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**MEDIATED NATIONALISM: PRESS FREEDOM, MASS
MEDIA, AND NATIONALISM**

by

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December 2017

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**MEDIATED NATIONALISM: PRESS FREEDOM, MASS MEDIA, AND
NATIONALISM**

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MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This research seeks to identify the underlying factors in the production of nationalism. Using the World Values Survey to establish levels of nationalist attitudes, the author uses quantitative analysis to examine how levels of nationalism change in response to nationalistic terminology transmitted through online news media. Additionally, this thesis analyzes the relationship between press freedom and levels of nationalist word use in the online news media. The findings demonstrate that a free press has a positive effect on the use of some forms of nationalist terminology in the news and a negative effect on others. The evidence also shows that certain nationalist terminology in news media is associated with substantial increases in nationalist attitudes. These findings show promise for better understanding of factors that can be manipulated to influence levels of nationalism within a country.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AfD	Alternative for Germany
AIC	Akaike Information Criterion
EU	European Union
GDP	gross domestic product
OWI	Office of War Information
ROC	receiver operating characteristic
U.S.	United States
UK	United Kingdom
WVS	World Values Survey

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I. INTRODUCTION

With the recent United States (U.S.) Presidential election, the British decision to exit the European Union (EU), and nationalist leaders and parties in Europe gaining political ground, these societies appear to be embracing nationalism to an increasing degree. This rise of nationalism and its ability to unite or divide communities, can have security implications globally as nationalist parties quite often attempt to repress communities they identify as their opposition. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the mechanisms that promote nationalism.

Nationalism has been defined many ways. Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as “the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that.”¹ In this definition, the homogenous culture, organized within a government structure, is often based on language, geography, ethnicity, or a historical past (whether real or imagined) that binds the community together. While any state can have multiple nations within it, each of those nations can choose to fight for political representation and sometimes independence, or can live peacefully within the greater nation. As I will demonstrate, nationalist parties are quite often intolerant of outsiders or sub-nations within the state that can be perceived as a threat to political cultural congruency.

Because nationalism can be based on many factors, such as culture, race, historical past, or geography, it is important to examine how these factors are utilized for nationalist purposes. A nation’s culture changes in many ways over time, including through immigration, technological advances, and war. Examples of this phenomenon have been demonstrated with mass immigration into Europe from Syria due to war, and the continuous technological advances of modern societies, similarly to how Western Europe experienced American cultural diffusion after World War II. At that time, American GIs brought over rock and roll music with artists such as Elvis Presley, resulting in West Germany becoming

¹ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), 42.

the second largest U.S. rock and roll market in the world.² Nazi Germany, in contrast, based its nationality on race and ethnicity.³ Countries such as Israel base their nationalism on Zionism and a historic past that links it to the geography.⁴

These approaches to nationalism have all used mass media outlets as a method to spread such nationalist sentiments, often through propaganda.⁵ Adena et al. found that the Nazis' use of radio to spread propaganda resulted in a positive response by listeners who were predisposed to anti-Semitism and a negative response by those whose prior attitudes contradicted the propaganda.⁶ They found that "restrictions of extremist speech are an important element helping mass media to serve as a safeguard of democracy" and that in an autocracy, dictators can use propaganda to build support and stabilize a country.⁷ Another example of mass media's ability to influence nationalism is seen in the Rwandan genocide, where radio propaganda encouraged the Hutu to commit genocide and kill the Tutsi, accounting for an estimated "10 percent of overall participation" in the violent acts.⁸ Israelis and Palestinians have also accused each other of using the media to spread nationalist

² John Dean, "A Diffusion of American Culture in Western Europe since World War Two: A Crosscultural Survey," *Journal of American Culture* 20, no. 4 (December 1997): 11-24, 10.1111/j.1542-734X.1997.t01-1-00011.x.

³ Aristotle Kallis, *Fascist Ideology Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002).

⁴ "Politics in Israel Is Increasingly Nationalist," *Economist*, May 20, 2017, <https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21722031-israels-politicians-promote-religion-and-intolerance-politics-israel-increasingly>.

⁵ Marjan Malesic, "Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism," *Res Publica* 39, no. 2, (1997): 245-257; Stefano Della Vigna and Ethan Kaplan, "The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (August 2007): 1187-1234, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/36702070/>; Zhongshi Guo, Weng Hin Cheong, and Huailin Chen, "Nationalism as Public Imagination: The Media's Routine Contribution to Latent and Manifest Nationalism in China," *The International Communication Gazette* 69 no. 5 (October 2007): 467-480, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048507080873>; Jeffrey Herf, "Nazi Germany's Propaganda Aimed at Arabs and Muslims During World War II and the Holocaust: Old Themes, New Archival Findings," *Central European History* 42, no. 4 (December 2009): 709-736, 10.1017/S000893890999104X; Maja Adena et al., "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130, no. 4 (January 2015): 1885-1939, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1698196432/>; Stefano Della Vigna et al., "Cross-Border Media and Nationalism: Evidence from Serbian Radio in Croatia," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 6, no.3 (2011): 103-132, 10.1257/app.6.3.103.

⁶ Adena et al., "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany," 1890.

⁷ Adena et al., "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany," 1935.

⁸ David Yanagizawa-Drott, "Propaganda and Conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129, no. 4 (November 2014): 1989, 10.1093/qje/qju020.

propaganda.⁹ This points to the need for closer analysis of the relationship between mass media communications and the creation of nationalist attitudes.

A. METHOD

This thesis will attempt to answer the following research questions: How does press freedom affect the production of nationalist terminology by a country's mass media and what are the effects of those images and narratives on nationalist attitudes within that country? To do this, I have conducted a quantitative analysis of the relationship between press freedom and nationalist terminology in online news media content, and the relationship between nationalist terminology and levels of nationalist attitudes.

In order to identify any relationship between country-level press freedom and nationalist terminology, this research conducts a quantitative analysis of press freedom as reported by Freedom House and levels of nationalist terminology used in the online news media. Additionally, this research will attempt to identify any relationship between nationalistic terminology used in the online news and levels of nationalist sentiments measured through the World Values Survey.

I hypothesize that higher levels of press freedom are associated with increased production of nationalist mass media narratives. In nations such as the United Kingdom, United States, Germany, and France where there is a free press, there is room for more narrow, "ethnic" or "sectarian" forms of nationalism to use mass media to challenge the dominant nationalism. On the other hand, in nations with a censored or partly censored press, such as Turkey and Hungary, there is less tolerance of outsiders who could challenge the dominant nationalism using mass media. While a censored press likely also produces nationalist terminology in the news media, I hypothesize that it does so at a lesser rate than a free press. Additionally, I hypothesize that the amount of media narrative concerning nationalism is correlated with subsequent levels of nationalism within a country. Specifically, as nationalist terminology increases in mass media, we should expect that

⁹ "Palestinian civil war is 'Israeli media propaganda', minister says," *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (November 2006), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/458650933/>; "Sharon Tells Palestinians to End Anti-Israeli Propaganda (text)," *BBC Monitoring Middle East* (November 2004), <http://search.proquest.com/docview/459214184/>.

nationalist attitudes, whether dominant or not, will also rise. For the same reasons, as the media's use of nationalist terminology decreases, we should expect that nationalist attitudes will also be reduced.

B. SIGNIFICANCE

Understanding the role nationalism has played in recent events is crucial to understanding how important it is to national security. Many have argued that English nationalism was a contributing factor in the 2016 British referendum vote to leave the European Union.¹⁰ Lord Ashcroft conducted an exit poll of 12,369 voters after they had cast their votes. Of those who voted for the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the EU, 49% said the biggest single reason for leaving was “the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK,” while 33% said the main reason was “that leaving offered the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders.”¹¹ Politicians such as Nigel Farage used immigration concerns to rally votes. He used examples of refugee criminal and terrorist behavior, in Germany and Belgium,¹² to incite fear and make immigration a security risk for U.K. The free press in Britain¹³ seems to have allowed those such as Farage to spread a nationalist narrative, which challenged British Prime Minister David Cameron's narrative to stay in the EU. The media captured this nationalist sentiment in the online daily news but also captured the sentiment of those who opposed Farage.¹⁴

¹⁰ Harry Brown, “Post-Brexit Britain: Thinking about ‘English Nationalism’ as a Factor in the EU Referendum.” *International Politics Review* 5, (June 2017): 1–12, 10.1057/s41312-017-0023-7; Ana Carolina Balthazar, “Made in Britain: Brexit, teacups, and the materiality of the nation,” *American Ethnologist* 44, no 2 (May 2017): 220–224, 10.1111/amet.12471; Ailsa Henderson, et al., “England, Englishness and Brexit.” *The Political Quarterly* 87, no 2, (April 2016): 187–199, 10.1111/1467-923X.12262.

¹¹ Michael Ashcroft, “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday... and Why,” Lord Ashcroft Polls, accessed August 27, 2017, <http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/>.

¹² Darren McCaffrey, “Farage Warns Over Sex Attackers and Terrorists,” *Sky News*, April 29, 2016, <http://news.sky.com/story/farage-warns-over-sex-attackers-and-terrorists-10262663>.; Owen Bennett, “There will be More Cologne-Style Sex Attacks if Turkey Joins the EU, Claims Nigel Farage,” *Huffington Post UK*, April 29, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/nigel-farage-turkey-brexit-eu-referendum_uk_57234a8ae4b0d6f7bed5d801.

¹³ According to Freedom House's Press Freedom Report, the UK had a highly free press that earned a score of 25 out of 100; “Freedom of the Press 2016,” Freedom House, 2017, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016>.

¹⁴ Andrew Rawnsley and Toby Helm, “David Cameron on the Prospect of Brexit, ‘Leave Want to Take the Country Backwards,’” *The Guardian*, June 11, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/11/david-cameron-brexit-eu-referendum-listen-jeremy-corbyn>.

Nations with a censored press would likely have denied the expression of views which contradicted the ruling party's narrative.

In 2016, the United States elected President Donald Trump. One of President Trump's campaign promises was to conduct immigration reform. He promised a ban on Muslim immigrants, and to build a wall on the United States–Mexico border to stop illegal immigration.¹⁵ President Trump used social media to speak out about terrorist attacks, using them to justify a ban on Muslims presumably in order to prevent further Islamist-related terror attacks in the United States.¹⁶ He stated that his wall would stop the illegal drug flow into the United States and help bring back jobs impacted by illegal immigration.¹⁷ The media has had no problems capturing the president's comments while providing the views of those who challenge his statements. While the United States has a free press,¹⁸ President Trump has routinely called his opposition "Fake News."

In Turkey, nationalism is closely linked to political Islam.¹⁹ While Turkey is a democracy with an elected president and religious freedom, some sources argue non-Muslims are not found in government positions, including army officers, policemen, or judges.²⁰ On 15 July 2016, Turkey experienced a failed military coup d'état.²¹ This coup

¹⁵ Amanda Holpuch, "Trump Re-ups Controversial Muslim Ban and Mexico Wall in First Campaign Ad," *The Guardian*, January 4, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/04/donald-trump-great-again-first-campaign-ad-isis-mexico-wall-muslim-ban>.

¹⁶ "All Tweets from @realDonaldTrump that Include the Word 'Muslim' or 'Muslims' Since Donald Trump Declared his Candidacy for President on June 16, 2015," National Immigration Law Center, accessed August 27, 2017, <https://www.nilc.org/issues/litigation/trump-tweets-with-muslim-muslims/>.

¹⁷ Philip Bump, "Here's What Donald Trump Said in his Big Immigration Speech, Annotated," *The Washington Post*, August 31, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/08/31/heres-what-donald-trump-said-in-his-big-immigration-speech-annotated/?utm_term=.71ca66d65248; U.S. News Staff, "Read: Donald Trump's Acceptance Speech," *U.S. News*, July 21, 2016, <https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-07-21/read-donald-trumps-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-the-republican-convention>.

¹⁸ "Freedom of the Press 2016."

¹⁹ Toni Alaranta, "Turkish Islamism and Nationalism Before and After the Failed Coup Attempt," *The Turkey Analyst*, December 1, 2016, <https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/569-turkish-islamism-and-nationalism-before-and-after-the-failed-coup-attempt.html>.

²⁰ Orhan Kemal Cengiz, "Could Turkey's Christians Wear Police Uniforms?" *Al-Monitor*, October 16, 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/turkey-urges-christians-join-police.html>; Omer Taspinay, Review of *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* by Soner Cagaptay, *The Middle East Journal* 60 no. 4 (October 2006): 815.

²¹ "Turkey's Failed Coup Attempt: All You Need to Know," *Al Jazeera*, July 15, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/turkey-failed-coup-attempt-161217032345594.html>.

attempt is an example of a community within Turkey which challenged the current government for political representation. In response, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan capitalized on the coup with the 2017 Turkish Constitutional Referendum where he won 51% of the votes,²² granting him extensive executive powers. President Erdogan used the coup attempt to fire over 100,000 people and arrest 50,000 people believed to be his political opposition.²³ Additionally, he has arrested journalists and raided media outlets for reporting on protests over irregularities in the referendum.²⁴ News media outlets outside of Turkey captured these events with condemnation while any attempt to do so within Turkey would surely result in arrest.²⁵

In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has repeatedly challenged the E.U. concerning refugees and immigration. He has called the mass of asylum seekers in Europe “a poison,” saying that Hungary did not need a single immigrant, and that “every single migrant poses a public security and terror risk.”²⁶ In a speech in Malta, Orban warned that “migration turned out to be the Trojan horse of terrorism” and that Europe’s “Christian identity” was under threat.²⁷ Orban has said the government must be “in the hands of nationalist forces.”²⁸ Hungary has released an official leaflet falsely claiming that London had “no-go” areas due to illegal immigrants, while also claiming that terrorists deliberately

²² Patrick Kingsley, “Erdogan Claims Vast Powers in Turkey After Narrow Victory in Referendum,” *The New York Times*, April 16, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/world/europe/turkey-referendum-polls-erdogan.html?mcubz=0>.

²³ “Turkey’s Failed Coup Attempt: All You Need to Know.”

²⁴ “Journalists Detained in Wake of Turkey Referendum,” Committee to Protect Journalists, April 21, 2017, <https://cpj.org/2017/04/journalists-detained-in-wake-of-turkey-referendum.php>.

²⁵ Turkey’s press freedom score was a 71 in 2016 and worsened to 76 in 2017; both of these scores indicate that Turkey does not have a free press; “Freedom of the Press 2016.”

²⁶ “Hungarian Prime Minister Says Migrants are ‘Poison’ and ‘Not Needed,’” *The guardian*, July 26, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/hungarian-prime-minister-viktor-orban-praises-donald-trump>.

²⁷ Jim Brunsten, “Orban: E.U.’s ‘Christian Identity’ Under Threat From Muslim Migrants,” *Financial Times*, March 30, 2017, <https://www.ft.com/content/7ecde2c2-af12-329a-9133-29a7bee08e31>.

²⁸ Marton Dunai, “Hungary’s Orban Makes Rallying Call to European Nationalists,” CNBC, March 15, 2017, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/15/reuters-america-hungarys-orban-makes-rallying-call-to-european-nationalists.html>.

blend in with immigrants in Paris, Brussels, and Berlin.²⁹ Orbán's government has erected walls covered in razor wire along its borders to stop the flow of refugees.³⁰ Orbán's nationalist political party has passed legislation to more strictly control the media, and made changes to the constitution restricting political advertising and reducing the checks and balances of the judiciary branch.³¹ On October 2, 2016 Hungary held a referendum to determine whether it should accept the E.U.'s proposed refugee resettlement plan. While a majority, 98%, of those who voted opposed the resettlement, turnout totaled under 44%, making the referendum invalid.³² NPR's Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson commented on Morning Edition that voters were telling her that Hungary "is a Christian country" and "they wanted it undiluted by immigrants, and they want to preserve the Hungarian culture."³³ Those who opposed the referendum within Hungary were able to use some forms of media to challenge Orbán's stance on immigration. One party crowdsourced a \$150,000 billboard and poster campaign to mock and counter the referendum.³⁴

Finally, in 2017, both France and Germany had presidential elections and both nations experienced rising nationalist parties. Marine Le Pen's National Front party in France gained political ground on its anti-European and anti-immigration stance by focusing on the terrorist threat, the refugee crisis, and immigration.³⁵ Similarly, Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) party saw a spike in popularity during the refugee crisis,

²⁹ "Deport Migrants to Secure Camps, Says Hungary's Prime Minister," *Sky News*, September 22, 2016, <http://news.sky.com/story/deport-migrants-to-secure-camps-says-hungarys-prime-minister-10588475>.

³⁰ "Hungarian Prime Minister Says Migrants are 'Poison' and 'Not Needed.'"; "Deport Migrants to Secure Camps, Says Hungary's Prime Minister."

³¹ Dalibor Rohac, "Hungary's Goulash Authoritarianism," *Wall Street Journal*, February 28, 2014, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/hungarys-goulash-authoritarianism-1393534188>; "What to do When Viktor Orbán Erodes Democracy," *Economist*, June 22, 2017, <https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21723835-europe-has-tools-make-autocrat-back-down-what-do-when-viktor-orban-erodes-democracy>.

³² Camila Domonoske, "Hungary's Referendum on Refugee Resettlement is Overwhelming but Invalid," *NPR*, October 3, 2016, <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/03/496376263/hungarian-referendum-on-refugees-is-overwhelming-but-invalid>.

³³ Domonoske, "Hungary's Referendum."

³⁴ Domonoske, "Hungary's Referendum."

³⁵ Angélique Chrisafis, "Marine Le Pen Defeated but France's Far Right is Far from Finished," *The Guardian*, May 7, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/marine-le-pen-defeated-front-national-far-from-finished>.

hitting a high of support in September 2016, only to drop as immigration concerns slowed.³⁶ The AfD continued to campaign on immigration, calling the wave of newcomers a burden on the education system, the cause of increased crime, and an “Islamization of society.”³⁷ While neither of these parties won their respective elections, nationalist popularity during the refugee crisis appears to have spiked based on the xenophobic fears they campaigned on. Both nations have a free press³⁸ which allowed the media to effectively capture the opinions of both parties and their opposition.

The political implication from the rising nationalism, as demonstrated, can affect security as countries nationalist parties attempt to restrict press freedom and create out-groups. The examples all show the use of an in-group and an out-group while promoting a form of nationalism. The countries with a free press all experienced rising nationalist parties or agendas that were competing for political authority, while the countries with a censored or part free press experienced higher levels of nationalism because of a perceived threat to the state resulting in attempts to consolidate more power. This research is important to the U.S. if it continues to promote democracy or plans to nation-build after it defeats an enemy state. Nationalism can help unify a nation fractured by religious or ethnic differences such as the current divide between Shia, Sunni, and the Kurds in Iraq. It may also be in the U.S. interest to divide a nation and inhibit nationalism that supports a current regime, in countries such as North Korea by pursuing strategies to facilitate an anti-nationalist media narrative to combat a censored mass media. Regardless of our aims, the examples presented here demonstrate how important it is that we understand the mechanisms underlying the production of nationalism.

³⁶ Jill Petzinger, “Populist Anger in Germany isn’t about Smashing the Elite-it’s Purely about Immigrants,” *Quartz*, August 11, 2017, <https://qz.com/1050086/populist-anger-in-germany-isnt-about-smashing-the-elite-its-purely-about-immigrants/>.

³⁷ Kirsten Grieshaber, “German Nationalists Try Reviving Migration as Election Topic,” ABC News, August 21, 2017, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/german-nationalists-reviving-migration-election-topic-49331918>.

³⁸ “Freedom of the Press 2016.”

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature concerning nationalism is very broad. For this research, I have already used Gellner's terms to help define nationalism, so it would be prudent to provide his theory and discuss his views of the interaction between nationalism and the media, in addition to examining the work of Benedict Anderson and Carlton Hayes, to establish a baseline understanding about nationalism for this research. I will then expand my focus down to consider research on press freedom, mass media, propaganda, and their effects on nationalism.

A. NATIONALISM THEORY

Ernest Gellner's book, *Nations and Nationalism*, argues that there are three fundamental stages of mankind's history. First is a pre-agrarian stage, where hunter/gatherers lived in small groups that prevented the "political division of labor" found in states.³⁹ This is followed by an agrarian stage where a literate (specially trained) ruling class (high culture) attempted to keep themselves separate from the masses (keeping the peasants (low culture) from joining the high culture.⁴⁰ Finally, we see an industrial stage, where the drive for improvement required specialization. This specialization required standardized basic education and specialized training, which allowed mobility between positions within society.⁴¹

Gellner argues that nationalism is the product of industrialism's cultural homogeneity, and educational and communication standards. Nationalism does not cause homogeneity, "it is rather homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism."⁴² He challenges accusations that nationalism causes homogeneity and claims that it is the

³⁹ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 5.

⁴⁰ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 16.

⁴¹ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 19–37.

⁴² Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 38.

need for homogeneity which can be seen in nationalism.⁴³ He provides a theory of nationality that includes both will and culture. Nationalism selectively uses the pre-existing, historical cultures and often transforms them into something completely different to meet the needs of current conditions.⁴⁴

When discussing nationalism and ideology, Gellner argues that the media, whether it be radio or print, does not transmit a nationalistic message to a population untouched by nationalism. He believes that it is the media themselves based on the language and style of transmission, and not the message at all, which generates nationalism. Those “who can understand them, or can acquire such comprehension is included in a moral and economic community.”⁴⁵ He states that “what is actually said matters little.”⁴⁶ This is a stark contrast to my thesis, that what is said in the media is correlated to levels of nationalism.

Benedict Anderson’s book, *Imagined Communities*, argues that nationalism only came to be when three cultural conceptions could no longer control people’s minds. Anderson believed the decline in these three concepts together with a rise in the ability to communicate helped split cosmology from history. In doing so, societies needed something that linked them together and he proposes that print media was the source people found which identified those new fraternities.⁴⁷ With rising capitalism, state languages were often replaced by more popular languages in print media creating new communities. Many states taught the state language in schools to unify a nation often destroying less common languages over time. Once these linguistic-based nationalisms took hold, official nationalisms were able to develop from powerful groups attempting to maintain control being threatened by imagined communities.⁴⁸

⁴³ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 44.

⁴⁴ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 54–55.

⁴⁵ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 121–122.

⁴⁶ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 122.

⁴⁷ Benedict Anderson. *Imagined communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso Books, 2006), 36.

⁴⁸ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 109–110.

Hayes provides a more complicated definition of nationalism and differentiates between political nationalism and cultural nationalism. Political nationalism being when a cultural nationalism desires to create a nation state while cultural nationalism is based on common language and traditions.⁴⁹ Throughout the text, Hayes routinely mentions how economic changes (industrialization) influenced nationalism and the importance of the media as a means of spreading nationalism through propaganda. Where Hayes differs from Anderson is that Hayes argues that as the industrial age has caused people to migrate, they have lost their religious ancestry and possess a natural human urge to replace it, often with nationalism.⁵⁰ Hayes proposes that nationalism is present in primitive tribes on a much smaller scale where Anderson believes that nationalism is more political and hence did not start till the end of the agrarian age.

Of importance to this research is the continued reference to the power of the media and propaganda. When discussing the French revolution, Hayes mentions the importance, above all other factors, of the flood of cheap newspapers and pamphlets which catered to public opinion.⁵¹ When discussing Napoleonic imperialism, Hayes describes how the Habsburg emperor created a propaganda bureau and how there was a patriotic reaction to foreign writers against Napoleon.⁵² Hayes argues that the journalism was an outcome of mass schooling ultimately resulting in cheap popular journalism based on sensational rather than factual articles and that any group with a financial backer could and did publish their propaganda.⁵³ As Anderson has advanced Hayes's theories concerning political nationalism and the impacts of the industrial age, this research attempts to advance Hayes's claims that nationalist propaganda (nationalist media narrative) contributes to nationalism.

⁴⁹ Carlton J.H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2016), 1–4.

⁵⁰ Hayes, *Nationalism*, 14.

⁵¹ Hayes, *Nationalism*, 49.

⁵² Hayes, *Nationalism*, 56–57.

⁵³ Hayes, *Nationalism*, 79–80.

B. MEDIA CENSORSHIP AND NATIONALISM

Having mentioned some of the prominent works in the field of nationalism, I will now turn my attention to research more closely related to the relationship between censorship, the media and nationalism. Many studies about the mass media and nationalism focus on its influence or control within the public sphere,⁵⁴ while others focus on censorship or press freedom.⁵⁵ Additionally, there is also research concerning propaganda and its influence on nationalism.⁵⁶ The following pages will provide an overview of these works.

1. Mass Media's Ability to Influence

Recent research has demonstrated the ability of the mass media to influence an audience. Andrew Calabrese and Barbara Ruth Burke argue that in the United States, the media claims a role in representing the American identity. They provide insight to where the media gets its narratives and claim that the media presenting an American identity is problematic due to who is represented by the media, and who has access to media production.⁵⁷ Because of the influence the media has on nationalism, their concern is focused on who has access to broadcast through the media and the message they present for American nationalism.

⁵⁴ T. Camber Warren, "Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty," *International Organization* 68, (January 2014): 111–141, 10.1017/S0020818313000350; Andrew Calabrese and Barbara Ruth Burke, "American Identities: Nationalism, the Media, and the Public Sphere," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 16, no. 2 (June 1992): 52–73, <https://doi.org/10.1177/019685999201600205>; Chrystopher Kim, "Nationalism: the Media, State, and Public in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute," (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 1-122, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45206>; T. Camber Warren, "Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of Collective Violence in African States," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 3 (February 2015): 297–311, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343314558102>.

⁵⁵ Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," *International Security* 21, no. 2 (1996): 5-40, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v021/21.2.snyder.html; Foerstel, Herbert N., *Banned in the Media: A Reference Guide to Censorship in the Press, Motion Pictures, Broadcasting, and the Internet*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998) 1-252.

⁵⁶ Guntram Henrik Herb. *Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918–1945*. (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997): 1-250; Malesic, "Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism," 245-257.

⁵⁷ Calabrese and Burke, "American Identities," 52–73.

While some have claimed that social media was the driving factor in the Arab Spring,⁵⁸ Jon B. Alterman demonstrates that news media outlets had the biggest impact on the growing protests in the Arab Spring and that social media only played a supporting role.⁵⁹ While Alterman's research is focused on broadcast mass media which was not censored by Egypt, it demonstrates how citizens connected with the media's representation of Egyptians uniting for political change. Others have also identified the media's ability to influence nationalism in specific countries. Munawar Sabir analyzed the role media plays in Pakistani nationalism and concluded that because of the influence the media plays, the press must be educated to prevent exaggerations and conspiracy stories.⁶⁰ Stefano Della Vigna et al. identified Serbian broadcast radio that reached across borders into Croatia as influencing Croats to switch from voting for moderate nationalist parties to ultra nationalist parties. They also identified that areas exposed to these broadcasts experienced higher levels of anti-Serbian graffiti.⁶¹ Guo, Cheong, and Chen identify the mass media's ability to construct a unifying national identity in China as a double-edged sword that also creates out-groups.⁶² Wanning Sun's research in China focused on the differences of state sponsored media events and media stories presented by the press. Sun concludes that the popular press in China does not exclusively contradict the national narrative but registers the anxieties of ordinary citizens.⁶³

Any review of nationalism and mass media would be incomplete without mentioning the role of propaganda. Guntram Herb discusses how Nazi Germany used propaganda to promote nationalism. He focuses his attention on the drawing and

⁵⁸ Ekaterina Stepanova, "The Role of Information Communication Technologies in the "Arab Spring," *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo* 159, (George Washington University, 2011), http://www.ponarseurasia.com/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/pepm_159.pdf.

⁵⁹ Jon B. Alterman, "The Revolution will not be Tweeted," *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (October 2011): 103–116, 10.1080/0163660X.2011.610714.

⁶⁰ Munawar Sabir, "The Role of Media in Creating Values of Nationalism in Pakistan," *Journal of Political Studies* 18, no. 2, (December 2011): 17–36, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1059553844/>

⁶¹ Della Vigna et al., "Cross-border media and nationalism," 103-132.

⁶² Guo, Cheong, and Chen, "Nationalism as Public Imagination," 467-480.

⁶³ Wanning Sun, "Media Events or Media Stories? Time, Space and Chinese (Trans) Nationalism," *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 4, no. 1 (March 2001): 25–43, 10.1177/136787790100400102

publishing of maps as nationalist propaganda. He presents examples of how German nationalism was continuously manipulated based on culture, borders, ethnicity, and language, to suit the needs of the government.⁶⁴

More recent examples include the use of propaganda in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Marjan Malešič's provides a qualitative analysis of the use of propaganda in mass media to promote nationalism. Malešič participated in research that analyzed news articles and broadcasts from Croatia and Serbia concerning the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Malešič identified the former Yugoslavia as having a national identity bound to a common national history which changed when Yugoslavia's political system disintegrated.⁶⁵ He demonstrates how the media used propaganda to spread nationalistic narratives to create new national histories and symbols when the governments split.

A study by Yanagizawa-Drott used a dataset of prosecutions of those accused of participating in the genocide in Rwanda with radio coverage to analyze the role radio propaganda played in the genocide. He identified the Hutu use of radio propaganda as contributing to the genocide of the Tutsi.⁶⁶ A similar study by Adena et al., analyzed the role radio played in the rise of the Nazi party as well as the effects radio propaganda had on anti-Semitism in Germany.⁶⁷ They found that Nazi nationalist radio "propaganda increased the frequency of expressions of anti-Semitism by ordinary Germans."⁶⁸

Camber Warren, in "Not by the Sword Alone," proposes that "mass media technologies facilitate the maintenance of stability and sovereignty by altering the structural forces operating on the production and dissemination of normative appeals to national unity and state loyalty."⁶⁹ In another article, Warren and finds that the vertical

⁶⁴ Herb. *Under the Map of Germany*, 1-250.

⁶⁵ Malesic, "Massmedia, Propaganda and Nationalism," 249.

⁶⁶ Yanagizawa-Drott, "Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide," 1947-1994.

⁶⁷ Adena et al., "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany," 1900.

⁶⁸ Adena et al., "Radio and the Rise of the Nazis in Prewar Germany," 1933-1934.

⁶⁹ Warren, "Not by the Sword Alone," 12.

integration offered by radio has a pacifying effect over a population.⁷⁰ Both of Warren's articles demonstrate the ability of mass media to influence a population. This thesis looks to demonstrate that this influence to unify a nation or instill state loyalty can be applied not only to controlling violence but to levels of nationalism as well. Warren argues that "the public nature of mass communication technologies allow leaders to convert nationalist images, narratives, and symbols into elements of 'common knowledge,' which are known by all to have been seen by all, and which thereby achieve even greater normative impact."⁷¹ I propose that this argument can also be applied to the study of nationalist attitudes.

2. Press Freedom and Nationalism

Research concerning press freedom's impact on production of nationalism can be split into two categories. Those analyzing censorship of the mass media and those analyzing online censorship. Authors such as Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine provide a qualitative analysis of the relationship between nationalism and press freedom comparing it to an economic market. They argue that control of information in the media can be problematic in democratizing societies by identifying the media as advertising or soliciting political support through nationalist mythmaking. They demonstrate how monopolies on the supply of information can allow a government to disseminate a nationalistic narrative with few challengers. They argue that segmented democratic markets are conducive to nationalism. Finally, the authors conclude that new democracies experiencing a free press face increased nationalistic mythmaking by those using monopolies on the information to solicit support from a segmented society.⁷²

Others such as Chrystopher Kim provide quantitative analysis of the media's nationalist narrative and levels of nationalism in Japan and China. He sees the media as

⁷⁰ Warren, "Explosive connections?" 297–311.

⁷¹ Warren, "Not by the Sword Alone," 16.

⁷² Snyder and Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," 25.

a “transporter of nationalism” between the public and state⁷³ and argues that there is a difference in levels of nationalistic narrative based on levels of press freedom. His research found a correlation between Japan’s media coverage of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and levels of nationalism but no correlation with China’s media coverage of the dispute and nationalism. He attributes this difference to China’s state censorship.⁷⁴ However, Kim’s use of English translated newspapers could have affected his conclusions. I believe that, as Kim pointed out in his thesis, media outlets often have different priorities and China may tone down the nationalistic narrative for the English version of the news. Additionally, the thesis is focused on news articles concerning disputed islands but fails to account for other possible articles with narratives that could influence levels of nationalism.

Nationalist messages are also found in online websites, chatrooms, and blogs.⁷⁵ These online sources are often censored. Research on this topic often focuses on China’s ability to censor online media to promote nationalism. King, Pan, and Roberts describe China’s censorship apparatus as the largest in history. Their research compared pre and post censored social media posts and found that censorship was aimed at stopping collective action by silencing calls for social mobilization against the government.⁷⁶ Ying Jiang divides imposed Chinese Internet censorship into offensive and defensive categories. The offensive promotes a narrative the government wants while the defensive often removes or replaces a negative narrative. Jiang notes that political topics which had previously been self-censored are increasingly being allowed as long as they maintain a pro-China perspective as demonstrated in the online

⁷³ Kim, “Nationalism,” 9.

⁷⁴ Kim, “Nationalism,” 36.

⁷⁵ Piet Bakker, “New Nationalism: The Internet crusade,” (paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Convention, Chicago, IL, February 20-24, 2001), <http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/nation/bakker.pdf>; Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Nationalism and the Internet,” *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 1 (January 2007): 1–17, 10.1111/j.1469-8129.2007.00273.x

⁷⁶ Gary King, Jennifer Pan and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” *The American Political Science Review* 107, no. 2 (May 2013): 326–343, 10.1017/s0003055413000014.

discussions concerning Tibet in 2008.⁷⁷ Christopher Cairns and Allen Carlson propose that China also uses censorship as a tool to provide an outlet for citizens when political pressure is building up. In these instances, the government can reduce or stop censorship to allow citizens to express their outrage over controversial issues such as the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.⁷⁸ The authors also argue that government censors were reduced in this event because of nationalist sentiment present in Chinese government officials.

⁷⁷ Ying Jiang, *Cyber-Nationalism in China. Challenging Western Media Portrayals of Internet Censorship in China*. (Adelaide, Australia: University of Adelaide Press, 2015), 82.

⁷⁸ Christopher Cairns and Allen Carlson, “Real-World Islands in a Social Media Sea: Nationalism and Censorship on Weibo during the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Crisis,” *The China Quarterly* 225, (March 2016): 23–49, 10.1017/S0305741015001708.

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III. PERSUASIVE POWER OF THE NEWS MEDIA

The news is often charged with some form of bias that impacts public opinions and perceptions. This is done through selective reporting, or putting a positive or negative undertone on the news being reported. Propaganda is also used in the news either through the creation of events to report or through the selective reporting of certain facts to persuade a nation. The following chapter will examine the persuasive power of the news media and examples of how newspapers have used nationalist terminology to spread nationalist attitudes.

A. NEWS MEDIA BIASES

News media outlets are known to have biases.⁷⁹ These biases are often called frames, slanting, or spin and refer to the manner in which the news is reported. There are many suggested explanations for these biases to include, consumer preference, where the news media biases their reporting of the news toward what it perceives its consumers want,⁸⁰ or that news outlets maintain the bias from their sources either because they agree with the bias or because they want to keep the source producing news for them.⁸¹ In the latter case, the bias may be more about economics. If the news outlet loses the source, they may also lose the story to their competition.

Self-censorship in the news media can also lead to a bias. This is evident in the reporting of the news prior to the invasion of Iraq, where many journalists who challenged the U.S. government's claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction were

⁷⁹ David Niven, "Objective Evidence on Media Bias: Newspaper Coverage of Congressional Party Switchers," *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 80, no. 2 (June 2003): 311–326, 10.1177/107769900308000206; Yi Xiang and Kiklos Sarvary, "News Consumption and Media Bias," *Marketing Science* 26, no. 5 (September 2007): 611–628, 10.1287/mksc.1070.0279; Armando J Garcia-Pires, Hans Jarle Kind and Lars Sorgard, *News Sources and Media Bias*, 1411 (Bergen: Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration, 2012), https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/166844/A21_12.pdf?sequence=1; Morris, 2007.

⁸⁰ Xiang and Sarvary, "News Consumption and Media Bias," 611–628.

⁸¹ Garcia-Pires, Kind and Sorgard, *News Sources and Media Bias*.

fired. Journalists such as Peter Arnet,⁸² and Phil Donahue⁸³ were fired for their outspoken negative views and statements concerning the war at a time when “nearly two-thirds of all [news] sources were categorized as pro-war.”⁸⁴ This example demonstrates that countries with a free press are not immune to biased reporting of the news and the influence it has on the public.

News source biases present a problem in accurate reporting of the news. News outlets have found themselves having to apologize for inaccurate news due to source manipulation of photos and stories. This happened in the U.K. with the reporting of British soldiers abusing detainees and the publishing of a false story with fake photos in the Daily Mirror.⁸⁵ In the United States, the Los Angeles Times fired Brian Walski for digitally altering photos in a news report from Iraq.⁸⁶ While both of the news outlets corrected their reporting, it raises the question about how many falsely reported articles go unchallenged and influence their audience.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which essentially argues that words matter, is also important to this argument. Sapir, Whorf, and others believe that language and grammar influence how people see the world.⁸⁷ Those who speak different languages see the world in different ways. The hypothesis that words influence perceptions directly applies to the

⁸² Claire Cozens, “Arnett Fired by NBC After Iraqi TV Outburst,” *The Guardian*, March 31, 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2003/mar/31/broadcasting.Iraqandthemedial>.

⁸³ “Phil Donahue on His 2003 Firing from MSNBC, When Liberal Network Couldn’t Tolerate Antiwar Voices,” Democracy Now, accessed November 7, 2017, https://www.democracynow.org/2013/3/21/phil_donahue_on_his_2003_firing.

⁸⁴ Morgen s. Johansen and Mark R. Joslyn, “Political Persuasion During Times of Crisis: the Effects of Education and News Media on Citizens’ Factual Information About Iraq,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 85, no. 3 (September 2008): 594, 10.1177/107769900808500307

⁸⁵ “Editor Sacked Over ‘Hoax’ Photos,” *BBC News*, (May 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3716151.stm.

⁸⁶ “Editor’s Note,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 2, 2003, <http://articles.latimes.com/print/2003/apr/02/news/war-1walski2>.

⁸⁷ Lera Boroditsky, “Lost in Translation: New Cognitive Research Suggests that Language Profoundly Influences the Way People See the World; a Different Sense of Blame in Japanese and Spanish,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 24, 2010, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/659030126/>; Basel Al-Sheikh Hussein, “The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis Today,” *Theory and Practice in Language Studies* 2, no. 3 (March 2012): 642–646, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1348130535/>; Emily Cibelli et al., “The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis and Probabilistic Inference: Evidence From the Domain of Color.” *PloS One* 11, no. 7 (July 2016), <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0158725>.

news. As words are chosen and sentences put together to report the news they impact our perceptions of what is being reported.

This bias in the news media can be problematic for democratic politics. Yi and Miklos reported that “journalists agree that ‘the central purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with accurate and reliable information they need to function in a free society.’”⁸⁸ If media consumers use the news to educate themselves about what is happening in the world around them, and they are getting a biased version of the news, then they may learn or confirm that bias as well.

B. PERSUASIVE NEWS AND PROPAGANDA

The news media do not just report the facts of what has happened. They also “analyze, select, make comments, give their opinion and reflect their own attitudes,”⁸⁹ influencing public opinion. This is easily seen in news outlet’s use of subject matter experts who provide their insight and opinions about what is being reported. For those who subscribe to a particular bias in the news, what is said in the commentary accompanying the news can be perceived as the dominant view of a particular political party or community and part of what it means to be part of that party or community. Albert Gunther’s research found that the news media’s bias or slant, impacts the readers perception of public opinion.⁹⁰

Recent studies demonstrate the power of the media to sway people’s opinions. Jonathan McDonald Ladd and Gabriel S. Lenz found that a shift in four newspapers endorsement of political candidates in the UK led to a 10 to 25% shift in votes for the labor party.⁹¹ They recount how the newspaper’s shift in support was directed by Rupert

⁸⁸ Xiang and Sarvary, “News Consumption and Media Bias,” 613.

⁸⁹ Vlera Ejupi, Liljana Siljanovska and Arburim Iseni, “The Mass Media and Persuasion,” *European Scientific Journal* 10, no. 14 (May 2014): 636–646, <http://www.eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/3483/3276>.

⁹⁰ Albert C. Gunther, “The Persuasive Press Inference: Effects of Mass Media on Perceived Public Opinion,” *Communication Research* 25, no. 5 (October 1998): 486–504, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/197133042/>.

⁹¹ Jonathan McDonald Ladd, Gabriel S. Lenz, “Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift to Document the Persuasive Power of the News Media,” *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 394–410, 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00377.x.

Murdoch, the owner, to gain policy concessions and a friendly regulatory environment from the newly supported candidate.⁹² This fact is particularly intriguing since one person directed this change in media bias which resulted in influencing media consumers. This implies that many citizens in countries with a free press are influenced by the elite who own news organizations, while in countries with less press freedom, the state may have more of a monopoly on persuasion in the news. In either case, their message is designed to persuade someone to do or support something. This type of communication can also be called propaganda. Joint Publication 3-2, defines propaganda as “any form of adversary communication, especially of a biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.”⁹³

Edward Bernays is famous for his understanding and use of propaganda to sway public opinion. In his article “Manipulating Public Opinion: The Why and the How,” he argues that analysis must be done to determine the correct approach to presenting propaganda. He presents an example concerning discrimination in the southern United States and states that the location for a convention to discuss this topic along with the support of influential leaders was crucial to the spread of support of the topic. The location had to be in the South because it would add more credibility for those from the South. Bernays also added that inviting influential groups from around the country also helped influence public opinion. In the end, he says that because of the importance of all of the components of the convention as they were designed and reported, the topic gained interest and support as the public read about it in the papers.⁹⁴ As Bernays points out in discussing a campaign for aid to Lithuania,

that was waged to make 110,000,000 people in America realize that a small country on the Baltic was not simply a spot on the map. Lithuania was reflected to this country in its drama, music, literature, habits, economics and agriculture. The printed word and events created to

⁹² Ladd and Lenz, “Exploiting a Rare Communication Shift,” 396.

⁹³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Psychological Operations*, JP 3-13.2 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-2.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Edward Bernays, “Manipulating Public Opinion: the Why and the How,” *American Journal of Sociology* 33, no. 6 (May 1928): 958-971, 10.1086/214599.

symbolize facts and ideas made America aware of the conditions in Lithuania and of its just aspirations. Ignorance was dissipated and sympathies strengthened to a point where these feelings became translated into action. Lithuania received economic aid and political recognition.⁹⁵

The news media often uses similar tactics to those mentioned above in its reporting of the news. The news media has been used repeatedly to spread nationalist propaganda in the past. The United States and Germany both used nationalist propaganda during World War II. The United States often used it to characterize the Japanese people as enemies, and the Germans to characterize the Jewish people as enemies. Next, I will examine more closely how nations were influenced by the newspapers in each country.

1. U.S. Nationalist Propaganda in WWII

On 15 Jan 1942, the U.S. government established a “Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press” which governed the “proper handling of news.”⁹⁶ The code was well described by John Steinbeck as follows:

The rules for correspondents [were both] imposed and self-imposed.

There were no cowards in the American Army, and of all the brave men the private in the infantry was the bravest and noblest. The reason for this in terms of the War Effort was obvious. The infantry private had the dirtiest, weariest, least rewarding job in the whole war. In addition to being dangerous, a great many of the things he had to do were stupid. He must therefore be reassured that these things he knew to be stupid were actually necessary and wise, and that he was a hero for doing them... A second convention held that we had no cruel or ambitious or ignorant commanders.

We were all a part of the War Effort. We went along with it, and not only that, we abetted it. Gradually it became a part of all of us that the truth about anything was automatically secret and that to trifle with it was to interfere with the War Effort. By this I don't mean that the correspondents were liars... [but] it is in the things not mentioned that the untruth lies.

We felt responsible to what was called the home front. There was a general feeling that unless the home front was carefully protected from the

⁹⁵ Bernays, “Manipulating Public Opinion,” 967.

⁹⁶ “The War: Communication,” WETA, September, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/thewar/at_home_communication_news_censorship.htm.

whole account of what war was like, it might panic. Also, we felt we had to protect the armed services from criticism, or they might retire to their tents to sulk like Achilles.⁹⁷

The news was not only reported as Steinbeck described above, to boost morale at home and contribute to the war efforts. The Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Ernie Pyle provided detailed accounts of his time on the front lines. Many of his columns contained derogatory wording and likened the adversary to an animal. In the sample of his work below, he used the derogatory term “Jap” to refer to the Japanese while likening them to wild animals swinging from coconut trees. This corresponds with posters made at the time depicting the Japanese as monkeys.⁹⁸

Fighting the Japs is like fighting a wild animal. The troops said the Jap is not afraid to die, it is an honor to die for the Emperor, he is their God. A lot of the fighting is done at night and you can smell the Japs 25 yards away... The Japs watch from coconut trees in the daytime and then when it becomes dark they sneak into your foxhole and cut your throat or throw in a hand grenade...The Japs take all kinds of chances, they love to die. Our troops are advancing very slowly. It is a savage campaign...You also hear all sorts of noises made by animals and you think it is the Japs.⁹⁹

Columns like this helped shape the American public’s perception of the enemy. They transformed the Japanese soldier into an animal to be killed. The news from the front told stories of the heroism of the U.S. soldiers. All of this was designed to help bolster American nationalism and support at home for the war efforts. These efforts eventually culminated in creation of the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) on 13 June 1942 to collect, censor and disseminate news concerning the war efforts,¹⁰⁰ which was responsible for propaganda in the United States and abroad.

⁹⁷WETA, “The War: Communication.”

⁹⁸ Anthony V. Navarro, “A Critical Comparison Between Japanese and American Propaganda during World War II,” Michigan State University, accessed November 7, 2017, <https://www.msu.edu/~navarro6/srop.html>.

⁹⁹ Ernie Pyle, July 15, 1943 quoted in “Samples from the columns of war correspondent Ernie Pyle,” The War, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/thewar/detail_5238.htm.

¹⁰⁰ “June 13, 1942: The Office of War Information is Created,” The National WWII Museum, June 13, 2012, <http://www.nww2m.com/2012/06/june-13-1942-the-office-of-war-information-is-created/>.

2. German Propaganda in WWII

The United States was not the only country in World War II to use propaganda to boost nationalism. Germany's Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels studied the works of Edward Bernays and used his teachings to create a "Führer cult' around Adolf Hitler."¹⁰¹ Germany's propaganda was similar to the United States in that it was designed to build support for the dominant party and to dehumanize the enemy, likening the Jewish people to animals to be killed. Germany also censored its press in similar ways to the United States, although Germany went much further in 1933 by documenting the race of editors and journalists in order to exclude Jewish people from the profession.¹⁰²

The German press printed articles in the newspapers similar to the U.S. articles concerning the Japanese. The excerpts below are from one of Goebbels' essays published in the *Der Angriff* on 30 July 1928. In the first excerpt, Goebbels demeans the Jewish people and blames them for the German defeat in World War I. The second excerpt is one of many examples of Goebbels demeaning the Jewish people and comparing them to demons or animals. The final excerpt shows the call for nationalism while establishing the Jewish people as the enemy.

The Jew has corrupted our race, soiled our morals, undermined our values, and broken our strength. He is the reason we today are the pariah of the whole world.¹⁰³

The Jew is the plastic demon of decay. Where he senses filth and decay, he appears from his hiding place and begins his criminal slaughter of the peoples. He puts on a mask of friendship before those he wants to betray, without the innocent victim noticing that his neck is already broken.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Richard Gunderman, "The Manipulation of the American Mind: Edward Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations," *The Conversation*, July 9, 2015, <http://theconversation.com/the-manipulation-of-the-american-mind-edward-bernays-and-the-birth-of-public-relations-44393>.

¹⁰² "Holocaust Encyclopedia: Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment," United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed November 7, 2017, <https://www.ushmm.org/collections/ask-a-research-question/how-to-cite-museum-materials#website>.

¹⁰³ Joseph Goebbels, "Why do we Oppose the Jews?" *Der Angriff*, July 30, 1928, trans. German Propaganda Archive, 2016, <http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/angrif17.htm>.

¹⁰⁴ Goebbels, "Why do we Oppose the Jews?"

What does anti-Semitism have to do with nationalism? I ask the opposite: What does the Jew have to do with nationalism? Nationalism is the doctrine of blood, of race. The Jew is the enemy and destroyer of unified blood, the conscious destroyer of our race. We are nationalists who oppose the Jew because we see in the Hebrew the eternal enemy of our national honor and our ethnic freedom.¹⁰⁵

Goebbels produced many essays that were printed in newspapers and read in radio broadcasts. Randall Bytwerk's German Propaganda Archive¹⁰⁶ provides plenty of these translated news articles and essays, as well as many from other Nazi leaders used to influence German nationalism.

These examples demonstrate the power of the news media to influence its consumers. The news media often possesses a bias in their narrative, whether intentional or accidental, that influence how people perceive the news being reported to them. News outlets also selectively censor themselves thereby creating added biases. Finally, as demonstrated by the United States and Germany in World War II, countries use nationalist terminology in the news to spread nationalist attitudes often by using propaganda to heighten animosities towards the enemies.

In the sections that follow, I argue that the mass media generate systematic influences on nationalist attitudes. Specifically, that when news is presented in nationalist terms, it tends to reinforce and increase existing nationalist attitudes. At the same time, state censorship can limit political opposition and the production of rival nationalist attitudes. Mass media in countries with state censorship will therefore still produce nationalist terminology but it will be at a lower rate because, due to censorship, it does not have to compete with rival nationalist attitudes that may be fighting for political representation. I argue that countries with a low press freedom will therefore have lower levels of nationalist text in their news media.

The next chapter will provide evidence demonstrating the relationship between press freedom and levels of nationalist terminology used in online news media, as well as

¹⁰⁵ Goebbels, "Why do we Oppose the Jews?"

¹⁰⁶ Randall Bytwerk, "Nazi and East German Propaganda Guide Page," German Propaganda Archive, 2016, <http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/index.htm>.

the relationship between levels of nationalist terminology in the media and levels of nationalist attitudes amongst a country's population. Based on the argument presented so far, I present the following hypotheses:

1. Countries with a free press will experience higher levels of nationalist terminology in online news media, while nations with a censored press will experience lower levels.
2. Higher levels of nationalist terminology in the online news media within a country will produce higher levels of nationalist attitudes within that country.

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IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The quantitative research in this thesis utilizes data from varying sources to conduct regression analysis. The sources vary from online databases of economic development indicators to records of world news media content. Software developed through the “R” language for statistical computing is then used to organize the data into variables that can be input into regression models. The following chapter details the software used to analyze the data, the dependent and independent variables, and the logistic and beta regression models.

Since this thesis uses separate models and variables to analyze Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, this section will explain the variables and regression types categorized by hypothesis. Starting with the hypothesis that a nation’s press freedom level is associated with the production of nationalist terminology, I will describe the variables and regression models used to analyze this relationship. Then, I will explain the variables and models used to examine the hypothesis that nationalist terminology in online news are associated with higher levels of nationalist attitudes within a country.

A. HYPOTHESIS ONE

The following variables are used in a beta regression to answer Hypothesis 1. The dependent variable is the level of nationalist terminology in the online news media. The tested independent variable is press freedom and the independent control variables are regime type, population density and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

1. Dependent Variables

Levels of word use in a database of global online news media are used to establish the dependent variable of *Nationalist Terminology*. To do this, I chose some sentiment words and some nationalistic words (Table 1) as evaluation criteria against a database of worldwide online news articles. Frequent variations of the same word such as foreigner and foreigners are grouped together and included in the aggregate number of occurrences. The news article database consists of over 830 million articles that span the period 2013–

2015. The articles are untranslated and categorized by country, language, date, and other factors. To create the data set needed for this thesis, a separate Python script is used to translate the nationalist and sentiment words into 80 different languages using Google Translate.¹⁰⁷ A scan is then performed on the news media database to find every occurrence of the words based on all of the translated versions. The Python script then tabulates each occurrence of the identified concepts by country-day and records the following data: the total number of online articles per country-day, the total number of media sources per country-day, and the total number of languages per country-day. This produced a comma separated value (.csv) file for use in the R software package. An R script was developed to establish the proportion of the total news articles per country-year by dividing the observations for each conceptual category by the total number of articles. The proportion of articles referencing each of these 12 concepts within each country-year are then used as the dependent variables to capture the level of nationalist terminology present in the online news media.

Table 1. Nationalist and Sentiment Words

Words and variants						
Good						
Bad						
Love	Loves					
Hate	Hates					
Like	Likes					
Fear	Fears					
Foreign	Foreigner	Foreigners				
Invader	Invade	Invades	Invaders	Invaded	Invading	Invasion
Enemy	Enemies					
Nation	National					
Country						
Republic						

¹⁰⁷ “Google Translate,” Google, accessed October 27, 2017, <https://translate.google.com/>.

2. Independent Variables

The independent variable measuring press freedom was established using Freedom House's data set.¹⁰⁸ This variable analyzes censorship's influence on media narratives. Freedom house reports press freedom by coding each country as free, partly free, or not free. This is converted into two dichotomous variables, resulting in a dichotomous variable for a *Free Press* and a dichotomous variable for a *Not Free Press*. Those nations with a reported free press are recorded as a 1 and all others as a 0 in the *Free Press* variable; while those nations with a not free press are scored as 1 and all others as 0 for the *Not Free Press* variable.

The first control variable for Hypothesis 1 is logged Gross Domestic Product (*GDP*)¹⁰⁹ as reported by the World Bank. The World Bank tracks and reports the GDP based on the "sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products."¹¹⁰ The control variable of logged *Population Density* also comes from the World Bank. The World Bank tracks and reports population density based on the "midyear population divided by land area in square kilometers."¹¹¹ Due to the heavy tailed nature of these variables, they have a logarithm applied to them which reduces the heavy tails and improves the distribution for modeling.

The Polity IV Project¹¹² data set is used to establish regime type as an independent control variable. The Polity IV Project data provides a polity score ranging from -10 to +10 that determines autocratic and democratic states. Those countries scoring -6 to -10 are categorized as autocratic and those scoring +6 through +10 are categorized

¹⁰⁸"Freedom of the Press 2016."

¹⁰⁹ "GDP per Capita (Current US\$)," The World Bank, accessed June 17, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?view=chart>.

¹¹⁰ "GDP per Capita (Current US\$)."

¹¹¹ "Population density (People per sq. km of Land Area)," The World Bank, accessed June 17, 2017, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST>.

¹¹² "INSCR Data Page," Center for Systemic Peace, 2017, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

as democratic.¹¹³ This measure is converted into two dichotomous variables. The first variable is *Autocracy* and scores all autocratic countries as a 1. The second variable is *Democracy* and scores all democracies as a 1. In both dichotomous variables those countries not scored a 1 score a 0.

3. Beta Regression Model

Because the dependent variable of *Nationalist Terminology* is a proportional value as previously described, a beta regression provides the best option for statistical analysis. Beta regression is best suited for dependent variables with a value that ranges between 0 and 1 without any value equaling 0 or 1.¹¹⁴ The variables are organized into three model forms which analyze the relationship between press freedom and nationalist terminology used in the media. Each concept from the *Nationalist Terminology* list is treated as a separate dependent variable and modeled with the independent variables as follows. Model Form 1 includes the independent variables: *GDP*, *Population Density*, *Autocracy*, and *Democracy*. Model Form 2 adds the variables *Free Press* and *Not Free Press*. Finally, because of a possible interaction between an autocracy and a not free press, I included a variable to account for this in Model Form 3. All three model forms included a variable of the logged total number of news articles. The results from these models are reported in Table 2. The next chapter will provide analysis of the results from the three regression models produced for each conceptual category.

B. HYPOTHESIS TWO

To examine the hypothesis that nationalist terminology is associated with higher levels of nationalist attitudes within a country, the following variables are used. First, the dependent variable measuring nationalist attitudes is established. Next the independent variables are established. To simplify modeling, the independent variables are grouped

¹¹³ “The Polity Project,” Center for Systemic Peace, 2016, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.

¹¹⁴ Francisco Cribari-Neto and Achim Zeileis, “Beta Regression in R,” *Journal of Statistical Software* 34, no. 2 (October 2010): 3, 10.18637/jss.v034.i02.

into the categories: individual control variables, country level control variables, and tested media narrative variables.

1. Dependent Variable

To establish the dependent variable of *Nationalist Attitude*, I used responses to the World Values Survey (WVS) Wave 6. This free online data set contains anonymized survey responses from over 90,000 respondents in 57 countries from 2010 through 2014.¹¹⁵ A positive response to three questions in the survey—V39, V211, and V214—are used to establish respondents as more nationalistic than someone who did not respond positively to the same three questions. V39 asked respondents to list whom they would not like to have as their neighbors. A positive response for this question indicated the respondent identified “immigrants/foreign workers” in response and was coded as a 1.¹¹⁶ Responses were coded as 0 if the respondent did not identify immigrants. V211 asked respondents how “proud” they were to “be [French],” where French represented the nationality from where the survey was conducted.¹¹⁷ A proud response was coded as a 1, while a not proud or “I am not [French]” response was coded as a 0. V214 asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with the statement “I see myself as part of the [French] nation.”¹¹⁸ Again, French was substituted with the nationality of the country where the survey was conducted. An “Agree” or “Strongly agree” response was coded as a 1, while a “Disagree” or “Strongly disagree” response was coded as a 0. The responses to these questions were used to establish the dichotomous dependent variable of *Nationalist Attitude*. Those respondents who are coded with a 1 for all three questions are identified as individuals with a nationalist attitude; all other respondents are identified as not having a nationalist attitude and coded 0. All responses in the WVS with a response of -1 through -5 representing “missing, not asked, not applicable, no answer, or don’t

¹¹⁵ “Documentation for download,” accessed June 17, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>.


¹¹⁶ “WV6_Official_Questionnaire_v4_June2012,” World Values Survey, accessed June 17, 2017, <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp>.

¹¹⁷ “WV6_Official_Questionnaire_v4_June2012.”

¹¹⁸ “WV6_Official_Questionnaire_v4_June2012.”

know” were changed to N/A. A map of the proportion of *Nationalist Attitude* is provided in Figure 1. This map displays countries with a low proportion of *Nationalist Attitude* as blue and countries with a high proportion of *Nationalist Attitude* as red.

Figure 1. Map of the Proportion of WVS Respondents with *Nationalist Attitudes*¹¹⁹



This map displays the proportion of *Nationalist Attitude* based on country, between 2010 and 2014. Countries in blue have a lower proportion of nationalist response than countries in red and range from 0 to 0.557.


¹¹⁹ *Nationalist Attitude* data was collected using the methods detailed in Chapter IV. A R script was created to code and plot the data on the map.

2. Independent Variables

The first category of independent variables is the tested variable of *Nationalist Terminology*. These variables are very similar to the dependent variable in Hypothesis 1 with one exception. The 12 concepts are aggregated by country only, instead of country-year. This was done due to the limited timespan of the media content data and fact that the WVS data comes from a limited number of countries over particular years. Because the WVS and media data time frame do not completely overlap, organizing the data cross-sectionally (by country) ensures there is adequate data available to model. Fortunately, when examining the WVS nationalism data, I found that levels of nationalism did not vary significantly over short periods of time,¹²⁰ which gives additional credence to the cross-sectional approach. Future research should attempt to minimize this issue. A map of the proportion of news articles containing the concept of *nation* is provided in Figure 2. This map displays countries with a low use of the concept as blue and countries with a high use as red. The map provides a visualization of the level of nationalist discussion happening within a country's news media.

¹²⁰ I created an R script to compare reported nationalism based on the same criteria in this thesis. This script compared nationalism levels from WVS wave 5 and wave 6. This script showed mostly small changes in nationalism between surveys.

Figure 2. Proportion of Articles Using the Concept of *Nation* in Online News Media¹²¹



This map displays each countries proportion of online news articles using the concept of *nation*. Countries in blue have a lower proportion than countries in red and range from 4.42e-05 to 0.0779.

The category of individual control variables includes additional responses recorded in the WVS. This data represents the respondent's level of Internet access, age,

¹²¹ Data to represent the concept of *nation* was collected using the methods detailed in Chapter IV. A R script was created to code and plot the data on the map.

wealth and population density where they live. The independent variable, *Internet Access*, is developed using responses to the WVS question V223, concerning how frequently the respondent had access to the Internet. Responses indicate access “Daily, Weekly, Monthly, Less than monthly, and Never.” I create a dichotomous Internet variable based on access to the Internet at least monthly.

The independent variable measuring respondent age is based on responses to the WVS question V242. I create dichotomous variables for both *Young* and *Old*. Those who were between the age 16 and 30 are scored a 1 and all others scored a 0 for the *Young* variable. For the *Old* variable those over 60 are scored a 1 and all others scored a 0.

Reported wealth levels from the WVS were used to establish dichotomous variables for *Rich* and *Poor*. Respondents were asked to report their household income level from 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest levels of income and 10 being the highest levels of income. When viewing the histogram of reported wealth, three aggregate categories were apparent. The dichotomous variables for poor and rich are based on these categories. Those who reported income levels of 1 or 2 score a 1 and all others score a 0 for the variable *Poor*. Those who reported a 9 or 10 score a 1 and all others score a 0 for the variable *Rich*.

The last variable in this category is population density of the respondent. Population data based on the respondent’s city as reported in the WVS are used to establish whether the respondent lived in an *Urban* or rural area. Populations over 50,000 are classified as urban and scored a 1, and those under 50,000 classified as rural and scored a 0.

The final category of independent control variables is based on country level data. The variables include *GDP*, *Population Density*, *Free Press*, *Not Free Press*, *Autocracy*, and *Democracy*. Each of these variables are described in the section discussing Hypothesis 1, and are organized and measured in the same manner.

3. Logistic Regression Model

Hypothesis 2 is tested using logistic regression models to analyze the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. This is done because the dependent variable of *Nationalist Attitude* was organized into a dichotomous measure. A logistic regression is more appropriate to use with a binary dependent variable.

Prior to developing the final models for this Hypothesis, I first conducted a series of logistic regressions to evaluate the concepts used in the variable *Nationalist Terminology*. This helped determine if there were combinations of concepts that would be more effective than the use of all the concepts together. To do this I conducted logistic regressions with the dependent variable, *Nationalist Attitude*, and the following categories of concepts. I first modeled variations of the concepts *country*, *foreign* and *nation* along with all control variables. The next models included variations of only sentiment words, followed by models which combined sentiment and country words.

The final model included all concepts and control variables and resulted in the best model with the lowest 'Akaike Information Criterion' (AIC) scores. AIC compares models for best predictive fit while penalizing for added variables. Models with a lower AIC value are preferred because they generate greater levels of predictive success. Because of these results, when evaluating the effects of *Nationalist Terminology* on *Nationalist Attitudes* in the next set of models, all of the measured concepts were used in combined models.

The next set of logistic regression models are reported in Table 3. These models tested the effects of individual level, country level, and nationalist concept independent variables on the dependent variable of *Nationalist Attitude*. Model 4 tests all individual level control variables. I then added the country level control variables to Model 5. *Nationalist Terminology* variables are added in Model 6. Finally, because of a possible interaction between *Autocracy* and *Not Free Press*, Model 7 accounts for this possibility with an added interaction variable. The results from these models are discussed in the next chapter.

V. RESULTS

The methodology described in the previous chapter produced statistically significant regression results for both hypotheses. This chapter will examine the selection process of the best models for each hypothesis as well as the results derived from these models.

A. PRESS FREEDOM AND MEDIA NARRATIVES

In Hypothesis 1, I predict that countries with a free press will experience higher levels of nationalist terminology in online news media while nations with a censored press will experience lower levels. This prediction is tested using three forms of beta regression models to analyze the relationship between independent variables *GDP*, *Population Density*, *Autocracy*, *Democracy*, *Free Press* and *Not Free Press*, and the dependent variables of *Nationalist Terminology* in the media. All three model forms are used with each concept from the *Nationalist Terminology* list as a dependent variable and all produce results with a p-value of less than 0.01 for all independent variables. Finally, the three models' AIC scores are compared resulting in Model Form 2 having the lowest AIC score. These results were observed across all concepts tested, demonstrating that Model Form 2, which includes all variables except the variable for the interaction between *Autocracy* and *Not Free Press*, gives the best fit to the data.

The models reported in Table 2 demonstrate some interesting trends. First, the polity variables of *Autocracy* and *Democracy* had the largest effects across all concepts. *Autocracy* has a strong positive relationship and *Democracy* a strong negative relationship to the following *Nationalist Terminology* concepts: *bad*, *love*, *like*, *hate*, *good*, *country*, *enemy*, *foreign*, *invader* and *republic*. However, the concept *fear* presents opposite findings, with a strong negative relationship to *Autocracy* and a strong positive relationship to *Democracy*. Finally, the concept of *nation* displayed a strong negative relationship with both *Autocracy* and *Democracy* suggesting that “anocratic” countries that are not considered a democracy or autocracy have the highest levels of this concept. The results from the *country*, *fear*, and *nation* models can be found in Table 2.

These models also show a strong positive or negative relationship to press freedom based on what concept is used as the dependent variable. Of interest is the fact that the variable *Free Press* and the variable *Not Free Press* both display a strong positive relationship with the concepts of *nation* and *republic* and a strong negative relationship with the concepts *bad*, *like*, *good*, *fear*, *country*, *enemy* and *foreign*. This suggests that for the concepts *nation* and *republic*, both a censored and free press experience higher levels of these concepts than a partly free press does. In contrast, the negative relationship seen with the concepts *bad*, *like*, *good*, *fear*, *country*, *enemy* and *foreign* and both press freedom variables suggests that a partly free press produces higher levels of these words. The *Free Press* variable accounts for the largest regression coefficient for the concept of fear, and both press freedom variables are statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) across the full range of concepts.

While the strong relationships discussed so far may demonstrate a correlation between press freedom and use of nationalist terminology in the online news media within a given country, given that a partly free press experiences higher levels of the majority of the tested concepts, I must reject Hypothesis 1, which predicted that countries with a free press will experience higher levels of nationalist terminology in online news media while nations with a censored press will experience lower levels. The findings do however appear to support Snyder and Ballentine's argument that "when markets are imperfect, increased freedom of speech will tend to exacerbate nationalist mythmaking unless institutions and norms correct the flaws in the market."¹²² Here Snyder and Ballentine are referring to the mass media market place of ideas and they argue that as democracies grow, institutions are set up to professionalize the mass media which helps reduce biases and inaccuracies. The finding that a partly free press had the highest levels of nationalist terminology supports their argument that early democracies experience higher levels of nationalist mythmaking.

The control variables of *GDP* and *Population Density* also produce statistically significant results showing a strong relationship to the dependent variables. *GDP* displays a

¹²² Snyder and Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," 22.

strong positive relationship to the concepts *bad*, *foreign* and *republic*, and a strong negative relationship to the rest; while population density displays a strong negative relationship to the concepts *bad*, *fear*, *enemy*, and *nation*, and a strong positive relationship to the rest. The results for these variables, however, failed to show any clear patterns.

Table 2. Beta Regression Models—Nationalist Terminology

Independent Variables	Dependent variable: Proportional use of terminology for each concept (Model Form 2)		
	<i>fear</i>	<i>country</i>	<i>nation</i>
<i>GDP</i>	-0.134*** (0.0001)	-0.239*** (0.0001)	-0.458*** (0.0001)
<i>Population Density</i>	0.045*** (0.00004)	0.100*** (0.00004)	-0.138*** (0.00003)
<i>Autocracy</i>	-0.006*** (0.0002)	1.271*** (0.0002)	-0.892*** (0.0002)
<i>Democracy</i>	0.421*** (0.0002)	-0.975*** (0.0002)	-0.089*** (0.0002)
<i>Free Press</i>	-0.542*** (0.0002)	-0.012*** (0.0002)	-0.621*** (0.0002)
<i>Not Free Press</i>	-0.021*** (0.0002)	-0.864*** (0.0002)	-0.345*** (0.0002)
<i>Total News Articles</i>	0.044*** (0.00003)	0.101*** (0.00003)	0.154*** (0.00003)
<i>Constant</i>	-6.255*** (0.001)	-4.526*** (0.001)	-3.285*** (0.001)
Observations	248	264	270
R ²	0.036	0.061	0.023
Log Likelihood	3,058,480,339.000	2,592,318,034.000	2,326,120,203.000

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


B. MEDIA NARRATIVES AND NATIONALIST ATTITUDES

Hypothesis 2 predicts that higher levels of nationalist terminology in the online news media produce higher levels of nationalist attitude within a country. This prediction

is tested using four logistic regression models to analyze the relationship between independent variables organized into individual, country, and nationalist terminology categories as described in the methods section. The results from these models are presented in Table 3.

To further test the models, receiver operating characteristic (ROC)¹²³ curves are plotted for each model to determine the true positive and false positive rates for each. This test confirmed Model 7, which includes all individual-level, country-level, and interaction variables, as well as all categories of *Nationalist Terminology*, as the best model with the highest AUC statistic. The ROC curves in Figure 3 show each models curve plotted in a different color.

Figure 3. Hypothesis 2 ROC Plot



This plot provides a visual presentation of the receiver operating characteristic curves for Models 4–7 in Table 3.

¹²³ ROC curves display the true positive rates of a model. Models with a higher Area Under the Curve (AUC) statistic, are preferred.

While Model 7 showed the best predictive performance, it is important to note that the other models also produced similar statistically significant results. The individual-level independent variables *Internet*, *Urban*, *Rich* and *Poor* maintained their significance across all models, while the variables *Young* and *Old* were only statistically significant in Model 4. Those who reported having Internet access, living in an urban area or being poor showed substantially lower rates of nationalist attitudes.

Country-level variables are added in Models 5, 6 and 7. In these models the variable *Free Press* show a consistent strong negative relationship, while the variable *Not Free Press* and *Population Density* show a strong positive relationship to nationalist attitudes. The variables for *Autocracy* and *Democracy* fluctuate between a negative to a positive relationship in the different models. *GDP* shows no significance in Model 5 but in Model 6 and 7 has strong positive coefficients with a p-value of less than 0.01 in both.

The concepts capturing *Nationalist Terminology* are added in Model 6 and Model 7, with Model 7 including an additional variable to account for an interactive relationship between the variables *Autocracy* and *Not Free Press*. Except for the concept *love* in Model 6, all *Nationalist Terminology* variables are statistically significant across both Models 6 and 7 with p-values of less than 0.01 and maintain consistent positive or negative relationships across all specifications.

Table 3. Logistic Regression Models—Nationalist Attitudes

Independent variable	Dependent variable:			
	<i>Nationalist Attitude</i>			
	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Internet access</i>	-0.262*** (0.020)	-0.146*** (0.023)	-0.223*** (0.024)	-0.220*** (0.024)
<i>Old</i>	-0.133*** (0.028)	-0.025 (0.031)	-0.013 (0.033)	-0.006 (0.033)
<i>Young</i>	-0.048** (0.022)	-0.097*** (0.023)	-0.030 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.025)
<i>Rich</i>	0.210*** (0.049)	0.223*** (0.051)	0.167*** (0.054)	0.195*** (0.054)

Independent variable	Dependent variable:			
	<i>Nationalist Attitude</i>			
	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Poor</i>	-0.062** (0.027)	-0.080*** (0.029)	-0.101*** (0.030)	-0.096*** (0.030)
<i>Urban</i>	-0.571*** (0.020)	-0.669*** (0.022)	-0.312*** (0.025)	-0.340*** (0.026)
<i>Democracy</i>		-0.106*** (0.034)	0.079 (0.049)	0.180*** (0.050)
<i>Autocracy</i>		-0.299*** (0.036)	-0.493*** (0.103)	1.195*** (0.168)
<i>Free Press</i>		-0.699*** (0.039)	-0.418*** (0.051)	-0.569*** (0.052)
<i>Not Free Press</i>		0.225*** (0.028)	0.548*** (0.037)	0.628*** (0.037)
<i>Population Density</i>		0.038*** (0.009)	0.135*** (0.013)	0.114*** (0.014)
<i>GDP</i>		0.021 (0.014)	0.070*** (0.021)	0.144*** (0.022)
<i>Use of concept good in media</i>			-26.290*** (4.741)	-55.319*** (5.241)
<i>Use of concept enemy in media</i>			1,227.872*** (156.120)	443.180*** (169.157)
<i>Use of concept bad in media</i>			-50.955*** (4.320)	-67.225*** (4.547)
<i>Use of concept republic in media</i>			-154.215*** (11.287)	-85.632*** (12.590)
<i>Use of concept country in media</i>			22.322*** (4.607)	67.094*** (5.810)
<i>Use of concept fear in media</i>			-71.534*** (5.434)	-63.458*** (5.347)
<i>Use of concept foreign in media</i>			74.172*** (17.441)	109.774*** (17.789)
<i>Use of concept hate in media</i>			-203.699*** (32.151)	-125.819*** (32.602)
<i>Use of concept invader in media</i>			447.216*** (42.111)	433.975*** (42.527)

Independent variable	Dependent variable:			
	<i>Nationalist Attitude</i>			
	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
<i>Use of concept like in media</i>			-40.099*** (2.631)	-31.737*** (2.705)
<i>Use of concept love in media</i>			12.422 (9.850)	55.573*** (10.432)
<i>Use of concept nation in media</i>			52.130*** (5.608)	26.704*** (5.852)
<i>Logged (Total Articles)</i>	-0.027*** (0.006)	0.011 (0.008)	0.039** (0.016)	-0.075*** (0.018)
<i>Autocracy*Not Free Press</i>				-1.973*** (0.156)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.497*** (0.084)	-1.284*** (0.134)	-3.118*** (0.215)	-2.005*** (0.231)
Observations	66,304	59,083	54,934	54,934
Log Likelihood	-34,565.800	-30,398.760	-27,626.240	-27,545.840
Akaike Inf. Crit.	69,147.600	60,825.520	55,304.490	55,145.690


Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Model 7 demonstrates strong positive associations with the use of the concepts for *love, enemy, country, foreign, invader, and nation*. As the use of these words increases in online news media, the probability of respondents answering WVS questions with a nationalist attitude increases. The opposite affect can be said for the concepts of *good, bad, fear, hate, like and republic*, which all show a strong negative relationships to nationalist attitudes.

Two concepts stood out from the rest as having consistently strong positive relationships to nationalist attitudes with the largest change in probability of nationalist attitudes. These are the concepts of *invader* and *country*. A visualization of the fit of Model 7, showing the effects of increased usage of both concepts, is provided in Figure 4, which shows the dependent variable *Nationalist Attitude* on the y-axis and the independent *Nationalist Terminology* variables for the concepts *invader* and *country* on each x-axis respectively. The shaded area around each blue line represents the 95% confidence interval for the estimated effect. These charts show that as the proportional

use of the concepts of *invader* and *country* in the online media go up, the probability of expressing nationalist attitudes also goes up significantly. The plots show that increasing the use of the concept *invader* in online news media, from its minimum observed value to its maximum, generates a shift in the predicted probability of nationalist attitudes from 25% to 70%. The same shift in the usage of the concept of *country* generates a shift in the probability of nationalist attitudes from 25% to 75%.

Figure 4. Visualization of Model 7 Regression for the Concepts of *Invader* and *Country*.



This figure displays estimated effects from Model 7 with the *Nationalist Terminology* (*invader* and *country*) on the x-axis and the dependent variable *Nationalist Attitude* on the y-axis.

In general, the results from Model 7 support the hypothesis that higher levels of nationalist terminology in the online news media produce higher levels of nationalist attitudes within a country. It showed that as certain forms of *Nationalist Terminology* such as *country*, *foreign*, and *invader*, are used more frequently, the probability of a *Nationalist Attitude* goes up. It also showed that as the frequency of other forms of *Nationalist Terminology* such as *bad*, *fear*, or *hate* goes up, the probability of a *Nationalist Attitude* goes down.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. IMPLICATIONS

The results presented in the previous chapter show some interesting findings. They fail to confirm Hypothesis 1, that countries with a free press will experience higher levels of nationalist terminology in online news media while nations with a censored press will experience lower levels. Instead, these results seem to provide evidence to confirm Snyder and Ballentine's argument that countries experiencing new press freedom would experience higher levels of nationalist mythmaking in the media.¹²⁴ This finding implies the need to establish mass media institutions to train journalists in professional reporting practices and to establish effective rules and regulations for the media environment. It may be in a country's best interest to establish institutions ensuring the training of journalists and accuracy of reporting prior to increasing press freedom. This has the potential to restrict the increase in nationalist mythmaking by various groups competing for public support. Similarly, some countries may choose to use censorship in their new government to limit challenges to their own nationalist mythmaking such as the Nazis' did as they rose to power.

The statistically significant findings supporting Hypothesis 2, that higher levels of nationalist terminology in the online news media produce higher levels of nationalist attitudes within a country are interesting and relevant to the implications of Hypothesis 1. If what is said in the media can influence levels of nationalism, then influence over the media environment may be an important lever for change. However, a more effective solution may be to include formal education in primary schools on critical thinking skills teaching the population to identify media biases and propaganda. Of course, this would have to be a long term solution.

The control variables also presented some interesting findings. The variable *Internet* showed a strong negative relationship with nationalist attitudes. This may be due to the ability to fact check the news through the use of the Internet. Countries that want to

¹²⁴ Snyder and Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," 22.

reduce levels of nationalism may try increasing access to the Internet, though this could also pose problems as access to social media may have the opposite effect. This will be discussed further in chapter VI. The variables *Urban* and *Poor* also showed strong negative relationships to *Nationalist Attitudes* while the variable *Rich* showed a strong positive relationship. These findings may help in targeting nationalist or anti-nationalist messaging.

While censorship may not result in less *Nationalist Terminology* in the online news media, the variable *Not Free Press* does have a strong positive relationship with *Nationalist Attitudes*. I attribute this to the fact that countries that censor the media often practice nationalist propaganda as demonstrated through the examples from the United States and Germany in World War II. In these examples of nationalism, and all others that I encountered in my research, there is always an in-group that is good, and an out-group that is blamed for all of the problems. Under censorship this is further increased, as the only message that is allowed is a positive one for the current form of government and a dehumanization of the enemy. Countries that choose to educate their citizens to look at information critically, should incorporate this lesson into their teachings.

B. CAVEATS

The findings presented here should also be taken with a few caveats. First, the concepts that were used to build the *Nationalist Terminology* variable were not filtered in any way. That is to say, any time the word “country” was used, it was included in the aggregate number. No attempt was made to directly associate these concepts with positive or negative sentiment. Articles discussing country music would also have been included in this count, which may not be ideal for statistical purposes. Second, as I have already mentioned, the time period of the WVS and the media data do not completely overlap. Expanded data would allow for more investigation of variation in nationalism over time.

C. FUTURE STUDIES ON NATIONALISM

Attempts to improve upon this thesis could start by addressing the caveats I have mentioned. This could be done by using completely overlapping data bases as they

become available and more detailed metrics to add sentiment analysis to filter out the versions of the nationalist terminology that are not true representations of nationalist concepts such as “country” when it refers to music or a rural location. Future research should also examine how social media effects levels of nationalism. Social media provides the opportunity for people to communicate with little censorship. Additionally, there are no educational requirements to start publishing information on social media. Because anyone can broadcast on social media without any education and because there are no centralized institutions to control the quality of information, one could argue that social media provides a fertile landscape for nationalist attitudes. Similar to Snyder and Ballentine’s description of the ‘imperfect marketplace’ that arises when new press freedoms produce rising forms of nationalism, I believe social media can be seen as an imperfect marketplace with dispersed parties fighting for power and control of the information with little or no controls over the quality of information. Since most people now have the ability to spread or follow nationalist narratives on social media and countries have been slow to institute professional controls, the nationalist discourse that can be found on social media today may be contributing to the rising nationalism observed in many countries.

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2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California