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On the basis of this experience, I hope to become a more skilled military officer to serve the people and the nation.

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I. INTRODUCTION

This study compares how civil–military relations developed during the process of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan. This research has several meaningful characteristics.

First, this study examines historical similarities and differences between South Korea and Taiwan. During the 20th century, South Korea and Taiwan have undergone a similar process. Both countries had been invaded by imperialist Japan and have had experience fighting against communism. Also, they have had a close relationship with the United States. Furthermore, strong authoritarian regimes ruled the countries at the beginning of their national development, and since the late 1980s, both countries have taken the path of democratization and become successful economic powers through rapid economic growth. Specifically, in South Korea, Kim Young-sam was elected as the first genuine civilian president after a long military dictatorship. Next, South Koreans witnessed their first democratic regime change in 1998, in which Kim Dae-jung was elected. His successor, Roh Moo-hyun, was elected in 2003 and served until 2008.

In Taiwan, during the reign of Lee Teng-hui from 1988, he conducted a top-down democratization reform. In 1996, the first direct election by the people was held in Taiwan. In 2000, the first democratic regime change took place in Taiwan when Chen Shui-bian was elected as the first non-Koumintang president. He was re-elected in 2004 and served until 2008. Therefore, this study sets 2008 as the end of a democratically transformed regime.

The two countries also have differences, however. Taiwan's regime (the Koumintang) once had a strong dominance in mainland China, but was driven out by the Communist Party and moved to the island of Taiwan. The Koumintang forcibly controlled the native Taiwanese and maintained martial law until the late 1980s. In South Korea, conflicts with North Korea reached their peak during the Korean War. In the early 1960s, Major General Park Chung-hee set up a military regime by a coup, followed by

Chun Doo-hwan's regime. Martial law did not persist for a long time as in Taiwan, however.

Second, the two countries are prominent examples that have succeeded in the transition from authoritarian to democratic government. After the collapse of the Cold War, many authoritarian countries attempted to convert to democracy. Some states that were authoritarian states, like South Korea and Taiwan, have succeeded in stable democratization. Therefore, if many authoritarian countries experience democratization in the future, this study could provide meaningful lessons for civil–military relations.

Finally, despite these characteristics, it is hard to find precedents of comparative studies of the civil–military relations between the two countries during democratization. In a similar field study, Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn discussed civil–military relations between South Korea and Taiwan—along with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand—in their study “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New Democracies” (2009). In this study, the authors state that South Korea and Taiwan are the only countries that have succeeded in securing civilian control of the military in the region, while Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have failed.¹ The authors explain four causes: “There are historical legacies of authoritarian rule and the path of democratic transition, the internal security role of the military, and the relationship between development and democratic consolidation.”² In addition, they said that the failure of civilian control ultimately results in democratic stagnation in those countries.³ In other words, Croissant and Kuehn set Taiwan and South Korea as one group and compare it with other countries. As a result, there is little comparison of previous research on civil–military relations in the process of democratization between South Korea and Taiwan. Therefore, this study could be a significant precursor in this field.

This paper will first discuss the main theories of civil–military relations in the literature review. After reviewing and summarizing the theories and arguments of

¹ Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, “Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New Democracies,” *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9 (2009): 187–217.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

distinguished civilian military scholars, this study will select Narcis Serra's military reform theory of the new civil–military relations theory.

Next, this paper will analyze South Korea. The historical and political analysis of the process of democratization in South Korea will be conducted. Then, Narcis Serra's military reform will be used to examine the changes in civil–military relations in the process of democratization. After that, this paper will draw the major implication of analyzing changes in the civil–military relations during the democratization process of South Korea. This paper will then conduct an analysis on Taiwan. Analysis on Taiwan will be conducted in the same order as South Korea. This paper will first look at the process of democratization, then analyze the changes of civil–military relations, and finally draw upon the major implications. After that, this paper will explain the similarities and differences of the two countries. The possible causes of the difference between South Korea and Taiwan will be looked at in the history of the democratization process of the two countries.

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The factors that influence the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal axis, are defining new missions and ensuing need for organizational change, measures impacting on the forces as a career, and changing the quality of life in the military.

disastrous to intervene in politics.”⁸⁴ At that time, the military did not actively try to intervene in politics. According to Aurel Croissant, soldiers did not think that they would be threatened by the government because Roh Tae-woo was from the military and supported by the Chun Doo-hwan regime.⁸⁵ For example, investigations of the military about illegal events in the past had been delayed through political agreements between the president and the opposition political parties.⁸⁶ Also, military intelligence agencies continued to monitor civilians as before.⁸⁷ Therefore, the soldiers did not fear Roh Tae-woo’s regime or feel the need to intervene politically.⁸⁸ President Roh Tae-woo tried to protect the interests, values and political status of the military.⁸⁹

Even if military professionalism at that time was stable, there were cases in which the political neutrality of the military could be suspected. One example was the illegal election activity of the military in the March 24th general election in 1992.⁹⁰ The commanders of the military advocated or criticized specific political parties and candidates.⁹¹ At that time, the change of military professionalism did not bring civilian control. Specifically, the defense minister had been a retired general, and institutional efforts for civil control did not take place. The military thus maintained their authority under the protection of the regime.

3. The Kim Young-sam Regime and the Beginning of the Civilian Regime

In 1993, President Kim Young-sam (period of presidency: 1993–1998) was elected as the first genuine civilian president after the long-term dictatorship of the

⁸⁴ Ibid., 288.

⁸⁵ Aurel Croissant, “Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea,” *Armed Forces and Society* 30, no. 3 (Spring 2004): 370–371.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ David Kuehn, “Institutionalising Civilian Control of the Military in New Democracies: Theory and Evidence from South Korea,” *Giga working paper*, no. 282 (February, 2016): 1–34.

⁸⁸ Croissant, 370–371.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Tu-seng Hong, *Han’guk ūi Kun Kwa Simin Sahoe* [Korean Military and Civilian Society] (Koyang-si: In’gan Sarang, 2015), 36–39.

⁹¹ Ibid.

when the military killed civilians.¹⁰⁰ He also abolished the military intelligence agency's civilian surveillance and created a procedure in which Congress could systematically control the military.¹⁰¹

In this process, the military did not resist the regime. A possible reason is fear of the citizens. Soldiers experienced direct armed conflict with citizens, undergoing the May 18th democratic movement of armed conflicts in the previous regime. In addition, the military witnessed the democratic uprising when tens of millions of citizens came out on the streets to resist military dictatorships in June 1987.¹⁰² The military had to worry that their political intervention would lead to a democratic struggle of citizens. Therefore, there was no willingness for the military to suffer the many casualties that could arise when the military suppressed the struggle of such citizens. This opinion of the military was also revealed in the interview by Lee Jong-koo, the former Minister of National Defense. Lee Jong-koo warned that military intervention would bring about disaster.¹⁰³ Furthermore, the democratization movement continued during the Roh Tae-woo regime. This made it difficult for the military to conduct political engagement. The Roh Tae-woo regime responded strongly to the democratization movements in various parts of society.¹⁰⁴ On April 26, 1991, when Kang Kyung-dae, a student of Myongji University, was murdered by the plainclothes police during the demonstration, nationwide demonstrations for democracy again took place.¹⁰⁵ While several million citizens participated in demonstrations nationwide for sixty days,¹⁰⁶ eleven people committed

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Victor D. Cha, "Security and Democracy in South Korean Development," in *Korea's Democratization*, edited by Samuel S. Kim (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208.

¹⁰² In June 1987, millions of civilians participated in the June democratic movement, almost every day, against the dictatorship of the Chun Doo-hwan regime.

¹⁰³ Cho, 288.

¹⁰⁴ Minjuhwa Undong Kinyŏm Saŏphoe, 463–473.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ There is no official data on the number of citizens who participated in the 60-day democratization movement. According to Minjuhwa Undong Kinyŏm Saŏphoe [the Democratization Movement Memorial Business Association], however, more than 300,000 people participated nationwide on the day of May 9th.

suicide, and another student died during the demonstration.¹⁰⁷ These nationwide democratization movements played a role of checking the power of the military.

Such efforts by President Kim Young-sam certainly contributed to military professionalism. Civilian control of the military was only partially improved, however. First, no civilian defense minister was appointed. Only a few civilians served as deputy defense ministers.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, most of the employees in the ministry of national defense were active military officers.¹⁰⁹ The military control in the congress changed considerably, however.¹¹⁰ The national defense commission in the congress began to properly check and balance against the ministry of defense.¹¹¹

Cho Young-gap assessed Kim Young-sam's military reform as follows: "First, it contributed to increasing military professionalism; second, the dismantling of private groups in the military and the reform of the personnel; third, the restructuring of the security command, which was the most political institution in the military; finally, he contributed to make democratic and effective military operations."¹¹² According to a survey¹¹³ on the national consciousness conducted in Korea, the military had the largest influence on politics in 1988, but in 1990 it ranked fourth, and in 1993 it fell to sixth.¹¹⁴ Also, the number of members of congress from military services decreased significantly. In 1992, the national congress members from the military service were thirty-five percent, but they were reduced to fifteen percent in 1996.¹¹⁵ Also, the proportion of former military officers among the higher governmental officers (ministers) had declined

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ki-joo Kim, "The Soldier and the State in South Korea," *Journal of International and Area Studies* 21, no. 2 (2014): 125.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 127.

¹¹² Cho, 298–301.

¹¹³ Seoul National University, *Hankook Sahoe wa Kookmin eusik Josa Yungu* [Korean Society and National Consciousness Survey and Research], 1993.

¹¹⁴ Cho, 295.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 297.

appointed a number of civilian experts in the ministry of national defense, and the NSC had been created directly under the President to create and control defense policies by the civilian government.¹⁴⁰ President Kim Dae-jung's successor, President Roh Moo-hyun, expanded the NSC's capabilities¹⁴¹ and increased the civilian staff in the ministry of national defense.¹⁴² He also created the defense acquisition program administration for government surveillance of the military's arms purchase business.¹⁴³ Therefore, the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes can be categorized as the administrations of the democratic consolidation period. First, let us look at the process of the democratic transition.

1. Democratic Transition Period—Kim Young-sam Regime

First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra's model, can be considered stable. After the long military dictatorship, President Kim Young-sam was elected as the first genuine civilian president through popular direct election. It can be judged that the legitimacy of democracy greatly increased as he took power in a legal process. Furthermore, President Kim Young-sam succeeded in eliminating Hanahoe, a powerful military faction.¹⁴⁴ He also arrested former presidents and generals who had caused a coup and massacred civilians in the past.¹⁴⁵ Even in this situation, however, the military did not protest or resist the government, and accepted the reform measures.¹⁴⁶ In this regard, the conflict level axis did not increase significantly, and remained stable.

Next, look at the control of the military axis. At first, Kim Young-sam abolished the military intelligence agency's civilian surveillance.¹⁴⁷ In contrast, the military surveillance function of the national assembly was improved during the Kim Young-sam

¹⁴⁰ Kuehn, 16.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Kim, 126.

¹⁴³ Kuehn, 16.

¹⁴⁴ Cho, 292.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Cha, 208.

national defense from fifty percent to seventy percent over the long term.¹⁶⁶ This is because the main positions that determine policies were occupied by active soldiers and civilians who had been soldiers.¹⁶⁷ “The ongoing high national security threat would help the armed forces to justify and retain its institutional autonomy in the process of democratic consolidation.”¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ Kim, 126.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid 129.

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democracy after the Kaohsiung Incident in society.¹⁸⁸ In fact, in Taiwan, the strict authoritarianism of the Koumintang made it hard for the democratization movement to spread. The Koumintang limited democratic rights guaranteed by the Constitution after the 1949 declaration of martial law. In particular, they banned any form of rallies and demonstrations and oppressed the democratic movement.¹⁸⁹ The Koumintang killed about 3,000 political prisoners during the martial law period.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, it was not easy for the democratic activists in Taiwan to carry out a broad democratic movement as in South Korea.¹⁹¹ Fulda argued that considering the political environment in Taiwan, promoting democracy moderately and peacefully was the best possible choice for democratic activists.¹⁹² He further argued that while the moderate political activists such as Lin Xiantang and Kang Ningxiang during the dictatorship of the Koumintang had been ignored by academics in the past, their campaigns clearly meant democracy in Taiwan.¹⁹³ The movement of change showed, however, as the ruling coalition of the Koumintang was loosened during the administration of Chiang Ching-kuo.¹⁹⁴ In addition, in the 1980s, the rapid economic growth of Taiwan led to a rapid rise in the middle class. As a result, the demand for democracy was increasing, and it could have affected to Chiang's decision.¹⁹⁵ The second possible reason is international pressure. As the economic growth of the People's Republic of China made Taiwan internationally isolated, even the United States suggested human rights issues in Taiwan.¹⁹⁶ This might have forced Chiang to utilize democracy as a diplomatic solution.¹⁹⁷ The third reason is the personal

¹⁸⁸ Tzeng, 92.

¹⁸⁹ Tien, 9–11.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Andreas Martin Fulda, "Reevaluating the Taiwanese Democracy Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Opposition Organizations under Japanese and KMT Rule," *Critical Asian Studies* 34, no. 3, 357–394.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Chong-pin Lin and Man-jung Mignon Chan, "Taiwan and Mainland: A Comparison on Democratization," *World Affairs* 155, no. 3 (2017) 123–124.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Tzeng, *ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

in 1991, and people elected the head of the local governors in 1994. Furthermore, in 1996, Taiwanese citizens directly elected president for the first time. In the 1996 election, Lee Teng-hui won a majority of the votes.

Though Lee Teng-hui was from the Koumintang, conservative military commanders did not see him as friendly because of his democratic reforms. At that time, Hau Pei-tsun, former chief of the general staff, was a prime minister. He publicly opposed Lee Teng-hui's policies.²¹³ In 1991, Lee Teng-hui ordered Gen Chiang Zonglin to be promoted as a first-grade general, but Hau Pei-tsun refused to follow him for one year.²¹⁴ Furthermore, in June 1991, it became clear that Hau had met with military leaders in November 1990 for a secret meeting.²¹⁵ This has led to suspicions that Hau was not only suspected of violating the President's military command, but also of simulating a coup.²¹⁶ Furthermore, in October 1992, Hau indirectly criticized and threatened Lee Teng-hui's policy, arguing that soldiers should oppose Taiwan's independence decision that could be made by president, saying "It is unthinkable that the commander of the armed forces of the ROC would take no action when seeing the name of the ROC being dropped."²¹⁷ Another problem was political intervention during the 1996 election. According to Tzeng's research, security officials maximized the Missile Crisis²¹⁸ against China for the election of Lee Teng-hui.²¹⁹

In spite of these big and small problems, however, there also had been positive changes in the realm of professionalism. First, the Taiwanese military did not try to make a direct political engagement. Tang Fei, who was then chief of the general staff in 1998, declared in the national assembly that "even if the state changes from ROC to Taiwan,

²¹³ Ibid., 111.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid., 112.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Fravel, 63.

²¹⁸ This is a series of missile tests conducted by the PRC from March 8 to March 15 off the Taiwanese coast to influence the 1996 presidential election in Taiwan.

²¹⁹ Tzeng, 146–147.

military from holding membership in certain political parties.²⁶⁰ The regime also transferred all active military officers who worked in the civilian government back to the military.²⁶¹

The democratic consolidation can be categorized as occurring during the Chen Shui-bian regime. The Chen Shui-bian regime took legal actions to allow civilian governments to effectively control defense policies. The command structure of the military had been unified by the ministry of national defense, and a third of the staff of the ministry of defense had been filled by civilian employees.²⁶² It also expanded the NSC's capabilities and allowed the President and his staff to plan and control defense policies directly.²⁶³

1. Democratic Transition Period—Lee Teng-hui Regime

First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra's model, is considered a middle tension. Lee Teng-hui took power after the long-lasting Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo regimes. Lee Teng-hui joined the Koumintang in 1971 and served as minister of agriculture and prime minister of Taipei. Such a Koumintang career could have been a factor that helped the military to make a positive relation with the regime. Lee Teng-hui was a native Taiwanese, however. Therefore, he may have felt a sense of heterogeneity with the heads of the military, who are mostly from the Chinese mainland.²⁶⁴ In addition, he pursued relatively stronger democratic reforms than Chiang Ching-kuo. This would have created a tense relationship between him and the military. To be specific, Hau Pei-tsun, then prime minister of the Lee Teng-hui regime, former chief of the general staff, publicly objected to Lee Teng-hui's policy.²⁶⁵ Lee Teng-hui refused to promote General Chiang Zonglin as a first-grade general because of Chiang's

²⁶⁰ Fravel, 66–67.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² Tzeng, 151–172.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 103.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 111.

secret meeting with other military generals.²⁶⁶ Chiang had also opposed and threatened Lee Teng-hui on an official stage, saying, “It is unthinkable that the commander of the armed forces of the ROC would take no action when seeing the name of ROC being dropped.”²⁶⁷ In addition, in the 1996 election, major military leaders tried to inflict negative political damage to Lee Teng-hui by using a security crisis against China.²⁶⁸ Nevertheless, during the Lee Teng-hui regime, the military did not engage in direct physical action. Considering all these actions, its level of conflict could be assessed as moderate.

Next, look at the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis. First, in 1993, all active soldiers withdrew from the Koumintang, and the law prohibited certain parties from participating in the military.²⁶⁹ It also prohibited active military personnel from participating in civilian government except in the security area.²⁷⁰ Considering this, it can be seen that the control of the military had been slightly improved as a whole, although there had been conflicts like that of Hau Pei-tsun, then prime minister, former chief of the general staff, who objected to and resisted the regime.²⁷¹

The last is the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal axis. The leaders of the military had secret meetings with Hau Pei-tsun, then the prime minister and formerly chief of the general staff, in which participants were suspected of planning for a coup.²⁷² They also inflated the military crisis against China during the election to influence the regime.²⁷³ Tang Fei, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, declared that the military would defend the Constitution even as the nation’s character changed, however, and Chiang Chung-ling, defense minister, declared that the military would remain loyal

²⁶⁶ Ibid., 111–112.

²⁶⁷ Fravel, 63.

²⁶⁸ Tzeng, 146–147.

²⁶⁹ Fravel, 66–67.

²⁷⁰ Ibid.

²⁷¹ Tzeng, 111–112.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid., 146–147.

to the President and maintain political neutrality.²⁷⁴ In addition, all active soldiers were withdrawn from the Koumintang systematically and could not participate in civilian government except in the security area.²⁷⁵ This shows that professionalism had increased considerably.

2. Democratic Consolidation Period—Chen Shui-bian Regime

First, the conflict level axis, which is the vertical axis of Serra's model, is considered continue middle tension. Overall, the military did not oppose the civilian government from using military force during the regime. In addition, they partly accepted the policy changes required by the civilian government and tried to minimize friction. Shortly after Chen Shui-bian's regime, however, a large number of air force pilots applied for discharge, mocking the president in an official military lecture.²⁷⁶ There were also two soft coup cases suspected of intervention by the military.²⁷⁷ This indicates that their tense relationship had not been greatly mitigated.

Second, look at the control of the military axis, which is the horizontal axis. Chen Shui-bian gave the commanding power to the Ministry of Defense for civilian control.²⁷⁸ It also gave the minister of defense the right to report directly to the President.²⁷⁹ In addition, he made the system whereby congress could monitor the ministry of defense and the military intelligence bureau on a regular basis.²⁸⁰ The NSC also expanded its organization to allow the President to plan and implement Taiwan's own defense policies.²⁸¹ In addition, the president appointed a genuine civilian defense minister and ordered one-third of the staff of the ministry of defense to be filled with civilians.²⁸²

²⁷⁴ Fravel, 66.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

²⁷⁶ Lee, 210.

²⁷⁷ Tzeng, 157 and Lee, 211.

²⁷⁸ Tzeng, 151–172.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

Despite these efforts, however, the genuine civilian minister of defense, whom he appointed, was not able to carry out any practical activities, and the civilian personnel of the ministry of defense were also filled with reservist soldiers.²⁸³ Also, as the two soft coup cases show, the civilian regime had difficulty in controlling the military. Even then, the presidential staff complained that some of the military seemed more loyal to the mainland than the president.²⁸⁴ In this regard, the control of the military axis can be considered slightly increased.

The last remaining axis is the professionalism axis, which is the second horizontal axis. At that time, the main positions of the military were filled by members of the former Koumintang party, but they tried to accommodate the changes in defense policy required by the regime. In particular, in response to the civilian government's Taiwan independence policy, the military declared its mission to protect "the island of Taiwan" rather than the Republic of China.²⁸⁵ A large number of Air Force pilots had left the military as a backlash against Chen Shui-bian, however, and some higher ranking military members were suspected of involvement in two soft coups.²⁸⁶ Considering this, the professionalism axis can be considered to have risen slightly.

These changes in civil-military relations during democratization in Taiwan are detailed in Figure 3.

²⁸³ Ibid., 173–198.

²⁸⁴ Lee, 210.

²⁸⁵ Tzeng, 151–172.

²⁸⁶ Lee, 210.




Figure 3. Changes in civil-military relations during democratization in Taiwan.²⁸⁷

C. MAJOR IMPLICATIONS

As a result of democratization, Taiwan's civil-military relations have suffered difficulties while making a significant change during the democratization process. Chiang Ching-kuo abolished the martial law in 1987, and in 1990, Lee Teng-hui became the first native Taiwanese president. He tried to make the military be an independent army from the Koumintang and excluded soldiers from the civilian administration.²⁸⁸ Chen Shui-bian was elected president in 2000, when he was the first in Taiwan to replace the Koumintang regime. In an effort to institutionalize the civilian control, he tried to unify the military command as a minister of national defense, expand the functions of the NSC, and appoint a civilian defense minister.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁷ Adapted from Serra, 64.

²⁸⁸ Fravel, 66–67.

²⁸⁹ Tzeng, 151–172.

In the process, however, military and former military key figures publicly opposed the President's policies and mocked the President. In particular, during the Chen Shui-bian regime, there were two soft coup cases suspected of involvement in the military.²⁹⁰ This suggests that the process of democratization in Taiwan has not progressed steadily.

Applying Serra's theory of military reform, the conflict level axis remained in the middle state, and the control of the military axis rose slightly in both regimes. And the professional axis seems to have risen considerably in the Lee Teng-hui regime, but only slightly in the Chen Shui-bian regime.

These changes are related to the characteristics of the democratization process in Taiwan. In Taiwan, in 1979, the Kaohsiung Incident happened. Hundreds of citizens demanded democracy and more than a hundred citizens were arrested by the police. This was a meaningful event that caused the desire for democratization in Taiwan, which was under the control of martial law for a long period of time. After this event, however, the democratization movement, in which the majority of the people participated, did not progress smoothly or steadily. Although Chiang Ching-kuo ended martial law in 1987, there seemed to be other reasons for his decision to accept democracy besides the pressure of citizens, such as diplomatic pressure or personal preference.²⁹¹ After him, Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese who favored democracy, became the president by an internal decision of the Koumintang.²⁹² The Wild Lily student movement happened at the beginning of the regime, but participants were mainly Taipei's college students. During the reign of Lee Teng-Hui, there was no nationwide democratization movement. Therefore, this made an environment that allowed Taiwan's military to cope with the civilian leader's democratic policies relatively flexibly without fear of the civilian movement.

²⁹⁰ Lee, 210.

²⁹¹ Tzeng, 92.

²⁹² According to Fulda, the Koumintang treated native Taiwanese as inferior second-class citizens and used them as a means to discriminate and advance into the mainland. During the dictatorship of the Koumintang, in Taiwan, mainlanders monopolized almost all the politics, society and power within the country. (Source: Fulda, 357–394.)

These changes in Taiwan's civil-military relations are also related to the effectiveness and the incentives that the new civil-military relations theory emphasizes. First of all, in the perspective of effectiveness, the Lee Teng-hui regime changed into an offensive military strategy to defend the island of Taiwan.²⁹³ This can be regarded as a realistic military strategy, realizing that the Taiwanese military cannot occupy the Chinese mainland themselves. Taiwan could not obtain the necessary weapons, however, due to the negative attitude of the United States concerned about China's opposition and the conflict with the Koumintang in parliament during the Chen Shui-bian regime.²⁹⁴ This limited Taiwanese military effectiveness. Looking at the incentives, Lee Teng-hui, although from the Koumintang, was a native Taiwanese. He, therefore, did not feel the necessity of a "single China" principle and the strong public security politics that the Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo regimes had maintained. Chen Shui-bian was also a former human rights lawyer and participated in the Kaohsiung Incident. He saw the necessity of democratization and the necessity of change in civil-military relations. The relationship with China led to conflicts as the Taiwan government pursued an independence policy. Therefore, external threats at this time were high and internal threats were stable, but there was always a risk of military challenge. Therefore, there was a middle state incentive to change civilian relations for civilian leaders, but it was not an optimistic environment.

²⁹³ Jae Yeop Kim, "Taiwan's Defense Reform: Background, Process, and Assessment," *China & Soviet Research* 35, no. 2 (2011): 141–173.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

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V. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN'S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION

The two countries have experienced considerable changes in civil-military relations in terms of their institutions. The militaries of the two countries had a powerful influence on politics and society before democratization. In particular, soldiers entered the civilian administration and the parliament as active soldiers or reservists, and chose the main policy of the state. Furthermore, the military themselves decided and enforced their policies.

When democratization began in both countries, the civil-military relations also went through a process of democratization in the vortex of change. In the process of change, the two countries institutionalized civilian control of the military. Specifically, policies established control of the military for a civilian president and have made it possible for the parliament to monitor the military. In addition, active soldiers have been unable to operate in civilian governments in areas except the security area. The influence of the reservists of the government and the congress have significantly diminished. Also, the soldiers themselves have also improved professionalism to try to accommodate the changes demanded by civilian leaders and regimes. In particular, the military in both countries did not oppose the civilian regime by using direct military power during the democratization process. This commonality is also reflected in results of applying Serra's theory. In both countries, the control of the military axis and the professional axis appear to improve overall in both the democratic transition and the democratic consolidation period.

B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN'S CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION

First, in South Korea, President Kim Young-sam took office in 1993 as the first genuine civilian since the long military regime. President Kim Young-sam removed Hanahoe, a private organization that had a strong influence in the military after his

inauguration,²⁹⁵ and conducted a survey of military personnel and corruption that had been hidden.²⁹⁶ In addition, he arrested Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, former Presidents, and generals who took power by raising coups and massacring innocent civilians in Gwangju.²⁹⁷ Also, he banned the military intelligence agency's civilian inspections that had been done in the past.²⁹⁸ In the meantime, the military did not engage in open opposition or armed resistance. The South Korean military conforms to the instructions of the civilian president.

In the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun presidential regimes, civil-military relations worsened. Although Kim Young-sam was the first genuine civilian elected after a long period of military dictatorship, he was elected president as a candidate of the political party (Democratic Liberty Party) including military dictatorship groups such as Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo. As a democratization activist, however, President Kim Dae-jung had been on the other side of the military regime during his entire life, and was almost killed by the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan regimes. President Roh Moo-hyun also took the lead in the struggle for democratization as a human rights lawyer. As a congress member, he opposed Kim Young-sam's political merger with the military dictatorship group. He also took a lead and became a star in criticizing the military dictatorship at the parliamentary hearing in 1988. Furthermore, from a policy perspective, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun attempted to solve the North Korea problem through dialogue, exchange and cooperation. These parts could be a conflicting element between the civilian government and the military.²⁹⁹ The military, however, as during Kim Young-sam's regime, chose to adapt rather than resist the civilian regime. The military accepted the government's policy of reconciliation with North Korea and implemented measures to alleviate tensions with North Korea.³⁰⁰ In particular, the military suspended psychological warfare, such as the broadcasting using loudspeakers to

²⁹⁵ Croissant, 372.

²⁹⁶ Cho, 292.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Cha, 208.

²⁹⁹ Cho, 376.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

North Korea, which even caused a criticism of the military from conservative medias in South Korea. The military also accepted control of the civilian government through an expansion of the NSC and monitoring function by the National Assembly.³⁰¹ Of course, there were some noises of opposition to this process, but they were only complaints expressed among some military members and leaked through media and reserve organizations. The personnel or organization of the military did not officially act against government policies or express their opposition to the public.

In Taiwan, however, a different image often appeared. After a long period of the reign of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo in Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, who gained power in 1988, transformed the military from the Koumintang army into a national army. He passed laws that prevented certain political parties from directly controlling the army, and prevented active soldiers from taking positions in the Koumintang.³⁰² In addition, active soldiers could not operate in the civilian government except for security-related areas.³⁰³ Also, he appointed the first genuine civilian minister of national defense in Taiwan's history in 1990.³⁰⁴ As for Lee Teng-hui's reform policies, though the military did not mobilize direct military force, they caused considerable resistance. The former joint chief of staff, Hau Pei-tsun, was then prime minister. He refused to implement the military reform policies, and criticized the policies to the public.³⁰⁵ He also had a secret meeting with incumbent military leaders.³⁰⁶ It is doubtful, however, that he intended to start an actual coup.³⁰⁷ The Taiwanese security agencies had also pushed for a security crisis to intervene in the presidential election in 1996.³⁰⁸

The first regime change took place in Taiwan through the 2000 presidential election. Chen Shui-bian, a former Democrat and a human rights activist, was elected

³⁰¹ Kuehn, 16.

³⁰² Fravel, 66–67.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Tzeng, 111–112.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., 146–147.

president. His election was able to bring a crisis to civilian relations than Lee Teng-hui's regime period. Chen Shui-bian was a human rights lawyer who had fought for the democratization movement since the Kaohsiung Incident, and he also wanted to make Taiwan an independent country from China.³⁰⁹ These were repulsive factors for the people who had been ruled by the Koumintang for a long time. In fact, when Chen Shui-bian took power as president, pilots who were relatively free to change jobs among the soldiers applied for retirement.³¹⁰ This not only hurt Taiwan's air power, but also put political pressure on the president. In addition, the Taiwanese military publicly ridiculed the president during an official event.³¹¹ Above all, the Taiwan military was suspected of involvement in two soft coup events during the reign of Chen Shui-bian. One time, the military were suspected of trying to assassinate Chen Shui-bian, and another time, the high-ranking military generals were suspected of denying their duties as a group and trying to hinder the president's performance.³¹²

Why did this difference appear? The origin of the democratization movement in South Korea can be found even before the foundation of government. The Donghak Peasant Movement, which occurred during the Chosun dynasty in 1886, did not have a specific institutional slogan of democracy, but hundreds of thousands of peasants participated nationwide in the battle against the government forces. The peasants advocated abolition of the class system and equality and human rights. After this movement, the Independent Association, which was established in 1896, organized the People's Mass Meeting to spread democratic values such as freedom, human rights, equality, division of powers, and establishment of a parliamentary system.³¹³ Later, in 1919, the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea instituted a democratic and republican constitution according to the influence of the Independent Association.³¹⁴ After the foundation of the country, the April 19th Revolution occurred in 1960 and

³⁰⁹ Lee, 209–211.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² Ibid. and Tzeng, 157.

³¹³ Hyung-ik Choi, *ibid.*

³¹⁴ Ibid.

hundreds of thousands protested against an authoritarian regime. Although the military coups and dictatorial regimes continued for decades after the revolution, the democratization movement continued in the meantime. Especially, in the 1970s, rapid economic growth led to the expansion of a middle class, and the authoritarian rule sparked dissatisfaction within the society and caused a commitment to a democratization movement.³¹⁵ In particular, tens of thousands of protesters participated in the Bu-ma Demonstrations in 1979 in the Busan and Masan areas, which resisted the dictatorship of the Park Chung-hee regime. This case is considered to have had a great impact on the fall of the Park Chung-hee regime. Also during the Chun Doo-hwan regime, the Gwangju Democratization Movement occurred in 1980, and hundreds of thousands of Gwangju citizens resisted the bloody suppression by the authoritarian regime and fought an armed struggle. In addition, a democratization uprising broke out in June 1987. Millions of citizens participated in the demonstrations nationwide and endeavored to end the dictatorship. On June 29, 1987, President Chun Doo-hwan accepted a direct presidential election system and the long-term military dictatorship ended.

The history of the South Korean democratization movement seems to have affected the civil-military relations during democratization. South Korean have fostered the value of democracy on their own, through a long-term democratic movement. Recognition of the importance of democracy reached a peak in the June Democratic Movement in June 1987, when millions of citizens protested against the authoritarian regime for one month. This change in perception has contributed to two major aspects in the South Korean military's acceptance of civil-military relations. First, the soldiers themselves became positive about democratization. The South Korean military has been a conscription system, and the lower-class officers (mainly lieutenants) and soldiers, who occupy the majority of the members, come to the military to perform military service obligations for a short period of time. These young people were able to see and listen and experience the democratization movement in society, and to hold the importance of democratization during military service. In addition, senior officers who had been in the military for a long time were also able to have a chance to change their perceptions

³¹⁵ Chang-jip Choi, *ibid.*

indirectly through family, friends, or the media, although they did not participate in the direct democratization movement. This aspect has helped the military members voluntarily accept democratization of civil-military relations. The second aspect of change is the pressure on the democratization of the citizens. The main commanders of the military had watched for a long period of resistance against the military dictatorship. In particular, in 1980, citizens of Gwangju voluntarily organized an armed militia against martial law forces. On May 27, 1980, when the martial law forces suppressed the militia stationed in the Jeonnam Provincial Government Office, the militia resisted to the end, even though they knew they would not be able to avoid death. In addition, soldiers watched millions of civilians go out on the streets against the military regime in June 1987. Hence, major military commanders had to worry about the backward winds that could come upon them when they made decisions that countered democratic changes in civil-military relations. They had to take not just a power struggle with the civilian government, but a struggle with millions of citizens. Of course, in this situation, the military could use its own exclusive force to oppress the civilian government and citizens. Military commanders had to doubt whether their young subordinate members would obey their orders, however, because of the aforementioned factor. Furthermore, they also had to consider that their decisions would be at the expense of citizens' armed resistance, as in the past at Gwangju. This potential instability contributed to the decision of the main commanders of the military to accept rather than resist the democratization of civil-military relations. Especially, when the democratization movement ended military dictatorship and the perpetrators were punished, the military became aware of what a political intervention was leading to.

The process of democratization in Taiwan had differences from that of South Korea. First of all, there are diverse decisive factors for democratization with people's resistance such as international pressure and preference of political leaders.³¹⁶ Chiang Ching-kuo announced in December 1985 that he would not pass his power to his family,

³¹⁶ Chong-pin Lin and Man-jung Mignon Chan, "Taiwan and Mainland: A Comparison on Democratization," *World Affairs* 155, no. 3 (2017): 123–124.

and in July 1987 he ended the martial law that had lasted from 1947.³¹⁷ Also, the Taiwanese people were allowed to visit relatives in mainland China in October 1987, and the restrictions on the media were relaxed in January 1988.³¹⁸ The cause of why he actively embraced democracy is not known exactly.³¹⁹ Scholars generally suppose the following three, however: first, the increase of the citizens' democracy movement; second, the diplomatic isolation caused by the growth of China and the pressure on the improvement of human rights from the United States; and third, Chiang Ching-kuo's preference to stop his dictatorship. Unlike South Korea, these three factors together seem to have played an important role in Taiwan, rather than any one of them being overwhelming. Chiang Ching-kuo's series of reforms for democratization surprised even the key agents of the Koumintang at that time.³²⁰ After Chiang Ching-kuo's death, Lee Teng-hui, who was then the deputy prime minister, succeeded to power. Lee, a native Taiwanese, tried to eliminate the dictatorship and authoritarian elements that had remained in the country, and he continued the democratic reform so that the people could directly elect a national leader.

In Taiwan, the reason why the people's democratization movement did not, relatively speaking, actively happen was the strict authoritarian rule of the Koumintang. The Koumintang slaughtered tens of thousands of the native Taiwanese in 1947 by sending troops from mainland China in the February 28th Incident. The Koumintang declared martial law after withdrawing to the island of Taiwan in 1949. The martial law restricting the political freedom of the people guaranteed by the Constitution lasted for thirty-eight years until Chiang Ching-kuo lifted it in 1987. According to Fulda, the rule of the Koumintang was no different from the colonial rule of Japan for Taiwan.³²¹ The Kuomintang discriminated against Taiwanese as secondary citizens, and the

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

³¹⁹ Hung-mao Tien, "Social Change and Political Development in Taiwan," in *Taiwan in a Time of Transition*, ed. Harvey Feldman and Michael Y. M. Kau (New York: Paragon House, 1988), 10.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Andreas Martin Fulda, "Reevaluating the Taiwanese Democracy Movement: A Comparative Analysis of Opposition Organizations under Japanese and KMT Rule," *Critical Asian Studies* 34, no. 3, 357–394.

modernization of the Taiwan islands was not meant for Taiwanese, but for their original purpose as a means to advance into the mainland.³²² During the martial period, the Koumintang restricted citizens' freedom in various ways.³²³ The Koumintang gave the press guidelines to the press, and they arrested the journalists.³²⁴ The Koumintang also prohibited citizens from participating in any kind of demonstration activities such as massive marches, street protests, and strikes.³²⁵ During the martial law period, the Taiwanese never elected their own presidents.³²⁶ The Koumintang even executed about 3,000 political prisoners during the martial law period.³²⁷ Therefore, since these political oppressions of the Koumintang gave fear to the opposition, the democratization activists in Taiwan controlled and restrained themselves not to make a national democratic movement.³²⁸ Tien argued that, compared to South Korean democrats, Taiwanese democrats held relatively mild struggles against the regime.³²⁹

Therefore, in Taiwan, the democratization movement did not actively take place compared with South Korea. In 1947, the February 28th Incident occurred before the Koumintang entered Taiwan in earnest. Hundreds of thousands of native Taiwanese protested against the repressive rule of the Koumintang. During this process, the Koumintang army slaughtered tens of thousands of native Taiwanese. This incident was a conflict between indigenous people and immigrant people who oppressed the indigenous. After this incident, a national democratization movement did not actively take place in Taiwan for a long time. Many years later, the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 made a big impact on the democratization of Taiwan, but only hundreds of people participated, and only in the Kaohsiung area. In 1990, the Wild Lily movement occurred, but the participants were mainly university students in a capital city.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Tien, 1–38.

³²⁴ Ibid.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid.

The democratization movement in Taiwan has a meaningful history. But it did not have a history of nationwide protest, in which a majority of the population participated, like South Korea. The difference between South Korea and Taiwan's democratization movement can help explain the unrest in Taiwan's civil-military relations during the democratization process. The comparative weakness of Taiwan's national democratization movement created a lack of stimulus to actively accept the democratization of civil-military relations in the military. Because the military members did not feel the need for democracy themselves, they did not need to actively accept changes in civil-military relations that could be disadvantageous to them. Also, there was little social pressure to force the military to make changes. In the process of democratization in Taiwan, there was no armed struggle of citizens or national resistance like South Korea, so that soldiers could consider that even if they rejected the change of civil-military relations, they would not face a serious crisis internally. In other words, since the perception of the necessity and inevitability of democratization itself seems to be lower, Taiwan's military had some maneuvering room for their actions.

By applying Serra's model, South Korea's conflict level axis decreased from the democratic consolidation period through the democratic transition period. This figure increased gradually in Taiwan through the democratic transition and consolidation periods, however. Furthermore, though both the professionalism axis and the control of military axis rose during the democratic transition and consolidation period in both countries, the rises in South Korea were higher than in Taiwan. Figure 4 compares the changes in civil-military relations during democratization in South Korea and Taiwan.




Figure 4. Comparing changes in civil-military relations during democratization in South Korea and Taiwan.³³⁰

³³⁰ Adapted from Serra, 64.

VI. CONCLUSION

On May 10, 2017, Moon Jae-in was elected president in the election in South Korea, after the impeachment of former president Park Geun-hye. He visited the ministry of defense on May 18, shortly after his election to the presidency, received reports from the military commander, and reaffirmed his security commitment. On May 30, however, Yoon Young-chan, the chief of the national communication department in the presidential office, said the ministry of defense deliberately missed a report about the additional deployment of four THAAD missile launchers. The presidential office surveyed key military personnel, including the then minister of defense, Han Min-gu, who was appointed by the former president. Given that the THAAD issue³³¹ was a sensitive issue in the security surrounding the Korean peninsula, the incident has brought a significant wave. After the dispute, President Moon Jae-in appointed Song Young-moo, a former chief of the navy, as minister of national defense, and Chung Kyung-doo, then chief of the air force, was appointed to the joint chiefs of staff. Significant changes are anticipated, given that both positions have usually been held by the army.

On May 20, 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected president in Taiwan. She became the first female president in Taiwan and the second Democratic Progressive Party president. Her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who was from the Koumintang, had maintained a relatively friendly relationship with the military. Since Tsai was a woman in Taiwan, however, where every man was obliged to military service, she had no military experience. In addition, Tsai supported a policy of Taiwan independence that the military has not favored. After she took office, Tsai ordered the military to reform the military strategy and culture in August 2016. Tsai criticized the Taiwanese military for its improper remnants of the Koumintang army, and advised the Taiwanese military to re-

³³¹ THAAD is an acronym for “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense” and is a ballistic intercept missile system developed for U.S. military use. The debate began in South Korea in June 2014, when the USFK Commander said there was a need to deploy THAAD in South Korea to defend against missile attacks by North Korea. While China and Russia strongly oppose THAAD’s deployment on the Korean peninsula, Park Geun-hye’s government decided to deploy it in July 2016.

establish their reason for existence and the object to be countered.³³² After Donald Trump became president of the United States at the end of 2016, then President-elect Trump held a telephone conversation with president Tsai. This was the highest-level call made in thirty-seven years after the two countries broke official diplomatic relations. Tsai also officially traveled to the United States while visiting Latin America.

The internal and external security situations of these two countries are expected to have a considerable impact on civil-military relations. It is also likely that civil-military relations would affect them and their leaders' performances.

In this paper, Narcis Serra's theory of military reform has been used to analyze the development process of civil-military relations in South Korea and Taiwan during their democratization. The development processes of the two countries had both commonalities and differences. This study also looked at the history of the democratization movements of the two countries as a possible cause of the differences in their marches toward democracy.

The democratic transition of South Korea can be regarded as beginning with the election of President Kim Young-sam. He purged Hanahoe, a private organization that had a strong influence in the army, and punished former presidents and generals who caused military coups and slaughtered civilians.³³³ South Korea's democratic consolidation period occurred during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun regimes. The two presidents created the NSC and expanded its capabilities to allow the President to effectively control defense policy.³³⁴ Also, they tried to increase the proportion of civilian employees in the department of defense.³³⁵ During the democratization of South Korea, the military actively accepted reforms rather than resisting the civilian presidents. The reason for the military's choice seems to be the influence over a long period of the extensive democratization movement in South Korea. Applying Serra's theory, the

³³² Minnie Chan, "Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen Orders Revamp of Military Strategy, Weapons Upgrade," *South China Morning Post*, August 25, 2016.

³³³ Cho, 292.

³³⁴ Kuehn, 16.

³³⁵ Kim, 126.

conflict level axis remained stable during the democratization period, and the control axis of the military gradually shifted toward civilian control. The professional axis shifted to increasing military professionalism.

Taiwan's democratic transition period can be classified as taking place during the Lee Teng-hui regime. He carried out reforms that changed the military from the Koumintang army into the national army.³³⁶ He also appointed the first genuine civilian defense minister in Taiwan's history.³³⁷ The democratic consolidation period can be considered to be the Chen Shui-bian regime. He created the NSC that allowed the president to control the defense policy, and allocated the ratio of civilian staffs in the department of defense by law.³³⁸ During this period, the Taiwanese military did not resist the civilian president directly by using military force, and tried to accept the policies of the civilian government. A high-ranking official from the military did not accept the civilian president's policy, however, and made a secret meeting with other generals.³³⁹ Furthermore, soldiers mocked the civilian president during an official event.³⁴⁰ In addition, two soft coups occurred.³⁴¹ Applying Serra's theory, while the control of the military axis and the professional axis increased gradually for civilian control and military professionalism during Taiwan's democratic transition and consolidation period, they were not higher than those of South Korea. Furthermore, the conflict level axis rather increased during both periods and did not approach a stable state like South Korea.

The difference in the democratization process between the two countries' civil-military relations seems to be due to the differences in the process of democratization between the two countries. In the case of South Korea, during the process of democratization, citizens voluntarily aided the national democratic movement against the authoritarian regime. Occasionally, civilians voluntarily armed themselves and fought

³³⁶ Fravel, 66–67.

³³⁷ Tzeng, 111–112.

³³⁸ Tzeng, 151–172.

³³⁹ Tzeng, 111–112.

³⁴⁰ Lee, 210.

³⁴¹ Tzeng, 151–172, Lee, 211.

against military forces. Millions of citizens from across the country came out on the street every day and campaigned for democracy. South Korean dictators were forced to adopt democracy under the pressure of these citizens. This South Korean democratization movement not only made soldiers aware of the importance of democratization voluntarily, but also reminded them of the social pressure that they should bear if they accepted the democratization of civil-military relations passively. In the case of Taiwan, there was a voluntary democratization movement of citizens, but there were also other main factors such as international pressure and political leaders' preferences. The strict social controls of the Koumintang in Taiwan had limited citizens' voluntary democracy movements. This characteristic of the Taiwanese democratization process created a shortage of incentives that would allow the military to actively accept changes in civil-military relations that could have a negative effect on them. In addition, the Taiwan military did not worry too much about the storm from society after it had blown over, even if they accepted the change of civil-military relations passively. For these reasons, the Taiwanese military did not actively accept the democratization of civil-military relations as much as South Koreans.

This study is an area where prior research has made little progress. Therefore, this research can be a starting point in this field. In the past, many authoritarian countries have undergone and are undergoing a process of democratization. In the future, authoritarian or totalitarian nations like North Korea can also undergo a process of democratization. This study could contribute to analyzing the civil-military relations of such countries in the future.

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