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Understanding the Need to Revise Japan's Article 9

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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Abstract

The Japanese are proceeding towards an Article 9 revision, and have been for some time. Careful consideration must be given to avoid a miscalculation that might threaten the peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Evolving from militarism to passive pacifism, the Japanese now need to evolve further into proactive pacifism to address today's security environment. Real security threats exist for the Japanese, driving shifts in public opinion and policy for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. These new challenges, both internally to Japan and within the Indo-Pacific region, require an introspective look at outdated elements of the Japanese Constitution like Article 9. The potential ramifications of permanent constitutional changes are likely to be significant, but revision of Article 9 remains the logical conclusion to addressing these challenges. The United States must support its long-standing ally, as Japan takes the next logical step in reaffirming its rightful place alongside other reasonable actors in the Indo-Pacific region.

Dedication

For Dad

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Chapter 1, Introduction

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.¹

--Japanese Constitution, Article 9

Soon, the Japanese government will legitimize the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) by amending the second clause to Article 9 of its Constitution. Changes to Article 9 may upset decades of status quo in the security environment and a perception of pacifism enjoyed by Japan today. Consequences for such a course of action could be beneficial or detrimental to the Indo-Pacific region, depending on whether the Japanese make a miscalculation in executing the change. Careful considerations must be made by both Japan and its ally, the United States, to fully understand the ramifications of such a decision and to demonstrate to others how the benefits outweigh any perceived problems for making this change.

With resurging military powers now capable of challenging the status quo, the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region has changed since World War II. The People's Republic of China (PRC), despite being decimated by two wars with Japan, has recovered and today is a regional power with global actions and ambitions. The PRC military continues to grow in size and strength, mustering the largest armed force in the world.² As the Chinese occupy and develop new territories, like islands in the South

¹ Japanese Constitution, Article 9.

² Credit Suisse Research Institute, *The End of Globalization or a More Multipolar World?* (Zurich, Switzerland: Credit Suisse AG, September 2015), 41.

China Sea, the PRC military plays an increasing role in its strategy. The PRC, embracing expansionism, as Japan once did, now influences other continents, like Africa and the Americas.³ Actors, like Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), inflame the security environment by choosing to nuclearize, elevating its arsenal in an effort to reach greater global notoriety. While its arsenal is threatening on its own, the DPRK also demonstrates the willingness to provoke Japan, disregarding established norms through frequent, unannounced ballistic missile testing in and around the islands of Japan.⁴ The Indo-Pacific region is less secure today.

With its pivot to the Indo-Pacific region, the United States seems ready and able to challenge robust threats as these. Other actors in the region, like South Korea and Australia, are also poised to counter threats with U.S. assistance. Japan, a bilateral ally to the United States, is an important choice to assist against emerging security challenges.⁵ But if the JSDF is limited by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the extent to which Japan could contribute to stability in the region would also be limited. Japan is currently considering revisions to Article 9 that would allow it more freedom to provide security.

As actors exceed and challenge the capacity of the JSDF, Article 9 becomes an outdated limitation preventing Japan from protecting not only its people, but also, as part of the United Nations, others as well. Japan has long maintained a self-defense force in

³ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism'," *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

⁴ James J. Przystup, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Review of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015: 18.

⁵ U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, "The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond," (April 25, 2014), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac> (accessed March 20, 2018).

view of threats to its sovereignty. While not a true armed force and limited in the actions it can perform, the JSDF is still quite capable. Yet, the world criticized Japan for their non-response to global security threats, such as in the Persian Gulf War.⁶ As the most capable armed force in the Indo-Pacific region next to the PRC, the JSDF can have the primary intent of balancing the regional and the global security environment, especially as Japan maintains economic interests abroad.⁷ Desiring to remain a defensive force yet obligated to perform its share of security responsibilities with other states, Japan remains prepared to revise Article 9. As the JSDF reviews its obligations to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, it finds itself limited in the breadth of what it can do while still avoiding war.

Recent internal Japanese politics also favor an Article 9 change. The resident Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, expresses a desire to amend Article 9 by 2020.⁸ His political party, the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, controls a supermajority inside the Japanese legislative branch, the Diet. JSDF popularity improves with recent JSDF operations demonstrating the Japanese public appreciates the benefits behind a more capable JSDF.⁹ The Japanese government increasingly expands the JSDF role to ensure national security at home and abroad, evidenced by the recent collective self-defense

⁶ James J. Przystup, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Review of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015: 7; Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 3.

⁷ Credit Suisse Research Institute, *The End of Globalization or a More Multipolar World?* (Zurich, Switzerland: Credit Suisse AG, September 2015), 41.

⁸ Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017); Mainichi Japan, "PM's Call for Revisions to Article 9 of Constitution Puzzle Even Ruling Parties," *The Mainichi*, May 4, 2017, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170504/p2a/00m/Ona/010000c> (accessed December 28, 2017).

⁹ Andrew L. Oros, "Japan's Strategic Culture: Security Identity in a Fourth Modern Incarnation?" *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 2014): 232.

policy. Yet, broad reservations remain within Japanese politics and the society at large regarding the potential for Japan to revert the militaristic society and culture that dominated it for nearly a millennia. The history of militarism with the subjugation of its neighbors produces much of the anxiety against an Article 9 change, both internal to Japan and across the region, countering any benefits an Article 9 revision might provide. The fears of potential offensive capabilities with the JSDF linger in the minds of those who remember what Japan was.

The earlier history of Japan demonstrates a tendency toward militarism, and highlights the external and internal tensions such a history creates in the contemporary world. Japan's history trends from isolationist militarism before opening to the western world, expansionist militarism through the end of World War II, and, until recently, "passive pacifism" in the aftermath of World War II.¹⁰ Analysis of significant state actors in the Indo-Pacific region demonstrates the strategic importance of developing the JSDF as a deterrent and shows how any Article 9 revisions will likely improve the security environment. Exploration into the extant challenges facing the JSDF today displays why Article 9 revisions need to keep pace with the Japanese modern view of the military. Lastly, evaluation of current Japanese politics shows a Japanese understanding evolving beyond militarism and pacifism into proactive pacifism, yet narrowing a window of opportunity for completing the Article 9 revisions that necessitate a sense of urgency. Ultimately, while an Article 9 revision is not perfect the revision strengthens the Indo-Pacific region, does not destabilize it, and is the path to a logical conclusion.

¹⁰ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism'," *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

Chapter 2, Militarism to Pacifism

Only until recently, since the end of World War II, has the world experienced a Japanese strategic culture embedded with what Shin'ichi calls "passive pacifism".¹ As defined, passive pacifism is the peaceful de-escalation of conflict through preventing aggression and avoiding arming oneself. Japan's Article 9 implements this concept through renouncing the right to war, lacking war potential, and refusing its right of belligerency.² However, Japan was not always so pacifistic. Militarism long preceded the present society. This Japanese history creates problems for the country to move beyond pacifism, especially in regards to its Indo-Pacific neighbors' reliance on Japan. Regional countries fear the extreme violence associated with Japan's once militaristic past.³

Shogunate and Isolationist Militarism

For a millennia the Japanese have been a very structured society, and the society is patriarchal and hierarchal by design. Japanese social structure evolved from the norm found in many Asian cultures. The individual is part of a family, the family is part of a community, and the communities created a nation.⁴ The early foundation to Japanese society for centuries was the *samurai*, the warrior caste. As such, their society revolved

¹ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism'," *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

² Japanese Constitution, Article 9.

³ Peter D. Fromm, "Understanding Japan's Role in Securing the Western Pacific," *Military Review* Vol. 97, No. 4 (July/August 2017): 81.

⁴ Naoko Sajima, "Japan: Strategic Culture at a Crossroads," in *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 77-79.

around this military ethos.⁵ The pinnacle of Japanese society was the *shogun* or military dictator of Japan. The *shogunate*, the form of Japanese government under samurai rule, became the feudal staple in Japan from around 1185 to the end of the 19th century.

Along with the shogunate, Japanese feudalism centered around an Emperor as well. Subordinate and appointed by the Emperor, the shogun technically did not rule, but rather wielded the power of the Emperor on his behalf. Unlike the American colonies who disdained the control of an English absolute monarchy, the Japanese people were devoted to their Emperor. Historically, and even today, as the Emperor appoints the Prime Minister, the Japanese cultural center remains the Imperial family.⁶ Yet, despite how much Japanese society supported its Emperor, the shogunate wielded the power every day; thereby, it relegated the Emperor to more of a figurehead vice a true head of government. The Japanese military caste controlled Japanese society.⁷

While the shogunate provided a power structure within Japanese society during this period, it did not provide peace. The shogun relied on the samurai to enforce their policies. In effect, the samurai retained absolute power over Japanese society similar to European knights.⁸ Japanese *daimyo*, feudal lords, vied for power within their society, amassing power under *clans*, families, which would retain large armies of samurai to assume control. The *daimyo* of the strongest clan normally would become the shogun.

⁵ Peter D. Fromm, "Understanding Japan's Role in Securing the Western Pacific," *Military Review* Vol. 97, No. 4 (July/August 2017): 81.

⁶ Linda Sieg and Kaori Kaneko, "Japan's Emperor Akihito to Abdicate on April 30, 2019," *Reuters*, November 30, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-emperor/japans-emperor-akihito-to-abdicate-on-april-30-2019-idUSKBN1DV3AS> (accessed March 22, 2018).

⁷ Andrew L. Oros, "Japan's Strategic Culture: Security Identity in a Fourth Modern Incarnation?" *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 2014): 231-233.

⁸ Ibid.

The samurai of different *daimyo* regularly vied for power. This constant power struggle was not only political in nature, and, except for in rare circumstances, kept Japanese society internally focused.⁹ The rare distraction of a Mongol or Korean invasion unified the country to an external threat. External threats were met with brutal violence and subjugation, but the internal turmoil returned and generally inhibited Japanese society from engaging with outside powers, which led to a consistent isolationism during the shogunate period.¹⁰ Tokugawa, the last shogunate, reigned supreme with absolute military power for almost three centuries, and that period led to the codification of the Japanese isolationist policy called *Sakoku*, closed country.

Meiji Restoration and Expansionist Militarism

The unexpected arrival and return of Admiral Perry and the U.S. Black Ship Fleet in 1854 forced the Japanese to confront the *Sakoku* policy. The Japanese found themselves at a distinct disadvantage to a far superior military that eroded the shogunate power base.¹¹ The United States Navy, and other western civilizations, demonstrated military technologies exceeding the standard in Japan at the time. Up to this point, Japanese society compared itself to the Qing Dynasty in China or Joseon Empire in Korea. The paradigm shift of opening Japan, along with already underlying internal

⁹ Naoko Sajima, "Japan: Strategic Culture at a Crossroads," in *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 71-73.

¹⁰ Andrew L. Oros, "Japan's Strategic Culture: Security Identity in a Fourth Modern Incarnation?" *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 2014): 231-233.

¹¹ Naoko Sajima, "Japan: Strategic Culture at a Crossroads," in *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 71-73.

issues against the shogunate, became a significant political schism for the Japanese that ultimately led to a civil war, culminating in the Meiji Restoration.

The Meiji Restoration in 1868, a direct result of Admiral Perry's visit a decade before, changed the strategic culture inside Japan and returned the Emperor to power. First, Japan opened itself to outside trade and influence, especially from western nations. Next, the Japanese recognized that to survive against more technologically advanced western civilizations they had to expand, which is very similar to the People's Republic of China (PRC) today.¹² Yet, while the Meiji government replaced the shogunate, the Japanese more closely resembled a constitutional monarchy, but even within the new government the military remained the dominant power.¹³ The cabinet, while appointed by the Emperor, like the shogun, more closely resembled an oligarchy of influential people and had overarching power.¹⁴ The Japanese replaced the samurai with a modern civilian or military-equivalent, who maintained a similar predisposition toward militarism but lacked the loyalties that led to isolationism. Those internal changes led to Japan's relentless expansion around the Indo-Pacific region. The Japanese invaded China in 1894 and again in 1937, then the Russian Empire in 1904, and attacked the United States in 1941; they even annexed territory like Korea and Taiwan during the process. Such an

¹² Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism'," *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

¹³ James E. Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World," *Law and Contemporary Problems* Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1990): 172-173.

¹⁴ Peter D. Fromm, "Understanding Japan's Role in Securing the Western Pacific," *Military Review* Vol. 97, No. 4 (July/August 2017): 81.

expansionist militaristic norm continued until the end of World War II, but has not been seen since in Japan in the 70 years since.¹⁵

Post-World War II and Passive Pacifism

The combination of unchecked expansionism and militarism led the Japanese to defeat during World War II. Surprisingly, perhaps, the Japanese viewed the loss of World War II as a direct result of their militaristic government and its fight for regime survival.¹⁶ Though defeated and despite enduring horrific losses due to the policies of a powerful few in Japanese government, Japanese society-at-large remained proud. The obedient attitude was in no small part due to unwavering hierarchal culture and made it possible to reinvent themselves.¹⁷ As such, they engendered a drastic aversion to the militaristic tendencies that typified their history and imposed passive pacifism into their Constitution.

General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, would have to reconstitute Japan from a recent industrial aggressor with a natural tendency for militarism into a contributing member of the world. As he and his Japanese counterparts struggled to rebuild the Japanese government, they had two concerns: not to alienate the Japanese and to appreciate Japanese society's lack of experience with a true

¹⁵ Nippon Communications Foundation, "Abe's Moves Toward Collective Self-Defense," *Nippon.com*, July 11, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00062/> (accessed December 27, 2017); Japanese Government. Cabinet Decision. "Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan's Survival and Protect its People." (July 1, 2014).

¹⁶ Peter D. Fromm, "Understanding Japan's Role in Securing the Western Pacific," *Military Review* Vol. 97, No. 4 (July/August 2017): 79.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 81.

democracy.¹⁸ MacArthur and his counterparts achieved this in part by focusing attention away from the Emperor but without deposing the position. That process resulted in the current Japanese Constitution, which was a modification of the original Meiji Constitution, with sections largely written by the U.S. authorities during the occupation.¹⁹ Yet, approval still rested with the Japanese Diet, the legislative branch. As the Diet made changes, details like Article 9 became more of a cooperative effort instilled with a Japanese pacifistic sentiment to avoid a future proclivity for militarism. The United States and Japan both endorsed Article 9 as a further precaution to ensure a pacifistic stance for the nation.²⁰

For over 70 years, the Japanese Constitution has maintained a peaceful Japan through Article 9 and thereby kept a status quo of peace in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan has no military, but maintains the right of self-defense with the JSDF, which was initially challenged by the Japanese people but upheld unanimously by the Japanese Supreme Court.²¹ While struggling with militarism and pacifism, the Japanese demonstrated their willingness to change and upheld their pacifist promise since World War II. “Japan’s pacifist image is still very important to the region and will continue to be so in the decades ahead.”²² The current Indo-Pacific security environment, however, challenges

¹⁸ Naoko Sajima, “Japan: Strategic Culture at a Crossroads,” in *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. Ken Booth and Russell Trood (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 73-75.

¹⁹ John O. Haley, “Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context,” *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 4-6; Rust Deming, “Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?” *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 1.

²⁰ John O. Haley, “Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context,” *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 4-5.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²² Peter D. Fromm, “Understanding Japan’s Role in Securing the Western Pacific,” *Military Review* Vol. 97, No. 4 (July/August 2017): 76.

the Japanese notion of passive pacifism as embodied by Article 9, which would enable a more proactive pacifistic stance, and creates tension both externally and internally, especially in regards to Japan's history of militarism.²³ As defined by Shin'ichi, proactive pacifism differs from passive pacifism in that for peace to occur international security cooperation, and not disarmament, is required. International cooperation is required because one nation alone cannot address or deter the emerging threats in the regional security environment.

²³ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism'," *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

Chapter 3, Regional Strategic Implications

Japan's merciless and brutal history alienated it from every other state actor in the Indo-Pacific region. Most of Asia maintains some degree of animosity toward the Japanese due to its numerous atrocities during World War II, and these Asian states are not willing to forgive Japan despite reparations made.¹ The implementation of Article 9 immediately following World War II effectively addressed the concerns of a potential, resurgent Japanese military, yet the security environment has changed significantly since 1945. Analysis of the significant state actors in the Indo-Pacific region shows how the security environment has changed and suggests that a resurgent Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) could stabilize it by better balancing power.

Two contested island regions in the Indo-Pacific region are the epicenters of multinational conflict. The South China Sea (SCS) and the East China Sea (ECS), especially the Senkakus, have immense strategic and economic value, as they provide control over large swaths of ocean by which sovereignty and sovereign resource claims can be exercised. Since the mid-1990s, the People's Republic of China (PRC) extended and enforced claims in both of them.² The SCS is highly contested by many state actors, including the PRC, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia.³ The PRC makes numerous claims to the SCS islands, using their nine-dash line as the basis, but

¹ Peter D. Fromm, "Understanding Japan's Role in Securing the Western Pacific," *Military Review* Vol. 97, No. 4 (July/August 2017): 78.

² John O. Haley, "Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context," *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 15.

³ Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific," *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 2014): 169.

only recently are they willing to aggressively possess and militarize this area despite international backlash, warranting a more concerted examination by all other state actors.

This illegitimate PRC claim, the so-called nine-dash line, delineates the entire SCS under PRC sovereignty despite claims or presence by other ASEAN states. As such, the PRC is militarizing them. For example, Fiery Cross Reef was a simple atoll with no footprint four years ago, but today it is a robust operational PRC military airbase today with deployed electronic warfare equipment.⁴ The PRC recently landed their first strategic bomber on Woody Island, adding to the deployed fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles there.⁵ In the ECS, the Senkakus are a highly contested set of islands off the northeastern coast of Taiwan, administered by Japan, but claimed by both the Japanese and the Chinese (as well as the Taiwanese), yet neither occupy it. Best described as a stalemate between the two state actors, the area is heavily patrolled by both with about a dozen warships in the vicinity and in close proximity to each other, but the bulk of maritime activity comes from coast guard and fishing trawlers. The JSDF only meets PRC violations of Japanese territorial waters with proportional force, reluctant to escalate the confrontation and hindered by Article 9.

China

The People's Republic of China (PRC) is the largest regional security challenge for Japan. Prior to the advent of the PRC in 1949, China posed no threat, as Japan had

⁴ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 25.

⁵ Ankit Panda, "South China Sea: What China's First Strategic Bomber Landing on Woody Island Means," *The Diplomat*, May 22, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/south-china-sea-what-chinas-first-strategic-bomber-landing-on-woody-island-means/> (accessed May 22, 2018).

decimated them in two Sino-Japanese wars.⁶ The Chinese repetitively use the historical narrative to inflame tensions and cast doubts on the Japanese today. Yet, the PRC's reference to and use of history as a propaganda tool creates resentment among the Japanese.⁷ Despite Japanese atrocities, in 1972, the PRC renounced claims of war reparations in exchange for Japan recognizing their sovereignty over China.⁸ The recognition is important because the Japanese had both military and economic superiority, but "over the past two decades, Japan has gradually yielded to China its premier military status in Asia."⁹

So now, the balance of power is rapidly changing in the Indo-Pacific region. China achieved economic global preeminence. In 1990, Japan had the 2nd largest economy with the 3rd largest defense budget.¹⁰ As of 2014, the PRC is the world's largest national economy, as measured by GNP.¹¹ Dwarfed today in expenditure by resurging powers, Japan is still able to muster a sizeable force to protect Japanese interests.¹² Yet, the Japanese cannot keep pace at the current expenditure rate to keep the JSDF relevant. The PRC is spending more as defense spending proportionally increased to its GDP rise. "For the past 10 years... China's military spending has increased fourfold."¹³ The

⁶ John O. Haley, "Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context," *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 14.

⁷ Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 3.

⁸ "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China," September 29, 1972, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html> (accessed May 14, 2018).

⁹ John O. Haley, "Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context," *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

¹² Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 236.

¹³ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism'," *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

region's security capabilities will become more and more overwhelmed as the PRC surpasses it in spending and development. Such unprecedented Chinese military and economic growth runs counter to any singular viable force to counter it.

Despite Chinese preeminence, the PRC and Japan have a tenuous balance of power today, provoked in contested regions, like the Senkakus.¹⁴ If not for the escalation of PRC forces overall and perceived aggressive expansion into regions like the ECS and the SCS, the necessity of expanding the scope of the JSDF would be hard to justify. The PRC seeks some type of hegemony, in defiance of any other power and legal constraints, demonstrated by its actions in contested regions, but Chinese leadership differs in how it defines hegemony.¹⁵ Specifically, they understand hegemony as either regional or global and in terms of whether the United States will partner with them.

The build-up of PRC military outposts and island reclamation in the SCS demonstrates a need for a capable military to rein in this hegemony. Most state actors bordering the SCS are hopelessly outmatched by the PRC. Multiple incidents between them and the PRC have occurred in recent history, usually with an outcome in favor of the PRC. While U.S. naval forces continue a sporadic presence in the SCS through faulted freedom of navigation efforts, their activity is minimal compared to the constant presence of indigenously produced PRC naval forces, which now includes indigenous aircraft carriers. The United States has not taken a hard line in disputes against the PRC and their nine-dash line claim beyond the actions above, leaving the presence of U.S. naval forces, at best, perfunctory, and resulting in embarrassing incidents that include the

¹⁴ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 319.

¹⁵ Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific," *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 2014): 169.

confiscation of U.S. military assets not once but at least twice in almost a decade. The Hainan island P-3 incident occurred in 2001, and the underwater drone confiscated from the U.S. 7th Fleet occurred in 2016. The PRC remains unrestrained in their SCS hegemony.

Yet, for the PRC to achieve a legitimate hegemony, the world would expect the PRC to abide by rule of law. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruled against the nine-dash line claims of the PRC.¹⁶ In contempt of the legal proceedings, the PRC ignored arbitration by the tribunal and continued its expansion into the SCS.¹⁷ Violating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the PRC ratified and played a leading role in formulating, the PRC refused to uphold the award to the Philippines.¹⁸ The Chinese refused to even participate in the proceedings and questioned the tribunal's jurisdiction, which was justified based on the terms of UNCLOS.¹⁹ The United States called upon the PRC to honor the 2016 Hague Tribunal ruling in favor of other SCS states. While a non-claimant, Japan further denounced the PRC methodology in the SCS to date, through a joint statement with the United States.²⁰ The PRC still remains unrestrained in their SCS hegemony.

The Senkakus are a totally different matter. These ECS islands, recognized as part of Japan since 1895, remain under Japanese administrative control. Control defaulted back to them in 1972 upon return of the Ryukyus and Okinawa from the United

¹⁶ Permanent Court of Arbitration, *The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China)*, The Hague (The Hague, 12 July 2016), 2, 8-11.

¹⁷ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 152.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Permanent Court of Arbitration, *The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People's Republic of China)*, The Hague (The Hague, 12 July 2016), 1, 6-8.

²⁰ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 477.

States after World War II.²¹ The PRC announced in 2013 an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the ECS that aggravated the already tense situation over administration of the islands, strongly condemned by both Japan and the United States.²² Most likely, the Article 9 revision would alter nothing in the current status quo for the ECS, as this region is considered by the Japanese as their home islands, but it does offer the JSDF a wider range of responses to a PRC miscalculation that potentially deters the PRC and improves regional stability. The contention between the PRC and JSDF often results in these miscalculations already and sometimes in a volatile incident. The last major incident happened in 2010 between a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel, led to detaining the Chinese crew and a standoff between the two countries, and caused confusion across Japanese government offices on how to respond.²³

The fact that Japan and the United States are interested in continuing a “productive and constructive relationship with China,” also potentially emboldens the PRC military to take an even more aggressive posture than today.²⁴ With this in mind, the Japanese should consider this to curb unfavorable, unintended reactions to an Article 9 revision. The PRC have no reason to favor an Article 9 revision unless to benefit from

²¹ John O. Haley, “Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context,” *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 15.

²² Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific,” *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 2014): 169. U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, “The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond,” (April 25, 2014), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac> (accessed March 20, 2018).

²³ James J. Przystup, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Review of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015: 15; Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “The Turnabout of Japan’s Security Policy: Toward ‘Proactive Pacifism’,” *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

²⁴ U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, “The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond,” (April 25, 2014), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac> (accessed March 20, 2018).

it, but an expansion would create strategic opportunities for the JSDF: defense cooperation or bilateral exercises. However, the PRC desire for absolute regional hegemony drives their military posture and counters the current Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

North Korea

Compared to the PRC, the DPRK is an entirely different aggressive state actor. The North Koreans precipitated the early JSDF, the National Police Reserve, when General MacArthur directed its formation after the outbreak of the Korean War in July 1950.²⁵ However, since then, the DPRK directed most aggressions toward the United States or its ally, the Republic of Korea (ROK). More infamous examples include the capturing or sinking of the USS PUEBLO in 1968 and the ROKS CHEONAN in 2010. DPRK aggression to the Japanese is mostly limited to rhetoric and force posturing. Such rhetoric is nominally aimed at the ROK, like turning Seoul into a “sea of fire.”²⁶ DPRK force posturing ranges from coercive maritime threats to cyber-attacks to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Japan considers the DPRK possession of WMDs a “grave and imminent threat.”²⁷

While the memory of Japanese subjugation of Korea during World War II remains, there will likely be no direct conventional confrontation with Japan today. The

²⁵ James E. Auer, “Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force ‘Forever’ to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World,” *Law and Contemporary Problems* Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1990): 176.

²⁶ James J. Przystup, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Review of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015: 1-4.

²⁷ John O. Haley, “Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context,” *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 16.

DPRK has the means to inflict significant casualties through their nuclear weapons. Unwarranted recent EEZ overflights by ballistic missiles of the Japanese home islands over the past two decades lend credence to the Kim regime's threats in their nuclear capability despite the latest DPRK claims to forego development of more weapons in advance of the U.S.-DPRK summit.²⁸ While deemed as the only threat by the Japanese to be handled, if necessary, with a preemptive military strike, minimal sympathy exists if they offend the North Koreans between the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and the aforementioned ballistic missile threat.²⁹ Even minimal revisions of Article 9 could improve the JSDF responses to such a threat.

Simultaneously, the DPRK is seemingly indifferent to Japan, and primarily focused on maintaining the Kim regime at any cost. Likewise the Japanese seem to not consider the DPRK reaction to an Article 9 revision and are rather intent on the JSDF capability to defend against the DPRK's ballistic missile threats. The routine U.S.-ROK show of force exercises over the past years have convinced the Kim regime of the likelihood of U.S. aggression on the peninsula, which suggests the DPRK are willing to respond with preemptive nuclear attacks, if necessary.³⁰ The recent willingness of the DPRK to denuclearize suggests the effectiveness of defensive partners like South Korea to generate regional security for Japan and reduce regional tensions. As the JSDF gravitate from a local defense architecture with what is called Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) to a broader regional defense architecture with Important

²⁸ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 61.

²⁹ Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 3.

³⁰ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 60.

Influence Situations (IIS), an Article 9 revision will demonstrate value by adding flexibility to JSDF to further offset the DPRK threat.

South Korea

As with the DPRK, the ROK experienced the same Japanese subjugation over the past two centuries. The ROK was decimated by World War II and the Korean War and had little strategic value as a partner then. Today, the ROK, due to its military and economic strength, and its key geographic positioning offset both the DPRK and PRC. The ROK maintains one of the strongest military forces in the Indo-Pacific region behind those like the PRC and Japan.³¹ Though they are not formal, direct allies, Japan and the ROK are formidable partners, offsetting their common security challenges together. There are those in Korean society, North and South, who will never forgive nor forget the Japanese atrocities.³² The perpetual hatred remains the largest obstacle to what could become the strongest alliance inside the Indo-Pacific region. Despite the resentment, the ROK and Japan and the United States are ideal examples how a common cause can forge beneficial partnerships strengthened by routinely exercising trilaterally, and with the ROK and Japan occasionally having bilateral exchanges.³³

Though the ROK maintains concerns about any expansion of the Japanese military, including Article 9, the focus on common security challenges present Japan an opportunity to address rising threats in the Indo-Pacific region. The March, 2014

³¹ Credit Suisse Research Institute, *The End of Globalization or a More Multipolar World?* (Zurich, Switzerland: Credit Suisse AG, September 2015), 41.

³² Various personal communications with Korean family members.

³³ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 500.

Trilateral Summit between the United States, the ROK, and Japan condemned actions by the DPRK and is a clear example of a focus on common security challenges.³⁴ RIMPAC, Pacific Partnership, and a host of other naval multilateral exercises and training display the same.³⁵ The focus on common security challenges present grounds the ROK can support, but the ROK maintain their anxiety over an Article 9 revision. If the ROK is assuaged, it will likely influence other Indo-Pacific nations, like those in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to follow suit toward providing a security partnership capable of offsetting aggressive state actors in the SCS.

ASEAN

The SCS is a prime example of the changed security environment since World War II. ASEAN is an organization formed with the purpose of “accelerating economic growth” and “promoting regional peace and stability” in the SCS.³⁶ The aggressive and unlawful actions of the PRC in the SCS has the potential to destabilize the Indo-Pacific region which ASEAN was formed to resist. With ten member states surrounding the SCS, except the PRC, ASEAN suggests the importance of alliances or partnerships to deter aggression, but no single member of ASEAN has nearly the military strength to openly challenge the PRC. In November 2016, the PRC impounded nine armored

³⁴ U.S. Office of the Press Secretary, U.S.-Japan Joint Statement, “The United States and Japan: Shaping the Future of the Asia-Pacific and Beyond,” (April 25, 2014), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/us-japan-joint-statement-united-states-and-japan-shaping-future-asia-pac> (accessed March 20, 2018).

³⁵ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 497-498.

³⁶ “The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration),” August 8, 1967, *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, <http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/> (accessed May 15, 2018).

vehicles from the Singapore Army after an exercise with Taiwan; similar to the illegal seizure of a U.S. P-3 on Hainan island in 2001.³⁷

The growth of ASEAN military power is important as it allows the credible enforcement of international law. In July of 2016, the Hague Tribunal ruled unanimously that China has no legal basis whatsoever for its so-called nine-dash line and favored the Philippines' claim. Yet, the PRC remains illegally. Despite this recent legal UN support, ASEAN and the Philippines are unable, and maybe unwilling, to enforce the ruling.³⁸ One reason is that ASEAN lacks the military forces compared to the PRC. Vietnam attempted to challenge PRC authority in 1974, but was forcibly removed by the PRC from the Paracels. Yet, Vietnam's capacity is increasing, as evident from U.S.-Vietnam naval exercises and a U.S. carrier port visit.³⁹ While ASEAN supports the rule of law, there is no credible endemic military force to actively deter the PRC and to balance power.

Japan is carefully adopting defense relationships with ASEAN, providing assistance to countries in ASEAN since the 1950s.⁴⁰ They recently designed a defense initiative, called "Vientiane Vision" that describes specific strategic end states that align with Japanese and ASEAN interests.⁴¹ Aimed at increasing defense cooperation, the JSDF executed dozens of capacity-building assistance events, multi-lateral exercises, and

³⁷ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 147.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 146.

³⁹ Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Cultures and Security Policies in the Asia-Pacific," *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 35, No. 2 (August 2014): 169.

⁴⁰ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism'," *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

⁴¹ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 494.

defense exchanges with ASEAN over the past few years.⁴² This past June, the JS Izumo deployed to the SCS in support of Indo-Pacific regional security. Japan has no claims to the SCS, and does not seek to regain outdated claims. Yet, with an Article 9 revision, Japan would be in a position to protect Japanese and Indo-Pacific security concerns in the SCS. ASEAN has an opportunity to leverage the one regional power capable of challenging the PRC directly, and thereby has every reason to support the Japanese revision to Article 9.

The Indo-Pacific security environment has changed. Robust, real threats in the region exist today against Japan. Japan exercises routinely with U.S. allies throughout the region, including former enemies like the ROK. Contested islands are the forefront of destabilizing scenarios that could rapidly lead to miscalculations. The Article 9 revision evolves the JSDF in accord to today's security environment by giving them the necessary flexibility in such regional situations. And the flexibility could also lead to other opportunities for the JSDF in security cooperation across the globe. In most cases, the PRC desire for hegemony goes undeterred because of a lack of endemic, credible military forces and overwhelming economic power.

⁴² Ibid., 494-503.

Chapter 4, The JSDF

For over half a century, the Japanese Constitution prohibited a standing military, contrary to the norm for a sovereign state. After the defeat of the Japanese military and enactment of Article 9, U.S. intent suggests Japan believed the United States would protect it from external threats.¹ The fallout of the Korean War and the U.S. prioritization of military resources from Japan to defend Korea led the Japanese to establish the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) by the Self-Defense Forces Law in 1954. The JSDF was almost unnecessary then. Military forces across the Indo-Pacific region were underdeveloped and small compared to the U.S. forces. Some Japanese citizens challenged the JSDF's mere existence, and popular dissent led to several legal challenges.

The most significant challenge came in 1959 during the *Sunakawa* case.² Protests against the updated Japan-U.S. Security Treaty drew the resignation of the Prime Minister (PM) and a new status for the JSDF. The court ruled that in the absence of a clear violation, the decision as to whether the JSDF is constitutional should be left to the interpretation of other political branches.³ Supporters argued that to relinquish such security capability was to invite disaster and that common sense, the need to provide self-

¹ James E. Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World," *Law and Contemporary Problems* Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1990): 176.

² John O. Haley, "Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context," *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 8.

³ *Ibid.*, 2. *Sakata v. Japan*, known as the *Sunakawa* (i.e. courts) case, was a defining, en banc, 15-0 1959 Japanese Supreme Court decision in favor of the Japanese right of self-defense and treaty obligations.

defense, should prevail.⁴ Ultimately, after legal battles it implemented the JSDF. The JSDF is a capable force, but its intent is significantly restricted by law in the functions it can perform compared to other militaries in the Indo-Pacific region.

Today, with over a quarter of a million personnel and budgeted at more than \$45 billion annually (1% of its GDP), the JSDF is quite capable.⁵ It is also the 4th strongest military in the world.⁶ Under Article 9, the Japanese achieved the defense of the homeland with significant U.S. support using quite a smaller defense force. The least of which is the permanent basing of the only forward-based carrier strike group in the U.S. inventory, and more recent discussions of development of Japanese Tomahawk missiles.⁷ The newest examples of Japanese defense initiatives supported by the United States are the theater ballistic missile defense, SM-3 Block IIA, and 5th generation fighters, F-35A.⁸ Yet, the United States and Japan continually redefine the intent of the defense relationship, especially over the last two decades.⁹ Relaxing previous restraints, Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan (SIASJ) evolving to Important Influence Situations (IIS) is a clear example of the defense relationship evolution. The recent

⁴ James E. Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World," *Law and Contemporary Problems* Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1990): 176.

⁵ Nippon Communications Foundation, "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance," *Nippon.com*, August 31, 2016, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00146/> (accessed December 27, 2017).

⁶ Credit Suisse Research Institute, *The End of Globalization or a More Multipolar World?* (Zurich, Switzerland: Credit Suisse AG, September 2015), 41.

⁷ Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017).

⁸ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 28.

⁹ Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 3.

Japanese Legislation for Peace and Security encompasses this policy and collective self-defense (CSD) among others.

As the Japanese relax restraints for the JSDF, the capabilities multiply. The JSDF today provides a resident stable capability that goes beyond mere security. The JSDF have already supported stability effects globally, such as humanitarian assistance in Iraq and anti-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean.¹⁰ Two recent disaster relief events showcase this well: the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami (Operation TOMODACHI) and the 2016 Kumamoto earthquake. Operation TOMODACHI was the U.S. military response under a joint task force to the 2011 tsunami, encompassing thousands of U.S. personnel enabling JSDF personnel;¹¹ in contrast, the 2016 disaster relief response to Kumamoto included Republic of Korea (ROK) forces as well, but involved minimal U.S. forces. As the JSDF potential increases without restraints, so does its intent to provide stability effects in the Indo-Pacific region.

Since September 11, the Japan-U.S. relationship has never been stronger.¹² True, since World War II, the United States and Japan have operated together for the defense of Japan and now operate consistently with mutual respect and proficiency. However, extant challenges demand further interoperability beyond a singular alliance with Japan. Fundamentally, the current Article 9 restrains how much the JSDF can do. Today's security environment demands the JSDF commit forces to coalition efforts other than just the United States. Showcasing the current operations under which the United States and

¹⁰ John O. Haley, "Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context," *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 11.

¹¹ Personal experiences from tour at U.S. Pacific Fleet during Operation TOMODACHI.

¹² Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 8.

Japan defend, compared to others, shows the potential of what an Article 9 revision could allow.

Article 9 shifts the debate about funding the JSDF from constitutionality to regional security demands. “But for Article 9, [Japan] would have had to justify on purely policy grounds any constraint on military spending.”¹³ The annual Japanese 1% GDP investment is a relatively low investment due to a voluntary limitation and has remained relatively constant.¹⁴ The limitation is an attempt by the Japanese to minimally defend the homeland, but is inadequate to defend its citizenry abroad and assist in regional and global security efforts. The restraints in funding have not allowed the JSDF to maintain the necessary advantage over regional adversaries. “Japan is arguably playing more of a game of gradual catch-up than one of one-upsmanship.”¹⁵ Furthermore, Article 9 influences the current funding restraints that hampers interoperability, hinders partnering, and limits the effectiveness of the JSDF from contributing to regional security. Ultimately, the restraints on the JSDF undermine the Japanese ability to maintain deterrence. Without Article 9 restraints, Japan will likely improve its capability and develop policy flexibility.¹⁶ PM Abe states it better: “Taking all possible preparations will serve as a great deal of power that will thwart schemes to wage war on Japan. This is what we call deterrence.”¹⁷

¹³ John O. Haley, “Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context,” *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 15.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹⁶ Rust Deming, “Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?” *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 8.

¹⁷ Japanese Prime Minister, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Abe, Tuesday, July 1, 2014,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0701kaiken.html (accessed December 29, 2017).

The revised Article 9 will explicitly have to address this relative JSDF deterrence in order to alleviate those concerns. Considering how much is actually spent on the JSDF and the capabilities produced, “a political consensus has endured that enables Japan to possess...the most technologically advanced defensive military in East Asia.”¹⁸ Next to the PRC, the Japanese maintain the strongest armed force in the Indo-Pacific region and in multiple warfare areas are equal, if not better than the PRC in capability and technology despite having far fewer personnel in uniform.¹⁹ The Japanese accomplished this impressive feat despite the restraints stemming from Article 9, yet fall behind the deterrence once garnered when the JSDF and the PRC forces maintained a more significant disparity.

Previously viewed as using “checkbook diplomacy” in the global security arena such as the Persian Gulf War, Japan focused on rebuilding its nation with minimal investment elsewhere, paying off its cooperative security requirements rather than contributing direct forces.²⁰ The world reaction was harsh and influenced Japanese perception of their role in the world. Today, some Japanese believe they have a moral responsibility for Japan to share the military burden that supersedes the constitutional standard.²¹ The belief in global responsibility, at least in part, drives proactive pacifism. “Japan is expected to make international contributions, and there are various challenges

¹⁸ John O. Haley, “Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context,” *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 1.

¹⁹ Credit Suisse Research Institute, *The End of Globalization or a More Multipolar World?* (Zurich, Switzerland: Credit Suisse AG, September 2015), 41.

²⁰ James J. Przystup, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Review of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2015: 7; Rust Deming, “Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?” *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 3.

²¹ Peter D. Fromm, “Understanding Japan’s Role in Securing the Western Pacific,” *Military Review* Vol. 97, No. 4 (July/August 2017): 77.

that Japan cannot meet under its current constitution.”²² The recent UN peacekeeping operations (PKO), like South Sudan, are evidence of that.²³ Yet, “Japan could not engage in combat activities independently and only when directly attacked or at least threatened.”²⁴ The JSDF have the potential to be a more stabilizing role in the future PKO if left unrestrained by an Article 9.

Also, contributing to a policy of proactive pacifism, the world is dependent on global commerce and trade. Japan primarily imports raw goods and exports manufactured products. For the JSDF to extend its capability to assist the world and to protect Japanese interests abroad countering aggressive expansion in areas outside the homeland, evolving Article 9 will provide the justification to help this along, specifically legitimizing the JSDF and stipulating its role in protecting Japanese abroad. The first Japanese lead of a combined task force, CTF-151, is representative of what the JSDF can accomplish abroad if given the opportunity.²⁵

The Japanese have evolved their definition of JSDF offensive capability before to include endorsing defensive nuclear weapons, despite maintaining three nonnuclear principles.²⁶ Another example of when the policies governing the JSDF evolved is when the Japanese Diet authorized preemptive strikes against imminent ballistic missile attacks. The JSDF does engage in some multilateral exercises, but in most cases it is

²² Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 4.

²³ Michael MacArthur Bosack, "What Did Japan Learn in South Sudan?" *The Diplomat*, June 10, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/what-did-japan-learn-in-south-sudan/> (accessed January 1, 2018).

²⁴ John O. Haley, "Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context," *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 8.

²⁵ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 382.

²⁶ Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 2.

limited to security dialogues and visits, which hinders capability and interoperability.²⁷ Of course, there is no comparison to the dozens of U.S. exercises that occur annually.²⁸ All of these challenge restraints spun from interpretations of what defending Japanese national interests abroad is in terms of Article 9. For the moment, the Legislation for Peace and Security minimally accomplishes this fact, but a revised Article 9 would further remove restraints.

Yet, there are still challenges to U.S.-Japan interoperability. Even as security cooperation heightens and JSDF restrictions lessen, the thought toward Japan's history will remain, but the largest divide is the cultural barrier. Though efforts are made to bridge the gap, the differences are quite extreme. Using the U.S.-Japan relationship as a model, Japanese citizens are often fluent or conversant in English, but few U.S. citizens are even conversant in Japanese. The specifics of military jargon or operating procedures compound the difficulty and complexity of these cultural problems. Though the two countries share many defense architectures of similar design or manufacture, key components tend to be proprietary. So, while the systems look the same, they may not operate the same, nor have the same capabilities. Take the AKAGI-class and ARLEIGH BURKE-class destroyers for example. At first glance, they appear to be the same ship, and both platforms exhibit equivalent ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities.²⁹ But at more discernable levels, different electronics, radars, and weapon systems exist on each. Addressing system-level differences requires additional JSDF funding.

²⁷ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 497.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 473.

²⁹ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 330.

The Article 9 revision notwithstanding, these challenges will exist due to the dual nature of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, but there is a difference between what happens now and what will not happen after a revision. The JSDF feels routinely obligated to limit itself on how far it can advance the alliance or promote itself while under Constitutional constraints, an unintended consequence of operating in a restricted role in regards to Article 9.³⁰ The default becomes not what is in the realm of the possible or how the alliance can be furthered, but rather what the JSDF is one allowed to do. Any warfighter recognizes the distinct difference and the debilitating consequences of uncertainty regarding policies and legal restraints. The JSDF has every capability of a military and walks a fine line between the responsibilities of sovereignty and remaining in accord with its own Constitution.³¹ All of the policy limitations are underscored by the uncertainty of the constitutional legitimacy of the self-defense force, which to critics is in clear violation of the second clause of Article 9.³² To function as a partner within the Indo-Pacific region and perhaps later globally, Article 9 remains an important obstacle the Japanese must address.

³⁰ Personal experiences from two tours in Japan operating with the JSDF.

³¹ James E. Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World," *Law and Contemporary Problems* Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1990): 181.

³² Nippon Communications Foundation, "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance," *Nippon.com*, August 31, 2016, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00146/> (accessed December 27, 2017). The Japanese Communist Party wants to fully dissolve the JSDF in its entirety.

Chapter 5, Article 9 and Japanese Politics

“The peace we enjoy today is not bestowed upon us by someone else. The only way to achieve it is to establish it with our own hands.”¹ Prime Minister (PM) Abe made that statement shortly after announcing the new collective self-defense (CSD) policy, which suggested a significant change to Japan’s use of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). PM Abe’s announcement generated many of the same debates about militarism and pacifism within Japan as it did within the Indo-Pacific region. Review of the proposed changes and examination of the politics regarding how the Japanese employ the JSDF shows the revisions would enable Japan to address concerns about a resurgence of Japanese militarism and allow the JSDF to more adequately function as a U.S. and international partner.

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the Renunciation of War, has two clauses that separates Japan from most other countries. The first deals with Japan renouncing her sovereign right to conduct offensive and expansionist war, which was included to ensure Japan could not again become militaristic.² The clause states, “aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”³ As most nations have renounced war at some time in multi-lateral agreements, such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact or the UN Charter, it is possible to

¹ Japanese Prime Minister, “Press Conference by Prime Minister Abe, Tuesday, July 1, 2014,” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201407/0701kaiken.html (accessed December 29, 2017).

² James E. Auer, “Article Nine of Japan’s Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force ‘Forever’ to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World,” *Law and Contemporary Problems* Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1990): 175.

³ Japanese Constitution, Article 9.

view the clause as purely rhetorical. The Japanese people firmly believe, however, in renouncing war as a solemn promise between their society and its government, a lesson learned from its militaristic past.⁴ The philosophy and history behind the clause is why the Japanese only espouse defensive operations, i.e. self-defense. The Japanese are not considering any Article 9 proposal to alter this first clause.⁵ As such, regardless of any change to Article 9's second clause, the Japanese will still embrace some form of pacifism.

The second clause forbids Japan from maintaining any armed forces. It is this clause that is under consideration for revision. The clause, as currently written, states that "in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."⁶ Many inside and outside Japan interpret the second clause literally, as an absolute check against militarism. Others within Japan consider the clause applicable to offensive weaponry only, i.e. carriers and bombers, but both interpretations have evolved over time.⁷ Much of Japanese society understands that the security environment has changed since World War II, and the society has developed a view of proactive pacifism, which understands that a JSDF and international cooperation are

⁴ James E. Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World," *Law and Contemporary Problems* Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1990): 172.

⁵ Interview with a mid-level Japanese defense official, February 14, 2018.

⁶ Japanese Constitution, Article 9.

⁷ Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 2.

required.⁸ In all cases, the political framework for revisions of Article 9 are grounded in debates over pacifism and fears of militarism.

There is plenty of speculation and posturing in Japanese politics regarding what needs to be in a revised Article 9. There are primarily three general versions under consideration. Again, none alter the first clause. The Japanese seem to desire that the country must continue to steer clear of militarism and dedicate itself to pacifism. All likely proposals either edit the second clause or remove it outright. The first, and most likely as it is supported by PM Abe, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, is the addition of a third paragraph stipulating the need for a JSDF in contrast to what Article 9 states today.⁹ In this case, CSD interpretations would remain governed by a July 2014 Cabinet Decision and the Legislation for Peace and Security, but the JSDF could have a larger regional security role defending Japanese interests abroad with allies and partners, providing a more proactive stance. The next most likely proposal is a 2012 version supported by the former Defense Minister and party Secretary-General Shigeru Ishiba that completely removes the second clause altogether, replacing it with an updated clarification of the JSDF similar to a military under civilian control.¹⁰ This position

⁸ Kitaoka Shin'ichi, "The Turnabout of Japan's Security Policy: Toward 'Proactive Pacifism'," *Nippon.com*, April 2, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00108/> (accessed March 22, 2018).

⁹ Interview with a mid-level Japanese defense official, February 14, 2018; Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017); Mainichi Japan, "LDP Body Pushing for Article 9 Revision Draft Within Month," *The Mainichi*, February 8, 2018, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180208/p2a/00m/0na/021000c> (accessed February 20, 2018).

¹⁰ Interview with a mid-level Japanese defense official, February 14, 2018; Mainichi Japan, "LDP Body Pushing for Article 9 Revision Draft Within Month," *The Mainichi*, February 8, 2018, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180208/p2a/00m/0na/021000c> (accessed February 20, 2018); Nippon Communications Foundation, "The Article 9 Debate at a Glance," *Nippon.com*, August 31, 2016, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00146/> (accessed December 27, 2017).

removes the debate of the JSDF and CSD, but opens the Article 9 revision to criticism concerning the extent to which the Japanese could now use the JSDF, because there would no longer be limitations other than the threat of force. The least supported version simply adds verbiage concerning Japan's right to self-defense.¹¹ Such a limited approach could come into consideration as the coalition to approve an Article 9 revision may require additional votes from outside the LDP and incorporate other proposals for passage.¹² The most likely version, however, supports PM Abe's vision of proactive pacifism and international cooperation, while minimizing the scrutiny and escalation a normal Japanese military would provide.

As a practical matter, PM Abe's desired goal of 2020 for the implementation of an Article 9 revision means the passage of the amendment should occur no later than sometime in 2019.¹³ Enactment, when the legislation is in effect, should occur about six to twelve months after passage, when it is signed.¹⁴ The snap election for the lower chamber of the Diet, the House of Representatives, in October 2017 was a recent, expected first step toward that goal. By advancing the schedule from December 2018,

¹¹ Interview with a mid-level Japanese defense official, February 14, 2018; Mainichi Japan, "LDP Body Pushing for Article 9 Revision Draft Within Month," *The Mainichi*, February 8, 2018, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180208/p2a/00m/Ona/021000c> (accessed February 20, 2018).

¹² Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017).

¹³ Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017); Mainichi Japan, "PM's Call for Revisions to Article 9 of Constitution Puzzle Even Ruling Parties," *The Mainichi*, May 4, 2017, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20170504/p2a/00m/Ona/010000c> (accessed December 28, 2017).

¹⁴ Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017).

the lower house election would otherwise have been a distraction that drew attention and engendered a risk-adverse atmosphere during amendment consideration.¹⁵

To get a Constitutional amendment passed, the LDP must secure enough support prior to the end of 2018. Two hurdles remain to passing an Article 9 revision. The Constitutional amendment process, Article 96, stipulates both:

Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify. Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.¹⁶

A Constitutional amendment would require a supermajority, or two-thirds, vote in each house in the legislative branch of the Japanese government, plus a national referendum approved by a simple majority of the Japanese people. The Japanese Diet currently maintains a sufficient supermajority within the LDP-led coalition to pass an amendment.¹⁷ Hence, a window of opportunity is open now. Around a dozen political parties hold significant power; the LDP and its allied coalition leads through the chaos, levying enough votes in the Japanese Diet at any given time to sway a comfortable supermajority. So, the Diet vote could pass, in the summer/fall of 2018, with a little

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Japanese Constitution, Article 96.

¹⁷ Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017); Rust Deming, "Japan's Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?" *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 4.

leverage from the LDP and driven by the increasing security threats around the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁸ Politically, the timeline aligns for an Article 9 amendment.

Where the outcome becomes more unpredictable is the national referendum. While current polling suggests a majority, fifty-six percent, of the Japanese people support an Article 9 revision, it tends to ebb and flow based on current events.¹⁹ The April 30, 2019 abdication of the Japanese emperor, Emperor Akihito, in favor of his son, Crown Prince Naruhito, could have significant consequences. Current law implies that the emperor serves until his death. Due to Japanese law, while on the throne, the emperor cannot influence politics directly, but the law does not govern a former emperor's behavior after abdication, and there is no modern legal precedent.²⁰

The Emperor and Empress have tirelessly advocated and worked during their tenure to uphold the values of pacifism.²¹ The emperor, freed from legal constraints, could openly campaign against an Article 9 revision. The abdication and subsequent events, to include the upcoming hosting of the Summer Olympics in 2020, will at least distract the Japanese for a greater part of 2019 and 2020.²² For PM Abe to successfully navigate his 2020 timeline and before he would step down in the 2019 elections, the United States should expect the national referendum to be in advance of the coordination

¹⁸ Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Seig, Linda, and Kaori Kaneko. "Japan's Emperor Akihito to Abdicate on April 30, 2019." *Reuters*. November 30, 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-emperor/japans-emperor-akihito-to-abdicate-on-april-30-2019-idUSKBN1DV3AS> (accessed March 22, 2018).

²² Michael MacArthur Bosack, "Japan's Path to Constitutional Amendment," *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017).

with the abdication. As such, with a political majority present and impending national events looming, the passage of Article 9 is a logical path to conclusion for the Japanese government.

In addition to the uncertainty national and international events provide an Article 9 revision, public opinion could waver for the JSDF, as well. Current polling suggests that public interest and impressions of the JSDF are at historic highs.²³ Hypothetically, Japanese public support could evaporate if the JSDF sustained significant casualties while supporting regional security. The Japanese anxiety over recent JSDF peacekeeping operations in the vicinity of combat in the South Sudan seems to attest to this conclusion.²⁴ During the JSDF deployment, PM Abe tried to preemptively assuage concerns when he stated, “Japan will not be involved in a war to protect another nation.”²⁵ While the LDP holds significant power in the Japanese Diet, as the supermajority, public opinion could easily change, which could limit support for constitutional revision and further limit the ability of the JSDF. Furthermore, China could attempt to manipulate public opinion by increasing or decreasing its antagonistic role in the Senkakus.

Under the current Constitution, the Self-Defense Forces Law and the Legislation for Peace and Security allowed the JSDF to expand the means with which it provides security, but the political parties make the sustainment of that legislation precarious. The LDP could lose power or the Japanese Diet could reinterpret the constitutionality of

²³ Japanese Ministry of Defense, *2017 Defense of Japan*, (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, June 2017), 518.

²⁴ Michael MacArthur Bosack, “What Did Japan Learn in South Sudan?” *The Diplomat*, June 10, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/what-did-japan-learn-in-south-sudan/> (accessed January 1, 2018).

²⁵ Nippon Communications Foundation, “Abe’s Moves Toward Collective Self-Defense,” *Nippon.com*, July 11, 2014, <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00062/> (accessed December 27, 2017).

current legislation. The LDP currently represents the will of the Japanese people, demonstrating a stunning reaffirmation of control over the national government through overwhelmingly positive results in recent general elections the past few years. Nevertheless, “interpretations left to elected governments are by definition subject to change.”²⁶ Surprisingly, it is not this aforementioned urgency that drives the Japanese government toward an Article 9 amendment, but rather a duty to codify the vision of the JSDF.²⁷ Yet, as of May 2018, despite firm LDP control, the Japanese Diet has been unable to issue a revised Article 9 proposal. That should change as a draft proposal is expected soon.²⁸ Recent shifts in Japanese politics also removed much support against Japanese Constitutional revision.²⁹

The Japanese are proceeding towards an Article 9 revision, and have been for some time. Evolving from militarism to passive pacifism after World War II, the Japanese now need to evolve further into proactive pacifism to address today’s security environment. Real security threats exist for the Japanese, driving shifts in public opinion and policy for the JSDF. These new challenges, both internally to Japan and within the Indo-Pacific region, require an introspective look at old policies like Article 9. Revision of Article 9 remains the logical conclusion to addressing these challenges.

²⁶ John O. Haley, “Article 9 in the Post-Sunakawa World: Continuity and Deterrence within a Transforming Global Context,” *Washington International Law Journal* Vol. 26, No. 1 (January 2017): 3.

²⁷ Interview with a mid-level Japanese defense official, February 14, 2018.

²⁸ Mainichi Japan, “LDP Body Pushing for Article 9 Revision Draft Within Month,” *The Mainichi*, February 8, 2018, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180208/p2a/00m/0na/021000c> (accessed February 20, 2018); Michael MacArthur Bosack, “Japan’s Path to Constitutional Amendment,” *The Diplomat*, May 26, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/japans-path-to-constitutional-amendment/> (accessed December 28, 2017).

²⁹ Rust Deming, “Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?” *Strategic Forum* No. 213 (November 2004): 3.

Chapter 6, Conclusion

The Article 9 revision to the Japanese Constitution is the natural, and expected, return of Japan to a sovereign state. Despite its history almost a century ago, Japan has taken a more realistic position since then and remains a proven, pacifistic nation, one of the few countries that learned from its militaristic past. Japan has moved beyond war and now uses its military in a purely defensive role to protect its citizenry. Yet, passive pacifism only succeeds when the security environment remains relatively benign. Given the growing threats in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan will need to better defend itself. A defensive force is an effective deterrent only if its enemies understand the force can be used. The deterrence effects of Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) fades as the People's Republic of China (PRC) military gains in capability and reach. A more proactive pacifistic stance, using cooperative security, is required. Article 9 in its current form remains a critical barrier, but the opportunity exists now to revise it.

The JSDF is the best regional military force to prevent escalation of threats across the Indo-Pacific region. Under an Article 9 revision, allowing the JSDF to become a full ally in the Japan-U.S. alliance and a contributing partner to other coalitions is imperative. Threats from state actors like the PRC and North Korea loom on the horizon. The drive for energy and resources like oil and rare earth minerals will lend itself to greater conflicts in the future. PRC expansion will continue, and the South China Sea is just the beginning. The security environment will continue to destabilize until a regional actor like Japan can offset the PRC. The JSDF can fill that crucial role in restoring the balance of power. The Article 9 revision allows the JSDF to balance its ingrained need for pacifism against the potential militarism of an increasingly expansionistic adversary.

The ramifications of such a revision will not only impact the bilateral alliance between the United States and Japan, but also have lasting implications on the security environment and relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. In order not to further destabilize the region, the United States, and its representative, USINDOPACOM, should take advantage of this opportunity and support the Article 9 revision, allowing Japan to take a leading role within Indo-Pacific regional security. U.S. situational awareness will be crucial over the political process and the desired security environment. Any ample forewarning to avoid unintended consequences or untoward incidents may be enough to gain passage of the Article 9 revision. At the very least, Japan will look to the United States for concurrence and potentially guidance. The United States may further help by stepping aside to give the JSDF the lead wherever possible with coalition partners, proving the worth of the JSDF and highlighting the limitations under the current Article 9. The Japanese would in turn appreciate the responsibility; adversaries would be less threatened by the United States, but most importantly, the United States would still advance its national interests in the region by taking a supporting role. Revising Article 9 may become the key factor to promoting the USINDOPACOM Theater Strategy against its future security challenges.

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