YIP: A logical Foundation for Cybersecurity Built on Hyperproperties

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Final Report
# Abstract

Our research in this grant contributed to the science of security. We developed a verification methodology for a specific hyperproperty, and we provided a powerful new security mechanism for mobile devices, as well as other GUI-based, security-sensitive systems. We also made progress on a verification methodology that works for all hyperproperties expressible in HyperLTL, and on establishing the trustworthiness of that methodology.
1 Summary of Grant Objectives

The objectives of the proposed research were to develop logical foundations for cybersecurity using the theory of hyperproperties as a basis. We proposed the following topics as questions of interest:

- How to prove that programs satisfy hyperproperties.
- Mechanization of the proof theory of hyperproperties in a proof assistant.
- The formal semantics of authorization logics.
- How to quantify the availability properties of programs by analysis of their source code, including how they consume and produce information and system resources.
- A mathematical theory that simultaneously characterizes confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

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2 Highlights of Research

2.1 Verification of Apps that Declassify Information

In collaboration with a team at the University of Maryland, we developed a new framework for Android app security based on information flow control and user interactions [7]. The key idea behind our framework is that users naturally express their intentions about information release as they interact with an app. For example, clicking a button may permit an app to release a phone number over the Internet. Or, as another example, toggling a radio button from “coarse” to “fine” and back to “coarse” may temporarily permit an app to use fine-grained GPS location rather than a coarse-grained approximation.

To model these kinds of scenarios, we introduced interaction-based declassification policies, which extensionally specify what information flows may occur after which sequences of events. Events are GUI interactions (e.g., clicking a button), inputs (e.g., reading the phone number), or outputs (e.g., sending over the Internet). A policy is a set of declassification conditions, written in a logic based (like HyperLTL) on LTL. We formalized a semantic security condition, interaction-based noninterference (IBNI), over sets of event traces generated by an app. Intuitively, IBNI holds of an app and policy if the system appears to be a deterministic function of low inputs, after all inputs have been declassified according to the policy.

We built ClickRelease, a static analysis tool to check whether an Android app and its declassification policy satisfy IBNI. ClickRelease generates event traces using SymDroid [6], a Dalvik bytecode symbolic executor. ClickRelease works by simulating user interactions with the app and recording the resulting execution traces. In practice, it is not feasible to enumerate all program traces, so ClickRelease generates traces up to some input depth of n GUI events. ClickRelease then synthesizes a set of logical formulae that hold if and only if IBNI holds, and uses Z3 [4] to check their satisfiability.

To validate ClickRelease, we used it to analyze four Android apps, including both secure and insecure variants of those apps. We ran each app variant under a range of input depths, and confirmed that, as expected, ClickRelease scales exponentially. However, we manually examined each app and its policy, and found that an input depth of at most 5 is sufficient to guarantee detection of a security policy violation (if any) for these cases. We ran ClickRelease at these minimum input depths and found that it correctly passes...
and fails the secure and insecure app variants, respectively. Moreover, at these depths, ClickRelease takes just a few seconds to run.

Our research thus contributed to the science of security by

- developing a verification methodology for a specific hyperproperty; and
- providing a powerful new security mechanism for mobile devices, as well as other GUI-based, security-sensitive systems.

2.2 Verification of Hyperproperties

The theory of trace properties, which characterizes correct behavior of programs in terms of properties of individual execution paths, developed out of an interest in proving the correctness of programs. Verification of security, unfortunately, isn’t directly possible with that theory, because some important security policies require sets of execution paths to model. But in our ongoing work on the theory of hyperproperties, we have shown that certain classes of security policies are amenable to verification. Specifically, in our work sponsored by AFOSR (under award FA9550-12-1-0034) in previous years, we developed logics named HyperLTL and HyperCTL* for automated model checking of hyperproperties. That model checker, however, inherently works only for a fragment of HyperLTL, because of the model-checking algorithm it uses. So there are hyperproperties expressible in HyperLTL that we cannot hope to verify using that technique.

We worked to develop a proof system for HyperLTL—that is, a set of axioms and inference rules that could be used to prove all valid formulas of the logic. (The beginning of this work was funded through an NSA Science of Security Lab at the University of Maryland, but when PI Clarkson moved from GW to Cornell, that funding was eliminated.) So far we have created the proof system and formalized it in Coq (a mechanized proof assistant).

Our next goal was to prove the soundness and completeness of the proof system in Coq. Soundness would assure that the proof system itself cannot prove invalid formulas. Completeness would ensure that all valid formulas can be proved. We would then have a verification technique that can used for all hyperproperties expressible in HyperLTL.

This task remains unfinished at the end of the grant. When completed, it would contribute to the science of security by

\[\text{http://coq.inria.fr}\]
• giving a verification methodology that works for all hyperproperties expressible in HyperLTL; and

• establishing the trustworthiness of that methodology by mechanically checking its correctness in Coq.

2.3 Other Research Supported

Andrew Hirsch, a PhD candidate at Cornell and former student of PI Clarkson, was funded for one semester on this grant. Hirsch worked on authorization logics, which are used to analyze the correctness of authorization mechanisms in distributed systems. Hirsch is developing Flow-Limited Authorization First-Order Logic (henceforth, FLAFOL), which is an authorization logic that incorporates information-flow labels. FLAFOL enables proof that authorization mechanisms cannot leak private information.

Tom Magrino and Isaac Sheff, both PhD candidates at Cornell, were funded for two semesters on this grant. They are working to develop a new consensus protocol that supports heterogeneous trust among the participants. The idea is that different participants can have different opinions about how trustworthy the other participants are. This consensus protocol is being used to develop a new kind of blockchain that allows organizations to support a blockchain together in a federated way [8].

3 Transitions

There are no transitions to report.

4 Publications

• Quantification of Integrity. See reference [3] below for details.


5 Students Supported

- Steven Frink, PhD student at Cornell University, now at IBM
- Andrew Hirsch, PhD student at Cornell University
- Thomas Magrino, PhD student at Cornell University
- Isaac Sheff, PhD student at Cornell University
- Hunter Goldstein, undergraduate student at Cornell University (not supported financially, but advised by PI Clarkson and worked on research related to this award)

6 Technical Outcomes Achieved

Of the key technical outcomes originally proposed for this grant, we achieved the following:

- Original goal: Mechanization of a proof system for hyperproperties in Coq. What we achieved: A formalization of the proof system, and a partial proof of soundness.

- A case study using a proof system for hyperproperties to verify a piece of security-critical code. What we achieved: A case study of using a symbolic executor to verify security of Android apps, especially as they declassify information. Although that project began by using a proof system for hyperproperties, we discovered that a simpler technique (based on symbolic execution and on trace properties) sufficed.

References


1. Report Type
   Final Report

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   YIP: A Logical Foundation for Cybersecurity Built on Hyperproperties

Grant/Contract Number
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The full name of the principal investigator on the grant or contract.
   Michael R Clarkson

Program Officer
The AFOSR Program Officer currently assigned to the award
   Tristan Nguyen

Reporting Period Start Date
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AFOSR LRIR Number

LRIR Title

Reporting Period

Laboratory Task Manager

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Research Objectives

Technical Summary

Funding Summary by Cost Category (by FY, $K)

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Report Document

Report Document - Text Analysis

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Appendix Documents

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