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**THE WEAPONIZATION OF MIGRATION: EXAMINING
MIGRATION AS A 21st CENTURY TOOL OF
POLITICAL WARFARE**

by

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December 2017

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21st CENTURY TOOL OF POLITICAL WARFARE**

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ABSTRACT

In today's interconnected world, international migration continues to grow as migrants come from all around the globe in search of better lives for themselves and their families. While many migrants seek to improve social and economic status, others come in search of asylum due to conflict, political repression, or fear of persecution in their country of origin. As globalization steadily diffuses international power and blurs the line between war and peace, human migration is becoming a viable weapon in the arsenal of many state and non-state actors pursuing unconventional means to increase regional influence and to achieve objectives. This thesis examines different means in which state and non-state actors make use of human migration to achieve political, economic, or military objectives while also analyzing the conditions necessary to achieve these desired objectives. The ability to map these trends and identify underlying conditions that are the precursors to weaponizing migration will enable military and other interagency elements to better develop strategies and to mitigate potential vulnerabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GMO	Genetically Modified Organisms
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
MS-13	Mara Salvatrucha
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PRC	People's Republic of China
RT	Russia Today
TCO	Transnational Criminal Organization
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VEO	Violent Extremist Organization

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I. ON WEAPONIZED MIGRATION

A. INTRODUCTION

In today's interconnected world, international migration continues to increase as migrants from all around the globe seek better lives for themselves and their families. While many migrants seek to improve their social and economic status, others migrate in search of asylum due to conflict, political repression, or fear of persecution in their country of origin. As globalization steadily diffuses international power and blurs the line between war and peace, human migration is becoming a viable weapon in the arsenal of many state and non-state actors pursuing unconventional means to increase regional influence and achieve their varied objectives.

Conventional wisdom leads many to believe that weaponizing migration refers exclusively to recent efforts by Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) to infiltrate refugee flows and to facilitate terrorist operations in states offering asylum. Although this is one form of weaponized migration, many other variants—subject only to a policy maker's imagination—exist. Exploiting vulnerable populations is nothing new, as examples can be found throughout history, ranging from European colonization of the Americas to the 1980 Mariel boatlift through which Fidel Castro coerced the United States into foreign policy concessions after sending more than 100,000 Cuban migrants, including criminals and the mentally disabled, to Florida.¹ Although weaponizing migration is not uncommon, it is understudied in academia where only select cases have been examined.

B. CURRENT OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Today's operational environment is changing rapidly and U.S. adversaries are adapting just as quickly. America's technological superiority is unquestioned in most realms, and should remain dominant in the coming years. But the United States and its allies are currently being challenged and, in many cases, overpowered in other, far more

¹ Kelly Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2010), 89–106.

politically uncomfortable domains. The current operational environment can no longer be described in terms of a war and peace dichotomy. Instead, complex threats occupy positions along the entire spectrum of conflict.² Whether we lump their actions under the terms Political Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, Asymmetric Warfare, or Next-Generation Warfare, adversaries will continue to pursue innovative means to gain advantages. And, by weaponizing humans in non-technological ways, state and non-state actors will seek to equalize the playing field without engaging in armed conflict.

C. BACKGROUND LITERATURE AND THEORY

While weaponizing migration is not a new tactic, the literature about it is limited and, until recently, has not included theory. Instead, scholars have sought to identify causes for rapid growth in international migration and have generally focused on explaining refugee-producing episodes. Although scholars who address the topic, such as Michael Teitelbaum,³ Myron Weiner,⁴ Robert Mandel,⁵ and Charles Keely⁶ offer varied explanations, the root causes of migration generally fall into one of the following categories:

- Political instability
- Civil conflict/Ethnic conflict
- Economic opportunity
- Environmental degradation/Natural disaster

² Department of the Army, SOF Support to Political Warfare White Paper, Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2015. [http://www.soc.mil/swcs/ProjectGray/Support%20to%20Political%20Warfare%20White%20Paper%20v2.3-RMT%20\(10MAR2015\)%20%20%20.pdf](http://www.soc.mil/swcs/ProjectGray/Support%20to%20Political%20Warfare%20White%20Paper%20v2.3-RMT%20(10MAR2015)%20%20%20.pdf).

³ Michael S. Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy," *International Organization* 38, no. 3 (1984): 429–450.

⁴ Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods," *International Security* 21, no. 1 (1996): 11; "Security, Stability, and International Migration," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992): 92.

⁵ Robert Mandel, "Perceived Security Threat and the Global Refugee Crisis," *Armed Forces and Society* 24, no. 1 (1997): 77–103.

⁶ Charles Keely, "How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows," *International Migration Review* 30, no. 4 (1996): 1056.

- Migratory barriers removed/Increased communication/transportation capability

Teitelbaum does go a step further and subdivides international migrants into four types: permanent-legal immigrants, temporary-legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and refugees.⁷ However, when considering the potential ways in which migration can be weaponized, this typology requires modification, and should include other dislocated civilian categories such as internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and returnees.⁸

Teitelbaum and Weiner were the first academics to suggest that governments regularly create mass migrations as a tool of foreign policy. Among the examples they cite are the British colonization of North America, Israeli settlements in the West Bank,⁹ and Soviet attempts to influence Pakistani decision-making by driving Afghans to seek asylum across the Durand Line.¹⁰ Of course, the United States is no stranger to utilizing immigration as a means to achieve foreign policy objectives. In fact, the United States utilized Cuban exiles when attempting to overthrow Fidel Castro during the Bay of Pigs invasion.¹¹ Conversely, the United States has also sacrificed its policy objectives to *prevent* immigration. Fidel Castro's ability to unleash migrant flows from Cuba resulted in multiple U.S. foreign policy concessions spanning multiple decades and multiple presidential administrations.¹²

Others have since expanded on Teitelbaum's and Weiner's research, citing examples of nations that have engineered mass migrations to force recognition of the sending state, to stop interference from a receiving state, to destabilize the receiving

⁷ Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy," 429–450.

⁸ Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 3-57 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2011), http://www.apd.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/fm3_57.pdf.

⁹ Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy," 437–438.

¹⁰ Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," 101.

¹¹ Jorge I. Dominguez, "Immigration as Foreign Policy in US-Latin American Relations," in *Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Robert W. Tucker, Charles B. Keely, Linda Wrigley (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 153.

¹² Dominguez, "Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy," 150–166.

state,¹³ and/or to extend influence through colonization.¹⁴ Kelly Greenhill—building on this work—labels such a tactic “strategically engineered migration,” and suggests four all-inclusive types of strategically engineered migration: dispossessive, exportive, militarized, and coercively-engineered.¹⁵

While Greenhill has clearly added to Teitelbaum’s and Weiner’s earlier work, she has focused primarily on coercively engineered migration. Also, the research undertaken so far overwhelmingly examines inter-state migration. Yet, today’s operational environment also calls for us to take into account intra-state conflict, as well as actions taken by Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) and non-state actors.

¹³ Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes,” *International Migration Review* 30, no. 3 (1996): 665, doi:10.2307/2547631.

¹⁴ Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” 102–103.

¹⁵ Kelly Greenhill, “Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War,” *Civil Wars* 10, no. 1 (2008): 8.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis examines how state and non-state actors make use of human migration as a means to achieve political, economic, and/or military objectives while also taking into consideration the conditions necessary to achieve these goals. The ability to map the trends and identify the underlying conditions that are the precursors to being able to weaponize migration should enable military and other interagency elements to better develop counter-measures as well as strategies to mitigate vulnerabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

A. METHODOLOGY

Using open-source data from leading inter-governmental organizations in the human migration field, and limiting my sample to cases occurring within the last decade (2007-2016), I identify migratory trends affecting populations estimated to be in excess of 50,000 people.¹⁶ I then narrow my investigation to cases in which challengers leverage human migration to achieve their objectives. By limiting my sample to the last 10 years, I can compare migratory trends given a common operational environment, and extend any insights into the near future. I have not limited my sample of weaponized migration to any specific form of migration but, rather, I include all forms of legal migration, illegal migration, and cases involving dislocated civilians. In addition, I identify cases in which mass migration does not occur, but where entities leverage the *threat* of human migration to achieve a desired outcome. I also identify potential uses of migration and analyze how state and non-state actors might choose to employ them in the future. Finally, in my typological analysis I categorize variants of weaponized migration in order to better gauge their efficacy, and thereby facilitate a better understanding of this tactic in today's operational environment.

¹⁶ Data for this research comes from the United Nations and International Organization for Migration annual publications on migration and databases.

B. UNDERSTANDING WEAPONIZED MIGRATION

Weaponized migration occurs when a challenging state or non-state actor exploits human migration—whether voluntary or forced—in order to achieve political, military, and/or economic objectives. In all cases, the challenger weaponizes migration by either strategically engineering the migration itself, or by opportunistically exploiting migratory events already underway.

C. TYPOLOGY

Building on earlier work by migration scholars, and drawing on my research that examines cases occurring since 2007, we can distinguish among seven, non-mutually exclusive variants of weaponized migration. Figure 1 presents a comprehensive typology of these variants.




Figure 1. Weaponized Migration Categories¹⁷

¹⁷ Adapted from Greenhill, “Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War,” 8.

- Coercive—Occurs when a challenger utilizes, or threatens to utilize, human migration as a foreign policy instrument to induce behavioral changes, or to gain concessions from the target.¹⁸
- Dispossession—Usually consists of, or is precipitated by a series of events during which the challenger employs migration as a means to appropriate territory or resources from the target group. This can include the purging of a target group considered to be an ethnic, political, or economic threat.¹⁹
- Expulsive—Occurs when a dissident target group is expelled to solidify power; the displacement of a population may also be used to politically destabilize an adversary.²⁰
- Economic—Describes when a challenger utilizes the inflow or outflow of economic migrants or dislocated civilians for economic gain.
- Fifth Column—Refers to a long-term strategy in which a challenger dispatches migrants to a target’s territory (or recruits migrants already within a territory) to undermine a target government. Opportunistically, a challenger may choose to employ its citizens and/or sympathizers already living abroad as a fifth column against an adversary.
- Militarized—Includes the forced displacement of a population to disrupt enemy operations or to lessen support for opposing military forces. This form of weaponized migration can also include the infiltration of migrants into a target’s territory or the recruitment of dislocated civilians—many times forcibly—for increased manpower.
- Propaganda/Political—Leverages migration to increase political legitimacy, to decrease an adversary’s political clout, or to justify future actions. Generally, challengers will incorporate migration-related propaganda into their information operations to improve their perceived legitimacy regionally or internationally.

¹⁸ Greenhill, “Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War,” 8.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

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III. TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

After reviewing migration trends between 2007 and 2016, I identified 50 cases in which a challenging actor deliberately weaponized migration (Figure 2).




Figure 2. Weaponized Migration by Type (2007–2016)

In many instances, a challenger’s actions has served multiple ends. For example, since 2008, Iran has continued to threaten its Afghan refugee population with expulsion. This coercive technique allows Iran to maintain influence and political leverage within Afghanistan at the expense of the United States. By threatening to deport Afghan refugees, Iran is able to indirectly increase instability within the region (exportive), and facilitate foreign fighter infiltration into Afghanistan (militarized), both of which impact stability and run contrary to U.S. aims

Figure 3 depicts the range of weaponized migration types, from strategically engineered to opportunistic, and details how challengers employ each variant. For example, challengers generally induce population migrations deliberately when using the propaganda and fifth column variants, while more often than not challengers apply the

militarized and economic forms opportunistically when targets of opportunity present themselves.

In addition, Figure 3 also portrays where each challenger operates along the weaponized migration spectrum. Nation-state challengers span the entire spectrum and, historically, weaponize migration more often than does any other type of entity. Also, certain types of government, such as democracies or authoritarian regimes, utilize particular variants more frequently. At the same time, certain types of government are more susceptible to certain types of variants. In the following section, I will discuss these trends in further detail.




Figure 3. Spectrum of Weaponized Migration

Perhaps not surprisingly, other types of challengers operate along a much narrower spectrum. IGOs, for example, utilize weaponized migration less often than other challengers, which can likely be attributed to their having more stakeholders. For the European Union (EU) to weaponize migration, for instance, all 28 member states would

have to approve the strategy. Because consensus is difficult, and because member states have conflicting objectives, IGOs rarely use variants in unison. Financial objectives seem to be those they are most likely to agree on, and consequently, IGOs will generally limit weaponized migration to either coercive or economic variants (e.g. EU vs Turkey).

A. WEAPONIZED MIGRATION VARIANT 1—COERCIVE

1. Background

Mass migration, an extremely polarizing issue, inevitably leads to public outcries calling for resolutions that, many times, would violate international law. For instance, as a signatory of the 1948 Human Rights Declaration, the United States publicly acknowledges Article 14 which states, “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”²¹ The United States is not a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which initially defined international legal obligations concerning the protection of refugees,²² but rather, the United States is a signatory of the updated 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees.²³ These protocols, which seek to protect human rights, make nation-states vulnerable to coercively engineered migration since they force states to choose between accepting asylum seekers, along with significant logistical costs, or turning away asylum seekers and preventing immigration. Either path comes with certain domestic political costs.²⁴

Since 2007, states using outflows of migrants have attempted to gain policy concessions or extort adversaries on at least fifteen occasions. In all of these cases, either a nation-state or IGO acted as challenger, while targets varied between states and IGOs, (11/15) and non-state (4/15) actors. Prior to 2007, weaker states generally used coercively engineered migration to target more powerful nations. But this trend seems to be

²¹ “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations, December 10, 1948, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights>.

²² “The 1951 Refugee Convention,” United Nations Refugee Agency, July 25, 1951, accessed November 12, 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html>.

²³ “States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol,” UNHCR, accessed April 16, 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf>.

²⁴ James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (1994): 577–592.

changing. Before 2007, challenging states that coercively used, or threatened the use of migration, were typically considered to be militarily inferior to the states they targeted.²⁵ However, this trend has reversed, and since 2007 only 27% (4/15) of challengers were militarily weaker than their targets. For instance, countries such as Russia, Iran, and Pakistan are effectively using the technique against their neighbors. Even IGOs are fighting back with this technique as evidenced by the EU's actions, which I will discuss later in this chapter. Table 1 illustrates coercive migration cases occurring in the last 10 years.

Table 1. Coercive Migration Cases

START YEAR	END YEAR	CHALLENGER	ASSISTED BY	TARGET	LOCATION	COERCE
						Force Policy Concession / Extort
Pre-2007	2017	Israel	USA	Palestine, Syria	West Bank, Gaza, and Golan Heights	X
Pre-2007	2017	Sudan	Janjaweed	rebels & citizens	Sudan	X
2007	2009	Kenya govt		Somali asylum seekers / international community	Kenya	X
2008	2017	Iran		USA / Afghanistan	Afghanistan	X
2009	2017	Eritrea govt		Eritrean diaspora	Global	X
2010	2017	Libya		EU	Europe	X
2011	2011	Ecuador		Colombia	Ecuador	X
2013	2017	Russia		Kyrgyzstan / Tajikistan	Russia	X
2014	2017	Pakistan	UNHCR	Afghanistan	Pakistan	X
2014	2015	Russia		Finland / Norway	border region	X
2015	2017	Turkey		EU	Turkish / EU border	X
2015	2017	EU		Turkey	Turkish / EU border	X
2016	2017	Iran	Syria	ISIS / Syria rebels / Afghan refugees	Iran, Syria	X
2016	2017	USA		Mexico	US / Mexico border	X
2016	2017	EU		Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan	EU Border	X

²⁵ Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, 23-31.

For coercive migration to be effective, the threat of migration must come at a higher cost than that of compliance with the challenger's demands.²⁶ Costs to a target may be political or economic and, based on the situation, a target's vulnerability will likely increase. Historically, Fidel Castro strategically timed his use of coercive migration to coincide with U.S. political campaigns, thus forcing a candidate to act quickly or risk facing political fallout from a migration crisis during election season. There are no cases over the past decade when a challenger specifically targeted a candidate by threatening the use of mass migration, but the susceptibility certainly exists. If the target's cost of inaction is less than the cost of meeting a challenger's requirements, then the target is not likely to comply. Thus, the challenger must understand the target to determine which manner of weaponized migration to use.

The type of government or regime plays an important role when evaluating potential costs. Democratic nations, for example, must consider popular opinion when determining whether to concede to, or reject, the challenger's demands. When Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi threatened to turn Europe "black" unless the EU provided financial assistance and met other demands, the EU submitted.²⁷ Alternatively, when President Trump threatened to stop remittances from migrants unless Mexico funded a border wall, Mexico's leadership refused.²⁸ Whether or not President Trump follows through on this threat remains to be seen, but nonetheless, the example demonstrates the importance of credibility when attempting to use this variant.

Historically, authoritarian governments have proved less vulnerable to coercive migration because they are harder for domestic constituents to pressure. Perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the international community does remain important. But with minimal risk of being removed from power if they lose popular support, authoritarian

²⁶ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), 4.

²⁷ Kelly Greenhill, "Migration as a Weapon in Theory and in Practice," *Military Review* (2016): 24.

²⁸ Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, "Trump Reveals How He Would Force Mexico to Pay for Border Wall," *Washington Post*, April 5, 2016, accessed June 19, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-would-look-to-block-money-transfers-to-force-mexico-to-fund-border-wall/2016/04/05/c0196314-fa7c-11e5-80e4-c381214de1a3_story.html?utm_term=.5aee31ec1309.

leaders have much more leeway to stop migrants and displaced persons at a border and refuse them entry.

2. Force Policy Concession/Extortion (EU vs. Turkey)

The ongoing migration crisis in Europe illustrates the manner in which governing entities exploit vulnerable populations and coerce adversaries into policy concessions. In 2013, approximately 1.3 million migrants applied for asylum status in the 28 European Union (EU) member countries, plus non-EU members Switzerland and Norway.²⁹ The surge in applications was blamed primarily on various conflicts throughout Southwest Asia and North Africa. In 2015, Syrian asylum seekers alone accounted for nearly 700,000 applications.³⁰ For many Syrian migrants seeking asylum in the EU, the first step has been traveling a precarious route through Turkey, followed by crossing sections of the Aegean Sea to reach Greece, an EU member-state.

This large influx of migrants recently put leaders of EU nations in an unenviable bind. All EU members are signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees that define a state's obligations and responsibilities towards protecting refugees on their territory.³¹ Yet, mass migration from Syria has proven to be economically taxing and politically polarizing for many EU member-states. Recent terror-related attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, and Barcelona have sparked fears of terrorist operatives infiltrating the EU via the migration crisis, and ultimately, have forced politicians to choose between fulfilling international and legal obligations relating to human rights and refugee protection, or responding to domestic pressure from constituents who vote in future elections.

Turkey acts as the pathway between Syria and the EU, and, in a sense, Turkey operates the lever controlling the migrant flow into the EU. The Turkish government has

²⁹ Phillip Conner, "Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015," Pew Research Center, August 2, 2016, accessed March 5, 2016, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/>.

³⁰ "Syria Regional Refugee Response," UNHCR, 2017, accessed March 5, 2017, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php>.

³¹ "States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol," UNHCR, accessed April 16, 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf>.

the ability to manage the number of Syrian migrants entering Turkey as well as the number of Syrian migrants attempting sea crossings to the Greek islands. Financial impacts from the migration crisis are significant in both Turkey and the EU, but politically effects in Turkey are minimized due to the state's shift from a more democratic to a more authoritarian-style government.

3. A Game Theory Approach to Migration

Basic game theory demonstrates how states can coercively use migration to achieve their objectives. We can use game theory to identify both Turkey and the EU's ideal strategy for how best to coerce one another or for how to better cooperate so as to optimally resolve their disagreements over migratory policy.

Assumptions and Rules

- Each player is rational
- Each player seeks to maximize its individual strategy
- Players are able to communicate at all times
- EU objectives³²
 - Ensure Turkey secures its border and minimizes the number of Syrian migrants into EU member-states
 - Avoid expediting the process for Turkish accession into the EU
 - Abide by international law; be perceived by international community as human rights advocate
 - Return irregular migrants to Turkey
 - Limit visa liberalization policy for Turkish citizens
 - Provide minimal economic aid to address the migrant crisis
- Turkish objectives³³

³² Bianca Benvenuti, "The Migration Paradox and EU-Turkey Relations," *Istituto Affari Internazionali* (2016): 1-23.

³³ *Ibid.*, 1-23.

- Expedite process for accession into EU
- Receive maximum economic aid
- EU visa liberalization for Turkish residents
- Minimize number of migrants in Turkey
- Abide by international law; be perceived by international community as human rights advocate
- Avoid taking irregular migrants back from EU

a. Initial Options

Figure 4 illustrates options for both the EU and Turkey by using letters to indicate coercion or cooperation, while numbers indicate the ordinal value of the option. Four is the preferred option for each player and one is the least preferred option. The first number in each quadrant indicates the EU’s ordinal value, followed by the second number that indicates Turkey’s ordinal value.

			TURKEY	
			Coerce EU for \$\$ and policy change	Cooperate With EU
			C	D
EU	Coerce Turkey to Stop Migrants	A	1,1	4,2
	Cooperate With Turkey	B	2,4	3,3

AC	EU attempts to coerce Turkey; Turkey attempts to coerce EU; both achieve very few objectives
AD	EU coerces Turkey and achieves all objectives; Turkey cooperates and achieves few objectives
BC	EU cooperates and achieves few objectives; Turkey coerces EU and achieves all objectives
BD	EU cooperates and achieves some objectives; Turkey cooperates and achieves some objectives

Figure 4. Initial Coercive Migration Outcomes

Figure 4 is synonymous with the game of “chicken” which has the potential to lead to unfavorable outcomes for both players. When both players attempt to coerce each other in order to achieve their desired objectives, the players figuratively collide, resulting in the worst possible outcome for both parties as very few objectives are

achieved. If one player chooses to coerce while the other cooperates, the coercive player achieves the best possible outcome and achieves most of its objectives while its opponent receives the second-worst outcome and attains few objectives. An example of a coercive tactic would be Turkey relaying its intent to facilitate Syrian migration into Greece if the EU does not provide a certain amount of economic aid and if it does not also immediately liberalize visa requirements for Turkish citizens. Likewise, with Turkey seeking admission into the EU, member-states could express their intention to veto this option, or at a minimum, indicate they will slow the admissions process should Turkey not restrict the flow of migrants into Greece. Finally, if both players choose to cooperate, both players achieve their second-best outcome while achieving some of their desired objectives.

Clearly, neither the EU nor Turkey has a dominant strategy. Table 2 and Table 3 illustrate each player's options ranked from most to least desirable. Following conservative MAXIMIN strategies without communicating would lead to a payoff of 3,3. However, both players can improve their position by attempting to coerce the other and improve the payoff from 3 to 4. In fact, the Nash Equilibrium in this pure-strategy game lies at points AD and BC on the matrix and suggests that without communication, cooperation will be difficult to maintain. In addition, some elements of cooperation will be difficult to undo when either actor seeks to move from "cooperate" to "coerce." For example, if Turkey achieved its objective of expediting the EU admissions process, it would be more difficult for the EU to overturn this than it would be for Turkey to readjust the flow of migrants into Greece. Consequently, the player that is more incentivized to change strategies to improve its absolute outcome is more likely to deviate from a cooperative strategy.

Table 2. Options Available to the European Union Ranked 4 to 1

4	Best	AD	EU coerces Turkey and achieves all objectives; Turkey cooperates and achieves few objectives
3	Second Best	BD	EU cooperates and achieves some objectives; Turkey cooperates and achieves some objectives
2	Next to Worst	BC	EU cooperates and achieves few objectives; Turkey coerces EU and achieves all objectives
1	Worst	AC	EU attempts to coerce Turkey; Turkey attempts to coerce EU; both achieve very few objectives

Table 3. Options Available to Turkey Ranked 4 to 1

4	Best	BC	EU cooperates and achieves few objectives; Turkey coerces EU and achieves all objectives
3	Second Best	BD	EU cooperates and achieves some objectives; Turkey cooperates and achieves some objectives
2	Next to Worst	AD	EU coerces Turkey and achieves all objectives; Turkey cooperates and achieves few objectives
1	Worst	AC	EU attempts to coerce Turkey; Turkey attempts to coerce EU; both achieve very few objectives

b. Strategic Moves

The Syrian refugee crisis is an ongoing event requiring constant communication between the two players. In the game of chicken, with open communication, it is in each player’s interest to move first. In this case, moving first allows the challenger to achieve more of its objectives. By moving first, the EU should choose to coerce, forcing Turkey to maximize its own possible value by cooperating (AD/4,2). Additionally, the EU should not allow Turkey to move first as this would allow Turkey to coerce and therefore force the EU to cooperate for an outcome of 2,4 (BC). To defend against first-move coercion, players moving second should consider relaying a credible threat. For example, if Turkey signals it intends to coerce by choosing C, then the EU would benefit by also threatening coercion (See Figure 5). Assuming the EU’s counter-threat is credible, BC is eliminated as an option and Turkey must choose between AC, which means it will achieve very few objectives or AD—the better outcome for Turkey—whereby it will achieve more objectives. On the other hand, if the EU is first to act and intends to act coercively, Turkey should reciprocate by credibly threatening to open its borders with the EU (C), thereby forcing the EU to choose between its two worst options (AC/1,1 and BC/2,4).

While credible threats are beneficial, promises are strategically ineffective as they serve to reduce attainment of the outcome sought and thus would be declined. For the player who moves second, combining a threat with a promise is strategically beneficial (see Figure 6). When the first player communicates its intent to coerce, its opponent should threaten to do the same. This threat should be caveated with a promise to cooperate if the first player cooperates. Doing so would eliminate the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (BC, AD) and result in both players cooperating to achieve some of their objectives (BD).

			TURKEY	
			Coerce EU for \$\$ and policy change	Cooperate With EU
			C	D
EU	Coerce Turkey to Stop Migrants	A	1,1	4,2
	Cooperate With Turkey	B		3,3

Figure 5. Threat

			TURKEY	
			Coerce EU for \$\$ and policy change	Cooperate With EU
			C	D
EU	Coerce Turkey to Stop Migrants	A	1,1	
	Cooperate With Turkey	B		3,3

Figure 6. Threat with Promise

c. Interval Scaling

Ranking potential moves based on ordinal values helps identify strategies that might be applied in the game, but ordinal values do not reflect the true value of each player’s objectives. By using interval scaling, estimated values can be placed on the various objectives to determine their likely utility. In Table 4, I have assigned the likely estimated value that each player would assign to each objective; the higher values reflect a higher level of importance to the player. For instance, an objective valued at 3 is three times more important than an objective valued at 1. The utility of each outcome is based on my assumption about which objectives each player would achieve for each outcome.

Table 4. Cardinal Value of Objectives

EU		Turkey	
5	Secure Turkish border and limit number of Syrian migrants into EU	5	Expedite process for admission into EU
5	Avoid expediting process for Turkish accession into EU	5	Receive maximum economic aid
4	Abide by international law; perceived as human rights advocate	4	EU visa liberalization for Turkish residents
3	Return irregular migrants to Turkey	3	Limit number of migrants in Turkey
2	Limit visa liberalization policy for Turkish citizens	2	Abide by international law; perceived as human rights advocate
1	Provide minimal economic aid to address the migrant crisis	1	Avoid taking irregular migrants back from EU

Table 5 depicts the objectives each player is projected to achieve based on the outcome of the game and the cardinal utility associated with the outcome. Clearly, the EU would prefer to coerce and have Turkey cooperate (AD). Although this option would require the EU to provide economic aid to Turkey, the EU would not concede any of Turkey’s other demands. In addition, the EU would return “irregular” economic migrants—migrants that have taken advantage of the Syrian refugee crisis to unlawfully enter the EU—and exchange them for Syrian migrants in need of refuge. By making this exchange, the EU would relocate a limited number of Syrian families evenly throughout the European Union rather than overwhelming countries near the Turkish border, such as Greece. This would also satisfy the international community by demonstrating the EU’s willingness to assist with the refugee crisis.

Table 5. Cardinal Value of Outcomes

EU - AD - 19		Turkey - BC - 20	
5	Secure Turkish border and limit number of Syrian migrants into EU	5	Expedite process for admission into EU
5	Avoid expediting process for Turkish accession into EU	5	Receive maximum economic aid
4	Abide by international law; perceived as human rights advocate	4	EU visa liberalization for Turkish residents
3	Return irregular migrants to Turkey	3	Limit number of migrants in Turkey
2	Limit visa liberalization policy for Turkish citizens	2	Abide by international law; perceived as human rights advocate
EU - BD - 17		1	Avoid taking irregular migrants back from EU
5		Turkey - BD - 11	
5	Secure Turkish border and limit number of Syrian migrants into EU	5	Receive maximum economic aid
5	Avoid expediting process for Turkish accession into EU	5	Receive maximum economic aid
4	Abide by international law; perceived as human rights advocate	4	EU visa liberalization for Turkish residents
3	Return irregular migrants to Turkey	2	Abide by international law; perceived as human rights advocate
EU - BC - 9		Turkey - AD - 7	
5	Secure Turkish border and limit number of Syrian migrants into EU	5	Receive maximum economic aid
4	Abide by international law; perceived as human rights advocate	2	Abide by international law; perceived as human rights advocate
EU - AC - 8		Turkey - AC - 4	
5	Avoid expediting process for Turkish accession into EU	3	Limit number of migrants in Turkey
2	Limit visa liberalization policy for Turkish citizens	1	Avoid taking irregular migrants back from EU
1	Provide minimal economic aid to address the migrant crisis		

The EU’s next best option would be for both players to cooperate. The EU would continue to achieve most of its objectives but, in this case, the EU would provide economic aid to Turkey while liberalizing the visa entry policy for Turkish citizens (BD).

Cooperating with a coercive Turkey would be the EU's second-worst option as the migratory flow would remain limited, but at the cost of fast-tracking Turkey's admission into the EU (BC). Given President Erdogan's increasing consolidation of power and the potential consequences associated with that, this option is not preferred. If both players, meanwhile, attempted to coerce each other, little would be accomplished (AC). Turkey might open the border and allow migrants to overwhelm the EU, but the EU would refuse to entertain discussion of Turkey's admission into the EU, would refuse to liberalize current visa policies, and would refuse to provide economic aid.

As was true for the EU, Table 4 also represents Turkey's cardinal utility for each possible outcome. Turkey would achieve the most utility by coercing a cooperative EU (BC). Although many migrants would stay within Turkish borders, the flow would not completely stop. The EU would provide sufficient economic aid to maintain minimum international standards for refugee operations. More importantly for Turkey, the EU would be forced to expedite Turkey's admission process into the EU while immediately relaxing visa requirements for Turkish citizens traveling to the EU. On the other hand, should both players cooperate, Turkey's aspirations for entrance to the EU would remain long-term, but at least travel restrictions within the EU would loosen with the relaxed visa policy (BD). As for what would happen if Turkey cooperated with a coercive EU, economic aid would be provided to help pay for refugee costs, while also allowing Turkey to make up for some of the economic shortfalls it has experienced since the 2016 attempted coup. If, however, both players attempted to coerce each other, Turkey's migrant issue would shift to become more of a problem for the EU, but Turkey would gain nothing from the EU in return (AC). Finally, when looking at both countries' cardinal utilities in Figure 7, it becomes apparent that BD is nearer maximum utility for the EU (17) than Turkey (11), suggesting that the EU is more likely to accept the mutual-cooperative option.




Figure 7. Interval Scales

Figure 8 illustrates the new game with cardinal utilities factored in. Again, no dominant strategy exists for either player and the Nash equilibria remain at **AD** and **BC** in this pure-strategy, non-zero-sum game. Figure 9 indicates that **BD**—the cooperative strategy for both players—is Pareto optimal as neither player can improve without hurting its opponent’s outcome. Although each player seeks to maximize its outcome, the two players have an enduring relationship and should seek to negotiate a mutually acceptable outcome.

		TURKEY		
		Coerce EU for \$\$ and policy change	Cooperate With EU	
		C	D	
EU	Coerce Turkey to Stop Migrants	A	8,4	19,7
	Cooperate With Turkey	B	9,20	17,11

Figure 8. European Union vs. Turkey—Cardinal Utility




Figure 9. Payoff Polygon

And indeed, **BD**—the obvious solution to the migration game—represents the March 2016 agreement between the two players.³⁴

Unfortunately, neither the game nor the migration problem ends here. The cooperative agreement does not reflect continued threats of coercion now that agreed upon terms have been violated and other events have occurred. In reality, the EU has failed to meet the deadline for easing visa-entry standards as agreed upon, and EU members recently passed a non-binding resolution to freeze talks on Turkish EU membership in light of President Erdogan’s heavy-handed response to the failed coup attempt. Consequently, it should not be surprising that President Erdogan has accused the EU of breaking promises and has threatened to reopen Turkey’s borders to allow migrants to flow freely into the EU. Further complicating matters for the EU is that its member states have been unable to return most irregular migrants to Turkey as many are beginning to claim asylum in order to avoid being sent back there.

³⁴ “EU-Turkey Statement,” European Council and Council of the European Union, 18 March 2016, accessed October 25, 2016, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement> .

B. WEAPONIZED MIGRATION VARIANT 2—DISPOSSESSIVE

One can find throughout history instances of weaponizing migration by dispossessive means. The first recorded example of this occurred in the Assyrian Empire during the eighth century BC. King Tiglath-Pileser III utilized the combination of forced deportations to appropriate new territory and to strengthen his already prominent empire.³⁵ The Babylonians, Greeks, and Romans continued these tactics of expelling people to appropriate territory and resources while neutralizing potential ethnic, political, or economic threats

When in the Middle Ages leaders sought to reassert religious purity, they often unleashed bouts of ethnic cleansing directed at minority populations of Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims, and other religious sects.³⁶ In fact, U.S. history can be said to have been shaped by use of weaponized migration. Witness Indian reservations, which were a direct result of forced relocations by the U.S. government as it dispossessed Indians and appropriated their territory. Table 6 lists known dispossessive migration cases from the last ten years.

³⁵ Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 111-112.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 111.

Table 6. Dispossessive Migration Cases

START YEAR	END YEAR	CHALLENGER	ASSISTED BY	TARGET	LOCATION	DISPOSSESSIVE	
						Appropriate Territory and / or Resources	Ethnic Cleansing
Pre-2007	2017	Israel	Palestinians	Jordan	Jordan	X	
Pre-2007	2015	FARC		Colombian govt	Colombia / Ecuador border	X	
Pre-2007	2017	Israel	USA	Palestine, Syria	West Bank, Gaza, and Golan Heights	X	
Pre-2007	2009	Tamil Tigers		Sri Lanka / Sinhalese	Sri Lanka	X	X
Pre-2007	2017	Myanmar Govt		Rohingya Muslims & Rakhine Buddhists	Rakhine State, Myanmar	X	X
Pre-2007	2017	Sudan	Janjaweed	Ethnic / tribal adversary	Sudan	X	X
Pre-2007	2008	Central African Republic		Ethnic / tribal adversary	Central African Republic		X
Pre-2007	2017	Al-Houthi		Yemen / Sunni	Yemen	X	X
2007	2009	General Nkunda forces (Tutsi)	Rwanda Govt (Tutsi)	Congo Govt / FLDR combatants (HUTU)	North Kivu Province, Congo	X	X
2007	2013	Tanzania		Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda refugees	Tanzania	X	
2008	2008	Russia	South Ossetia	Georgia	South Ossetia	X	
2012	2015	Mali		Tuareg / Arabs	Northern Mali	X	X
2014	2014	ISIS	Sunni	Yazidi / Iraq Govt	Sinjar, Iraq	X	X
2014	2014	Russia		Ukraine	Crimea	X	

Dispossessive-engineered migration is one of the more widespread forms of weaponized migration today as well. Since 2007, state and non-state actors have used dispossessive-engineered migration on thirteen documented occasions. Sovereign states served as the challenger 64% of the time (9/14), while non-state actors or ethnic groups accounted for the remaining 36% (5/14). Additionally, states were the primary target of dispossessive-engineered migration 64% of the time (9/14), while non-state actors or ethnic groups were targeted in 36% of the cases (5/14).

1. Appropriate Territory and/or Resources (Israel vs. Palestine)

Israeli settlements in the West Bank exemplify the effective use of dispossessive-engineered migration to appropriate territory. Originating with the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and continuing today, these settlements were inherited by ideologically-minded individuals seeking to reclaim biblically relevant locations and to protect their homeland

by establishing early-warning outposts on advantageous terrain within the newly claimed, but disputed territory. Today, Jewish migration into the West-Bank has become an established Israeli reality, supported both financially and militarily by the Israeli government. In fact, it can be argued that reverse cleansing is occurring as the Israeli government actively assists citizen relocation to the West Bank which simultaneously serves to appropriate disputed territory and to decrease the viability of a future Palestinian state.³⁷ Since the 1967 war, all Israeli administrations have supported construction in the West Bank, with some leaders, such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, significantly increasing budget allocations to the West Bank region by offering additional tax benefits and incentives to settlers. Government ministries also encourage new businesses within the West Bank by funding tourism and agricultural projects there.³⁸

While some assert that U.S. participation in peace talks help to restrain Israel, others contend that U.S. participation actually strengthens Israel's stance in the conflict. The Oslo Accords, for example, continue to facilitate Israel's appropriation of territory by dividing the West Bank in a manner that enables Israel to retain exclusive control over important agricultural and natural resources.³⁹ This ultimately makes Palestinian statehood less likely.

2. Ethnic Cleansing (Islamic State vs. Non-Sunni Population)

Ethnic cleansing—a serious sub-variant of dispossessive engineered migration—remains common. For example, in 2014 the Islamic State conducted a systematic and deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign in Northern Iraq against ethnic Yazidis and other non-Sunni Muslim populations by killing an estimated 3,100 people either by execution or by forced starvation due to isolation on Mount Sinjar.⁴⁰ ISIS kidnapped thousands

³⁷ Hugh Lovatt and Mattia Toaldo, "EU Differentiation and Israeli Settlements," *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁴⁰ Valeria Cetorelli, Isaac Sasson, Nazar Shabila, and Gilbert Burnham, "Mortality and Kidnapping Estimates for the Yazidi Population in the Area of Mount Sinjar, Iraq, in August 2014: A Retrospective Household Survey," *PLoS Medicine* 14, no. 5 (2017): 8-12.

more, forcing many to convert to Islam. By some accounts, the Islamic State forced as many as 830,000 others to leave the territory it appropriated; not coincidentally, they had to surrender most of their property in the process.⁴¹

In most cases, when challengers combine dispossessive-engineered migration with other forms of weaponized migration, this indicates that the aim is not just territorial acquisition, but also politically, economically, or militarily motivated. In Israel's case, the migration serves all three purposes, although publicly, they do not advertise military objectives. For the Islamic State, appropriations of territory ensures increased access to economically significant energy-sector assets, and while the international community refuses to acknowledge ISIS as a legitimate governing entity, its tactics undoubtedly influence those who share its ideology, increasing its political credibility.

C. WEAPONIZED MIGRATION VARIANT 3—EXPORTIVE

Exportive migration is another technique that governing entities have used to solidify power or, in some cases, to destabilize adversaries. Since 2007, sixteen cases of exportive migration have occurred (Table 7). Of these cases, 75% (12/16) of challengers sought to expel dissidents while 50% (8/16) attempted to destabilize adversaries by exporting migrants. On several occasions, challengers attempted to do both.

⁴¹ "Ethnic Cleansing on a Historic Scale: Islamic State's Systematic Targeting of Minorities in Northern Iraq," Amnesty International, August 2014, accessed March 8, 2017, https://www.es.amnesty.org/uploads/media/Iraq_ethnic_cleansing_final_formatted.pdf.

Table 7. Exportive Migration Cases

START YEAR	END YEAR	CHALLENGER	ASSISTED BY	TARGET	LOCATION	EXPORTIVE	
						Expel Dissidents	Destabilize Adversary
Pre-2007	2017	Israel	Palestinians	Jordan	Jordan	X	
Pre-2007	2015	FARC		Colombian Govt	Colombia / Ecuador border	X	
Pre-2007	2009	Tamil Tigers		Sri Lanka / Sinhalese	Sri Lanka	X	X
Pre-2007	2017	Myanmar Govt		Rohingya Muslims & Rakhine Buddhists	Rakhine State, Myanmar	X	
Pre-2007	2017	Sudan	Janjaweed	Ethnic / tribal adversary	Sudan	X	X
Pre-2007	2008	Central African Republic		Ethnic / tribal adversary	Central African Republic	X	
Pre-2007	2017	Al-Houthi		Yemen	Yemen	X	
Pre-2007	2010	Zimbabwe		Political dissidents	Zimbabwe	X	
2007	2009	General Nkunda forces (Tutsi)	Rwanda Govt (Tutsi)	Congo Govt / FLDR combatants (HUTU)	North Kivu Province, Congo	X	X
2008	2008	Russia	South Ossetia	Georgia	South Ossetia		X
2008	2017	Iran		USA / Afghanistan	Afghanistan		X
2012	2015	Mali		Tuareg / Arabs	Northern Mali	X	
2014	2017	Pakistan	UNHCR	Afghanistan	Pakistan		X
2014	2014	Russia		Ukraine	Crimea		X
2015	2017	Burundi		Burundi dissidents	Burundi	X	
2015	2017	Turkey		Kurds	Turkey	X	X

1. Expel Dissidents (Tutsi vs. Hutu)

Conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu tribes is nothing new dating back generations. In the 1970s, Tutsi military personnel killed tens of thousands of Hutus in Burundi; in 1994, Hutu factions killed hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in what has come to be called the Rwandan genocide. More recently, in addition to alleged ethnic cleansing and the forced recruitment of displaced persons (militarized variant), Tutsi rebel forces led by General Laurent Nkunda utilized exportive migration against the Democratic

Republic of Congo's government by forcibly displacing approximately 370,000 Hutu or non-Tutsi residents in Congo's North Kivu province.⁴²

Exportive migration is most commonly executed post-revolution, when a state or other governing entity wants to reshape the demography within its territory.⁴³ Having only gained independence in the 1960s, many former European colonies in Africa still rely on exportive migration. Governments in the Congo, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Mali, Burundi, and the Central African Republic have all made use of exportive migration over the past 10 years.

2. Destabilize Adversary (Iran vs. Afghanistan)

In Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad used exportive migration not to expel dissidents, but rather to destabilize Afghanistan and, by default, United States operations there. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the number of displaced Afghans seeking refuge in Iran is second only to the number who have taken refuge in Pakistan. Although more than five million refugees returned to Afghanistan following the toppling of the Taliban leadership in 2001, an estimated 2.5 million Afghans remained in Iran as late as 2010.⁴⁴ With so many Afghans in Iran, President Ahmadinejad effectively turned to exportive migration and combined this with coercive and militarized techniques to increase his influence over Afghan President Hamad Karzai's government. For instance, in 2007, Iran deported more than 80,000 Afghans to protest Karzai's acceptance of an official NATO presence in Afghanistan. Ahmadinejad also allegedly sought to demonstrate what Iran could do should Afghanistan fail to support the Iranian nuclear program or should it limit the Helmand River's flow into Iran.⁴⁵

⁴² Claire Bourgeois and Khassim Diagne, "Real-Time Evaluation of UNHCR's IDP Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo," UNHCR, September 2007, <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/research/evalreports/46ea97fe2/real-time-evaluation-unhcrs-idp-operation-democratic-republic-congo.html>.

⁴³ Greenhill, "Strategic Engineered Migration as a Weapon of War," 9.

⁴⁴ Ahmad Majidiyar and Ali Alfoneh, "Iranian Influence in Afghanistan: Refugees as Political Instruments," *AEI Middle Eastern Outlook*, 5 (2010): 1.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 2-3.

Beyond turning on and off the flow of deportations, Iran also chooses particular deportation locations to maximize instability. For example, when deporting migrants, Iran specifically targeted Afghan provinces with no NATO presence or without Provincial Reconstruction Teams who could help ease the burden. In addition, Iran also conducted mass deportations without prior coordination with Afghanistan.⁴⁶ Humanitarian crises consequently occurred, and neither Afghan nor NATO forces were able to adequately respond. Clearly one reason Tehran did this was to signal the Afghan government, the U.S. government, and the international community that Iran remains key to Afghanistan's long-term stability, whereas American support during the last decade and a half has proven anything but.

When using exportive migration, a challenger often seeks to not only destabilize a target government, but to also serve as the source of stability, thus gaining influence and perceived legitimacy. According to David Kilcullen's theory of competitive control, this helps explain why the Taliban intentionally create disputes throughout Afghanistan, yet will also quickly step in to resolve conflict, which then results in increased allegiance from local populations.⁴⁷ Although Kilcullen applies his theory to an armed non-state actor, it fits states as well. By employing exportive migration, Iran creates significant problems for Afghanistan and its NATO allies through fomenting instability in under-governed areas. Yet, through state-sponsored support, Iran is then able to stabilize some of the areas where it which it has deliberately created problems, therefore proving itself to be the rescuer.

D. WEAPONIZED MIGRATION VARIANT 4—ECONOMIC

Over the past decade, millions of people have traveled from one location to another in search of improved living standards and social mobility. These economic migrants are not easily exploited, but a challenger can utilize the inflow or outflow of economic migrants or dislocated civilians for economic gain. Since 2007, challengers

⁴⁶ "Afghan Official Accuses Iran of Expelling 60,000 Afghan Refugees," *Afghan Islamic Press*, May 10, 2010; and "Iran Deports Over 50,000 Afghan Refugees," *Arzu TV*, May 10, 2010.

⁴⁷ David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 116-168.

consisting of states, IGOs, and Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) have employed this method on at least eight occasions (Table 8). They have done so strategically and opportunistically, and in a wide variety of ways. I categorize recent cases of economically weaponized migration into four sub-variants, each of which differs based on the challenger’s current situation and intended economic objectives.

Table 8. Economic Cases

START YEAR	END YEAR	CHALLENGER	ASSISTED BY	TARGET	LOCATION	Economic			
						Exploit Migration for Inexpensive Labor	Import / Export Forced Labor	Exaggerate Refugee numbers	Remittances / Diaspora Tax
Pre-2007	2007	Jordan		UNHCR / International Community	Jordan			X	
Pre-2007	2017	United Arab Emirates	Guest nation / Corporate sponsor	Migrant workers	United Arab Emirates	X			
2009	2017	Eritrean govt		Eritrean diaspora	Global				X
2010	2017	Zeta cartel		Migrants	Central America / Mexico	X			
2013	2017	Russia		Krgystan / Tajikistan	Russia	X			
2014	2017	North Korea		UN sanctions	Russia / China		X		
2015	2017	Lebanon		Syrian refugees	Lebanon		X		
2016	2017	USA		Mexico					X

1. Exploit Migration for Inexpensive Labor (United Arab Emirates)

Whether or not a country will choose to exploit migrants or displaced persons for financial gain can depend on a host country’s laws, level of domestic or international pressure on the government, and/or, most importantly, the labor market. Authoritarian governments are most apt to practice this form of weaponization as domestic pressure is minimal and regimes of this type can more easily adjust or bypass legalities. Issues arise when the price of labor is below equilibrium, resulting in a labor supply shortage. Rather than creating incentives to increase their own domestic labor supply, some governments

will import foreign labor to completely change the labor market's equilibrium and significantly decrease costs.

The United Arab Emirates' (UAE) adoption of this approach has contributed to significant economic growth over the past decade. In fact, Human Rights Watch and international labor organizations estimate that 95% of the UAE's workforce consists of migrant workers.⁴⁸ To manage the influx of migrant workers, the UAE developed the Kafala system to monitor them beginning with the visa process and continuing through employment. Low-income countries such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka provide the majority of laborers, but without sufficient embassy or consular staff available to manage complaints, abuse of foreign laborers is common. Laborers hoping to leave abusive employers face consequences such as prosecution for running away, food deprivation, beatings, or other punishments. In 2014, the UAE implemented limited labor laws requiring employers to provide one day off a week, and eight hours of rest a day. Even so, these regulations are seldom enforced given foreign laborers' second-class status in the court system.⁴⁹

2. Exporting Forced Labor to Generate Revenue (North Korea)

While the UAE exploits foreign workers who voluntarily cross its borders, North Korea exploits its own citizens by sending tens of thousands of laborers abroad to work under what amounts to slave-like conditions. With significant sanctions having been placed on North Korea, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un must seek other means to raise capital for state expenses, and forced labor provides one such alternative. Most laborers are sent against their will either to China or to Russia, where they labor for up to 20 hours a day, with only two days off a month. Employers deposit a laborer's wages into accounts controlled by the North Korean government, and employees only receive a small

⁴⁸ Sevil Sönmez, Yorghos Apostolopoulos, Diane Tran, and Shantyana Rentrope, "Human Rights and Health Disparities for Migrant Workers in the UAE," *Health and Human Rights* 13, no. 2 (2011): 17–35.

⁴⁹ "United Arab Emirates: Trapped, Exploited, Abused," Human Rights Watch, October 22, 2014, accessed September 7, 2014, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/22/united-arab-emirates-trapped-exploited-abused>.

percentage of the overall amount. The United Nations estimates that the North Korean regime earns between \$1.2 and \$2.3 billion annually from this practice.⁵⁰

Although the international community is aware of these human rights violations, North Korea continues to access currency in a way that not only circumvents international sanctions, but will generate added revenue for it to continue pursuing its nuclear goals. The tragic irony is that all of this will continue so long as international actors remain willing to facilitate the forced labor flow.

3. Exaggeration of Refugee Numbers (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan)

Conflict in the Middle East continues to take its toll on countries directly and indirectly involved in the fighting. During the height of the conflict in Iraq, many residents fled their homes in search of stability and safety. Many escaped west to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, resulting in a noteworthy migration crisis that required substantial international assistance. At one point, the Jordanian government estimated that one million Iraqis crossed into Jordan during the Iraq War (2003-2011).⁵¹

Specific numbers are important because the scale of a migration crisis helps to generate international financial assistance. Incentives are such that countries are prone to want to exaggerate numbers during a crisis, or even to engineer a crisis in order to maximize incoming aid. Whether or not the challenger directs all aid towards the crisis then becomes difficult to measure, especially when corruption and money laundering systems are available and supported by government officials. Without a neutral party to oversee accountability during all phases of the crisis, governments will likely continue to make use of exaggerated numbers.

⁵⁰ “Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” United Nations, September 8, 2015, accessed February 20, 2017, <http://undocs.org/A/70/362>.

⁵¹ Dallal Stevens, “Legal Status, Labelling, and Protection: the Case of Iraqi ‘Refugees’ in Jordan,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 25 no. 1 (2013): 1-38.

4. Remittances / Diaspora Tax (Eritrea vs. Emigrants)

Eritrea's authoritarian government is a prime example of an entity that weaponizes migration in many forms and against many entities in order to maintain domestic control. In addition to securing upwards of €200 million by threatening European policy makers with increasing migrant flows out of Eritrea, the regime exploits Eritrean diaspora communities abroad to make up for lost revenue due to international sanctions.

Eritrea's diaspora community is one of the largest in the world relative to the size of its population and consists of between one-third and one-half of all Eritrean nationals.⁵² The Eritrean regime levies a 2% tax on all of its citizens abroad. Failure to pay the tax results in the inability to obtain or maintain critical documents required by other countries, such as birth certificates, marriage certificates, and/or passports. Should Eritrean emigrants refuse to pay the diaspora tax, other government services become increasingly difficult to obtain as well. The Eritrean regime coerces the diaspora community by also controlling their ability to purchase land, to invest in business interests, or to relocate family members away from Eritrea.⁵³

Eritrean embassies collect taxes from members of the diaspora, and actively coerce individuals who refuse to pay. Although some countries are beginning to expel Eritrean diplomats or sanction the Eritrean government over to these issues, diaspora taxes continue to be Eritrea's largest single source of foreign currency. An International Monetary Fund paper suggests that the ratio of incoming funds from the diaspora community to the overall Eritrean Gross Domestic Product equals approximately 37%.⁵⁴

⁵² Nicole Hirt and Mohammad Abdulkader Saleh, "By Way of Patriotism, Coercion, Or Instrumentalization: How the Eritrean Regime Makes use of the Diaspora to Stabilize its Rule," *Globalizations* (2017): 1–16.

⁵³ Nicole Hirt, "The Eritrean Diaspora and Its Impact on Regime Stability: Responses to UN Sanctions," *African Affairs*, 114, no.454 (2015): 125.

⁵⁴ Ayumu Yamauchi, "Fiscal Sustainability: The Case of Eritrea" (working paper, International Monetary Fund, 2004), 10, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Fiscal-Sustainability-The-Case-of-Eritrea-16962>.

This mixture of coercive and economic weaponized migration also allows the Eritrean regime to fund VEOs by way of exploiting its citizens. UN resolutions 1907 and 2023 clearly condemn the use of Eritrea’s diaspora tax to fund armed opposition groups including Al Shabaab. But until the diaspora community gains leverage over the Eritrean government, Eritrea is likely to continue to be able to funnel weapons and to provide financial assistance to VEOs. The credible threats of passport revocation and deportation, or threats aimed at emigrants’ relatives still living in Eritrea remain sufficient to maintain a consistent revenue flow to the government in Asmara.

E. WEAPONIZED MIGRATION VARIANT 5—FIFTH COLUMN

1. Background

The fifth column variant is generally a long-term strategy through which the challenger dispatches migrants to a target’s territory (or recruits sympathizers within that territory) to undermine a target government. This technique may be used opportunistically as well, and a challenger may well choose to employ its citizens already living abroad by operating as a fifth column against an adversary.

Fifth column operations involving migrants can range from overt and hostile in support of support of military operations to more clandestine or passive undertakings, such as espionage or engaging in labor strikes that negatively affect a targeted government’s objectives.⁵⁵ Due to lengthy timeframes required to plan and execute fifth column operations, people often dismiss evidence as imaginings of the conspiracy-minded who are quick to voice suspicions on politically sensitive and polarizing topics such as racism or immigration. Table 9 illustrates fifth-column attempts within the last decade.

⁵⁵ Theodore H. Moran, *Governments and Transnational Corporations* (London: Routledge, 1993), 260-264.

Table 9. Fifth-Column Cases

START YEAR	END YEAR	CHALLENGER	ASSISTED BY	TARGET	LOCATION	5TH CLM
						Political / Ideological Advantage
Pre-2007	2017	Israel (accused)	Palestinians	Jordan	Jordan	X
Pre-2007	2017	Muslim Brotherhood / CAIR		US / Europe	USA / Europe	X
Pre-2007	2017	China		Taiwan		X
Pre-2007	2017	Al-Qaeda / ISIS		non-Sunni	Global	X

2. Political / Ideological Advantage (China vs. Taiwan)

Over the past decade, increasing geopolitical tensions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan have begun to set the stage for Chinese weaponized migration in fifth column form. With many Taiwanese seeking independence, and the PRC claiming there is only “One China” with Taiwan acting as a Special Administrative Region, compromise seems unlikely. To predict future PRC actions, Taiwan need look no farther than Hong Kong to identify Chinese strategy during a similar situation.

During Hong Kong’s transition from British to Chinese control, more than 83,000 Chinese with fake identities migrated to Hong Kong, under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These immigrants added up to 1.4% of Hong Kong’s population, but, more importantly, totaled 9.12% of the territory’s voting population. These migrants served as Beijing’s “invisible hand” to steer the territory in the desired direction.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Yin Qian, “Beijing’s Fifth Column and the Transfer of Power in Hong Kong: 1983–1997,” in *Hong Kong in Transition*, ed. Robert Ash (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2000), 113–129.

Taiwan is similarly vulnerable. Immigrant family members from the mainland, as well as journalists, academics, and others of Chinese origin, are all suspected by Taiwan's National Security Bureau to be PRC recruits whose message is to influence Taiwanese policy and elections.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, as long as the PRC is able to continue advancing its interests via migration into Taiwan, the possibility of a military response becomes less likely. By using this strategy, the Taiwanese will gradually become desensitized to increasing PRC influence, until ultimately, the balance shifts, and PRC-backed politicians are able to adjust policy to align Taiwan with the PRC.

F. WEAPONIZED MIGRATION VARIANT 6—MILITARIZED

The most common form of weaponized migration over the past ten years has been the militarized variant that includes the forced displacement of populations to disrupt enemy operations or to lessen support for military opponents. We have also seen militant infiltration via migration as a legal or illegal way to gain entry to a target's territory. Challengers have also recruited dislocated civilians, many times forcibly. Forced recruitment by state and non-state actors is especially widespread throughout unstable regions, but most notably in Africa due to perpetual interstate and intrastate conflicts there. Case of militarized migration are outlined in Table 10.

⁵⁷ Chen Ching-Chih, "Beware China's Fifth Column Efforts," Taiwan Center, April 1, 2004, accessed March 20, 2017, <http://www.taiwancenter.com/sdtca/index.html>.

Table 10. Militarized Migration Cases

START YEAR	END YEAR	CHALLENGER	ASSISTED BY	TARGET	LOCATION	MILITARIZED		
						Migrants Used for Manpower	Infiltration	Disrupt / Deprive Enemy of Support
Pre-2007	2015	FARC		Colombia govt	Colombia / Ecuador border	X		
Pre-2007	2017	Israel	USA	Palestine, Syria	West Bank, Gaza, and Golan Heights			X
Pre-2007	2009	Tamil Tigers		Sri Lanka / Sinhalese	Sri Lanka	X		
Pre-2007	2017	Sudan	Janjaweed	Ethnic / tribal adversary	Sudan	X		X
Pre-2007	2008	Central African Republic		Ethnic / tribal adversary	Central African Republic	X		
Pre-2007	2017	Al-Houthi		Yemen / Sunni	Yemen	X		X
Pre-2007	2017	Al-Qaeda		non-Sunni / west	Global	X	X	X
2007	2007	Chad/Sudan rebels / Ethnic adversaries		Chad govt	Chad	X		
2007	2009	General Nkunda forces (Tutsi)	Rwanda Govt (Tutsi)	Congo govt / FLDR combatants (HUTU)	North Kivu Province, Congo	X		
2007	2009	Ethiopia	USA	Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)	Somalia	X		
2008	2017	Iran		USA / Afghanistan	Afghanistan		X	
2009	2017	Boko Haram		Nigeria	North Nigeria			X
2010	2017	Zeta cartel		Migrants	Central America / Mexico	X		
2011	2014	Al Shabaab		Kenya	Kenya		X	
2012	2015	Tuareg / Mali separatists		Malian IDPs	Northern Mali	X		
2013	2017	Syria	Russia	Syrian rebels / Population / EU	Syria			X
2015	2017	Rwanda	Burundi Refugees	Burundi (HUTU) / Ethnic / tribal adversary	Burundi	X		
2015	2017	ISIS		Syria & West	Syria	X	X	
2016	2017	Iran	Syria	ISIS / Syria rebels / Afghan refugees	Iran, Syria	X		
2016	2017	MS13		IDPs	Guatemala	X		

1. Migrants Used as Additional Manpower (Drug Trafficking Organizations)

Not only did the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) deliberately expel civilians to prevent civil resistance and erode support for the Colombian government, but prior to the 2016 peace agreement, the organization forcibly recruited child soldiers to engage in guerrilla warfare. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that rebel forces have recruited approximately 14,000 children in Colombia, and during one kinetic engagement, Colombian officials noted that 43% of

enemy casualties were children.⁵⁸ The FARC is not alone; the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Zeta cartels are both known to capture migrants traveling to the United States and forcibly use them for narco-trafficking across borders or to serve as a diversion for other illicit activities.⁵⁹

Similarly, Iran actively recruits Afghan refugees, both voluntarily and by force, to fight ISIS on behalf of Bashar al-Assad's regime and other radical Sunni elements. Reports indicate that Afghan refugees are paid \$500-\$800 a month, along with receiving Iranian legal status if they volunteer for military training and then travel to Syria for combat operations and the protection of religious sites.⁶⁰ Reports produced by Human Rights Watch, an international Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) that focuses on human rights advocacy, suggests that Iran often combines both militarized and coercive variants to achieve its military objectives in Syria. Based on dozens of interviews with Afghan refugees living in Iran, the NGO concludes that many Afghan men must choose to fight on the front lines in Syria, or face deportation to Afghanistan. Other Afghans are not even given an option, but are rather forced into conscription and follow-on paramilitary service in Syria.⁶¹

Militarizing migration in this way does not just benefit the challenger by increasing manpower during combat operations, but also by limiting domestic casualties. By forcing foreign conscripts to bear the brunt of frontline combat operations, a country can better maintain support for its war efforts. If the domestic population sustains significant casualties, political pressure will begin to mount, recruiting will dry up, and governing entities must either reinvigorate domestic support for combat operations, or, more likely, adjust policy and strategy to decrease domestic casualties and corresponding negative perceptions. In Iran's case, by highlighting Afghan conscript casualties and

⁵⁸ Ana María Ibáñez, "Forced Displacement in Colombia: Magnitude and Causes," *The Economics of Peace and Security Journal* 4, no. 1 (2009): 51.

⁵⁹ Jeremy Slack and Scott Whiteford, "Violence and Migration on the Arizona-Sonora Border," *Human Organization* 70, no. 1 (2011): 11-21.

⁶⁰ W. Andrew Terrill, "Iran's Strategy for Saving Assad," *The Middle East Journal* 69, no. 2 (2015): 222-236.

⁶¹ "Iran Sending Thousands of Afghans to Fight in Syria," Human Rights Watch, January 29, 2016, accessed July 5, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/29/iran-sending-thousands-afghans-fight-syria>.

minimizing news regarding Iranian casualties, leadership misleads the local population to believe that expendable, but volunteer foreign fighters are bearing the costs in terms of blood, while Iran assists primarily with treasure.

2. Infiltration

Today, the topic of weaponized migration typically conjures fears of Islamic State militants exploiting migration crises in the Middle East and North Africa by posing as asylum seekers to gain entry into Europe in support of ISIS military objectives. The effectiveness of this technique remains to be seen, but findings from a bipartisan congressional committee indicate that Islamist terrorists *are* actively attempting to gain access to the West, and evidence conveys that some terror attacks—such as the November 2015 Paris attacks—were successful due to this form of weaponized migration.⁶²

What must make this variant tempting to prospective challengers, is the lack of safeguards in place to protect against this weaponized form of migration. The U.S. Homeland Security Committee recently released a report that reveals the futility of background checks on Syrian refugees given the lack of information available to effectively screen them terrorist ties or criminal histories.⁶³

Again, the polarizing topic of immigration plays a major role in facilitating the effectiveness of this strategy of weaponized refugees. Politicians must find a balance between conservative constituents who care deeply about security threats and liberal constituents who tend to care about human rights. One unintended consequence of increasingly polarized views is that once refugees enter the European Union, limited travel restrictions result in some countries avoiding the conversation all together, which

⁶² “Syrian Refugee Flows: Security Risks and Counterterrorism Challenges,” House Homeland Security Committee, November 2015, 2–3, https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/HomelandSecurityCommittee_Syrian_Refugee_Report.pdf

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 4.

only speeds movement of refugees through borders and into other countries.⁶⁴ By looking the other way, elected officials are able to pass economic and security burdens onto other EU member-states, while simultaneously avoiding public objections from their constituents.

3. Disrupt Enemy / Deprive Enemy of Support

Across the spectrum of conflict, challengers actively seek ways to disrupt opposition elements whether directly or indirectly. The use of migrants provides challengers with an indirect approach that is, in turn, less likely to result in a direct response by the opposition. Used at least three times since 2007, challengers have targeted specific populations in key terrain in what could also be considered a clever counterinsurgency move.

In Syria, indiscriminate bombing by Russian and Syrian forces continues to cause significant population displacement among the populace. Former NATO Commander General Philip Breedlove recently testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services that, in his view, this indiscriminate bombing is designed to terrorize the Syrian populace, dislocate civilians by forcing them to move, and ultimately turn the dislocated persons into someone else's problem.⁶⁵ Essentially, by pushing the asylum seekers west, Russia and Syria have forced Jordan and Turkey, both opposed to the Assad regime, to deal with a migration crisis. This means that Jordan and Turkey find themselves expending a substantial amount of resources on refugees rather than against al-Assad.

In many cases, this sub-variant must be combined with another form of weaponized migration to be effective. In the case of Syria, the Asaad regime exploits migrants by using a combination of exportive and militarized weaponized migration. In other cases, migrants may be used to block opposition military movements, or, in some

⁶⁴ Tamara Cohen, "We Have to Stop Waving Migrants Through Says EU Chief: Juncker Speaks Out After Emergency Summit Turns Sour," *Daily Mail*, October 26, 2015, accessed October 6, 2017, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3291010/We-stop-waving-migrants-says-EU-chief-Juncker-speaks-emergency-summit-turns-sour.html>.

⁶⁵ Armed Services Committee. Hearing to Receive Testimony on United States European Command. 114th sess., March 1, 2016, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/16-20_03-01-16.pdf.

cases, to increase the likelihood of targets becoming protected and thus off-limits to opposition weapons or operations.

G. WEAPONIZED MIGRATION VARIANT 7—PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL

Using propaganda as an instrument of influence is nothing new. In *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler describes the use of propaganda as “a means to an end” for generating support for Germany and ultimately helping to achieve victory.⁶⁶ Conversely, using human migration as a source of propaganda in order to increase political legitimacy, decrease an adversary’s political clout, or to justify future actions is much less common. But, over the last decade, Russia incorporated the use of this technique into its information operations to set the conditions for future campaigns and to justify these campaigns to both near-abroad states and the rest of the international community. Table 11 outlines these cases.

Table 11. Propaganda / Political Cases

START YEAR	END YEAR	CHALLENGER	ASSISTED BY	TARGET	LOCATION	Prop / Pol	
						Passportization	International Propaganda
2008	2008	Russia	South Ossetia	Georgia	South Ossetia	X	
2014	2017	Russia		Ukraine	Russia / Ukraine border		X
2014	2014	Russia		Ukraine	Crimea	X	

⁶⁶ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Munich: Eher Verlag, 1925, 6.

1. Passportization (Russia vs. Georgia/Crimea)

Russia utilized this variant of weaponized migration to justify operations in South Ossetia during the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, and Crimea in 2014. Using a technique termed “passportization,” Russia issued Russian passports to residents of South Ossetia and Crimea, granted citizenship to the new passport holders, and ultimately increased the official number of Russians living in each territory. Although weaponizing migration in this way did not entail human movement from one place to another, the massive shift in citizenship from one country to another did in effect, create a virtual migration that Russia then used to justify military action.

By being able to claim that military action was necessary to protect Russian citizens, it is unclear that Russia actually violated international law. According to the Hague Convention, each country is responsible for determining who its citizens are.⁶⁷ With a significant number of Russian citizens in both South Ossetia and Crimea, Russia strategically engineered a situation that facilitated the exploitation of international norms to achieve its political and military objectives.

2. International Propaganda (Russia vs. Ukraine)

Another clever technique that Russia has used has to do with the number of migrants from Ukraine seeking asylum in Russia. Figures varied from source to source, with the Russian Kremlin claiming 500,000 refugees,⁶⁸ *Russia Today* (RT) television claiming 110,000,⁶⁹ and local government authorities, the most knowledgeable source, claiming 18,000 to 25,000.⁷⁰ Unfortunately, journalists and organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were unable to verify whose

⁶⁷ Kristopher Natoli, “Weaponizing Nationality: An Analysis of Russia’s Passport Policy in Georgia,” *International Law Journal* 28, no. 2 (2010): 389; 411.

⁶⁸ Sean Guillory, “Ukraine’s Refugees: How Many,” Sean’s Russia Blog, June 17, 2014, accessed May 14, 2017, <http://seansrussiablog.org/2014/06/27/ukraines-refugees-many/>.

⁶⁹ “Ukrainian Refugees Precipitate Emergency Situation in 6 Russian Regions,” July 10, 2014, accessed September 5, 2017, <https://www.rt.com/politics/171772-russia-emergency-ukraine-refugees/>.

⁷⁰ Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, “Anatomy of Exaggeration: How Russian Propaganda Cites UN Figures,” *The Interpreter*, July 10, 2014, accessed September 5, 2017, <http://www.interpretermag.com/anatomy-of-exaggeration-how-russian-propaganda-cites-un-figures/>.

numbers were correct as they were denied access to refugee camps. UNHCR—generally a credible source of refugee numbers—somehow then felt forced to use Russian government estimates⁷¹ which, in turn, became the source for popular news outlets such as the *Wall Street Journal*.⁷² Once reported by UNHCR, Russia then began citing UNHCR as the original source of information, rather than its own government, when discussing refugee numbers originating from Ukraine.

This propagandistic technique proves effective when the challenger seeks to make a situation look worse than it is. Perceptions in the international community can then allow the challenger to take additional measures or escalate the situation in order to protect its vulnerable population. In Russia’s case, creating a perceived migration crisis based on fake news was likely planned in order to shift international support from Ukraine to Russia.

⁷¹ “UN Refugee Agency Warns of ‘Sharp Rise’ in People Fleeing Eastern Ukraine,” UN News Centre, June 27, 2014, accessed September 5, 2017, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48159#.Wa8Pp_196Un.

⁷² Andrew Morse, “110,000 Have Fled to Russia From Ukraine United Nations Says,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 27, 2014, accessed September 5, 2017, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/110-000-have-fled-to-russia-from-ukraine-united-nations-says-1403873653>.

IV. CONCLUSION

A. IMPLICATIONS

Over the course of the past decade, weaponized migration has proven to be an effective alternative to conventional warfare for actors seeking to achieve political, military, or economic objectives. These acts regularly go unnoticed and they are often subsumed by other events. Nevertheless, the effects of weaponized migration should not be minimized. As access to technology spreads, and as challengers explore new ways to indirectly target adversaries, the international community should expect to see competing entities continue to challenge one another along the spectrum of weaponized migration, while simultaneously seeking new innovative sub-variants with which to more effectively target each other.

1. Migration and Biological Threats

Synthetic bio-technology and the ability to manipulate genetic codes pose one looming security threat. Advances in technology allow anyone with access to the Internet to obtain genetic sequences for deadly pathogens such as smallpox, Ebola, and other viruses. Bioethics organizations have recently warned that inexpensive chemistry kits purchased online provide amateurs with the ability to remove and replace sections of DNA, potentially leading to the development of dangerous strains of bacteria and other organisms.⁷³ Targets would likely regard a bioterrorism event as an act of war. But, a response becomes more difficult when an event is organized or executed by non-state actors such as the Islamic State or Al Qaeda. In cases of bioterrorism, potential delivery platforms are plentiful, and migrants, whether incoming or outgoing, could easily serve as vectors.

Simply infecting a large contingent of outgoing asylum seekers or populations within a refugee camp could effectively devastate a targeted country or region.

⁷³ Sarah Knapton, "Bill Gates: Terrorists Could Wipe Out 30 Million People by Weaponising a Disease Such as Smallpox," *Telegraph*, April 19, 2017, accessed October 10, 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/2017/04/19/bill-gates-terrorists-could-wipe-30-million-people-weaponising>.

Competent challengers could modify genetic code to ensure the virus remains antibiotic-resistant, or that the microbe remains dormant for a period of time necessary to facilitate the migrant's movement into a targeted region. Without having proper quarantine protocols already in place, the effects would be devastating. History provides examples when challengers utilized biological threats by poisoning water wells, lacing arrowheads with deadly substances, or simply spreading deadly organisms on blankets while disguising the act as humanitarian assistance. 21st century versions of these procedures should be expected at some time in the future, and could easily be combined with migration.

The United States military is not blind to this threat as the Center for Army Lessons Learned recently released a handbook entitled *Commander's Guide to Support Operations Among Weaponized Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees*. The handbook, though directed specifically at chemical and biological specialists, provides a basic overview of considerations and methods of reaction should biological warfare be executed using dislocated civilians.⁷⁴ Unfortunately, military chemical experts are unable to plan for all scenarios involving dislocated civilians, leaving much of the world vulnerable.

2. Widespread Sterilization Via Migration

Rather than devastate a targeted population quickly, challengers could just as easily target an adversary by taking a more long-term approach and sterilizing a population using migrants. Historically speaking, governments have forcibly or secretly sterilized individuals belonging to specific demographic groups. In the 1970s, Native Americans accused the U.S. government of sterilizing upwards of 25% of young Native American women that went to the Indian Health Service for medical procedures.⁷⁵ In Israel, the government has been accused of forcibly sterilizing African immigrants to help

⁷⁴ Department of the Army, *Commander's Guide to Support Operations Among Weaponized Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees*, *Center for Army Lessons Learned*, 14 no. 10 (August 2014): 3-8. http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/14-10_HB_0.pdf.

⁷⁵ Jane Lawrence, "The Indian Health Service and the Sterilization of Native American Women," *American Indian Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2000): 400.

curb high poverty rates.⁷⁶ In both instances, governments were trying to control domestic sub-populations. In the future, it is entirely possible that a challenger could deceitfully sterilize migrants or displaced persons to affect population growth inside or outside of its borders.

As genetically modified organism (GMO) products become more ubiquitous, opportunities for sterilizing people increase. For example, the former biotechnology company Epicyte once created a strain of corn that contained antibodies known to attack human sperm, thereby rendering people infertile.⁷⁷ Although production was discontinued, the possibility of state and/or non-state actors using such a product nefariously is not inconceivable, especially since this technique amounts to little more than a long-term variant of ethnic cleansing.

With sufficient planning, a government could utilize a practice like this under the guise of humanitarian assistance. Suppose a natural disaster displaces thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of people in an adversarial state. The challenger, in this case, could then use the relief efforts as an opportunity to both extend an olive branch *and* to weaken its adversary by providing humanitarian assistance in the form of genetically modified food that just so happens to contain reproductive antibodies. This might occur via direct food shipments, or by funneling food through a relief agency or NGO. Once recovery efforts end, dislocated civilians would presumably return to their homes and no one would be the wiser.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States government is not oblivious to the fact that it is vulnerable to weaponized migration. In fact, the National Intelligence Council warned of this threat in 2001 and, specifically, focused on our country's vulnerability vis a vis bilateral

⁷⁶ Elise Knutsen, "Israel Forcibly Injected African Immigrants with Birth Control, Report Claims," *Forbes*, January 28, 2017, accessed September 25, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/eliseknutsen/2013/01/28/israel-forcibly-injected-african-immigrant-women-with-birth-control/#62c5530c67b8>.

⁷⁷ Don Williamson, "Preventing Slow Extinction: Combating the Use of Weaponized Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees to Inflict Generational Genocide," Commander's Guide to Support Operations Among Weaponized Displace Persons, Refugees, and Evacuees, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/14-10_HB_0.pdf#page=27.22.

relations.⁷⁸ There are however, steps that the U.S. government can take in order to reduce our susceptibility to various forms of weaponized migration and to improve our own ability to use these techniques against potential adversaries.

1. Devalue the Effect of Weaponized Migration

Challengers weaponize migration because in many cases it is more effective than negotiating at the table and less expensive—in both blood and treasure—than choosing to conduct military operations. Challengers hope that others, whether the target or the international community, either ignore the action or, when the weaponized migration is being used coercively, comply with demands. Essentially, if the cost of opposing the weaponized migration is greater than the cost of allowing it to continue, then the weaponization will be effective. For most countries, if the event does not immediately affect them negatively, then opposition is unlikely.

The United States is extremely vulnerable to coercive migration due to immigration being such a polarizing topic. Immigration scholars recommend taking steps to lessen susceptibility. They suggest proactively implementing immigration-related policy measures, conducting diligent research on countries that have the ability to produce refugees and/or economic migrants, and even offering generous financial incentives if it helps keep us on good terms with potential challengers. In addition, preparing for such events with adequate infrastructure and response capabilities will reduce the chaos should sudden refugee flows be triggered.⁷⁹

2. Exploit Domestic Fears in Areas Where International Issues Exist

Coercively engineered migration is likely to remain the most commonly utilized form of weaponized migration in the future due to its usefulness for forcing policy concessions in a non-militaristic manner. By preparing various courses of action to target potential adversaries by way of coercively engineered migration, the United States could expand the array of options it has available beyond the typical economic sanctions or

⁷⁸ "The US National Intelligence Council on Growing Global Migration," *Population and Development Review*, 27, no. 4 (2001): 817-819.

⁷⁹ Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration*, 274.

military action it usually threatens. Identifying a targeted country's immigration fears, for instance, could provide an initial roadmap to unconventional alternatives. In many cases, immigration and/or emigration instigates domestic fear whether on the part of the governing regime, or the populace, or both.

Take North Korea, for example. A mass exodus from the country not only has the ability to threaten the regime due to its losing control over most of its dissidents, but a mass outflow also has the potential to affect China, Russia, and South Korea. In this case, North Korea and the countries on its border have much to worry about. North Korea's neighbors obviously understand the threats, and thus take active measures to prevent mass emigration. However, this does not make such an event impossible. With creative planning, and with buy-in from key allies and organizations, fears in the region, or even the threat of these fears, could be exploited. Thus, North Korea might be able to use threats of migration in the case of war or state collapse, as a deterrent.

3. Improve International Cooperation

While more accessible flows of information have played a major role in rapid globalization, these can also be blamed for instigating fear and polarization in countries worldwide. To calm these fears and reduce paranoia and polarization, as well as to better secure ourselves from those seeking to destroy our way of life, we should enhance our information sharing capabilities, particularly with allies who can help us better identify and fill in migration-related information gaps. We can do this militarily or diplomatically through IGOs, such as NATO or the United Nations. Multilateral training exercises as well as real-world operations also provide venues and represent ideal opportunities for beginning to mitigate this vulnerability.

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