel's continued military presence as justification not to.[266] Because of Hezbollah's militia, the LAF still does not have a monopoly on legitimate violence in Lebanon.[267] Lebanon's civilian leadership is either unable or unwilling to give the LAF enough resources to legitimately provide security for the whole country.[268] Additionally, Syrian troops occupied west Beirut, northern, and eastern Lebanon in 1976 "to protect Christians from Muslim and Palestinian militias" during the Lebanese Civil War.[269] The Syria troop withdrawal began in 1991 but was not fully complete until 2005 (a total of 30 years), which means that Lebanon's first 15 years of independence were still under Syrian occupation.[270] This likely hindered the development of the LAF greatly. Casey Addis explained, "most analysts agree that Syrian interference is the single greatest hindrance to Lebanon's independence and stability. A cornerstone of Syrian foreign policy is to dominate the internal affairs of Lebanon."[271] Given Lebanon's extensive occupation by foreign forces and its sectarian political context, the LAF requires robust security assistance in order to control non-state actors, secure its borders, and defend against hostile neighbors.

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[263] Ibid.

[264] Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," 245.

[265] Deegan, *Middle East and Problems of Democracy,* 110–115.

[266] Humud, *Lebanon*, 2–3.

[267] Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," 246.

[268] Ibid., 250–251.

[269] Casey Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, CRS Report No. R40485 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 17.

[270] Ibid., 18–19.

[271] Ibid., 8.

From 1990–1992, Lebanon's Freedom House rating improved from 5.5 to 4.5, which is 1 point "more free."[272] From 1993–2004 it was back to 5.5; from 2005–2016 it averaged between 4.5 and 4.0; and in 2017 it changed to 5.0[273] (See Figure 4 for changes in Freedom House rating over time in relation to U.S. SA funding levels.) Lebanon signed a treaty with Syria in 1991, and it held general elections for the first time in 20 years in 1992.[274] Lebanon reorganized its military toward greater sectarian integration in 1992, and they implemented a draft in 1993 for a representative sectarian mix in the military.[275] In 2005, Hariri (the anti-Syrian Sunni Prime Minister) was assassinated by Hezbollah, which triggered the "Cedar Revolution" against Syrian military occupation in Lebanon and resulted in a pro-Western, anti-Syria "March 14" coalition government.[276] In 2006, the 34-day Israel-Hezbollah War resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, a United Nations-monitored ceasefire that was to be implemented by the LAF.[277] In 2008, Hezbollah briefly occupied Beirut to protest trials of Hezbollah members charged with Hariri's 2005 assassination, but Qatar brokered a peace deal.[278] The 2011–2017 Syrian Civil War caused at least 1 million Syrian refugees to flee to Lebanon, and it motivated Hezbollah's support for the al-Assad regime.[279] Sunni extremists retaliated with attacks on Shia in Lebanon in 2013, which motivated the LAF and Hezbollah to close Lebanon's border in 2014.[280]

Between the end of the civil war (1990) and 2006, U.S. SA focused on re-constituting the LAF and on training its officer corps.[281] After 2006, U.S. SA focused on

[272] "Freedom in the World," Freedom House, February 26, 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/.

[273] Ibid.

[274] Deegan, *Middle East and Problems of Democracy,* 116–117.

[275] Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," 247–249.

[276] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 1; Humud, *Lebanon*, 3.

[277] Ibid., 13.

[278] Ibid., 3.

[279] Ibid., 16.

[280] Ibid., 8–9.

[281] "Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Lebanon," U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, 2017, https://lb.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/embassy-fact-sheets/.

training and equipping the LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to secure southern Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 1701.[282] After 2006, U.S. SA funding was 25 times higher than the pre-2006 quantity as measured in US$, and it covered a broader range of security assistance and security cooperation programs.[283] (See Figure 4 for changes in U.S. SA funding levels over time in relation to Freedom House rating.)


Figure 4.   Lebanon—Freedom House Rating and U.S. Security Assistance Funding (1991–2017)[284]

The democratization literature specified many pre-conditions that increase the likelihood of successful democratization, seven of which are listed here. Rowen argued that rising incomes and education proliferation will gradually cause democratization, despite any temporal setbacks.[285] Sørensen noted three key domestic precursors for democratic success: "(1) political leaders committed to the promotion of democracy, (2) a

[282] Ibid.

[283] "Lebanon," Security Assistance Monitor, April 17, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Lebanon/2000/2018/all/Global//.

[284] Freedom in the World Ratings use an inverse scale. A higher number is "less free." A lower number is "more free." In this thesis, "more free" equates to "more democratic."

[285] Rowen, "The Tide Underneath the 'Third Wave,'" 307.

politically independent, merit-based state bureaucracy, and (3) a vibrant civil society capable of imposing checks on the state."[286] Bromley identified two pre-requisites for democratic, capitalist state formation: first, the state's monopoly on coercion; and second, the separation between the political and economic sources of power.[287]

Of these seven particular pre-conditions, most authors writing on Lebanon agreed that it lacked several democratization pre-conditions. Though it is a partially free country and technically democratic, many authors argue that the confessional system entrenches familialism, fosters clientelism, and keeps state institutions weak. Anne Marie Baylouny argued that Syrian military control protected the LAF's legitimacy, impartiality, professionalism,[288] and effectiveness from the potentially undemocratic influence of sectarianism.[289] She stated that the LAF does not have a monopoly on coercion, and some in the government fear that a strong LAF would undermine patronage in their sectarian communities.[290] Furthermore, she asserted that civilian control of the military would have caused more conflict, because politicians motivated by sectarian interests would have used the military for selfish goals, undermining state security.[291] Iliya Harik argued that developing civil society need not precede democracy, because many civil society groups resist democratization, and in many cases the government unilaterally initiates liberalization.[292] Since Lebanon's civil society is tied to family and confession rather than secular political parties, those sects are not committed to institutional change.[293] In a U.S.

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[286] Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, 98.

[287] Bromley, "The Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East," 380.

[288] In this thesis, professionalism refers to the "expertise, responsibility, and corporateness" of Huntington's concept of professionalism, not to include his conception of civilian control over the military; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002), 8–10.

[289] Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," 243.

[290] Ibid., 246–250.

[291] Ibid., 251.

[292] Harik, "Pluralism in the Arab World," 281.

[293] Ibid., 284.

House of Representatives subcommittee hearing in Oct 2017, Lebanon was described as "a constitution without a state."[294]

In the same hearing, a DoS official posed a dilemma about whether to support the LAF if they are cooperating with Hezbollah, or whether to make cutting ties with Hezbollah a pre-condition for U.S. security assistance.[295] Michele Dunne argued that high-level U.S. politicians prefer the simplicity of dealing with autocrats over the unpleasantness of promoting political reform.[296] She asserted that concerns over security vs. reform "tradeoffs" are overblown, that foreign governments will cooperate with the United States if it is in their interest, and that international military education and training (IMET) can enhance respect for human rights.[297] In short, U.S. SA and pressuring for reform can "shape the environment in which governments make decisions" by pushing all U.S. agendas simultaneously, albeit with some inconveniences.[298] Thomas Carothers argued that IMET programs will not strengthen foreign civil-military relations, because they "do not by themselves reshape entrenched, often badly flawed foreign institutions."[299] He describes how difficult it is to change state institutions, and how democracy promoters were overly optimistic in the late 1980s and early 1990s about their ability to do so, despite existing literature on the topic.[300]

Jamil Mouawad argued that Lebanon's sectarian elites and United Nations assistance efforts have both taken pressure off the state to provide basic services, which undermines the state's civil institutions.[301] Makdisi et al. argued that familialism,

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[294] Ros-Lehtinen, Michael Ratney, and Jeanne Pryor, U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon, § Middle East and North Africa (2017), https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/subcommittee-hearing-u-s-policy-toward-lebanon-2/.

[295] Ibid.

[296] Dunne, "Integrating Democracy into the U.S. Policy Agenda," 211–212.

[297] Ibid., 218.

[298] Ibid., 221.

[299] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 200.

[300] Ibid., 200–203.

[301] Jamil Mouawad, "Unpacking Lebanon's Resilience: Undermining State Institutions and Consolidating the System?" (working paper, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2017), 4–10, www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1729.pdf.

clientelism, lack of reform efforts, and the influence of neighboring authoritarian petro-states may destabilize Lebanon, but they argued that Lebanon's system also provides protection for minority groups, freedom of expression, open debate, and moderate government policies by way of consensus-building.[302] Heather Deegan emphasized Lebanon's vulnerability to external influence as its primary weakness, evidenced by Palestinian refugees, Israeli and Syrian military presence, and Iran's influence in the Shia community.[303] In sum, the literature revealed supporting arguments for each of the three hypotheses in Lebanon's case. The majority argued that domestic politics is the most influential in its effects on democratization, with regional influence a close second. A few authors argued that U.S. SA was very influential, and they were split on whether the effects were positive or negative.

C.   U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON

What kind of security assistance has the United States provided to Lebanon since 1991, and what were the associated foreign policy goals?[304] From 1991–2006, the overwhelming majority of funds went to the following Title 22 SA programs: excess defense articles; IMET; and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) programs.[305] In 1991, the United States resumed selling excess defense articles to Lebanon, which "allowed the LAF to enhance its transportation and communications capabilities, which were severely degraded during the civil war."[306] In the early 1990s, most of those items were "non-lethal equipment (such as armored personnel carriers and transport helicopters)."[307] IMET was unfunded from 1991–1992, but it resumed in 1993. IMET funding was approximately $500,000 per year from 1993–2002,

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[302] Samir Makdisi, Fadia Kiwan, and Marcus Marktanner, "Lebanon: The Constrained Democracy and its National Impact," in *Democracy in the Arab World: Explaining the Deficit*, ed. Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir A. Makdisi (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 116–137.

[303] Deegan, *Middle East and Problems of Democracy,* 118.

[304] Unless otherwise specified, Section C data sourced from: "Lebanon," Security Assistance Monitor, April 17, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Lebanon/2000/2018/all/Global//.

[305] See the Appendix for descriptions of all SA and SC programs pertaining to Lebanon and Pakistan.

[306] "Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Lebanon."

[307] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 2.

and it increased to $700,000 from 2003–2005.[308] In response to human-rights related concerns, "in the 1990s, the Pentagon added courses on democracy and human rights, military-media relations, and other aspects of civil-military relations" to its foreign military training programs.[309] The Defense Security Cooperation Agency explained that, "IMET training in Lebanon is designed to reduce sectarianism in the LAF," and enhance US-Lebanese partnerships.[310]

In other words, the goal was to promote institutional change through education and contact, which over time would socialize and diffuse into defense institutions as those IMET students promoted within their organizations. The DoD defines defense institutions as "the people, organizations, rules, norms, values, and behaviors that enable oversight, governance, management, and functioning of the defense enterprise."[311] In practice, that refers to offices such as the defense ministry, interior ministry (police forces), military service headquarters, joint staffs, and other general staffs (typically the lowest level considered to be a "defense institution").[312] Defense institutions are the lynchpin between the military and civilian governing officials, and they are widely considered to be essential to good civil-military relations, which is a fundamental component in democratic consolidation.

In 2005, the Title 10 funded Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was allocated $300,000. After the 2005 Cedar Revolution, a combination of Prime Minister Hariri's assassination, a dozen unsolved bombings, and persistent trafficking across the Lebanon-Syria border threatened Lebanon's stability—so the CTFP was intended to prevent the collapse of state security during transition from Syrian military to LAF

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[308] "U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946–2015," United States Agency for International Development, January 10, 2017, https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html.

[309] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 197.

[310] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 4–5.

[311] Department of Defense, *Defense Institution Building (DIB)*, DoD Directive 5205.82 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 13, www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/520582p.pdf.

[312] Ibid.

responsibility.[313] The CTFP trains foreign officers in non-lethal techniques for law enforcement type situations.[314] The idea is that by conducting detainee handling procedures in accordance with international human rights norms, for example, military and police officers would conduct their jobs more effectively while enhancing the legitimacy of the state through respectable conduct.

Starting in 2006, Title 22 foreign military financing averaged \$90,000,000 per year, and Title 10 Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority averaged \$21,000,000 per year. Section 1206 is designed to enhance foreign militaries' counterterrorism capabilities and ability to support U.S. armed forces operations as required.[315] This was a big help for Lebanon, because upon conclusion of the Israel-Hezbollah war, the LAF replaced Hezbollah to provide security in southern Lebanon in fulfillment of UNSCR 1701.[316] The spike in funding in 2006 was intended to support the LAF's additional responsibilities. Starting in 2007, Title 22 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) averaged \$17,000,000 per year. In 2007, new funding for INCLE and increased funding in the other two programs were designed to help the Internal Security Forces control weapons trafficking into Lebanon, to prevent terrorist attacks on Israel launched from "southern Lebanon and Palestinian refugee camps," to enhance LAF professionalism, and to reinforce civilian control of the military.[317]

From 2006–2017, these three categories constitute approximately 85% of U.S. SA to Lebanon. From 2008–2009, Title 10 "Section 1207 security assistance and stabilization assistance" funding of \$10,000,00 per year was intended to modernize the ISF's communication systems, to strengthen their policing of Palestinian refugee camps after the

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[313] U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2005–2006" (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2006), https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/.

[314] See the Appendix for descriptions of all SA and SC programs pertaining to Lebanon and Pakistan.

[315] See the Appendix for a detailed description of Section 1206.

[316] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 2–4.

[317] Ibid., 2.

2008 LAF/Fatah al-Islam battle in Nahr al-Barid, and to control Hezbollah.[318] In 2009, foreign military financing was $160,000,000 and Section 1206 was $49,000,000. These funds "were used to deliver more sophisticated equipment to the LAF," which enhanced its overall capabilities and its interoperability with other units in the field.[319] By sourcing the LAF so as to outmatch militant groups, the United States sought to improve the LAF's effectiveness, leading to better security, civil-military relations, and potentially democratic progress.

From 2011–2015, the average $6,000,000 per year of Counter-Drug Assistance money assisted with border security and policing in response to the Syrian Civil War and associated refugee influx.[320] In 2013, Sunni extremist attacks on Shia targets in Lebanon increased in response to Hezbollah's support for al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War.[321] From 2014–2015, there was a $40,000,000 per year increase over the previous three years, almost all of which supported new SC programs. In 2014, $1,400,000 supported the Defense Institutional Reform Initiative (later rebranded as defense governance and management), which was designed to enhance governance and accountability of the defense sector. $230,000 each were allocated to combined exercise programs and attending service academies. Other initiatives included cooperative threat reduction, regional centers for security studies, funding to attend the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, and the Aviation Leadership Program. In 2015, $5,000,000 was allocated to cooperative threat reduction, and $48,000,000 was allocated to the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. The 2014–2015 funding surge was in response to increasingly frequent LAF clashes with Islamic State and Nusra Front militants.[322] According to Humud, "U.S. officials described the August 2014 clash between the Islamic State and the LAF in Arsal as a watershed moment for U.S. policy towards Lebanon, accelerating the provision of equipment and

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[318] U.S. Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Section 1209 and Section 1203 Report to Congress On Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for Fiscal Years 2008, 2009, and 2010" (Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2012).

[319] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 4.

[320] Humud, *Lebanon*, 3.

[321] Ibid., 8.

[322] Ibid.

training to the LAF."[323] Though the SA provided in 2014–2015 was more diverse, the intended purpose was the same: help the LAF and ISF secure Lebanon against terrorist activity.

In sum, from 1991–2005, U.S. SA was designed to improve the capacity and capability of the government of Lebanon by training and equipping the LAF, professionalizing the LAF through IMET, and preventing Lebanon's collapse. From 2006–2013, U.S. SA was designed to transfer UNSCR 1701 responsibilities to the LAF in southern Lebanon as opposed to Hezbollah, to modernize the LAF and ISF, and to better control refugee populations and cross-border trafficking. From 2014–2015, U.S. SA was designed to prevent Lebanon from collapsing due to Syrian Civil War spillover, and also to deny Islamic extremist groups recruiting grounds in Lebanon's refugee camps. From 2016–2017, SC programs faded away as the Islamic State weakened, but SA programs maintained steady funding levels. This decline in program funding indicates that the 2014–2015 security assistance surge was not the "watershed moment" that U.S. officials declared it to be in response to the Islamic State-LAF clash of August 2014. Rather, it seems to have been a temporary spike of security assistance to address the security threat posed by the Islamic State in Syria.

D.   THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LEBANON

Who was behind the development of U.S. foreign policy objectives, and why did specific policy choices come about? The periods of 1991–2005, 2006–2013, and 2014–2015 represent three distinct phases in U.S. SA to Lebanon, and none of them aligned neatly with U.S. presidential terms in office. This indicates that these policy shifts were reactions to political events in Lebanon and in the Middle East, not a result of sustained, ideological shifts within U.S. foreign policy or between administrations. As such, it appears that U.S. SA to Lebanon has been consistently security focused, with no decisive shift toward security assistance of the sort that is designed to drive institutional reform. It also indicates that there were underlying assumptions about security assistance shared between administrations that compelled them to continue their predecessor's approach.

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[323] Ibid.

What assumptions were consistent between administrations? One assumption is that international military education and training at the tactical level can produce state-level institutional change in civil-military relations, which many considered to be an important element of democratization. Joseph Nye, Jr. wrote in 1996 that "expanded IMET has changed the nature of civil-military relations in many countries."[324] Carothers recounts an example of how Secretary of Defense William Perry, who served under President Clinton, was impressed with an IMET-trained Albanian battalion's discipline and respect for civilian authority, and that such anecdotes are commonly used as proof of IMET resources well spent.[325] In 2005, Dunne writes positively about the potential for IMET to compel reform.[326] In 2011, Addis relayed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's view of IMET: "IMET training in Lebanon is designed to reduce sectarianism in the LAF and develop the force as a unifying national institution," and to improve U.S.-Lebanon military interoperability.[327] The optimism about IMET is evident in Lebanon, who has received IMET assistance from the 1950s until current day, even during their 15-year civil war.[328] Carothers argued that there are enough cases in which foreign militaries that received extensive IMET have blatantly violated human rights (e.g., Turkey and Indonesia) to undermine the argument that IMET drives institutional reform.[329] In Lebanon, the LAF reforms of the 1990s (sectarian intermixing, unit redeployment, and the draft to get a representative confessional mix) were driven by an aggressive Lebanese Army general and the occupying Syrian military to fit Lebanon's unique needs, not by sustained contact with IMET programs.[330]

Why does the United States continue extensive IMET if its correlation to institutional reform is uncertain? Carothers proposed that the DoD may have sought new

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[324] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 199–200.

[325] Ibid.

[326] Dunne, "Integrating Democracy into the U.S. Policy Agenda," 218.

[327] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 4–5.

[328] "U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Fiscal Years 1946–2015."

[329] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 199–200.

[330] Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," 247–248.

initiatives as the U.S. threat perception adapted to post-Cold War realities,[331] but that would not explain why consistent IMET funding for Lebanon dates back to the 1950s, or why U.S. IMET funding tended to increase *after* improvements in Lebanon's democratization instead of prior to U.S. Congressional budgeting cycles. Another explanation is that U.S. policy favors immediate security interest at the expense of democratization objectives, a tradeoff that may not even be necessary according to Dunne.[332] This reasoning may explain why high ranking politicians heartily endorsed IMET programs that produce reliable ground combat units, while avoiding the unpleasantness of pushing for institutional reform in high-level discussion.[333] It may explain why there is so much more security assistance than democracy assistance. It may also explain why there is no distinctive increase in defense institution building programs that represents a deliberate change in policy, and why the overwhelming majority of security assistance continues to go to foreign military financing, train and equip, and INCLE programs relative to DIB.

Gaddis described President Bush's view of spreading democracy as an active, challenging process.[334] However, the priority of security over democracy was evident in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy. Vice President and former Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney (and other so-called "neocons") favored defeating terrorists militarily over promoting ideology and political reform, as evident by his position on interrogation techniques.[335] The Obama administration continued the Bush administration's SA approach toward Lebanon and only changed it when Syria's Civil War created an existential threat to Lebanon.[336] The immediate reduction of SC funding as the Islamic State threat declined supports the idea that U.S. SA is not seriously designed to support the institutional change that some argue supports democratization. Given that worldwide U.S. SA increased from FY2014/2015 to FY2016/17 at the same time that U.S. SA to Lebanon

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[331] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 198.

[332] Dunne, "Integrating Democracy into the U.S. Policy Agenda," 218.

[333] Ibid., 211–212.

[334] Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience,* 89–90.

[335] *Taxi to the Dark Side*, directed by Alex Gibney (2007; Los Angeles, CA: ThinkFilm, 2007).

[336] Humud, *Lebanon*, 8–9.

decreased, it seems that the 2013–2015 spike in U.S. SA to Lebanon was an example of a short-term increase in security assistance to address a specific threat.[337]

If democratization has been a significant component of almost every National Security Strategy since 1991, then why was U.S. SA to Lebanon not apparently designed to support it? What policy objective was it designed to support that explains the aforementioned observations? The primary goal of U.S. security assistance to Lebanon seems to have been to prevent terrorist attacks against Israel, not necessarily to reform and strengthen Lebanon's state institutions. Many of the U.S. excess defense articles and foreign military financing programs provided non-lethal capabilities to the LAF, because the United States feared that lethal weapons may fall into Hezbollah's hands and be used to attack Israel.[338] Baylouny pointed out that the LAF's complaints about the non-lethal equipment from the United States was indicative of the fact that they were generally outgunned by militias.[339] The United States may have allowed this capability gap because Israel's security was a more important foreign policy objective than Lebanon's democratization, despite U.S. democratization rhetoric. U.S. SA appears to have been designed to make the LAF stronger than Hezbollah, but not strong enough that it could threaten Israel, a fear that was held within the Washington establishment since the 2010 Lebanese-Israeli border skirmish that killed soldiers on each side.[340]

The most significant changes in restructuring and professionalizing the LAF were Lebanese-led and Syrian-led reform efforts in the 1990s. A potential explanation for what drove Lebanon's only sustained increase in democracy (the 2005 Cedar Revolution) is that domestic and regional actors influenced reform efforts prior to 2005, which supported democratization. After 2005, U.S. SA helped prevent state collapse and democratic backsliding during periods of significant strain (e.g., Syrian Civil War). The United States increased SA funding *after* the LAF's reforms and the Cedar Revolution; it did not drive

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[337] "Security Assistance Monitor Data," Security Assistance Monitor, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard.

[338] Ibid., 21.

[339] Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," 251.

[340] Humud, *Lebanon*, 21.

those changes. This is not surprising given that U.S. SA does not appear to have been designed to drive institutional change at all. Since U.S. security assistance did not promote or undermine Lebanon's democratization, the United States could theoretically pursue its security and democratization objectives in Lebanon independently. But if it wants to promote democratization, it must craft its policy with full recognition of the influence of domestic and regional actors (especially Syria, Iran, and Israel).

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III.   PAKISTAN

A.   INTRODUCTION

How has U.S. security assistance affected Pakistan's democratization? What was U.S. SA to Pakistan designed to accomplish? Did it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on its democratization? How influential were other factors compared to U.S. SA? My analysis will cover 1980–2017, which includes the two waves of U.S. SA funding during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s and then after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. First, I will review the literature on Pakistan's military and government. Second, I will describe what the three hypotheses argue in relation to Pakistan. Third, I will describe U.S. SA to Pakistan and its intended purpose. Fourth, I will analyze the validity of the three hypotheses against the evidence in the case of Pakistan.

B.   PAKISTAN'S MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT

Why did Pakistan's military seek and welcome external assistance? When Pakistan partitioned from India in 1947, it lacked the finances, defense forces, population size, and industrial base necessary to defend itself against a much stronger Indian neighbor.[341] The 1947 Kashmir conflict forced Pakistan to seek assistance right after independence, and in the post-World War II environment Washington was the best available choice.[342] Pakistan subsequently lost a 1965 war with India[343] and lost East Pakistan (i.e., Bangladesh) in the 1971 war with India.[344] Losing the 1971 war confirmed Pakistan's suspicions: India had a much stronger and technologically sophisticated conventional military.[345] The 1971 secession of Bangladesh and the 1974 Indian nuclear tests began an arms race that Pakistan

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[341] Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 66.

[342] Ibid., 67.

[343] Ibid., 130–131.

[344] Ibid., 158–176.

[345] Aparna Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India*, Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series 41 (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 101.

could not win, so they pursued nuclear weapons and asymmetric warfare to deter Indian aggression.[346]

During periods of U.S. sanctions, Pakistan sought aid from China,[347] the Soviet Union, France, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank to pursue military parity with India.[348] In fact, 19 out of 20 IMF programs to Pakistan since 1998 were during times of U.S. aid cessation or sanctions.[349] Since independence, Pakistan has perceived India as an existential threat because India antagonized Pakistan's military, committed human rights abuses on Pakistanis, grew its conventional military rapidly, and (most importantly) developed nuclear weapons.[350] In short, India outmatched Pakistan's economy, military, and population, so Pakistan obtained external assistance from whoever was willing to provide it so as to secure its territory against India.

From 1980–1988, Pakistan's "Freedom in the World" rating changed from 6.0 to 3.0 (3 points "more free").[351] From 1988–1998 it was back to 4.5; in 1999 it jumped to 6.0 due to a coup; from 2000–2007 it was 5.5; and from 2008–2017 it was 4.5.[352] (See Figure 5.) From 1977–1988, President-General Zia ul-Haq's rule was characterized by a combination of martial law with state-sponsored Islamism.[353] From 1988–1999, four democratically elected civilians governed Pakistan, all of whom "were removed by the army through explicit or implicit presidential orders."[354] The seat of Prime Minister alternated twice each between Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistani People's Party, and Nawaz

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[346] Nasra Talat Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations: Pakistan's Strategic Choices in the 1990s*, Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics 6 (London; New York: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2016), 29.

[347] Ibid., 28.

[348] Ehtesham Ahmad and Azizali Mohammed, "Pakistan, the United States and the Bretton Woods Institutions," in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan*, ed. Aparna Pande (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 230–235.

[349] Ibid., 235.

[350] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 174–175.

[351] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World."

[352] Ibid.

[353] Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 217.

[354] K. Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan's Scheduled 2008 Election Background*, CRS Report No. RL34335 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34335.pdf.

Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz.[355] In 1990, the United States cut all aid in response to Pakistan's nuclear program per the requirements of the 1985 Pressler Amendment.[356] In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf executed a coup and ruled through 2007. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States resumed SA to Pakistan, which agreed to support the United States in the fight against al-Qaeda and the subsequent Global War on Terror.[357] From 2008–2017, Pakistan was democratic with its first ever peaceful, democratic leadership transition in 2013.[358]

During the 1980s, the United States routed its SA through Pakistan's military to reinforce the Afghan Mujahidin's pre-existing fight against the Soviet invasion.[359] This would support the Carter Doctrine tenet of protecting the Persian Gulf by "rolling back" the Soviet military from Afghanistan.[360] In exchange for Pakistan's support, U.S. SA also included equipment more suitable for achieving conventional military parity with India.[361] From 1990–2001, U.S. SA was almost entirely withdrawn (per the Pressler Amendment) due to Pakistan's nuclear program and the post-Cold War emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation.[362] After 2001, U.S. SA funding was two to four times higher than in the 1980s, and it was designed to leverage Pakistan as a partner in post-9/11 U.S. counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[363] From 2001–2008, U.S. SA focused on Pakistan's tactical capacity as a military partner, and after 2009 SA was made more conditional with the intent that it would support a more comprehensive approach to

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[355] Ibid., 2–7.

[356] Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 268.

[357] Ibid., 323–327.

[358] Ibid., 344–380.

[359] Ibid., 233.

[360] Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 102–113.

[361] Ibid., 103–104.

[362] Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, CRS Report No. R41856 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 9–10, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf.

[363] Ibid.

strengthening Pakistani governance and maintaining counter-terrorism capabilities.[364] Figure 5 displays Freedom in the World ratings and U.S. SA quantities for Pakistan over time.


Figure 5.   Pakistan—Freedom House Rating and U.S. Security Assistance Funding (1980–2017)[365]

C.   THE THREE HYPOTHESES IN RELATION TO PAKISTAN

1.   U.S. Security Assistance Undermines Democratization

Nancy Bermeo argued that "the United States often undercuts its democracy assistance efforts with its military assistance initiatives."[366] Through a quantitative and qualitative analysis, she identified the primary causal mechanism as a combination of aid

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[364] Akbar Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," *Economic and Political* Weekly 46, no. 32 (August 2011): 106–109.

[365] Freedom in the World Ratings use an inverse scale. A higher number is "less free." A lower number is "more free." In this thesis, "more free" equates to "more democratic."

[366] Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," 73.

dependency and entrenchment of an authoritarian state's coercive apparatus.[367] Akbar Zaidi argued that ever since independence, "the persistence of military rule determining economic and political development" is what hinders Pakistan's democratization.[368] They used financial and regulatory instruments to control the private sector, thus retaining control over the state's political economy even during periods of civilian government.[369] According to Azeem Ibrahim (2009), the economic independence of the Pakistani military, including the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), enabled them "to create [their] own networks of political patronage by, for example, co-opting existing political parties through threats and bribes."[370] He argued that military aid (not civilian aid) should be conditioned on avoiding democratic backsliding, not on accomplishing positive progress, because the civilian government is weak vis-à-vis the military.[371] Talat Farooq argued that U.S. aid was too heavily security-oriented in the 1980s and 1990s, and such a direct relationship with Pakistan's military reinforced its role in politics.[372]

Aparna Pande argued that when the United States routed SA through the Pakistani military (especially the ISI) after 1979, it solidified their control over foreign policy and domestic security.[373] Zaidi argued that U.S. SA may have "strengthened the hand of the military in Pakistan's political economy" because it was disproportionately larger than economic aid.[374] As such, the elected civilians remain institutionally immature. International Crisis Group agreed with Zaidi (2011) that the disproportionate nature of U.S. SA "entrenched the military's control over state institutions and policy, delaying reforms,"

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[367] Ibid., 77–89.

[368] Akbar Zaidi, "Sindhi vs Mohajir in Pakistan: Contradiction, Conflict, Compromise," *Economic and Political Weekly* 26, no. 20 (May 1991), 1296.

[369] Ibid., 1298.

[370] Azeem Ibrahim, *U.S. Aid to Pakistan - U.S. Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption* (Cambridge, MA: *Belfer Center*, 2009), 20, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/us-aid-pakistan-us-taxpayers-have-funded-pakistani-corruption.

[371] Ibid., 30–31.

[372] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations,* 176.

[373] Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 25–26.

[374] Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," 108.

and undermined the development of Pakistan's democratic institutions.[375] They recommended shifting funds to well-targeted democracy promotion and economic aid. Pande, Dhar, and Mehra argued that Pakistan is a 'rentier' state, and this dynamic keeps the military and ISI dominant over political parties.[376]

Ahmad and Mohammed concurred, noting a Dutch disease effect, except the rapid inflow of capital comes from foreign aid instead of natural resources.[377] Dutch Disease "entails real appreciation of the currency and increased government spending, both of which expand nontraded goods and service sectors… and render uncompetitive noncommodity export sectors such as manufactures. If and when world commodity prices go back down, adjustment is difficult due to the legacy of bloated government spending and debt and a shrunken manufacturing sector."[378] Ahmad and Mohammed cited Pakistan's historically feeble attempts at tax reform and fluctuations in external rent— regardless of whether it came from the United States, other bilateral donors, the IMF, or the World Bank—as evidence of Pakistan's Dutch disease.[379] The logic is that the rapid influx of U.S. SA causes Dutch Disease; which supports a "rentier class" in Pakistani society; which undermines structural reform, inclusive service delivery, and accountability of the government to its citizens.[380]

2. U.S. Security Assistance Has Comparatively Minimal Effect on Democratization

Thomas Carothers argued that it is very difficult to change state institutions, and democracy promoters had groundless optimism in the late 1980s and early 1990s about

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[375] "Aid and Conflict in Pakistan," International Crisis Group, June 27, 2012, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/pakistan/aid-and-conflict-pakistan.

[376] Aparna Pande, Shefali Dhar and Sidhanta Mehra, introduction to *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan*, ed. Aparna Pande (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 11.

[377] Ahmad and Mohammed, "Pakistan, the United States and the Bretton Woods Institutions," 230–234.

[378] Jeffrey A. Frankel, "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey." *National Bureau of Economic Research* Working Paper 15836, 34, http://www.nber.org/papers/w15836.

[379] Ahmad and Mohammed, "Pakistan, the United States and the Bretton Woods Institutions," 230–234.

[380] Ibid., 228–229.

their ability to do so, despite existing literature on the topic.[381] Ishrat Husain argued that Pakistan's failures of governance derived from the self-seeking decisions of a narrow group of elites, having nothing to do with whether it was a military or civilian government.[382] He viewed aid fluctuations as contributing to economic volatility, but he gave primacy to domestic politics in determining democratic outcomes. McInnis and Lucas argued that success in building partner capacity "depends on a number of factors largely outside of U.S. control," such as the alignment of strategic interests and the quality and capacity of host nation state institutions.[383] Umair Javed argued that elite capture and patronage prevented class mobilization, political participation, and thus democratization.[384] He added that like the colonial state before partition, the military after partition allied with landed elites to form a patronage structure to control the working class.

3. U.S. Security Assistance Supports Democratization

Epstein and Kronstadt stated that U.S. SA has improved Pakistan's security force effectiveness and "measurably improved Pakistan's energy, health, and education sectors, bolstered its infrastructure, and facilitated better governance and gender equity."[385] They recommended conditionality on SA (not civilian aid) to incentivize democratic consolidation. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009 specifically lists supporting democracy as one of the purposes of SA,[386] and this was a common theme in various appropriations acts and aid-related legislation.

In sum, the literature reveals support for each hypothesis, but the most common argument is that U.S. SA undermined democratization by entrenching the Pakistani military's role in politics. Some argued that domestic politics was the most influential in

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[381] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 200–203.

[382] Ishrat Husain, "The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy," *Journal of International Affairs* 63, no. 1 (Fall/Winter 2009): 15–16.

[383] McInnis and Lucas, *What Is 'Building Partner Capacity'*, 57.

[384] Umair Javed, "Profit, Protest and Power: Bazaar Politics in Urban Pakistan," in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan*, ed. Aparna Pande (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 151–152.

[385] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 2–3.

[386] Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–73 (2009), 10.

its effects on democratization as evident by historical elite capture, corruption irrespective of regime type, and economic mismanagement regardless of regime type. Some argued that U.S. SA supported democratization by directly bolstering Pakistan's security capacity and indirectly through conditionality (a common view in U.S. foreign policy).

D.   U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

What kind of security assistance has the United States provided to Pakistan since 1980, and what was it designed to accomplish?[387] Since 1980, U.S. SA funding to Pakistan exceeded that of economic aid. SA funding was approximately twice the amount of economic aid in the 1980s (including overt and covert SA)[388] and between 50–130% higher after 2001 (overt SA only).[389] According to Zaidi, much of the post-2001 economic aid was actually spent for military purposes in Pakistan's fights in the Northwest, not on development, which means that the security-to-economic aid ratio is probably larger than official numbers indicate.[390]

From 1980–1990, 97% of the $4.3 billion of overt U.S. SA funds went to Title 22 funded foreign military financing (FMF), and the remaining 3% went to the international narcotics control and law enforcement (INCLE) and international military education and training (IMET) programs. In 1965, the United States had cut off almost all aid in response to Pakistan's attack on India,[391] so from 1980–1982 the meager $9.8 million of overt SA went to INCLE for all three years and to IMET in 1982. In 1981, "the Reagan Administration negotiated a five-year, $3.2 billion economic and [overt] military aid package with Pakistan."[392] Another $4 billion comprehensive package for 1988–1993 was "mostly earmarked for defence expenditure allowing Pakistan to purchase military hardware and anti-submarine weapons that were more suitable for countering India than

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[387] Unless otherwise specified, Section D data sourced from: "Pakistan," Security Assistance Monitor, April 17, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Pakistan/2000/2018/all/Global//.

[388] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 25–26.

[389] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, Summary.

[390] Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," 106.

[391] Ibid., 104.

[392] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 9.

the Soviet Union."[393] As a result, from 1983–1990 a total of $4.2 billion of foreign military financing grants flowed to Pakistan, which bolstered ISI-directed support for the Mujahidin and also Pakistan's nuclear program.[394]

In 1981, the United States authorized the sale of 40 F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, which used $800 million of Saudi money to finance the purchase.[395] While foreign military sales using non-U.S. money is technically not a form of U.S. aid, it is a security assistance program. From 1980–1992, in close coordination with Pakistan's ISI, the Central Intelligence Agency "funneled $3.5 billion and weapons, including Stingers, into Afghanistan" in support of the Mujahidin.[396] From 1980–1992, combined overt and covert SA was $8 billion, approximately double the amount of U.S. economic assistance provided.[397] In short, U.S. SA to Pakistan in the 1980s was designed to make the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan as costly as possible without committing U.S. troops, and to strengthen Pakistan's conventional military as compensation for their support in the Cold War "roll back" strategy.[398]

In 1990, the Bush administration did not certify Pakistan as compliant with nuclear non-proliferation requirements per the 1985 Pressler Amendment, so the United States froze nearly all aid.[399] The United States suspended distribution of $700 million of previously committed aid, and it "declined to transfer twenty-eight F-16 aircraft and other military equipment for which Pakistan had already paid a billion dollars and imposed an embargo on Pakistan-owned military equipment sent to the United States for repairs; U.S. military training programs for Pakistani officers were also stopped."[400] F-16s were Pakistan's primary nuclear weapons delivery platform, so this undermined a major pillar

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[393] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 25.

[394] Ibid., 26.

[395] Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 154.

[396] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 25.

[397] Ibid., 25–26.

[398] Husain, "The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy," 6.

[399] Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy,* 105.

[400] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 56.

of their national security strategy vis-à-vis India.[401] Combined with India's rapid economic and military development, this prompted Pakistan to double down on the use of militant proxies as an asymmetric strategy,[402] develop its domestic weapons industry, and seek assistance from China for its nuclear program.[403] But since Pakistan primarily used U.S.-manufactured equipment, China could not replace U.S. support entirely, especially regarding equipment maintenance.[404]

From 1991–2001, international narcotics control and law enforcement was the only program funded annually, receiving between $2.1–7.7 million per year for counter-narcotics and law enforcement operations. Why did the United States fund INCLE so consistently during a decade of sanctions? INCLE was designed to undermine terrorist organization financing, who receive financial support via organized crime syndicates and cross-border drug trafficking.[405] In 1993, the United States gave "a onetime waiver from the Pressler Amendment" and traded $368 million of weapons for Pakistan's extradition of Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing suspect (who also attempted to assassinate Benazir Bhutto).[406] Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 military coup prompted U.S. sanctions and solidified its coercive policy approach.[407] In short, U.S. SA from 1991–2001 was designed to support counter-narcotics operations and to persuade Pakistan to extradite a terrorist for legal action. Sanctions and the withholding of U.S. SA were designed to coerce Pakistan into abandoning its nuclear program and its support for militant proxies.[408]

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[401] Ibid., 146.

[402] Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy,* 104–106.

[403] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 145–146.

[404] Ibid.

[405] Pranay Kotasthane, Guru Aiyar and Nitin Pai, "The Other Pakistan: Understanding the Military-Jihadi Complex," in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan*, ed. Aparna Pande (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 412.

[406] Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 284.

[407] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 175; Savita Pande, "India as a Factor in Pakistan's Policy," in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Pakistan*, ed. Aparna Pande (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 432.

[408] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 172.

In 2001, the 9/11 attacks prompted the United States to seek Pakistan's support in destroying terrorists, many of whom were based out of Northwestern Pakistan.[409] From 2001–2017, Pakistan was the fifth largest recipient of U.S. SA with a total of $23 billion.[410] From 2002–2008, U.S. aid to Pakistan was 73% military and 27% economic (10% overall for development), but much of the economic aid was spent for military purposes in Pakistan's fights in the Northwest, not for its intended purpose.[411] Title 10 funded Coalition Support Funds (CSF) accounted for 74% ($6.7 billion), and foreign military financing accounted for 17% ($1.6 billion) for a combined 91% ($8.3 of $9.1 billion) of U.S. SA. Other Title 22 SA program funding went to INCLE at 3% ($289 million); excess defense articles (EDA) at 1.5% ($138 million); nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs (NADR) at 0.6% ($52 million); and IMET at 0.1% ($11 million). Other Title 10 SC program funding went to Train and Equip at 1.9% ($168 million), Counter-drug Assistance 1.3% ($122 million), and the following below 1%: Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, Global Lift and Sustain, Unified Command, Regional Centers for Security Studies, Service Academies, and the Aviation Leadership Program. The United States funded 11 security assistance and security cooperation programs to Pakistan that were unfunded before 9/11. Overall, the seven-year total of post-9/11 U.S. funding for overt SA was $1 billion higher than combined overt and covert SA funding to Pakistan in the 1980s.

Coalition Support Funds (CSF) was a new SC program designed "to reimburse [primarily] Pakistan for logistical and operational support of U.S.-led military operations,"[412] which translated to support for approximately 100,000 Pakistani troops.[413] CSF authorized spending for all of Southwest Asia, but Pakistan was its largest and most

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[409] McInnis and Lucas, *What is 'Building Partner Capacity'*, 31.

[410] The top 4 were Afghanistan ($80 billion), Israel ($54 billion), Iraq ($29 billion), and Egypt ($23.5 billion).

[411] Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," 105–106.

[412] K. Alan Kronstadt, and Susan B. Epstein, *Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002–FY2018* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf.

[413] Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," 106.

consistent recipient by far.[414] From 2001–2013, CSF was upwards of 20–25% "of Pakistan's total military expenditures," but disbursement oversight was poor, which led to the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act requirement to itemize CSF expenditures.[415] Some analysts estimated more than half of CSF funds went to boost Pakistan's capabilities vis-à-vis India during this period.[416] The United States emphasized "train and equip" program funding from 2006–2009, which was designed to strengthen Pakistan's "law enforcement capabilities through basic police training, provision of advanced identification systems, and establishment of a new Counterterrorism Special Investigation Group."[417] In 2007, U.S. training focused on the Frontier Corps.[418] Though only 3% of total SA spending, INCLE's funding grew more than ten-fold from the previous decade, and most of the others programs also grew significantly.

In 2004, President Bush "designated Pakistan a Major Non-NATO ally" and resumed arms sales to Pakistan in 2006.[419] The most notable big ticket items were "36 new F-16C/D aircraft and associated equipment [e.g., munitions]," upgrades for the F-16A/Bs, and 115 self-propelled howitzers (155mm), which combined accounted for $2.9 of the $3.5 billion of Pakistan's 2006 arms purchases.[420] President Bush indicated that these arms sales and excess defense articles transfers were designed for Pakistani self-defense and for support in the Global War on Terror.[421] Kronstadt described the U.S. equipment as suitable for both counterterrorism and conventional operations.[422] In short, from 2002–2008, all of the security assistance and security cooperation programs (with the potential exception of

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[414] Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, *Security Cooperation Programs Fiscal Year 2016: Revision 16.0* (Washington, DC, 2016), 76–77.

[415] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 17–18.

[416] Ibid., 20.

[417] K. Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, CRS Report No. R41832 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 55, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41832.pdf.

[418] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 22.

[419] Richard F. Grimmett, *U.S. Arms Sales to Pakistan*, CRS Report No. RS22757 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 1–2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22757.pdf.

[420] Ibid.

[421] Ibid.

[422] Kronstadt, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, 55.

IMET) were designed to strengthen Pakistan's security forces so they could defend themselves conventionally and conduct effective counter-terrorism operations domestically, while the United States focused on operations in Afghanistan.[423]

A year after Pakistan's 2008 democratic elections, President Obama signed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) (a.k.a. the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act), which refocused foreign assistance and security assistance to support democratic consolidation.[424] Within the EPPA, U.S. SA was designed to enhance Pakistan's counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism operations and "to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government."[425] Specifically, it authorized IMET, foreign military financing, and personnel exchange programs with comments on how those efforts should specifically support Pakistani democracy.[426] The EPPA increased civilian aid relative to security assistance,[427] and it increased the conditionality and certification requirements necessary to authorize SA disbursement.[428] Specifically, Pakistan had to take sufficient action to control the flow of nuclear material, terrorist networks, money laundering, and ensure the ISI stayed out of politics and the justice system.[429] Foreign military financing and the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) spending had to be itemized and proven to abide by the Leahy Law on human rights (e.g., concerns over ISI-sponsored extrajudicial killings),[430] and foreign military financing could only be used to fight against al-Qaeda or the Taliban in Pakistan.[431] Overall, the EPPA was a strategic shift

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[423] McInnis and Lucas, *What is 'Building Partner Capacity'*, 31–32.

[424] Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, 3–4.

[425] Ibid., 10.

[426] Ibid., 10–11.

[427] Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," 109.

[428]Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements*, CRS Report No. R42116 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 5–8, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42116.pdf.

[429] Ibid.

[430] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 17.

[431] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements*, 5–8.

in U.S. foreign policy toward Pakistan, and Pakistan unsurprisingly disliked what they viewed as micromanagement.[432]

From 2009–2011, U.S. SA averaged $2.5 billion annually (in spite of the worldwide financial crisis), a two-thirds increase over the 2002–2008 $1.5 billion annual average. From 2009–2011, Coalition Support Funds increased by 25%, but as a share of overall SA funding it dropped from a prior 65% to 49% ($3.3 billion). The new PCCF program received 28% ($1.9 billion), and it was designed to enable Pakistan "to clear and hold terrain in contested areas throughout the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and elsewhere along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan."[433] Foreign military financing held steady at $300 million annually, accounting for 13% ($900 million), which included: radios, a frigate, F-16A/B upgrade kits, light infantry gear, armored personnel carriers, small boats, unmanned aerial surveillance systems, and other supplies.[434] The United States also delivered 18 new F-16C/Ds and various associated bombs and missiles.[435] INCLE more than doubled and received 5% ($330 million), which supported border security, counter-narcotics operations, and law enforcement training (i.e., security sector reform).[436] The United States discontinued Section 1206 Train and Equip in 2010, though in 2009 alone it received 2% ($139 million) of three-year funding totals.[437] Counter-Drug Assistance received 1% ($90 million), including equipment and operation support.[438] All other programs received less than 1% of funding, but many of them doubled in funding quantity. In short, U.S. SA from 2009–2011 was designed to strengthen Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities "while conditioning such aid on that government's progress in both combating militancy and further democratizing."[439]

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[432] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 15.

[433] McInnis and Lucas, *What is 'Building Partner Capacity'*, 33.

[434] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan."

[435] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 19–20.

[436] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan."

[437] Ibid.

[438] Ibid.

[439] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 13.

In 2011, several events strained U.S.-Pakistani relations, particularly the U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistani territory.[440] A decade of U.S. SA to Pakistan without fundamental progress from the U.S. perspective made it evident that there was a principal-agent problem in U.S.-Pakistani relations. In 2012, the relationship fundamentally changed from a strategic partnership to an issue-based, transactional approach over shared interests.[441] President Obama made clear his intent to withdrawal from Afghanistan by 2014 (originally 2011, but was delayed).[442]

From 2012–2017, U.S. SA steadily declined ten-fold, which aptly reflected the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fundamental shift in bilateral relations. Coalition Support Funds received 64% of total U.S. SA ($4.6 of $7.5 billion). The notable exception was in 2012: the United States froze Coalition Support Funds reimbursement (as required by law), because "Pakistan had barred NATO from transiting along its Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) linking Afghanistan with the Arabian Sea."[443] Foreign military financing received 23% ($1.6 billion), though it was shifted to security sector reform after 2013. Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund received 6% ($452 million) in 2012, and then it was discontinued. INCLE received 4% ($310 million), and it supported stabilization operations, counter-narcotics, governing justly and democratically, rule of law and human rights, and security sector reform of border patrol and police. Nonproliferation, anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) received 1% ($71 million), which supported antiterrorism assistance, export control, and border security initiatives. All other programs received less than 1%, and as of 2017 the only programs still funded were foreign military financing, INCLE, NADR, and IMET. In 2014, President Obama shifted funding to approximately 2/3 economic and 1/3 security aid—a substantial shift from his 50/50 distribution in 2009 and the 30/70 ratio from 2002–2008—though U.S SA

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[440] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements*, 1.

[441] Kronstadt, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, 5.

[442] Jalal, *The Struggle for* Pakistan, 356.

[443] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 3; NATO troops killed 24 Pakistanis in a friendly fire incident, which is why Pakistan closed the GLOCs to NATO traffic. See Kronstadt, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, 1.

was qualitatively the same.[444] In short, U.S. SA from 2012–2017 was designed to sustaining support for Pakistan's counter-terrorism capabilities, border security, and civilian control of the military while the United States shifted its strategic priorities elsewhere.[445]

In sum, from 1980–1990, U.S. SA was designed to reinforce counter-narcotics operations, professionalize and acculturate the Pakistani officer corps through IMET, finance and equip the Pakistani military and Afghan Mujahidin, and "roll back" the Soviets from Afghanistan. From 1991–2001, U.S. SA was designed to undercut terrorist financing via counter-narcotics operations and coerce Pakistan to abandon its nuclear program and its support for militant proxies. From 2002–2008, U.S. SA was designed primarily to enable Pakistan to effectively support U.S. counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also to strengthen their conventional capabilities.[446] From 2009–2011, U.S. SA was designed "to strengthen Pakistan's efforts to develop strong and effective law enforcement and national defense forces under [democratic] civilian leadership" to support counter-terrorism operations.[447] From 2012–2017, U.S. SA was designed to sustain Pakistan's counter-terrorism capabilities and enhance its democratic governance so that the United States could withdrawal from Afghanistan, avoid a resurgence in terrorism, and shift its strategic priorities elsewhere.

E.   ANALYSIS

Georg Sorensen argued that three domestic elements must precede successful democracy: "(1) political leaders committed to the promotion of democracy, (2) a politically independent, merit-based state bureaucracy, and (3) a vibrant civil society capable of imposing checks on the state."[448] From a political economy perspective, Simon Bromley identified two pre-requisites for democratic, capitalist state formation: the state's

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[444] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 28.

[445] Ibid., 47–48; Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, 10.

[446] Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," 106–109.

[447] Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, 5.

[448] Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, 80.

monopoly on coercion and the separation between political and economic sources of power.[449] Of these five factors, the first three were present throughout Pakistan's history to some degree. Regarding the fourth, Pakistan never fully solidified its monopoly on violence due to the use of militant proxies in its asymmetric security strategy against India. The fifth factor has historically been missing due to elite capture, patronage, and the military's economic assets. The literature revealed that U.S. SA was designed to counter terrorism and strengthen Pakistan's monopoly on coercion (especially after 9/11), but it may have brought the political and economic sources of power closer together. This analysis focuses on the tension between these two factors, because they are central to the debate on the effects of U.S. SA on Pakistan's democratization.

The "U.S. SA supported democratization" argument correlates with the quantitative data, because a "more free" ranking lagged a few years after each significant increase in U.S. SA funding. The literature proposed two causal mechanisms. The first mechanism is that strengthening Pakistan's security sector may have enhanced its operational effectiveness, which is one key component of good civil-military relations.[450] Good civil-military relations would then enhance democratization. Matei explained three metrics by which security force effectiveness is measured: a strategic plan; "structures and processes to both formulate the plans and implement them, and "resources, in the form of political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient equipment, trained forces, and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles and missions."[451] The idea is that U.S. SA provided money, equipment, training, and other assets to enhance security force effectiveness, and through the causal chain listed above, supported democratization.

The question is: did the improvements in civil-military relations enhance the state' monopoly on coercion in line with Bromley's pre-requisites for democratic, capitalist state formation? As evidenced in the "U.S. Security Assistance to Pakistan" section, U.S. SA significantly enhanced the capabilities and capacity of the Pakistani military, to include its

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[449] Bromley, "The Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East," 380.

[450] Bruneau and Matei, introduction to *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, 1.

[451] Matei, *A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations*, 32.

nuclear program. This much is clear. However, in the 1980s just as much U.S. SA money went to militant proxies as it did to the Pakistani military, which reduced Pakistan's monopoly on coercion. Additionally, Pakistan's economic challenges and military disadvantages vis-à-vis India gave them an incentive to use militant proxies in a low-cost, asymmetric security strategy in Kashmir and Afghanistan long after the 1980s. In Pakistan's case, increased capacity led to increased security force effectiveness, but it did not equate to monopolizing the use of violence. In Pakistan's case, this counter-balancing effect brings the validity of this causal mechanism into question.

The second mechanism is that U.S. SA may have enabled a struggling Pakistani economy to grow and/or develop, leading to an educated middle class that demanded democracy.[452] Given the 1988 and 2008 democratic transitions from authoritarianism, this seems plausible. Pakistan's per capita gross national income (GNI) increased from $2,060 in 1990 to $5,560 in 2017, crossing the $4,200 threshold in 2009.[453] Przeworski et al. found that per capita gross national product (GNP) above $4,200 correlated strongly with a "better than even chance of" democracy surviving.[454] This is not to say growth caused democratization, but if aid helped growth at all, it may have assisted with the *consolidation* of democracy after 2009. However, this assumes that U.S. SA actually fostered economic growth or development. Aid was in massive quantities, inconsistent, unaccompanied by structural reform (e.g., tax reform), and did not foster the kind of politically cohesive middle class typically associated with modernization theory. U.S. SA (and other aid) certainly contributed to consumer spending, but may not have directly fostered economic growth or development. The qualitative analysis contradicts causation, and it is indecisive in its support for correlation between U.S. SA and democratization in Pakistan.

The "U.S. SA undermined democratization" argument would anticipate an increase in U.S. SA to precede a decline in freedom, or that the absence of U.S. SA would precede either an increase in freedom or no real change. The data show the exact opposite. The

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[452] Bellin, "The Political-Economic Conundrum," 143.

[453] International Comparison Program Database (object name GNI per capita, PPP (current international $); accessed March 24, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org.

[454] Ibid.

spike in U.S. SA from 1983–1989 preceded a 3-point increase in "freedom" from 1985–1989. When U.S. SA was cut off from 1991–2001, "freedom" declined by 1–1.5 points in the early 1990s and by a total of 3 in 1999 (Musharraf's coup). The spike in U.S. SA in 2001 preceded a 1-point increase in "freedom" in 2008. The quantitative data directly contradict this hypothesis.

Qualitatively, this common argument has an intuitive logic to it: if the military dominating politics is the problem, then strengthening the military must undermine democracy. This hypothesis proposed three causal mechanisms. First, when U.S. SA is coordinated directly with the military, it may undermine civilian institutions by placing ownership of foreign policy and security decisions with the military. The authors articulated this concept well (and it is a straight forward mechanism), but they failed to address that Pakistan could simultaneously strengthen the military's capacity *and* re-define its role vis-à-vis elected officials. Second, U.S. SA may entrench the military's financial independence (i.e., a geographic rentier effect), which enables it to affect politics without being vulnerable to loss of support. Ayesha Siddiqa argued that the Pakistani military's economic holdings derived from the political power it gained after its entry into politics in the 1950s.[455] Subsequent coups in 1977 and 1999 yielded additional economic clout for the military, weakening civilian institutions.[456] The military's economic and financial holdings "allowed the military fraternity to evolve into an independent class which guarded its own interests along with those of its clients from other dominant classes, and institutionalized its control of the state."[457] In essence, the military has a lot to lose by withdrawing from politics, so out of sheer self-interests it will actively seek to influence policy-making and resource allocation (either directly through political activity or indirectly through economic and financial autonomy).[458] Since the military has a direct interest in maintaining political influence, the idea is that U.S. SA reinforces the military's

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[455] Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2007), 129.

[456] Ibid., 248–249.

[457] Ibid.

[458] Ibid.

financial independence, hinders civilian accountability mechanisms, and makes it impossible "to get the military out of politics, or for the military to strengthen democratic institutions."[459]

Third, failure to implement democracy-related aid conditionality may undermine democracy. According to these three causal mechanisms, the 1980s should have been the best case scenario to prove the argument that U.S. SA undercuts democracy, but the results were the exact opposite. Pakistan channeled half of the U.S. SA in the 1980s to Islamic militants who competed with Pakistan's military for a monopoly on violence. The United States routed its SA through the Pakistani military instead of the civilian government, entrenching the military's financial independence. U.S. SA was "big enough" in scale and introduced suddenly enough to create a "Dutch disease" effect.[460] Lastly, U.S. SA lacked democracy-related conditionality. All of these characteristics of U.S. SA to Pakistan in the 1980s "should have" undermined Pakistan's democratization. However, a 3-point increase in "freedom" took place in the midst of peak-1980s U.S. security assistance. Those who argue that U.S. SA undercuts democratization in Pakistan would need to explain how Pakistan became 3 points "more free" when U.S. SA was entirely security-centric and not designed to foster democracy. It was Pakistan's biggest shift from authoritarianism to democracy in the last forty years, and it happened during a period of peak U.S. SA that had all of the causal mechanisms that allegedly undermine democratization. Those who advocate this argument need to explain the 1980s. The qualitative analysis appeared logical and intuitive on the surface, but when analyzed in detail it did not align with the quantitative data or hold up well to scrutiny.

The "U.S. SA has minimal effect on democratization" argument would expect aid recipients to make governance decisions independently of the aid provider's conditions and expectations. When the United States suspended SA in 1990, Pakistan continued to pursue its nuclear program. In spite of sanctions in 1999, Musharraf stayed in power until he lost

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[459] Ibid.

[460] Nor did the authors specify a threshold past which annual SA funding would cause a rentier effect. $10 million? $1 billion? 10% of GDP? 50% of government budget? They assumed that what they think is "a lot" of U.S. SA increased the military's role in politics.

legitimacy in 2007. Despite decades of INCLE funding, the National Logistics Cell, "a trucking company wholly owned by the Pakistani military," working with the Taliban shipped "weapons and material to Afghan guerrillas while funneling out vast amounts of heroin."[461] This is just one example of Pakistan's use of militant proxies as a pillar of its India-centric security strategy since 1947.[462] Osama bin Laden was harbored in Pakistan until 2011, even though 2009–2011 U.S. SA was specifically designed and resources to support democratization and counter terrorism. Taken individually, these are anecdotal events, but as a whole they illustrate a fundamental incompatibility between U.S. and Pakistani interests. This supports the argument that there is a principal-agent problem: the United States expects its SA be used to combat terrorism, but Pakistan views India as the primary threat, which is why it is willing to forego aid to maintain a nuclear program and its ties with militant proxies. Biddle said it best: "when allies see existential risks in reform, even the sweetest carrots and strongest sticks available are unlikely to outweigh such incentives."[463]

Not only is there a principal-agent problem, but according to Pew Research Center, Pakistani public opinion on Americans and on the United States was consistently more unfavorable than favorable in the post-9/11 context. From 2002–2013, Pakistan was among the top five countries/territories with an "unfavorable" view of Americans every year,[464] topping out at #1 in 2002 and 2012.[465] The percentage of Pakistani survey respondents holding an unfavorable view of Americans ranged between 47% and 73% (see Figure 6).[466]

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[461] Kotasthane, Aiyar and Pai, "The Other Pakistan, Understanding the Military-Jihadi Complex," 412.

[462] Paul S. Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, "The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia," *International Security* 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 138.

[463] Biddle, "Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency," 135.

[464] Others frequenting the top five with an "unfavorable" view include the Palestinian territories, Turkey, Jordan, and Egypt.

[465] "Opinion of Americans," Pew Research Center, August, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/2/survey/all/response/Unfavorable/.

[466] "Opinion of Americans," Pew Research Center, August, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/2/country/166/response/Unfavorable/.

Figure 6.   Percentage of Pakistanis with an Unfavorable Opinion
of the American People[467]

From 2002–2015, Pakistan was among the top eight countries/territories with an
"unfavorable" view of the United States ever year, topping out at #2 in 2002 and 2012.[468]
The percentage of Pakistani survey respondents holding an unfavorable view of the United
States ranged between 56% and 80% (see Figure 7).[469]

[467] Ibid.

[468] "Opinion of the United States," Pew Research Center, August, 2017,
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/survey/all/response/Unfavorable/.

[469] "Opinion of the United States," Pew Research Center, August, 2017,
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/country/166/response/Unfavorable/

Figure 7.   Percentage of Pakistanis with an Unfavorable Opinion
of the United States[470]

These surveys support the idea that U.S. involvement in Pakistan is largely unpopular, though it is unclear if this negative attitude necessarily undermines democratization, or if it is related to U.S. security assistance. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that such a negative public opinion strengthens the "U.S. SA supports democratization" argument.

In summary, Pakistan made significant steps toward democratization twice during periods of high U.S. SA, including two leadership transitions from military dictators to elected civilian officials (1988 and 2008). This weakened the argument that U.S. SA undermined democracy by entrenching the military in the economy and in politics. Pakistan made its largest measurable shift toward democracy during the late 1980s (when support to militant proxies was at its greatest). This weakened the argument that U.S. SA supported democracy by strengthening Pakistan's security sector. The order of events correlated with domestic political events more than it did with U.S. SA, and the post-2011 shifts in U.S. policy toward Pakistan are tacit acceptance by the United States of its interests being divergent from Pakistan's. The primacy of the Indian threat in Pakistan's security strategy

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[470] Ibid.

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created a principal-agent problem with U.S. SA, which drove Pakistan to make political decisions with a good amount of disregard for U.S. incentives and punishments.

Since U.S. SA did not appear to have supported or undermined Pakistan's democratization, the United States could theoretically pursue its security and democratization objectives independently. But if the United States wants to promote democratization, then it should craft its policy with full recognition of India's primacy in Pakistan's strategic thought. The Pakistani state and its resident militant groups both view India as their biggest security threat. The Pakistani state and the United States both view Pakistan's resident militant groups as a security threat, just to differing degrees. The United States views those militant groups as a greater threat to its own interests than Pakistan does to its own interests. As a result, Pakistan's threat perception aligns more strongly with its resident militant groups than it does with the United States. If U.S. SA could decisively support Pakistan's democratization, it would likely be under conditions where: U.S. and Pakistani interests and threat perceptions aligned more closely, the United States created more coercive penalties for violating democracy-related aid conditionality, the United States significantly increased incentives for anti-democratic actors to comply with democratization, the United States significantly strengthened its support for pro-democratic actors in Pakistan, or a combination of several of these conditions.

IV.   ANALYSIS

This analysis will address three things. First, it will summarize the Lebanon case study. Second, it will summarize the Pakistan case study. Lastly, it will evaluate the cumulative evidence from the case studies to determine the degree to which it supports or undermines the three hypotheses: that U.S. security assistance (SA) supports host nation democratization, that U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and that U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to domestic and regional political factors.

A.   SUMMARY OF THE LEBANON CASE STUDY

My analysis of Lebanon covered 1991–2017, because 1990 was when Lebanon's current system of government and military organization were established. Since its independence in 1943, Lebanon has had a power-sharing political system based on religion, which was designed "to prevent any one group from dominating the others," but it often led to political deadlock.[471] Border skirmishes along the Lebanon-Israeli border led to internal conflict in Lebanon that escalated into a 15-year civil war (1975–1990), after which the 1989 Taif Accords began the reconciliation process.[472] All civil war militias were subsequently disarmed and integrated with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), except for Hezbollah's Shi'ite militia in the South.[473] Syrian troops occupied much of Lebanon from 1976–2005, originally "to protect Christians from Muslim and Palestinian militias" during the Lebanese Civil War.[474] This likely hindered the development of the LAF greatly, even after the civil war. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War resulted in United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, a United Nations-monitored ceasefire along the southern border with Israel that was to be implemented by the LAF.[475]

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[471] Humud, *Lebanon,* 5.

[472] Deegan, *Middle East and Problems of Democracy,* 110–115.

[473] Humud, *Lebanon*, 2–3.

[474] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 17.

[475] Humud, *Lebanon*, 13.

Given Lebanon's extensive occupation by foreign forces and its sectarian political context, the LAF requires robust security assistance in order to control non-state actors, secure its borders, and defend against hostile neighbors. Between the end of the civil war (1990) and 2006, U.S. SA focused on re-constituting the LAF after the civil war and on training its officer corps.[476] The overwhelming majority of funds went to the following Title 22 SA programs: excess defense articles; International Military Education and Training (IMET); and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) programs.[477] IMET to Lebanon was "designed to reduce sectarianism in the LAF," and enhance US-Lebanese partnerships.[478] In 2005, the Title 10 funded Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was intended to prevent the collapse of state security during transition from Syrian military to LAF responsibility.[479] In sum, from 1991–2005, U.S. SA was designed to improve the capacity and capability of the government of Lebanon by training and equipping the LAF, professionalizing the LAF through IMET, and preventing Lebanon's collapse.

After 2006, U.S. SA focused on training and equipping the LAF and Internal Security Forces (ISF) to secure southern Lebanon in accordance with UNSCR 1701.[480] U.S. SA funding was 25 times higher than the pre-2006 quantity, and it covered a broader range of security assistance and security cooperation programs.[481] Approximately 85% of U.S. SA was Foreign Military Financing, Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority, and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).[482] From 2006–2013, U.S. SA was designed to transfer UNSCR 1701 responsibilities in southern Lebanon from Hezbollah to the LAF, to modernize the LAF and ISF, and to better control refugee populations and cross-border trafficking. In response to Islamic State-LAF clashes, the

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[476] "Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Lebanon."

[477] Security Assistance Monitor, "Lebanon."

[478] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 4–5.

[479] U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest, 2005–2006."

[480] Ibid.

[481] Security Assistance Monitor, "Lebanon."

[482] Ibid.

2014–2015 spike in U.S. SA was designed to prevent Lebanon from collapsing from Syrian Civil War spillover, and also to deny Islamic extremist groups recruiting opportunities in refugee camps in Lebanon.[483] From 2016–2017, SC programs faded away as the Islamic State weakened, but SA programs maintained steady funding levels.[484]

The literature on Lebanon revealed supporting arguments for all three hypotheses. The majority argued that domestic politics was the most influential in its effects on democratization, with regional influence a close second. Some authors argued that U.S. SA was highly influential, but they were split on whether it supported or undermined democratization. Regarding how security assistance was designed and resourced, the United States appears to have prioritized immediate security interests for itself and its allies over Lebanon's democratization in terms of the way it designed and resource its security assistance efforts. The primary goal of U.S. SA to Lebanon seems to have been to prevent terrorist attacks and make the LAF stronger than Hezbollah, but not strong enough that it could threaten Israel—a fear held within the Washington establishment since the 2010 Lebanese-Israeli border skirmish that killed soldiers on each side.[485] The most significant changes in restructuring and professionalizing the LAF were Lebanese-led and Syrian-led reform efforts in the 1990s.[486] The only sustained increase in democracy (2005 Cedar Revolution) resulted from a domestic revolt against Syrian military occupation.[487] In both cases, the U.S. increased SA afterward; it did not drive those changes.

B.   SUMMARY OF THE PAKISTAN CASE STUDY

My analysis of Pakistan covered 1980–2017, which includes the two waves of U.S. SA funding during the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s and after the 9/11 attacks in 2001. Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has perceived India as an existential threat because India antagonized Pakistan's military, committed human rights abuses on

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[483] Humud, *Lebanon*, 3–8.

[484] Security Assistance Monitor, "Lebanon."

[485] Humud, *Lebanon*, 21.

[486] Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," 247–248.

[487] Addis, *U.S. Security Assistance to Lebanon*, 1.

Pakistanis, grew its conventional military rapidly, and (most importantly) developed nuclear weapons.[488] India outmatched Pakistan's economy, military, and population, so Pakistan obtained external assistance from whoever was willing to provide it so as to secure its territory against India. From 1977–1988, President-General Zia ul-Haq's rule was characterized by a combination of martial law with state-sponsored Islamism.[489] From 1988–1999, four democratically elected civilians governed Pakistan, all of whom "were removed by the army through explicit or implicit presidential orders."[490] In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf executed a coup and ruled through 2007. From 2008–2017, Pakistan was democratic and held elections in 2008 and 2013.[491]

During the 1980s, the United States routed its SA through Pakistan's military—primarily the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)—to reinforce the Afghan Mujahidin's pre-existing fight against the Soviet invasion.[492] This was designed to reinforce counter-narcotics operations, professionalize and acculturate the Pakistani officer corps through IMET, resource the Pakistani military and Afghan Mujahidin, and support the Carter Doctrine tenet of protecting the Persian Gulf by "rolling back" the Soviet military from Afghanistan.[493] In exchange for Pakistan's support, U.S. SA also included equipment more suitable for conventional military deterrence vis-à-vis India.[494] From 1991–2001, U.S. SA was almost entirely withdrawn (per the 1985 Pressler Amendment) due to Pakistan's nuclear program and the post-Cold War emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation.[495] assimilate

After 2001, U.S. SA funding to Pakistan was two to four times higher than in the 1980s,[496] and it was designed primarily to enable Pakistan to effectively support U.S.

[488] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 174–175.

[489] Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 217.

[490] Kronstadt, *Pakistan's Scheduled 2008 Election Background*, 1.

[491] Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 344–380.

[492] Ibid., 233.

[493] Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 102–113.

[494] Ibid., 103–104.

[495] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 9–10.

[496] Ibid.

counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also to strengthen their conventional capabilities to address the perceived threat from India.[497] In 2009, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act placed more conditions on U.S. SA and was designed to support a more comprehensive approach to strengthening Pakistani governance and maintaining counter-terrorism capabilities.[498] In 2012, the relationship fundamentally changed from a strategic partnership to an issue-based, transactional approach over shared interests.[499] From 2009–2011, U.S. SA was designed "to strengthen Pakistan's efforts to develop strong and effective law enforcement and national defense forces under [democratic] civilian leadership" to support counter-terrorism operations.[500] From 2012–2017, U.S. SA was designed to sustain Pakistan's counter-terrorism capabilities and enhance its democratic governance so that the United States could withdrawal from Afghanistan, avoid a resurgence in terrorism, and shift its strategic priorities elsewhere.[501]

The literature on Pakistan revealed supporting arguments for each of the three hypotheses, but the most common argument is that U.S. SA undermined democratization by strengthening the Pakistani military's political influence. A minority argued that domestic politics was the most influential in its effects on democratization as evident by historical elite capture, corruption irrespective of regime type, and economic mismanagement regardless of regime type. Some argued that U.S. SA supported democratization by directly bolstering Pakistan's security capacity and indirectly through conditionality (a common view in U.S. foreign policy). The literature revealed that U.S. SA was designed to counter terrorism and strengthen Pakistan's monopoly on coercion (especially after 9/11), but it may have brought the political and economic sources of power closer together, which Bromley argued hinders democratization.[502]

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[497] Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," 106–109.

[498] Ibid.

[499] Kronstadt, *Pakistan-U.S. Relations*, 5.

[500] Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, 5.

[501] Ibid., 10; Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance,* 47–48.

[502] Bromley, "The Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East," 380.

In summary, the quantitative analysis supported the "U.S. SA supports host nation democratization" hypothesis, and the qualitative literature supported the "U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization" hypothesis. Pakistan made significant steps toward democratization twice during periods of high U.S. SA, including two leadership transitions from military dictators to elected civilian officials (1988 and 2008). While U.S. SA clearly entrenched Pakistan's military in its economy,[503] these elections weakened the qualitative argument that U.S. SA undermined democracy by entrenching the military in the economy and in politics. Pakistan made its largest measurably shift toward democracy during the late 1980s (when support to militant proxies was at its greatest). This weakened the argument that U.S. SA supported democracy by strengthening Pakistan's security sector, because those militants later hindered Pakistan's monopolization on the legitimate use of violence. The order of events correlated with domestic political events more than it did with U.S. SA. despite episodic improvements in democracy. Throughout the literature, there was evidence that the primacy of the Indian threat in Pakistan's security strategy created a principal-agent problem with U.S. SA, which drove Pakistan to make political decisions with a good amount of disregard for U.S. incentives and punishments.

C.   EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE HYPOTHESES

Before proceeding, I must address the concern of some that democracy promotion is no longer a stated aspect of U.S. foreign policy under the "principled realism" of Donald Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy. Thomas Carothers and Frances Brown argued that the strategy "does establish that U.S. foreign policy still officially includes supporting democracy, defending human rights, advancing accountable governance, mitigating fragility, and making at least some use of multilateral forums and mechanisms."[504] While the strategy does not use the terms "human rights" or "democracy promotion" overtly, it uses language that refers to the following concepts indirectly: democracy 20 times, human

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[503] Siddiqa-Agha, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy,* 248–249.

[504] Frances Z. Brown and Thomas Carothers, "Is the New U.S. National Security Strategy a Step Backward on Democracy and Human Rights?," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 30, 2018, http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/30/is-new-u.s.-national-security-strategy-step-backward-on-democracy-and-human-rights-pub-75376.

rights 12 times, accountable governance 10 times, fragile states 19 times, and multilateralism 14 times.[505] In a separate piece, Carothers delivered scathing criticism of President Trump's words and actions and their negative effects on democracy promotion.[506] However, he proceeded to explain that many influential people in U.S. bureaucracies, Congress (from both parties), diplomatic roles, and NGOs continue to support democracy around the globe. In short, he described how democracy promotion is an enduring aspect of U.S. foreign policy, regardless of the approach to international relations of the administration currently in office. I will continue with this analysis under the assumption that democracy promotion will continue to be an important theme in U.S. foreign policy.

1. Hypothesis: U.S. Security Assistance Supports Host Nation Democratization

The authors who argued this hypothesis proposed four causal mechanisms. The first causal mechanism is that when prosperous democracies set a good example of protecting human rights and individual liberties, it influences other countries to do likewise. One could argue that there should be a correlation between host nation democratization, the health of U.S. democracy, and a favorable view of U.S. democracy from the host nation. Freedom House rated U.S. democracy at a best possible score of 1.0 from 1980–2016 and a 1.5 in 2017.[507] The logic is as follows: the U.S. was one of the best measurable democratic examples from 1980–2016, and spikes in U.S. SA increase U.S. contact with the host nation, which increased awareness of the U.S. democratic example, inspiring the host nation to democratize. U.S. SA to Lebanon surged *after* increases in democracy, which means this mechanism is not generalizable. On the other hand, U.S. SA to Pakistan surged

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[505] Gareth Fowler, "Appendix: Democracy, Human Rights, Rule of Law, Fragile States, and Multilateralism in the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 29, 2018, http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/29/appendix-democracy-human-rights-rule-of-law-fragile-states-and-multilateralism-in-2017-u.s.-national-security-strategy-pub-75377.

[506] Thomas Carothers, "Democracy Promotion Under Trump: What Has Been Lost? What Remains?," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 6, 2017, http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/06/democracy-promotion-under-trump-what-has-been-lost-what-remains-pub-73021.

[507] Epstein and Rosen, *U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs*,

before increases in democracy in the 1980s and 2000s. In 2008 and 2013–2015, approximately twice as many Pakistani survey respondents viewed the U.S. government's respect for the personal freedoms of its people as positive rather than negative, a stark contract to their consistently negative view of Americans and of the United States.[508] Therefore, there is a correlation after 2001 between: a strong U.S. democratic example, increased U.S. SA (i.e. 'contact' with Pakistan), a positive Pakistani opinion of U.S. personal freedoms, and a 1-point increase in Pakistani democracy. Was U.S. SA the means by which Pakistan increased its awareness of the U.S. democratic example? Not necessarily. For example, from 1997–2003, overall print circulation increased in Pakistan.[509] In 2002, General Musharraf liberalized media laws and gave privately-owned media outlets licenses, which initiated a decentralization of Pakistan's media.[510] One could argue that the proliferation and decentralization of media, not U.S. SA, increased Pakistani awareness of the U.S. democratic example.

The second causal mechanism is that aid conditionality incentivizes state elites to democratize to secure the future flow of aid money. Increases in Lebanon's democracy came before increases in U.S. SA, and U.S. SA to Pakistan in the 1980s lacked conditionality during Pakistan's biggest increase in democracy, so this mechanism may not be generalizable. The 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) implemented democracy-related conditionality and certification requirements necessary to authorize U.S. SA disbursement to Pakistan.[511] Specifically, Pakistan had to take sufficient action to control the flow of nuclear material, terrorist networks, money laundering, and ensure the ISI stayed out of politics and the justice system.[512] Foreign military financing and the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund (PCCF) spending had to be itemized and

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[508] "U.S. Personal Freedoms," Pew Research Center, August, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/72/country/166/; These are the only years for which survey data is available on this question.

[509] "Media in Pakistan: Between Radicalisation and Democratisation in an Unfolding Conflict" (Denmark: International Media Support, July 2009), 20.

[510] Ibid., 16.

[511] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements*, 5–8.

[512] Ibid.

proven to abide by the Leahy Law on human rights (e.g., concerns over ISI-sponsored extrajudicial killings).[513] In short, the \$10 billion of U.S. SA to Pakistan from 2010–2014[514] under the EPPA's democratic conditionality is exactly the kind of initiative this causal mechanism would expect to support democratization, but Pakistan's Freedom House rating has not changed since 2008.[515] From that perspective, one could argue that this causal mechanism is neither generalizable nor applicable to the particular cases of Lebanon or Pakistan.

One could also argue that the quantity of U.S. SA must exceed a certain threshold whereby the potential of losing aid is consequential enough to compel change. From 1980–2016, cumulative U.S. SA was 0.60% of Pakistan's cumulative GDP (see Figure 8).[516] After 9/11, cumulative U.S. SA was 0.87% of Pakistan's cumulative GDP.[517] U.S. SA to Pakistan was at its highest in 2002, 2003, 2010, and 2011; measuring between 1.28% and 1.52% of Pakistan's annual GDP.[518] From 1990–2016, cumulative U.S. SA to Lebanon was 0.24% of its cumulative GDP.[519] After 9/11, cumulative U.S. SA to Lebanon was 0.30% of its cumulative GDP.[520] Over the full periods of analysis, the United States gave an average of 2.56 times more security assistance funding to Pakistan than to Lebanon (2.88 times more in the post-9/11 period).[521] One could argue that U.S. SA to Pakistan was above the threshold due to Pakistan's democratization after spikes in U.S. SA, but neither increase in democracy happened under democracy-related conditionality. This suggests that democracy-related aid conditionality is less influential than the overall share of SA as a percentage of host nation GDP in compelling democratization. One might argue that

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[513] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 17.

[514] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan."

[515] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World."

[516] The World Bank Database (object name GDP (constant 2010 US\$); accessed May 19, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.

[517] Ibid.

[518] Ibid.

[519] Ibid.

[520] Ibid.

[521] Ibid.

Lebanon contradicts this argument, but perhaps other factors compelled Lebanon to democratize while this particular mechanism compelled Pakistan to democratize because aid was above a certain threshold. This argument would require many more data points to determine a threshold, but if this mechanism is active, then these cases indicate the threshold is somewhere between 0.25% and 0.60% of host nation GDP. Also, this threshold might vary depending upon other contributing factors, such as internal or external armed conflict. This would be a topic for further research.


Figure 8.   U.S. Security Assistance as Percentage of Host Nation GDP (2017 Constant US$)[522]

The third causal mechanism is that externally sourced peacekeeping operations, security force assistance, and security sector assistance efforts bolster the security necessary for democratic transitions, consolidation, and all other aspects democratic governance itself. In 2006, the United Nations expanded the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mandate in response to the Israel-Hezbollah war, including an

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[522] Ibid.; All data were pulled in constant 2010 U.S. $s and converted to constant 2017 U.S. $s for calculation of percentages to ensure an accurate basis of comparison over time and between countries. Data for Lebanon is unavailable before 1988, likely due to the civil war.

approximate 10-fold increase in troops in conjunction with a spike in U.S. SA funding.[523] While it is true that the one-point increase in democracy in 2005 took place before the increase in UN troops and U.S. SA to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),[524] one could argue that these efforts prevented democratic backsliding by providing stability or supported democratic consolidation. The logic is that for Lebanon to avoid backsliding with the challenging context of the Syrian Civil War is evidence of the effectiveness of U.S. SA as supporting democratization via stability. Kumar and de Zeeuw specified an important counterpoint that "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants" is necessary for successful war-to-peace transitions.[525] The Lebanese government still has not accomplished this vis-à-vis Hezbollah's militia, even with all of the UNIFIL troops and U.S. SA in support. Thus, while that support has provided stability, one could argue that Hezbollah's militia (or even sectarianism in general) has prevented U.S. SA from increasing democracy in Lebanon, even if U.S. SA did prevent democratic backsliding. In Pakistan's case, increased capacity led to increased security force effectiveness, but it did not equate to monopolizing the use of violence due to its use of militant proxies in a low-cost, asymmetric security strategy vis-à-vis India.[526] However, Epstein and Kronstadt argued that U.S. SA has "measurably improved Pakistan's energy, health, and education sectors, bolstered its infrastructure, and facilitated better governance and gender equality," all of which are widely believed to support democracy.[527]

The fourth causal mechanism is that security force assistance supports host nation security sector reform, which improves its civil-military relations (CMR) and democratic governance. This is the view most commonly found in CMR, security assistance, and U.S. foreign policy and strategy literature. Figure 8 and the associated paragraph outlined how U.S. SA may support democratization in terms of overall financial motivation, but this mechanism focuses types of assistance that improve civilian control over and effectiveness

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[523] Humud, *Lebanon*, 13–14.

[524] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World."

[525] Kumar and de Zeeuw, "Democracy Assistance to Postconflict Societies," 4.

[526] Kapur and Ganguly, "The Jihad Paradox," 138.

[527] Epstein and Kronstadt, *Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance*, 2–3.

of the state's coercive apparatus (e.g., defense institution building, international military education and training (IMET), and expanded-IMET). Diamond recommended an incremental reform process to establish civilian oversight, reorient the military toward external defense, slowly remove them from the political realm, and punish human rights abuses only to the extent that it will not risk a coup.[528] Similarly, Schmitter emphasized that the primary challenge for elected officials is to re-integrate and re-task the security sector and military while simultaneously holding them accountable, without provoking backlash.[529] An example of this backlash is when Hezbollah occupied the capital in 2008 (after 2 years of enhanced UNIFIL support and U.S. SA) in response to the civilian government's attempt to prosecute their members for Prime Minister Hariri's assassination in 2005.[530] In Pakistan, however, there have been no similar instances since its 2008 transition to elected civilian leadership.

Epstein and Rosen noted that from FY2006–FY2017, the U.S. SA programs most heavily funded worldwide were those designed to accomplish security objectives, not those designed to strengthen civil-military relations or foster democratization (such as defense institution building).[531] In the two cases analyzed, defense governance and management was only funded for Lebanon.[532] In the only year it was funded, defense governance and management was only 1.05% of the U.S. SA budget to Lebanon in FY2014.[533] Post-9/11, it was less than 0.1% of overall U.S. SA to Lebanon. If you include the following programs, it only amounted to 2.8% of post-9/11 U.S SA to Lebanon: IMET, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, Regional Centers for Security Studies, Service Academies, Defense Institution Reform Initiative (i.e., defense governance and management), and Defense

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[528] Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*, 113–115.

[529] Schmitter, "Dangers and Dilemmas of Democracy," 89–92.

[530] Humud, *Lebanon*, 3.

[531] Epstein and Rosen, *U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs*, 7–8.

[532] Prior to 2015, defense governance and management (DGM) was called Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI).

[533] Security Assistance Monitor, "Lebanon."

Institute of International Legal Studies (an E-IMET program).[534] The same list of programs constituted 0.37% of post-9/11 U.S. SA to Pakistan.[535] However, if you include the 2009–2012 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) (part of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act), it constituted 10.5% of post-9/11 U.S. SA to Pakistan.[536] Given that the PCCF included civil-military and human rights-related training components, this mechanism would anticipate funding of this magnitude to support democratization, but Pakistan's democracy has not increased since 2008 according to Freedom House.[537] It can be argued that this mechanism is valid when funded heavily enough and consistently enough, but one would have to establish an activation threshold or specify an optimal balance between U.S. SA geared toward institutional reform and "traditional" forms of SA.

2. Hypothesis: U.S. Security Assistance Undermines Host Nation Democratization

The authors who argued this hypothesis proposed four causal mechanisms. The first causal mechanism is that strengthening the security apparatus of a non-democratic state enables them to oppress democratic reformists more effectively. Bermeo's core argument is that U.S. SA to authoritarians strengthens the state's coercive apparatus, which "is likely to use its coercive apparatus in ways that work against democratizers."[538] Finkel et al., Fortna, Abu Jaber, Burnell, Youngs, Falcoff, and Abrams all made similar assertions, but the data in these cases do not support the argument, especially for Pakistan. Lebanon's increase in democracy happened before U.S. SA spiked,[539] and Pakistan increased in democracy twice during periods of very high U.S. SA, which challenges Bermeo's argument. She makes an even stronger claim, "that military aid may have an *independent*

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[534] Ibid.; The potential effects of many of these programs on democratization is debatable, but I included them to show that even a generous interpretation of their ability to support host nation democratization demonstrates that such initiatives are a meager portion of overall U.S. SA to Lebanon.

[535] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan."

[536] Ibid.

[537] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World."

[538] Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," 77.

[539] Lebanon was not authoritarian from 1990–2017, so it does not meet Bermeo's criteria in such a way as to assist with analyzing this mechanism.

[emphasis added] and negative effect on the likelihood of democratic regime change and thus that increasing democracy aid without decreasing military aid may not boost democratization."[540] However, one could argue that U.S. SA must exceed a certain threshold of influence in order to undermine democratization, and that neither case study reached that activation threshold. From 1980–2016, cumulative U.S. SA was 0.60% of Pakistan's cumulative GDP (see Figure 8).[541] From 1990–2016, cumulative U.S. SA to Lebanon was 0.24% of its cumulative GDP.[542] If this mechanism is active and generalizable, then it may activate when greater than 0.60% of host nation GDP.

Post-9/11 U.S. SA to Pakistan was larger at times than in the 1980s, but it did not share the same potentially anti-democratic, qualitative characteristics. The scenario of 1980s Pakistan most closely resembles Bermeo's core argument,[543] so it may be a better indicator of the activation threshold for this proposed causal mechanism. In the analysis of the Pakistan case in Chapter III, I outlined how all of the characteristics of U.S. SA to Pakistan in the 1980s "should have" undermined Pakistan's democratization per this argument. In short, U.S. SA was routed through the Pakistani military instead of the civilian government (entrenching the military's financial independence), was seemingly "big enough" in scale and introduced suddenly enough to create a "Dutch disease" effect, and entirely lacked democracy-related conditionality. Nonetheless, from 1984–1988, Pakistan's democracy increased by 3 points on the Freedom House scale and transitioned from a military dictatorship to an elected civilian government.[544] From 1983–1988, cumulative U.S. SA was 0.85% of Pakistan's cumulative GDP.[545] If this mechanism is valid and generalizable, then one could argue that its activation threshold is greater than 0.85% of host nation GDP, but these two cases generally undermine the validity of this mechanism.

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[540] Bermeo, "Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security," 82.

[541] The World Bank Database (object name GDP (constant 2010 US$); accessed May 19, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.

[542] Ibid.

[543] Bermeo called it the "rationalized security scenario."

[544] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World."

[545] The World Bank Database.

The second causal mechanism is that when prosperous democracies set a bad example domestically and/or support repressive authoritarians abroad, that hypocrisy undermines their moral authority and makes democracy less appealing to would-be host nation democratizers. One could argue that there should be a correlation between decreased host nation democracy, the status of U.S. democracy, and an unfavorable view of U.S. democracy from the host nation. The logic is as follows: though the U.S. was one of the best measurable democratic examples from 1980–2016, spikes in U.S. SA to oppressive authoritarians undermined U.S. moral authority, which deterred the host nation from following the U.S. democratic example. As mentioned in the previous section, spikes in U.S. SA to Pakistan came before increased democratization, and in both the 1980s and 2000s U.S. SA was provided to military dictators. However, one could argue that while Pakistani public opinion of U.S. personal freedoms was positive, it could also view the U.S. democratic example as hypocritical (and unappealing) in international relations. Their negative opinion of the United States and Americans supports that logic, but Pakistan's increases in democracy in the 1980s and 2000s undermines this mechanism as generalizable. In Lebanon's case, U.S. SA went to the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces, not to a repressive authoritarian, so that was not hypocritical. In 2008, 2013–2015, and 2017 between 55% and 87% of Lebanese survey respondents had a positive opinion of the U.S. government's respect for the personal freedoms of its people;[546] and from 2002–2005 between 58% and 71% of Lebanese had a negative opinion of the United States.[547] Shortly after a four-year period of Lebanon's predominantly negative opinion of the United States, Lebanon increased in democracy, which undermines this argument. Given that military dominance over elected civil institutions is one of the biggest threats to democratization, one could argue that the positive example of U.S. civil-military relations outweighs negative perceptions of other aspects its democracy.

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[546] "U.S. Personal Freedoms," Pew Research Center, August, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/72/country/121/.

[547] "Opinion of the United States," Pew Research Center, August, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/1/country/121/response/Unfavorable/.

The third causal mechanism is that the history of Western foreign policy created a resistance toward Western liberal democracy, and it planted fear of Western-sponsored democratic revolutions into the minds of authoritarians. The French created what is modern-day Lebanon in 1920, but before that it was not a state; it was a variety of people groups underneath Ottoman rule.[548] Upon gaining independence in 1943, the Lebanese had spent a total of 23 years under French control, which was viewed favorably by Lebanon's Christian population and unfavorably by its Muslim population.[549] Internal conflicts regarding external alliances have been a part of Lebanon's political landscape ever since. One could argue that Lebanon's consociational democracy is a reflection of its particular sectarian divisions, not a result of unified resistance toward Western liberal democracy. Lebanon has not been authoritarian since its independence, so it does not fear a democratic revolution.

Pakistan and India were part of British India prior to their 1947 independence and partition.[550] Lipset explained how past British rule is highly correlated with democracy, which is evident by the institutional legacy of parliamentary democracy in India and Pakistan.[551] From 1977–1988 Zia ul-Haq's rule combined martial law with state-sponsored Islamism, which created a permissive political environment for the Saudi-financed spread of Wahhabi-Sunni ideology in Pakistan.[552] This undercut the popularity of Western, liberal values in Pakistan, but not the demand for political rights (as evident by the period of democratically elected civilian leaders from 1988–1999).[553] From 2001–2008, U.S. SA focused on Pakistan's tactical capacity as a military partner, not on pressing democratization.[554] Pakistan had the full-fledged support of the Bush administration during the War on Terror, so Musharraf had little reason to fear a post-9/11, U.S.-backed color

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[548] Humud, *Lebanon*, 1–2.

[549] Ibid.

[550] Husain, "The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy," 2.

[551] Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," 153.

[552] Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 217–218.

[553] Ibid., 259–293.

[554] Zaidi, "Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?," 106–109.

revolution. If anything, the 2003 Iraq War reduced U.S. attention toward Pakistan's domestic politics.[555] The consensus of the literature is that the 2007 Lawyers' Movement protests and the victory of Musharraf's political opponents in the 2008 elections were in response to domestic politics (with no serious consideration given to external meddling).

The fourth causal mechanism is that U.S. security assistance creates an aid dependency dynamic, especially when such assistance lacks conditionality related to democratic reform. Fortna and Chayes in particular focused on aid dependency and corrupt governance as the way in which U.S. SA undermines the government's accountability to its citizens, which reduces the will of host nation elites to democratize. This mechanism would expect that when U.S. SA is a large percentage of host nation government revenue, then the host nation government would be less compelled to democratize. From 1990–2016, U.S. SA averaged 1.16% of Lebanon's government revenue, and the post-9/11 average was 1.37% of Lebanon's government revenue.[556] As a percentage of Pakistan's government revenue, U.S. SA averaged: from 1980–2016, 4.32%; from 1983–1988, 4.69%; post-9/11, 6.14%; and from 2010–2014 (during the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act), 7.37%.[557] (See Figure 9.)

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[555] Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 336.

[556] Security Assistance Monitor, "Lebanon"; Economy Watch Economic Statistics Database (object name Lebanon General Government Revenue (% of GDP) Statistics; accessed May 19, 2018), http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/Lebanon/General_Government_Revenue_Percentage_GDP/.

[557] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan"; Economy Watch Economic Statistics Database (object name Pakistan General Government Revenue (% of GDP) Statistics; accessed May 19, 2018), http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/Pakistan/General_Government_Revenue_Percentage_GDP/.

Figure 9.   U.S. Security Assistance as Percentage of Host Nation
Government Revenue

Lebanon's tax revenue as share of government revenue was between 62% and 76% from 1997–2016, and Pakistan's was between 63% and 106% (see Figure 10).[558] Assuming this data is accurate, and assuming that the difference is comprised entirely of external rent, one could argue that Lebanon since 1997 and Pakistan after 9/11 have a mild-to-moderate rentier dynamic. Given that U.S. SA as a share of government revenue peaked at 4.8% for Lebanon and 10.6% for Pakistan, and only for short durations, it is not necessarily a notable contributor to a rentier dynamic (to the extent one exists). Even if Lebanon does have a rentier dynamic, the 1.16% average U.S. SA as a share of government revenue is paltry compared to the remaining 24% to 38% of government revenue not obtained from taxation. Based on the data in Figure 10, one could reasonably argue that post-9/11 Pakistan has a rentier dynamic. From 2002–2011, Pakistan consistently gained 24% to 37% of its revenue from sources other than taxation.[559] This means that from 2002–2011, between 14% and 37% of Pakistan's rent (i.e. Pakistan's non-tax government revenue) came from U.S. SA.

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[558] The World Bank Database (object name Tax revenue (% of GDP); accessed May 19, 2018), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.TAX.TOTL.GD.ZS.

[559] Ibid.

The data support the argument that the United States is a significant contributor to Pakistan's rentier dynamic.


Figure 10.   Host Nation Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Government Revenue[560]

The key question at this point is whether or not a mild rentier effect in Pakistan is undermining its democratization. Bromley identified separation between political and economic sources of power as a pre-requisite for democracy.[561] Siddiqa argued that the military—via its economic and financial holdings, which were entrenched by a combination of periods of military dictatorship and spikes in U.S. SA—essentially became a rentier class in Pakistani society.[562] She makes a convincing case that any direct financial or material support to the Pakistani military increases its ability to influence policy-making and resources allocation (either directly through political activity or indirectly through economic and financial autonomy).[563] Several other authors in Chapter III made similar

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[560] Ibid.

[561] Bromley, "The Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East," 380.

[562] Siddiqa-Agha, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy,* 248–249.

[563] Ibid.

arguments, but Pakistan's 2008 shift from military dictatorship to election civilian leaders (a 1-point democratic increase per Freedom House) indicates that other mechanisms may be more influential on Pakistan's democratization than its supposed rentier dynamic. On the other hand, the increase in democracy may indicate that external rents are simply not a large enough share of government revenue consistently enough to create a rentier effect.

3. Hypothesis: U.S. Security Assistance Has Minimal Influence on Host Nation Democratization; Domestic and/or Regional Political Factors Are the Primary Drivers

The authors who argued this hypothesis proposed five causal mechanisms. The first causal mechanism is that host nation elites are inherently more politically influential, and their will to democratize is indispensable for a successful democratic transition. This mechanism would expect aid recipients to make governance decisions independently of the aid provider's conditions and expectations. In Lebanon, the LAF reforms of the 1990s (sectarian intermixing, unit redeployment, and the draft to get a representative confessional mix) were driven by an aggressive Lebanese Army general and the occupying Syrian military to fit Lebanon's unique needs, not by sustained contact with U.S. IMET programs.[564] The only sustained increase in democracy (2005 Cedar Revolution) seems to have been driven partially by domestic factors and a dose of regional influence. In both instances, U.S. SA increased afterward; it did not drive those changes (though it may have helped consolidate democratic gains). The case of Lebanon does not support or undermine this mechanism, because these changes were made in the absence of significant U.S. SA, not in spite of it. However, when the United States suspended SA to Pakistan in 1990 and embargoed maintenance shipments,[565] Pakistan continued to pursue its nuclear program in spite of the fact that it reduced their fixed wing aircraft readiness dramatically (i.e., no U.S. support for F-16 maintenance) during its arms race with India.[566] Despite sanctions in response to Musharraf's 1999 coup, he stayed in power until he lost legitimacy domestically in 2007. Despite democracy-related conditionality of the Enhanced

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[564] Baylouny, "Building an Integrated Military in Post-Conflict Societies: Lebanon," 247–248.

[565] Pande, *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy,* 105; Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 56.

[566] Farooq, *US-Pakistan Relations*, 146.

Partnership with Pakistan Act (upwards of 10% of government revenue),[567] Pakistan has not increased its democracy since 2008. These examples show that Pakistan acted with disregard for U.S. SA conditionality and sanctions regardless of the system of government or particular administration in charge. The case of Pakistan supports this mechanism as active, though it is not clear if it is generalizable.

The second causal mechanism is that the presence or absence of host nation characteristics, historical experiences, or societal pre-conditions influence democratization more than U.S. SA. Bellin argued that per capita GNP strongly influences democratic consolidation, with a $4,200 threshold making it more likely than not, and a $6,000 threshold making it nearly certain.[568] Lebanon crossed the $6,000 threshold in 2007,[569] and it fluctuated half of a point in democracy positively and negatively since then. Pakistan crossed the $4,200 per capita GNP threshold in 2009, had its first peaceful electoral loss of an incumbent party in 2013, measured at $5,560 in 2017, and has general elections scheduled for July 2018. Both cases support the economic aspect of this mechanism. However, Elbadawi and Makdisi argued that "the combined negative impact on polity of sectarianism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, regional oil and the civil war more than counterbalanced the positive influence of Lebanon's relatively high per capita income."[570]

Walt and Olson argued that the rule of law, an independent judiciary, private property and contract rights, and respect for human rights generally precede democratization.[571] Olson also argued that conditions for power sharing and democratization are ripe when no group can dominate society and intermixed groups cannot become enclaves.[572] In Lebanon, no group can dominate society, but each sect is effectively an enclave, which has strained its democracy throughout its history. In Pakistan,

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[567] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan"; Economy Watch Economic Statistics Database.

[568] Bellin, "The Political-Economic Conundrum," 141–143.

[569] International Comparison Program Database.

[570] Makdisi, Kiwan, and Marktanner, "Lebanon: The Constrained Democracy and its National Impact," 129–130.

[571] Walt, "Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other Countries?"; Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," 572–574.

[572] Ibid.

the military class has dominated society several times in its history, and one could argue that it is also an economic enclave. Though many argue that U.S. SA entrenches Pakistan's military in its economy, Siddiqa argued that its economic holdings derived from the political power it gained after its entry into politics in the 1950s.[573] Nonetheless, both countries had democratic and civil society experience since independence in the 1940s (and to some extent colonial influence before independence), which Lipset and Sorensen identified as essential for democratic consolidation.[574] One could argue that that these attributes enabled Lebanon to avoid democratic backsliding during the Syrian Civil War and refugee crisis, and they enabled Pakistani society to mobilize for political rights against military authoritarians in the 1980s and 2000s. Both cases support the political dynamic of this mechanism, though it is uncertain whether or not this is generalizable.

The third causal mechanism is that donor countries lack the resources or political will to commit a large enough effort for long enough to decisively influence democratization. Was U.S. SA large enough to support democratization? Lebanon derived at least 13x, and Pakistan derived at least 7x more of its government revenue from taxes than from U.S. SA, which is telling since both countries rank well below the world average for government revenue as a percentage of GDP.[575] From a financial aspect, each country's domestic population was a significantly more influential constituent than the United States, even during times of peak U.S. SA. The main takeaway from Cordesman's argument is that the security-centric "train and equip" approach does not have a "trickle up" effect toward democratization.[576] It can add value, but it must be part of a whole-of-government approach that comprehensively improves civil-military relations.

Was U.S. SA committed for long enough to support democratization? In Lebanon's case, this peak was three years long at best, and in Pakistan's case it was five years long in

[573] Siddiqa-Agha, *Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, 129.

[574] Lipset, "The Centrality of Political Culture," 153; Sørensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, 98.

[575] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan"; Security Assistance Monitor, "Lebanon"; Economy Watch Economic Statistics Database. World average is approximately 30%, Lebanon 20%, and Pakistan 15% during their respective periods of analysis.

[576] Cordesman, "21st Century Conflict," 21–25.

the 1980s and (at most) eleven years long in the 2000s.[577] Some may argue that this should make a notable difference, but Carothers and Huntington argued for a consistent commitment in terms of decades, not years.[578] Pakistan's democratic backsliding after withdrawal of U.S. SA supports this argument, and Lebanon's consistently "partially free" rating indicate that any potentially positive effects may be too small to decisively support democratization.[579] The Freedom House data, the economic data, and the qualitative political analysis from both case studies support this mechanism as generalizable.

The fourth causal mechanism is that failures in state legitimacy may motivate citizens to demand democracy. Elbadawi and Makdisi found that oil wealth and armed conflict undermined democratization, but frequent political instability and failure in economic diversification from authoritarian regimes prompted democratization among Middle East and North African countries studied.[580] Neither case is one of oil wealth, but Lebanon experienced a civil war that undermined democracy, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War, and spillover from the Syrian Civil War. Lebanon was not authoritarian, though, so it does not necessarily apply to this mechanism. Husain argued that Pakistan's failures of governance derived from the self-seeking decisions of a narrow group of elites, regardless of whether it was a military or civilian government, which undermines this mechanism.[581] From 1977–1988, Zia ul-Haq undermined the judiciary, restricted civil liberties (especially for women), and strengthened the presidency with the Eighth Amendment, which gave him the power to dissolve parliament unilaterally.[582] He tightened his grip on competition before the 1985 elections, so that they were not genuinely contested.[583] Musharraf's rigid security paradigm hindered him from reviving the economy.[584] He went to great lengths to

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[577] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan."

[578] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, 341–351; Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," 6.

[579] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World."

[580] Elbadawi and Makdisi, "The Democracy Deficit in the Arab World," 323–324.

[581] Husain, "The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy," 15–16.

[582] Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 245–252.

[583] Ibid.

[584] Ibid., 315.

rig the system against fair elections in 2002.[585] In 2007, he fired Justice Chaudhry for advocating for fair elections, which led to democratic protests, which prompted Musharraf to declare a state of emergency and crack down on protests.[586] These failures of legitimacy of Pakistani authoritarians support this mechanism, though it is unclear if it is generalizable.

The fifth causal mechanism is that there is a principal-agent problem in which U.S. security assistance lacks the leverage necessary to incentivize host nation democratization due to stronger influence from regional actors. This mechanism would expect that when the interests of the agent diverge significantly from that of the principal, that non-coercive approaches of aid conditionality and technocratic support (e.g., defense institution building) should not support democratization. In cases where principal-agent interests align, these non-coercive approaches may support democratization even if they are not the primary driver. In the 1980s, U.S. and Pakistani interests (pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan) aligned much more than they did in the 2000s, and Pakistan democratized more in the 1980s than in the 2000s. That correlation supports this mechanism. After 9/11, the United States expects its SA be used to combat terrorism, but Pakistan views India as the primary threat, which is why it is willing to forego aid to maintain a nuclear program and its ties with militant proxies. One could argue that the primacy of the Indian threat in Pakistan's security strategy created a principal-agent problem with U.S. SA, which drove Pakistan to make political decisions with a good amount of disregard for U.S. incentives and punishments (even during the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan period of 2010–2013).[587]

The Lebanon case revealed that Syria and Iran (via Hezbollah) strongly influence Lebanon's internal politics, and Syria and Israel strongly influence Lebanon's external threat perception. One could argue that the principal (United States) is primarily interested in Israel's security, and the agent (Lebanon) is primarily interested in political stability.

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[585] Ibid., 330–334.

[586] –347.

[587] Biddle, "Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency," 135.

This argument would hold that the United States wants the LAF to be stronger than Hezbollah, but not strong enough that it could threaten Israel, as evident by the large amount of non-lethal U.S. SA.[588] For example, the United States views Hezbollah in its entirety as a foreign terrorist organization, but the Lebanese are willing to coordinate with them politically and militarily to maintain domestic peace. McInnis and Lucas argued that the institutional and interpersonal linkages created through IMET programs do not affect the degree of alignment between U.S. and host nation interests.[589] One could argue that because IMET and E-IMET are primarily focused on tactical units or individuals that are in no position to affect institutional change, their influence on democratization (being marginal at best) also depends upon alignment of interests between donor and recipient nations. The case of Pakistan revealed significant agency loss after 9/11, which supports this mechanism. U.S. SA to Lebanon was not sourced in such a way as to support or undermine this mechanism, so it is unclear if this mechanism is generalizable.

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[588] Humud, *Lebanon*, 21.

[589] McInnis and Lucas, *What is 'Building Partner Capacity'*, 49.

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V.   CONCLUSION

A.   RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS

This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.

Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the "U.S. SA supports host nation democratization" argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the "U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization" argument to a lesser degree. It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation's local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation's institutions, political culture, civil society, etc. My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization.

Does U.S. SA support host nation democratization? I argue that U.S. SA can help prevent democratic backsliding, but it does not actively support democratization in the way

that it is typically designed and resourced. If the United States supported host nation democratization via its inspirational democratic example (e.g., protecting human rights and individual liberties), then U.S. SA was not the conduit for broadcasting the U.S. democratic example. The evidence showed that two spikes in U.S. SA (between 0.8% and 1.4% of host nation GDP) were quickly followed by increases in democratization, but the largest spike in U.S. SA (upwards of 1.52% of host nation GDP, and conditioned on democracy-related reforms) did not increase democratization.[590] *If* aid conditionality supports host nation democratization, then the case studies indicate that the threshold is between 0.25% and 0.60% of host nation GDP.[591] The evidence in both cases supported the idea that U.S. SA reinforced host nation security, which helped prevent state collapse and democratic backsliding, though it did not increase democratization. If U.S. security sector assistance generally supports host nation security sector reform—which then improved its civil-military relations and democratic governance—then the case studies indicated the threshold is above 10.5% of annual U.S. SA to the host nation.[592] Overall, the cases provided little evidence to support this argument and plenty of evidence to undermine it.

Does U.S. SA undermine host nation democratization? I argue that U.S. SA does not undermine democratization as it is currently designed and resourced, but it could have an anti-democratic influence under the same design with excessive funding. Does U.S. SA to oppressive authoritarians' security apparatuses undermine democratization? The case of Pakistan revealed two increases in democracy shortly after large spikes in U.S. SA given to military dictators, and both of those SA packages lacked democratic conditionality.[593] If this mechanism is generalizable, then the activation threshold is above 0.85% of host nation GDP.[594] Pakistan's positive public opinion of U.S. personal freedoms in the 2000s undermined the argument that a bad U.S. democratic example deters host nation

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[590] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan"; The World Bank Database.

[591] Ibid.; Security Assistance Monitor, "Lebanon."

[592] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan."

[593] Ibid.; Freedom House, "Freedom in the World."

[594] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan"; The World Bank Database.

democratization.[595] Both cases undermined the argument that Western foreign policy created a resistance toward Western liberal democracy. Both gave ample evidence of domestic and regional factors that can explain different forms of host nation democracy. I found no evidence that either country feared a Western-sponsored democratic revolution.

The most compelling causal mechanism was that U.S. SA (especially when it lacks democratic conditionality) creates an aid dependency dynamic. If U.S. SA reinforces a rentier class in the host nation society, then it likely undermined democracy. Before 2008, U.S. SA to Pakistan was below 6.14% and was followed by democratization.[596] After the 2008 increase in democracy, Pakistan's Freedom House rating stayed at 4.5 through 2017; and from 2010–2014, U.S. SA averaged 7.37% of Pakistan's government revenue.[597] This causal mechanism may activate when U.S. SA is above 6.14% of host nation government revenue, but that assumes that Pakistan has a notable rentier dynamic. If Pakistan does have a rentier dynamic, then U.S. SA was a notable contributor to it. I found that Pakistan's military economy predated U.S. SA, and so U.S. SA may have entrenched it slightly, but it did not alter the fundamental dynamic of state governance. In short, U.S. SA and other aid sources were insufficient to create a rentier dynamic that did not already exist.

I argue that U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to domestic and regional actors. It is designed to accomplish U.S. security objectives. The programs capable of driving institutional reform are a meager share of overall U.S. SA. U.S. SA is rarely integrated with a whole-of-government effort for supporting host nation democratization, and when one could argue it is, the quantity and duration of funding is inadequate to supersede the influence of domestic and regional actors. When the host nation's security interests diverge from those of the United States (e.g., post-9/11 Pakistan), the resulting agency loss increases the threshold of U.S. SA necessary to have a significant influence. Despite the stated theme of democracy promotion in U.S. policy documents, U.S. SA was primarily designed to accomplish security

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[595] Pew Research Center, "U.S. Personal Freedoms."

[596] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan"; Economy Watch Economic Statistics Database.

[597] Freedom House, "Freedom in the World"; Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan."

objectives. By design it was not able to compete with domestic and regional actors, and by quantity it is not enough to significantly influence host nation democratization.

B.   POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The United States can pursue its security objectives and democratization agenda somewhat independently in accordance with its typical design and resourcing of U.S. SA. There is a continual debate in U.S. foreign policy circles regarding whether or not to use aid conditionality to incentivize democratization or to allow U.S. SA to focus solely on security objectives without constraints relating to host nation governance.[598] I found no evidence that democracy-related aid conditionality on "traditional" forms of U.S. SA influenced host nation democratization, which means that such conditionality should be applied for other purposes (e.g., to satisfy U.S. legal requirement or political sensitivities).

If the United States wants to decisively support host nation democratization, then U.S. SA should go to recipients with good democratic prospects in sufficient quantity for adequate duration. U.S. SA would need to be designed as part of a whole-of-government support package and implemented for a generation or more. It would need to exceed 1.52% of host nation GDP and increasingly emphasize defense institution building programs and other programs that bolster host nation civil-military relations.[599] Anything less is unlikely to support host nation democratization decisively. How would a head of state decide where to commit its resources to promote democracy if it cannot afford to take this approach worldwide? I concur with Ottaway that there are two basic choices. The United States can lower its democracy promotion policy ambitions and settle for sub-standard democracies, or it can abandon some countries in which democratic prospects are particularly dim and focus its resources on countries that are more likely to democratize.[600] U.S. SA would go to states that largely share U.S. security interests (which reduces agency loss); have a high GDP, a history of democracy, and some form of civil society (which supports democratic

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[598] Sharp, *U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East*, 6–16.

[599] Security Assistance Monitor, "Pakistan"; The World Bank Database.

[600] Ottaway, "Promoting Democracy After Conflict: The Difficult Choices," 318–321.

consolidation); have neighboring democratic examples; have host nation elites willing to democratize; and have the institutional capacity to absorb the assistance.

If the United States wants to undermine host nation democratization,[601] then it could fund the host nation government with enough U.S. SA (or other aid money) for long enough to turn it into a rentier state. The United States could convince other states or international organizations to do likewise, amplifying the effect. This can be particularly influential if the host nation has a low per capita GDP, has a small enough government revenue to fund long-term without losing U.S. domestic political support, has no history of democracy, and if funding is routed to a financially autonomous military with extensive economic holdings.

C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

A quantitative study comparing Freedom in the World ratings against U.S. SA (measured as a share of host nation GDP and share of host nation government revenue) may validate one of the activation thresholds (or identify these case studies as exceptions). If U.S. SA supports host nation democratization without democracy-related conditionality, then the evidence suggests that state elites may democratize to retain aid flows when they are between 0.25% and 0.60% of host nation GDP. I argued that aid with democracy-related conditionality does not compel host nation democratization below 1.52% of host nation GDP (the peak of U.S. SA found within the case studies). If U.S. SA undermines democratization via the aid dependency/rentier dynamic causal mechanism, then the activation threshold should be above 6.14% of host nation government revenue. If it does not, then there should be cases when a host nation democratized above the 6.14% threshold. If local and regional factors are significantly more influential, as I argue, then a quantitative study would show that host nation democratization changes independently of U.S. SA within the thresholds identified. If such a study revealed statistically significant correlation

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[601] For example, if the most effective way to combat an existential threat is to fund a host nation with the equivalent of 90% of its government revenue for 20 years (effectively turning it into a rentier state), then the United States may prioritize that security objective over host nation democratization. Or, if U.S. interests are better served coordinating with an authoritarian, then it may undermine host nation democratization.

between U.S. SA and host nation democratization within these thresholds, then it would undermine my conclusion.

APPENDIX. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

The following list is sourced from Security Assistance Monitor,[602] and it provides a brief description of every overt security assistance and security cooperation program that the United States funded for Lebanon and Pakistan during the time periods analyzed in this thesis.

1. Aviation Leadership Program: The Aviation Leadership Program is a Defense Department program that provides undergraduate education and training to personnel of friendly, less-developed foreign air forces.

2. Coalition Support Funds: Coalition Support Funds (CSF) refers to money from the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) that is eligible to be used to reimburse coalition partners for logistical and military support to U.S. military operations.

3. Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program: Funded through the Defense Department, the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) provides funding for "foreign military officers to attend U.S. military educational institutions and selected regional centers for non-lethal training."

4. Cooperative Threat Reduction: The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, housed within the Defense Department, was created to secure and dismantle weapons of mass destruction and associated infrastructure in the former Soviet states.

5. Counterterrorism Partnership Fund: The Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund provides support and assistance to foreign security forces or other groups or individuals to conduct, support, or facilitate counterterrorism and crisis response activities pursuant to section 1534 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015

6. Defense Institute of International Legal Studies: The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies enables the Department of Defense to promote institutional legal capacity through resident courses and mobile activities.

7. Defense Institution Reform Initiative: The Defense Institution Reform Initiative enables the Department of Defense to engage with partner

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[602] "Security Assistance Monitor Data," Security Assistance Monitor, 2018, https://securityassistance.org/content/security-aid-dashboard.

nations in their efforts to develop accountable, effective, and efficient defense governance institutions.

8. Department of Homeland Security—U.S. Coast Guard Activities: Through the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Coast Guard provides training and technical assistance to U.S. government agencies or foreign nationals on topics ranging from maritime law enforcement to port security.

9. Developing Country Combined Exercise Program: The Developing Country Combined Exercise Program authorizes the Department of Defense to reimburse developing countries for certain incremental expenses, excluding normal pay and benefits, incurred when participating in a bilateral or multilateral military exercise with U.S. forces.

10. Global Lift and Sustain: The Global Lift and Sustain authority permits the Defense Department to provide logistics support, supplies and services to allied forces participating in combined operations with U.S. Armed Forces.

11. Exchange Training: Joint Combined Exchange Trainings (JCET) are military exercises that provide training for American Special Operations Forces (SOF) in friendly foreign countries alongside the armed forces of the host nation.

12. Excess Defense Articles: The Excess Defense Articles authority allows the U.S. government to transfer used U.S. defense equipment from U.S. military stockpiles to foreign security forces. Separated by the Security Assistance Monitor, equipment provided under this heading only includes Excess Defense Articles that the United States gave to foreign countries.

13. Foreign Military Financing: The Foreign Military Financing program provides grants and loans to help countries purchase U.S.-made defense articles and defense services on the U.S. Munitions List.

14. International Military Education and Training: International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds provide training and education on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations.

15. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: Separated by the Security Assistance Monitor, the security assistance part of the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) program provides equipment and training to foreign countries for counternarcotics and anti-crime efforts.

16. Non-Security Assistance: Unified Command: Headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified Command Plan's non-security assistance focuses on humanitarian and civic aid.

17. Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs: The Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account supports funding in nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, regional stability and humanitarian assistance to help reduce transnational threats to American security and mitigate local threats.

18. Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund: The Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) is an account that provides funding to build and maintain counterinsurgency capabilities of the Pakistani security forces.

19. Regional Centers for Security Studies: DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies function to provide bilateral and multilateral research, communications, and exchange of ideas involving military and civilian participants. 10 U.S.C. 184 authorizes the administration of Regional Centers.

20. Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance: Authorized in the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1004 permits the Defense Department to give U.S. and foreign security forces additional support for counter-narcotic activities.

21. Section 1033 Counterdrug Assistance: (FY1998 NDAA, P.L. 105–85, as amended): Assistance for additional counter-narcotics support for specified countries.

22. Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority: Section 1206 authority grants the Secretary of Defense the authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces to perform counterterrorism operations and to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. Armed Forces are participating.

23. Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance: Section 1207 authorized the Defense Department to transfer to the State Department up to $100 million per Fiscal Year in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization and security activities in foreign countries. This authority has since been replaced with the Global Security Contingency Fund.

24. Service Academies: The United States Service Academies are federal academies for undergraduate education and training of commissioned officers for members of the United States Armed Forces, but each academy also allows foreign military personnel to attend under certain circumstances.

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