GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR:

CONSIDERATIONS FOR MODERN JOINT FORCE COMMANDERS

BY

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ABSTRACT

This study evaluates current US military joint doctrine specific to Joint Force Commanders through historical analysis of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur during his tenure as the Supreme Commander of Southwest Pacific Area forces in World War II from 1942-1945. Modern joint doctrine evolved into its current form following failures in the Vietnam War and several smaller operations of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, resulting in adoption of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. As a product of limited warfare experience and forced reorganization, joint doctrine remains untested in the crucible of great power conflict—a potentially critical vulnerability in an age of rising military powers, including China and Russia. This study utilizes the experiences of General MacArthur, specifically his command of World War II joint forces, to examine joint doctrine’s efficacy in a great power conflict with the purpose of gleaning lessons, considerations, and recommendations for future Joint Force Commanders and developers of joint doctrine.
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Introduction

Military strategy is concerned with the ends sought and the means to attain those ends. Doctrine by contrast, has nothing to say about the ends sought, as these can be ephemeral, reflecting the ebb and flow of policy. Doctrine is, however, related to the means. If strategy is concerned with what is to be done, doctrine involves how it is to be carried out.

— I. B. Holley, Technology and Doctrine

Doctrine is favoured with many meanings, and when formalized in official publications its significance can vary from determinative for good or ill all the way to fully irrelevant.

— Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge

Doctrine is a fundamental enabler of military affairs. It captures best practices, provides guidance, acculturates military members, and "tells a military institution what it wants to believe" while simultaneously telling "the outside world what it wants the world to believe." In essence, doctrine defines and bounds military conduct, organization, and character. Consequently, doctrinal relevance is a persistent concern for military institutions.

In the wake of the Vietnam War, the United States redefined military regulations and institutional architectures to enhance inter-service, or joint, interoperability through adoption of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. Following Goldwater-Nichols’ enactment, the US military developed joint doctrine to define and bound the conduct, organization, and character of joint forces operating under the command of a Joint Force Commander (JFC). A common challenge to doctrinal development is alleviating the incorporation of institutional and author biases created by culture and recent experience. Given the cultural and experiential catalyst for creating the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act—the limited war in Vietnam—and the limited scope of military conflict in the thirty-one years since Goldwater-Nichols enactment, a

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3 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2013, i-ii.

Testing joint doctrine in near-peer or great power conflict outside the crucible and context of actual war hinges on abstracting lessons from military exercises, including war-gaming, and historical case studies. This work’s purpose is the latter: to glean doctrinal lessons and considerations regarding force employment by a JFC from a historical case study closely matching the contextual variables that may confront US military forces in a future near-peer or great power conflict. The US military’s most recent experience in great power conflict occurred during World War II.\footnote{The author defines “great power conflict” as active warfare between individual nation-states or alliances existing as global hegemonic poles in a bipolar or multipolar world. Hence, the Cold War’s limited proxy conflicts (Korea/Vietnam) and conflicts since the establishment of US unipolarity, such as Operation Desert Storm, do not meet the author’s criteria for “great power conflict.”} Within that war, the Southwest Pacific Area campaign commanded by General Douglas MacArthur from 1942-1945 best reflects variables relevant to assessing joint doctrine on the employment of forces under a JFC.

General MacArthur’s command of the Southwest Pacific campaign during the Second World War required overcoming various multinational, inter-service, and intra-service challenges to integrate forces against an aggressive and capable enemy. Further, the diverse array of forces available for his campaign, and the geopolitical context he faced, mirrors many of the force diversity and geopolitical challenges confronting modern JFC’s in areas ripe for future near-peer conflicts, including the South China Sea. Consequently, General MacArthur’s command experience in the Pacific offers critical insight into a range of JFC-related joint doctrine issues, including command and staff relationships in joint campaigns, intra-service versus inter-service culture.
compatibilities at the strategic level, and multi-national integration considerations. Ultimately, these insights provide guidance for future joint leaders concerned with integrating disparate service elements into a cohesive force, as well as individual service leaders seeking opportunities to shape their service into more compatible joint force elements. In this last regard, this work seeks recommendations for the US Air Force in response to Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein’s recently stated top priority to “improve both how it develops joint leaders and how it teams with other services.”

Extracting useful insights and guidance from General MacArthur’s command of the Southwest Pacific during World War II hinges on first demonstrating his historical relevance to doctrinal concepts of a JFC, and then comparing his experience with current doctrine to illuminate revelatory points of contrast. Two central questions guide efforts toward these ends. First, during World War II, where did General MacArthur fit or not fit into doctrinal conceptualizations of a JFC? Second, what does his performance during World War II offer toward bettering conceptualizations of the JFC? Additionally, given the extensive breadth of joint doctrine—detailed in 83 individual joint doctrine publications—the focus of inquiry will concentrate specifically on JFC-related elements of the capstone publication underwriting all subsidiary US military joint doctrine: Joint Publication (JP) 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. In other words, the scope of doctrinal assessment in this historical analysis remains at the level of strategy with minimal intrusion into operational or tactical-level assessments of joint doctrine and integration.

Method & Structure

This historical analysis centers on General Douglas MacArthur’s command of the Southwest Pacific Area from his arrival in Australian in March of 1942 through his return to Corregidor in the Philippines at the head of Allied

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liberation forces in early March 1945. Analysis focuses on three specific areas within the broad efforts of his campaign: (1) his general authorities, roles, and responsibilities as JFC of the Southwest Pacific Area; (2) his organization and management of his General Staff, and their subsequent impact on the campaign; and, (3) MacArthur’s command and control of subordinate component commanders, and the subsequent influence of this leadership interaction on the campaign. Throughout the study, secondary sources provide context and initial evidentiary support, balanced by primary sources for depth and validity.

The chapters of this thesis divide into two parts. Part I includes the first three chapters and provides a doctrinal and historical foundation facilitating subsequent analysis in the second part. Part II incorporates the last four chapters. It analyzes and evaluates MacArthur’s relationship with his staff, component commanders, and his leadership in general to extract observations and recommendations for joint doctrine.

Chapter 1 dissects current joint doctrine relating to employment of forces by a JFC, detailed in *Joint Publication (JP) 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. The chapter breaks JFC doctrinal tenets into three categories to aid succeeding analysis: (1) tenets concerning a JFC’s authorities, roles, and responsibilities; (2) tenets regarding the JFC and his General Staff; and, (3) tenets relating to the JFC’s command and control of subordinate commands. These categories provide benchmarks for analyzing MacArthur as a JFC in addition to a framework for comparing MacArthur against doctrine to glean lessons and considerations.

Chapter 2 provides strategic context. It places MacArthur’s campaign in context with global efforts during World War II as well as the broader Pacific theater efforts surrounding MacArthur’s area of control. Further, the chapter examines two issues influencing General MacArthur’s personal perspective on Pacific theater and Southwest Pacific Area strategy and operations.

Chapter 3 provides an operational overview of the Southwest Pacific Area campaigns from the area’s inception in 1942 through General MacArthur’s

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liberation of Corregidor in 1945. The chapter follows a sequential timeline of
major operational movements carried out by MacArthur's forces in the
Southwest Pacific for reference in later chapters where analytical focus shifts
more narrowly in scope to MacArthur’s interactions with his General Staff and
subordinate commanders.

Chapter 4 analyzes General MacArthur’s management of his General
Staff. It assesses roles and responsibilities assigned to his staff and the staff’s
impact on the campaign through the lens of joint doctrine. Further, the chapter
identifies any changes in staff roles and responsibilities relative to joint doctrine
as the campaign evolved and as General MacArthur matured in his
understanding of staff functions in joint force integration.

Chapter 5 explores General MacArthur’s command and control of
subordinate force commanders, and the influence of this leadership interaction
on the Southwest Pacific campaign through the lens of joint doctrine. The
chapter also examines changes in subordinate leadership and command
relationships as MacArthur regularly shaped his force to meet demands of the
mission. Chapters 4 and 5 also simultaneously evaluate MacArthur’s broader
authorities, roles, and responsibilities during the war—those general JFC
functions crossing into both staff and subordinate command interactions.

Chapter 6 synthesizes information from previous chapters to answer the
question: where did General MacArthur fit or not fit into modern doctrinal
conceptualizations of a JFC? This chapter frames and justifies MacArthur as a
relevant historical reference for evaluating JFC-specific joint doctrine. Further,
the chapter identifies doctrinal points of contrast necessary for gauging
observations and recommendations.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this historical analysis by answering the
question: what does General MacArthur’s performance during World War II offer
to improve conceptualizations of the JFC? To this end, the chapter draws out
observations and recommendations for joint and individual service leaders
based on the points of contrast revealed in the previous chapter. These
recommendations serve as starting points for future exploration by academic
and professional researchers seeking to improve joint integration and doctrine.
Concerning Personality

A fundamental challenge in assessing General Douglas MacArthur as a JFC is separating image from action. His larger-than-life persona tends to draw researchers toward an assessment of his personality rather than his capabilities. The epilogue of a recent popular MacArthur biography by Walter R. Borneman, *MacArthur at War*, emphasizes this priority of personality over capability—image over action. Borneman concludes his 508-page work by stressing the superlatives describing General MacArthur, noting they “were superlatives of either adulation or disdain and emblematic of the superlatives that always would catalog the contradictions of his personality and define the hallmarks of his career.”

He goes on to describe how the American people named MacArthur “the greatest United States army general in the war,” garnering 43 percent of a popular vote on the subject and beating General Dwight Eisenhower, who came in second with 31 percent. This focus on image culminates with Borneman’s assertion that “Douglas MacArthur’s most important contribution to history was to be the hero who rallied America and its allies when they were at a low ebb and to become the symbol of a determined resolve so desperately needed in the grim months of 1942.” The words hero and symbol assess image, not capability—a testament to Borneman’s focus on MacArthur’s personality over his capability as a theater commander.

Even the most lauded MacArthur historian, D. Clayton James, notes the draw toward personality in his preface to *The Years of MacArthur, Volume 2, 1941-1945*:

> I have endeavored in my research and writing to strive toward the level of objectivity, as well as of thoroughness, achieved by the official historians. They, however, were dealing largely with impersonal matters of strategy, logistics, and operations, whereas I, though employing a life-and-times approach that encompasses a considerable coverage of the Southwest Pacific war, was primarily concerned with the person and position of the theater commander himself, who, in this case, happened to be one of the most controversial figures in American military annals. Thus, while I tried earnestly to be objective, I am quite aware that some of my

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judgements will appear far from neutral to certain readers.\textsuperscript{13} Like Borneman, the avoidance of \textit{impersonal matters} to focus on \textit{person and position} belies James’ prioritization of MacArthur’s personality over his capability.

While General MacArthur’s personality is certainly captivating, this historical analysis focuses on the impersonal matters defining his actions and capability as a theater commander. General MacArthur’s likability, temper, reticence—or any other personality characteristic—is not central to assessing his relevance to joint doctrine or probing for doctrinal lessons. MacArthur’s capability to employ forces and act in the best interests of force integration, on the other hand, are central to assessing his relevance to joint doctrine.

Where the author disagrees with historians on assessments of General MacArthur’s conduct as a theater commander, the reader should expect the conflict between assessing personality and capability to be the culprit of discord. In the circumstances where personality credibly impacts General MacArthur’s capability or actions as a theater commander, the author strives to clearly emphasize the issue to the reader in terms reflecting a capability or action associatively influenced by personality. Pulling personality out of the equation creates clearer points of contrast and comparison between General MacArthur and the JFC-specific doctrine in question, subsequently providing more distinct lessons and considerations.

\textsuperscript{13} James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, vii. Emphasis added.
PART I:

DOCTRINAL & HISTORICAL FOUNDATION
Chapter 1

Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine consists of the fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces in coordinated action against a common objective. It provides the authoritative guidance from which joint operations are planned and executed.

— US definition of “Joint Doctrine,” JP-1

[Doctrine] is authoritative but requires judgement in application.
— From NATO Definition of “Doctrine”

Doctrine is essential to modern militaries. In simplest terms, doctrine is “institutionalized beliefs about what works in war.”

1 Harald Høiback, “What Is Doctrine?” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 6 (December 2011), 897.


It attempts to capture historical and theoretical best practices for future implementation to avoid the friction of rediscovery amidst new conflict. Accordingly, doctrine’s future utility relies on past success at the relevant level of war—tactical, operational, or strategic. As Colin Gray notes in The Strategy Bridge, “strategy is the most fundamental source of military doctrine, while doctrine is a notable enabler of, and guide for, strategies.”

In other words, at the strategic level, useful doctrine captures the best practices of prior successes and proffers them to future strategists as a starting point in strategy development. Consequently, forming doctrine is “a question of forethought and honesty,” and, when “properly written, doctrine will light your way, ease your progress, train your judgement, and help you avoid pitfalls.”

Stated differently, effective doctrine captures and shapes best practices based on anticipated conflict, creating standards and routines that free decision-makers from the procedural and mundane to face the more complex and dynamic crises in war. Effective doctrine therefore facilitates decision-making in crises during war.

Decision-making in war thrives in doctrine’s predictability, dependability, and conservation of time. In its absence, doctrinal needs are often “filled by something, or someone, else” resulting in the unpredictable employment of
strategic concepts.\textsuperscript{4} Doctrine creates predictability by offering decision-makers “optimum selections in a given, though generic, circumstance.”\textsuperscript{5} This predictability subsequently creates dependability. As Everett Dolman describes in his book \textit{Pure Strategy}, the “most advantageous outcome of following doctrine carefully may simply be to ensure the most consistent decisions will be made, ones on which decision makers higher in the chain can depend.”\textsuperscript{6} Predictability and dependability ultimately work together to conserve time: “Potential decisions are categorized and resolved beforehand. Decision-making is made swift and consistent with the expectations of others working toward the same ends. The decision maker simply has to recognize the context or situation, and follow the established rules associated with it.”\textsuperscript{7} Time conserved through the effective application of doctrine frees senior leaders to confront challenges falling outside doctrine’s scope and shape strategies to meet those challenges. In the complexity and ambiguity of modern warfare, this time offers opportunities to outmaneuver or outpace the enemy—a necessity for success.\textsuperscript{8} Consequently, doctrine is essential to modern militaries because it sets the conditions for success.

Joint doctrine faces the challenge of institutionalizing disparate beliefs about what works in war from separate military services with varying priorities. As Colin Gray notes, historically “it has been more common for different elements of armed forces to wage more or less simultaneously the kinds of warfare that each prefers, than for them to develop and execute plans genuinely calculated to produce complementary, let alone synergistic, military effects.”\textsuperscript{9} Accordingly, attempts at joint doctrine often comprise “more of a brute force stapling together of unlike elements than a coherent and harmonious whole.”\textsuperscript{10} In the wake of Vietnam and subsequent military actions, the US sought to overcome the disharmony of service elements by forcing better integration

\textsuperscript{5} Everett C. Dolman, \textit{Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age} (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 44.
\textsuperscript{6} Dolman, \textit{Pure Strategy}, 44.
\textsuperscript{7} Dolman, \textit{Pure Strategy}, 153.
\textsuperscript{9} Gray, \textit{The Strategy Bridge}, 77.
\textsuperscript{10} Gray, \textit{The Strategy Bridge}, 77.
through the enactment of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. US joint doctrine of the subsequent three decades underscores this emphasis on finding joint synergy—evident in the broad, evolving array of available joint publications (see Figure 1 below).

At the apex of this array sits Joint Publication (JP) 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, the “capstone publication for all joint doctrine, presenting fundamental principles and overarching guidance for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.” JP-1 contributes the US military’s strategic doctrine before contextualizing and scoping it for operational and tactical specificity in subsidiary doctrinal publications. Within JP-1, Chapters IV and V present joint doctrine defining and bounding the conduct, organization, and character of joint forces operating under a JFC at the strategic level. Consequently, evaluating the adequacy of JFC-specific joint doctrine for future great power conflict centers on the tenets within these two chapters.

JFC doctrine in JP-1 falls into three broad categories of tenets: (1) those concerning a JFC’s authorities, roles, and responsibilities; (2) those regarding the JFC and his General Staff; and, (3) those relating to the JFC’s command and control of subordinate commands. Exploring these three categories establishes benchmarks useful for analyzing General Douglas MacArthur as a JFC and subsequent comparisons between MacArthur’s campaign and doctrine to glean lessons and considerations.

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12 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 2013, Letter from the 18th Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey on the unnumbered page before page i.
JFC Authorities, Roles, and Responsibilities

Two JFC responsibilities underwrite all ancillary JFC authorities, roles, and responsibilities. They are the responsibility for unity of command and unity of effort. JP-1 states that command “is the most important role undertaken by a JFC. It is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces.”\(^{13}\) Because command is paramount, unity of command takes precedence over other responsibilities of the JFC, including unity of effort. Unity of command “means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”\(^{14}\)

Unity of command starts with the official designation of a JFC by a

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\(^{13}\) JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, V-14.

higher authority. Once designated, the JFC is authorized and responsible for establishing an uncomplicated chain of command to facilitate the mission with “well-defined command relationships and a clear delineation of responsibilities and authorities.” Defining command relationships includes assigning operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) of subordinate elements. To this end, the JFC must ensure no more than one commander within the joint organization exercises “the same command relationship over the same force at any one time.”

After establishing a chain of command, the JFC may delegate mission authorities to subordinate elements, but maintains ultimate responsibility for mission accomplishment. Ultimate responsibility includes maintaining “the discipline of all military personnel assigned to the joint organization” and removing undisciplined elements that detract from mission accomplishment. The JFC may also designate a Deputy JFC to act as their principal assistant and to replace the JFC, as necessary. The designation of a deputy is not mandatory. Normally, however, the Deputy JFC “is not a member of the same Service as the JFC” to ensure balanced representation of component services.

Unity of effort complements unity of command, and is defined as “coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure.” Unity of effort subdivides into two components: (1) coordination and (2) cooperation—both conducted toward a commonly recognized objective.

The JFC is responsible for establishing coordination via mechanisms that facilitate “integration, synchronization, and synergistic interaction among joint forces.”

15 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-14.
16 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-14 and V-18.
17 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-14.
18 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1.
19 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1.
20 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, IV-18.
23 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1.
force components.” Mechanisms include agreements, memoranda, liaison officers, information sharing, integrated staffing assignments, interoperable communications systems, and integrated plan development. When properly established, these mechanisms create linkages between the JFC, the joint force staff, and subordinate command elements enabling plan execution and rapid coordination of changes as context evolves.

A critical enabler of coordination, established by the JFC, is battle rhythm. Battle rhythm is the “cycle for briefings, meetings, and reporting requirements” essential to “support decision making, staff actions, and higher headquarters information requirements and to manage the dissemination of decisions and information in a coordinated manner.” Battle rhythm must synchronize across and meet the needs of all echelons of command. Consequently, the JFC’s role in establishing a battle rhythm includes effectively incorporating staff, component, and supporting agency elements despite geographic separation, time zone interference, and other factors.

To facilitate coordination and battle rhythm, the JFC is also responsible for establishing a command and control (C2) system. This C2 system should include infrastructure connecting all necessary nodes while maintaining interoperability among all component elements of the joint organization. Further, it “is essential for the JFC to ensure that subordinate commanders, staff principals, and leaders of C2 nodes understand their authorities, roles in decision making and controlling, and relationships with others.” The mechanisms, battle rhythm, and C2 systems describing coordination represent tangible elements enabling unity of effort.

Cooperation pertains to an intangible element enabling unity of effort: intent. The JFC shapes the intentions of subordinate elements by specifying a commander’s intent that fosters cooperation. Additionally, a critical responsibility of the JFC is consistently broadcasting that intent and

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24 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-16.
25 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-16.
26 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-16.
27 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V16.
28 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-16.
29 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-18.
30 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-18.
31 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, IV-12.
communicating any specified tasks necessary to meet the intent:

Commander’s intent represents a unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within centralized, overarching guidance. It is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military end state. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military end state without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned.  

Commander’s intent fosters force agility and adaptability by minimizing “restrictive control measures and detailed instructions” in favor of *mission command*. Mission command is “the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders” that demand “subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.” Mission command capitalizes “on the initiative of subordinate commanders” and requires a high degree of mutual trust between the JFC and subordinate commanders. The JFC is responsible for fostering this trust.

In summary, the JFC is responsible for the cooperation and coordination of assigned joint forces. The JFC fosters cooperation through mission command and commander’s intent, and enables coordination through integration mechanisms, battle rhythm, and C2 systems. Successful cooperation and coordination create unity of effort. Unity of effort is a prerequisite for unity of command, along with requirements for the JFC to define a chain of command, command relationships, and delegate command authorities. Unity of command and unity of effort are the primary responsibilities and central purpose of a JFC, and they are the cornerstone of JFC-related joint doctrine.

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32 JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, V-15
The JFC and the General Staff

The JFC’s General Staff exists specifically to enable unity of command and unity of effort. The primary purpose of the JFC’s General Staff is assistance “in the decision-making and execution process” to enhance the situational awareness of the JFC and subordinate commanders.37 “A properly trained and directed staff will free the JFC to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the overall situation.”38 The JFC should establish a joint staff for commands composed of multiple military departments, and arrange the staff, assign members, and assign responsibilities “as deemed necessary to accomplish the mission.”39 To this end, the JFC is responsible for (1) organizing, (2) balancing, (3) empowering, and (4) bounding the staff. The JFC’s first staff responsibility is organizing.

Organization depends on mission requirements. The JFC typically organizes the staff into “staff directorates corresponding to the major functions of command, such as personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and communication systems.”40 The JFC is responsible for avoiding the institution of extraneous directorates or special staff sections. Directorates and sections “should be limited to those functions for which the JFC is responsible or that require the JFC’s general supervision in the interest of unity of effort.”41 The JFC should designate a Chief of Staff to coordinate and direct the staff directorates, and to serve as “the principal staff officer, assistant, and advisor to the JFC.”42 To further foster unity of effort, the staff should include liaison officers spread throughout the command from “various higher, lower, and adjacent organizations” including military and non-military organizations associated with mission accomplishment.43

Balance hinges on adequate diversity. JP-1 states the “composition of a joint staff should be commensurate with the composition of forces and the character of the contemplated operations to ensure that the staff understands

37 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1 and V-17.
38 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1.
39 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, IV-13 and V-1.
41 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, IV-14.
42 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, IV-14.
the capabilities, needs, and limitations of each element of the force.”

To this end, the JFC should consider personnel “numbers, experience, influence of position, and rank” to balance Service-specific representation across the staff and influence on the joint components. The JFC’s responsibility for balancing the staff also extends to avoiding over-bureaucratization by minimizing the staff to a size necessary for the mission and appropriately considering recommendations from any staff member.

Empowerment stems from JFC delegated authorities. The JFC “should give the staff authority to make routine decisions within the constraints of the commander’s intent while conducting operations.” Further, the JFC should authorize the staff to act in the name of or for the JFC, within predefined limits, to include the issuance of routine orders and directives to subordinate commanders. The JFC may also “authorize the command’s staff officers to communicate directly with appropriate staff officers of other commands concerning the details of plans and directives” to foster teamwork and subsequent unity of effort.

Finally, boundaries enhance unity of effort between the JFC, JFC’s staff, and subordinate commands. The JFC must ensure his staff remains sensitive to “the battle rhythm of subordinate organizations” for the sake of coordination and cooperation. In other words, the JFC is responsible for minimizing staff intrusions on subordinate commands and trusting subordinate command staffs to plan and execute operations conforming to the JFC’s intent. Accordingly, the JFC should bound authorities to ensure “higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs” enabling the component staffs to “work solely for the component commander.”

In summary, the JFC is responsible for organizing, balancing, empowering, and bounding his General Staff. These responsibilities enable the joint force staff to aid decision-making and mission execution thereby

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48 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, IV-14.
49 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, IV-14.
50 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-17.
51 JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1 and V-18.
enhancing the JFC and subordinate commander’s situational awareness. Greater situational awareness improves the JFC’s capability to maintain unity of command and unity of effort.

**The JFC and Subordinate Component Commanders**

The JFC maintains authority for establishing component commands to control military operations.\(^{52}\) The JFC establishes these commands as necessary to “integrate planning; reduce their span of control; and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapon systems management, component interaction, or control over the scheme of maneuver.”\(^{53}\) After establishing a command, authority to designate the component commander also rests with the JFC, although normally the JFC appoints a component commander from the military service with a preponderance of forces and the ability to maintain C2.\(^{54}\) Once established, the JFC is responsible for (1) authorizing, (2) enabling, and (3) informing subordinate component commanders for successful mission accomplishment.

Authority is essential for the decentralized execution of missions. The JFC must define and delegate specific authorities and responsibilities to subordinate commanders commensurate with mission requirements, including authority for any training necessary to meet those requirements.\(^{55}\) As part of delegating authority, the JFC defines OPCON and TACON relationships for specified operational missions over set durations.\(^{56}\) Additionally, authority “normally is given to the subordinate commander to select the methodology for accomplishing the mission” including authority to “plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces” within the subordinate component.\(^{57}\) The JFC issues these authorities and any limiting directives as *mission-type orders* that:

- direct a subordinate to perform a certain task without specifying how to accomplish it. Within these orders, the actual mission

\(^{52}\) JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-17.  
\(^{53}\) JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-17.  
\(^{54}\) JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-17-18.  
\(^{55}\) JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-12, IV-18, and V-6.  
\(^{56}\) JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-17-18.  
\(^{57}\) JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-12 and V-6-7.
statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose—a clear statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The senior leaves the details of execution to the subordinate, allowing the freedom and the obligation to take whatever steps are necessary to deal with the changing situation while encouraging initiative at the lower levels.\textsuperscript{58}

The JFC uses these mission-type orders to empower subordinate commanders with specific responsibilities, delineate any geographic boundaries, and facilitate timely decision making that is flexible and allows “abbreviation should the situation warrant.”\textsuperscript{59}

The JFC enables subordinate commanders by transferring forces and establishing support relationships between subordinate components. The JFC authorizes all force transfers necessary to accomplish specific mission tasks and centralize functionality while avoiding reduction in “the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.”\textsuperscript{60} In addition to force transfers, the “JFC may establish support relationships between component commanders to facilitate operations. Support relationships afford an effective means to prioritize and ensure unity of effort for various operations.”\textsuperscript{61} To this end, the JFC identifies the \textit{supported} and \textit{supporting} components within the joint force for specific operations, the degree of authority granted to the supported component commander, and issues a directive detailing the purpose, desired effects, and scope of action assigned to the supported commander.\textsuperscript{62} Once identified, the JFC provides his supported commander the leniency to give general directions to the joint force for specified operations including target prioritization, integration of supporting forces, the operational timeline, and “other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.”\textsuperscript{63} Additionally, the JFC acts as a buffer between the supported and supporting component commanders to ensure supporting commanders integrate into the operation with appropriate force elements, tactics, methods, procedures, and

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{58} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, IV-12 and V-15.
\bibitem{60} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, IV-12 and IV-17.
\bibitem{61} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, IV-18 and V-10.
\end{thebibliography}
communications based on the supporting commander’s capabilities.\textsuperscript{64} Finally, the JFC always maintains the right and authority to adjust forces or support relationships across the phases of an operation as required for the mission.\textsuperscript{65}

The JFC informs subordinate component commanders by serving as the informational conduit for the joint force. Subordinate component commanders are responsible for advising the JFC on proper force employment options, component capabilities, and anticipated consequences to mission objectives.\textsuperscript{66} Further, they are responsible for coordinating departures from original operations plans with the JFC and other component commanders involved in the mission.\textsuperscript{67} Subordinate commanders, especially of mixed-service components, must also remain “cognizant of the constraints imposed by logistic factors on the capability of the forces attached or made available,” and they must address any logistics issues with the JFC.\textsuperscript{68} Finally, the subordinate component commanders must keep the JFC apprised of their situation and progress.\textsuperscript{69} In return, the JFC is responsible for consolidating, prioritizing, and clarifying information from the joint force and distributing all available information affecting assigned missions and objectives to appropriate subordinate component commanders.\textsuperscript{70}

In summary, the JFC is responsible for establishing subordinate component commands and then authorizing, enabling, and informing those commands to accomplish the mission. The JFC authorizes subordinate commanders through delegated responsibilities, command relationships, and the dissemination of mission-type orders. The JFC enables subordinate component commanders through force transfers and establishment of support relationships. Finally, the JFC informs subordinate components by streamlining information flows between higher headquarters and affected subordinate commanders.

\textsuperscript{64} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, V-9.
\textsuperscript{65} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, V-10.
\textsuperscript{66} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, IV-12 and IV-18.
\textsuperscript{67} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, IV-12.
\textsuperscript{68} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, IV-18.
\textsuperscript{69} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, IV-12.
\textsuperscript{70} JP-1, \textit{Doctrine for the Armed Forces}, IV-12.
The purpose of evaluating doctrine through historical case studies is not invalidation. The purpose of evaluation is identification of shortfalls and the comprehensive enhancement of doctrine. As Everett Dolman argues in *Pure Strategy*:

> Tremendous thought and effort goes into the formation of doctrine, and decision makers abandon it at their peril [...] Until there is a better alternative, a better doctrine, we are stuck with it. It is therefore imperative that thinking military professionals continuously generate decision scenarios, develop options, and evaluate potential outcomes, and in this manner form alternative approaches so that obsolete or senescing doctrine can be **effectively** replaced.71

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71 Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 44.
Historical case studies are retroactive *decision scenarios* to inform military professionals for future formulations of alternative or enhanced approaches to doctrine. Historical studies broaden opportunities for doctrinal enhancement because the "more that individual agents are exposed to situations in which doctrine is expected to apply, the more refined the doctrine can become."\(^{72}\)

A challenge of doctrinal refinement at the strategic level is maintaining conceptual longevity. As Colin Gray notes, strategic doctrine is deliberately opaque.\(^{73}\) Opaqueness occurs because strategic doctrine avoids contextual specificity to create durability. In other words, strategic doctrine attempts to remain free of circumstance. It captures the enduring concepts that transcend operational contexts and, more importantly, adversarial entrapments. These characteristics are critical because doctrine "cannot be kept secret, for doctrines are means to socialization of an army, especially since complying with their precepts is by definition repetitious."\(^{74}\) The military must therefore expect adversaries to act based on predictions informed by the public availability of US doctrine. Consequently, doctrinal refinements, especially at the strategic level, must account for potential foreign interdiction, avoid contextual specificity, and incorporate tenets with enduring efficacy.

Understanding these requirements is a prerequisite to evaluating doctrine through the historical study of General Douglas MacArthur’s command in World War II—potential refinements gleaned from MacArthur’s experience must meet doctrine’s longevity requirements for further consideration. Further, only doctrinal tenets relevant to MacArthur’s command experience are open to evaluation. As Everett Dolman notes, “Doctrine is not invalidated simply because it is not used. It is invalidated when it no longer makes sense for normal operations.”\(^{75}\) In other words, assessing doctrine requires its use in normal operations or an intentional refusal of use for cause. The previous sections of this chapter outline tenets the US currently accepts as enduring for the strategic employment of forces under a JFC (simplified for reference in *Figure 2* above). Outlining these tenets aids in identifying where General

\(^{72}\) Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 182.
\(^{73}\) Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, 78.
\(^{74}\) Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, 78.
\(^{75}\) Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 162.
MacArthur fit or did not fit into doctrinal conceptualizations of a JFC. "Fitting in" involves two levels of assessment. First, assessing whether MacArthur used modern doctrinal tenets. Second, assessing whether MacArthur intentionally disregarded any unused doctrine. Used and intentionally unused doctrine is open to historical evaluation. Unintentionally unused doctrine is not subject to historical evaluation.

Evaluation of used and intentionally unused doctrine provides insights potentially improving doctrinal conceptualizations of the JFC. Where General MacArthur used doctrinal tenets, the specifics of MacArthur's utilization may provide enhancement. Where MacArthur operated against doctrinal tenets, careful consideration of the decision-making context is necessary because when "action in opposition to doctrine is taken due to instinct, visceral reaction, or fatigue, it is not a choice: it is a response." Responses do not aid doctrinal refinement unless they are thoroughly explainable after the fact. Divergence from doctrine by choice, however, is informative and potentially useful for doctrinal refinement: “If the choice was valid for this instance, it may be used to tweak doctrine. It may also be the exception that solidifies the rule of doctrine. If the choice was superior to doctrine in all instances like this one, then the doctrine will be changed.” The scope of this historical study is too narrow to identify the doctrinal superiority of choice in all like instances. Rather, this historical evaluation will focus on illuminating divergent concepts that necessitate further exploration and research by future scholars and military professionals.

Consequently, the doctrinal tenets evaluated through the historical study of General MacArthur's command in World War II will fall into three categories: (1) unevaluated tenets—those unintentionally unused by MacArthur; (2) used tenets—those MacArthur embraced; and, (3) conceptual divergences—the doctrinal tenets where MacArthur chose to act differently. While used tenets offer validation to joint doctrine, the preponderance of discussion in the concluding chapter of this work will focus on the implications of General MacArthur's conceptual divergences. To get there, however, historical study

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76 Dolman, Pure Strategy, 162.
77 Dolman, Pure Strategy, 162.
78 Dolman, Pure Strategy, 162.
starts with a strategic and operational overview of the Southwest Pacific Area campaign from the initiation of hostilities in 1941 through General MacArthur's arrival on Corregidor in 1945, thereby setting the stage for further doctrinal analysis.
Chapter 2
Strategic Context

World War II was a vast undertaking. General Douglas MacArthur’s operations in the Southwest Pacific Area represent just one tranche of the total war effort. Placing MacArthur’s campaign in strategic context with global efforts as well as wider Pacific theater endeavors facilitates comprehension of MacArthur’s major operational movements in the Southwest Pacific between 1942-1945. Comprehending these operational movements and their strategic context is a prerequisite for further analysis of JFC doctrine through General MacArthur’s command.

The strategic context in the Southwest Pacific evolved from geopolitical circumstances leading to the Second World War’s outbreak. In the decade prior to war with the US, Japan sought aggressive expansion in Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific. Japanese “tradition, patriotism, and economic necessity” drove this expansion, supported at home by “militarists and extreme nationalists.”1 In the 1920s, Japan shifted away from Western liberal influence and “embarked on a program of military preparation and territorial aggrandizement,” initiated through withdrawal from the League of Nations followed by the economic and eventual military control of Manchuria.2 In 1937, Japan extended territorial expansion further through the invasion of northern China.3 This invasion triggered a full-scale war with the Chinese, and US interests in China subsequently led to economic sanctions against Japan.4

The economic cost of war with China, US sanctions, and concern over potential Soviet incursions into Manchuria drove Japanese leaders to outline four priorities guiding Japan’s actions prior to WWII: (1) the elimination of outside aid to China; (2) adoption of “a firm attitude” to the US, stronger ties with the Axis, and readjusted relations with the Soviets; (3) access to raw resources in the Southwest Pacific; and, (4) “political, economic, and military

preparations” for further war. In the eyes of Japanese leaders, a military treaty with Germany and Italy offered the greatest promise to achieve these ends. Consequently, Japan signed the Tripartite Act in September 1940. Japanese Cabinet members believed the pact would force US neutrality in the Pacific and restrict US intervention in China, stemming the outbreak of war. The US, however, viewed the pact as a threat to US interests and the interests of Pacific free nations, and increased economic pressure on Japan.

In April 1941, Japan approached the US one last time demanding access to the South Pacific’s raw resources and assistance negotiating with the Chinese in exchange for a guarantee from Japan to not initiate war. The prospect of aiding the rise of Japanese regional hegemony, however, stood firmly outside US interests. Further, support to Japan—an Axis power—undermined support already committed to Britain and the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease Act, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in March 1940, which committed resources to counter Axis aggression in Europe. Consequently, the US refused Japan’s terms, and Japan opted for war.

In the US, geopolitical perspectives and strategic concerns were more global in scope compared to Japan. The primary US strategic concern before December 7, 1941, was the continued existence of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Both were “fighting angrily for survival” against Nazi Germany and required US economic support—the loss of either would cripple US capability to counter the Axis powers. Between 1939-1941, President Roosevelt accelerated US preparations for war with emphasis on Europe, while secondarily accounting for the rising tensions in the Pacific. In the Pacific, Roosevelt ordered a Japanese oil embargo and, against senior military advice, he reinforced military garrisons in the Philippines. Beyond these actions,

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7 Morton, *War in the Pacific*.
however, the brunt of US preparations went toward Britain and the Soviet Union through Lend-Lease.\textsuperscript{14} Despite Japan’s surprise attacks against the US at Pearl Harbor and subsequent national outrage, the US priority remained focused on Europe upon entry into World War II.

The varied scope of geopolitical interest between the US and Japan early in the war played a key role in theater strategy. At the outbreak of war, Japan’s geopolitical priorities were: (1) access raw resources in the Southwest Pacific; (2) eliminate outside aid to China; (3) eliminate US military capability to impede access to Southwest Pacific or aid China; and, (4) maintain ties with the Axis while keeping the Soviets from declaring war on Japan.\textsuperscript{15} In contrast, the US geopolitical priorities defined by President Roosevelt were: (1) maintain the solidarity of the Anglo-American coalition; (2) defeat Nazi Germany first, as early as possible; (3) give the Soviets “unstinted aid” to ensure they fight to the end; (4) force Germany and Japan into unconditional surrender; (5) keep China in the war and help them enter the post-war world as a great power; and, (6) form a postwar international organization of “United Nations” from the “union of victorious allies: the United States, Great Britain and its Commonwealth, the USSR, and China.”\textsuperscript{16} The difference in these geopolitical perspectives—Japan’s regional perspective versus America’s global perspective—set the stage for Pacific theater strategy and subsequent military operations, including General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific campaign.

\textsuperscript{14} Greenfield, \textit{American Strategy in World War II}, 53.
\textsuperscript{15} Morton, \textit{War in the Pacific}, 59 and 103-109. Interpolation from the original list on page 59 compared to Japanese strategic goals as outlined in their war plans detailed on pages 103-109.
\textsuperscript{16} Greenfield, \textit{American Strategy in World War II}, 78-79.
American Pacific theater strategy evolved through three phases: (1) strategic retreat and defense, (2) limited offense to extend defensive perimeters, and (3) strategic offense to defeat Japan. Beyond Japanese dispositions, two internal influences consistently shaped these strategic phases. First, the previously discussed Anglo-American coalition policy to “beat Germany first, meanwhile containing the Japanese,” which pushed resources away from the
Second, the subdivision of the Pacific theater into individual operating areas with separate commanders reporting to individual service chiefs back in Washington, DC (see Figure 3 above). General MacArthur was appointed commander of the Southwest Pacific Area on April 18, 1942, and reported directly to Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall.18 The South and North Pacific Areas, under the command of Admiral Robert Ghormley and Admiral Alfred Theobald, respectively, reported to Admiral Chester Nimitz. Admiral William Halsey, Jr., replaced Ghormley in October 1942 as commander of the South Pacific. Nimitz commanded both the Central Pacific Area and all US Pacific Forces, except for MacArthur’s forces, and reported to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King.19 King and Marshall served on both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff. This split arrangement introduced Army-Navy service rivalries into strategic discussions throughout the war.

The strategic retreat and defense phase lasted from World War II’s outbreak in the Pacific at Pearl Harbor through the early spring of 1943. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor launched into action two pre-war contingency plans called Rainbow-5 and War Plan Orange-3 (WPO-3).20 Rainbow-5 called for the mobilization of US forces to support offensive operations in Europe and the Atlantic Ocean while leaving enough presence in the Pacific to conduct operations “in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by directing Japanese strength away from Malaysia.”21 Specific actions to achieve this ambiguous directive for the Pacific were left out of Rainbow-5 pending Presidential approval of the plan. Unfortunately, President Roosevelt neither

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18 SWPA General Order #1, RG-4, Records of Headquarters, US Army Forces Pacific, 1942-1947, Box 1, Folder 1, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia (MMA); JCS Directive to Supreme Commander SWPA, RG-4, Box 15, Folder 3, MMA. General Order #1 includes the date of SWPA establishment. The JCS Directive includes reporting instructions to the Army Chief of Staff.
20 Morton, War in the Pacific, 139-140. Officially, Rainbow-5 was executed by President Roosevelt following confirmation of the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the plan’s ambiguity concerning the Pacific led theater commanders like MacArthur to fall back on the tenets of WPO-3, which was specific to an attack from Japan.
21 Morton, War in the Pacific, 88-91. Quote is from ABC-1 plan on page 88 that was incorporated verbatim into Rainbow-5 per page 90.
approved nor disapproved the plan prior to war, so the military entered hostilities with an obscure framework for action in the Pacific.\footnote{Morton, War in the Pacific, 90-91.}

Rainbow-5’s ambiguity drew Pacific commanders to fall back on WPO-3, the existing plan for Pacific operations in response to Japanese aggression. The “Orange Plans” dated back to 1904 during a rise in US interest regarding the strategic value of the Philippines and surrounding trade routes.\footnote{Morton, War in the Pacific, 24-26.} Over the years, the plans morphed in conjunction with shifting regional priorities, but their basic principles remained the same: conduct offensive naval actions to cut off Japanese lines-of-communication to resource areas in the South Pacific, reinforce the Philippine main island of Luzon, and defend Manila Bay utilizing Corregidor Island.\footnote{Morton, War in the Pacific, 29-44.} The priority given to Philippine reinforcements and Manila Bay’s defense varied in the two decades prior to war—at one point the estimate for arrival of reinforcements was two to three years.\footnote{Morton, War in the Pacific, 39.} This estimated timeline improved to a few months in early 1941, but General MacArthur, who was commanding US Forces in the Philippines at the outbreak of hostilities, knew WPO-3 and Rainbow-5 likely meant abandonment of the Philippines well before the launch of any Pacific counteroffensive.\footnote{D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur. Vol. 2: 1941 - 1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 85; for a comprehensive overview of WPO strategic evolution in the decades prior to World War II and throughout the war, read Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007.} Consequently, as the Allies scrambled to contain Japanese aggression throughout 1942, they fell back on outdated plans that left US Philippine-based forces in a lurch pending the arrival of reinforcements—which deployed to Europe, instead—and offensive naval support from a fleet recently devastated at Pearl Harbor. The result was strategic retreat throughout the Western Pacific to defensible perimeters.

In March 1942, the Japanese reached the “high-water mark” of their expansion into the Pacific.\footnote{Morton, War in the Pacific, 284.} Near simultaneously, the Philippine defense around Manila Bay and the Bataan Peninsula started to collapse, prompting President Roosevelt to order General MacArthur to leave Corregidor for
Australia. Philippine surrender occurred on May 6, 1942, following General Jonathan Wainright’s capitulation to the Japanese on Corregidor. US naval activity in the Central and South Pacific, however, curbed the Japanese advance. In May and June of 1942, the US Navy defeated the Japanese at the Battle of the Coral Sea and Battle of Midway. Most Pacific commanders, including MacArthur, saw Midway as a decisive victory that “restored the balance in naval power in the Pacific, and removed the threat to Hawaii and the West Coast of the United States.” This naval rebalancing prompted Admiral King to push the Combined Chiefs to approve limited offensive operations in the Pacific. Approval came in early 1943 when the directive language for Pacific operations shifted from “maintaining” pressure on the Japanese to “extending” pressure. In the meantime, operations in the Pacific focused on holding the Japanese advance in Papua, New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Gilbert Islands, and Marshall Islands.

The strategic shift toward limited offensive operations to extend the defensive barrier gained initial approval at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. At the conference, the US Joint Chiefs convinced the Combined Chiefs that protecting the line of communication between the US and Australia required a wider defensive barrier, especially in the Southwest Pacific where the Japanese established a major forward base at Rabaul on New Britain Island in New Guinea. The Combined Chiefs agreed to a limited reallocation of resources to the Pacific to support three limited offensive actions: (1) the recapture of the Aleutian Chain in the North Pacific, (2) capture of the Truk-Guam line in the Central Pacific, and (3) a coordinated effort between the Southwest and South Pacific to capture Rabaul via Papua, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands.

The Joint Chiefs issued the directive for these operations in March

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28 James, The Years of MacArthur, 98-99. The President’s order was issued in late February, but MacArthur delayed departure until mid-March.
32 Morton, War in the Pacific, 290. See footnote concerning Kings memo to the JCS on 4 May 1942.
33 Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II, 32.
34 Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II, 382.
35 Greenfield, American Strategy in World War II, 386.
In the South and Southwest Pacific, action toward this directive occurred during the Cartwheel operations from June 1943 through March 1944. The limited offensive operations in the Pacific during this period introduced the concept of “island-hopping” or bypassing hardened enemy positions to extend the advance, ultimately isolating these bypassed positions from support and leaving them vulnerable to air attack. Island-hopping was initially adopted in the North Pacific to bypass Japanese forces at Kiska in the Aleutian Island chain, but quickly filtered into operations throughout the Pacific. Island-hopping resulted in increasing momentum across the Pacific toward the Japanese mainland requiring further strategic guidance.

In 1944, strategy shifted one last time toward an offensive to defeat Japan. On March 12th, the Joint Chiefs triggered a debate between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz by proposing to capture Formosa (modern Taiwan) and, consequently, the Formosa-Luzon-China area via an offensive thrust through the Marianas, Carolines, and Palau Islands designed to sever supplies flowing north to Japan near Formosa and support bombing operations out of China. The proposal placed priority on Admiral Nimitz’s Central Pacific forces, with General MacArthur in a supporting role. MacArthur viewed this as an abandonment of the Philippines—a former US territory with citizens loyal to the US and American prisoners waiting for rescue. Additionally, General Marshall privately considered the Palau-Formosa plan overly risky, with potential for catastrophic losses, and preferred an approach enabling invasion of Japan’s southern main island of Kyushu. He offered these thoughts to MacArthur, pushing MacArthur to develop an alternate plan for consideration. MacArthur’s plan, submitted in July 1944, proposed capturing the Philippine

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36 Strategic Planning Directive dated 29 March 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 2, MMA.
37 James, The Years of MacArthur, 338; J. Miller and Department of the Army. Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, United States Army in World War II (Department of the Army, Office of the chief of military history, 1959), 49 and 380. Map in James, 388, provides an overview of the actual timeline for operations.
38 Borneman, MacArthur at War, 303, 306, 309, and 311. Borneman argues the Japanese unwittingly invented the “island-hopping” strategy during their advance in 1941-42, but this begs the question: is an unwittingly-created strategy a strategy at all? Any definition that describes strategy as a “plan” undermines Borneman’s argument—a plan requires prior intent, not decisions on the fly.
39 Message from Washington to GHQ SWPA dated 12 March 1944, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 5, MMA.
40 Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 18 June 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 1, MMA.
41 Private Message from Marshal to MacArthur dated 24 Jun 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 1, MMA.
main island of Luzon via a thrust through the southern Philippines from lodgments on Vogelkop and Morotai south of Mindanao Island. This approach would allow him to cut off the Japanese lines-of-communication with southern resource areas earlier than the Formosa effort, offer Luzon as a staging area for the invasion of Kyushu, and offer a more defensible line-of-communication through the Philippines to support bombing operations against Japan. The proposal also called on the Central Pacific forces to protect MacArthur’s right flank from attack—protection the Central Pacific plan lacked.\footnote{Message from MacArthur to AGWAR dated 8 July 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 1, MMA.}

The Joint Chiefs settled the issue on September 10th, issuing strategic direction that balanced the two proposals. The directive ordered MacArthur to lead an offensive through the Philippines to take Luzon by February 20, 1945. Additionally, the directive ordered Admiral Nimitz to support MacArthur’s operation plus occupy, develop, and defend Formosa by March 1, 1945.\footnote{Directive from JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz dated 10 September 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 2, MMA. The official Army history (The “Green Books,” specifically the Leyte Operation history by M. Hamlin Cannon) dates this JCS directive to 8 September 1944, but the archived message is dated 10 September 1944. The Army official history may refer to the date of the 171st JCS meeting when the JCS decided upon the details of the directive, but no message from 8 September was found in the archives.} A month later, the Joint Chiefs updated the directive, ordering MacArthur to occupy Luzon by December 20, 1944. The directive also ordered Admiral Nimitz to abandon the Formosa plan, and instead occupy the Nanpo Shoto Islands (Iwo Jima) due south of Tokyo by January 20, 1945, in addition to the Nansei Shoto Islands (Okinawa) due south of Kyushu by March 1, 1945.\footnote{Directive from JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz dated 4 October 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 2, MMA.} These islands positioned US forces for the invasion of mainland Japan supported by continuous bombing efforts from the Philippines and Marianas Islands.

Planning for the invasion of Japan—the Olympic and Coronet Plans—escalated in April 1945 following the capture of Luzon and invasion of Okinawa, but the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, followed by Japan’s formal surrender on September 2, 1945, rendered the invasion strategy moot.\footnote{James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 766-778 and 788-789.} Consequently, the offensive directives issued by the Joint Chiefs in September and October of 1944 constitute the last strategic phase implemented in the Pacific theater.
Significant Influences on General MacArthur

Beyond the evolving theater strategy, two personal concerns consistently colored General MacArthur’s strategic perspective and operational directives as the Southwest Pacific Area commander: (1) returning to the Philippines and (2) maintaining Australian support.

For General MacArthur, regaining the Philippines was an obligation driven by loyalty. MacArthur had a long history with the Philippines. He was stationed in Manila as a Lieutenant from 1903-1904. He returned as a Brigadier General from 1922-1925, and returned again as a Major General from 1928-1930 where he became close with future Philippine President, Manuel Quezon. After serving as Army Chief of Staff from 1930-1935, MacArthur accepted a position from Quezon as head of the new Philippine Military at the rank of Field Marshal. Following increased German aggression in Europe, President Roosevelt reactivated MacArthur as Commanding General, US Army Forces Far East in July 1941. In the nearly six consecutive years MacArthur lived in Manila before reactivation, he married his wife, Jean, welcomed the birth of his only son, Arthur, and built a Filipino military destined to face the Japanese—all events inspiring loyalty to the Philippines.

Further, following his evacuation from Corregidor, MacArthur insisted the Japanese invasion of Luzon was reversible, but believed misinformation regarding reinforcement availability and his ordered evacuation before Filipino forces could properly organize ultimately led to surrender and the loss of his American and Filipino troops. MacArthur’s feeling of loyalty and loss underscored much of his subsequent strategic thought. For example, he wrote his famous “I will return speech” on a train to Melbourne before any strategic directives were issued to reclaim the Philippines and without consulting the President—whom he

46 Borneman, MacArthur at War, 16.
47 Borneman, MacArthur at War, 29, 31, and 32-35.
48 Borneman, MacArthur at War, 48 and 55.
49 Borneman, MacArthur at War, 60. German aggression seems unrelated to Pacific military reactivations, but Roosevelt was concerned with Japanese posturing following their Axis ally’s activities.
50 Borneman, MacArthur at War, 49-62; James, The Years of MacArthur, 90-91. James notes that much of MacArthur’s loyalty also evolved through his devotion to Manuel Quezon, who he yielded to on several occasions following the Japanese invasion of Luzon when the question of supporting Filipino versus American needs arose.
51 James, The Years of MacArthur, 150; MacArthur, Reminiscences, 121.
referenced in the speech. Further, MacArthur’s 1944 argument to assault Japan through the Philippines included enough loyal sentiment to convince Marshall to privately reprimand MacArthur for placing personal desires over national priorities. Consequently, analysis of MacArthur’s decisions—from strategy to staff selections—must consider his resolve to regain the Philippines.

Between 1942-1943, the need to maintain support from Australia, especially from Prime Minister John Curtin, also influenced General MacArthur. The obvious factor driving this influence on MacArthur was Australia’s position as the last strategically defensible position in the Southwest Pacific. Australia accepted MacArthur’s appointment as Supreme Commander over their forces, but the funding, raising, and equipping of Australian forces was still under Australian control. In other words, MacArthur could direct military action, but he required support from the Australian government to fix severe military shortfalls he discovered on arrival in 1942. Further, US priority toward operations in Europe and the long line-of-communication between the US and MacArthur meant US Southwest Pacific forces might become dependent on their Australian hosts for material support if Japanese aggression broke through in the Central Pacific. Consequently, consideration for Australia heavily influenced MacArthur until the US strategic position in the Pacific improved.

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52 Speech Draft on Melbourne hotel paper, RG-3, Records of Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-1945, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA.
53 Message from Marshall to MacArthur dated 24 June 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 1, MMA.
54 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 151.
55 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 151; Directive of the Commander-in-Chief to MacArthur dated 15 April 1942, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA.
56 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 152.
57 Morton, War in the Pacific, 206. Refer to map.
The operational movements of the Southwest Pacific Forces under General Douglas MacArthur fall into five major campaigns: (1) the Papuan Campaign, (2) Cartwheel operations, (3) the Approach to the Philippines, (4) the Leyte operation, and (5) the Philippine Conquest (see Figure 4 above).

Additionally, MacArthur conducted several limited operations to hold the defensive line in New Guinea between completion of the Papuan Campaign and start of Cartwheel operations in October 1943. The following overview of Southwest Pacific operational movements between 1942-1945 outlines the broad plans, actions, and outcomes of these major campaigns.

The Joint Chiefs directed General MacArthur to accomplish eight objectives in their directive initially creating the Southwest Pacific Area and designating MacArthur as Supreme Commander. These objectives were to:

(a) Hold key military regions of Australia as bases for future offensive action against Japan, and strive to check Japanese aggression in the South West Pacific Area

(b) Check the enemy advance across Australia and its essential lines of communication by the destruction of enemy combatant, troop and supply ships, aircraft and bases in Eastern Malaysia and the New Guinea-Bismark-Solomon Islands region.

(c) Exert economic pressure on the enemy by destroying vessels transporting raw materials from recently conquered territories to Japan.
(d) Maintain our position in the Philippine Islands.

(e) Protect land, sea and air communications within the South West Pacific Area and its close approaches.

(f) Route shipping in the South West Pacific Area.

(g) Support operations of friendly forces in the Pacific Ocean Area and in the Indian theatre.

(a) Prepare to take the offensive.¹

The directive also authorized MacArthur to organize a General Staff comprised of members from assigned nations, assemble a force structure for area operations, and designate subordinate commanders. Southwest Pacific Area General Order #1, issued by MacArthur in April 1942, organized forces into air, sea, and land components under subordinate component commanders (see Figure 5 below).² This force structure persisted throughout the war with two notable changes: (1) the addition of the Alamo Force—later re-designated Sixth Army—in February 1943, and (2) the addition of Eighth Army in August 1944.³ Both forces reported directly to MacArthur, rather than the land component commander, General Sir Thomas Blamey of the Australian Army.

Figure 5: Southwest Pacific Command Organization, 1942-1945

Source: Figure created by author from info in SWPA General Order #1, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA; James, The Years of MacArthur. Vol. 2: 1941 - 1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), 312 and 498.


² SWPA General Order #1, RG-3, Records of Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-1945, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA.

Planning for the first campaigns in the Southwest Pacific began in April 1942, before the Joint Chiefs issued any planning directives. General MacArthur, concerned about a strike against northern Australia from Japanese forces building at Rabaul, issued a planning directive to his subordinate commanders for an operation to hold the northeast coast of Australia and increase Australian troop presence at Port Moresby on the southern coast of Papua. MacArthur expected the Japanese to attack Port Moresby overland from Buna on the north coast of Papua, through the Owen Stanley Mountains, and he intended to halt them in the mountain passes to prevent their capture and use of Port Moresby as a staging base for invading Australia.

Following the successful interception of Japanese landing forces between 5-8 May by Admiral Ghormley’s forces during the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Joint Chiefs issues a directive to the South and Southwest Areas on July 2nd. The directive tasked MacArthur to support South Pacific operations against the Solomon Islands, and to capture and occupy Rabaul and adjacent locations in the New Guinea-New Ireland area, including the Papuan and New Guinea northern coast. By July 13th, MacArthur’s plan included the capture and occupation of an airfield at Buna to support subsequent operational thrusts throughout New Guinea and New Ireland. Unfortunately, a Japanese invasion force beat MacArthur to Buna, making landfall and digging into positions on July 21-22. The Japanese invasion launched the Papuan Campaign—an effort to recapture Buna and the surrounding areas of Papua necessary for future operations against Rabaul.

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4 SWPA Operations Instruction #2 dated 25 April 1942, RG-3, Box 175, Folder 1, MMA.
6 S. Milner, Victory in Papua, United States Army in World War II (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957), 35-40 and 46.
7 Milner, Victory in Papua, 48.
8 Milner, Victory in Papua, 51-52.
9 Milner, Victory in Papua, 54-55.
The Papuan Campaign

Figure 6: Papuan Offensive Plan, October 1942

From July through October 1944, the Japanese built up forces in Buna while MacArthur shifted Australian forces to Port Moresby and Milne Bay on the southeastern tip of Papua to hold the defensive line and mountain passes in the Owen Stanleys. On the evening of August 25, 1942, Japanese forces landed near Milne Bay to wipe out the Australian garrison there and take control of the local airfield. Fortunately, they landed in a fouled location and underestimated the Allied garrison strength, resulting in Japanese defeat.

The attack on Milne Bay and ongoing skirmishes between Australian and Japanese troops in the jungle-covered mountains between Buna and Port Moresby concerned MacArthur. He viewed the Australian troops as inferior jungle fighters to the Japanese, and believed an offensive action against Buna offered the best option to push back the Japanese expansion before the “situation became serious” in the region. In October, Southwest Pacific forces

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10 Milner, Victory in Papua, 68 and 74-76.
11 Milner, Victory in Papua, 81-86.
12 Personal Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 6 September 1942, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 1, MMA.
executed their offensive—by November they were in position to attack Buna (see Figure 6 above).

As the offensive thrust approached Buna, General Blamey contacted MacArthur with a proposal to utilize General George Kenney’s air transports to move two battalions into forward positions along the advance. Given naval fighting north of Papua toward the Solomon Islands, MacArthur rejected the proposal out of concern for follow-on resupply availability via sea lines-of-communication. Eventually, however, MacArthur reconsidered, approved, and subsequently recommended the airfield for inserting forces, provided Blamey worked with Kenney to keep the troops supplied by air. The air transport was successful, and forces were in position to assault Buna in mid-November in an operation called Lilliput.

Part of the Lilliput operation included a naval landing followed by seaborne supply operations. Consequently, General Blamey requested naval fire support from Admiral Carpender through communiques to MacArthur’s General Headquarters. In four responses to MacArthur and Blamey’s requests, Admiral Carpender refused to support the operation fully, citing the risk of uncharted coastal waters with unknown depths and refueling requirements. Only three small submarines and two corvettes assisted the operation—a fraction of available naval support.

The Buna assault commenced on November 16th. It took almost two months and a second assault to capture the Buna area, with the last Japanese forces surrendering in early January 1943. The frustratingly slow pace of operations around Buna convinced MacArthur to bring US troops recently arrived in theater forward to relieve the Australians, in addition to a US Corps

13 Milner, * Victory in Papua, 116-119.  
14 Letter from MacArthur to Blamey dated 20 October 1942 and Message from MacArthur to Blamey dated 1 November 1942, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA.  
15 Milner, * Victory in Papua, 127-128.  
Commander, General Robert Eichelberger. The mop-up operations in the Papuan Campaign continued around Sanananda through January 22, 1943, when MacArthur declared the campaign successfully closed.

Ultimately, the campaign claimed 5,698 Australian casualties and 2,848 American casualties. Japanese survivors remarked Allied air superiority and “coordination of firepower and advance was very skillful.” Air transport proved critical to supply and medical evacuation—General MacArthur sent a request to his Australian headquarters from his forward headquarters for procurement of seventy-five more C-3 aircraft because operations were “dependent entirely on air for troop movement.” In contrast, the naval contribution beyond supply was negligible, with fire support provided only once during the operation. Strategically, the Papuan Campaign was a bloody series of operations leaving the Southwest Pacific Area “exactly where it would have been the previous July had it been able to secure the beachhead before the Japanese got there.” On the other hand, the campaign ingrained in General MacArthur an understanding of air power’s capabilities, the need for sea power, and the desire for commanders willing to aggressively drive land power in future operations.

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19 James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 208-212 and 243-244; Milner, *Victory in Papua*, 155, and 202-204. James notes that Eichelberger was brought to Australia to push Blamey, who was viewed as “comfortable” with the slow pace of operations in the Buna effort. Eichelberger was eventually chastised by MacArthur and sent to the front after MacArthur’s Chief of Staff, General Richard Sutherland, reported American troops were near breaking. Though ultimately a success, the Buna operation arguably tainted MacArthur’s opinion of Eichelberger, Blamey, and Carpender for the rest of the war.

20 Milner, *Victory in Papua*, 369; Press Release from MacArthur to US Forces dated 24 January 1943, RG-3, Box 3, Folder 8, MMA. MacArthur’s press release was issued two days after he called a close to the campaign.

21 Milner, *Victory in Papua*, 370.

22 Milner, *Victory in Papua*, 374.

23 Message from MacArthur to SWPA GHQ dated 24 November 1942, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 1, MMA.

24 Milner, *Victory in Papua*, 376.

The successful completion of the Papuan Campaign allowed Southwest Pacific forces to return to the task of seizing Rabaul. In January 1943, General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey presented plans to the Joint Chiefs for discussion at the Casablanca Conference. MacArthur’s plan, code-named “Elkton,” called for an offensive along two lines of advance, one through Northeast New Guinea by Southwest Pacific forces and the other through the Solomon Islands by South Pacific forces. Their objective along the advance was the capture of airfields and advanced staging bases to cover an assault on Rabaul. Following Casablanca, MacArthur sent his staff to a Pacific planning conference to negotiate the details of the plan with the other area planners.

At the conference, MacArthur’s planners, led by his Chief of Staff, General Richard Sutherland, forecast massive troop and material losses in the capture of Rabaul requiring reinforcement from the US or European theater. The Joint Chiefs refused the reinforcement given the “Germany first” policy, and issued an operational directive on March 28th with language to “isolate” Rabaul instead of “seize.” MacArthur assumed the language left Rabaul’s capture to a later operation. Because the directive required action from both the Southwest and South Pacific areas, MacArthur urged the Joint Chiefs to time the movements of each area to enhance mutual support. The Joint Chiefs responded by giving MacArthur directive control over Halsey for coordination purposes, but not command of his forces. By June 1943, the plan to isolate Rabaul included thirteen invasions over eight months to capture advanced fighter and bomber bases for attacks on Rabaul—codenamed “Cartwheel.”

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26 J. Miller and Department of the Army. Office of the chief of military history (Washington), Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, United States Army in World War II (Department of the Army, Office of the chief of military history, 1959), 6.
27 Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 11.
28 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 176.
30 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 168; Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 15.
31 James, The Years of MacArthur, 310.
32 Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 25 March 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 2, MMA.
33 Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 18-19.
34 Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 26.
The Cartwheel operations started with a deceptive bombing campaign by General Kenney’s air forces to cover the advance of Allied forces.\(^\text{35}\) The ground effort included General Blamey’s forces in addition to the newly formed Alamo Force under the command of Lieutenant General Walter Krueger. MacArthur assigned Blamey’s forces to operations on New Guinea and the Alamo Force to operations on New Britain Island and, later, the Admiralties.\(^\text{36}\) The first invasion forces launched on June 30, 1943, for landings at Woodlark, Kiriwana, and Nassau Bay to establish air bases—all objectives captured with ease compared to Buna.\(^\text{37}\)

In September 1943, MacArthur ordered General Blamey to initiate operations to capture the Huon Peninsula in New Guinea.\(^\text{38}\) The Huon operations were especially unique for two reasons. First, the Southwest Pacific air forces conducted the first tactical airdrop of paratroopers behind enemy

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\(^{36}\) James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 312-313.

\(^{37}\) Message from MacArthur to Marshall concerning Cartwheel Plan dated 5 May 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 2, MMA; Miller, *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*, 56.

\(^{38}\) Miller, *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*, 189-192.
lines in combat, albeit unopposed, and then used airdrops from B-17’s to keep those troops resupplied. Second, the operation included the first use of inland-based fighters for naval escort, since no carriers were allocated to MacArthur. Additionally, the same fighters simultaneously provided close air support for General Blamey’s troop movements.

While Cartwheel operations were underway, senior leaders and planners debated the final operation to take Rabaul. Early in the campaign General Marshall directed MacArthur to consider planning for bypassing, cutting off, and reducing Rabaul using Kenney’s air forces. While initially opposed, MacArthur eventually accepted the idea, selecting locations on New Ireland and the Admiralty Islands for advanced air bases to isolate and bomb Rabaul. In February 1944, reconnaissance aircraft located a lightly guarded Japanese airstrip in the Admiralty Islands. Eight days later, on February 29th, General Krueger’s Alamo Force landed on Los Negros Island in the Admiralties to capture the airfield under the cover of a naval escort commanded by MacArthur’s new naval commander, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid. Krueger’s forces cleared Los Negros for air operations by the end of March. The airbase on Los Negros effectively isolated Rabaul, so General MacArthur cancelled subsequent invasion plans for New Ireland and ended Cartwheel Operations.

The Cartwheel operations were a success defined by “speed and precision,” with MacArthur’s air and naval components reducing Rabaul “to impotence” by Cartwheel’s close in March 1944. Additionally, the Allied forces of the South and Southwest Pacific successfully stopped two Japanese counter-attacks and met their objectives within the planned timeline. Consequently, Cartwheel isolated over 144,000 Japanese troops from supply and support, effectively removing them from the fight. Further, the experience introduced

40 Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 191-193.
41 Message from Marshall to MacArthur dated 21 July 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 3, MMA.
42 Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 223-225.
43 James, The Years of MacArthur, 380.
44 Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 323-328.
45 Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 348.
46 Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 380-381.
48 James, The Years of MacArthur, 443.
MacArthur’s forces to the concept of “island-hopping”—a strategy used in their next operation at Hollandia, the first step on MacArthur’s approach to the Philippines.49

The Approach to the Philippines

Figure 8: Southwest Pacific Area Philippine Approach, 1944

The Approach to the Philippines campaign involved seven operations conducted in rapid succession, typically with planning for the subsequent operation occurring during execution of the previous (see Figure 7 above).50 The campaign perfected the “island-hopping” model used around Rabaul, using Allied air power to cover rapid advances bypassing major Japanese positions for lightly defended positions promising an extension of airpower coverage and further advance. MacArthur initiated the Approach to the Philippines based on directives issued by the Joint Chiefs in January 1944, during the Cartwheel operations, for continued offensive thrusts along the New Guinea northern

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49 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 166; Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, 382.
coast and Bismarck Archipelago.\textsuperscript{51} The first operations of the campaign, conducted simultaneously at Hollandia and Aitape in April 1944, bypassed a major Japanese position at Wewak on Hansa Bay, and served as a template for the five successive operations in the campaign.\textsuperscript{52} Specifically, Hollandia established MacArthur’s routines for coordinating land, air, and sea in a joint operation.\textsuperscript{53}

General MacArthur chose to assault Hollandia due to its potential for supporting a major airbase with offshore anchorages deep enough for major naval combat, cargo, troop vessels—criteria he used for selection of most subsequent invasion locations.\textsuperscript{54} General Kenney’s air forces provided bombing and reconnaissance sorties prior to the operation to soften and locate Japanese positions. During the operation, aircraft provided close air support, fighter sweeps, and then shifted to an air blockade of the surrounding islands to prevent the arrival of Japanese reinforcements.\textsuperscript{55} Admiral Kinkaid’s naval forces provided beach reconnaissance, shore approach charting, and mine sweeping prior to the operation. Naval landing craft brought the invasion force to shore and kept the forces supplied throughout the operation.\textsuperscript{56} General Krueger’s Alamo Force conducted the invasion, assault, and sweep of the Hollandia area. As the invasion force, Krueger was the “supported commander” and responsible for planning all logistical actions under MacArthur’s direction for the operation.\textsuperscript{57}

General MacArthur repeated this choreographed interaction between the land, sea, and air components for all operations during the Approach to the Philippines campaign, resulting in overall success with only minor deviations. For example, Hollandia was beyond the range of Kenney’s fighters, so Admiral Nimitz provided three days of carrier-based fighter support while MacArthur’s forces conducted a simultaneous invasion at Aitape, 125 miles from Hollandia.

\textsuperscript{51} Three separate Directives from the Joint Chiefs to MacArthur dated 17 and 24 January 1944, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 5, MMA.
\textsuperscript{52} MacArthur, \textit{Reminiscences}, 189.
\textsuperscript{53} Smith, \textit{The Approach to the Philippines}, 13.
\textsuperscript{54} Smith, \textit{The Approach to the Philippines}, 13 and 24.
\textsuperscript{55} Smith, \textit{The Approach to the Philippines}, 24-27.
\textsuperscript{56} Smith, \textit{The Approach to the Philippines}, 27-29.
\textsuperscript{57} Smith, \textit{The Approach to the Philippines}, 29-31. The terminology “supported” versus “supporting” was not doctrine or common parlance at the time, but Smith refers to Krueger receiving and directing support from the other components.
The Aitape invasion established a primitive fighter base to support the Hollandia ground advance after Nimitz’s carriers departed. Consequently, at Hollandia the Japanese lost four men for every Allied casualty due to synchronized air and naval support. Additionally, at Aitape, Allied intelligence, supported by air, located the Japanese 18th Army preparing for a counter-attack, allowing Krueger to activate reinforcements in time. Though fighting lasted a month, the Allied forces defeated the counter-attack and held the airfield. The Alamo Force defeated another Japanese counter-attack after the invasion of Biak Island. Their ground success enabled bomber and fighter operations from Biak to support Central Pacific offensive actions against the Mariana Islands. This integration between MacArthur’s component forces gained in proficiency throughout the campaign. Joint planning and execution culminated during the final operation at Morotai where Southwest Pacific forces seized the island with no lost aircraft or naval vessels, and encountered only limited resistance from small Japanese raiding parties. Ultimately, the Allies suffered 20,237 casualties in the campaign compared to Japan’s estimated 43,347 casualties.

The success of the Approach to the Philippines campaign produced several strategic benefits for the Pacific Theater and MacArthur. First, invasions seized oil fields from the Japanese surrounding the Vogelkop Peninsula in New Guinea, and allowed Allied Forces to intercept Japanese oil lanes supplying Japan’s mainland. Further, the invasion of Morotai provided a base for launching fighter escort to bombers conducting operations throughout the southern Philippines and Marianas. Most importantly, especially for General MacArthur, the campaign coincided with the debate in Washington concerning the third phase of Pacific Theater strategy: the offensive to defeat Japan. MacArthur’s rapid advance, ending with the invasion of Morotai in mid-

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60 Smith, *The Approach to the Philippines*, 113 and 133.
63 MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 202; Message from SWPA GHQ to Rear Echelon SWPA GHQ dated 15 September 1944, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 9, MMA.
64 Smith, *The Approach to the Philippines*, 577-578.
September, supported his persistent arguments for an offensive thrust through the Philippines to subsequently launch the invasion of Japan from Luzon. Undoubtedly, the two directives from the Joint Chief’s to MacArthur and Nimitz in September and October 1944, establishing the Allied offensive strategy to defeat Japan and ordering MacArthur to capture Luzon, emanated from the success achieved during the Philippine approach. The issuance of these directives also pointed the Southwest Pacific forces toward their next objective: Leyte.

The Leyte Operation

The comparably short Leyte operation was a critical juncture in the Southwest Pacific’s push north toward Japan. According to 1944 intelligence estimates, the Philippine Islands contained the largest troop concentration facing Pacific forces to date, totaling 180,000 Japanese fighting troops—80,000 on Luzon in the north, 50,000 on Mindanao in the south, and 50,000 spread throughout the Visayan Islands that split Luzon and Mindanao from east to west. Of the 50,000 Japanese combat troops in the Visayan Islands, an estimated 20,000 were stationed on Leyte, the easternmost and largest island of the Visayan group. Additionally, 442 Japanese fighter aircraft and 337 bombers stood ready to provide air support against an Allied invasion.

In September 1944, MacArthur dissolved the Alamo Force, and designated General Krueger as Commanding General, Sixth Army. The change was largely administrative, since Krueger continued commanding all elements of his Alamo Force and reported directly to MacArthur, but it did signal a shift in operational scope. In addition to Krueger's original forces, the Sixth Army absorbed an entire Army corps from the Central Pacific for operations in the Philippines. The new Sixth Army brought 202,700 combat troops to Leyte,

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67 Directive from JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz dated 10 September 1944 and Directive from JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz dated 4 October 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 2, MMA.
68 M.H. Cannon, *Leyte: The Return to the Philippines*, United States Army in World War II (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 21-22. These Japanese strength estimates proved inaccurate after the war. By January 1945, there were 275,000 Japanese combat troops on Luzon alone—referenced during upcoming details of the Philippine Conquest.
69 James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 499.
including 174,000 troops for the initial invasion.\footnote{Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 26.}

General MacArthur’s scheme of maneuver for the operation mirrored characteristics of his previous operations during the Approach to the Philippines, with one critical exception: the landing forces were 500 miles beyond land-based fighter aircraft coverage, a situation similar to Hollandia but without the option to rapidly establish an airfield during initial landings.\footnote{MacArthur, \textit{Reminiscences}, 213 and 224.} Consequently, Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific ordered Admiral Halsey to provide fleet support to MacArthur. Subsequently, the entire Third Fleet participated, totaling 92 combat vessels including aircraft carriers for invasion air cover.\footnote{Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 23 and 90; MacArthur, \textit{Reminiscences}, 224.} Together with MacArthur’s Seventh Fleet, under Admiral Kinkaid’s command, a total of 164 combat vessels supported the Leyte landings.\footnote{Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 90.}

Unfortunately, the command relationship between MacArthur and Halsey remained similar to previous arrangements in the South Pacific, with Halsey reporting to Nimitz throughout the operation instead of MacArthur. To facilitate smoother naval coordination between the fleets, MacArthur designated Admiral Kinkaid as the supported commander during amphibious phases of the operation, with General Krueger taking the lead once personally established on a beachhead in Leyte.\footnote{Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 24.} MacArthur’s air component, under General Kenney, provided reconnaissance, bombing, and fleet support to forces while they remained in range.\footnote{Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 27; MacArthur, \textit{Reminiscences}, 213.}

On October 17, 1944, Ranger battalions from the Sixth Army captured three small islands guarding the entrance to Leyte Gulf prior to invasion of Leyte Island by Krueger’s main force on October 20th, D-Day for the operation (see \textit{Figure 9} below).\footnote{Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 34 and 60.} Despite heavy Japanese resistance, the landings were successful. Between October 23-26, however, the operation nearly failed due to naval miscommunications created by the command relationship between MacArthur, Halsey, and Kinkaid. Operating under priority orders from Nimitz to engage and destroy the Japanese fleet, Halsey departed Leyte Gulf early on October 24th following the sighting of an enemy fleet 300 miles northeast, off
the coast of Luzon. His departure left the San Bernardino Strait unguarded, giving access to Leyte Gulf by a separate Japanese fleet under the command of Admiral Takeo Kurita. During the Third Fleet’s departure, communications between Halsey and Kinkaid gave the false impression that some of Halsey’s fleet still guarded the strait. Once Kinkaid discovered the error, MacArthur attempted to turn Halsey’s fleet around, communicating initially through Nimitz before resorting to direct options. Admiral Kurita’s fleet sailed through the pass on October 25th, before Halsey’s return, and engaged Kinkaid’s smaller force. As MacArthur noted in a later report, “only the lack of enemy aggressiveness” coupled with Kinkaid’s brilliant use of cruisers and destroyers defeated Kurita’s fleet. Kurita later claimed to turn around due to lacking Japanese air cover, despite sailing to within an hour of the Allied beachheads.

Figure 9: Plan for Leyte Operation


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Beyond the close call during Kurita’s naval advance, the Leyte operation unfolded successfully, albeit against determined Japanese resistance. Over the course of the campaign, the Japanese attempted to land reinforcements from Luzon, but Allied air and naval forces sank eighty percent of the vessels dispatched.\textsuperscript{81} Despite these severe losses, approximately 45,000 Japanese reinforcements and 10,000 tons of supplies reached Leyte, enabling a Japanese counter-attack on December 5, 1944.\textsuperscript{82} Krueger’s forces held the attack, then landed Allied troops behind enemy lines on the Japanese occupied side of Leyte between December 7-10. The landings occurred under the cover of Kinkaid’s Third Fleet and Kenney’s fighter aircraft—recently dispatched to the Allied side of the island.\textsuperscript{83} The combined actions collapsed the Japanese defense on Leyte. On December 25, 1944, MacArthur called an end to the campaign, although sporadic fighting continued well into January.\textsuperscript{84} Ultimately, Allied forces suffered 15,500 casualties.\textsuperscript{85} Japanese casualties are less certain, but estimates range from General MacArthur’s high figure of 80,500 casualties to Krueger’s estimate of 56,000 casualties and post-war Japanese reports of 49,000 casualties.\textsuperscript{86}

Leyte’s capture created personal and strategic impacts. On the personal level, the Leyte operation seared into MacArthur’s mind the need for unified command in a major theater. In a report to Washington after the conflict he argued for the Joint Chiefs to “simplify command structures and abolish artificial boundaries” in the Pacific theater.\textsuperscript{87} Decades later in his memoirs, he still blamed the Leyte naval debacle on Washington’s failure to unify

\textsuperscript{81} Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 101-102.
\textsuperscript{82} Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 101-102 and 275.
\textsuperscript{83} Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 276-280.
\textsuperscript{84} Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 361 and 367; MacArthur, \textit{Reminiscences}, 233. MacArthur remembers calling the campaign to a close on 26 December in his memoirs.
\textsuperscript{85} Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}, 367-368.
\textsuperscript{86} Cannon, \textit{Leyte: The Return to the Philippines}; MacArthur, \textit{Reminiscences}, 234. The figure from MacArthur is worth comparing to Krueger’s and the official Japanese account because it demonstrates MacArthur’s optimistic expressions of reality.
\textsuperscript{87} Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 17 December 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 2, MMA.
command. Strategically, the operation split and isolated Japanese forces in the Philippines. Southern forces in Mindanao remained cut off from any effective support or supply for the war’s duration, leaving the reduced forces on Luzon alone to face the final campaign of the Southwest Pacific’s advance: the Philippine Conquest.

**The Philippine Conquest**

The Philippine Conquest was the largest joint campaign in the Pacific during World War II. After initial landings in the Lingayen Gulf on Luzon, however, the struggle for Luzon became primarily a ground war with minor exceptions, such as the capture of Corregidor Island in Manila Bay. General MacArthur’s plan to capture Luzon mirrored the Japanese invasion of 1941. The initial plan involved an amphibious movement along the east coast of Luzon and around the northern tip to assault the Lingayan beaches on the northwest quadrant of the island. Lingayan offered the best beaches for landing with access to the Central Plains of Luzon, Clark Airfield, and Manila Bay. Further, a Lingayan assault cut supply lines from mainland Japan.

Unfortunately, the northern route placed the amphibious force beyond land-based fighter range, and both Admiral Kinkaid and Admiral Nimitz—who tasked Admiral Halsey to support operations with the Third Fleet—thought risk to the amphibious force from Japanese aircraft on Luzon and Formosa was too great for naval aircraft to bear. MacArthur’s G-3 (Operations Chief), Major General Stephen Chamberlain, concurred with the admirals, recommending a route through the Visayan Islands following the capture of Mindoro Island to

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88 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 230. Interestingly, MacArthur placed no personal blame on Admiral Halsey, maintaining that the command relationships defined by the JCS were the root of the problem. MacArthur and Halsey shared a relationship of kindred respect throughout the war, impinged on mainly by resource competition and difficult command arrangements. This relationship was critical to success in the Pacific. Halsey’s ability to “lubricate” naval interactions with MacArthur enabled some semblance of cooperation between MacArthur and Nimitz’s headquarters throughout the war. For more insight into Halsey and MacArthur’s relationship from the South Pacific Area standpoint reference: Thomas Alexander Hughes, Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2016).

89 Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, ix.

90 R.R. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, Triumph in the Philippines (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1963), ix.

91 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 238; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 18-20.

extend land-based air cover. Consequently, MacArthur opted to assault Mindoro Island on December 15, 1944, followed by the main assault on Luzon via the Visayan Islands, and South China Sea on January 9, 1945. At Kinkaid’s recommendation, the early January invasion date took advantage of high tides and low moonlight to cover the amphibious movements.

Despite the near-debacle at Leyte, the command relationships for the Luzon invasion remained the same. Admiral Halsey reported to Nimitz and coordinated with MacArthur, and Kinkaid led the invasion force during the amphibious phase until General Krueger landed on the Lingayan beaches with 191,000 infantry troops from the Sixth Army and thousands more to follow. Meanwhile, naval elements of the Seventh and Third Fleets would cover the landings, along with fleet carrier aircraft. Prior to the operations and during the amphibious movements leading to invasion, General Kenney’s air forces provided air cover and bombing sorties in the Visayan area and over southern Luzon. Admiral Halsey took responsibility for air cover and bombing operations over northern Luzon and Formosa while patrolling the waters between Luzon and Formosa for Japanese fleet activity. Once ashore, movement from Lingayan to Manila was a “skeleton of a plan” leaving Krueger to flex his forces as the situation required.

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98 Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 57-58; Urgent Message from RJ Marshall to MacArthur dated 27 September 1944 and Message from MacArthur to JCS dated 28 September 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 2, MMA.
On December 15th, the Mindoro invasion force landed unopposed and established an airfield on the southwestern edge of the island.\textsuperscript{100} With Mindoro captured, the invasion force departed for Luzon, landing as planned in January

\textsuperscript{100} Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, 44-45 and 48.
on the Lingayen beaches. Initial engagements with the Japanese along the beaches were sporadic, and Krueger believed this indicated an enemy ruse—a belief proven accurate. After Leyte, MacArthur’s G-2 (intelligence chief), Major General Charles Willoughby, increased the estimated strength of Japanese forces on Luzon from 80,000 to 152,500 troops. Actual Japanese forces on the island numbered 275,000, and, following food shortages, illness, and the invasion of Leyte, the overall Japanese commander on Luzon, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, took a defensive posture. He ordered his men to dig into positions set back from the beaches and throughout the mountains for maximum defensive effect. This defense severely hampered Allied movements.

By mid-January, General MacArthur, who reportedly moved around the frontline forces like a corps commander, pushed General Krueger to increase the pace to Manila. In response, Krueger’s men drove down the Central Plain, risking exposed flanks, to take Clark Airfield on February 1st and enter the outskirts of Manila on February 3rd. A month later, on March 3rd, after fight block-by-block through the city, Manila fell to Allied forces. While Allied forces fought for Manila, MacArthur ordered the capture of Corregidor Island.

The Corregidor Island operation was one of the last notable joint actions on Luzon. Kenney’s bombers, along with Kinkaid’s cruisers and destroyers, pounded the island from January 22nd through the morning of invasion. On February 16th, over 2,000 paratroopers loaded onto C-47 transports on Mindoro and airdropped onto Corregidor while Army units in amphibious craft assaulted the beaches in a shore-to-shore movement from Luzon. Air elements provided close air support while naval elements pushed supplies ashore. On February 26, 1945, Corregidor fell and MacArthur returned to the island on

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101 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 241; Press Release dated 9 January 1945, RG-3, Box 3, Folder 7, MMA.
102 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 85.
103 Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, 21-22; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 85, 89-90, 93-94.
104 James, The Years of MacArthur, 628-629; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 139.
105 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 246; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 186 and 249. MacArthur remembers forces entering Manila on 4 February, not 3 February as the official history states.
107 Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 340.
108 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 249; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 335-338.
March 2nd for a flag raising ceremony.\(^{109}\)

Following the capture of Corregidor and Manila, priorities shifted from Luzon to preparing for invasion of Japan, and the Joint Chiefs reduced MacArthur’s joint force accordingly. The preponderance of MacArthur’s naval transport force shifted to Admiral Nimitz, along with Admiral Halsey’s fleet support and portions of Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet. Additionally, General Kenney shifted bombing operations toward attacks on Japan’s southern island of Kyushu.\(^{110}\)

General MacArthur declared an end to the Philippine campaign on July 4, 1945, but fierce fighting and mop-up operations continued, especially in the mountainous northern peninsula of Luzon, until August 1945, when the Japanese ordered an end to hostile actions in preparation for formal surrender on September 2, 1945.\(^{111}\) In mid-August, an estimated 115,000 Japanese were still fighting from random defensive pockets throughout the Philippines.\(^{112}\) Ultimately, the Philippine Conquest cost over 47,000 Allied casualties and an unknown number of Japanese and Filipino civilian losses.\(^{113}\)

Strategically, Luzon provided a foothold for bombing and the planned invasion of Japan, and kept 380,000 Japanese troops engaged abroad instead of establishing a defense on Japan’s main islands.\(^{114}\) For General MacArthur, the Philippine Conquest was also his last major operation of World War II and represented the fulfillment of the personal promise given in 1942 to return and liberate the Philippines. General MacArthur’s operational movements during the Second World War, at the head of Southwest Pacific Area forces, provide a timeline for reference and comprehension as this study narrows focus in Part II toward analyzing and evaluating MacArthur’s relationship with his staff, component commanders, and his leadership in general to extract observations and recommendations for joint doctrine.

\(^{109}\) Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 348-349.

\(^{110}\) MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 244-245.


\(^{112}\) Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 651.

\(^{113}\) Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 652.

\(^{114}\) Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines*, 651.
PART II:

ANALYSIS, EVALUATION, & RECOMMENDATIONS
Chapter 4

The General Staff

*If MacArthur had a blind spot, it was his extreme loyalty to these people who had been with him in Manila before the war.*
— General Frank Britton, SWPA G-3 on General MacArthur’s “Bataan Gang”

The relationship between General MacArthur and his General Staff influenced the efficacy of MacArthur’s General Headquarters (GHQ) in Southwest Pacific Area efforts during World War II. A number of his senior staff members, referred to as the “Bataan Gang,” fled Corregidor Island and the Bataan Peninsula with MacArthur in torpedo boats.¹ After arrival in Australia, they formed the core of MacArthur’s GHQ for the duration of the war.² While personalities within the Bataan Gang understandably capture the attention of biographers, the looming issue relevant to evaluating doctrine is broader than the individuals on senior staff or their personal shortfalls. The issue relevant to doctrinal evaluation is whether General MacArthur effectively organized, balanced, empowered, and bounded his General Staff in a manner that relieved his focus and decision-making from routine matters for broader mission concerns—concerns only addressable by MacArthur himself. Analyzing these characteristics of MacArthur’s General Staff, start with its organization.

Figure 11: JFC General Staff — JP-1 Doctrinal Tenets

Source: Figure created by the author based on JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, Chapters IV and V.
Of the four characteristics for analysis, MacArthur’s General Staff organization most clearly reflects doctrinal expectations. *JP-1* states that a JFC organizes the staff based on mission requirements into an efficient architecture, typically directorates, without extraneous elements. Additionally, the JFC should incorporate liaison officers throughout the command hierarchy as necessary to foster unity of effort. MacArthur’s GHQ organization models these doctrinal requirements.

In terms of staff architecture, Allied General Staffs in early World War II did not express directorate divisions using a joint prefix (e.g.- “J-1, J-2, etc.”),

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although this changed during the war. Instead, directorate prefixes were Service-specific. For example, the Army used a “G” prefix for Army-led staff elements, despite the integration of any joint forces into the GHQ architecture, such as in MacArthur’s. A quick comparison of organizational charts, however, reveals structural uniformity between MacArthur’s staff and modern joint staff organizations despite the prefix differences (compare Figure 12 and 13 above). In other words, MacArthur’s staff architecture matches modern doctrinally-derived joint staff architectures.

Beyond architecture, General MacArthur also integrated liaison officers throughout GHQ and the command. Within MacArthur’s GHQ in Brisbane, country-specific liaison offices existed to represent national interests, including a British office managed by a British Lieutenant General.4 Additionally, US agency liaisons integrated into MacArthur’s GHQ, such as Lieutenant Commander William McGovern from William Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency.5 These and other liaison officers participated in theater planning. For instance, during the Cartwheel operations, Captain Felix Johnson liaised with Southwest Pacific planners on behalf of Admiral Halsey and the South Pacific Area to ensure coordinated effort between the areas of command. The limited details on these liaison officers, however, offers no substantial insight into their effectiveness in Southwest Pacific operations.6 At worst, their impact was negligible. The same judgement applies to the organizational size and scope of MacArthur’s GHQ in general. No clear evidence indicates the existence of extraneous directorates or staff size. In fact, component commanders sought to add personnel to the bureaucracy for the sake of balance—the subject of the next section.

In sum, MacArthur’s General Staff mirrors modern joint staffs so closely in structure that it offers little for further evaluation beyond validating current doctrinal conceptualizations of joint staff organization.

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4 GHQ Phonebook including all directorates and liaison offices, RG-3, Records of Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-1945, Box 3, Folder 9, MMA.
5 Memo from William Donovan to MacArthur dated 26 April 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 2, MMA.
6 James, The Years of MacArthur, 390, 398-399, 450, and 453. James’ discussions of Captain Johnson reflect the typical information found on liaison officers—beyond Johnson’s name and purpose, the accounts of his interactions with staff focus on personality compatibilities, not influence on operations.
Staff Balance

Figure 14: “Bataan Gang” Senior Staff Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>G-1*</th>
<th>G-2</th>
<th>G-3</th>
<th>G-4</th>
<th>Engineers</th>
<th>Signals</th>
<th>Adjutant Gen</th>
<th>Anti-Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BG Gunner</td>
<td>MG Willoughby</td>
<td>MG Chamberlain</td>
<td>MG Whitlock</td>
<td>MG Casey</td>
<td>MG Akin</td>
<td>BG Pitch</td>
<td>MG Marquat</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = Directorate / Office led by “Bataan Gang” member

MacArthur’s initial G-1, Col Stivers, was also a “Bataan Gang” member

Source: Figure created by the author. GHQ Phonebook including all directorates and liaison offices, RG-3, Box 3, Folder 9, MMA; James, The Years of MacArthur, 100; Masuda, MacArthur in Asia, 9-19.

JP-1 characterizes staff balance as adequate diversity based on assigned forces and mission to ensure individual component capabilities, needs, and limitations are understood. Balance extends beyond instituting proportional staff numbers in GHQ based on component element size. Rather, balance requires proportional influence on the JFC according to staff member position and rank.7 Staff balance was the most controversial issue within General MacArthur’s General Staff. Criticisms claiming MacArthur made no effort to balance his GHQ staff or even ignored requests for balance, however, do a disservice to MacArthur. General MacArthur certainly failed to balance his senior staff—positions held by the Bataan Gang—but he made efforts to introduce staff diversity across lower echelons. Consequently, his efforts at balancing failed to produce proportional component influence at the JFC level, even though his overall intent was balance.

After formation of the Southwest Pacific Area and his establishment as Supreme Commander, General MacArthur installed members of the Bataan Gang into seven of the ten senior staff positions at GHQ.8 The three individuals selected to fill positions from outside the Bataan Gang were all highly-regarded Army officers, including Brigadier General Stephen Chamberlain who served as

8 James, The Years of MacArthur, 121.
MacArthur’s operations officer, or G-3. MacArthur selected Chamberlain because he was a “sound, careful staff officer, a master of tactical detail and possessed of bold strategic concepts, he was a pillar of new strength.”\(^9\) Despite qualifications of men like Chamberlain, MacArthur’s selection placed Army officers in all top positions on the staff, a decision drawing admonition from General George Marshall, who requested “a fair representation of Australian and Dutch officers in the higher staff positions” at GHQ.\(^10\) General MacArthur argued no “qualified” senior Australian or Dutch officers were available in 1942 due to the ballooning size of their militaries in preparation for Pacific warfare and the associated need for leadership.\(^11\)

Notwithstanding MacArthur’s justifications, historian D. Clayton James asserts that MacArthur carefully excluded US Navy and foreign officers from senior staff positions in his GHQ throughout the war, but also states similar bias occurred on other theater-level joint staffs, including Nimitz’s Central Pacific staff.\(^12\) Author Walter Borneman goes further regarding Australian representation on staff, arguing no record exists indicating General MacArthur made any efforts to seek out qualified Australian staff officers, especially from his land component commander, Australian General Sir Thomas Blamey, who had officers available in 1942.\(^13\) James’ assertion regarding senior staff positions is largely accurate, although it still misrepresents the recruitment of some foreign senior officers for upper-level posts. Borneman’s argument, however, is inaccurate based on the historical record. On April 20, 1942, after Marshall’s admonition, MacArthur wrote General Marshall with details of the initial GHQ staff. According to MacArthur, it included sixteen US Army officers, two US Navy officers, two Australian officers, one Filipino officer, and one Dutch officer. Additionally, MacArthur noted his staff intelligence division, called “The Combined Operations Intelligence Centre,” consisted of nineteen Australian officers, three US Army officers, and one US Navy officer under the command of an Australian. Considered together, the GHQ and Intelligence Centre staff were

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\(^10\) James, The Years of MacArthur, 121-122.
\(^11\) James, The Years of MacArthur, 121-122; Messages from MacArthur to Marshall dated 20 April 1942 and 15 June 1942, RG-4, Box 15, Folders 3-4, MMA.
\(^12\) James, The Years of MacArthur, 311.
\(^13\) Borneman, MacArthur at War, 185.
evenly split between foreign officers and US officers, albeit predominantly US Army officers.\textsuperscript{14}

A year after the 1942 response to Marshall, records show General MacArthur contacted General Blamey requesting a senior ranking Australian officer for the GHQ “G-4 section” to assist with procurement.\textsuperscript{15} General Blamey’s response to MacArthur is telling. In it, Blamey offers Brigadier General T. White for the G-4 section and states, “If you so desire, I am now in a position to further increase the Australian personnel [in GHQ] considerably” and then proceeds to offer “three or four” more officers between the ranks of Captain and Lieutenant Colonel.\textsuperscript{16} Blamey’s response implies officers were not available for staff positions prior to MacArthur’s request, conforming with MacArthur’s earlier claims regarding officer availability. MacArthur’s subsequent response also supports this implication. In it MacArthur states, “I shall be delighted to have additional Australian staff officers as suggested,” and requests two more officers beyond Blamey’s offer.\textsuperscript{17} MacArthur ultimately placed Brigadier General White in the G-3 section as Chief of Planning reporting to General Chamberlain—a senior position with influence on operations.\textsuperscript{18}

General MacArthur’s efforts to balance the GHQ staff also included sister service integration. In April 1944, following criticism concerning naval representation in GHQ, MacArthur sent a message to the War Department noting that twelve US Navy, two US Marine Corps, and seventeen Australian Navy officers currently worked in various GHQ directorates, and a further eight US Navy positions remained vacant “at this time, to which US naval officers could be assigned if they were available.”\textsuperscript{19} Further, a review of the GHQ telephone book from late 1944 shows senior US Navy officers in the G-3 and G-4 directorates, albeit no officers of flag rank with the notable exception of a naval advisor working directly for MacArthur, Rear Admiral Raymond

\textsuperscript{14} Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 20 April 1942, RG-4, Box 15, Folder 1, MMA.
\textsuperscript{15} Message from MacArthur to Blamey dated 4 August 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA.
\textsuperscript{16} Message from Blamey to MacArthur dated 18 November 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{17} Message from MacArthur to Blamey dated 22 November 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA.
\textsuperscript{18} Message from MacArthur to Blamey dated 22 November 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA; GHQ Phonebook including all directorates and liaison offices, RG-3, Box 3, Folder 9, MMA.
\textsuperscript{19} Priority Message from MacArthur to the War Department dated 6 April 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 1, MMA.
General MacArthur also envisioned the close geographic location of the land, naval, and air component headquarters providing balance to GHQ staff planning and operations beyond any measure attainable by simply integrating component personnel into GHQ. In a message to General Marshall, MacArthur states:

The physical location of land, air, and naval headquarters at General Headquarters make possible a constant daily participation of the staffs in all details of planning and operations. Every member of the General Headquarters from the Commander in Chief down is in intimate daily contact with appropriate members of the three lower headquarters. GHQ is in spirit a general headquarters planning and executing operations, each of which demands effective combinations of land, sea, and air forces, and has successfully developed an attitude that is without service bias.

In other words, MacArthur envisioned the four headquarters—GHQ plus land, sea, and air component headquarters—acting in unison as a super GHQ. Therefore, in MacArthur’s eyes, proportional GHQ staff balancing was unnecessary given the balancing effect of the three physically co-located component headquarters. The inter-headquarters balance General MacArthur envisioned grew toward fruition from 1944-1945 when MacArthur’s most trusted component commanders—Kenney, Krueger, and Kinkaid—held enough sway to consistently break through the Bataan Gang’s barrier to MacArthur during GHQ planning. Unfortunately, General MacArthur’s idealistic vision of interaction between four headquarters staffs for the good of the campaign did not extend to the Bataan Gang members, who held dominant influence over GHQ.

The Bataan Gang’s influential dominance in GHQ proved a formidable constraint to creating positional balance on the General Staff. Their dominance manifested itself in occasional operational blunders. For example, an intentional invasion landing on the wrong side of a flooded river during Cartwheel operations occurred because senior staff failed to discuss the

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20 GHQ Phonebook including all directorates and liaison offices, RG-3, Box 3, Folder 9, MMA; James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 358.
21 Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 3 July 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 3, MMA.
invasion plan with naval officers, and the misuse of Australian air and naval assets during the Approach to the Philippines transpired because senior staff failed to seek out doctrinal employment differences from Australian officers. More often, the Bataan Gang’s dominance frustrated component commanders, who were fighting to incorporate operational plans into broader GHQ campaign plans.

Despite occasional blunders and component commander frustrations, MacArthur showed no serious intent to replace members of his senior GHQ staff. Even private discussions about change with his component commanders led to excuses or conversational subject changes, as General George Kenney discovered after he and MacArthur discussed replacing General Sutherland. MacArthur’s efforts to maintain the Bataan Gang as senior staff are typically attributed to loyalty, but they also served a grander purpose for MacArthur: the Bataan Gang shared in his desire to avenge the Philippines—a desire underpinning their planning efforts and actions in GHQ. Put simply, General MacArthur’s vision of balance incorporated the preponderance of GHQ, but not the uppermost element of GHQ working tirelessly to achieve his personal desire for Philippine redemption.

In the language of joint doctrine, MacArthur’s failure to balance his senior staff equates to a failure to balance influence proportionally based on position and rank at the JFC level. MacArthur’s balancing concepts at lower staff echelons, though, fall in line with doctrinal conceptions. In other words, General MacArthur’s conception of balance deviates from doctrinal conceptions, but only regarding senior staff. Further, this deviation was purposeful. An overwhelming desire to liberate the Philippines drove General MacArthur, and his Bataan Gang shared in that desire. Placing these men in senior positions ensured Southwest Pacific strategic proposals and campaign plans evolved with Philippine liberation in mind. Consequently, General MacArthur was free to focus on war-fighting issues requiring the Supreme Commander’s personal

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22 James, The Years of MacArthur, 358-359 and 477.
23 Kenney Diaries, 14 June 1943 handwritten entry, RG-54, Box 1, Volume 5, MMA. Interestingly, in this conversation, according to Kenney, MacArthur initiated the discussion about replacing Sutherland claiming Sutherland’s ego was “ruining him,” but quickly back-pedaled stating that no suitable replacement existed, then changed the subject.
attention, assured that his Bataan Gang would see his ultimate intentions through in GHQ.

**Staff Empowerment**

Like staff organization, General MacArthur empowered his General Staff in a manner paralleling the empowerment of modern joint staffs. *JP-1* describes staff empowerment as delegation of authority to make routine decisions and act in the JFC’s name within JFC intent, and authorization to communicate and coordinate directly with component command staff directorates rather than through commanders in the chain of command. MacArthur’s staff operated with all of these authorities and occasionally more.

The most apparent demonstration of staff empowerment was the frequent issuance of *operations instructions* from the GHQ staff. These instructions drove the overarching activities of Southwest Pacific forces and subordinate planning staffs. They defined strategic and operational objectives, outlined command and support relationships, allocated forces to campaigns, and dictated the timeline for operations and planning. These instructions served as mechanisms for joint force planning and employment synergy throughout the war. The GHQ staff, typically General Sutherland or General Chamberlain in the G-3 directorate, developed and issued these instructions in General MacArthur’s name—MacArthur personally signed none of the issued operations instructions between 1942-1945 for the Southwest Pacific Area. These instructions are a clear demonstration staff empowerment. Further, MacArthur encouraged his staff and component command staffs to work together directly on campaign plans and operational schemes. When the different staffs disagreed on a course of action, MacArthur expected his GHQ staff to resolve the issue with the component commanders rather than approach him.

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26 See Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MMA.
27 Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 3 July 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 3, MMA.
28 J. Miller and Department of the Army. Office of the chief of military history (Washington), *Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul*, United States Army in World War II (Department of the Army, Office of the chief of military history, 1959), 382.
MacArthur also authorized his senior staff to act in his name with higher authorities outside the Southwest Pacific Area. In September 1942, February 1943, and October 1943, General MacArthur sent delegations of GHQ planners in his stead, led by General Sutherland and General Kenney, to meet with Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combined Chiefs of Staff leaders and planners for global and theater strategic planning conferences. MacArthur trusted these men to speak and plan within his intent. On return from these conferences, General Sutherland extended his authority, without intervention from MacArthur, to include follow-up correspondence between GHQ and the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding issues brought up at the conferences.

Beyond operations instructions and planning conferences, the staff also utilized memoranda and verbal orders to direct operations in MacArthur’s name, even issuing directives to component commanders. For instance, in June 1942, General Sutherland directed General Kenney to attack Rabaul airfield “in compliance with Operations Instruction No. 8” following a perceived lull in the operational timeline. This directive was issued in Sutherland’s name, but “by the command of General MacArthur.” Staff authority also extended to critiques of operational plans presented by component commanders at GHQ. Both Admiral Kinkaid and General Kenney expressed frustration at the periodic difficulty of selling their naval or air plan to GHQ. Occasionally, this authority proved problematic. For example, field reports from component staffs in July 1942 included intelligence reports of Japanese troop ships headed toward Buna, but the GHQ intelligence chief, General Willoughby, thought the evidence faulty. Consequently, GHQ chose not to alert MacArthur and the Japanese seized Buna, initiating the unanticipated Papuan campaign to reclaim the loss.

Even on occasions when GHQ staff, especially Sutherland, overstepped their authorities, MacArthur gave his staff the benefit of the doubt and support.

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30 Two Messages from Sutherland to Marshall dated 8 March 1944, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 5, MMA.
31 Memo from Sutherland to Kenney dated 4 June 1942, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 1, MMA.
32 James, _The Years of MacArthur_, 231.
33 James, _The Years of MacArthur_, 191-192.
For instance, in September 1944, General MacArthur joined the landing forces invading Morotai leaving GHQ in the hands of Sutherland. Following an inquiry from the Joint Chiefs, General Sutherland sent a message to General Marshall agreeing to campaign plans for the Leyte operation without first consulting MacArthur. The component commanders at GHQ insisted the decision should wait for MacArthur, but Sutherland acted anyway. Upon MacArthur’s return, Sutherland briefed the Supreme Commander on his decision and, to the surprise of the component commanders, MacArthur praised Sutherland for his decisiveness and supported the action.34

One final yet significant example of MacArthur’s staff empowerment was promotion. Nearly all members of the senior GHQ staff—especially the Bataan Gang—were recommended for promotion during the war, and many made flag officer rank.35 Promotion, especially to flag rank, imbues the recipient with significant influence on subordinate elements and other theater commands. MacArthur utilized promotions to show trust, gain continued loyalty, and reward performance, but the higher rank also empowered staff members to act with greater authority in MacArthur’s absence.

General MacArthur recognized the importance of empowering his staff, and his staff utilized their empowerment to plan and execute operations in a manner that released MacArthur to focus on larger operational and strategic issues. Consequently, the Southwest Pacific General Staff’s empowerment closely corresponds to expected staff empowerment dictated by joint doctrine. In this regard, comparing the General Staff’s empowerment to doctrinal conceptualizations of empowerment offers little to this study beyond validating doctrine. Arguably, MacArthur empowered his General Staff too much, but the overextension of authority is more relevant to the next section: staff boundaries.

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34 Urgent Message from Sutherland to Marshall dated 13 September 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 2, MMA; Borneman, *MacArthur at War*, 415-417.
35 Message from MacArthur to War Department dated 15 June 1942, RG-4, Box 15, Folder 4, MMA. There were multiple (20-30) staff promotion recommendations from MacArthur throughout the MMA. This specific message includes MacArthur’s justification for promotions based on a need for staff members with influential rank.
Staff Boundaries

*JP-1* describes staff boundaries as sensitivity to component command battle rhythms, the avoidance of unnecessary staff intrusions, and prohibition of independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs. Historical records offer few examples of MacArthur constraining his General Staff. His staff, especially senior staff, appeared to operate with few, if any, restrictions. That said, the lack of staff boundaries inspired frustration more than anything, unlike the severe contention triggered by MacArthur’s staff balance issues.

Clark Lee, a correspondent covering MacArthur and his staff in Corregidor and Australia, described the Bataan Gang as wearing “an air of superiority that was most irritating to men who had endured the hardships and perils of other fronts.” The component commanders expressed the most frustration with this superior attitude, especially commanders outside MacArthur’s good graces. For instance, General George Brett, who MacArthur replaced with General Kenney, believed the GHQ staff “have an exaggerated idea of their own importance,” calling them “officious” with “no proper sense of the need for cooperation with forces operating under the Commander-in-Chief.” Of course, Brett also aggravated his relationship with GHQ. He boasted to Kenney of avoiding MacArthur for a month, and only speaking to Sutherland on the telephone—not the actions expected of an integrated component commander.

Even MacArthur’s trusted component commanders, including Kenney and Krueger, expressed occasional frustrations with GHQ staff. Those frustrations, however, were typically pointed at individuals, particularly Sutherland. In other words, MacArthur’s GHQ staff, while unrestrained by MacArthur, rarely crossed the line from frustrating to unnecessarily intrusive or disruptive to battle rhythms. Moreover, on the occasions GHQ crossed these lines, someone besides MacArthur typically corrected the situation. Perhaps the most referenced example of such a correction was an interaction between...

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37 James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 195.
38 Report from Brett saved by Kenney in his personal memoirs, RG-54, Box 1, Volume 1, MMA.
39 Kenney’s personal memoir dated 29 July 1942, RG-54, Box 1, Volume 1, MMA.
40 Handwritten journal entry in Kenney’s memoir dated 17 June 1943, RG-54, Box 1, Volume 5, MMA.
Sutherland and Kenney shortly after Kenney became the air component commander. In August 1942, General Sutherland issued orders to Kenney’s air elements with explicit attack instructions against Japanese locations during the South Pacific Area’s operations in Guadalcanal. These orders superseded Kenney’s previous orders and, worse, included planning details normally left to the air component headquarters staff. Essentially, Sutherland cut Kenney’s headquarters staff out of planning. Enraged, Kenney confronted Sutherland, reminding Sutherland that he ran the Air Force and maintained authority for issuing detailed plans and orders based on GHQ’s broad directives. Further, Kenney offered to take the issue to MacArthur. Sutherland backed down, and no other reports of this type of intrusion occurred again in Kenney’s memoirs or records.\textsuperscript{41}

Similarly, during the early Papuan campaign in 1942, persistent GHQ staff requests and directives caused one of General Blamey’s senior staff members to remark that “GHQ is like a bloody barometer in a cyclone—up and down every two minutes.”\textsuperscript{42} Comments like this indicate unnecessary GHQ staff intrusions and a disruption to the campaign battle rhythm, but the absence of such comments later in the war indicates GHQ subsequently adjusted their interactions with subordinate elements to avoid intrusion and disruption. Further, such disruption is not surprising considering the Papuan campaign was the first opportunity for GHQ and subordinate elements to test their coordination and interaction in the heat of battle. In later campaigns, GHQ processes demonstrated tempered restraint. For instance, instead of issuing persistent erratic information requests from the front, Sutherland’s issued consolidated memoranda to component commanders and staffs requesting information and updates, or initiating staff studies to gather information for GHQ planning support.\textsuperscript{43}

The GHQ staff’s correction away from unnecessary intrusions and disruptions to battle rhythm indicate a process of learning expected in war.

\textsuperscript{41} Kenney’s personal memoir dated 4 August 1942, RG-54, Box 1, Volume 1, MMA; Borneman, \textit{MacArthur at War}, 234-235; James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 200-201.
\textsuperscript{42} James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 209.
\textsuperscript{43} As a sample, see Staff study request from Sutherland dated 5 August 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 1, MMA. Other examples exist in the archives and seemed to increase throughout the war indicating more organized processes for information requests.
Perhaps MacArthur’s lack of apparent staff boundaries exposes his recognition that GHQ staff learned to bound *itself* as the war progressed, although this assertion is difficult to prove. Regardless, the staff restricted itself by war’s end in a manner consistent with doctrinal expectations for staff boundaries. Further, their self-imposed restrictions kept MacArthur disengaged from staff issues and available to focus on larger war concerns. The GHQ, however, continued to inspire frustration throughout the war. Worse, General MacArthur held the power to end many of these frustrations, especially vexations grown through Sutherland’s tactless relationship with the Navy and the GHQ’s openly negative comments toward the Australians, yet he chose not to end them. Consequently, these frustrations offer a lesson for joint doctrine: bounding a staff extends beyond restricting intrusions and disruptions to component elements. Staff boundaries must include attitudinal boundaries to ensure communication occurs across proactive channels with minimized institutional bias. Poor attitudes toward component elements breed frustrations creating communicative barriers that potentially inhibit operational efficiencies. Ironically, General MacArthur’s failure to enforce attitudinal boundaries gravitated around one individual well within MacArthur’s reach and authority to replace: his Chief of Staff, General Richard Sutherland.

**General Richard Sutherland**

A comprehensive evaluation of the influence and impact of General Richard Sutherland on MacArthur and the Southwest Pacific campaign is well beyond the scope of this study. An entire book is necessary for such a task. Sutherland, however, requires brief discussion as his actions validate an important component of joint doctrine.

General Sutherland wanted the role of MacArthur’s enforcer, explaining once to his deputy, Major General Richard Marshall, “Well, Dick, somebody around here has got to be the S.O.B. General MacArthur is not going to be, so I guess I’m it.” Acting as enforcer is not problematic per se. The concept of a

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44 Borneman, *MacArthur at War*, 438; James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 595-597; Kenney’s memoir dated 10 June 1943, RG-54, Box 1, Volume 5, MMA.
senior officer serving as enforcer in a military organization remains common practice even today, although, officers are not supposed to enjoy the enforcer role. Sutherland, though, seemed to enjoy his role as enforcer, particularly when guarding access to General MacArthur. Examples range from the ridiculous to the reprehensible. On the ridiculous end of the spectrum are instances such as Sutherland forcing naval officers to wait for hours to see MacArthur without legitimate reason, including a decorated Rear Admiral joining MacArthur’s 7th Fleet. Reprehensible actions include General Sutherland blocking General Lewis Breton, MacArthur’s air commander in the Philippines, from conferring with MacArthur for several hours on air defenses and counter-attack options during the Japanese initial Philippine offensive on December 8, 1941.

Sutherland’s actions as enforcer and guard created an operational bottleneck in GHQ even MacArthur grew aware of over time. In November 1944, General MacArthur created a separate logistics and supply component, US Army Forces Far East (USAFFE), with an independent GHQ staff reporting directly to him through new USAFFE Chief of Staff, General Richard Marshall, Sutherland’s former deputy. This change served to loosen the bottleneck created by Sutherland, although some, including General Kenney, argue it simply increased administrative coordination requirements. Replacing Sutherland seems a more efficient approach, but General MacArthur remained unwilling.

In most regards, General Sutherland acted with authority more akin to a Deputy Commander than a Chief of Staff, a reality even MacArthur noted in a letter to the War Department. Despite the bureaucratic bottleneck Sutherland created, MacArthur refused to reduce his authorities until the end of the war.

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46 In modern Air Force squadrons, the Commander often leans on their Operations Officer to act as an enforcer in the squadron. Similarly, an Air Force Wing Commander often leans on the Wing Vice Commander.
47 James, The Years of MacArthur, 357-358.
48 Borneman, MacArthur at War, 78-79.
49 Kenney’s memoir dated 17 June 1943, RG-54, Box 1, Volume 5, MMA.
50 Kenney’s memoir dated 27 November 1944, RG-54, Box 2, Volume 9, MMA.
51 James, The Years of MacArthur, 78-79.
52 Masuda, MacArthur in Asia, 171. Interestingly, MacArthur’s actions limiting Sutherland’s authority seem to start after Sutherland covertly disobeyed an order from MacArthur to cease an affair with an Australian woman and was caught. Of all the issues caused in GHQ by Sutherland, it took a breach of trust (loyalty) to reduce Sutherland’s authority.
Further, General MacArthur seemed unaware or uncaring of Sutherland’s arrogance and the resentment it inspired throughout GHQ and the component commands. This resentment, coupled with MacArthur’s apparent ignorance of it, inspired an Australian official historian to classify Sutherland after the war as “the wrong kind of chief of staff for MacArthur, whose foibles he would not offset but nourish.”

Consequently, given the range of Sutherland’s authority and MacArthur’s willingness to accept Sutherland’s faults, two relevant and related observations emerge. First, Sutherland epitomizes the dangers of clinging onto personal loyalties through professional or competitive trials, such as war. MacArthur needed to look beyond loyalty and either restrain or replace Sutherland before his ego undermined staff performance. Second, because loyalty is such a powerful tool for bias, doctrinal recommendations for a Deputy JFC from a separate service are not only valid, but should be viewed as a requirement rather than recommendation. Sutherland demonstrates the damage created without such a requirement—an unnecessary risk for modern joint forces.

Staff Conclusions

Comparing MacArthur’s General Staff to joint doctrine reveals two compatibilities and two deviations (refer to Figure 15 below). Specifically, MacArthur’s staff organization and empowerment align with modern doctrinal conceptions, demonstrating doctrinal compatibility in a potential great power conflict and, consequently, validity. His staff boundaries and balance, however, deviate from doctrinal conceptions in revealing areas. First, concerning staff boundaries: while MacArthur made no apparent efforts to bound his senior staff members, the staff restricted itself over time and through experience to boundaries compatible with joint doctrine, subsequently validating current doctrinal conceptions. MacArthur’s staff interactions also reveal a separate requirement for JFC’s to set attitudinal boundaries for their staff to enable proactive communications across heterogeneous staff elements and stamp out unnecessary biases.

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53 James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 595-596.
In terms of staff balance, MacArthur’s deviations center on competing visions for his General Staff. On one hand, he desired the “complete and thorough integration of ground, air, and naval headquarters with GHQ” including incorporation of foreign elements for an equitable balance amongst the lower GHQ echelons.\(^55\) On the other hand, MacArthur sought GHQ staff leadership from loyal Bataan Gang members “because of their anticipated contribution to the liberation of the Philippines.”\(^56\) In other words, he wanted like-minded staff leaders willing to bend over backwards to defeat Japan by way of Philippine liberation—MacArthur’s driving ambition and principal consideration. Consequently, MacArthur’s vision for GHQ balance was one of cooperation, coordination, and performance, where integrated headquarters

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\(^{55}\) James, *Years of MacArthur*, 314; Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 3 July 1941, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 3, MMA.

\(^{56}\) MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 141.
fostered cooperation and coordination while like-minded staff leaders drove staff performance towards MacArthur's ambitions. Interestingly, the focus on performance is a theme General MacArthur repeats through interactions with component commanders, as seen in the next chapter.
Chapter 5

The Component Commanders

Figure 16: MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Component Commanders

The quality of General MacArthur’s interactions and relationship with subordinate component commanders correlates directly to each component commander’s mission focus and loyalty to MacArthur, especially his belief in unity of command. The more dedicated to the mission and loyal to MacArthur, the better the interaction and vice versa. Unlike the Bataan Gang, who MacArthur held onto at almost all cost to drive staff performance toward his goals, MacArthur routinely replaced or threatened to replace subordinate commanders based on perceived field performance relative to his objectives. Consequently, a comprehensive analysis of General MacArthur’s relationship with subordinate component commanders through the lens of joint doctrine requires two elements: first, a composite evaluation of MacArthur’s ability to authorize, enable, and inform his component commanders (see Figure 17 below); and, second, the simultaneous explication of nuances in MacArthur’s authorizing, enabling, and informing actions based on the mission focus, loyalty, and performance of individual subordinate component commanders. Together, these elements paint a cogent picture of General MacArthur’s interactions and relationship with component commanders—a picture offering clear considerations for joint doctrine and JFCs.
Component Commander Authority

JP-1 describes subordinate component commanders as *authorized* when the JFC empowers them with authority and responsibility for specific mission objectives, typically through mission-type orders, and defines OPCON and TACON relationships between forces. Mission-type orders delineate geographic boundaries and mission timelines, but leave employment methodology to the subordinate commanders.¹

General MacArthur normally delegated authority and defined command relationships through operations instructions issued by his GHQ or through personal memoranda to individual component commanders. A typical operations instruction contains all the elements expected and necessary for modern mission-type orders. For instance, Operations Instructions #33-34, issued on May 7, 1943, and June 13, 1943, respectively, pertain specifically to the planning and execution of early Cartwheel operations. The first page defines the overarching objectives for subordinate commanders, in this case air bombardment operations throughout the Cartwheel geographic area and

ground assaults to protect the Southwest Pacific Area’s northwestern flank. The next two pages of each instruction identify the primary and supporting components for the operation, along with the relevant commanders and their command relationships with one another, including OPCON and TACON for the specified tasks. The remaining pages of the two instructions break down specific tasks and deadlines for each subordinate component related to the planning and attainment of overall objectives, including any synchronization requirements between components and the “D-Day” for initiation of operations. Annexes detail force compositions, command and control networks, communications plans, logistics arrangements, and the latest intelligence estimates. The final page of these instructions always includes the statement, “By command of General MacARThUR,” denoting the weight of authority given to the subordinate commanders identified in the instruction.²

Importantly, these and all other operations instructions issued by the GHQ staff remained broad in focus, specifying tasks such as an island’s capture, waterway’s isolation, or airfield’s establishment and associated deadline without specifying each component’s employment methodology.³ In this manner, MacArthur empowered his component commanders to define and direct operations as they saw fit, typically remaining out of the major planning conversations until presented a comprehensive plan for review. For instance, during planning for the Leyte Operation, Admiral Kinkaid set up a temporary headquarters on Hollandia where he worked with Vice Admiral Daniel Barbey, his amphibious landing force commander, along with Generals Krueger and Kenney to develop the scheme of maneuver for invading and seizing Leyte. In the month spent planning the operation, MacArthur only physically participated in planning four times, choosing to receive updates by phone while he toured his operational area. MacArthur approved the final plan, but remained free of the planning process unless issues arose beyond his subordinate commanders’

² Operations Instruction #33 dated 7 May 1943 and Operations Instruction #34 dated 13 June 1943, RG-3, Records of Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-1945, Box 175, Folders 1-2, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia (MMA). Operations instructions related to major campaigns followed similar, if not exact formats, throughout the war—all are available in Box 175, MMA.
³ Again, refer to any operations instruction located in Box 175, MMA, for examples.
authority to handle.⁴ The interaction between MacArthur and his subordinate commanders, demonstrated in circumstances such as Leyte, epitomizes the delegation of authority expected by joint doctrine.

Beyond operations instructions, the memoranda General MacArthur used to communicate and coordinate with subordinate component commanders also reveals the wide authority invested in these men. For instance, MacArthur issued a memorandum to Vice Admiral Herbert Leary, his first naval component commander, on April 27, 1942. In the memo, MacArthur outlines six broad missions assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area requiring the direct or indirect use of Allied Naval Forces under Leary’s command. The most specific of these missions was to “exert economic pressure on the enemy by destroying vessels transporting raw materials from the recently conquered territories to Japan.”⁵ At the end of the memo, MacArthur states,

Would you be good enough to furnish me your suggestions as to the best plan to employ in order to accomplish the parts of the above mission appropriate to the naval forces. I would appreciate it if the plan could include the organization of your command into its major elements and the missions assigned each element. Suggestions of the methods or means of coordination with, or assistance desired from, other forces included in the Southwest Pacific Area would be helpful.⁶

MacArthur signs off by asking Leary to report in daily with updated mission advice and any operations completed. Interestingly, Admiral Leary habitually refused to support Southwest Pacific operations during his time as the naval component commander, especially amphibious landings, citing risk to his ships in uncharted waters. Consequently, General MacArthur’s opinion of Leary was poor—he regarded Leary as too “timid.”⁷ Despite this poor opinion, MacArthur afforded Leary broad authority and empowerment to conduct the naval mission until MacArthur replaced him with Admiral Carpender in September 1942.⁸ In

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⁵ Memo from MacArthur to Leary dated 27 April 1942, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA.
⁶ Memo from MacArthur to Leary dated 27 April 1942, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA.
other words, MacArthur appeared to believe in doctrinal tenets for authorizing component commanders still utilized today, and held to those tenets until replacing a commander became necessary to correct substandard performance.

Lackluster performance, mission dedication, or loyalty drove General MacArthur to occasionally interject himself into component affairs or rearrange command relationships and authorities. As mentioned, MacArthur removed Leary for failing to accept risk and a demonstrated lack of mission focus. Additionally, MacArthur readily accepted a replacement for Admiral Carpender in November 1943.⁹ Though MacArthur spoke positively about him in memoirs and messages, Carpender also demonstrated timidity with fleet employment in support of operations due to the uncharted waters. Further, Carpender defied MacArthur’s mandate for unity of command, opting instead to correspond routinely with naval superiors outside his chain of command, including Admirals King and Nimitz, without first clearing communiques through General MacArthur or GHQ.¹⁰ Consequently, MacArthur deemed Admiral Carpender inessential due to suboptimal performance, mission focus, and loyalty, readily replacing him with Admiral Kinkaid in November 1943.¹¹

Similarly, MacArthur replaced General Brett, his first air component commander, in July 1942. Following an initial series of negative interactions between the two men, starting with MacArthur’s evacuation from the Philippines in March 1943, General Brett was slow to respond to reports of Japanese ships headed toward Buna with an invasion force. Instead of launching an attack, Brett put his tired crews to rest for a day while waiting for better intelligence.¹² Coupled with lackluster interactions at GHQ—an intentional effort by Brett to avoid MacArthur and the Bataan Gang—General MacArthur identified a lack of mission focus and loyalty in Brett, opting to

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⁹ Borneman, MacArthur at War, 243-244; James, The Years of MacArthur, 231-232 and 315-316; Message from MacArthur to the War Department dated 28 October 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 4, MMA.
¹⁰ Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 2 February 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 2, MMA; James, The Years of MacArthur, 358.
¹¹ Borneman, MacArthur at War, 315-316; Message from MacArthur to the War Department dated 28 October 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 4, MMA.
replace him with General Kenney in July 1942.\textsuperscript{13}

Not all interjections led to replacement. MacArthur often intervened with threats of replacement or timely directive messages to ramp up performance, as well. The land forces faced the brunt of these interventions short of removal. For instance, during the Papuan Campaign, MacArthur sent Sutherland to evaluate and push General Blamey when the front stalled.\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, he prodded General Krueger with messages during a slowdown in operations to take Biak Island during the Philippine Advance leading Krueger to fire a Division Commander.\textsuperscript{15} During the Leyte campaign, MacArthur even threatened to replace General Krueger as the operations stalled enough to threaten MacArthur’s timeline for invading Luzon.\textsuperscript{16} MacArthur’s deepest intrusion into component operations, though, occurred after the invasion of Luzon, when he moved along the front lines like a corps commander, spurring Krueger’s men on toward Clark Field and Manila.\textsuperscript{17} One commonality ties together all these interjections: MacArthur’s perception of sluggish performance requiring reinvigoration.

All things considered, General MacArthur clearly authorized component commanders in a manner compatible with joint doctrine, although he interjected himself into employment methodology and adjusted command relationships based on perceptions of performance, mission focus, and loyalty. Consequently, his authorizing actions during World War II support current conceptualizations of joint doctrine and emphasize performance, loyalty, and mission focus as areas for further doctrinal consideration.

\textsuperscript{13} Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 30 June 1942, RG-4, Box 15, Folder 4, MMA; Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 7 July 1942, RG-4, Box 15, Folder 4, MMA; Kenney’s personal memoir dated 29 July 1942, RG-54, Diaries of General George C. Kenney, USAAC, 1941-1945, Commanding General, 5th Air Force / FEAF, SWPA, Box 1, Volume 1, MMA.

\textsuperscript{14} James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 591-594.

\textsuperscript{15} James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 209; S. Milner, \textit{Victory in Papua}, United States Army in World War II (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1957), 201-205.

\textsuperscript{16} James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 459-460.

\textsuperscript{17} R.R. Smith, \textit{Triumph in the Philippines}, Triumph in the Philippines (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1963), 139-186.
Enabling Component Commanders

*JP-1* describes enabling component commanders as transferring forces and establishing support relationships between subordinate components. Force transfers include material and troop transfers from outside the theater necessary to accomplish the mission. Support relationships refer specifically to the designation of *supported* versus *supporting* force elements, as well as the JFC’s right to adjust force relationships as required for the mission.  

General MacArthur’s enablement of component commanders through force transfers manifested as intent more often than materialization. The Allies’ grand strategic priority for defeating “Germany first” meant Pacific theater commanders were consistently short-changed on forces and materiel. By extension, MacArthur’s efforts to transfer forces into theater necessary for mission accomplishment in the Southwest Pacific Area never fully materialized in his eyes. For instance, during the Papuan Campaign, Cartwheel operations, and Philippine approach, MacArthur desired naval carrier support and more amphibious landing craft. He received the landing craft, but carrier support under his direct command never transpired. Additionally, throughout the war MacArthur sought better bombers and fighters for air operations, with limited returns from higher headquarters. MacArthur’s intent for more support was always clear, although procurement meeting his intent remained rare.

Intent is an important component of enablement via force transfer, regardless of actual acquisition. When materialization is impossible, intent demonstrates to subordinate commanders and component forces a respect and desire to improve their plight—respect that enhances morale and hope pending eventual availability of forces. MacArthur mastered the art of demonstrating

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18 *JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-12, IV-17-18, and V-8-10.
21 Message from Marshall to MacArthur dated 10 September 1942, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 1, MMA; Summary Report on Cairo from Sutherland dated 8 February 1944, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 5, MMA; MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 166 and 191.
22 Message from MacArthur to Blamey dated 4 January 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA; Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 17 October 1942 and Telegram from MacArthur to Marshall dated 24 November 1942, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 1, MMA; Summary Report on Cairo from Sutherland dated 8 February 1944, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 5, MMA; Message from Marshall to MacArthur dated 7 October 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 2, MMA.
intent. He argued for force augmentation in Australia in 1942 so vehemently that he received a personal message from President Roosevelt:

I find it difficult this spring and summer to get away from the simple fact that the Russian armies are killing more Axis personnel and destroying more Axis material that all the other 25 United Nations put together. Therefore, it has seemed wholly logical to support the great Russian effort in 1942 by seeking to get all munitions to them that we possibly can [...] I know that you will feel the effect of this. But, at the same time, we will continue to send you all the air strength we possibly can and secure, if possible, the chain of islands on the line of communications.23

This implied cease and desist from the President of the United States enabled MacArthur to demonstrate to his component commanders and troops extensive efforts toward inter-theater force transfers. Of all his inter-theater force transfer requests, General MacArthur gained the most success in acquiring ground forces, especially in February 1943 with the arrival of the Alamo Force under General Krueger.24 As for intra-theater force transfers under MacArthur’s direct control: he typically shifted Southwest Pacific Area assigned forces through the issuance of operations instructions.

GHQ operations instructions for major campaigns served as the primary tool for intra-theater force transfers and included appendices with force assignments and transfers detailed down to the battalion level.25 Some historians, including James, argue MacArthur’s efforts to transfer and augment forces in theater fell short, especially in the early war, citing a proposal from General Blamey in January 1943 to MacArthur.26 In the proposal, Blamey recommends the transfer and integration of American and Australians into each other’s units to spread operational experience amongst new arrivals.27 MacArthur refused the request, citing the limited availability of experienced American troops while offering the continued exchange of staff and public relations officers.28 To the non-military observer, MacArthur’s refusal may

23 Letter from Roosevelt to MacArthur dated 6 May 1942, RG-4, Box 15, Folder 3, MMA.
24 James, The Years of MacArthur, 311-313.
25 See Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MMA.
26 James, The Years of MacArthur, 254-256.
27 Letter from Blamey to MacArthur dated 28 January 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA.
28 Letter from MacArthur to Blamey dated 12 February 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA.
seem unreasonable, however, disparity in employment doctrines, operational cultures, and tactical languages between national forces can lead to lethal confusion in the heat of battle. Even today, such a practice is uncommon outside of highly experienced special operations forces, so minimal experience among Southwest Pacific American units certainly justifies MacArthur’s refusal. Blamey’s letter aside, and despite limits on inter-theater forces available for the Pacific, General MacArthur managed intra-area force transfers well, as demonstrated by the Southwest Pacific’s continuous streak of operational victories, albeit hard fought victories, especially in Buna, Leyte, and Luzon.

Like force transfers, MacArthur managed support relationships through operations instructions issued by his GHQ, and the delineation of force support relationships within these instructions improved throughout the war. For instance, the first twenty-two operations instructions include limited use of words such as support, supported, or supporting, instead using will conduct and similar terms to delineate specific tasks to component commands without clear reference to component cooperation and coordination. Operations Instruction #23, dated November 10, 1942, introduces clearer support language into individual component tasks, although stops short of designating a single force as supported or supporting. Operations Instruction #34, dated June, 13, 1943, concerning the Cartwheel operations improves definitions further, splitting forces into “task forces,” the equivalent of supported forces, and “supporting forces.” This remained the standard to the end of the war, although more dynamic support relationships in 1944-1945 required further description in detailed operational plans more narrowly scoped than operations instructions. Examples include the Leyte operation and Luzon invasion where the transfer of primary operational control and associated support relationships from Kinkaid to Krueger hinged on certain criteria like a stabilized beachhead and radio contact between beach and flagship.

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29 See Operations Instructions 1-22 issued throughout 1942, RG-3, Box 175, Folder 1, MMA.
30 Operations Instructions # 23 issued 10 November 1942, RG-3, Box 175, Folder 1, MMA.
31 Operations Instructions # 34 issued 13 June 1943, RG-3, Box 175, Folder 2, MMA.
32 M.H. Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, United States Army in World War II (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), 24; Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, 33-34.
Additionally, like his actions to authorize component commanders, MacArthur’s perception of performance played into the transfer of forces and design of support relationships. The most obvious example is General Blamey’s shifting control of land forces over the course of the war. During the Papuan Campaign, Blamey’s forces led the fight to regain Buna, but his slow performance toward achieving the objective frustrated MacArthur and inspired him to reach out to General George Marshall with the message: “Experience in this area indicates the imperative necessity for the tactical organization of an American Army [...] I recommend that the Third Army under General Krueger be transferred to Australia. This action would provide an able commander and an efficient operating organization.”33 As a result, Krueger transferred to the Southwest Pacific and the Alamo Force was established, reporting directly to General MacArthur, not Blamey.34 The Alamo Force introduced an American component that MacArthur could pressure for maximal performance through an American commander. Further, as the front line extended away from Australia, and Australian homeland support became less critical to MacArthur’s efforts to reach the Philippines, MacArthur shifted land force support relationships further. In July 1944, MacArthur tasked Blamey’s ground component to support mop-up operations in island areas bypassed en-route to the Philippines while leaning harder on Krueger’s Sixth Army and, eventually, General Robert Eichelberger’s Eight Army to meet his objectives.35 MacArthur based these enablement decisions specifically on performance—a combination of MacArthur’s concern for General Blamey’s ability to drive operations forward and the desire to control a politically-detached American force with pressure points completely susceptible to MacArthur’s influence.

In summary, General MacArthur’s force transfers and establishment of support relationships enabled his subordinate component commanders in a manner compatible with doctrinal conceptualizations of a JFC. Additionally, similar to the previous discussion on authorizing component commanders,

33 Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 11 January 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 2, MMA.
34 James, The Years of MacArthur, 311-313; Message from MacArthur to Krueger dated 11 January 1943 and Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 16 January 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 2, MMA.
35 Force redistribution memo from MacArthur to Blamey dated 12 July 1944, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA.
MacArthur’s actions emphasize consideration for the role of performance in component commander enablement.

**Informing Component Commanders**

According to *JP-1*, the JFC serves effectively as an informational conduit for the joint force when they inform subordinate component commanders. Further, informing is a feedback process. Component commanders are responsible for providing the JFC with operational requirements and outcomes. In return, the JFC consolidates, prioritizes, and clarifies information from the joint force for distribution amongst the component commanders.\(^{36}\)

General MacArthur’s informational processes with subordinate commanders were largely successful, although technological and material constraints generated notable negative impacts. As with authorizing and enabling, MacArthur utilized operations instructions to design and implement communication systems supporting his informational processes. These systems, usually schematics for telephone and radio linkages between the forward and rear headquarters elements of GHQ and components, appear in the appendices of operations instructions for major operations and campaigns.\(^{37}\)

Radio and telephone systems allowed MacArthur and his subordinate commanders to share critical information and operational updates with each other quickly, often in the form of telegrams. In addition to radio and telephone, memorandums provided more detailed information exchanges, carried between headquarters through mail movements made by General Kenney’s aircraft.\(^{38}\) Examples of information exchanges between General MacArthur, GHQ, and component elements appear extensively in every campaign and operation conducted by Southwest Pacific forces. For instance, prior to the Papuan Campaign, South Pacific forces spotted a Japanese invasion force, and passed details to MacArthur. MacArthur’s GHQ subsequently pushed these details out to the forces in Operations Instruction #5—the

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\(^{36}\) *JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-12 and IV-18.

\(^{37}\) See Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MMA. Folder 1 contains very details schematics of the earliest radio and phone linkages.

instruction General Brett chose to temporarily ignore leading to his relief.39

During the early Cartwheel operations, General MacArthur served as the information conduit between General Blamey and Admiral Carpender as the two men fought over naval support for an amphibious landing. Blamey required naval fire support for his beach landings, and Carpender was unwilling to risk vessels in uncharted waters.40 MacArthur shaped the exchange based on operational priorities, ultimately leading Carpender to release two corvettes and three submarines for support.41

In the Leyte operation, efficient information passage and feedback processes through MacArthur proved central to eventual mission success. For instance, as Central Pacific naval support shifted towards alternate operations following the initial invasion, Japanese aircraft took advantage of the situation by attacking Admiral Kinkaid’s unprotected fleet. Kinkaid’s timely feedback to MacArthur allowed GHQ to coordinate with General Kenney and Central Pacific carriers to rapidly reprioritize air operations for continuous coverage over Kinkaid’s fleet.42 Further, as General Krueger’s forces bogged down in heavy resistance on the island, the communication systems enabled Krueger to relay requests for fire support and reinforcements stemming any Japanese counterattacks.43 In other words, MacArthur’s integrated communications system facilitated cooperation, coordination, and performance.

Aside from rapid operational exchanges, General MacArthur informed his component commanders through routine informational procedures, including exchange of daily operations reports and summaries. MacArthur established

39 James, The Years of MacArthur, 192-193; Operations Instruction #5 dated 17 May 1942, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1, MMA.
42 Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines, 45. Kenney personal memoir from 17 October 1944, RG-54, Box 2, Volume 9, MMA.
daily deadlines for report submissions to provide GHQ time to convert the information into subsequent GHQ operations and intelligence summaries for distribution to the component forces and higher headquarters. Commanders who failed to submit reports received messages ordering compliance directly from MacArthur. Interestingly, these messages reveal the technological limitations Southwest Pacific forces faced in information exchanges. For example, for a period during the Leyte operation, Admiral Kinkaid’s forces were beyond radio contact and unable to transmit their daily summary. This inability to transmit resulted in a series of messages from MacArthur to Kinkaid increasing in frustration without any resulting response. Once reestablished on communications, Kinkaid explained the situation and everyone moved on.

Some of the most frequent information passing through MacArthur and GHQ to the subordinate components, outside of intelligence updates, were messages of congratulations and “job well done” to commanders and troops involved in major operations throughout the chain of command. This aspect of informing the components provided MacArthur’s forces with a direct link to the most senior political and military leaders in the United States, subsequently motivating forces toward continued operational performance.

Despite the general success of MacArthur’s informational processes, shortfalls and failures existed. Component commanders attributed many of these informational shortfalls to intelligence, a tradition that continues today. For instance, General Krueger looked to intelligence experts within his Alamo Force headquarters before trusting intelligence estimates passed from GHQ after inaccuracies during Cartwheel operations. Additionally, material capacity inhibited some information processes. Both Krueger and Admiral Daniel Barbey, the amphibious warfare commander under Carpender, sought

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44 For sample see Memorandum from MacArthur to Leary dated 27 April 1942, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA.
45 Message from Sutherland to Blamey dated 18 April 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA; Message from MacArthur to Kinkaid dated 25 October 1944 and Message from MacArthur to Kinkaid dated 27 October 1944, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 4, MMA.
46 Message from Sutherland to Blamey dated 18 April 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA; Message from MacArthur to Kinkaid dated 25 October 1944 and Message from MacArthur to Kinkaid dated 27 October 1944, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 4, MMA.
47 Multiple messages from MacArthur to component commanders throughout 1942-1945, RG-4, Boxes 6 and 14, MMA.
comprehensive data concerning island and underwater topography. The inability of GHQ to requisition assets for these tasks due to personnel and equipment limitations, however, led the two component commanders to initiate internal efforts to acquire or create map data.\textsuperscript{49} Perhaps the most blatant example of informational process failure, though, occurred during the Papuan Campaign when General MacArthur publicly announced the successful completion of campaign operations with light losses while ground forces were still engaged in battle following weeks of heavy losses.\textsuperscript{50} Frustrated component commanders rushed to reassure their men that their sacrifices were not forgotten.\textsuperscript{51}

In general, the informational shortfalls and failures MacArthur faced in the Southwest Pacific mirror challenges joint forces routinely face in current military campaigns. That said, General MacArthur’s informational processes overwhelmingly met the needs of his subordinate component commands. Consequently, his methods for informing component commanders support doctrinal conceptualizations for joint force employment, albeit with more rudimentary technologies and materials.

**Component Commander Conclusions**

Overall, General MacArthur lived by the modern doctrinal tenets for authorizing, enabling, and informing subordinate component commanders while commanding the Southwest Pacific Area. Consequently, his actions support and validate doctrinal conceptualizations of the JFC and joint force employment in a great power conflict (see Figure 18 below). Additionally, General MacArthur’s convictions regarding loyalty, mission focus, and performance emphasize a requirement for further doctrinal consideration of these concepts. In other words, MacArthur’s convictions illuminate conceptual extensions for doctrine relevant to employing joint forces in great power conflict. The next chapter explores these convictions and their implications for joint doctrine while generally analyzing MacArthur as a JFC.

\textsuperscript{49} Holzimer, *General Walter Krueger*, 114-115.
\textsuperscript{50} MacArthur Press Release dated 24 January 1943, RG-3, Box 3, Folder 8, MMA.
\textsuperscript{51} James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 271-286; Milner, *Victory in Papua*, 369-370.
Figure 18: JFC & Component Commanders — JP-1 Comparison Outcome

Source: Figure created by author based on author’s thesis analysis regarding JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, Chapters IV and V.
Chapter 6

General MacArthur...Joint Force Commander?

Figure 19: JP-1 JFC Doctrinal Tenets

Previous chapters analyzed General MacArthur’s relationship with his General Staff and component commanders to establish a framework necessary for justifying MacArthur as a relevant historical reference for evaluating JFC-specific joint doctrine. Completing this framework for justification requires an assessment of General MacArthur’s outcome in achieving unity of command and unity of effort—the two principle tenets underpinning JFC doctrine (see Figure 19 above). Assessing MacArthur’s realization of unity of command and effort largely entails synthesizing information already introduced, although areas requiring amplification are augmented with further data.

Justifying General MacArthur as a relevant reference for evaluating doctrine simultaneously addresses the question of where MacArthur fits into or deviated from modern conceptualizations of a JFC. Illuminating these doctrinal compatibilities and deviations provides points of contrast necessary for gauging observations and recommendations in the final chapter. In joint doctrine, unity of effort enables unity of command, so assessing MacArthur as a JFC starts by evaluating his achievement of unified effort in the Southwest Pacific Area during World War II before turning to unity of command.
Unity of Effort

JP-1 defines unity of effort as “coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure.” The JFC enables coordination through integration mechanisms, battle rhythm, and C2 systems. Further, the JFC fosters cooperation through mission command and commander’s intent.

Coordination

General MacArthur’s efforts toward coordination center largely on GHQ staff’s use of integration mechanisms, battle rhythm, and C2 systems in their relationship with subordinate component headquarters and commanders. The integration mechanisms utilized were extensive and varied, providing resilience and robustness to coordination efforts in the Southwest Pacific. The most discernible integration mechanisms include operations instructions from GHQ, official memoranda, operations and intelligence reports, and the telephone and radio-based C2 system. Less apparent integration mechanisms include the directorate architecture in GHQ and each component headquarters with their parallel sections—personnel, intelligence, and operations—that facilitated information flow between the command echelons. Additionally, the physical location of GHQ and most of the component headquarters in and around the same office building in Brisbane, Australia, aided integration. The exception to this physical co-location was General Blamey’s land component headquarters in Melbourne. GHQ’s frequent contact with other components compared to Blamey’s compelled MacArthur to require more extensive daily operations.

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1 Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 2013, V-1.
3 Discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. See Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Records of Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, 1942-1945, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia (MMA).
reports from the land component to improve integration. Beyond headquarters’ physical location, liaison officers and frequent visits by MacArthur and staff to forward headquarters also aided integration, coordination and unity of effort.

In contrast, a few mechanisms worked against or degraded integration. Staff balance in the GHQ was both positive and negative. The integration of foreign and sister service officers into GHQ’s lower echelons aided integration and coordination, but the lack of proportional influence on MacArthur at the senior staff levels worked against integration, degrading any impact from integrative diversity in the lower echelons. Further, certain members of the Bataan Gang, particularly General Sutherland, fostered an atmosphere of division that drove a wedge into the relationship between subordinate components and GHQ. The Bataan Gang’s negative influence on GHQ is the most significant detractor to integration. That said, the robust impersonal integration mechanisms, like operations instructions and memoranda, ensured the components were well coordinated despite the negative influence of the Bataan Gang. Less clear is the impact of relieving and replacing subordinate commanders on integration. Arguably, replacements create instability as forces adjust to a new commander, although, at the component commander level, MacArthur’s replacement efforts ultimately introduced men interested in working towards his goal of defeating Japan via the Philippines—specifically, Kenney, Krueger, and Kinkaid. In other words, command replacements eventually introduced component commanders who promoted integration and performance. Overall, the Southwest Pacific’s integration mechanisms supported coordination and unity of effort, albeit with occasional degradation induced by certain Bataan Gang members on staff.

Beyond integration mechanisms, battle rhythm, also supported coordination. Today, joint commanders publish detailed battle rhythms for

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6 Message from MacArthur to Blamey dated 11 September 1942 and Message from Sutherland to Blamey dated 18 April 1943, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 2, MMA.
7 Discussed in Chapter 4. GHQ Phonebook including all directorates and liaison offices, RG-3, Box 3, Folder 9, MMA.
their joint force on 24-72 hour cycles depending on force and mission. MacArthur’s battle rhythm was comparably less defined, but still written and released to subordinate elements for execution. Specifically, daily operations reports and intelligence summaries were due to and released by GHQ at specified times each day. Beyond these reports, however, the daily rhythm of GHQ and subordinate elements appears more ad hoc than modern battle rhythms. This sporadic rhythm proved to be an issue during the Papuan Campaign as GHQ probed General Blamey’s headquarters for frequent updates to the frustration of Blamey’s staff. That said, notable issues created by the battle rhythm disappeared after Papua. One reason for the apparently limited influence of battle rhythm in the Southwest Pacific was the reduced operations tempo at night. While modern headquarters run at full tempo both day and night, MacArthur’s operations typically occurred during the day and his headquarters operations still adhered to normal human sleep cycles. Consequently, while battle rhythm was less important in World War II, and therefore offers little to joint doctrine, MacArthur’s limited development of a battle rhythm improved coordination and unity of effort.

Finally, C2 systems proved essential to coordination and unity of effort. Compared to modern C2 systems, General MacArthur’s systems were archaic, but juxtaposed to systems available in previous conflicts, the Southwest Pacific C2 system was highly advanced. MacArthur’s C2 system incorporated multiple layers of technology providing an array of connectivity for commanders to coordinate with other echelons in the command. Radios and telephones provided rapid, flexible communications between commands. The physical colocation of headquarters in Brisbane offered a backup option for quick

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8 For instance, the Air Tasking Cycle supporting Central Command (Air Battle Rhythm) is a 72-hour cycle due to the extensive coordination required for air operations whereas many land component staffs operate on a 24-hour battle rhythm cycle defined by command elements meetings.
9 Discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. For sample see Memorandum from MacArthur to Leary dated 27 April 1942, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA.
10 James, The Years of MacArthur, 209.
11 Modern C2 systems work across the entire electromagnetic spectrum and include cyber and space assets for data-linking. The German Blitzkrieg introduced the radio as a tool for rapid coordination. Prior to WWII, radio transmittals were unreliable, so the preponderance of communication occurred between major headquarters by telephone line, mail, and runners.
12 Discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. See communications schematics in Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MMA.
communications and enabled face-to-face interaction between commanders and staffs for planning and execution of major operations.\textsuperscript{13} MacArthur replicated the benefits of physical colocation at forward locations, such as Hollandia, where GHQ and component elements set up forward headquarters near each other.\textsuperscript{14} The major discriminator in comparing the Southwest Pacific C2 system to earlier conflicts was the airplane, though. Aircraft enabled the rapid transfer of mail, supplies, and personnel. The capability to fly plans, commanders, or planners, like Generals Sutherland and Kenney, to planning conferences in Hawaii or Washington DC, and then back to Australia or a forward headquarters in time for execution, was unprecedented.\textsuperscript{15} Further, the aircraft allowed MacArthur to coordinate operations at GHQ then move forward to witness the operation in real time with his forces. An example was the September 1943 paratrooper airdrop on Nadzab during the Cartwheel operations. After ordering the airdrop, MacArthur accompanied General Kenney in bombers to watch the drop unfold.\textsuperscript{16} Such C2 access was both unavailable and unthinkable in previous wars. The system showed occasional flaws, such as MacArthur’s inability to coordinate with Admiral Kinkaid for a short period at Leyte, but overall the Southwest Pacific’s C2 systems greatly enhanced coordination and unity of effort.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Cooperation}

In contrast with coordination, General MacArthur’s cooperation efforts center more on his subordinate component commanders than staff, although the GHQ staff played a key role in publishing commander’s intent and the specific objectives enabling mission command through operations instructions

\textsuperscript{13} Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 3 July 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 3, MMA.
\textsuperscript{14} James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 543-547.
\textsuperscript{17} Discussed in Chapter 5. Message from MacArthur to Kinkaid dated 25 October 1944 and Message from MacArthur to Kinkaid dated 27 October 1944, RG-4, Box 6, Folder 4, MMA.
and press releases.\textsuperscript{18} With rare exception, MacArthur leaned heavily on precepts now associated with \textit{mission command} to enable cooperation and performance amongst his subordinate elements. Operations instructions, memoranda, and telegrams provided his subordinate commanders with objectives, tasks, and deadlines for specific campaigns without providing specifics for execution.\textsuperscript{19} Each component designed their own plan based on force capabilities and then passed support requirements and limitations to the other components for integration. Examples include General Blamey’s plan for assaulting Buna that included requirements for amphibious landing craft covered by naval fire support. In response, Admiral Carpender perceived risks inhibiting his forces capability to provide fire support, and the two men worked their own pieces of the plan, with cooperation through MacArthur, until a cooperative agreement for execution developed.\textsuperscript{20}

Similarly, during the invasion of Hollandia, General Krueger developed a plan requiring air support over the target area. General Kenney and his staff recognized that limited fighter range inhibited air support pending acquisition of an airfield closer to Hollandia. The resulting cooperation between air and ground staff led to a plan for the simultaneous capture of Hollandia and an airfield at Aitape for subsequent fighter support over the objective area.\textsuperscript{21} Further, both invasions required extensive naval fire and amphibious landing support, particularly until the airfield at Aitape was operational. Once a cooperative plan formed for operations, the components presented it to MacArthur for final approval.\textsuperscript{22} Until a cooperative plan formed, though, MacArthur generally remained clear of the detailed component planning efforts.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{18} Discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. See Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MMA.
\textsuperscript{19} Discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. See Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MMA.
\textsuperscript{22} Of note: GHQ staff remained engaged with the components throughout planning efforts to ensure compatibility with MacArthur’s campaign objectives and to “lead-turn” issues between the components. In this regard, planning was “decentralized” to the components with centralized oversight from MacArthur’s coordinating authority, the GHQ staff.
\end{footnotesize}
unless required to resolve disputes such as Buna’s naval fire support issue. In other words, Southwest Pacific campaign planning was a decentralized process forcing cooperation to gain final approval from the central authority, General MacArthur.

After plan approval, campaign execution was also decentralized. General MacArthur left his component commanders and their subordinates to act aggressively and independently toward mission accomplishment, trusting them to remain focused on the mission objectives. When performance waned, however, MacArthur introduced pressure to improve performance or replaced the commander. Examples include the firing of General Brett in 1942, the eventual replacement of Admirals Leary and Carpender, threats to replace General Krueger, pressure on Krueger resulting in the firing of ground commanders, and the decision by MacArthur to personally push fielded forces near the front-lines of Luzon. These intrusions on MacArthur’s part are circumstance where he ignored mission command for the sake of shaping campaign performance, with the unfortunate side effect of eroding mutual trust within the command, especially between certain component commanders. For instance, MacArthur threatened to replace Krueger within earshot of General Eichelberger, one of Krueger’s potential replacements, fostering distrust between the two commanders for the sake of influencing their performance.

Eichelberger wanted a lead role in the offensive campaign and Krueger wanted to remain commander of the primary offensive force, so both men increased performance accordingly when MacArthur put the pressure on Krueger. Aside from these limited instances, though, General MacArthur overwhelmingly remained out of his component commander’s operational and tactical planning and execution processes, choosing decentralization instead to foster cooperation and unified effort using mission command precepts.

To enable mission command in the Southwest Pacific, General MacArthur consistently broadcast his commander’s intent, normally through the issuance of operations instructions and memoranda to his component commanders. Operations instructions for major campaigns included his

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23 Refer to Chapter 5.
24 James, The Years of MacArthur, 591-595.
commander’s intent at the opening of each instruction through the designation of overarching objectives. For instance, Operations Instruction #55, issued during the Approach to the Philippines, states as an overall objective to “seize, occupy and defend TABLETENNIS and establish therein airfields and minor naval facilities for the purpose of supporting further operations westward.”

TABLETENNIS was the code-word for Noemfoor Island. The broad language of the Noemfoor objective offers clear purpose yet wide latitude for subordinate components. With one sentence distributed throughout the component elements via an operations instruction, component commander’s understood MacArthur’s next operational target, his planned use for that target, and his intended campaign direction following mission accomplishment. Consequently, the components were unified in effort towards a single, clear purpose.

General MacArthur also distributed strategic commander’s intent—his overarching goal for liberating the Philippines prior to Japan—although the target audience for this strategic intent was much broader in scope than his assigned forces and component commanders. MacArthur’s primary means for issuing strategic intent was press releases. Starting with his early 1942 arrival in Melbourne and delivery of his “I will return” speech without any endorsement from higher US authority, MacArthur utilized the press to push his strategic agenda for Philippine liberation. Even press releases without mention of the Philippines supported his agenda. For instance, MacArthur often released news of Southwest Pacific victories and achievements, sometimes to the chagrin of senior US military and civilian leaders. These news releases bolstered support throughout the US for MacArthur and his campaign efforts to the degree that MacArthur ranked ahead of all other generals in popularity after the war. This support placed MacArthur in a unique position to make popularly and politically backed demands of his seniors, including prioritization for utilizing the Philippine Archipelago as a launching point for Japanese invasion and

25 Operations Instruction #55 dated 17 June 1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folder 4, MMA.
26 MacArthur’s Speech, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA. See multiple press releases from 1942-1945, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 9, and Box 3, Folders 7-8, MMA.
27 Message from Marshall to MacArthur dated 7 September 1943, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 7, MMA; Marshall expressed concern over a misrepresentation of fact concerning bombings during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Message from Marshall to MacArthur dated 13 October 1943, RG-4, Box 16, Folder 4, MMA; Marshall expresses concern with MacArthur’s rapid press releases before informing the War Department of operational actions.
strategic bombing operations.\textsuperscript{28} In short, General MacArthur issued press releases to control the \textit{strategic narrative} in the Pacific, not just shape cooperation.\textsuperscript{29} In this regard, MacArthur exceeded doctrinal conceptualizations for creating unity of effort. Specifically, he shaped joint force cooperation through commander’s intent that enabled mission command and he shaped the broader geopolitical environment supporting his cooperative forces through strategic narrative.

\textbf{Performance...MacArthur’s addition to Unity of Effort}

Overall, General MacArthur’s actions toward unity of effort support doctrinal conceptualizations of the JFC and joint force employment. Where his actions deviated from joint doctrine, a common thread appears: a need for performance, specifically performance supporting his ambition to regain the Philippines. On GHQ staff, the Bataan Gang served MacArthur’s need for performance. The desire they shared with MacArthur shaped all products driving cooperation and all processes for coordination toward Philippine liberation. For instance, operations instructions included the capture of objectives for follow-on operations in the general direction of the Philippines, and planning conference trips, especially in 1944, included vociferous support from the Southwest Pacific GHQ staff for invasion of Japan through the Philippines.\textsuperscript{30}

Supporting staff proposals and processes for liberating the Philippines necessitated field performance that gained enough ground to provide MacArthur strategic leverage—leverage he ultimately utilized in late 1944 to prioritize capture of the Philippines in addition to and, eventually, instead of Formosa.\textsuperscript{31} Field performance required field commanders capable of pushing their forces forward despite the friction of war and will of the Japanese, supported by component commanders willing and capable of applying effective pressure to

\textsuperscript{28} General Douglas MacArthur, \textit{Reminiscences}. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2012), 197-200; Message from MacArthur to AGWAR dated 8 July 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 1, MMA.


\textsuperscript{30} Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MMA; James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 364-365, 368-369, and 391-394.

\textsuperscript{31} James, \textit{The Years of MacArthur}, 521-542.
avoid offensive stagnation. A key factor in applying effective pressure is maintaining *mission focus*, or focus on the primary mission objectives. Loss of mission focus occurs when subordinate tasks take precedence over the primary objective causing movement toward the primary objective to stagnate. For instance, when General Krueger’s forces bogged down on Leyte, MacArthur grew concerned that Krueger lost sight of the main objective—launching an invasion of Luzon from Leyte—replacing it instead with the interim task of capturing Leyte.\(^{32}\) Maintaining mission focus shapes the application of pressure necessary to drive performance. Consequently, performance and its two enablers—mission focus and pressure—were central to MacArthur’s quest for unified effort in the Southwest Pacific, and represent tenets for consideration and possible inclusion in joint doctrine.

**Unity of Command**

*JP-1* describes unity of command as the operation of forces “under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.”\(^{33}\) Unity of command requires official designation of a single commander as the JFC and the assignment of subordinate command relationships by the JFC. Additionally, to ensure unity of command, the JFC maintains ultimate responsibility for the mission and discipline of forces.\(^{34}\)

Of all tenets regarding a JFC, General MacArthur’s efforts toward unity of command are most clearly in compliance with joint doctrine. General MacArthur advocated for unity of command persistently during World War II, not only as the cornerstone of his command in the Southwest Pacific Area, but as a requirement for adoption everywhere. Following his official designation as the Southwest Pacific Area’s Supreme Commander, MacArthur immediately issued a general order identifying the component commanders, defining the component command organization and relationships, and unifying the component chains of command under his leadership.\(^{35}\) Throughout the war, he

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\(^{32}\) James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 591-595.

\(^{33}\) *JP-1*, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, V-1.

\(^{34}\) *JP-1*, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces*, IV-13, IV-18, V-1, V-6, V-14, and V-18.

\(^{35}\) General Order #1 dated 18 April 1942, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 1, MMA.
updated these command relationships, including OPCON and TACON, through operations instructions issued by his GHQ staff. Any infringement on this command unity from outside the Southwest Pacific met with harsh criticism and attack from MacArthur. For instance, in 1942, a directive from the Joint Chiefs to conduct operations in the Solomons with the South Pacific Area forces without unifying the forces under a single commander prompted MacArthur to write the War Department a lengthy message opening with: “The command setup proposed by King outlined in your [directive] is open to the most serious objections. The entire operation in the Solomons-New Guinea-New Britain-New Ireland area should be considered as a whole in which the successful accomplishment of the offensive will depend upon complete coordination of the land, sea, and air components.” MacArthur closed the message with a recommendation to unify forces under one commander otherwise “unity of action cannot be achieved.” Unification never occurred, and the South and Southwest Pacific learned to cooperate despite separate command structures.

The closest MacArthur’s forces came to failure due to separate command structures was the naval jumble in Leyte Gulf following the Leyte invasion in late 1944—a near failure precipitated by many factors stemming from a lack of unity of command. In December 1944, following this near catastrophe, MacArthur wrote a letter to the War Department outlining the dangers of failing to unify forces under a single commander, arguing further that “the ultimate success of the war against Japan is in the gravest jeopardy” due to a failure to unify the entire Pacific Theater under a single commander. Two weeks later, the Joint Chiefs recommended creating a command structure with dual “coordinate Commanders in Chief” for the entire Pacific Theater: MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. MacArthur responded with opinions on how this dual

36 Message from MacArthur to the War Department dated 1 July 1942, RG-4, Box 15, Folder 4, MMA.
37 Message from MacArthur to the War Department dated 1 July 1942, RG-4, Box 15, Folder 4, MMA.
39 Message from MacArthur to Marshall dated 17 December 1944, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 2, MMA.
40 Message from JCS to MacArthur dated 2 January 1945, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 3, MMA.
command structure might work, but noted that the best arrangement required the designation of a single commander.⁴¹ Years later in his memoirs, MacArthur remembered his failed efforts to unify command as a critical shortfall of the war in the Pacific:

I urged, with all the earnestness of which I was capable, that the command in the Pacific be unified. I stated that, although I was the senior ranking officer by many years, I would be willing to accept a subordinate position, to accomplish the general good. It was in vain. Of all the faulty decisions of the war perhaps the most unexplainable one was the failure to unify the command of the Pacific. The principle involved is the most fundamental one in the doctrine and tradition of command.⁴²

Despite failed efforts to unify the entire Pacific, MacArthur’s command within the Southwest Pacific remained unified throughout the war with clear command relationships, albeit relationships occasionally requiring coordination and cooperation across Southwest, South, and Central Pacific Area organizational boundaries.

Beyond designation as unified commander and his management of command relationships, MacArthur also maintained responsibility for the overall mission. Overall, the success of MacArthur’s operational campaigns points to responsible mission conduct, but force discipline also factors into mission responsibility. For MacArthur, force discipline relevant to unity of command equated to loyalty, especially loyalty to the chain of command. Of the three component commanders MacArthur ostensibly relieved in the Southwest Pacific over the course of the war, MacArthur dismissed two—General Brett and Admiral Carpender—due to lacking loyalty. General Brett bucked the system put in place by MacArthur on arrival in Australia, going so far as to avoid contact with the Supreme Commander and his GHQ, and Admiral Carpender routinely communicated Southwest Pacific issues with senior leaders outside the chain of command.⁴³ These men serve as examples of General MacArthur

⁴¹ Message from MacArthur to JCS dated 3 January 1945, RG-4, Box 17, Folder 3, MMA.
⁴² MacArthur, Reminiscences, 172.
maintaining discipline at the highest levels. MacArthur also reinforced
discipline by rewarding those who maintained loyalty and demonstrated ability
to perform with promotion to higher rank. Consequently, by war’s end, Kenney,
Krueger, and Kinkaid all held four-star rank.44

General MacArthur advocated for unity of command throughout his
assignment as Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area. His efforts
to manage command relationships, maintain responsibility for the mission, and
uphold discipline resulted in command unification completely compatible with
conceptualizations of joint doctrine. This compatibility validates the importance
of unity of command for JFCs, especially in great power conflict.

Conclusion

General MacArthur achieved both unity of effort and unity of command
in the Southwest Pacific Area during the Second World War, and his means of
achievement justifies his relevance as a reference for evaluating JFC-specific
doctrine. Further, the process of justifying MacArthur simultaneously revealed
where he fit into or deviated from modern conceptualizations of a JFC (see
Figure 20 below).

Generally speaking, MacArthur’s actions proved compatible with joint
doctrine. However, several notable deviations from doctrine exist. First, his
unbalanced and largely unbounded senior GHQ staff represents a deviation to
integrative mechanisms impacting coordination. Additionally, MacArthur’s
interjections into component commands during moments of degraded field
performance represent a deviation to mission command impacting cooperation.
Together, these two deviations reveal a reliance on performance, in balance with
cooperation and coordination, to create unity of effort. Further, MacArthur’s
application of pressure to improve mission focus and subsequent performance
in the field identifies mission focus and pressure as subordinate elements to
generating performance. Finally, General MacArthur’s utilization of a strategic
narrative to extend cooperation beyond his forces into the geopolitical
environment represents an expansion of doctrinal precepts worthy of further

44 James, The Years of MacArthur, 795-796. List displays rank at war’s end.
consideration. These doctrinal deviations and expansions are the focus of observations and recommendations in the next chapter.

Figure 20: JP-1 JFC Doctrinal Tenets & MacArthur’s Deviations

One issue not pursued in the next chapter, yet reappearing throughout MacArthur’s command in the Southwest Pacific, is loyalty. Despite the profound influence of loyalty on General MacArthur’s relationships with subordinates, its relative importance to joint doctrine is limited to maintaining unity of command. Specifically, loyalty influences force discipline impacting continued unity of command. Loyalty was certainly an emphasis item for MacArthur, but not a doctrinal deviation—just a focal point within the tenet of maintaining force discipline and, consequently, not worth further pursuit (it is annotated in Figure 20 for the sake of consistency given its prevalence in prior analysis).
Chapter 7

Observations & Recommendations

General Douglas MacArthur’s performance as Supreme Commander of Southwest Pacific Area forces during World War II offers several considerations for improving doctrinal conceptualizations specific to JFCs (see Figure 21 below). These varied considerations fall into three broad observations and recommendations (O&Rs) for further discussion:

**O&R #1:** Cooperation versus Performance
**O&R #2:** Staff Construction & Blind Spots
**O&R #3:** Strategic Narrative

The recommendations introduced emphasize areas for further examination and action by senior joint and individual service leaders. Additionally, these recommendations carry important implications for future joint employment as well as US Air Force integration and leadership in joint warfare. Finally, the recommendations and implications discussed in this chapter offer a launching point for future exploration by professional and academic researchers seeking to improve joint doctrine and integration.
Figure 21: JP-1 versus MacArthur—Observations & Recommendations

Source: Figure created by author based on author’s thesis analysis regarding JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, Chapters IV and V.
Observation

Throughout his command of the Southwest Pacific, General MacArthur constantly fought to balance cooperation, performance, and coordination at the strategic and operational levels of war. His efforts toward balance reveal a critical limitation in current joint doctrine. Specifically, JP-1 is written for an asymmetric war in favor of the US and its allies, not symmetric warfare against a great power or, worse, future asymmetric war against a more powerful enemy. The issue limiting current joint doctrine is the relationship between cooperation and performance based on conflict requirements. A quick look at the definition of cooperate versus perform helps illustrate the issue.

Cooperate means “to act together for mutual benefit.”\textsuperscript{1} By extension, cooperation requires incorporating all player’s interests prior to acting, otherwise benefits are not mutual. In other words, mutual benefit between

actors takes precedence over action. In contrast, *perform* means “to carry out an action.”

No added definitional caveats exist—action takes precedence over everything else in performance, including mutual benefits. Generally, *JP-1* does not address considerations or processes for choosing performance over cooperation based on conflict requirements, especially at the strategic or operational level of warfare. Instead, *JP-1* focuses almost solely on joint and international cooperation, without regard to performance. *JP-1* does introduce limited language distinct to performance when detailing mission command, specifically the requirement for “subordinate leaders at all echelons” to "exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.”

However, this characteristic of mission command conceptualizes disaggregated performance conducted by subordinate units, not aggregate strategic performance by a comprehensive force under the JFC’s command.

Strategic performance is vital in symmetric and asymmetrically disadvantaged warfare, because existential threats to the US reprioritize the need for action over mutual benefit (see *Figure 22* above). Consequently, *JP-1*’s ignorance of strategic performance and focus on strategic cooperation highlights doctrinal comfort with and over-reliance on asymmetric advantages in warfare. To prepare US joint forces, especially JFC’s, for future symmetric or asymmetric disadvantages in warfare, joint doctrine must incorporate best practices for recognizing need and shifting balance between strategic cooperation and performance based on conflict requirements.

General MacArthur recognized and shifted the balance between cooperation and performance based on the conflict in the Pacific. For instance, cooperative support from Australia, the Navy, the Air Corps, and US leadership hinged on their “buy in” to his strategic and operational vision. Further, success in the field required the effective integration of diverse national and service-specific assets, necessitating the cooperative development of integrative procedures and processes ultimately agreeable to all parties. So, cooperation was an imperative to General MacArthur, however, he also faced critical time and resource constraints demanding quick, decisive action. Japanese

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3 Refer to Chapter 2.
territorial acquisitions added to Japan’s strength while restraining MacArthur’s resource access and maneuver space. Consequently, every mile of territory acquired by the Japanese equaled additional time and resource expenditures for MacArthur’s planned defense and counter-attack. Further, with his soldiers dying in the Philippines on marches and a promise to liberate the Philippine people to uphold, MacArthur needed action more than cooperation.\(^5\)

To foster the requisite balance between cooperation and performance, General MacArthur created an environment conducive to both by managing and manipulating leadership in his component commands. Specifically, MacArthur relieved or restricted commanders until he found men meeting his need for cooperative performance, and he traded off cooperation for performance when offered opportunities to forgo arrangements for mutual benefit. An example was MacArthur’s cooperation with General Blamey. As the front lines extended away from Australia offering more maneuvering room and access to resources, General MacArthur dropped his reliance on Australian cooperation through Blamey to focus on performance utilizing General Krueger’s forces. Blamey demonstrated frustration with his relegation to a secondary role in the field, but MacArthur evaluated the continued Japanese threat to the Philippines and chose to exchange the time required to foster deeper cooperation with Australia for performance gaining ground towards the Philippines instead.\(^6\) In other words, MacArthur traded cooperation for performance based on campaign requirements.

In addition to balancing cooperation and performance, MacArthur also tailored his coordination elements to support cooperation and performance. For instance, operations instructions provided support and task relationships between forces fostering cooperation while timelines and objectives drove performance.\(^7\) Interestingly, the elements of coordination utilized by MacArthur differ little from modern elements, but MacArthur’s utilization of these elements towards performance in addition to cooperation differs in the sense that JP-1


\(^6\) James, *The Years of MacArthur*, 375-376, 465, 480-482, 702-703, 705, and 707-710.

\(^7\) See Operations Instructions 1-59 issued between 1942-1944, RG-3, Box 175, Folders 1-4, MMA.
addresses coordination as an aid to cooperation and neglects performance. In other words, the basic elements for coordinating performance already exist in joint doctrine even though performance as a main element of unified effort is missing. Consequently, updating doctrine to include strategic performance requires minimal changes to existing doctrinal conceptualizations of cooperation or coordination.

**Recommendation**

The US military should re-evaluate and rewrite JP-1’s JFC-specific doctrine to incorporate strategic performance as a vital component to creating unity of effort, in addition to cooperation and coordination. The process for re-evaluation and rewriting should include a comprehensive historical analysis of symmetric and asymmetric warfare experiences, not necessarily limited to US experience. Updated doctrine should incorporate the best mechanisms for identifying, managing, and manipulating strategic performance. For instance, General MacArthur’s process of assessing a commander’s mission focus to aid in applying pressure toward increased performance offer two mechanisms—mission focus assessment and pressure—for further research pursuit. Finally, while research and rewriting is conducted, the military should inform current JFCs of the intended doctrinal inclusion of performance so they may proactively gather lessons learned and relevant mechanisms for addition to the update.

**O&R #2: Staff Construction & Blind Spots**

**Observation**

General MacArthur’s primary integration mechanism for coordination creating subsequent cooperation and performance was his General Staff. The GHQ staff served as maintainer and operator of all other coordination elements, including operations instructions, memoranda transmittals, battle rhythm flow, and C2 system design. To foster coordination aiding performance, MacArthur constructed his GHQ staff to balance heterogeneity and homophily. The lower echelon staff elements incorporated the diversity and influence required for a joint force staff, while senior elements kept staff production focused on
MacArthur’s overriding goals and interests. Ultimately, though, MacArthur’s introduction of the Bataan Gang into senior staff positions introduced blind spots to his staff balance scheme undercutting its design for performance. Despite design flaws, MacArthur’s efforts to maximize staff performance and cooperation utilizing concepts common to modern social networking theory proves instructive for future joint staff employment.

Homophily, or “love of the same,” is a social networking concept proposing “common norms or values may bring [individuals] with common attributes together, or the reverse, common attributes and contacts may lead to common norms, and this holds true for both individuals and collectives.”\(^8\) The productive outcome of homophily is high organizational efficiency toward common goals. Efficiency occurs because people influence one another, become alike, design like processes to perpetuate common norms toward achievement of common goals, and draw more individuals along the social periphery into like processes subsequently expanding the effect of homophily.\(^9\)

In any organization, though, homophily requires the development of strong ties between individuals or diverse segments to perpetuate norms. Without developing strong ties, homophilious segments of the organization segregate from heterogeneous elements creating organizational imbalance—precisely what happened on MacArthur’s staff. The Bataan Gang’s inability to create strong ties with the diverse lower echelons undermined the potentially positive attributes of homophily negating the introduction of desired efficiencies.

MacArthur’s failure to effectively introduce or manage the positive aspects of homophily stems from his focus on loyalty rather than cultural commonalities. The Bataan Gang was loyal to MacArthur, but not necessarily culturally synced towards his cause. Some members, including General Sutherland, showed more interest in protecting MacArthur’s image and gaining influence within MacArthur’s circle than promoting mechanisms for interoperability to create mission focus and performance.\(^10\)


some Bataan Gang members were culturally attuned only to MacArthur the man, not MacArthur’s mission. Consequently, senior staff failed to build strong ties with the lower echelons to unite and streamline mission interests, and staff imbalance ensued. Arguably and in hindsight, applying General MacArthur’s management approach for component commanders to his senior staff—relieving or restraining them until he found compatible men—might eventually introduce the culturally compatible senior staff members necessary for homophily, but MacArthur never looked past loyalty as a tool for efficiency.

Like performance, *JP-1* addresses incorporating and managing heterogeneity on joint force staffs, but neglects the creation and management of homophily. Neglecting homophily is understandable in joint publications. An assumption exists that service orientation naturally introduces homophily to the joint staff environment—an accurate assumption when only considering the influence of service cultures, but ignorant of the opportunity to introduce a homophilious joint culture separate from service norms. Social heuristic studies demonstrate that in the absence of norms, individuals turn to previously ingrained norms and biases. General MacArthur’s challenge with homophily supports this assertion: in the absence of norms for joint staff conduct, his GHQ staff fell back on loyalty to MacArthur as the norm and bias. Similarly, in the absence of joint norms on modern staffs, individuals fall back on their service norms and biases.

The publication of joint doctrine alone is a step in the right direction toward joint norms, but effective normalization requires joint organizations to espouse joint norms in everyday processes, actions, and communications, not just study or reference them. This degree of normative adoption requires acquisition and acceptance of joint norms by central figures in the joint organization, those who will form the early strong ties, before organizational establishment. Further, cultural norms layer onto individuals over time, like layers on an onion. The innermost rings remain in place and flavor the newer outer layers of culture. In other words, the timing of service acculturation

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shapes subsequent joint acculturation, and vice versa. Consequently, the adoption of joint norms necessary for productive homophily with limited biases requires early and ongoing joint acculturation in service-member’s careers—potentially, much earlier than currently offered through senior company grade officer or early field grade officer professional military education. This observation is not intended to downplay the importance of heterogeneity on joint staffs, especially the need to balance the influence of domain specific expertise. The management of both homophily and heterogeneity is ultimately critical to performance and cooperation. Specifically, great power conflict will require performance toward common objectives, enabled by homophily, and balance through cooperation across military domains, aided by heterogeneity.

**Recommendation**

The US Defense Department should initiate studies into the relationship between service and joint acculturation with emphasis on timing to determine the optimal period for introduction and practice of joint culture best serving performance relationships—homophily—on joint staffs later in a career. For instance, studies may demonstrate a requirement for joint acculturation throughout indoctrination at service academies or reserve officer training corps programs followed by re-acculturation at all stages of professional education. Such a requirement could drive the restructuring of indoctrination and professional military education programs away from service-centric models with joint exchanges towards purely joint programs without any service affiliation.

Additionally, the US Joint Staff should rewrite *JP-1* utilizing findings from acculturation studies to provide JFCs with doctrine for balancing homophily and heterogeneity on their joint staffs, to include mechanisms based on evolving social networking theory for leveraging normative relationships to manage positive homophilic staff integration. Further, the rewrite should include tools aiding JFCs in their ability to create mission-oriented staff cultures that reduce service or personal loyalty-based blind spots while enhancing multi-domain integration.
O&R #3: Strategic Narrative

Observation

In his 2012 book, War from the Ground Up, Emile Simpson introduces the term strategic narrative, formalizing an amorphous strategic concept “that has been present in all conflicts.” Strategic narrative by its simplest definition is “the explanation of actions.” As Simpson notes, for “strategy to connect actions to policy it must therefore invest them with a given meaning in relation to its audiences, both prospectively and retrospectively.” So, strategic narrative imbues action with audience-tailored meaning to subsequently connect actions to policy.

General MacArthur recognized the power of a strategic narrative supporting his Southwest Pacific strategy, although his narrative occasionally linked action to personal ambitions rather than official US policy, such as fighting the “Germany first” directive. Further, MacArthur tailored his narrative to multiple audiences, including those necessary for strategic support and the target of his strategic aims. For instance, press releases informed the Philippine people of his intent to relieve them, inspiring continued guerrilla operations against Japan. The same releases raised awareness of MacArthur’s cause in Australia and the United States where political support translated into political capital for negotiations over strategic priorities. Press releases also kept the Japanese aware of their “annihilation” in the field and informed senior Japanese commanders of MacArthur’s intent to hold them liable for any war crimes committed against civilians or prisoners. Ultimately, MacArthur’s deft use of the predominant social networking tool of the day, the newspaper, and his ability to harness popular support to achieve strategic ends demonstrate the power of a strategic narrative for generating cooperation in the hands of an adept and capable JFC.

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14 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 179.
15 Emile Simpson, War from the Ground Up, 180.
17 See multiple press releases from 1942-1945, RG-3, Box 1, Folder 9, and Box 3, Folders 7-8, MMA.
Modern capacity for distributing social narratives is unprecedented given technological developments associated with the rise of the internet and mobile networking devices. The 2010 Arab Spring movements demonstrate the power of modern social narratives for inspiring action. Consequently, a JFC is remiss to ignore such strategic messaging potential in the present battle space. However, JP-1 offers little doctrine on the subject for JFCs, and focuses on communication more as an interagency, intra-Department, C2 system, and commander's intent enabler. The closest JP-1 approaches addressing the concept of strategic narrative is a short section discussing “communications guidance towards objectives” in Chapter I, and JP-1 never uses the term narrative. Further, the section offered in JP-1 is insufficient for referencing communications guidance within the framework of strategy, policy, or unified effort. JFC’s must be doctrinally ready and capable of creating unified effort and cooperation through strategic communications given the social networking capabilities of the day, and JP-1 requires update in this regard.

**Recommendation**

The US Joint Staff should research and introduce doctrine to JP-1 and requisite subordinate joint publications necessary for JFC’s to create and manage strategic narratives. As a wider extension of commander’s intent, the concept of strategic narrative best fits as a mechanism for cooperation, however, research should also investigate strategic narrative capacity to support performance and incorporate findings to balance narrative effects, as required.

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Military-Wide & US Air Force Implications

The observations and recommendations offered carry important implications for the military, generally, and US Air Force specifically. The US military is comfortable in the asymmetrically advantaged fight, and our adversaries will exploit any flaws precipitating from our normalization to asymmetrically advantaged warfare. General MacArthur’s command in World War II demonstrates a flaw in our doctrine stemming from our comfort with advantage. Specifically, the US lacks doctrine for joint strategic performance. Joint strategic performance is not unit performance or individual service performance, but amalgamated capacity to perform strategically as a joint team. Units and individual services routinely demonstrate capacity to perform when unencumbered by joint integration requirements. However, as conflicts move towards symmetry or disadvantage, joint integration and performance takes precedence in unified efforts.

In the absence of defined joint performance doctrine, the JFC is left to fall back on established norms and biases. Such norms and biases risk dangerous outcomes in a symmetric or disadvantaged fight. For instance, the lack of performance-focused doctrine in face of an overwhelming need for performance might lead the JFC and component commanders to return to former cultural biases and fall back on service or unit level performance capacities, abandoning the joint construct and fragmenting unity of effort—the worst-case scenario. More likely, the lack of doctrine could push the JFC and component commanders to lean on the cooperative tenets of JP-1 creating stagnation in a performance-centric fight while service components define and refine mutual benefits supporting cooperation. Such stagnation offers an opportunity for the adversary to take advantage of decision-making cycles and defeat the US.

The remedy for these risks is the adoption and acculturation of joint doctrine that incorporates performance mechanisms into tenets for the JFC, General Staff, and component commanders. Effective acculturation of joint forces underpins effective performance, so—returning to the previous onion analogy—the earlier the process of acculturation, the better. This requirement for early acculturation drives the military to reconsider their overall processes for timely joint acculturation. The consequent implication is a requirement for
more research into our military acculturation programs to determine whether current processes translate into joint performance and, if not, where those processes need repair or replacement.

For the US Air Force, especially, efforts to produce joint leaders and create joint teams hinges on overcoming early career technological and service-specific acculturation biases. The Air Force focuses heavily on performance and cooperation in the development of young officers within their tactical “stovepipes” but they add unique tactical cultures and language specific to weapons systems and mission sets that interfere with later efforts at joint acculturation. Further, this unique tactical acculturation combines with comparatively late introductions to the joint environment to create perception within other services that joint culture and integration is a secondary or tertiary priority for Air Force officers.

Overcoming these acculturation challenges and poor perceptions necessitates earlier introduction and practice with joint culture, without inhibiting the Air Force requirement for early technical expertise. Further research should focus on several areas: (1) identifying easy-to-correct disparities between Air Force and joint culture, such as simple nomenclature anomalies, for realignment to the joint standard; (2) evaluating the professional military education and indoctrination system for immersive joint acculturation opportunities, including potential partnering with sister services to create service-agnostic academies and developmental education programs; and (3) seeking early opportunities to place officers in joint billets outside the tactical expertise of an Air Force officer—in other words, placement at a joint operations center rather than a joint air operations center as a company grade officer.

**Conclusion**

General Douglas MacArthur’s command of the Southwest Pacific campaign during the Second World War required overcoming various challenges to integrate forces against an aggressive and capable enemy. The diverse array of forces available for his campaign and the geopolitical context he faced mirrors many of the challenges confronting modern JFC’s in areas ripe for future near-peer conflicts. Consequently, General MacArthur’s command
experience in the Pacific highlights several relevant JFC-related joint doctrine considerations. These considerations include: (1) the need to develop and incorporate doctrine for joint strategic performance, in balance with cooperation and coordination, to create unity of effort; (2) doctrinal consideration for the management of homophily and heterogeneity on joint staff organizations; and, (3) the need for doctrine on creating and utilizing strategic narratives to harness modern social networking capabilities. Ultimately, these considerations and the insights from General MacArthur's experience provide guidance to future joint leaders interested in integrating disparate service elements into a cohesive force, as well as individual service leaders seeking opportunities to shape their service into compatible joint force elements.
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