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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

THE SOUTH CAROLINA NATIONAL GUARD SECURE
AREA DUTY OFFICER PROGRAM:
A RESERVE COMPONENT ACTIVE SHOOTER
CONTINGENCY CASE STUDY

by

Barry N. Ramey

December 2017

Thesis Advisor: Robert Simeral
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On July 16, 2015, five military reservists were murdered during an active shooter attack on two reserve component military facilities. This act of domestic terrorism was only the latest in a series targeting U.S. military facilities in recent years. Since the Fort Hood Massacre in 2009, at least 37 military personnel have been killed and 55 wounded while at their place of duty in the United States. In response to this threat the South Carolina National Guard, in collaboration with the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, established an active shooter contingency program called the Secure Area Duty Officer Program, or SADOP.

The focus of this single case study thesis is to determine whether SADOP is an effective method to mitigate risk posed by the dynamic active shooter threat. The assertion that this innovative approach achieves its purpose is supported by the deliberate development methodology and interviews with key decision makers instrumental in the crisis-action response concept planning and program implementation.

The findings of this study indicate that SADOP resourcefully employs a force protection framework tailored to the success of the reserve component as opposed to obliging its organizations to utilize legacy force-protection regulations designed by and for the active component of the military.
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THE SOUTH CAROLINA NATIONAL GUARD SECURE AREA DUTY OFFICER PROGRAM: A RESERVE COMPONENT ACTIVE SHOOTER CONTINGENCY CASE STUDY

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ABSTRACT

On July 16, 2015, five military reservists were murdered during an active shooter attack on two reserve component military facilities. This act of domestic terrorism was only the latest in a series targeting U.S. military facilities in recent years. Since the Fort Hood Massacre in 2009, at least 37 military personnel have been killed and 55 wounded while at their place of duty in the United States. In response to this threat the South Carolina National Guard, in collaboration with the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, established an active shooter contingency program called the Secure Area Duty Officer Program, or SADOP.

The focus of this single case study thesis is to determine whether SADOP is an effective method to mitigate risk posed by the dynamic active shooter threat. The assertion that this innovative approach achieves its purpose is supported by the deliberate development methodology and interviews with key decision makers instrumental in the crisis-action response concept planning and program implementation.

The findings of this study indicate that SADOP resourcefully employs a force protection framework tailored to the success of the reserve component as opposed to obliging its organizations to utilize legacy force-protection regulations designed by and for the active component of the military.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR   after action reports
AHA   ammunition holding area
ALARACT  all Army activities
ALERRT  Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training
AO    administrative officer
AR3   Adaptive Response Readiness Report
ASE   active shooter event
ASOP  Armed Security Officer Program
ASP   ammunition supply point
AT    antiterrorism
ATFP  anti-terrorism force protection
ATP   Army Techniques Publication
ATR   anti-terrorism representative
COA   courses of action
CPD   Chattanooga Police Department
CRM   Composite Risk Management System
CRS   Congressional Research Service
CWP   concealed weapons permit
DA PAM  Department of the Army Pamphlet
DES   Directorate of Emergency Services
DHS   Department of Homeland Security
DJS   Director of the Joint Staff
DOD   Department of Defense
DoDD  Department of Defense Directive
DSCA  Defense Support of Civil Authorities
ECP   entry control point
ESF   emergency support function
FAMS  Federal Air Marshal Service
FBI   Federal Bureau of Investigation
FFDO  Federal Flight Deck Officer Program
FMJ  full metal jacket
FMS  field maintenance shop
FOUO LES  For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive
FPCON  force protection condition
FPO  force protection officer
FTO  foreign terrorist organization
FUOPS  future operations and plans
GEN  General
GFZ  gun-free zones
HAZMAT  hazardous material
HRT  high-risk target
HVE  homegrown violent extremist
IDPA  International Defensive Pistol Association
INNG  Indiana National Guard
IPR  in-progress review
JAG  Judge Advocate General
JFHQ  Joint Force Headquarters
JHP  jacketed hollow point
JOC  Joint Operations Center
LEA  law enforcement agency
LEO  law enforcement officer
LEOSA  Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act
MAJ  Major
MDMP  military decision making process
MEPS  Military Entrance Processing Station
MG  Major General
MJNGB  McEntire Joint National Guard Base
MOU  memorandum of understanding
MP  military police
MSC  major subordinate command
MTC  McCrady Training Center
MTOE  modified tables of organization and equipment
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NCIC</td>
<td>National Crime Information Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNG</td>
<td>North Carolina National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>non-commissioned officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OODA</td>
<td>observe, orient, decide, act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operations orders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSIC</td>
<td>Primary SADOP Instruction Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>posttraumatic stress disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>requests for information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPM</td>
<td>regional program manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADOP</td>
<td>Secure Area Duty Officer Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADOP-AG</td>
<td>SADOP-Augmenter Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAASCATS</td>
<td>South Carolina Advanced Active Shooter Counter Asymmetric Training System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCCJA</td>
<td>South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCDPS</td>
<td>South Carolina Department of Public Safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCEMD</td>
<td>South Carolina Emergency Management Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCNG</td>
<td>South Carolina National Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>SECDEF</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFS</td>
<td>security forces squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLED</td>
<td>State Law Enforcement Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Army specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPURS</td>
<td>State Personnel Reporting System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRPC</td>
<td>Soldier Readiness Processing Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRUF</td>
<td>standardized rules for the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>special weapons and tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC-Team</td>
<td>tactical team training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Transportation Security Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTX</td>
<td>tactical training exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWG</td>
<td>threat-working group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>unit marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMP</td>
<td>Unit Marshal Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARNORTH</td>
<td>U.S. Army North</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USB</td>
<td>universal safety brassard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code of Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 16, 2015, four U.S. Marine Corps reservists and one U.S. Navy reservist were murdered in an attack on two reserve component military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Mohammad Abdulrezeez, a naturalized American citizen, who had been radicalized online in recent months, perpetrated the act of domestic terrorism that was only the latest in a series targeting U.S. military facilities in recent years. Recognizing the vulnerability to a similar type of attack in South Carolina, Governor Nikki Haley ordered the South Carolina Adjutant General to develop a plan that would significantly mitigate a successful attack directed against the reserve component under her charge, the South Carolina National Guard (SCNG).

The Adjutant General, MG Robert Livingston, had established a threat-working group within days, and by July 21, 2015, the SCNG was coordinating directly with the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) to collaborate efforts to recruit, arm, train, and deploy a force of National Guard personnel to serve as an active shooter contingency. This platform would be similar in concept to the Federal Air Marshal Service and Federal Flight Deck Officer programs, where a cadre of specially trained and credentialed personnel provides an internal and immediate defense via concealed firearms carry.

On August 17, Governor Haley signed Executive Order 2015-18 authorizing the arming of the SCNG. The order directed precautionary measures to be implemented to protect military personnel and ordered a full review of SCNG facilities and installations and directed that appropriate and qualified SCNG personnel train in force protection tactics, techniques, and procedures in conjunction with SLED. After the conclusion of thorough research, legal review, bilateral planning, and credentialing coordination, the Secure Area Duty Officer Program (SADOP) was authorized as SCNG policy on October 3, 2015.

This research constitutes a case study of the SCNG SADOP and catalogs the program from its origin in the aftermath of the 2015 domestic terror attacks on the
reserve component facilities in Tennessee, through its progression to an innovative active shooter contingency program, which utilizes SCNG soldiers and airmen in an additional duty status to protect their fellow guardsmen and facilities. This study seeks to determine whether the program is well designed and efficiently organized to provide the appropriate level of response required to provide adequate force protection.

This study illuminates how the SCNG, in collaboration with SLED, conducted a fundamental shift in active shooter contingency philosophy by implementing active and passive measures to deter and disrupt the threat. Through the implementation of SADOP, the SCNG has attempted to deter a potential attack by publicizing the decision to arm its soldiers and airmen at the reserve centers, armories, training areas, and recruiting locations. It also sanctions advanced close-quarter tactics taught by SLED to disrupt active shooters and create opportunities for victims to evacuate, take shelter, or receive initial triage, which subsequently saves lives by stabilizing them or rapidly evacuating them to advanced trauma care.

This thesis scrutinizes the problem-solving methods utilized to identify the problem and the screening criteria used to determine the most actionable course of action for the organization. State legal challenges and concerns that the program has worked through and a detailed look at the civil-military collaboration has created a perpetual working relationship between agencies that transcends active shooter and counterterrorism topics and provides further cooperation during civil support or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) missions. This research compares other federal and state efforts to address the active shooter threat and provides a comprehensive review of the differences between the active and reserve components of the U.S. military and the nature of the force protection requirements specific to each.

The study reviews the program from inception to its current configuration and provides a detailed review of the program’s requirements, procedures, and organization structure in two separate appendices. SADOP revisions and amendments are reviewed, and the process for improving the program’s efficiency, as well as expanding its interaction with both state and federal partners, is explored.
The findings of this study indicate that SADOP creatively employs a force protection framework tailored to the success of the reserve component, as opposed to obliging its organizations to utilize legacy force protection regulations designed for the active component that is completely inadequate to meet the innovative threat posed from homegrown violent extremists, foreign terror organizations, criminal elements in society, or the insider threat.
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I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my family for their love and support during the last 19 months. First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife, Frances, for her phenomenal patience and for being incredibly accommodating to the seclusion that was necessary for me to write and research. Her gracious reassurance was a constant even when my own limits had been reached. My children, Emily, Joshua, Jonathan, and Lillian, who missed me during my seven trips for in-residence, had to sacrifice our time together even when I was at home. I also give thanks to my in-laws, Jim and Susan Madden, and my father, Harry Ramey, for their consideration, encouragement, and prayers during what has been an incredible journey.

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A sincerest thanks to my benefactors from the South Carolina National Guard and the South Carolina Emergency Management Division leadership who were instrumental in providing me this opportunity. The Adjutant General of South Carolina, MG Robert Livingston; Deputy Adjutant General MG Van McCarty; Director of the Joint Staff BG Stephen Owens; Future Plans and Operations Officer Lt. Col. Delphin Gantt; and SCEMD Director Kim Stenson all supported me to the fullest and without them my participation in CHDS simply would not have been possible. I am very appreciative to the members of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division, specifically Chief Mark Keel, Mr. Adam Whitset, and Captain Jim McClary, who provided in-depth assessments and commentary, which contributed greatly to this work.
Lastly, I would like to recognize the officers and men of the 263rd Army Air and Missile Defense Command and especially the full-time chain of supervision that demonstrated an extraordinary amount of patience and granted me the necessary time and wherewithal to be successful even at their own expense during the last 12 months.
I. INTRODUCTION

On July 16, 2015, four U.S. Marine Corps reservists and one U.S. Navy reservist were murdered in an attack on two reserve component military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The attack was perpetrated by Mohammad Abdulazeez, a naturalized American citizen originally from Kuwait but who held Jordanian citizenship. On December 18, 2015, Chattanooga Police Department (CPD) Officers Sean O’Brien, Grover Wilson, Jeff Lancaster, Kevin Flanagan, and Lucas Timmons were identified as the CPD officers who fired their weapons in response to the active shooter attack that previous July 16. At a press conference, Chattanooga Chief of Police Fred Fletcher said, “the men standing behind me and beside me are absolutely heroes in every sense of that word.”

It was just before nine o’clock in the morning on August 14, 2017, when Sergeant Sean O’Brien of the CPD introduced himself to the assembly. He was a guest speaker at the First Annual Regional Active Shooter Conference being hosted at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. A variety of active duty military, civilian first responders and full-time personnel from the South Carolina Army National Guard were in attendance at the Armed Forces Chaplaincy Center. Of the National Guard soldiers present that morning, about 50 were members of the Secure Area Duty Officer Program (SADOP).

These soldiers were especially interested in hearing what Sergeant O’Brien had to say because they were all well-versed in the homegrown violent extremist (HVE) attack on the Marine-Navy Reserve facility in Chattanooga. For these SADOP Armed Duty officers, the Chattanooga attack was a watershed moment in their careers that changed the way they lived their lives at their duty locations both on and off duty. Due to their primary SADOP instruction course (PSIC) training, they were all too familiar with the attacker Mohammad Abdulazeez and the five brothers in arms he had murdered on that.

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day in July 2015. They were transfixed by what an actual participant in the response to the active shooter event (ASE) was going to say.2

O’Brien gave a detailed synopsis of his actions that started when he heard radio traffic of shots fired at the Armed Forces Career Center off Lee Highway. O’Brien recalled the events and no one said a word in the auditorium when he turned on the dash-cam video footage of the car chase when he first made visual contact with Abdulazeez. However, fascination turned to anguish as O’Brien’s dash-cam camera ticked off the seconds when the police remained outside the perimeter of the Marine-Navy Reserve Center for 10 minutes. The active shooter had entered the facility and fired dozens of rounds that killed and wounded the unarmed and unprotected service members. Each second on the dash-cam caused frustration in the assembly despite everyone knowing how the incident would end.

After the end of the video, one of the soldiers asked, “Why were you just lying there for ten minutes? There were over ten of you with parity of firepower; what were you waiting for?”3 O’Brien explained that the responding officers were concerned that the suspect’s abandoned car had been booby trapped with explosives and were afraid of being caught in the crossfire of the Marines inside the facility due to the shooting. “What crossfire? The service members weren’t armed,” one soldier barked. “Yeah, but we assumed they were,” O’Brien explained.

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND

Honor never grows old, and honor rejoices the heart of age. It does so because honor is, finally, about defending those noble and worthy things that deserve defending, even if it comes at a high cost. In our time, that may mean social disapproval, public scorn, hardship, persecution, or as always, even death itself. The question remains: What is worth defending? What is worth dying for? What is worth living for?4

~ William Bennett, Lecture to the U.S. Naval Academy, 1997

2 Armed duty officer, personal communication, August 14, 2017.
3 Ibid.
This perplexing demonstration of complete situational miscalculation and apparent tactical incompetence underscores two major misconceptions that had lethal ramifications in the case of Chattanooga. The first is a nationwide misunderstanding by first responders of the differences between active and reserve component force protection capabilities. The fact that the CPD was unaware that reserve component military personnel manning armories are unarmed presents a potentially disastrous information gap if this sentiment occurs nationwide. After all, National Guard centers are routinely called “armories,” which by definition indicates a location at which arms are stored. However, in reality, reserve component personnel do not have dedicated security and are prohibited from carrying privately owned firearms.

The second misconception concerns the reserve component service members and their comprehension of who is coming to their aid in the event of an active shooter incident. The impression that once a 9-1-1 call is placed and is received by dispatch, police and first responders are coming heavily armed and are prepared to bring an active shooter incident to a rapid conclusion is also flawed. In reality, just because the “cavalry is coming” does not necessarily mean that they are mentally prepared, tactically equipped, properly trained, or capable of rapidly defeating an active shooter threat. Misconceptions on both sides have potentially deadly consequences.

The military regulates the selection, certification, credentialing, and equipping of protective service personnel; however, regulations and physical security programs, such as Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AR 190-11) and Physical Security (AR 190-16), constrain the use of arms and ammunition. Unlike active component facilities that have military police (MP), security force squadrons, Department of Defense (DOD) security personnel, and even fire departments, reserve components do not have comparable personnel available for internal force protection.

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B. **RESEARCH QUESTION**

Is the South Carolina National Guard’s (SCNG’s) SADOP an effective approach to meet the emerging threat of active shooters directed toward the reserve component of the U.S. military in general and the National Guard in particular? The expected outcome of this paper is to answer the question of whether SADOP has value and is a return on investment to its stakeholders from the perspective of risk mitigation and cost benefit. This paper quantifies whether there is a return on knowledge from the program’s instruction and interaction with state law enforcement. This return is measured by evaluating the training in advanced tactics, techniques and procedures, instruction in military counter-active shooter objectives, and civilian concealed firearms carry law.

C. **METHODOLOGY**

This thesis is a single case study of SADOP, which is an exceptional case and the only one of its kind. The assertion is that SADOP by design is specialized to mitigate the risk presented by the unique vulnerabilities relative to reserve component military organizations, which the larger active component formations do not experience. It is supported by a set of seven interviews with key decision makers from the SCNG and State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) who were instrumental in the program from the initial crisis-action response concept and planning to its implementation as an active shooter contingency policy.

This thesis reviews the deliberative problem solving and course of action screening criterion research methods implemented in the original development of SADOP to the perpetual adaptive measures that continues to keep the program relevant in its current configuration. The study examines the close collaboration between the SCNG and state law enforcement agencies and endeavors to determine if this cooperation, in conjunction with the innovative concept and structure of SADOP, created the necessary synergy to counter the emerging active shooter threat. This study contemplates the effectiveness of legacy active component force protection policies and their current relevance to the reserve component’s unique protection challenges.
1. Limitations

As with most case study research reviews, this thesis is subject to certain constraints.

a. Internal Limitations

One obvious limitation is the difficulty of quantifying the effectiveness of an active shooter contingency program that has not been tested by an actual incident. While preferable to documenting a response of lives lost or wounded on SCNG facilities, it channels the research almost exclusively on evaluating the program’s policy design and training but without empirical data to measure the effectiveness of the program’s passive or active measures.

b. External Limitations

In a credit to the procedural analysis of the SCNG threat-working group (TWG), future operations and plans (FUOPS) section and the state military and civilian leadership, an extemporized reflex to the governor’s executive order did not occur. SADOP was developed and implemented after deliberate threat analysis, risk management, and bilateral collaboration. No comparable programs were available however to use as a benchmark for contrast. Numerous examples of arming status changes, operations orders (OPORD) and state memoranda exist but are not on the same organizational policy level as SADOP. Likewise, many of the published studies available for consideration are mostly governmental or federal military policy reviews and publications that are not an equal comparison to a reserve component policy or program.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this study is to provide a measureable appraisal of SADOP, the SCNG’s counter-active shooter contingency policy. This study explores the program to determine if it meets its stated purpose to deter or disrupt an active shooter threat to the SCNG’s personnel and others who share workspaces in their facilities. It also seeks to determine whether the program is well designed and efficiently organized to actually provide the appropriate level of response needed to be successful.
This study describes how SADOP became policy and examines several ASEs instrumental in causing the SCNG to take the administrative action of developing an active shooter contingency mechanism. This thesis scrutinizes SADOP policy, program development archives, and interviews with SLED and military decision makers involved from the conceptual design processes to the implementation of the program. It reviews initial threat working groups, bilateral planning meetings with state government and law enforcement, projected timelines, and problem-solving phases. The ratification of the policy, initial training iterations, and the fielding of the program are also documented.

D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The chapters are organized chronologically with topical emphasis on the development of SADOP. After the tragedy in Chattanooga, the impetus on the senior leadership at SLED and the SCNG was to assess the likelihood of a similar attack in South Carolina and on securing unity of effort. This research follows the essential bilateral cooperation in program development sequentially, which is why the threat of terrorism is addressed in Chapter IV once joint synergy was established.

Chapter II provides the literature review covering the military’s force protection measures prior to the Chattanooga attack, the proactive measures that the SCNG took after the event, and examines other prominent ASEs and describes areas where most ASEs are known to take place.

The origins of the program are described in Chapter III to include the attack against the reserve component sites in Chattanooga, TWG consultations, the governor’s decision to issue an executive order, and then describes how the SCNG and the State of South Carolina took the initiative to provide force protection for reserve component personnel in a changing threat environment.

Chapter IV examines the domestic terrorism threat to the military and the reserve components in particular. This chapter describes how the program identified vulnerabilities to its personnel and facilities and the systematic problem-solving method used to recognize and respond to the evolving threat.
Chapter V is devoted to how the program initially took shape and provides a review to the viability, sustainment, and measures of effectiveness. This chapter also examines the collaboration between the SCNG and the civil authorities during the development of SADOP. It concludes with the legal issues and concerns including Staff Judge Advocate interpretation, South Carolina tort law, and liability protection.

The progression of SADOP is scrutinized in Chapter VI from its implementation as force protection policy to the various revisions and changes that brought the program from conceptual to practical. It observes the training concentration and administrative amendments that drastically revised how the program responds to the active shooter threat. The chapter further discusses the training required for armed duty officers to be proficient in the program and how these requirements are compared to other state and federal programs and policies. The chapter concludes by presenting an overview of how SADOP has been available and is prepared to support the state’s civil support security augmentation requests.

Chapter VII describes anticipated modifications to the program in the foreseeable future. This final chapter examines the way forward for SADOP with federal cooperation and transformation of the program’s legal standing from the executive to legislative branches of state government. It also evaluates whether SADOP is suitable to replicate and distribute to other states for potential use in similar reserve component organizations. This chapter provides insights from interviews with key decision makers who were instrumental in the initiation and progression of the program both from military and civilian perspectives. Finally, this chapter provides recommendations for the program to remain innovative and effective and offers a final comprehensive assessment of SADOP.

Data referencing the detailed aspects of SADOP are collated in two appendices. Appendix A: SADOP Policy and Procedures, details the recruiting, vetting, contact response doctrine, the “Warrior Class” mindset, safety and program risk management, and specific training metrics. Appendix B: SADOP Organization and Administration, focuses on how the program is systematized for management of personnel, training and equipment. It describes duty positions that are key to keeping the program operating efficiently.
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH

Response to ASEs is now one of the top priorities facing public safety agencies in the United States. This thesis provides a study that addresses how the SCNG is proactively taking action to prepare for an immediate response to an ASE targeted against a SCNG location. This study illuminates a fundamental shift in active shooter contingency philosophy, as it implements active and passive measures to deter and disrupt the threat.

Through the implementation of SADOP, the SCNG has attempted to deter a potential attack by publicizing the decision to arm its soldiers and airmen at the reserve centers, armories, training areas, and recruiting locations. It also sanctions advanced close quarter tactics taught by SLED to disrupt active shooters and create opportunities for victims to evacuate, take shelter, or receive initial triage, which subsequently saves lives by stabilizing them or rapidly evacuating them to advanced trauma care.

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This thesis addresses two chronologies and one topical resource, from the “pre-Chattanooga” force protection procedures and directives to the immediate aftermath of the tragedy of July 16, 2015. These documents establish a common understanding of the anti-terrorism and force protection enterprise’s operational tempo prior to and just after the active shooter attack in Chattanooga, TN. The second part of the literature review focus on the assessment of the “post-Chattanooga” reaction of various governors and state military departments, as well as the DOD. Lastly, this literature review provides an appraisal of literature on active shooter incidents and consistent danger areas.

A. “PRE-CHATTANOOGA” FORCE PROTECTION PROCEDURES

The military’s force protection condition (FPCON) measures are determined by commanders according to specific localized threats as part of terrorism threat assessments and integrated into the risk management process.\(^7\) FPCON is mandated by DODI 2000.16: DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards. These FPCONs range in severity from “normal” (no known threat) to “Delta” (localized, specific terrorist threat).

On May 7, 2015 the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Commander raised the FPCON level to “Bravo” (increased and predictable threat of terrorism), which was only the second time since 9/11.\(^8\) Immediately after the July 16 Chattanooga attack, the FPCON was revised to “Bravo Plus” in USNORTHCOM all Army activities (ALARACT) 15-200, indicating additional force protection advisories with an emphasis on off-installation activities, recruiting stations, reserve centers, and reserve officer training corps units.\(^9\) Ash Carter, then the Secretary of Defense

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\(^7\) Department of the Army, Risk Management, ATP 5-19 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), change no. 1.


SECDEF), also ordered a complete review of force protection policies in a departmental memorandum to the secretaries of the military departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Under Secretaries of Defense among others. The defense secretary’s intent was to ensure that they address the “challenging security environment.”

Numerous state governors responded to the Chattanooga attacks by issuing executive orders arming their full-time National Guard personnel with available federal firearms. Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson issued orders, such as executive order 15-17 in which he directed that “appropriate and qualified members of the Arkansas National Guard” carry firearms in accordance with Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5210.56. In a National Guard Bureau (NGB) hosted TWG, Ohio and Georgia announced that they were closing storefront recruiting stations or relocating recruiters from these and other “soft targets.”

A number of state adjutant generals implemented OPORD either authorizing the arming of National Guard personnel or published letters to permit open or concealed carry of privately owned firearms on National Guard facilities. The North Carolina National Guard (NCNG) implemented OPORD 15-075 “Guardian Hornet” in an effort to enhance the safety and security at NCNG facilities. The Indiana National Guard (INNG) issued Appendix 1 to Annex A (Safety) to the Adjutant General’s executive order 15-07. At this time, the Haley Administration of South Carolina contacted the

11 Ibid.
SCNG Adjutant General, Major General (MG) Robert Livingston, and directed him to take the necessary actions to mitigate the risk of a similar ASE from being successfully directed against SCNG personnel.

B. “POST CHATTANOOGA” SCNG FORCE PROTECTION PROCEDURES

With the guidance of the governor, the SCNG TAG initiated a TWG on July 19 and then formed a NGB TWG on July 20. Initially, the topics focused on immediate force protection measures to make SCNG facilities “harder targets” and increase the presence of local law enforcement. The TWG brought in local sheriffs, major subordinate command (MSC) administrative officers (AO), MP commanders, anti-terrorism force protection (ATFP) specialists, and staff officers of the SCNG Joint Staff. On July 23, the “Force Protection Operators and Special Constable” presentation was briefed to the SCNG Joint Staff. On July 25, “EXORD XX Draft” was presented by Governor Haley’s Chief of Staff James Burns, which directed bilateral cooperation with state law enforcement agencies and the SCNG. On July 28, a MSC AO meeting was held whereby the MSCs were validated on physical security inspections, active shooter drills, and tactical training exercises (TTXs). The meeting reviewed contingency plan reviews, created full-time manning rosters of personnel with concealed carry permits, reviewed fiscal estimates for upgrading storefronts and armories with ballistic panels, as well as numerous other aspects of force protection preparations.

During mission analysis and problem solving, the TWG referenced numerous foundational force protection regulations and documents including *Arming and the Use of Force* (DoDD 5210.56), *Marine Corps Interior Guard Procedural Guidance* (USMC order 5530.15), *Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives* (AR 190-11), *Protection* (ADP 3-37) and *Physical Security* (ATP 3-39.32). On August 17, Governor

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Nikki Haley issued executive order 2015-18, which specifically cited the active shooter attacks in Chattanooga. Acting as Commander-in-Chief of the state, and in accordance with Article IV, Section 13 of the State Constitution, pursuant to Section 1-3-410 of the SC Code of Laws, the governor took action to authorize the arming of the SCNG.  

Final drafting of the SADOP training program manual by the SCNG Joint Operations FUOPS in cooperation with SLED training section was completed in late September. SADOP became state policy with the publication of the SADOP manual on October 1, 2015.

As the SADOP training, fielding, and implementation progressed, the program was modified to provide an improved and streamlined process. Revisions 1.1 (October 22, 2015), 1.2 (December 29, 2015), and 1.3 (February 2, 2016) represented minor amendments to SADOP. The Adaptive Response Readiness Report (AR3) was published on August 16, 2016 and indicated that the program needed to be more reflexive in its arming policy and response doctrine. The result of AR3 was a major revision of SADOP implementing doctrinal shifts from the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) “run, hide, fight” and the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) principles of “avoid, deny, defend” to a SADOP philosophy of “assertive intervention” and a fundamentally different doctrinal focus called “contact response.”

The South Carolina Advanced Active Shooter Counter Asymmetric Training System (SCAASCATS) provided the training mechanism for the shift in SADOP in response doctrine, which included additional cooperation for advanced counter-active shooter training with SLED. The result of these major SLED supported modifications was SADOP policy version 2.0 published on January 1, 2017.

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23 Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Training Manual, ver. 1.0 (Columbia, SC: Military Department of South Carolina, 2015).


25 Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual, ver. 2.0 (Columbia, SC: Military Department of South Carolina, 2017), 24.
C. ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS AND DANGER AREAS

Hundreds of ASEs have occurred in the United States during the last five and a half decades. The U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report published in 2014 demonstrated that the trends are increasing.\textsuperscript{26} A 2013 Pew Research Center report found that while the gun-homicide rate had fallen 49\% since the mid-1990s, the FBI had determined that mass shootings had increased sharply.\textsuperscript{27} The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported that at least 78 ASEs had taken place between 1983 and 2012 with some of the deadliest occurring after 2007 (Virginia Tech, Aurora, Sandy Hook, Binghamton, Fort Hood, and the Washington Navy Yard).\textsuperscript{28}

Locations where active shooter incidents occur vary but almost always typically take place in areas with a small police presence and in which concealed firearm carry by the public is prohibited.\textsuperscript{29} The “Illogic of ‘Gun Free’ Zones” by Tom Trinko points out that people who respect “gun free” zones are precisely those who would never use a gun for a crime in the first place.\textsuperscript{30} Matt Vespa with CNS news quoted research by the Crime Prevention Research Center that demonstrates all but two active shooter attacks since 1950 took place in “gun-free” zones.\textsuperscript{31} A joint FBI, Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service report published in 2010 studied targeted violence affecting institutions of higher learning.\textsuperscript{32}


\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.


Other locations commonly targeted include work places, public gathering areas, government buildings, and specifically, military bases or reserve centers. Prior to the July 16, 2015 attack on a United States Marine Corps (USMC) recruiting storefront and a naval reserve center, DODD 5210.56 “limited and controlled” DOD components in regard to being armed unless their duties specifically required it. Therefore, these military sites by policy were in effect “gun-free” zones. This literature review studied several active shooter after action reports (AAR) including the Fort Hood, TX massacre, the San Bernardino mass shooting, the American Civic Association Shooting, and the Aurora Theater Shooting.

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III. THE ORIGIN OF SADOP

A. CHATTANOOGA: A CATALYST TO ACTION

On July 16, 2015, assumptions, such as the arming status of reserve component personnel, combined with other fundamental mistakes, resulted in a bungled response by local law enforcement first responders to an active shooter attack against Marine and Navy reservists in Chattanooga, TN, which left five servicemen dead. The tragedy in Chattanooga was a watershed event; a wakeup call for the military in general, but the reserve components in particular, as well as the leadership in South Carolina.

The SCNG Adjutant General, MG Robert Livingston supported the state governor’s decision to arm the National Guard by stating, “Given the evolution of the threat over the past 15 years, this order by Gov. Haley allows us to take the next step of force protection for troops on U.S. soil.” “We are implementing changes ... that are proactive, realistic and sustainable. We will continue to take all steps necessary to ensure our S.C. National Guardsmen have the proper force protection both here and abroad while they protect our citizens.”

These comments by MG Livingston were part of a coordinated media campaign from July through October 2015 in cooperation with the state’s governor to implement the first half of the dual purpose of SADOP deterrence. The objective of the state information drive was to disseminate the message through news reports, press conferences, the internet, and articles in local papers that the military personnel and armories in the state of South Carolina were no longer defenseless or soft targets.

The domestic terrorist attack in Chattanooga was the catalyst for action for the SCNG but unfortunately it was not the first time that military personnel or DOD civilians had been targeted by an active shooter. Military active shooter instances were following the trends in ASEs nationwide, primarily because—commensurate with civilian incident

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statistics—military bases had become, “in essence, Gun-Free Zones (GFZ).” In fact, military regulations do authorize firearms for personal protection but only on a “case-by-case basis” and only when “the responsible intelligence center identifies a credible and specific threat against DA personnel in that regional area.”

B. SCNG TWG ANALYSIS

In the wake of the Chattanooga attack and in close consultation with the governor of South Carolina, on July 19, 2015, just three days after the attack, the SCNG TAG convened a TWG and provided his initial guidance. In conjunction with the concerns of Governor Nikki Haley, the TAG directed the TWG to “mitigate the risk of a Chattanooga style attack succeeding in South Carolina.” The TWG was a select group of SCNG personnel and local state officials whose purpose was to discuss options, come up with course of action contingencies to counter the threat, and provide the TAG and the General Staff with recommendations.

Members of the TWG included senior SCNG officers and commanders, members of the Joint Staff, MP and force protection professionals, civilian state employee advisors, senior civilian law enforcement officials from local jurisdictions, a county sheriff, military policy planners, field grade staff officers, and military lawyers commonly known as Staff Judge Advocates, Judge Advocate Generals or more commonly, JAGs. The TWG met at the headquarters building of the Military Department of South Carolina and after receiving MG Livingston’s intent, began their discourse and problem analysis. MG Livingston’s intent was for the TWG to determine how best to safeguard the lives of SCNG personnel and property of SCNG facilities with an initial priority placed on SCNG storefront recruiting locations.


36 Headquarters Department of the Army, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1993), ch. 2, sec. 2.2.


38 Ibid.
This TWG meeting lasted for hours, with ideas varying from the simple and straightforward to the multifaceted and complex, such as:

- Coordinating with local law enforcement agencies to increase their patrols and perform site visits to SCNG armories and recruiting storefronts.

- Activating SCNG MP troops to provide force protection at recruiting storefronts.

- Posting sentries at armories during drill weekends when units were conducting training.

- Relocating SCNG recruiting stations from storefronts to armories where they would be separated from the public and more easily secured.

- Keeping the recruiting stations in the storefronts but installing ballistic paneling and providing security or arming the recruiters.

- Activating general purpose soldiers to state active duty status and deploying them in military vehicles outside of recruiting storefronts.

- Requesting that the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (SCDPS) take up the role of providing security to the state buildings (armories and reserve centers) where SCNG personnel conducted their duties.

- Overtly arming the full-time members of the SCNG to provide force protection in the armories across the state.

- Relaxing TAG imposed constraints barring soldiers and airmen from carrying privately owned firearms at SCNG facilities.

- Authorizing soldiers and airmen to be armed who had completed the state’s concealed weapons permit (CWP) course and had CWP licenses.39

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The crux of the problem was that the SCNG was in unchartered territory, and funding had not been allocated in the SCNG budget for arming a force protection mission. Unlike active component bases, ports, and facilities, which are typically large and enclosed by natural or deliberate barriers and are supported by garrison commands that provide services, such as emergency medical services, hazardous material (HAZMAT), fire and police, reserve component armories and reserve centers are comparatively small and spread out over entire states and territories. In the case of South Carolina, 64 armories and four recruiting storefronts needed to be considered, not just one or two large self-enclosed enclaves.

Legal issues also need to be considered, specifically, the scope of authority in which full-time National Guard soldiers and airmen can implement the pertinent force protection regulations. Title 32 of the United States Code of Law (USC) administers the duties and responsibilities of the reserve components, but military physical security regulations, such as AR 190-11 (Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives) and 190-14 (Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties) are in most cases applicable to the Active Army, the National Guard (Army National Guard) and U.S. Army Reserve. The force protection provisions and legal challenges being confronted by the SCNG TWG were completely disparate from what the active component was encountering. Therefore, the requirements of the active and reserve components were completely distinct and no precedence existed for funding Title 32 units to be supplied with force protection or facility security on a nationwide scale. Frustrated, the TWG concluded that without DOD or military branch level (Army and Air Force secretaries) guidance, the SCNG could do little using traditional policies, regulations, and procedures. The TWG had developed more requests for information (RFI) than recommendations or prospective solutions and scheduled to reconvene in the coming weeks for further deliberation.

On Wednesday July 29, 2015, SECDEF Ash Carter published a DOD memorandum addressing force protection following the Chattanooga shooting. In it he

stated, “I am directing all Components to consider any additional protection measures including changes to policy and procedures that protect our force against the evolving threat.”

August 21, 2015 was the suspense due date to the SECDEF for his review. The TWG was thus optimistic that higher headquarters command guidance was imminent, which in all likelihood would weigh heavily on the ongoing SCNG mission analysis being conducted. The suspense date came and went however without recommendations and extensions for further deliberation being submitted and approved. New DOD guidance would not be published until November 18, 2016 as DOD Directive 5210.56 Arming and the Use of Force, and in the meantime, the TWG continued with its assigned task.

Some services did publish guidance, however; the Air Force reiterated that commanders could arm qualified airmen to carry weapons on base. Air Force Security Forces Integrated Defense Action Officer Major (MAJ) Keith Quick said that the Air Force was now “formalizing its authorizations by reinforcing how already established programs can be used more effectively. Specifically, the Unit Marshal Program (UMP), allows unit commanders to train airmen, or unit marshals (UM) under the supervision of security forces and openly carry an M9 standard issue pistol. The role of these UMs would be self-protection and protection of others in their workspace.”

C. STATE EXECUTIVE ORDER 2015–18

While the federal government was assessing whether to revise existing force protection measures, threat levels, personal concealed carry of privately owned firearms and other physical security policies, the State of South Carolina initiated action. On August 17, 2015, the Office of the Governor of South Carolina made its guidance official as it put its intent to paper with the publication of executive order 2015-18. This executive department order filed by Secretary of State Mark Hammond specifically

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referenced the Chattanooga attack and the threat to domestic-based military personnel. The order directed precautionary measures to be implemented to protect service men and women and ordered a full review of SCNG facilities and installations. Further, it directed active shooter exercises, coordination, and training with law enforcement in general and SLED in particular.\textsuperscript{43}

In an unprecedented move that clearly separated South Carolina from other organizations around the country assessing the issue of homegrown violent extremism, Governor Haley invoked the authority of the state constitution to task the SCNG and SLED to cooperate together. The governor referenced Chapter 23 (Law Enforcement Training and Public Safety) of the South Carolina Code of Laws and specifically authorized the appointment of appropriate and qualified members of the SCNG, State Guard or any civilian employee thereof, to be trained with the coordination of SLED in force protection.\textsuperscript{44}

Due to the close coordination between the TWG and the governor’s chief of staff, Governor Haley authorized executive order 2015-18, whose main directives were to:

- Install security enhancements at all store-front recruitment centers and other facilities of the SCNG as necessary.

- Identify and designate appropriate and qualified members of the SCNG, State Guard or any civilian employees thereof to undergo specific force protection training coordinated through SLED.

- Assign and arm individuals who successfully complete force protection training with specific duties and responsibilities.

- Coordinate with state and local civilian law enforcement agencies for additional protection as necessary.

\textsuperscript{43} Haley, Executive Order 2015-18, 1–2.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 2.
Periodically issue and terminate orders to state active duty pursuant to Title 1, Chapter 3 for such members of the SCNG or State Guard as deemed necessary until such time as a permanent plan for force protection is implemented.\textsuperscript{45}

With this demonstration of political will, Governor Haley cast the die for what would become the SCNG’s SADOP.

D. A NATIONAL PROBLEM WITH A STATE SOLUTION

The police response to an active shooter call for service is to arrive on the scene as quickly as possible, but until an incident commander is on scene, much of the effort is unorganized and the level of responder preparedness varies. In the case of the San Bernardino attack for example, the first responders were typical police officers; an administrative lieutenant, a motor officer, a patrol officer, and a detective from the San Bernardino Police Department. Two of the officers had just grabbed lunch, another had stopped by headquarters for an errand while the last was just patrolling the streets of San Bernardino. According to the lieutenant who led the initial charge into the building, “If you were picking a team, the four of us were not the ones that would be picked first.”\textsuperscript{46} Clearly it was not exactly an elite special weapons and tactics (SWAT) team, which is typically how military personnel visualize their rescuers coming during an active shooter TTX.

The HVE attack on the reserve component facilities in Chattanooga was a horrific wakeup call directed at National Guard commands across the nation that brought the vulnerability of recruiting storefronts, armories, and reserve centers to the forefront. By introducing the initiative of the state adjutant general in cooperation with the authority of the state’s governor, SADOP presented the SCNG a unique opportunity to bring a state solution to a national problem. South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley directed the SCNG

\textsuperscript{45} Haley, Executive Order 2015-18, 2.

TAG to develop a plan to mitigate the risk of a similar tragedy succeeding in South Carolina. Three days later on July 19, the SCNG TAG ordered the formation of a TWG to assess options to respond effectively to a similar ASE directed against the SCNG. By July 21, the SCNG was directly coordinating with local and state law enforcement agencies to prepare just such a program.47

On August 17, Governor Haley signed executive order 2015-18, which authorized the arming of the SCNG to counter an active shooter threat and directed the resources of the state to cooperate in a bilateral training program. This order specifically directed the SCNG TAG to “Identify and designate appropriate and qualified members of the National Guard, State Guard, or any civilian employees thereof to undergo specific force protection training coordinated through the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division.”48 This innovative counter-active shooter platform was designed to be similar in concept to the federal air marshal and federal flight deck officer programs (FFDOs) where a cadre of specially trained and credentialed personnel provided an immediate response and internal defense via concealed firearms carry. After the conclusion of thorough research, legal review, extensive planning, and credentialing coordination, the SCNG SADOP was authorized as policy on October 1, 2015.

SADOP represents a unique approach in its purpose and scope while pioneering the enterprise of reserve component force protection programs. The SCNG program sets itself apart from other states by implementing advanced firearms tactics and counter-active shooter training criteria, safety protocols, administrative staff, budgetary parameters, extensive vetting procedures, and fostering an exclusive esprit de corps that recognizes the value of the personnel accepted to participate. SADOP is innovative as it establishes a foundational partnership between the SCNG and the state’s premier state law enforcement agency (LEA) to incorporate bilateral training and program support at the direction of the state government.

47 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 7.

48 Haley, Executive Order 2015-18, 2.
In the context of domestic force structure, the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, Navy and Coast Guard are typically located on large bases, posts, or ports, which have full-time MPs, security force squadrons, or DOD protective services. The reserve component, unlike its active component counterpart, is characteristically composed of more numerous but comparatively smaller armories, field maintenance shops (FMSs), airfields, or reserve centers extended across entire states or territories. Therefore, these remote locations have much smaller full-time personnel manning and consequently no force protection capability.

As demonstrated by data reported from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the threat environment is changing and traditional force protection measures are no longer adequate to protect reserve component personnel and facilities properly. Since 9/11, the threat from radical Islam terrorism has increased dramatically. According to the NCTC in October 2017, “the Sunni violent extremist threat has evolved from one defined by complex, large-scale attacks directed by a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) to mostly self-initiated attacks by homegrown violent extremists using relatively simple methods.” The NCTC GUIDE describes 28 premeditated and opportunistic attacks, including four against the U.S. military, three of which were directed against recruiting locations. Current trends indicate a rise in violence within the military community brought about by disaffected contractors and soldiers. Attacks, such as the Fort Hood Massacre, Washington Naval Yard, Fort Bragg Shooting, and the Quantico and Chattanooga attacks cross a spectrum of terrorism, the mentally ill and criminal motives, which have also elevated the vulnerability from the insider threat to unprecedented levels.

50 Ibid.
IV. THE DOMESTIC TERROR THREAT

Military personnel are vulnerable to active shooters primarily because of overly restrictive military firearms policies that prevent nearly all personnel from carrying firearms for unit or self-defense purposes.51

A. VULNERABILITIES

On June 1, 2009, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad opened fire on an Army recruiting station in Little Rock, AR and killed one soldier and wounded another.52 In December 2010, Muhammad Hussain attempted to bomb an Armed Forces Career Center in Baltimore, MD.53 Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh planned to use machine guns in an attack against a Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS), at which the military screens and processes enlistees.54 “Driven by a violent, extreme ideology, these two young Americans are charged with plotting to murder men and women who were enlisting in the Armed Forces to serve and protect our country. This is one of a number of recent plots targeting our military here at home,” said Todd Hinnen, Acting Assistant Attorney General for National Security.55

Each of these incidents expressly validates the premise that military recruiting facilities have been a recurring target of opportunity for radicalized HVEs seeking to demonstrate their hostility toward the U.S. government, U.S. foreign policy decisions, and military service members volunteering to serve in the nation’s armed forces. According to the Fall 2015 publication of the Military Law Review:

55 Ibid.
Satellite recruiting offices and small Reserve Centers, like those in Chattanooga, will continue to be uniquely vulnerable to active shooter attacks until DOD weapons policies are updated. These facts lend powerful support to the argument that military leaders need to arm service members within individual units to provide immediate response capability against the active shooter threat.56

Based on an internal vulnerability assessment, the SCNG TWG recommended, and the TAG approved, the prioritization of recruiting storefronts and the entry control point (ECP) guards located at the TAG Complex and McCrady Training Center (MTC) main gate. As a result, the first SADOP training iteration held on November 16–18, 2015 had 27 of the 30 slots filled by recruiters, TAG Complex ECP guards, MTC ECP guards, and the provost marshal.57

The DHS recognizes the threat posed by an asymmetrical adversary, and in the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan indicated, “Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”58 One supposition for the focused targeting of military recruitment centers specifically is that they are in essence defenseless targets.

As former Marine and serving Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter of California stated, “By current military regulation, these recruitment centers, they’re generally gun-free zones.”59 Another possibility for the frequency of plots and attacks against recruiting and in-processing venues is to reduce the allure of enlisting in the U.S. Armed Forces. If successful, this strategy may conceivably reduce enlistment rates by causing the military to relocate or harden its recruiting centers thereby making them less assessable to the public. “I think when you walk into a recruitment center, you want to be


57 Military Department of South Carolina, Agenda Secure Area Duty Officer Program Iteration #001, November 16–18, 2015 (Columbia, SC: Military Department of South Carolina, 2016).


at ease. So I think, you know, by definition these are places that are meant to put the public at ease and welcome them so they can have conversations and sign up,” Congressman Hunter remarked.60

Plots and attacks have also been directed at military sites and bases in the continental United States. In May 2007, six Muslims were arrested for a plot to attack Fort Dix, NJ. According to federal authorities who labeled them as Islamic extremists, they intended “to kill as many soldiers as possible.”61

Perhaps the most infamous attack against a U.S. Army installation and one extensively studied by the SCNG TWG, was the November 5, 2009 Fort Hood, TX active shooter incident. In this insider threat attack, U.S. Army psychiatrist MAJ Nidal Hasan became a radical follower of anti-American Muslim cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, and once motivated by the cleric’s indoctrination, initiated a massacre at a Soldier Readiness Processing Center (SRPC) where he systematically murdered 12 soldiers, one civilian, and wounded 32 others.

Other incidents whereby military members initiated domestic terrorism against their fellow service members included an attack in late 2010 when former U.S. Marine Yonathan Melaku, who according to U.S. attorney Neil MacBrige, “took calculated steps to target specific military buildings, cover up his crimes, and plan even more destruction should his message not be heard.”62 On April 2, 2014, disgruntled Army specialist (SPC) Ivan Lopez opened fire on defenseless service members and killed three and wounded 16. The Washington Navy Yard was the scene of another senseless ASE on September 16, 2013 when Navy contractor Aaron Alexis murdered 12 and wounded four DOD employees. The HVE attack on the Armed Forces recruiting station and U.S. Navy Reserve Center in Chattanooga, TN that left five service members dead and another two

60 “Military Recruitment Centers Have a History of Being Targeted.”


wounded was the watershed ASE that galvanized South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley and the SC TAG into action.

B. RECOGNIZING THE THREAT

The SCNG TWG received its commander’s initial guidance and timeline from the SC TAG on July 19, 2015 and promptly implemented the military problem solving process in conjunction with the military decision making process (MDMP). The TWG began the process of gathering what information was becoming available about the Chattanooga active shooter attack, started researching the nature of active shooters in general, and then focused on other active shooter incidents that had been directed against the military community specifically. The TWG established contact with the premier LEA in the state, SLED and then pursued the goal of identifying the problem.

The Army problem solving process is a seven-step that advocates:

- Gather information and knowledge.
- Identify the problem.
- Develop criteria.
- Generate possible solutions.
- Analyze possible solutions.
- Compare possible solutions.
- Make and implement the decision.\(^{63}\)

According to military problem solving, numerous kinds of problems range from “well-structured” or easily identified to “medium-structured,” being more interactively complex to “ill-structured” problems, which are complex, nonlinear, and dynamic, and

\(^{63}\) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* (Headquarters, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2015), change no. 1, 4–2.
therefore, most challenging to understand and solve. The TWG soon became conscious that due to the dynamic nature of the active shooter threat actors and their unperceivable motivations that identifying the problem in a domestic terrorism environment was an incredibly ill-structured problem. It was not easily identifiable and generating possible solutions would be incredibly difficult.

The SADOP TWG identified the problem of the active shooter in domestic terrorism as “recognizing the threat,” and subsequently, overcoming susceptibility to the active shooter. The TWG categorized the threat into three distinct groups:

- The criminal element
- The HVE
- The insider threat

(1) The Criminal Element

The SCNG has experienced occasional acts of vandalism and larceny; however, these activities are infrequent and most armories or readiness centers are generally not affected by petty crime.

(2) The Homegrown Violent Extremist

The HVE by definition is “The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political.” Although as the Chattanooga active shooter attack demonstrated, HVE attacks are a real and present threat to the reserve components. The SADOP TWG has established and maintains an interagency relationship with the SLED fusion center, which has perpetual real-time cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI. The

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64 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, change no. 1, 4–2.

SLED fusion center has a contact list of key SADOP administration personnel to alert if a credible threat is identified.

(3) The Insider Threat

The insider threat is “An Insider Threat is the threat that an insider will use her or his authorized access, wittingly or unwittingly, to do harm to the security of the United States. This can include damage to the United States through espionage, terrorism, unauthorized disclosure of national security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.”66 In an independent review of the Fort Hood active shooter massacre, the SECDEF stated that the “DOD force protection policies are not optimized for countering internal threats. These policies reflect insufficient knowledge and awareness of the factors required to help identify and address individuals likely to commit violence. This is a key deficiency.”67 This revealing admission from the DOD acknowledges the threat posed to service members; however, just four years later, Fort Hood would be traumatized by a second insider threat attack.

SADOP recognizes that 86% of the major active shooter attacks that have targeted the military community since 2009 have been a result of an insider threat. The potential modifiers to this threat category are impossible to qualify and range from online or self-radicalization, workplace altercations, mental instability (potentially a concern with soldiers undergoing treatment for severe posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)), family issues, employment discontentment, or heightened socio-political differences.

With few exceptions (including the Chattanooga case) almost all plots or attacks have had an insider connection where it was a service member or DOD employee who attacked his fellow service members, as shown in Table 1.

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Table 1. Active Shooter Attacks against DOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Threat Category</th>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohammod Abdulazeez</td>
<td>July 16, 2015</td>
<td>HVE</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Lopez</td>
<td>Apr. 2, 2014</td>
<td>Insider Threat</td>
<td>Fellow Soldier</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aaron Alexis</td>
<td>Sep. 16, 2013</td>
<td>Insider Threat</td>
<td>Fellow Contractor</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eusebio Lopez</td>
<td>Mar. 23, 2013</td>
<td>Insider Threat</td>
<td>Fellow Marine</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricky Elder</td>
<td>July 2, 2012</td>
<td>Insider Threat</td>
<td>Fellow Soldier</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yonathan Melaku</td>
<td>Jun. 17, 2011</td>
<td>Insider Threat</td>
<td>Fellow Marine</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In categorizing the problem, a risk impact to risk probability or a consequence to probability system was considered. However, due to the dynamic nature of domestic terrorism in general, and the active shooter threat in specific, this method was discarded for an “event step” methodology (see Table 2). The event steps are major processes or actions necessary to implement SADOP response principles successfully.

The original SADOP design framework was to introduce armed duty officers into the previously unarmed DHS construct of “run, hide, fight.”

Table 2. Original Event Steps: November 2015–December 2016

| (1) Deterrence: Announcement of armed duty officers deployed to sites. |
| (2) Response Doctrine: Reactive/defensive (modified DHS playbook run, hide, fight). |
| (3) Protection: Increased random anti-terror measures. |
| (4) Protection: Ballistic window barriers. |
| (5) Protection: Entry denial (electronic monitoring and enforced entrance physical security). |

Scrutinizing each of the three threat categories, developing supporting criteria, and considering possible event steps to counter the threat became the basis for generating solutions, and ultimately, a transition from the reactive DHS model to the more proactive contact response doctrine.
Additional indicators were associated across the threat categories but were identified as modifiers to and not independent of the listed categories. For example, gang violence, workplace violence, dissociated violent crime, familicide, and the mentally ill, unstable or disordered assailants, are all routinely associated with ASEs or random attacks but these are not necessarily differentiated from what the TWG identified as threat categories. A case in point is the January 6, 2017 Fort Lauderdale International Airport attack, or the “running amok”-style knife, axe or machete attacks, which are commonplace in Europe and Israel. Some of these appear to be influenced by mental illness while others are determined to be terrorist, ideological, or political in motivation.68

Although the SCNG TWG and SADOP administration have taken extraordinary steps at mitigating risk associated with vulnerabilities exposed by multiple active shooters against military targets since 2009, the potential hazard posed by the active shooter remains. Despite SADOP concentrations on becoming more assertive, the threat to service members is difficult to defend against and multidimensional. Part of the problem is that in the digital age, anyone with an internet connection presents a risk, as many ‘lone wolves’ are radicalized online. Including potentially, the very service members that SADOP armed duty officers volunteer to protect.

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68 Mineta Transportation Institute, *The Threat to Air and Ground Transportation by Mentally Disordered Assailants* (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute College of Business, 2017), 8.
V.  SADOP DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES

The systematic process implemented by the TWG was dedicated to identifying internal vulnerabilities and recognizing the threat. Although an incredible effort, it was only the beginning for SADOP development, as it was critical not to make assumptions to what type of program would meet the force protection requirements for the SCNG. Methods of determining the most viable course of action and focusing on the mutual civil-military partnership would prove equally thorough during the development of SADOP.

A. VIABILITY, SUSTAINMENT AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

In a DHS publication referred to as *Pocket Card Information*, the guidance for reacting to the actions of an active shooter include “coping with an active shooter situation by being aware of one’s environment and possible dangers; knowing where the two nearest exits are and if someone finds themselves in an office, stay there and secure the door.”69 The DHS publication goes on to state “Law enforcement is usually required to end an active shooter situation.”70 However this premise, while comforting, is not supported by research.

According to a FBI study of 160 active shootings from 2000 to 2013, “66.9% ended before police arrived and could engage the shooter.”71 Most of the ASEs, 56.3%, ended on the initiative of the attacker prior to responders arriving on scene and 69% were over in five minutes or less.72 With these conspicuous statistics, it was clear to the TWG that the status quo of the DHS plan was not a viable option to meet the intent of the SC TAG, nor ethically sustainable from a human lives perspective. Any counter-active

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70 Ibid.


72 Ibid., 21.
shooter plan that would be offered to the SC TAG must have measures of effectiveness that justified the implementation of a program based on quantifiable standards. The TWG relied on five military screening criteria that are routinely applied during planning and when refining potential courses of action (COA).

- **Suitable.** Does it solve the problem and is it legal and ethical?
- **Feasible.** Does it fit within available resources?
- **Acceptable.** Is it worth the cost or risk?
- **Distinguishable.** Does it differ significantly from other solutions?
- **Complete.** Does it contain the critical aspects of solving the problem from start to finish?\(^73\)

(1) Suitable

When assessing these criteria, the TWG planners reflected upon the stated purpose of the program, deterrence and disruption.\(^74\) These two aspects individually fall short of the minimum standard of problem solving. The passive aspect of deterrence has value in addressing vulnerabilities associated with having no security at all and arguably has a degree of potential effectiveness against certain features of the criminal and insider threats. The active aspect of the purpose, disruption, is considered the escalated solution to meet the perceived shortfall of deterrence while avoiding legal and ethical considerations about rules for the use of force. The program’s concept of having a two-tiered approach of announcing a change to the arming status of the state’s National Guard along with discerning recruitment, systematic vetting, and extensive initial and perpetual training, meets the standard.

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\(^73\) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, change no. 1, 4–4.

\(^74\) Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 16.
(2) Feasible

This criterion presented the most pressing challenge in the near term for the state. Fiscally, the Military Department of South Carolina was not prepared to spend funds that it had not forecasted for an emergency, such as what it now faced. The fiscal year for the state budget ran from July 1 to June 30 and the timing could not have been worse, as this crisis took place on July 16 and it was clear that the SCNG TWG would not submit a spontaneous plan of action that did not have expenses associated with it. The initial funds necessary to initiate the procurement of equipment, arms, ammunition, training, and other unforeseen expenses simply were not available. The costs for the firearms, holsters, ammunition pouches, and initial ammunition were over $168,000.00.75 Fortunately, the excellent relationship between the two organizations tasked to work together paid off. SLED had a surplus and was able to support the SCNG until it was able to reimburse its associate state agency. With a plan in place to procure the necessary fielding requirements, the feasibility of the plan was met.

(3) Acceptable

Certainly, the easiest part was to determine from lives at risk versus affordability and effort committed to planning, training and management. In short, fellow service members from Tennessee were under attack and a determined adversary had claimed casualties. SADOP met this aspect of the screening criteria without difficult deliberation.

(4) Distinguishable

When SADOP was published on October 1, 2015, this program was the very first of its kind. Now in its third year, a comparable program has yet to be published. SADOP’s emphasis on safety and its ability to evolve constantly to remain relevant is a testament to the innovation of the problem solving and staff work that went into the program’s development. Although 24 other states have armed or authorized the arming of their personnel, the SCNG SADOP remains exceptional as a policy.

75 Military Department of South Carolina, AMCHAR Wholesale Inc. SCNG Purchase Order #200106751 (Columbia, SC: Military Department of South Carolina, 2015).
The detailed planning involved with the SADOP experiment is extensive. From its thorough program development, policy approval process, state government support, bilateral state agency (SLED) support and mentorship, fiscal planning, personnel management, training and equipment documentation, and perpetual determination to break what is not broken then try again, SADOP is a comprehensive answer to an asymmetrical problem.

SADOP is sustainable as it strives to recognize the threat and mitigate the risk of failure, and continues to exercise the foresight to assess the potential threat actors and their most likely and dangerous COA. SADOP remains flexible to adjust its tactics, techniques, and procedures to present a strong deterrence and viable disruption capability, which is demonstrated by SADOP’s recognition that the threat is multi-tiered, unpredictable, and potentially, an internal risk. The National Guard is especially vulnerable to the insider threat, which is susceptible to online radicalization as with MAJ Nidal Hasan, can be criminally inspired, as with SPC Ricky Elder, or mental instability, as was the case with SPC Ivan Lopez.

B. SADOP: CIVIL-MILITARY COLLABORATION

The SCNG has a strong commitment to the state as is evident by co-locating the SCNG Joint Operations Center (JOC) with the South Carolina Emergency Management Division (SCEMD). A perpetual member of the state’s emergency management apparatus, the SCNG mans the emergency support function (ESF)-19 (military support) section. The SCNG has supported the state in response to floods, hurricanes, winter storms, wild fires, and has been prepared for civil disturbance operations.

The SCNG FUOPS section coordinates and verifies contingency plans at SCEMD conferences and conducts exercises annually. South Carolina’s most dangerous natural disaster threat scenario is a hurricane and FUOPS plans and prepares annually for this eventuality with key sections of the SCEMD staff including operations, plans, recovery and logistics, as well as multiple state agencies. The SCNG is a key capability multiplier during civil support operations and maintains a close working relationship with
representatives from ESF-1 (transportation), ESF-6 (mass care), ESF-9 (search and rescue), ESF-13 (law enforcement), and ESF-16 (emergency traffic management).

In its numerous cooperative interactions with state agencies, the SCNG has built a reputation for always being ready to support the state when called upon. For example, the SCDPS-SC Highway Patrol relied heavily on the SCNG for hundreds of troops who augmented SCDPS state troopers during the voluntary coastal evacuation on October 5, 2016. The next day, the governor ordered a mandatory evacuation in Colleton and Jasper counties and directed specified units of the SCNG to support SCDPS and SLED in “taking all reasonable precautions as necessary for the preservation of life and property.”

South Carolina is a coastal state and hurricanes represent potentially its most dangerous natural disaster. As a result, ESF-19 has coordinated closely with ESF-13 and ESF-16, which rely heavily on SCNG support both prior to and after a hurricane makes landfall. The SCNG has maximized these types of cooperative professional relationships by working across state agency lines during state emergencies, which is especially the case for security-centric, wellness verification, entry control, or traffic control type missions. Therefore, when directed to cooperate to develop a contingency for the active shooter threat, these relationships were already in existence. Jim McClary, captain of SLED’s training section, remarked, “We’ve worked with you guys during hurricanes.” “Coming together and working on the active shooter program was almost seamless.”

SLED was also an ideal partner for the SCNG to collaborate with because it is the premier LEA in the state for operational planning, assistance, and investigation, and most importantly for this task, coordination. “SLED is an assisting agency; city, county state partnerships are what is most important, that’s our role, and this program [SADOP]

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77 Nikki Haley, Executive Order 2016-33, State of South Carolina, Executive Department, Office of the Governor, Columbia, SC (2016).


79 Ibid.
demonstrates how we collaborate to capitalize on the separate agencies’ strengths,”80 said Mark Keel, Chief of SLED. “For us [SLED] working with other agencies is routine, it’s what we do best. SLED supports the U.S. Marshals Service with the Fugitive Task Force, the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service with the Violent Crime Task Force and the Joint Terrorism Task Force; so when the governor called, our response was ‘how can we help’?"81 Chief Keel continued, “We found this [partnership on SADOP] our opportunity to give back to the South Carolina National Guard.”82

For years, the SCNG had prepared to support the State of South Carolina by contributing to joint planning, participating in civil support exercises, and reacting to actual state emergencies including some as recent as severe winter weather responses in 2014 and 2015, Hurricane Joaquin, and the resulting “500-year” floods that devastated the state in October 2015. Now facing such a momentous task, the SCNG TWG was leveraging these state agency relationships that had been carefully constructed over the years. SLED’s expertise in advanced tactics, thorough training, lesson plan development, and regulatory authority over the state’s CWP program would prove critical in the months to come as SADOP transitioned from concept to program.

According to its policy manual, SADOP is “an internally manned, concealed carry, armed active shooter contingency response group of full-time National Guard, State Guard or State Employees. It is an exclusive group that is selective in its membership and entails extensive vetting prior to initial training. SADOP recruits, trains, equips and retains dedicated full-time National Guard, State Guard or State employees to serve incognito as force protection officers. These Armed Duty Officers serve specifically in a counter-active shooter capacity for the SCNG.”83 In short, it is a counter-active shooter contingency that incorporates available personnel assets, advanced close

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80 Mark Keel, in discussion with the author, Columbia, SC, October 23, 2017.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual, ver. 2.0, 10.
quarter tactical firearms training, and civil and military legal instruction to counter an ASE effectively.

The program promotes a dual purpose in that it uses both passive and active measures to first deter, and failing that, disrupt an active shooter incident against SCNG personnel and facilities.\textsuperscript{84} Deterrence is the passive aspect of the program’s purpose, which is founded on the precept that active shooters routinely bypass locations where it is common knowledge that armed security is present. In the event that deterrence fails, disruption concentrates on preserving life and preventing the destruction of facilities through direct action against a lethal threat.\textsuperscript{85} SADOP is based on an armed application platform that relies on anonymity to deter a potential attack and provide the advantage of surprise against an unsuspecting adversary.

The objective of arming personnel anonymously is that to the extent possible neither the public nor even many of the employees who work in a military facility are aware of which personnel are armed. Given that all military personnel are generally dressed identically, it also assists in providing armed duty officers an element of surprise when responding to an active shooter attack. The reasoning is to interrupt the active shooter’s OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act) and rapidly destroy the threat through accurately directed fire.\textsuperscript{86} Carrying the state-issued firearm in a concealed fashion provides the most advantageous opportunity for armed duty officers to intercept active shooters successfully and interrupt their OODA loop.

SADOP is a collaboration of efforts between civilian law enforcement professionals at SLED and the military officers and men of the SCNG. Both these organizations share the principles of what they commonly refer to as the “Warrior Class” of their chosen professions. The Warrior Class ethos is initially instructed during individual training at PSIC and then expounded on at tactical team training (TAC-Team).

\textsuperscript{84} Military Department of South Carolina, \textit{South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual}, ver. 2.0, 16.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.

at the advanced active shooter SCAASCATS course. It refers to an approach of duty and commitment without hesitation to defend the defenseless and treat the vulnerable as though they are family.

As previously described, SADOP was established at the direction of the governor with the specific objective to train an autonomous SCNG force dedicated to countering the active shooter threat. These two organizations however have very different responsibilities, missions, and training techniques. For example, the law enforcement team was skilled in the use of firearms on a more individual level with the prudent and often judicious application of force in a personal defense framework. This style of firing was atypical from the military perspective whose personnel had a very different concept of employing firearms in combat (especially its combat veterans and combat arms personnel). The SCNG troops had extensive experience in assault rifles, crew served weapons platforms, and other systems specifically designed to create havoc by establishing superior firepower. Few of the guardsmen were competent in dynamic close quarter pistol engagements, which was SADOP’s the strong suit.

C. LEGAL ISSUES AND CONCERNS

MG Livingston had provided guidance early in the development of the SCNG active shooter contingency that staff deliberation would be thorough and he would not accept an impetuous response to the governor’s directive. Detailed investigation and exhaustive collaboration with civilian counterparts resulted in sensible and effective resolutions. The solution was a state government “springing state active duty order,” which would be activated immediately when the armed duty officer took action in compliance with the state executive order.

1. JAG Interpretation and Guidance

The TWG would be conferring with the JAG office early and often so as not to waste time creating an unlawful or illegitimate program. This type of problem was

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particularly challenging due to little legal precedence and officials were apprehensive that the policy draft would be either ineffectual or excessive.88

The other consideration in the constructing of SADOP was that it was directed to be integrated with civil authorities. In other words, state statutes would be the governing authority until a federal policy was directed. The challenge was to design a program where service members conducting their routine duty assignments in a Title 32 USC status would also be responsible to serve in a distinctive force protection role, which was not part of their federal duty assignments.

2. Tort Law and Liability

According to Army and Joint doctrine, “Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside of boundaries of a given operational area.”89 However, in this case, the Army (federal) was not tasking the SCNG to protect its forces, but rather, the civilians. What if the federal government refused to accept liability if armed duty officers were critically wounded while attempting to carry out their responsibilities to the state against an active shooter? Worse still, what about wrongful death, if for example armed duty officers erred in judgment and engaged someone who was not a lethal threat or if they inadvertently wounded or killed an innocent bystander while responding to an active shooter incident? Would the armed duty officers be criminally liable or subject to civil suit? The JAG faced these questions during SADOP’s analysis phase.

The JAG offered provisions interpreted to protect SCNG service members acting on the state’s order. In protection from suit or trial, “No action or proceeding shall be prosecuted or maintained against a member of a military court or officer or person acting under its authority … nor shall any officer or enlisted man be liable to a civil action or criminal prosecution for any act done while in the discharge of his military duty when

89 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ADP 3-37 Protection (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012).
such act is in the line of duty.”

Additionally, on the issue of liability, the SC Code of Laws states, “The governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from: emergency preparedness activities and activities of the South Carolina National Guard and South Carolina State Guard while engaged in state or federal training or duty. This exemption does not apply to vehicular accidents.”

In the event that the federal government refused to provide benefits for a wounded armed duty officer disabled in the line of duty for the state:

Every member of the National Guard of South Carolina who shall be wounded or disabled while on duty in the service of the State or while reasonably proceeding to or returning from such duty shall be taken care of and provided for at the expense of the State, and, if permanently disabled, shall receive the like pensions or rewards that persons under similar circumstances in the military service of the United States receive from the United States.

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VI. SADOP PROGRESSION AND COMPARISONS

A. IMPLEMENTATION, REVISION, AND TRAINING

The initiation of SADOP as an active shooter contingency program was a nonstandard mission for the SCNG TWG and FUOPS planning section. Despite the utilization of sound military problem solving doctrine and detailed course of action development, the successful fielding of the program was never a guaranteed success. To understand the stages of how SADOP developed, this chapter chronicles the program from its initial implementation, catalogs modifications to the program, and overviews the program’s training.

1. Implementation

In his conclusion to a 2015 Military Law Review article, MAJ Anthony Osborne surmised, “Current DoD firearms policies are ineffective in protecting service members on military installations from the ability to carry firearms for unit or self-defense. The fact that active shooters on military installations have killed or wounded 92 DoD and civilian personnel since 2009 is strong evidence supporting this conclusion.”93

SADOP was the SCNG’s response to the challenges clearly articulated in the Fall 2015 issue of Military Law Review, which draws conclusions that firearms are not the problem. Instead, it is recognizes the threat in its various manifestations and acknowledges legacy force protection policies have not properly adapted to the threat, which is the crux of the problem. SADOP was authorized by the SCNG Director of the Joint Staff (DJS) and became policy on October 1, 2015. The first installment to the policy was the SCNG SADOP Manual version 1.0.

SADOP Manual 1.0 represented a plan that was foundational; however, it was not completed hastily to meet a specific timeline. To the contrary, although time was of the essence after the domestic terror attacks in the summer of 2015, and TWG meetings,

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office calls, and conferences with the governor’s chief of staff were routine, pressure was not applied to field a program at the expense of diligence.

Three weeks after the terrorist attack on August 10, 2015, the TWG briefed a “bridging options” timeline. This proposal indicated that the inaugural SADOP training iteration could begin training between 21 and 26 days after an executive order was published by the governor’s office. The TAG opined that it was understood that the TWG was embarking on not only on groundbreaking work, but that it carried with it a portion of risk that he would have to be convinced was acceptable. Any plan managed from a “top down” timeline-driven approach was more prone to be impetuous, reflexive, or improperly focused on “time and not standard.”

Even with the TWG-proposed timelines and in-progress reviews (IPR) to monitor the progress of the program’s development, the initial program’s concepts and scope were deliberated methodically and deadlines to activate SADOP were intentionally avoided. “We were not going to launch anything that wasn’t meticulously staffed,” said SCNG TAG MG Robert Livingston. The TAG was committed to his command of avoiding an instinctive response to the Chattanooga HVE assault, which was evident by his motivation and leadership. Timelines could not be unrealistic; arbitrary suspenses and the TWG would work directly with other state agencies to establish a robust policy and a thorough training plan.

The fundamental supposition of the plan was based on a concept not unlike DHS’s Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) or the volunteer program called the “Federal Flight Deck Officer Program” (FFDO). The FAMS are trained to “detect, deter, and defeat hostile acts targeting U.S. air

94 Military Department of South Carolina, “SCNG Bridging Options Timeline” (presentation, Columbia, SC, August 15, 2015).
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
carriers, airports, passengers, and crews.”

The FFDO is a TSA authorized program that “trains eligible flight crew members to use firearms to defend against an act of criminal violence or air piracy.” Participants in both programs are meant to remain anonymous. Having SADOP be completely manned by volunteers and based on anonymity were key principles taken from the FAMS and FFDO.

The SADOP 1.0 policy describes the organizational and administrative details including selection criteria, training concepts, constraints, standardized rules for the use of force (SRUF), instructional methodology, program metrics, and program management. The core of the policy however is ingrained not only in the protection of SCNG personnel and facilities, but also in the safety of the guardsmen who hopefully would volunteer for the innovative concept in this completely inaugural program. Version 1.0 of the policy was a risk-averse conservative approach to firearms carry, officer safety, and reactive active shooter philosophy. The basis of the program was founded on risk mitigation and what is referred to as the “safety protocol,” which placed extreme importance and devotion to the Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 5-19 (change 1) and the Four Universal Firearms Safety Rules (The Great Four).

Ingraining the importance of firearms safety was not the primary challenge of the program, as SLED instructors were vigorous in their pursuit of firearms carry safety. Their training techniques were to live daily with the understanding that the purpose of a firearm was to implement a successful outcome to an unfortunate and potentially deadly encounter. One of the most difficult aspects of implementing the program was measures to prevent fratricide. The TWG research indicated and SLED experience supported that an active shooter incident would be chaotic and introducing internal force protection assets that might be dressed identically to the threat would be problematic for internal security, as well as first responders. While numerous concepts were considered including

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what SADOP Manual 1.0 cites as the USB or universal safety brassard, the challenge to mitigate the risk of fratricide would be of paramount concern.

2. Revision

Now in the third year since its enactment, the program has undertaken both subtle amendments and a major program revision including substantial counter-active shooter philosophy, arming status, doctrine, organizational structure, and bilateral training with SLED on improved individual and team tactics. The intent of these modifications has been to prepare SADOP armed duty officers better for what is expected of them as the essential protective barrier between their fellow service members and the threat of an active shooter.

What is the expectation of a completely trained armed duty officer? According to Deputy Adjutant General Van McCarty, “Willing participation, demonstrated proficiency during the training course [PSIC] and a commitment to standards. A completely trained Armed Duty Officer must have the ability to make tough calls and exercise sound judgment.”100 When chief of SLED Mark Keel was asked this question, he said, “Vetting, I am very pleased with the results of vetting.”101 “I am confident that armories and guardsmen are better prepared [to meet the active shooter threat] and the level of training received provides not just an effective asset to the SCNG but also a multiplier for law enforcement.”102 SLED captain of training Jim McClary noted, “Proficiency, perpetual skill improvement. The expectation is that the Armed Duty Officer is as confident as possible to skillfully perform his duty and this is due to his or her exposure to stress induced response training.”103 Therefore, to meet such expectations, SADOP had to be flexible and open to becoming the best at what its design was intended to fulfill. Change theory is the mechanism the TWG uses to accomplish this process.

100 Van McCarty, in discussion with the author, Columbia, SC, October 17, 2017.
102 Ibid.
Based loosely on Kurt Lewin’s concepts of the change process in human systems, change theory implemented by the TWG is a series on perpetual appraisal referred to as “assess and break.” This assessment seeks to categorize gaps in operational responsiveness and then determines other factors, such as urgency, safety, effectiveness of tactics, and doctrine. Next, the revision is conceptualized and partner collaboration or input is recruited prior to receiving leadership endorsement. Once approved, the revision is planned, the change is communicated, and resistance anticipated. The plan is then implemented by instruction, training, and evaluation. The revision is piloted and further assessed for returns on knowledge and investment. The process is then assessed further in an attempt to isolate the weakness of the revision and start the process all over again.

The minor amendments to the original SADOP Manual were mostly administrative. SADOP 1.1, published on October 21, 2015, incorporated unit medical readiness non-commissioned officers (NCOs) as part of the vetting process. Their role was to “verify there are no restrictions on SADOP applicants by reviewing documentation in Ecase and Eprofile (electronic military medical programs) systems and programs.”

On December 29, version 1.2 was approved, which provided minor changes to the process for applicant packets submission, applicant training preparation, and revised a couple of the manual’s appendices regarding the verbiage in applicant consideration and agreement to participate in the program. However, one change to the program was indicative of the SADOP change theory process, as version 1.2 authorized armed duty officers “to carry a service weapon when not working on a duty day. The intent is to provide SADOP personnel with ample opportunity to maintain a weapon both on and off duty with the identical mechanical function thereby mitigating risk due to varying

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105 Military Department of South Carolina, “Primary SADOP Instruction Course” (presentation, Columbia, SC, May 3, 2017).

106 Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Training Manual, ver. 1.0, 10.
weapon types and conflicting muscle memory.” 107 This change was a conscious break from previous editions that only authorized the carry of a state-issued firearm during duty hours and while traveling to and from a place of duty.

Version 1.3 was approved on January 20, 2016 and represented a significant shift in updated leadership roles. Previously, the SADOP roles were designated by the occupants in the DJS positions, the J3 (state operations officer) and the J34 (provost marshal), but this revision removed SADOP from the auspices of the provost marshal’s office entirely and changed the role of the administrator role from that of the J3 to whomever was so designated by the SADOP director. The DJS was now recognized as the “Director of SADOP,” as opposed to just SADOP being another of his many duty responsibilities. Although still located within the joint operations section of the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), the program was autonomous from its former ancillary status within the office of the provost marshal.

The current version of SADOP policy was authorized on January 1, 2017 and was a comprehensive reformation of the program’s policy. With this revision, the program fundamentally shifted in its response doctrine and firearm arming status, and solidified its fratricide avoidance process, restructured its administrative support, and created a unique opportunity for SADOP members who under previous policy versions would have had to leave the program administratively to remain.

The program changed from an “amber” arming status (a loaded magazine inserted in the magazine well of the firearm but the weapon is un-chambered) to a “red status” (fully loaded, a cartridge chambered). This change had been a direct result of change theory and the decision was based on months of research, subject matter testimony, and metrics analysis. Another example of how change theory was being utilized was indicated by how the program expanded to include a SADOP-Augmenter Group or SADOP-AG. This policy change recognized the importance of “return on knowledge” and sought to reduce the loss of experienced armed duty officers due to SCNG operational tempo, promotions, transfers, and deployments. These former armed duty

107 Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Training Manual, ver. 1.2 (Columbia, SC: Military Department of South Carolina, 2015), 12.
officers whom through no cause of their own had to leave the program due to administrative reasons and the finite number of slots, now had a recourse to meet certain criteria and continue to serve. This SADOP-AG also authorized former class one law enforcement officers (LEOs) to apply to SADOP without being required to attend the entire three-day PSIC course or fill a SADOP allocation.

The program changed its response from a modified version of the DHS’s “run, hide, fight” to contact response, which involved aggressively locating and engaging the active shooter during an attack. The ongoing weak link of the USB in the SADOP plan was replaced with the “Determination T” and ballistic protection vest, which are easily recognizable to both fellow armed duty officers and responding law enforcement agencies. Lastly, SADOP became completely autonomous and organized around a geographic breakout of facilities and units whereby the program was more easily administered.

SADOP policy version 2.0 demonstrated that the TWG was dedicated to finding what the program required to be efficient and effective; diligently conduct necessary research, staff work, metrics analysis, legal coordination, and receive SLED partner agency consensus. The policy demonstrated a comprehensive paradigm shift from a conservative defense-oriented posture to a more assertive program that necessitated all armed duty officers receive a transitional firearms re-qualification and a complete active shooter response doctrinal shift.

3. Training

The SLED training section and the SCNG SADOP TWG officially began to conduct bilateral training plan coordination on July 21, 2015. Since then, the training in SADOP has been a continuous process and is constantly being upgraded for realism and relevance. Program training is progressive through individual and team stages and has mandated semi-annual firearms qualification, policy, and statutory reviews.

SLED training captain Jim McClary was at the inaugural planning meeting and recalled:
We were challenged to create an applicable lesson plan for SADOP because it was so innovative. We used pieces and parts of other programs to begin with and we relied on the CWP a lot as it was essential [to meet the intent of the governor]…SADOP is much more advanced than CWP training but, it was a requirement and we used it a lot…But the program is not that much different from what I would run at the academy [South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy] except that SADOP Armed Duty Officers receive more range time and are more well-rounded.108

The SADOP and SLED training teams segmented their training priorities along agency specific topics and along lines of organizational expertise and policy. SCNG SADOP trainers provided instruction reference:

- Expectations and qualifications
- SADOP origin: Chattanooga and Executive Order 2015-18
- Understanding the threat: HVEs, Islamic State and other factors
- Concept: purpose, scope and concealed carry
- Constraints: prohibited locations, SRUF, DSCA and deployment
- Safety and risk mitigation: safety protocol, ballistic vests, accountability and composite risk management
- SADOP administration: program management and organization
- Change theory: value assessment and life cycle
- Assertive intervention: contact response doctrine and arming status
- Civil agency interaction: fusion center, SLED, SCCJA and the local LEA109

The SLED training teams focused the SCNG armed duty officers on:

• Introduction to Glock pistol (Glock 101)
  
  The Glock caliber .40, model 23 pistol is the firearm determined to be the most suitable from an interoperability perspective with South Carolina law enforcement agencies and practical for concealment purposes. The striker fired, double action-only polymer pistol is significantly dissimilar to the standard military issued Beretta caliber 9mm, model F92 (military nomenclature “M9”) single/double action pistol and therefore required familiarity training.

• Safety and home safety

• Nomenclature and operation

• Field strip and maintenance

• Marksmanship fundamentals

• Range safety

• Mental conditioning

• Tactical targeting110

SLED also oversees graded practical training exercises and live-fire drills and qualification. Scenarios and drills include:

• Firearm stress manipulation drills

• Night fire

• Multiple target engagement

• Distance shooting111

110 Military Department of South Carolina, Agenda Secure Area Duty Officer Program Iteration #005, February 4, 2016.

111 Ibid.
Both SLED and SADOP training teams administer written examinations as the culminating event to the academic portion of the training at PSIC. SLED provides the state CWP examination, which is mandatory for SCNG to receive the state issued permit. SADOP instructors issue the SADOP PSIC exam that covers topics taught in the introductory, fundamentals, and SADOP doctrine and policy lessons.

a. PSIC

The initial training of an armed duty officer is a three-day process called PSIC and includes bilateral SCNG and SLED classroom instruction and practical “live-fire” individual exercises and examinations. PSIC training is conducted at the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy (SCCJA) utilizing classrooms and pistol ranges.

(1) Biannual Qualification

In accordance with policy, armed duty officers are required to validate on their assigned duty firearm no less than twice annually. Additionally, armed duty officers receive updates on South Carolina CWP law, SADOP policy, a review of the SCNG SRUF and are required to take two written examinations to demonstrate continued policy comprehension and familiarity with SC CWP statutes.

(2) SCAASCATS

The armed duty officer will attend TAC-Team provided by SLED to law enforcement agencies throughout the state. This two-day event is known as SCAASCATS. In 2017, SLED recognized SADOP as a partner organization with member status for seat availability. The first class of 12 armed duty officers completed the course on May 3, 2017.

The cooperative interactions and concentrations on a mutual training objective early in the planning phases of what became the SAPOP established an enduring bilateral

112 Military Department of South Carolina, *Agenda Secure Area Duty Officer Program Iteration #005, February 4, 2016.*

113 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 40.
partnership that continues to create opportunities for cooperation in both training and operations to support the state. Since the initial training plan consultation of July 21, 2015 and the end of 2017, the two agencies have jointly trained 12 SADOP class iterations and fielded approximately 250 armed duty officers for service throughout the state.

B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The threat facing the reserve component has evolved. According to the NCTC, “Since 9/11 25 of the 28 Sunni extremist attacks perpetrated in the U.S. have been carried out by individuals encouraged or supported by ISIS, al-Qaeda or their affiliates.”114 The Chattanooga domestic terror attack demonstrated that the policy and procedures for force protection were obsolete and the status quo was no longer acceptable to the SCNG. The TAG had galvanized the staff to establish a program that met the threat based on five screening criteria of which the most important to validate was whether SADOP was distinguishable from other solutions.

This section assesses the merits of other efforts to mitigate the risk of an active shooter incident and how SADOP measures up comparatively. It expresses the commonalities and differences not only between the active and reserve components, but also the interpretation of effective response within the reserve component communities. This section reviews recent DoDD policy and explores if potential exists for common ground at higher headquarters for future interoperability between the federal and state force structures.

In the summer of 2015, unbeknownst to the SCNG’s TWG, MAJ Anthony Osborne, a JAG officer assigned to the 82d Airborne Division’s Sustainment Brigade at Fort Bragg, NC, conducted a completely separate study and reached a very similar conclusion. His article titled “Becoming a Harder Target: Updating Military Firearms Policies to Combat Active Shooters” was published in the fall issue of Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 27-100-223-3 (Military Law Review 223, no. 3, 2015). MAJ Osborne recommended, “DoD leaders should create an Armed Security Officer Program (ASOP) modeled after the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, to arm select service

114 National Counterterrorism Center, Sunni Violent Extremist Attacks in the U.S. since 9/11, 1.
members to respond to active shooters. Implementing such a program is the best course of action to protect DOD employees from future active shooter attacks.”

MAJ Osborne further recommended, “The ultimate result of revising military firearms policies and implementing an ASOP (Armed Security Officer Program) is that the Army will transform from being a reactive organization to becoming proactive in countering the active shooter threat.”

The likenesses in concept between SADOP and ASOP is astounding especially considering one was constructed by a reserve component staff acting on the direction of a TAG while the other was a conceptualization by an active component JAG officer opining in a professional military law journal. However, similarities in the theories are basically where the resemblances end between the reserve and active component program models. This dissimilarity is partly due to the composition differences of the two organizations and also in the slow bureaucratic process that constrains the active component.

1. The Active Component

The active component is a federal entity that has dissimilar and intricate reporting chains, communication channels, and levels of responsibility that ultimately end in Washington, DC. In contrast, the reserve component (specifically the National Guard) that while funded by Title 32 and organized around regular Army and Air Force modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) is at the command and control of the state’s governor unless called to federal service. This unity of command necessary for implementing across the boundaries of the state is more readily available as the state executive branch level provides a degree of autonomy not available to the active component, which must plan, evaluate, and act on a far larger scale.

The active components have a limited number of large facilities in a given state or territory equipped with MPs, security force squadrons, DOD security personnel, or other

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116 Ibid., 77.
garrison services, such as fire departments, banks, and contracted businesses and services. These facilities are bases that support local civilian populations and businesses greatly, but have the ability to close their gates and operate basically autonomously during times of crisis. The reserve component facilities by contrast normally have dozens of much smaller compounds that are mostly armories or reserve centers with nothing comparable for sustainment much less internal force protection capabilities. Most armories and reserve centers have no security and it is not uncommon for a National Guard armory to have as few as half a dozen full-time personnel in the building or buildings, surrounded by a perimeter chain-link fence, are either open to the public, or easily accessible from a public street.

2. The Reserve Component

Since the attack in Chattanooga, many states or state TAGs, recognizing the disparity of risk to the active components, have unilaterally taken steps they deemed necessary to protect their reserve component personnel and facilities. According to the NGB, 46% of U.S. states and territories have taken some form of action.117

The steps taken among the states vary widely, and as of June 12, 2017, 16 states have issued Title 32 (federal MTOE items) government weapons to select guardsmen to enhance force protection, 17 states have authorized personal (privately owned firearms) carry by their guardsmen and eight states authorized both. Five states have military OPORD in effect from their TAGs, four states have an executive order in place from their state governments, and another three states are contemplating taking some type of action in an armed status.118

No uniformity exists throughout the country concerning this topic. For example, the two states that border South Carolina are Georgia and North Carolina and these three states have very different interpretations of protecting the force. North Carolina has formally issued Title 32 weapons to full-time members of the National Guard while Georgia and South Carolina have not. Georgia has not taken any action for organized

117 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Arming Posture.
118 Ibid.
arming of the force while both North Carolina and South Carolina have. However, both North Carolina and Georgia’s TAGs have released previous constraints on concealed carrying of personally owned firearms while South Carolina has not. I decided to take a closer look at North Carolina whose TAG took action just four days after the Chattanooga attack with the publishing of OPORD 15-075 “Guardian Hornet.”

(1) Operation Guardian Hornet

The NCNG published Joint OPORD 15-075 (Operation Guardian Hornet) on July 20, 2015. This OPORD had similar aspirations as the SCNG SADOP as it references the SRUF and its policy goal is “To ensure the safety and security of NCNG personnel and facilities.” The OPORD provides its objectives as:

- Security forces remain within the scope of mission requirements and legal boundaries.
- NCNG facilities are secure and personnel able to operate in a safe environment.

The OPORD provides basic guidance to:

- Obtain and coordinate installation of all NCNG facility clearing barrels.
- Nominate a minimum of two full-time guardsmen per facility to serve as force protection officers (FPOs).
- Conduct background investigations for all personnel directed to be FPOs.
- Issue military firearms.
- Prepare press statements and legal briefings.

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120 Ibid.
• Maintain a For Official Use Only—Law Enforcement Sensitive (FOUO LES) database for approved FPOs and their duty locations.

The OPORD addresses the issuance of military weapons and the coordination of logistics to supply the armories with the requisite type of ammunition. It reads what military regulations are cited for its authority to act and provides guidance to its FPOs that they must have qualified on the assigned weapon in the last 12 months. The OPORD gives more specific instructions, such as, “The FPO will draw assigned weapon from the unit’s vault upon arrival at duty station” and “Upon preparation for departing duty station, FPO will return assigned weapon and ammunition to the unit vault, maintaining the physical security measures designated in AR 190-11 at all times.”

The order however does not address the purpose or “why” that the OPORD is ordering the tasks that they were being directed to do in the first place. It does refer to “recent ASEs” in its first paragraph and gives the purpose of the operation as “to ensure continued vigilance and preparedness to deal with active shooter threats.” It also provides a caveat in the coordinating instructions that “Special Orders will be developed for each duty station in conjunction with the local Installation Response Plan, Active Shooter annex as required in AR 525-27.”

A number of questions are left completely unanswered. For example, why is the number of FPOs two; was that an arbitrary figure or done on purpose? Why only one primary and one alternate per armory when some armories have different numbers of associates working there? If a NCNG armory has over 100 personnel in it on a daily basis, did it receive the same allocation just like another armory that perhaps had only five personnel assigned? Also, if these two FPOs had duties that required them to be absent from the armory or readiness center, who would protect the armory? Was this an acceptable risk if both the FPOs needed to be elsewhere?

121 North Carolina National Guard, Joint Operations Order 15-075.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
It is unclear when the NCNG TAG rescinded concealed carry constraints on its personnel but clearly the “Guardian Hornet” does not address fratricide or actions at all to distinguish friendly forces in the event of an ASE. How would first responders know the difference between a potential active shooter and a NCNG FPO? Or even more complicating, how would n FPO discriminate a military active shooter from a NCNG soldier carrying concealed on NCNG property at the time of an ASE? What about responding law enforcement agencies? How could they discern that a NCNG soldier carrying concealed on NCNG property and trying to help end an ASE was not the active shooter himself?

What if anything is being considered about protecting NCNG troops once they leave their duty locations? If they are wearing their military uniforms when leaving their duty stations, then they are more of a target than when they are within the relative protection of the armory. Perhaps the risk mitigation explanations, both individual and per facility, are FOUO or published in a safety annex or explained in an ATFP TTX or policy to which I did not have access to during my research? Or, maybe it is acceptable risk as most incidents are over before first responders arrive? According to Steven Crimando of Behavioral Science Applications, “Active shooter events (ASE) are highly dynamic, rapidly evolving situations. In 63 incidents closely analyzed by the FBI in which the duration of the event could be determined, 44 were over in five minutes or less and 52% of those in just two minutes or less.”

Regardless, the lack of specific guidance in regard to fratricide is one of several key areas in the NCNG OPORD that appears to be obviously inadequate.

(2) Interoperability with Federal Policy

The differences between the Title 10 (federal) military’s constraints against individuals carrying concealed and the Title 32 (federal under state authority) with their individual state latitude to do so seem blatant. While a chasm appears to exist between the two, it may possible to bridge the gap to unite them both.

DODD 5210.56 *Arming and the Use of Force* was published on November 18, 2016 with verbiage that theoretically provides the material for just such a bridge. Although the policy specifically states that it is not applicable to the National Guard, it does provide a framework potentially to bring the two groups (active and reserve components) closer together on the topic of firearms carry in general and privately owned firearms in particular. “Does not apply to the arming of National Guard personnel in Title 32, U.S.C., status or in State active duty status. The decision as to whether to arm those State personnel is at the discretion of the Governors and State Adjutants Generals consistent with federal and state law.”\(^{125}\)

The policy presents the services with a pathway to integrate an appropriate number of individuals to possess privately owned firearms for personal protection. Section four “provides guidance for determining the eligibility of DOD personnel to carry privately owned firearms on DOD property for personal protection when it is not related to the performance of official duties.”\(^{126}\) The policy specifically lists criteria for meeting general eligibility including:\(^{127}\)

- **Age.** DOD personnel should be 21 years of age. This age is in line with what most states require.
- **Disciplinary Status.** No pending disciplinary actions.
- **Civilian Criminal Charges.** No convictions or current charges for violating a state or federal criminal law.
- **Training.** Demonstrated competence with a firearm through:
  - **Official Authorization.** “Possession of a Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (LEOSA) credential, or authorization by the state where the installation is located to carry a firearm.”\(^{128}\)

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\(^{126}\) Ibid., sec. 4.1, 19.

\(^{127}\) Ibid., sec. 4.3 b. (1–4), 20.

This policy, while clearly intended to regulate responsibilities for arming, firearms and establish policy for DOD personnel required to carry, may also clear the way for a more open agreement between the federal military authority and its DOD reserve component personnel. While arguably not all or most DOD personnel (either active or reserve component) would or even should meet the requirements to be authorized to carry a firearm on a federal installation, if this program is successful, it may be recognized as a force multiplier to deter or prevent another Fort Hood style active shooter massacre.

At a minimum, DODD 5210.56 provides a mechanism for active component personnel to obtain a CWP in the state in which they reside, leave post in a concealed carry status, and have the same personal protection privileges as anyone who lives within the state outside the base. Additionally, if the policy were to be expanded to include all DOD personnel including the reserves, contractors and civilians, they would be within their legal rights to have self-protection while they entered and exited the post on a routine basis. Currently, federal firearms regulations prevent soldiers from carrying concealed firearms on base, which precludes them from transiting the installation, and therefore, denies them the opportunity to arm themselves while off base.

C. CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

“The responsibility of the Armed Duty Officer extends to Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions so long as it is practical, supports the requirements of the specific mission and is in accordance with the command guidance referencing arming status.”129 This DSCA or “civil support” capability would soon be tested.

On October 8, 2016, Hurricane Matthew became the first hurricane to hit South Carolina directly since Hurricane Hugo in 1989. For the first time in 27 years, the interstates were reversed to support a full coastal evacuation. SLED was the lead LEA in charge of security post landfall and it expressed a requirement for additional SCNG MP troops than were already forecasted to augment their officers when conducting security

129 Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual, ver. 2.0, 17.
missions. More MPs were not available and SLED was specific that it required not just general-purpose troops but rather guardsmen who had been trained to law enforcement standards and were issued pistols.

As the SCNG FUOPS section began to execute running estimates in its military MDMP to meet the request for forces from SLED, SADOP became a feasible and potentially complete COA. “The MDMP is an iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or order. It assists leaders to apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic and professional knowledge to understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions.”130 SADOP armed duty officers were not only an available asset but were also a weighted factor for a variety of reasons.

The factors supporting the activation of the armed duty officers offered obvious advantages.

1. **Existing Partnership and Common Training**

SLED had been training iterations of armed duty officers for over a year and a professional bilateral relationship was already established between SADOP and SLED. Further, the tactics, techniques, and procedures the armed duty officers were taught during PSIC were exactly what would be required of them during security operations where they would be directly augmenting SLED officers. Expectations of the armed duty officers would be clear and the time to verify their mission sets miniscule.

2. **Ammunition and Weapon Interoperability**

By design, SADOP had fielded firearms that were of the same manufacture, model, and caliber as SLED. This interoperability had originally been adapted for counter-active shooter scenarios; however, it was now offering to pay dividends for a potential civil support operation. Armed duty officers had been fielded and certified on the Glock 23 .40 caliber pistol with jacketed hollow point (JHP) ammunition. The JHP

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130 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *FM 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, change, no. 1, 9–1.
bullets are the most common type of pistol cartridge issued for self-defense because it deforms on impact with soft tissue. This effect is preferable to the full metal jacket (FMJ) bullets usually used for target practice as opposed to defense because it tends to over penetrate. MPs on the other hand carried Beretta M9 9mm pistols with FMJ cartridges.

3. Operationally Available

Since all SADOP armed duty officers are full-time SCNG personnel, they were both available and easy to contact. Activating them for deployment to the coast would be rapid and efficient.

4. Logistics

Unlike other COAs being considered, SADOP armed duty officers were already armed with an operational load of 39 rounds. Expedited ammunition draws from Fort Jackson’s ammunition supply point (ASP) or time-consuming consolidations to draw ammunition at ammunition holding areas (AHAs) prior to linking up with SLED officers would not be necessary.

The SCNG issued a warning order for SADOP armed duty officers to be prepared for a potential deployment to the coast in support of SLED’s security operations. Within three hours, 47 SADOP armed duty officers from across all the MSCs who were not already committed to their units were contacted and began making arrangements to deploy on order. However, although the COA was considered and nearly implemented, other factors including improving the restoration of services, transitioning to civil authority control, and downgraded numbers of SCNG forces from SLED led to the decision to cancel the mission and the armed duty officers were stood down.

Hurricane Matthew however had set a precedent; civil authorities were prepared to request SADOP as an asset that had the value of multiplying their capabilities without increasing the size of the force already on orders. Eleven months later, Hurricane Irma posed a potential threat to the state of South Carolina and hundreds of SCNG troops were called up as a precautionary measure. The SC TAG announced its arming policy early and this time, SADOP was an available asset from the beginning. SADOP armed duty
officers, trained by SLED in advanced tactics, techniques, and procedures and being full-
time soldiers and airmen available on short notice representing the best of the MSCs had become an available asset for DSCA and civil support operations.

In the two years from its conceptualization to implementation, SADOP has seen considerable change. Initially designed to protect barricaded personnel during an ASE until law enforcement arrived, the program has progressed into a much more assertive response plan. With SLED expanding its requests for security specific personnel to augment its security missions and the precedence set during natural disasters for SADOP armed duty officers to become a preferred security augmenter group, the stage is being set for future debate on redefining civil support duties and expectations for the armed duty officers.
VII. CONCLUSION

A. THE WAY AHEAD

The effectiveness of SADOP as policy and its contribution to the practice of force protection in the homeland security enterprise is directly proportionate to remaining innovative in its concepts and dynamic in the implementation of its processes and procedures. SADOP is integrated with antiterrorism plans and essential to the security of the personnel and facilities of the SCNG. The enhancement of the program and its relevance to future variations to the regional threat assessment is intertwined with increasing interoperability or at least cooperation with federal authorities and securing the program in the South Carolina code of law.

1. Program Improvement

The SADOP administration continues to implement revisions based on improved counter-active shooter concepts, lessons learned, fiscal responsibility, and operational efficiency. In the most recent version of the SADOP policy, the administration approved a series of enhancements designed to benefit the SCNG managerially and cost-effectively in the long term. These approved program design revisions were another example of thorough bilateral cooperative planning between the SADOP administration, JAG section, and the SLED training and legal sections.

a. SADOP-AG

The SADOP-AG “is the process by which selected personnel with either SADOP or LEO service experience are incorporated into SADOP for continued service.”\textsuperscript{131} The willingness to serve in SADOP-AG provides additional dividends to the program that is recognized by the administration, which is ultimately why the COA was implemented. The difference is that the SADOP-AG soldier or airman augments the program by supplying their own privately owned firearm, holster, and ammunition pouches that meet

\textsuperscript{131} Military Department of South Carolina, \textit{South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual}, ver. 2.0, 13.
the standards set forth in SADOP policy manual 2.0. The SADOP-AG armed duty officer still conducts all training and completes all administrative requirements and carries state-issued ammunition. This addition to the program accomplished two things.

First, SADOP-AG provides a “return on knowledge” by providing a mechanism for previous SADOP armed duty officers in good standing or full-time National Guard personnel who are prior Class 1 certified LEOs an opportunity to continue to serve their communities, state and federal government as a trained Armed Duty Officer by by providing force protection to their fellow service members. Therefore, the previous time and resources invested in training and education plus the experience gained by the armed duty officer is not wasted due to the armed duty officer being either transferred for the good of the unit or when receiving a promotion and being required to relocate from current allocations. Likewise, the program recognizes the benefits that incorporating a soldier or airman who had previously served as a LEO and was certified by the SCCJA as Class 1 brings to SADOP. Therefore, this classification of SADOP-AG candidates is only required to attend a half day of induction or reclassification training and firearms qualification as opposed to the normal three days at PSIC.

Second, the SADOP-AG program, if assessed as successful, makes it possible to secure the program’s future. Unlike sister states where carte blanche authority for carrying a privately owned firearm is currently approved, the SADOP-AG program provides structure for incorporating privately owned firearms into a state sanctioned and administered program. In short, the SADOP-AG program provides a blueprint that either reduces the number of replacement SADOP firearms required or eliminates their necessity entirely. If SADOP-AG meets expectations, by the year 2026, it may mean a savings of over $100,000 in replacement firearms. The ultimate objective of SADOP is to mitigate the likelihood of a successful ASE. Therefore, if the program successfully integrates privately owned firearms into the supervised constraints of the administration, SADOP-AG may potentially transform from an augmentation or axillary to SADOP to the program’s successor.
b. **SADOP Stakes**

SADOP Stakes is a SLED hosted and sanctioned competitive shooting event designed to encourage both rivalry and camaraderie among the SADOP armed duty officers serving within the SCNG MSCs. The SADOP Stakes is an annual comprehensive firearms competition including distance fire, night fire, friend versus foe, and timed engagements that establish boasting rights by awarding the SADOP “Shield Trophy” that is rotational based on which MSC wins the competition. It is a team event and is designed to maximize tactics taught during PSIC and SCAASCATS to provide a realistic and reflexive validation of training. This event supports the intent of the SADOP administration to train and cultivate esprit de corps among SADOP armed duty officers and maintain exclusivity within the program.

c. **Core Cadre**

This intermediate level advisor and supervisory position was designed to support the SADOP administration regional manager as the MSC representative “responsible person for any and all SADOP personnel or equipment issues within their MSC.”132 This role as the “go to” person provides a link from SADOP to the MSC in matters of reporting personnel, training, and logistics within the MSC to SADOP regional managers. This role is a “train the trainer” type instructional format and is also available for lesson planning and presentations for the armed duty officers within their MSC and particular region.133

2. **Federal Cooperation**

The SCNG leases a large training area on the east end of the federal installation of Fort Jackson, SC. This training area is MTC and is a cantonment used for training thousands of National Guard and other reserve component troops every year. The two bases jointly utilize numerous tactical training areas, artillery firing points, bivouac sites, and weapons firing ranges. The Army and SCNG routinely interact for de-confliction of

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132 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 12.

133 Ibid.
training area purposes; however, how these two sites are administered is significantly different.

The active component manages Fort Jackson in a regimented environment typical of most permanent Army installations. The reserve component oversees the National Guard enclave at MTC as a smaller and more transient type facility where units and personnel go there to conduct training or attend military education courses who then return to their duty locations or home stations. Any person entering Fort Jackson is subject to Army firearms regulations, which means that carrying concealed is prohibited. Fort Jackson is under federal jurisdiction and no precedence of agreements has been set with state agencies for carrying firearms on the base.

On June 22, 2017, SADOP representatives briefed active component officials from the Directorate of Emergency Services (DES) at Fort Jackson to apprise the federal authorities of the program’s existence, concept, and purpose and to explore potential cooperation authorizing SADOP armed duty officers to carry concealed in the course of their duties on MTC. MTC relies on contracted security at its main gate as a MP or DOD station is not located on the reserve component enclave. The contracted security guards are neither trained to counter an active shooter threat nor authorized to leave their posts in the event of an attack. While MPs do conduct irregularly scheduled patrols on MTC, the response time from Fort Jackson is as long as 30 minutes.

The initial meeting led to a follow-on conference on August 18, 2017 with the Fort Jackson garrison commander and DES provost marshal. This briefing, while productive in providing the active component a detailed briefing of SADOP, fell short of garnering direct cooperation. For example, DES supported SADOP utilizing the Argentan known distance range and the combat pistol qualification course for the program’s semi-annual qualification. However, SADOP personnel were refused deliberate reciprocity upon entering Fort Jackson for routine military business. Other topics including interpretation of DODD 5210.56 were discussed and both parties agreed to reconvene on the subject of allowing SADOP armed duty officers access to Fort Jackson at a later date after an Army Secretary had been appointed and further specific federal Title 10 guidance had been issued.
3. **State Legislation**

SADOP was initiated by an executive order and was implemented during crisis action planning. The response however to the active shooter threat was never intended to be temporary nor designed to be a stopgap measure. SADOP has become synonymous with the SCNG’s force protection plan and has created a mutual partnership between the reserve component and the state’s premier LEA. The SADOP administration recognizes that the state legislature is integral to the long-term prospect of the policy remaining a permanent aspect of the Military Department of South Carolina’s force protection apparatus.

   **a. Restructuring SADOP Foundation**

   SADOP currently relies exclusively on the authority of the executive order from which it was implemented by the governor’s office. Just as the program was inaugurated by the action of a single executive, the program’s foundation relies on the magnanimity of whoever happens to be sitting in the governor’s office in the future. This vulnerability to the program’s sustainment was first identified as a concern by senior level SCNG JAGs. In an effort to provide a more stable underpinning for SADOP, the JAGs are introducing the program before a legislative session in the South Carolina House of Representatives. The program, once officially approved by the assembly, would become a part of the South Carolina Code of Laws and SADOP would be more thoroughly protected as an enduring force protection program for the SCNG.

   **b. Expanding SADOP as an Augmentation Capability**

   SLED is the responsible agency for certifying security programs in the state and currently SADOP, which by design is not a law enforcement program, is categorized as a security guard organization due to the geographic constraints that SADOP operates within and its force protection concentration. However, classifying SADOP in a security guard category is not accurate given the description of the task that SADOP was designed, trained, and authorized to fulfill. Further, this classification as a security guard type force does not factor in the advanced tactical training, counter-active shooter philosophical indoctrination, or in-depth firearms training that SADOP armed duty
officers undergo during PSIC and SCAASCATS, which is superior to what any security guard program or basic LEO course receives. By scrutinizing already existing statutes regarding “special constables,” JAGs are considering a proposal that expands the bounds of SADOP and mutually benefits both SLED and SADOP, as well as the security of the citizens of South Carolina.

Title 23 of the South Carolina Code of Laws specifically addresses law enforcement and public safety and the category of “special constable” exists with powers and duties to augment authorities as determined by the Director of Public Safety.134 A modification to this already existing statute provides powers and duties that would only be applicable to SADOP “on order” and when designated as an auxiliary to law enforcement specifically directed by SLED, SCDPS, or other specific law enforcement jurisdictions.

The benefit to SADOP would be a more accurate depiction and recognition of their purpose and service, as well as a considerable relief from prohibited locations. Currently when in uniform, SCNG personnel are potential targets for any would be radical jihadist HVE attack. SADOP armed duty officers are profiled by representing the government by affiliation in a duty uniform. Similar attacks against soldiers have taken place in Canada, Europe, and against uniformed LEOs in the United States.135 When guardsmen are in public while wearing a uniform in general or at firearms prohibited location in particular, such as a theatre, hospital, bank or other location where possession of firearms is forbidden, they are particularly vulnerable to a threat actor who is almost impossible to detect. By receiving recognition as “special constables,” armed duty officers would be unconstrained from considerable limitations that the average CWP is statutorily obliged to respect.

Benefits to SLED and other LEO jurisdictions, such as legal clarity in times of special exigent circumstances to request members of an organization for temporary

134 South Carolina Code of Law, Department of Public Safety Constable, Title 23, ch. 6, art. 5, sec. 23-6-210 (2000).
assistance who are well versed in crisis response, proficiently trained by SLED to work individually, and as a TAC-Team, armed with compatible firearms and interchangeable ammunition and readily available on short notice, is invaluable. As mentioned previously, SLED has already requested SADOP armed duty officers during civil support operations and having the legal standing, as well as operational confidence to request their assistance during exigent circumstances, is an effects multiplier for SLED and potentially other state agencies. The readiness of armed duty officers to respond rapidly, enhance, and support law enforcement during emergency conditions provides an augmentation capability that is an unqualified return on investment for the state.

SCNG recruiters are routinely in high schools. In the unlikely, but ever more prevalent event that an ASE takes place at a school while an armed duty officer happens incidentally to be present and may be able to assess the threat and directly interdict an attacker may arguably be the difference between life and death. In the case of the Townville Elementary School shooting, it was an unarmed local volunteer firefighter who subdued the teenage gunman.

B. SUITABILITY FOR REPLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION

As previously described, SADOP is designed as a state solution to a national problem. The extent of success that the SCNG has achieved can be assessed not only by the degree to which the program meets its designed purpose, but also by the level of appreciation from professional peer organizations. The functionality of SADOP’s design and the potential for its incorporation in similar reserve component administrations speaks volumes to the successful origination of its proposal.

1. Replication

The HVE attack on the reserve components that left five servicemen dead did not originate in South Carolina but the research dedicated to the creation of SADOP indicates that it just as easily could have. In fact, due to the basic uniformity of the reserve components and their configuration, organization, and equipment, it could happen almost anywhere across the nation. The reserve components, especially the Army National Guard, are historically located in small town America and are an integral part of the local
community. Despite modern differences in how promotions are managed and personnel management systems influence the manning of armories, they are predominately located in small towns and have responsibilities and ties within their neighborhoods.

“An impenetrable shield against all threats remains neither practical nor affordable. However, a force protection system that encompasses a variety of tactics, techniques, procedures and technology to deter and if necessary, defeat an attack against our people has proven effective.”136 SADOP was developed with the support of these community-based facilities as its primary emphasis. Although the effectiveness of ECP guards and perimeter security to counter an active shooter threat is debatable, what is not in question is that funding to hire and sustain a full-time private or contracted security force for the conceivable future is not an option. SADOP provides a framework for other reserve component organizations across the country from which to accept, modify, emulate, or stimulate debate.

According to AR 525-13, “resources, and facilities considered being at risk as potential terrorist targets due to mission sensitivity, ease of access, isolation, symbolic value, and/or potential for mass casualties are considered a High-Risk Target (HRT).”137 The precedence of partnership within their communities, easily accessible or remote locations, social ties to the local communities, limited manning and resources, combined with the unpleasant acknowledgement of an insider threat, no longer offer the reserve components the excuse to remain ignorant of their real status as potentially easy or soft targets.

2. Distribution

At the time of this research, three other states have inquired with the SCNG SADOP administration for program documentation. The SCNG stands ready and willing to assist in the development of other states that may choose to use the SADOP format as a foundation for their individual states or organizations.

C. INTERVIEWS AND KEY FINDINGS

An aspect of this research critical to the reliability of the report was conducting interviews with seven of the most influential leaders and decision makers involved with the conceptual and practical implementation of SADOP. The discussions provided otherwise unavailable insight into the departmental, practical, and approved policy driven decisions crucial to the formation of SADOP as a bilateral force protection program.

1. Interviews

Individual interviews were conducted with military and civilian leaders and professionals that were instrumental in the development of SADOP. These interviews focused on a universal series of seven questions. The individuals interviewed are listed in chronological order by date of interview.

a. Interviewed Persons

- Chief Mark Keel. Chief of SLED. October 23, 2017.

b. Interview Questions

- Has the organization had precedence in creating bilateral partnerships?
• Provide and explain the chronological timeline:
  • What took place within the organization?
  • In retrospect has this program created a benchmark for future collaboration?
• What policies or procedures were used in the establishment of SADOP training strategic concepts and lesson plans?
• Please provide examples of where the collaboration between SLED and the Military Department of South Carolina has revealed differences in the tactics, techniques and procedures in responding to an active shooter.
• Does the organization plan to adapt in order to remain innovative and effective?
• What is the expectation of a completely trained Armed Duty Officer?
• What are the differences in the training objectives for a SADOP Armed Duty Officer versus other Law?

2. **Key Findings**

Identifying three common findings from the interviews conducted with SLED and SCNG leadership confirmed the universal approval of SADOP as a force protection policy for the SCNG. The cooperation in the planning and implementation of SADOP between the civilian and military organizations solidified previous positive experiences in mutual cooperation.

*a. Bilateral Relationships*

Both civilian law enforcement and military leadership continually stressed the importance of maintaining the bilateral relationships that have been created as a direct result from the SADOP active shooter contingency partnership. SLED emphasized that their participation in SADOP’s success was more than a way for them to give back to the SCNG. Working with interagency or inter-state agencies is a large part of their
professional profile. However, the importance of maintaining the professional interaction between the two agencies for future operations is paramount. State emergencies are going to be a part of the future and an active working relationship between the two agencies is vital to success in the future.

b. Organizational Strength

Both agencies view their participation in SADOP as more of a duty than a task and both the SCNG and SLED are confident that the expertise and dedication in their officers is why the program is successful and why the program will continue to be innovative and responsive.

c. Different Procedures but Similar Roles and Responsibilities

The purpose of the SADOP is recognized as a dual purpose in that the primary and passive measure is to provide a level of protection simply through deterrence. This theme is common with SLED in its daily duties as well. The presence of a SLED agent, officer, or vehicle provides a similar effect; however, SLED is an overt symbol of deterrence whereas SADOP officers are carrying concealed and not identifying their roles as security forces unless a crisis arises.

The second part of SADOP’s purpose is to disrupt an active shooter, which is also the goal of a SLED officer. Both agencies utilize the concept of active measures employed to interrupt the mindset or OODA loop of the active shooter, or in SLED’s case, other myriads of violent criminals. The key differentiation is that SADOP officers are not held to the same escalation of force rules on properties under the auspices of the Military Department of South Carolina that SLED agents are as they serve in public.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

The TWG has played a vital role in the initial problem solving, bilateral synchronization with law enforcement, has been instrumental in the enduring analysis of SADOP, and has continually maintained awareness of trends in violence directed against military targets in the homeland. However, despite innovation and initial successes, the program does have limitations and areas where the program needs to be strengthened for
the comprehensive force protection efficiency of the SCNG. The following are recommendations, based on the research and analysis from this thesis, as well as collaboration with SLED, TWG, and the SC-ATFP ATR that can be considered and implemented to evolve and mature the SADOP.

1. **Increase ATFP ATR Collaboration**

   Collaboration with the ATFP anti-terrorism representative (ATR) is an area that can benefit from additional communication and cooperation. The ATFP ATR is constantly informed of changes to national FPCON and supplemental orders as directed by U.S. Army North (USARNORTH) Force Protection Directive 17-015, Change 1. The ATFP ATR is accountable for the SCNG active shooter TTX and is nested in other ATFP regulations including DODI 2000.26 *Suspicious Activity Reporting* and DODI 2000.16 *Anti-Terrorism Standards*, as well as state and federal force protection bulletins. The ATFP regional program manager (RPM) is the subject matter expert in overall Army anti-terror policy and reporting from Title 10 and 32 perspectives.

2. **Maintain SLED Fusion Center Synchronization**

   The synergy with the SLED fusion center and the positive relationships established through interaction with SLED should be improved upon and maintained. The fusion center’s national connections with the FBI and other federal partners provides invaluable information assistance should SCNG facilities or personnel be threatened by an unforeseen actor on social media or other electronic medium. The FBI has a tremendous ability to monitor suspicious posts online and notify the fusion center about potential hazards, and while working relationships have been established, SADOP may benefit greatly by becoming a better partner with the fusion center.

3. **Program Innovation and Education**

   According to the universally revered and renown military strategist Sun Tzu, “Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be
regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.” The program, while still in its early stages, recognizes that it must not remain static in policy or inflexible in its strategies but rather must remain innovative.

Previously, the program has done well in recognizing the importance of subject matter education on the topics relative to active shooters, domestic terrorism, and threat recognition. The TWG and members of the SADOP administration have initiated a good start at remaining relevant in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the field; however, to date, this research has identified only three seminars or practical training events outside its bilateral partnership with state and local law enforcement that include:

- The Joint Public Safety Response to the Active Shooter Course, June 1, 2017.
- Annual Regional Active Shooter Conference, August 14 and 15, 2017.

This thesis contends that the innovation demonstrated by SADOP should constantly be improved upon and that maximizing excellent educational opportunities in the field of force protection, security, and active shooter response doctrine should become a priority. The SADOP administration needs to fund this educational and professional development in its annual budget. Further, the SADOP administration should encourage their armed duty officers who demonstrate a willingness to be potential program leaders to attend active shooter conferences and education courses.

4. **Leadership Support and Program Expansion**

SADOP benefits in large part due to the steadfast backing of its leadership from the highest echelons both in the civil and military chain of commands. With the encouragement and guidance of the SCNG TAG and senior leadership, the SCNG has exceeded its contemporaries at both the state and federal levels in problem-solving

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analysis to the active shooter threat. SADOP has demonstrated its usefulness and the interest by other states is testament that the program is filling a force protection void. SADOP is a great first step; however, the program must not become complacent and fail to remain proactive in recognizing the ingenuity of the threat and respond with resourcefulness and innovation of its own.

5. **Inclusion of the Air National Guard**

SADOP tends to support the reserve component structure disproportionately when comparing the Army (SCARNG) and Air National Guard (SCANG). While SCANG airmen are trained as armed duty officers and one of the program’s most influential administrators was from the SCANG, their participation is less than 5% of the total allocations in the state.

Part of this disparity is due to the sizes of the two organizations, as the SCANG constitutes less than 20% of the SCNG. Another factor is because the garrisoning plan is vastly different between the two elements of South Carolina’s reserve component. First, the SCANG has over 99% of its manning located on one fixed site (McEntire Joint National Guard Base or MJNGB) while the SCARNG is extended throughout the entire state in dozens of armories, reserve centers, recruiting storefronts, and training areas.

Another cause is that the two organizations have contrasting MTOEs. The SCARNG has a MP battalion; however, it is a traditional National Guard structure, which means that other than a small cadre of full-time personnel who manage the training, administration, logistics and readiness of the battalion headquarters and the subordinate MP companies, no armed MPs are part of the full-time National Guard force. By contrast, the SCANG has a full-time security forces squadron (SFS) whose primary mission is the daily access to the base and the force protection of its personnel and facilities.

Additionally, MJNGB has SCARNG units on but these units rely on the force protection role of the 169th SFS SCANG and not SADOP because SADOP is not authorized to carry out a counter-active shooter mission on MJNGB as the SCANG falls under separate regulations and their facilities and buildings on the base are federal and not state property. This assessment suggests and the FBI analysis supports that most
ASEs are over before law enforcement, including military law enforcement, arrives on the scene. SADOP stands to enhance and not detract from the ability of the SCANG SFS to respond effectively to an active shooter threat, and therefore, should be integrated into MJNGB’s force protection plan.

6. Summary

This conclusion section quantifies SADOP as a comprehensive active shooter contingency policy for the SCNG and offers recommendations for sustaining the program. The two appendices provide detailed information about the program metrics, organization, and administration. SADOP is, in essence, a conscious and coordinated effort to employ effective techniques and lessons learned systematically against a known threat and mitigate the potential success of an asymmetrical HVE adversary or lethal insider threat. SADOP is a well-planned; safety focused systematic response to a dynamic and lethal threat that offers little if any warning of its imminence.

The purpose of this policy is to establish a safe and effective training and administrative program by setting the standards, processes, metrics, and responsibilities for its participants. Furthermore, it is nested in the approved South Carolina National Guard Adjutant General’s Standardized Rules for the Use of Force and structured around a strictly clarified and supported Safety Protocol with the goal of creating a safety centric culture within the SADOP organization.

Military leadership must lead, which requires decision making, accepting risk, and initiating action. With respect to force protection, decision making includes considering what USMC Commandant General (GEN) James Amos called a “sacred responsibility.” In the case of the SCNG, the product of the deliberative problem solving was a bilateral active shooter contingency plan known as SADOP. It required

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140 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Training Manual*, ver. 1.3 (Columbia, SC: Military Department of South Carolina, 2016), 9.

recognizing the threat, identifying vulnerabilities, implementing risk mitigation practices, and recognizing the requirement to remain flexible to amendments as necessary.

SADOP remains adaptable to adjust its tactics, techniques, and procedures to present a strong deterrence and viable disruption capability, which is demonstrated by SADOP’s recognition that the threat is multi-tiered, unpredictable, and potentially an internal risk. SADOP is sustainable, as it continually endeavors to cooperate with other agencies to remain tactically proficient, technically relevant, and capable of recognizing and responding to active shooter threats and their most likely and dangerous COA. The SADOP armed duty officers are exemplars of the military values of duty, selfless service, personal courage, and loyalty. They are taught to use sound judgment and discern between lethal and non-lethal threats before acting, but if called to perform, are equally bold to locate, close with, isolate, distract, and neutralize an active shooter threat. Armed duty officers are ingrained to act methodically to interrupt the OODA loop cycle of an attacker and thereby stop an unopposed assault.

The reserve components of the U.S. military, specifically the Army and Air National Guards, are similar but not identical and it is unlikely that a “one size fits all” paradigm will ever be exact when addressing force protection. SADOP however is an administrative success for the SCNG and a tribute to its leadership who took calculated risks to pioneer innovative concepts to the challenge of protecting its reserve component force. The SCNG leads its contemporaries in pursuing a civil-military bilateral program in lieu of resorting to legacy force protection designed by and intended for the active component.
APPENDIX A. THE SECURE AREA DUTY OFFICER PROGRAM

A. DEFINITION

SADOP is “an internally manned, concealed carry, armed active shooter contingency response group of full-time National Guard, State Guard or State Employees. It is an exclusive group that is selective in its membership and entails extensive vetting prior to initial training. SADOP recruits, trains, equips and retains dedicated full-time National Guard, State Guard or State employees to serve incognito as force protection officers specifically in a counter-active shooter capacity for the SCNG.”142

B. DUTIES

“The primary duty of the secure area duty officer (referred to universally as armed duty officer) is to provide force protection of SCNG personnel, state employees, and coworkers. The supplementary duty of armed duty officers is to prevent the destruction of SCNG equipment and facilities. This immediate response to an active shooter or other criminal incident applies while on the premises of the Military Department of South Carolina, approved DOD facilities, or while conducting Civil Support or Defense Support to Civil Authorities.”143 In short, it is a counter-active shooter contingency that incorporates available personnel assets, advanced close quarter tactical shooting training, as well as civil and military legal instruction to counter an ASE.

C. ARMED STATUS

SADOP is based on an armed application platform that relies on anonymity to deter a potential attack and provide the advantage of surprise against an unsuspecting adversary in the event of an actual ASE. This strategy is designed to counter the common tactic of a deliberate assault on locations with security, which is to eliminate armed

142 Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual, ver. 2.0, 10.
143 Ibid.
security guards first. SADOP armed duty officers are trained not to profile themselves and equipped to conceal their firearms effectively by not silhouetting them while wearing them on their uniforms.

The objective of arming personnel anonymously is that to the extent possible neither the public or even many of the employees who work in a military facility are aware of which soldiers nor airmen are armed. The idea behind the concealed arming status is that it becomes most difficult for attackers to defend against a deliberate counterattack if they are either unaware where they must be located to be able to defend from or are ignorant of the number of their intended victims who actively resist, which nullifies their ability to inflict casualties. Given that all military personnel are generally dressed identically further assists in the deception and prevents the active shooters from having complete awareness from where they may be engaged. In short, they are at risk from potentially anyone in uniform as soon as the assailants demonstrate intent. This arming status was determined to be preferable to an open status carry mode based on practical, philosophical, and doctrinal factors.

1. Practicality—Ease of Concealment and Movement

Soldiers and airmen are required by military regulation to wear uniforms during routine duty. The utility uniform worn by both services is by design loose fitting with an outer blouse worn untucked and outside of the trousers to hide a firearm worn either on the belt or inside the waistband. If a SADOP armed duty officer is in military dress uniform, the jacket also effectively conceals a firearm. Carrying concealed allows armed duty officers to continue their daily routines without being hindered by a cumbersome police or security style duty belt.

2. Assertive Intervention

SADOP espouses a response philosophy with the ultimate objective to stop the murder of defenseless persons.\textsuperscript{144} According to SADOP methodology, active shooters have a preconceived mentality that they are in a “predator mode” or that they are the

\textsuperscript{144} Military Department of South Carolina,\textit{ South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual}, ver. 2.0, 25.
“hunter” and anticipate killing without resistance until law enforcement arrives.\textsuperscript{145} This reasoning is supported by FBI analysis in that 56% of active shooter incidents studied ended on the initiative of the active shooters.\textsuperscript{146} The premise of assertive intervention is to interrupt the active shooters’ OODA loop cycle and rapidly destroy the threat through accurate direct fire.\textsuperscript{147} Carrying the state issued firearm concealed provides the most advantageous opportunity for armed duty officers to intercept active shooters successfully and interrupt their OODA loops.

3) Contact Response Doctrine

SADOP armed duty officers are trained in the five tenants of the contact response doctrine. This counter-active shooter principle places value on automated and methodical processes in an anticipated environment of terror and chaos. The purpose of the contact response doctrine is to synergize counter-active shooter response tactics, techniques, and procedures between SLED and SADOP to provide the best possible means for rapidly defeating a threat-actor and ending an active shooter incident on SCNG property.\textsuperscript{148} The five tenants of the contact response doctrine are as follows.

a. Locate the Threat

Armed duty officers are trained to ascertain where the threat-actors are currently presenting a threat and respond.

b. Close with the Threat

Once the exact locations of the threat-actors are determined, the armed duty officers will move to the targets.

\textsuperscript{145} Military Department of South Carolina, \textit{South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual}, ver. 2.0, 25.

\textsuperscript{146} Blair and Schweit, \textit{A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United State between 2000 and 2013}, 11.

\textsuperscript{147} Military Department of South Carolina, \textit{South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual}, ver. 2.0, 25.

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
c. Isolate

Through the use of movement and fire, armed duty officers will constrain the threat-actors from engaging or intermingling with their intended victims.

d. Distract

Armed duty officers will disrupt the threat-actors’ ability to focus on their intended victims by using any means necessary to distract them and force them to concentrate on their own survival.

e. Neutralize

By implementing the tactics, techniques, and procedures taught at PSIC and SCAASCAT, armed duty officers will render the threat-actors incapable of presenting a threat to themselves or others.149

D. TRANSPARENCY

Members of the SCNG, both full-time and traditional soldiers, are briefed on SADOP and its force protection mission. The program is entirely voluntary and service members are not compelled to serve in the program. SADOP is available to any full-time members of the SCNG who meet the prerequisites and achieve the standards. Eligibility prerequisites include but are not limited to a minimum time in active reserve military or state service, a security clearance requirement, no less than 24 months remaining on the applicants’ service obligation, and no documented instances of substandard duty performance or dereliction of duty in the last two years.150 The program also requires that all applicants be cleared to meet the state’s legal requirements to receive a South Carolina issued CWP.

SADOP exercises a robust selection process and detailed vetting procedure designed to impress upon the SCNG unit leadership submission only those whom they may want representing their organizations. The MSCs are encouraged to consider and

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149 Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual, ver. 2.0, 24.
150 Ibid., 14.
conduct a thorough internal inspection of those applicants within their ranks who want to be considered. Lackadaisical deliberation and poor review of applicants at lower echelons can and has resulted in awkwardness for both the applicants and their chain of supervision. The MSCs are limited in the numbers of applicants they can submit based on available allocations or “slots.”

E. RECRUITMENT AND VETTING

SADOP is a completely voluntary program that relies entirely on the interest and sense of obligation from the members of the SCNG’s full-time force to fill the program’s allocations. Armed duty officers serve in the program as an additional duty in positions that are not funded or compensated. These volunteers are required to incorporate the operational tempo of the program without unduly interrupting the routine work and responsibilities of their full-time SCNG positions. The SADOP administration also relies extensively on the MSC full-time managers and chain of supervision known as AOs who determine where and how their SADOP slots are manned and utilized. AOs also have direct oversight when it comes to recruiting within their MSC and are conscious of the prestige of serving in the program and extremely judicious on who represents their organization in SADOP.

The SADOP administration determined the numbers of allocations or “slots” as they staffed the security requirements of the SCNG MSCs. These slots were based on the finite number of available firearms, equipment, and analysis of a variety of supporting data including the following.

- **Location.** Proximity to local law enforcement agencies.
- **Associate Density.** The total number of full-time and civilian workforce stationed at the location.

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151 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 11.
152 Ibid., 15.
• **Minimal Duty Officer Presence.** Initial recommendation based on a primary and alternate allocation per location.

Selection and vetting of applicants to SADOP is a thorough protracted process initiating at the individuals and culminating in the actual graduation from PSIC training (see Figure 1). With armed duty officers directly representing and serving within the MSCs, it is in the inherent interest of those chains of supervisions to select the best possible candidates who apply for SADOP.\(^{153}\) Therefore, scrutiny at the lowest levels is intense and takes place long before the applicants are subjected to upper echelon vetting at the SADOP and SLED administration levels.

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\(^{153}\) Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 20.
The process of applicant vetting begins when perspective volunteers conduct a self-assessment to verify if they meet the minimum requirements to apply by reviewing the SADOP applicant selection criteria checklist (see Figure 2). SADOP applicants are encouraged to read the SADOP policy manual prior to submitting an application packet. These minimum requirements are closely integrated to the state’s requirements for requesting a state issued CWP. This integration is not a coincidence, as the SC CWP is managed through SLED regulatory services and the SC CWP is a requirement for SADOP armed duty officers to carry the state issued firearm either off the state’s military facilities, storefront recruiting stations, or to carry it concealed off regular duty hours. The SC CWP is the legal conduit that binds the state and military aspects of SADOP into one program.

154 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 59.
155 Ibid., 23.
After verifying that the service members meet the minimum requirements, they request authorization to represent the unit in the program. The unit chain of supervision, which usually consists of a NCO who serves as the unit’s readiness or training NCO, considers the application. The applicants are most likely to be rejected during this initial review. The unit verifies the accuracy of the packet and conducts an interview with the

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156 Source: Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 59.
applicants to verify that the service members fully understand the purpose of SADOP and how it applies at the unit level.

The chain of supervision becomes extremely familiar with the applicants at this lower echelon. The service record, work ethic, reliability, mental and emotional state, sociability, professionalism, marital or relationship stability, as well as any number of other aspects of the applicants are usually well known by their immediate supervisors or associated co-workers. For example, if the applicants have a short temper or are recognized to have routine issues with authority, have a history of substandard duty performance, irresponsibility, or other negative traits, these issues are evident to those at the unit level. Also, the program has also discovered that it is not necessarily service members with a poor performance record who are not well suited for the program. Quite the contrary; sometimes it is the vocal political or gun enthusiast who does not necessarily fit the mold for an ideal candidate for SADOP.

Service members accepted at the unit level are required to complete a memorandum of understanding (MOU) whereby the applicants receive the fundamental background of the program, the program’s purpose and responsibilities, as well as expectations for joining SADOP. Both the applicants and their immediate supervisors then sign this MOU before it becomes part of the applicants’ SADOP packet that is forwarded to the next level for consideration. The SADOP applicant packet consists of the following.

- Appendix A (SADOP MOU)
- Appendix C (selection criteria checklist)
- Letter of recommendation from the MSC
- SC CWP application
- Two completed standard fingerprint cares (applicant FD-258)\(^{157}\)

\(^{157}\) Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 35.
The next level of vetting is at the battalion level and is typically examined by a senior company grade or junior field grade officer. At this stage, the authorizations or slots can adversely affect the applicants’ request for consideration. The battalions’ AOs have the authority within the program to reallocate the authorized number of slots within their purview. For example, the battalion may have five subordinate company or battery units at five, six, or seven separate armories located either regionally or disparately throughout the state. The SADOP administration may have allocated 12 or 15 slots for the battalion; however, the exact placement of these slots is entirely at the discretion of the battalion or MSC AOs. Additionally, the battalion AOs may disagree with the assessment of the subordinate units’ approval of the applicants and summarily dismiss them without cause. If the applicants’ packets are not administratively rejected at the battalion level, they then progress to the next step.

Similar to that of the battalion level, the MSC has the authority both to reallocate slots and disapprove a subordinate’s recommendation of applicants. Traditionally, however, by the time the SADOP application packet successfully reaches the MSC stage of review, it is likely to be accepted. The final military administrative process necessary for the applicants’ packet to be forwarded is a letter of recommendation from the MSC AO, which officially provides MSC approval for the applicants to represent the MSC in SADOP.

The final administrative phases of program vetting occur when the SADOP administration, the SLED training section, and SLED regulatory services receive the applicants’ packets. The SADOP coordinator receives the packets who then processes the managerial and clerical obligations and creates a PSIC roster. As the senior program leader responsible for managing administration, training, and personnel, the SADOP administrator then reviews the applicants and has the authority to reject any applicant that in his judgment would not be a credit to the program. If it passes the scrutiny of the SADOP administrator, the SADOP coordinator consolidates the packets and delivers them to SLED regulatory services for vetting by law enforcement databases.

Completed packets arrive at SLED regulatory services two weeks prior to the first day of scheduled PSIC training. The applicants are vetted on two separate databases, the
National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which identifies charges or convictions that either inhibit or restrict applicants from receiving a SC CWP. The inability to receive a SC CWP in effect disqualifies applicant from SADOP. The second database is connected to Interpol and focuses extensively on firearms violations.

The final decision on whether to induct applicants into SADOP takes place during PSIC when the applicants can be assessed on safety, academic examinations, practical firearm expertise, tactical drill proficiency, and comprehensive professionalism. Either the SLED training section captain or the SADOP administrator may act unilaterally to remove applicants deemed unfit or inept for duty in the program.

(1) The Warrior Class

Not everyone is a “warrior.” As previously described, SADOP emerged as a direct response to the active shooter attack against reserve component facilities in Chattanooga, TN; however, the phenomenon of active shooters has been on the rise for years. Military facilities and personnel have been routinely identified as common targets for jihadist plots within the United States. In fact, of the 119 Americans accused of plotting attacks inside the continental United States since the 9/11 attack, nearly a third were alleged to have plotted to attack U.S. military targets. The targeting of military facilities and personnel by terrorist and jihadist sympathizers while dangerous in and of itself is enhanced exponentially when combined with other violent trends including mass shootings and workplace violence. The findings in a 2014 FBI study of 160 active shooter incidents in the United States from 2000 to 2013 documented an increase in the frequency of attacks annually from an average of 6.4 in the first seven years of the study to 16.4 incidents annually in the last seven years. The report identified 11 active shooter incidents taking place on government and military properties that resulted in 24 killed and 14 wounded.

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160 Ibid.
In the absence of a permanent MP force, DOD police, or professional security enterprise, the concept of fielding a volunteer cadre of soldiers and airmen from within the ranks of the everyday, full-time SCNG personnel seems formidable. However, as detailed as the recruitment and vetting process is, the SADOP administration monitors applicants and reserves the right of refusal for those who may not meet the desired condition. It might be expected that the program would be grateful for any or all volunteers to serve in the program; however, SADOP recruitment and vetting procedures are extremely stringent. This aspect of SADOP vetting may seem harsh and even prejudicial on its surface but as the graduates of the SADOP PSIC course attest to, SADOP is more than just a program, concept, or definition. It is an existence, a camaraderie, and a membership into an exclusive group of people who recognize the paramount importance of their potential responsibility.

SADOP armed duty officers are volunteers whom, when indoctrinated and qualified, embody the Warrior Class of their profession. During PSIC, armed duty officers are briefed on the gruesome details and the depth of the callous malevolence and unsympathetic mercilessness exhibited by active shooters. Active shooter case study reviews of Sandy Hook, Fort Hood Texas, San Bernardino, Aurora Theater, Virginia Tech, Columbine, and Chattanooga with the details of the moments of horror and carnage emphasize the critical importance of what they are volunteering their services to accomplish. Armed duty officers are galvanized in their resolve to “crave a righteous fight” to “brave all hazards and run to the gunfire to violently bring down a threat so that others may “Run, Hide & Fight,”” and that “there is no redeemable value to the evil that is inherent in the active shooter. He is a predator who kills without mercy those who he seeks out and finds defenseless.”161 They are challenged to answer the question of “What happens if they get past you?”162

By the terms of the executive order that facilitated its foundation, SADOP has become nested with both the SCNG and SLED. The program has fostered a strong professional relationship that has been mutually beneficial for both organizations. The SC

161 Military Department of South Carolina, “Primary SADOP Instruction Course,” 51–52.
162 Ibid.
CWP is the linchpin that has fused the civil-military relationship program to both agencies, which is issued through the SLED regulatory services department. The SCNG acknowledges the importance of SLED’s training and certification, while SLED reciprocates the comradeship between its law enforcement trainers and military protégés.

(2) Safety and Risk Management

“The importance of safety when implementing a firearm centric program, while obvious, is not necessarily inherent and cannot be overstated.” This quote is the opening sentence to the SADOP policy manual’s section on risk mitigation. The program’s safety foundation is based on its use of the U.S. Army’s Composite Risk Management System (CRM) and the safety protocol. Although not indicated in the SADOP policy manual, the Army chose to rescission the term “composite risk management” in April 2014 for the joint term “risk management.”

It is not surprising that the SCNG SADOP policy relies heavily on safety principles found in Army techniques publications or ATP 5-19 as it is the trademark for almost all Army risk management and assessment. The program suggests the utilization of DD Form 2977, the deliberate risk assessment worksheet to document active risk management planning and execution. The Army risk management process implements well worn, tried, and true measures of safety effectiveness and Army personnel serving in both the active and reserve components are well versed in its five fundamental steps.

- Identify the hazard.
- Assess the hazard.
- Develop controls and make risk decisions.
- Implement controls.

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163 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 29.


165 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 29.
Supervise and evaluate.¹⁶⁶

The program also stresses a safety guideline referred to as “the safety protocol.” This guideline is a four-part strategy that emphasizes:¹⁶⁷

- Self-defense, the defense of others and the protection of SCNG facilities
- The four universal firearms safety rules
- Firearms safety responsibilities
- Duty officer wellness

The safety protocol highlights fundamental firearms safety concerns, such as mitigating accidental discharges, theft prevention, fratricide, maintaining holstered firearms, proper removal and storage of firearms, protective vests, “Determination Tee” (a safety indicator to mitigate blue on green, or police/first responder firing on SCNG/SADOP personnel during an ASE).¹⁶⁸ The program also focuses a great deal on the fit for the duty aspects of armed duty officers. These aspects include perpetual confirmation of their ability to carry out their assigned responsibilities effectively and a continuous awareness of the mental, physical, and emotional wellness of the officers.¹⁶⁹

The safety protocol addresses “stand-to” counseling, which is the full-time chain of supervision routinely verbally counseling armed duty officers in their units to verify that no changes have occurred to the states of well-being that could hinder the officers from fulfilling their obligations or incur unnecessary risk to themselves or others.¹⁷⁰ This counseling is mandated quarterly.

Mechanisms in the safety protocol suspend armed duty officers from carrying their firearms due to mental or emotional stress, and medical conditions that require

¹⁶⁶ Department of the Army, Risk Management, change no. 1, 1–3.
¹⁶⁷ Military Department of South Carolina, South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual, ver. 2, 30.
¹⁶⁸ Ibid., 32.
¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 33.
¹⁷⁰ Ibid.
prescriptions that impair their judgment or physical responsiveness necessary for responsible firearm carry.171

F. METRICS: TRAINING, ASSESSMENT, CREDENTIALS AND HERALDRY

Chapter VI of this paper specifically addresses training; however, as an overview of the program as a whole, it is noteworthy to address that the SADOP policy manual does refer to training philosophy and lesson plan metrics.

SLED training focus is on producing a proficient SCNG force protection force. SLED implements an efficiency centric training philosophy incorporating real world scenarios that Armed Duty Officers may experience as opposed to “bull’s-eye” target shooting. SLED training implements a series of “reflexive” scenarios creating a training environment where SADOP trainee judgment and decision making is critical and becomes instinctive. SLED training is based on ‘actual’ or ‘similar to actual’ incidents and is comparable to scenarios found in competitive shooting programs such as the International Defensive Pistol Association (IDPA) and is based on the same training that SLED agents receive during the SLED pistol marksmanship course. SLED firearm instruction includes safety functions, security, capabilities, limitations, and maintenance. All personnel authorized to carry firearms must have qualified on the type of firearm carried, in accordance with current policy guidelines.172

SADOP trainees are taught to “overcome fear by employing essential skills and generating confidence.”173

SADOP trainees receive training assessments and are evaluated on their practical Glock firearm marksmanship drills, scored on record live fire exercises, and accurate distance shooting. Both SLED and SCNG instructors give written examinations on SC CWP criteria, safety, South Carolina laws, state firearms regulations, and SADOP policy procedures. In addition to academic examinations, SADOP trainees are evaluated on firearms qualification on a course that collates the numerous training skills and scenarios

171 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2, 34.
172 Ibid., 37.
173 Ibid., 38.
on which SLED had provided training. This timed qualification course of fire is designed to test the marksmanship, instinctive fire capabilities, and tactical flexibility of the SADOP trainee. The firearm qualification will require 50 rounds of operational load and be conducted at distances of three to 25 yards.\textsuperscript{174} The minimum standard of 80% is higher than the 70% required for SLED officers qualifying semi-annually or LEOs attending initial firearms training at the SCCJA.\textsuperscript{175}

Failure to meet standards either academically or during qualification results in remedial instruction and another attempt on the same course of fire and a modified written test. A repeat failure on either examination results in the trainees’ termination from the program.\textsuperscript{176}

Upon successful completion of PSIC, SADOP trainees become armed duty officers and receive a credential that identifies them by name, date of birth, photograph, SADOP number that has an expiration date commensurate with their SC CWP. In an effort to establish a physical token of esprit de corps and inclusion into the program, graduates receive certificates of completion and SADOP medallions or challenge coins that are individually numbered with the SADOP armed duty officers’ SADOP numbers. The heraldry and tradition associated with the medallion or challenge coin is also printed on formal card stock and emphasizes the individuals’ accomplishments and journey of the applicants, trainees and finally, armed duty officers into the exclusive membership of the program.

G. VIOLATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

SADOP is basically an entirely volunteer program that relies on the cooperation of SLED and the MSCs of the SCNG to operate at its fullest potential. This tremendous responsibility that armed duty officers take on in the event of an ASE is uncompensated. Therefore, the effectiveness of the program is dependent on the professionalism and

\textsuperscript{174} Military Department of South Carolina, \textit{South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual}, ver. 2, 39.
\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid.
sound judgment of its members, as well as the vision and oversight of its administration. The program strives to be exclusive in its membership and is unique in a variety of ways and not least of which is that it places safety above all else except for the counter-active shooter mission. Due to the daily hazard of carrying a firearm, the emphasis placed on the SADOP safety protocol is paramount and “violations of the safety protocol or other reckless, inept or inappropriate behaviors are met with immediate administrative responses.” The program is policed to preserve this safety protocol.

Program violations are almost completely judged on the level of infraction toward the program’s safety protocol. These infractions are classified simply as either “minor violations” or “major violations.”

Minor violations are chiefly subjective and are incidents that are incidental, understandable, or reasonable mistakes that will be adjudicated at the program administrator’s discretion. “Major violations are incidents whereby an Armed Duty Officer either deliberately ignored recognized policies and procedures or inadvertently experienced a significant occurrence.” According to the SADOP policy manual, major violations are referred to a board of review in cases of unacceptable behavior suspension, or dismissal from SADOP. In the event of a major violation of the safety protocol, the armed duty officer’s chain of supervision is notified.

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177 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 43.

178 Ibid.

179 Ibid.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.
APPENDIX B. SADOP ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

A. ORGANIZATION

SADOP is organized geographically into three jurisdictions, the Upstate, Midlands and Eastern regions (see Figure 3). These three regions encompass 58 armories, four recruiting and retention storefronts, one training center, 12 FMSs and the SC Adjutant General Headquarters Complex (referred to as sites). These sites fall under the full-time supervision of eight SCNG MSCs, two independent FMS sites and the Clark’s Hill Training Center. Dependent upon the actual location of the site, some MSCs have sites in multiple SADOP administrative jurisdictions. Each MSC is allocated SADOP slots, which is proportionate to the number of sites and associates employed under the supervision of that command.
The number of available state issued firearms and equipment limits the aggregate numbers of SADOP slots, which equate to approximately 20% of the assigned full-time strength of the SCNG. Normally, each site at a minimum has two armed duty officers; however, other factors, especially the number of associates employed at the site, influences this allocation. Larger or busier reserve centers equate to receiving more slots than other armories that have fewer associates using the facility as their primary duty assignment.

SADOP has armed duty officers allocated to 41 of the state’s 46 counties with a majority of the total number of sites being in the Eastern region (see Figure 4). This minor variance in total locations is offset by a disproportionate number of the bigger reserve centers with more allocations of armed duty officers assigned (five in the Upstate

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182 Source: Military Department of South Carolina, “Primary SADOP Instruction Course.”
and four in the Midlands regions) that makes the total distribution of slots approximately equal (see Figure 5).

Figure 4. Sites by Region

Figure 5. Total Distribution of Slots

Despite allocation limitations and regional jurisdictions for organizational purposes, the SADOP administration recognizes and relies on the MSC expertise in matters of specific site and slot management. These comprehensive decisions that have numerous variables are best handled by the MSCs who are the best arbiters of personnel management. A strength of SADOP’s autonomous parallel organizational structure is that it provides training, guidance, policy proficiency and coordination with other state agencies without interfering with the MSC and its supervision of personnel.183

B. ADMINISTRATION

SADOP has a supervisory and advisory staff that is primarily a leadership and management apparatus that constitutes the SADOP administration.184 The SADOP administration is sanctioned and funded by the state and manages the program independent of the MSCs, directorates, or other particular sections of the SCNG.185 The SADOP administration is an autonomous parallel structure that conducts research,

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183 Military Department of South Carolina, *South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual*, ver. 2.0, 11.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
provides training, manages personnel and equipment, coordinates with law enforcement and civil authorities, supports the intent of the adjutant general, and is responsible for the comprehensive good order, organization, and management of the program.\footnote{Military Department of South Carolina, \textit{South Carolina National Guard Secure Area Duty Officer Program Policy Manual}, ver. 2.0, 11.}

The SADOP administration has six primary positions: SADOP director, administrator, coordinator and three regional managers. The administration also has oversight of 14 MSC liaisons referred to as SADOP core cadre and manages the SADOP JWG whose role is to discuss and coordinate force protection topics, issues, and concerns.

(1) **Director**

The director is generally responsible for providing overall vision and direction of the program. The director receives and reviews major program policy revisions and is the chief spokesperson to the adjutant general in matters relating to SADOP.

(2) **Administrator**

The administrator is specifically responsible for providing leadership while managing administrative, training, and personnel requirements. The administrator is also responsible for managing the regional managers and coordinator, as well as directing the JWG and updating the director on developments as appropriate.

(3) **Coordinator**

The coordinator is a salaried state position responsible to the administrator and whose duties include clerical, accounting, inventory, application vetting, procurement, roster and allocation management, training and lesson plans, weapons and equipment maintenance, and accountability and input of orders into the State Personnel Reporting System (SPURS).
(4) Regional Manager

The regional manager is appointed by the administrator to manage program related personnel and equipment transactions within one of the regional jurisdictions. The regional manager is also responsible to the administrator for changes in allocations and projected PSIC training requests based on vacancies.

The members of the SADOP administration are volunteers and perform their duties in an additional duty capacity. The sole exception is the SADOP coordinator who is a full-time state employee. The SADOP administration volunteers to serve in their rolls for 24 months and provide recommendations for a replacement at the end of their tours. The exception is the director who is a permanent member of the administration.
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