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SOUTHEAST ASIA: ISIS'S NEXT FRONT

by

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SOUTHEAST ASIA: ISIS'S NEXT FRONT

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines key factors that may help the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) establish a new province, or front, within Southeast Asia. It poses the questions: What conditions have already allowed ISIS's brand of terrorism to spread to the region and how could they enable the terrorist organization to establish a front there? Four factors were examined across Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. These factors include the presence and strength of ISIS-aligned terrorist groups, the production and location of ISIS-affiliated foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), the number and severity of ISIS-linked activity, and the overall level of each state's weakness. While no country remains completely insulated from ISIS, the Philippines is by far the most exposed. The country faces several challenges—a unified network of structured pro-ISIS groups, scores of incoming Southeast Asian FTFs, a large number of severe ISIS-linked activities, and a lack of counter-terrorism (CT) capacity. Without making significant changes to the country's CT efforts, the Philippines will likely continue to face the greatest ISIS threat in the region. The findings identified in this thesis may help other countries detect and improve key vulnerabilities that, if left unchecked, may advance ISIS's influence.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Ansarul Khilafah Philippines
AKS	Ansar Khalifah Sarangani
AQ	al-Qaeda
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BNPT	Indonesia's National Counterterrorism Agency
CT	Counter-terrorism
FAKSI	Forum of Islamic Law Activists
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighter
GRP	Government of the Republic of the Philippines
IPAC	Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JAS	Jamaah Anshorul Syariat
JAT	Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JN	Jabhat al-Nusra
KFR	kidnapping-for-ransom
KIM	Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao
KMM	Kumpulan Militan Mujahidin
MG	Maute Group
MIB	West Indonesia Mujahidin
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIT	Mujahideen Indonesia Timor
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NBER	National Bureau of Economic Research
NSOF	National Special Operations Force
PAMANA	Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan
PGK	Royal Malaysian Police Special Branch Counterterrorism Unit
POTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act

RISM	Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement
SMATA	Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act
SOG	Special Operations Group

I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the past three years since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) claimed large swaths of land and declared the formation of their purported “caliphate,” the terrorist organization has lost approximately 60 percent of its territory in Iraq and Syria.¹ While ISIS suffers steady losses in the Middle East, the organization continues to perpetuate a global campaign that seeks to unify separate militant groups throughout the world.² Over the past three years, ISIS’s influence and appeal has been growing in Southeast Asia.³ Since June 2014, approximately 1,000 foreign fighters from Southeast Asian countries have traveled to the Middle East to join ISIS.⁴ Some of these fighters have joined Khatibah Nusantara (Malay archipelago unit), a company of Bahasa-speaking Southeast Asians currently fighting in Syria.⁵ Additionally, several Southeast Asian terrorist groups have already sworn allegiance to ISIS.⁶ This thesis will seek answers to the following two questions: (1) what conditions have already allowed ISIS’s brand of terrorism to spread to Southeast Asia and (2) how could they enable ISIS to establish a new front there?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In recent months, the topic of ISIS’s spread into Southeast Asia has received a great amount of attention. In the April 27, 2016, hearing before the Committee on

¹ Jack Moore, “End of ISIS Approaching as Caliphate Loses Money and Land,” *Newsweek*, last modified on June 27, 2017, <http://www.newsweek.com/islamic-state-wont-survive-fourth-year-after-territory-and-revenue-collapse-630018>.

² Jasmininder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Bin Jani, “‘Daesh-isation’ of Southeast Asia’s Jihadists,” *RSIS Commentaries* 80, April 11, 2016, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CO16080.pdf>.

³ Joseph Liow, “Escalating ISIS threat in Southeast Asia: Is the Philippines a weak link?” CNN, July 8, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/07/opinions/isis-southeast-asia-liow/>.

⁴ The Soufan Group, *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq* (New York: TSS, 2015), http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Liow, “Escalating ISIS threat in Southeast Asia?”

Homeland Security, Chairman Peter King said, “There are indications of [ISIS] and Islamist ideology spreading through parts of Southeast Asia that are reminiscent of the violent ideology’s expansion in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, and elsewhere in Africa.”⁷ Furthermore, he warned, many remain skeptical that Islamist extremism in Southeast Asia poses an actual threat to the U.S. homeland.⁸ This skepticism, he argued was the “same skepticism that ignored the threats from Yemen, Nigeria, and Libya until they had grown out of hand.”⁹ In a July 27, 2016, speech, U.S. Pacific Command head Admiral Harris warned that the Asia Pacific region could be the next front in the war against ISIS.¹⁰ He argued that ISIS continues to “rebalance” into the region after the organization established provinces in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria and Afghanistan.¹¹

Since 2016, ISIS expanded by establishing a series of wilayats, or satellite provinces in countries around the world.¹² On this expansion, Rahmani and Tanco write, “ISIS referred to its affiliates as semi-independent wilayats, or ‘provinces’—pockets of territory, varying in size—that expanded its geographic reach and strategic depth.”¹³ Furthermore, they explain,

Rather than build new provinces from the ground up, ISIS has typically coopted existing jihadist organizations. Groups initially contacted ISIS leadership and presented military and organizational plans of action, then pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. ISIS leadership accepted the oaths, publicly acknowledged the province, and either appointed a new leader or endorsed an existing one. The new provinces

⁷ *ISIS in the Pacific: Assessing Terrorism in Southeast Asia and the Threat to the Homeland: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence*, 114th Cong. (2016), <https://archive.org/details/gov.gpo.fdsys.CHRG-114hrg22758>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Harry B. Harris, “Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation,” speech, Japan - U.S. Military Statesmen Forum (Tokyo, 2016), <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/873237/rebuild-japan-initiative-foundation/>.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Bardia Rahmani and Andrea Tanco, “Growing Caliphate: Profiles of Affiliates,” Wilson Center, last modified February 19, 2016, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/isiss-growing-caliphate-profiles-affiliates>.

¹³ Ibid.

typically received training, funding, and foreign fighters, as well as a polished media presence. In return, ISIS expanded its global reach and deepened its strategic resilience.¹⁴

In the Arab world, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have been officially claimed as provinces by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.¹⁵ Claimed provinces outside the Arab world are found in the North Caucasus in Russia, Afghanistan/Pakistan, and Nigeria.¹⁶ The rise in ISIS-linked terrorism in Southeast Asia seems to indicate the group's intent to establish a new province, or front somewhere in the region. This thesis will use the term "front" in lieu of province.

ISIS-linked activity is on the rise. Since the proclamation of their supposed caliphate in 2014, ISIS has conducted 143 terrorist attacks in over 29 countries other than Iraq and Syria.¹⁷ Within Southeast Asia, in January 2016, a group of gunmen detonated a series of blasts in downtown Jakarta, killing four people and injuring 23. ISIS immediately claimed responsibility for the attack. This was the first successful large scale terrorist attack on Indonesian soil since 2009. A single terrorist attack in and of itself is not necessarily cause for great concern, however, the potential threat is magnified when this attack is examined beside other, equally important developments: (1) local support for the group in the form of Southeast Asian terrorist organizations pledging allegiance to ISIS; (2), the increase of battle hardened Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) bringing combat experience back from the Middle East; (3) the level of ISIS-linked efforts that indicated greater influence for the group within individual countries; and (4) the varying degree of state weakness in combatting terrorism across the region.

In many ways, the spread of ISIS represents a larger problem today for governments that have had experience countering terrorism in the past. ISIS ideology is

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Katherine Bauer, *Beyond Syria and Iraq: Examining Islamic State Provinces* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2016), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus149_Bauer.pdf.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ray Sanchez, Tim Lister, Mark Bixler, Sean O'Key, Michael Hogenmiller, and Mohammed Tawfeeq, "ISIS Goes Global: Over 143 Attacks In 29 Countries," CNN, January 25, 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/>.

centered on a movement in Islamic political thought known as Jihadi-Salafism, or jihadism for short.¹⁸ While other groups, like al-Qaeda (AQ), have been known to adopt jihadism at times, what makes ISIS different has to do with an extreme interpretation and promotion of that ideology.¹⁹ As Bunzel argues, “In contrast with AQ, [ISIS] is absolutely uncompromising on doctrinal matters, prioritizing the promotion of an unforgiving strain of Sala thought.”²⁰ The divergence of AQ and ISIS can be traced back to a key split between the founders of each group—Osama Bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Aaron Zelin, a Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues, “The ideological divide between bin Laden and Zarqawi played out on the battlefield... part of this was because Zarqawi felt that the only way to save the *umma* (global Islamic community) from itself was through purging it, whereas [bin Laden] believed that Muslims were not the problem, but that instead the ‘apostate’ institutions needed to be changed.”²¹ AQ leadership cautioned its followers of mass casualty after Zarqawi and his successors in Iraq conducted a series of gruesome extra-legal killings.²² Ironically, groups like AQ have benefited from ISIS’s extreme use of violence because they represent a more moderate alternative.²³ While jihadism has been a successful tactic used by many organizations, ISIS’s ideology represents a far more extreme threat to nations around the globe.

Judging from the past decades, one thing is likely—terrorism and the spread of terrorist ideology is not going away. As of November 2017, countries in Southeast Asia may possess the critical conditions required for the establishment of an ISIS front. By identifying these critical conditions and examining the empirical evidence on the

¹⁸ Cole Bunzel, *From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World 19, 2015), 9, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-ideology-of-the-Islamic-State.pdf>.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

²¹ Aaron Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement,” Research Notes, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20, 2014, accessed 2 March 2017, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf.

²² Donald Holbrook, “Al-Qaeda and the Rise of ISIS,” *Survival* 57, no. 2 (March 2015): <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080%2F00396338.2015.1026070>.

²³ *Ibid.*

prevalence of those conditions, we may be able to predict which countries in Southeast Asia are more likely to become ISIS's next front.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

Terrorism within Southeast Asia is not a new phenomenon. In the 1990s, a transnational terrorist network known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) formed across Southeast Asia.²⁴ JI fighters were sent to train in Afghanistan only to return to renew insurgencies and plot major terrorist attacks across Indonesia.²⁵ The group was responsible for several high profile attacks to include the Bali Bombings in 2002. Shortly after the September 11 attacks and the Bali bombings, Southeast Asia was labeled "the second front" in Washington's Global War on Terror.²⁶ While a great deal of research has been done on individual transnational threats like terrorism or piracy, far less has been done on the movement of those threats from one geographic area into another.²⁷ Unfortunately, because there are so many factors that could contribute to terrorism spreading from one area to another, much of the existing research lacks supporting data. In order to mitigate this problem and to determine which countries within Southeast Asia are more susceptible to become an ISIS front, this thesis will approach the topic at two levels: first, it will determine the essential conditions that make some countries more susceptible to ISIS's brand of terrorism; and second, it will use those conditions as a framework in examining Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia.

1. ISIS-Aligned Groups

A key condition that could enable ISIS's new front within Southeast Asia centers on local support in the region via ISIS-aligned terrorist groups. Since the formation of the

²⁴ U.S. Congress, *ISIS in the Pacific*, 7.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ John Gershman, "Is Southeast Asia the Second Front," *Foreign Affairs*, 81, no. 4, 2002, doi:10.2307/20033240, 60.

²⁷ For example, notable scholarship on the spread of terrorism include the following works: Martha Crenshaw's *Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power* (1983) and "The Causes of Terrorism" (1981), Manus I. Midlarsky, Martha Crenshaw and Fumihiko Yoshida's "Why Violence Spreads: The Contagion of International Terrorism" (1980), and Moorhead Kennedy's, "The 21st Century Conditions Likely to Inspire Terrorism," (1998).

caliphate, some terrorist organizations in the region pledged allegiance to ISIS, while others rejected the organization.²⁸ For example in Indonesia, JI became a leading voice opposed to ISIS in 2013.²⁹ Regardless, support for ISIS among local terrorists can be seen in many countries in the region. In Malaysia, Kumpulan Militan Mujahidin (KMM) pledged allegiance to ISIS.³⁰ In the Philippines, ISIS-aligned groups include: the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP), the Maute Group (MG), Ansar Dawlah Fi Filibbin, the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RISM), and the Khilafa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM). In Indonesia, groups like the Forum of Islamic Law Activists (FAKSI), Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) or the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad, Ring Banten, and Gema Salam have all pledged allegiance to ISIS.³¹ Simply put, a higher concentration of ISIS-aligned terrorist groups within specific countries indicates greater support for ISIS.

Before this thesis examines the consistency and prevalence of aligned groups across the region, it is important to establish the causal mechanisms that create alliances. The question arises—why have some groups formed alliances with ISIS, while others have not? One widely accepted explanation for alliance formation is centered on survival.³² Philipps writes,

Mobilization is vital for organizations, and terrorist organizations are no exception. These groups must seek out ways to stay strong, stay relevant, and therefore survive. One way terrorist groups can attempt to achieve these goals is through forming cooperative relationships with other terrorist groups. Relationships between groups have not yet been

²⁸ U.S. Congress, *ISIS in the Pacific*, 7.

²⁹ “Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),” TRAC, accessed November 9, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jemaah-islamiyah-ji>.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Greg Fealy and John Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, USAID, Arlington: Coffey International, 2016, 13, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2016/PBAAD863.pdf>.

³² Joel Day, “The ISIS Bandwagon: Under What Conditions Do Groups Pledge Support?” Boston University Institute of Culture, Religion, and World Affairs, March 8, 2016, <https://www.bu.edu/cura/files/2016/03/The-ISIS-Bandwagon-V3.pdf>, 1.

examined in the context of group longevity, but they are likely to play an important role.³³

This theory does not necessarily apply to groups pledging allegiance to ISIS for two reasons. One, a pledge of allegiance to ISIS likely invites unwanted attention from CT forces.³⁴ And two, a pledge of allegiance could invariably lead to a splintering of local alliances as some simply reject ISIS's ideology.³⁵ On this notion in Indonesia, Watts writes,

Many jihadist groups in Indonesia have actually rejected [ISIS] out of repugnance for their brutal tactics. But while many of the groups are primarily motivated by local grievances, those who have aligned themselves with [ISIS] are true believers who have been directly inspired by the global movement beyond any local considerations. These individuals are highly motivated to see an [ISIS]-linked Southeast Asian Islamic province realized.³⁶

If allegiances are born out of the need to survive, one could argue that pledging allegiance to ISIS would likely lead to the opposite.

Another explanation centers on increasing a group's capacity.³⁷ Day argues, "Small groups ally with larger groups to access new tactics which require skill-building and education, new weapons, and new cadres of recruits that perhaps they would not otherwise have access to."³⁸ Unfortunately, this explanation is also hard to support in the case of ISIS as local fighters in Southeast Asia have been known to travel to the Middle East to augment the conflict instead of the other way around.³⁹ If ISIS fighters sourced from the Middle East traveled into Southeast Asia to augment local forces, the "capacity building" explanation might make more sense. Another form of capacity building could

³³ Brian Phillips, "Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2014, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12073, 336-347.

³⁴ Day, "The ISIS Bandwagon," 1.

³⁵ Ibid., 3.

³⁶ U.S. Congress, *ISIS in the Pacific*, 12.

³⁷ Day, "The ISIS Bandwagon," 3.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

be based on individual Southeast Asians receiving tactical expertise in the Middle East and returning home. Similarly, this theory is not convincing as Southeast Asian jihadis would need to survive the conflict in the Middle East, evade international CT efforts, and return home. This process could take a great deal of time and the benefits of such an alliance may not be realized for several years. Therefore, aligning with ISIS to increase a group's capacity is hard to conceive.

The most convincing explanation for why groups pledge allegiance to ISIS is centered on increasing the group's legitimacy.⁴⁰ As Day argues,

The incentive for endorsing [ISIS] is less about material gain and instead is something socially imagined...Joining the caliphate from afar, likewise, is a fundamentally imaginative act, inventing connections where they previously did not exist. Just as nationalism serves political goals for narrow-cleavages of elites, turning a domestic terrorist organization towards the caliphate serves the political interests of certain elites within the organization.⁴¹

Essentially, groups pledge allegiance to ISIS because it brings a global narrative which positions some local elites over others.⁴² Regardless of the reasons behind forming alliances, countries that have a greater presence of ISIS-aligned groups are simply more vulnerable to the ideology.

2. Foreign Terrorist Fighters

As ISIS-held territory in the Middle East is lost, fears of Southeast Asian FTFs returning to the region have mounted. For example, on October 17, 2016, Malaysia's defense minister, Hishammuddin Hussein, ordered the military to "keep an eye on [developments] in Iraq and Syria because we are worried that [ISIS FTFs] might come here and it won't be a small number."⁴³ On the potential threat these FTFs pose, Habib argues, "I think this is going to be an imminent threat. When the fighters return to

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., 4.

⁴³ Bhavan Jaipragas, "Why Are Malaysia, Singapore Nervous as Iraq Looks to take Mosul from Islamic State," *This Week in Asia*, last modified on April 3, 2017, <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2029110/jihadist-alumni-what-southeast-asia-has-fear-if-iraq-retakes>.

countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, they will build a kind of alumni network, like the fighters from Afghanistan nearly two decades ago.”⁴⁴ Furthermore, on the threat of returning FTFs, Liow concurs,

Given how terrorism in Southeast Asia was previously catalyzed by returnees from the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union, it should hardly be surprising that the scenario of hardened militants returning from Syria with ideology, operational knowledge, and frontline experience to mount attacks in the region is one that exercises security planners. This is a potential threat that cannot be taken lightly.⁴⁵

Hundreds of militants have already been recruited from the Philippines, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia as ISIS began establishing its caliphate in 2014.⁴⁶ On the emergence of ISIS’s recruitment in the region, Sidney Jones argues, “suddenly there was the potential for Indonesian extremists to go to Syria and get military training, combat experience, ideological indoctrination and international contacts. What had become a low-level threat became more serious again.”⁴⁷ Almuttaqi mirrors this fear. He writes, “The key question worrying security analysts and policymakers in the region is what will happen once the Islamic State recruits return to Southeast Asia armed with battle-hardened experience, skills, and training.”⁴⁸

Two comprehensive studies have been done to understand the flow of FTFs. Firstly, the Soufan Group, a private intelligence think tank headquartered in New York City, published a comprehensive study of global FTF source countries in 2015. Secondly, in April 2016, Efraim Benmelech and Esteban F. Klor, of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in Cambridge Massachusetts, published a set of working papers titled, “What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS.” Their work is

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ U.S. Congress, *ISIS in the Pacific*, 25.

⁴⁶ Luke Hunt, “Islamic State Announces Expansion into Southeast Asia with Attacks, Threats,” *Washington Times*, last modified on January 31, 2016, <https://thcasean.org/read/articles/171/The-Islamic-State-and-the-rise-of-violent-extremism-in-Southeast-Asia>.

⁴⁷ Sidney Jones, “Battling ISIS in Indonesia,” *New York Times*, January 16, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/battling-isis-in-indonesia.html>.

⁴⁸ Ibrahim Almuttaqi, “The Islamic State and the Rise of Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia,” ASEAN Studies Program, accessed April 3, 2016, <https://thcasean.org/read/articles/171/The-Islamic-State-and-the-rise-of-violent-extremism-in-Southeast-Asia>.

considered “the first systematic analysis of the link between economic, political, and social conditions and the global phenomenon of ISIS foreign fighters.”⁴⁹ As fears of returning FTFs continue to mount, this thesis will incorporate both studies to establish where Southeast Asian FTFs were sourced from. Simply put, larger numbers of FTFs from a particular country highlight a larger vulnerability for that country to become ISIS’s next front.

Another study examines individuals who became inspired to join ISIS in the Middle East and subsequently became disenfranchised and returned home. In this study, conducted by the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, el-Said and Barrett argue that the majority of FTFs return to their countries of origin due to psychological and physical hardships.⁵⁰ If this theory is accurate and a majority of FTFs who have fought with ISIS return to their countries of origin, countries that produces more FTFs will simply receive more returnees after the conflict. As fears of returning FTFs continue to mount, this thesis will incorporate all three studies to establish where Southeast Asian FTFs were sourced from and where they may return to. Simply put, larger numbers of FTFs from a particular country highlight a larger vulnerability for that country to become ISIS’s next front. Whether these FTFs return to their countries of origin, or they consolidate within one country, their presence will likely play a major role in spreading ISIS’s influence.

3. ISIS’s Efforts

The third factor that may indicate a potential location for the establishment of ISIS’s next front centers on efforts made by ISIS-linked elements. These efforts are measured by examining the location, consistency, and severity of ISIS-linked activities. For the purposes of this thesis, “activity” is an umbrella term for three different subgroups—actions, attacks, and statements. For these terms, IHS Markit’s Terrorism

⁴⁹ Efraim Benmelech and Esteban F. Klor, “What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS,” NBER Working Paper No. 22190 (April 2016), <http://www.nber.org/papers/w22190>, 1.

⁵⁰ Hamed el-Said and Richard Barrett, *Enhancing the Understanding of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon in Syria* (New York, NY: United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, 2017), http://www.un.org/en/counterterrorism/assets/img/Report_Final_20170727.pdf, 43.

and Insurgency Database definitions will be used. IHS Markit defines an action as “an incident in which militants or their supporters commit a non-violent political act (such as signing a ceasefire), or a non-political violent act (such as a bank robbery).”⁵¹ It defines an attack as “an incident in which a sub-state actor (either an individual or organization) commits an illegal act of politically or ideologically motivated violence against persons or property, with the aim of coercing others to adopt or comply with its objectives, or to submit to their authority.”⁵² Lastly, it defines a statement as “an incident in which militants or their supporters issue a notable written or verbal statement.”⁵³

ISIS’s efforts, whether strong or weak, show the group’s intent to inspire followers and broaden support throughout the region. As terrorist groups continue to align with ISIS, criminal activities once common among unrelated Southeast Asian terrorist organizations, may now be orchestrated to provide support to ISIS. For example, in August 2016, known ISIS-linked operators from the MG, attacked a jail in Marawi and freed eight prisoners.⁵⁴ One may question whether this development supports or is related to ISIS at all. However, two months later in November 2016, the MG, fighting under the banner of ISIS since 2015, seized the township of Butig, Mindanao and fought Philippine Security Forces for six days.⁵⁵ Seemingly unrelated activities conducted by ISIS-linked elements in the region support ISIS.

Since 2014, ISIS-affiliates conducted several notable attacks within Southeast Asia. On May 23, 2017, hundreds of ISIS-linked fighters attacked and occupied the Philippine city of Marawi, which resulted in the deaths of 165 soldiers and 47 civilians.⁵⁶

⁵¹ “Terrorism and Insurgency Centre,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, November 9, 2016, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyCentre/Home>.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ “Country Reports on Terrorism 2016,” United States Department of State, July 15, 2017, available at: <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ “Islamic Freedom Fighters, Abu Sayyaf Next After Maute ‘Wipeout’ — Defense Chief,” *Manila Times*, last modified on October 27, 2017, <http://www.manilatimes.net/islamic-freedom-fighters-abu-sayyaf-next-maute-wipeout-defense-chief/358410/>.

The conflict displaced hundreds of thousands of Marawi residents.⁵⁷ On this development, international terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna writes, “The battle in Marawi has a significant impact on extremists in Southeast Asia and beyond. It indicates that despite government efforts, the [ISIS] threat is growing both in the physical and virtual space.”⁵⁸ In a January 2016 attack, ISIS-linked fighters bombed a police post in Jakarta that resulted in four dead and 23 injured.⁵⁹ In June 2016, ISIS-linked attackers attempted to detonate a hand grenade in a bar in Puchong, Malaysia, which resulted in eight injured.⁶⁰ It is hard to gauge the level of ISIS’s involvement in attacks like the ones mentioned previously. Some attacks, like the 2016 Jakarta attack, are thought to be coordinated and directed by higher echelon ISIS leaders.⁶¹ Others, like the attack in Malaysia may have been conducted by aspirational fighters with limited connections to ISIS. Regardless, any activity connected to ISIS should be evaluated.

In 2016, ISIS announced that a prominent Filipino terrorist would become the *amir*, or ruler, of all Southeast Asian operations. The Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict (IPAC) writes, “While it has not been formally declared as a province or *wilayat*, [ISIS] has endorsed an Abu Sayyaf leader, Isnlon Hapilon, as amir for Southeast Asia, and Southeast Asians in Syria have pledged their loyalty to him.”⁶² On this regional leadership decision, Angelica Habulan, terrorism analyst at International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, writes,

Isnlon Hapilon is currently the face of terrorism in Southeast Asia in the same manner that southern Philippines is the current nucleus of the

⁵⁷ Rohan Gunaratna, “Marawi: A Game Changer for Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” *CTTA* 9, no. 7, July 2017, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-July-2017.pdf>.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2016.”

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ For example, Indonesian Police chief Tito Karnavian claimed in an interview with Reuters news that notorious Indonesian ISIS fighter Bahrun Naim was behind the attack. Naim is currently thought to be in Syria. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/isil-claims-responsibility-jakarta-attacks-indonesia-160114104322617.html>.

⁶² *Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia*, IPAC Report No. 33 (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2016) 1, <http://www.southeastasia.fm/2017/05/10/ipac-report-33-pro-isis-groups-in-mindanao-and-their-links-to-indonesia-and-malaysia/>.

“Islamic State” in the region. An [ISIS] enclave in the Sulu Archipelago presents a security threat not only to the Philippines but also to Southeast Asia.⁶³

Furthermore, she proposes that the specific implications for this threat include, an increase in jihadist numbers in the area, an increase of terrorist training camps and bomb-making facilities, and a flood of non-Filipino foreigners attracted to the area to fight under Hapilon.⁶⁴ The establishment of Southeast Asia’s key leadership highlights the uptick in ISIS-linked activity and represents ISIS’s growing interest in influencing the region.

Gathering data on ISIS’s direct efforts over the past four years can be difficult without the right tool. This thesis uses data from the Jane’s IHS Markit Terrorism & Insurgency Centre, a resource that “delivers in-depth information and contextual analysis on 250+ non-state armed groups, in addition to offering at-a-glance briefings on immediate concerns and international incidents.⁶⁵ The IHS Markit database allows one to set various parameters to gather essential data. In order to focus the data solely on ISIS-related activity taking place in Southeast Asia since 2014, this author set the following parameters: (1) ISIS-linked activity must have taken place between June 29, 2014, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate, to August 23, 2017; (2) individual ISIS-linked activities must have taken place in the territorial boundaries of the three countries being evaluated; and (3) for activity to be considered ISIS-linked, it must have been conducted by, with, and through any of the ISIS-aligned groups described in chapter two.

Before proceeding, it is important to define a few key terms. For the purposes of this thesis, “activity” is an umbrella term for three different subgroups—actions, attacks, and statements. For these terms, IHS Markit’s definitions will be used. IHS Markit defines an action as “An incident in which militants or their supporters commit a non-

⁶³ Angelica Habulan, “The Emir of IS Philippines,” *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis* 8, no. 11, RSIS, November 2016, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-November-2016.pdf>, 21.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ “Jane’s World Insurgency & Terrorism,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, <https://www.ihs.com/products/janes-world-terrorism-insurgency.html>

violent political act (such as signing a ceasefire), or a non-political violent act (such as a bank robbery).”⁶⁶ It defines an attack as, “An incident in which a sub-state actor (either an individual or organization) commits an illegal act of politically or ideologically motivated violence against persons or property, with the aim of coercing others to adopt or comply with its objectives, or to submit to their authority.”⁶⁷ Lastly it defines a statement as, “An incident in which militants or their supporters issue a notable written or verbal statement.”⁶⁸

In order to provide clarity on the nature of the data, this author must first establish two points. One, IHS Markit Terrorism & Insurgency Centre claims that their data is very accurate. They write, “Data is gathered from multiple sources and double source verified, with each event ranked for significance, enabling analysts to work only with those data sets that are significant and reliable in order to support, validate, and declassify proprietary and classified sources.”⁶⁹ A second point centers on the definition of “ISIS-linked.” For example, an attack against government forces in the Philippines may have been conducted by an ASG member with a few, loose connections to ISIS. However, that event may be reported by the original source as an attack conducted by ISIS or ISIS-affiliates. While the nature of internal relationships between ISIS-linked fighters and ISIS remain unknown, for the purposes of this thesis, this event would still be considered ISIS-linked. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, some terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia have long histories tied to crime, long before they pledged allegiance to ISIS. For example, MG and ASG have both been involved in various kidnapping-for-ransom (KFR) activities before making their pledges. This author will assume that with a pledge of allegiance to ISIS, comes support in various forms. As ISIS loses its remaining territory and revenue in the Middle East, nefarious activities conducted by ASG and MG

⁶⁶ “Terrorism and Insurgency Centre,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, November 9, 2016, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyCentre/Home>.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ “Terrorism and Insurgency Centre,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, November 9, 2016 <https://www.ihs.com/products/janes-terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.html>.

will provide support to ISIS.⁷⁰ The connections between individual events and ISIS vary. Whether these connections are slight or significant, all events reported as ISIS-linked within this author's parameters will be incorporated.

4. State Weakness

Whether a state simply lacks essential funding and experience in countering terrorism, the state fails to prosecute and incarcerate terrorists, or state inadvertently creates more extremism through weak de-radicalization programs, state-weakness in combatting ISIS could play a major role in spreading the group's influence into Southeast Asia. Tore Bjorgo, professor and researcher at the University of Oslo, argues that "weak state control of territory," is a force that accelerates international terrorism.⁷¹ Some countries within Southeast Asia are more effective at countering terrorism than others. Similarly, some organizations within a specific country are more effective than others. For example, an Indonesian organization known as Detachment 88, has been vigilant at ensuring security within Indonesian borders.⁷² Greg Fealy, head of the Department of Political and Social Change at Australian National University writes,

In a police force notorious for corruption and incompetence, Detachment stands out as a one of the few units possessing high professionalism and an excellent track record of investigative success. Since 2002, it has arrested more than 1,000 suspected terrorists, successfully prosecuting more than 700 of them.⁷³

While Detachment 88 has been successful, other Indonesian police organizations remain less effective.⁷⁴ Indonesia's BNPT (National Agency for Combatting Terrorism), the organization charged with "preventive measures against terrorists and counter-terrorism

⁷⁰ In addition to losing 60 percent of its territory in the Middle East since 2014, ISIS is thought to have lost 80 percent of the group's revenue; Jack Moore, "End of ISIS Approaching as Caliphate Loses Money and Land," *Newsweek* June 29, 2017, <http://www.newsweek.com/islamic-state-wont-survive-fourth-year-after-territory-and-revenue-collapse-630018>.

⁷¹ Tore Bjorgo, *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward* (London, Routledge, 2005), 3.

⁷² Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 24.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

law enforcement operations,” has largely remained unsuccessful.⁷⁵ A clear example of this was the BNPT’s 2015 attempt to shut down 19 jihadist websites because they were mobilizing support for the ISIS.⁷⁶ The organization’s move to shut these websites down was misguided as both pro-ISIS and anti-ISIS websites were blocked. Additionally, ISIS supporters were simply able to bypass blocked websites by “reopening the webpage at a new address.”⁷⁷ A state’s overall ineffectiveness in conducting CT will directly impact ISIS’s ability to influence the local populous.

In addition to a simple lack of security, a misguided CT strategy may in fact magnify social grievances and inadvertently perpetuate the spread and acceptance of radical ideology. Silke argues, “As a driver and facilitator of terrorist campaigns, state countermeasures can have a negative impact far greater than many of the issues which are traditionally seen as root causes of terror.”⁷⁸ Furthermore, he argues, “Ultimately harsh, aggressive policies in response to terrorism fail so often in their stated aims, because they so badly misunderstand and ignore the basic psychology of the enemy and of observers. Strength and power alone are not enough to defeat terrorism.”⁷⁹

A clear example of a state’s more multifaceted approach in combatting terrorism can be found in Malaysia. In addition to intensifying police actions and pre-emptive arrests, Malaysia is currently using some non-traditional methods to stop ISIS’s influence. For example, on April 23, 2015, the Malaysian Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) which includes provisions that allow the detention of suspected terrorists for up to two years, requires tracking of detainees with electronic monitoring

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Andrew Silke, “Fire of Iolaus: the role of state countermeasures in causing terrorism and what needs to be done,” in *Root Causes of Terrorism* (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2005), 241.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 253.

devices, and requires the implementation of various deradicalization programs.⁸⁰ On these Malaysian deradicalization programs, Samuel writes,

According to Commissioner Datuk Seri Mohamad Fuzi from the Royal Malaysian Police, the deradicalization program in Malaysia has a 95% success rate as only a few hardcore militants had relapsed. Based on the 240 terrorists detained from various groups between 2001 and 2011, only 13 militants, or approximately 5% had relapsed and returned to their 'old ways'.⁸¹

A similar program is currently being conducted for those Malaysians connected to ISIS.⁸² It should be noted that success rates provided by the Royal Malaysian Police are likely inflated. Regardless, in addition to strong CT forces and state anti-terror laws, state-run deradicalization campaigns will play a pivotal role in keeping convicted terrorists from returning to terrorism.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

The creation of a new front within Southeast Asia is predicated on the dynamics of how terrorism moves and how the state either helps or hinders that movement. Several conditions could enable ISIS to establish a new front in Southeast Asia. The four hypotheses below fall into two distinct categories; the first two center on the structure and strength of individual terrorist groups and the presence of FTFs in the region. The last two center on the presence and severity of ISIS-linked activities and the state's role in countering ISIS.

A first hypothesis is based on the condition that countries with a greater presence of groups already aligned with ISIS are more vulnerable to become ISIS's next front. The presence of ISIS-aligned groups is an indicator that shows the prevalence of support for the group's ideology. Thus, the causal relationship is simple—the greater the presence of

⁸⁰ Bilveer Singh, "Prevention of Terrorism: Relevance of POTA in Malaysia," *RSIS Commentary* 75, March 31, 2015, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co15075-prevention-of-terrorism-relevance-of-pota-in-malaysia/#.WKJZgRiZNBu/>.

⁸¹ Thomas Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of DAESH in Indonesia, Malaysia and The Philippines* (Kuala Lumpur: The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016), https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific/Publications/2016/Radicalisation_SEA_2016.pdf, 90.

⁸² *Ibid.*

ISIS-affiliated groups in a particular country, the greater the probability of ISIS establishing a front there. This condition essentially gives one country a “head start” over countries that have fewer, if any, ISIS-aligned groups. A second hypothesis is that countries that produce and receive the influx of returning FTFs from the Middle East have a greater propensity to become ISIS’s next front than those with fewer. These FTFs, who received specialized training and combat experience, may greatly aid ISIS’s efforts in garnering local support and establishing a new front. A country with more FTFs will simply have a greater propensity for becoming ISIS’s next front. As mentioned previously, the last two hypotheses center on ISIS-related activity and the state’s role in quelling that activity. A third hypothesis is that countries with greater, more severe levels of ISIS-linked activity are more likely to become ISIS’s next front. A last hypothesis is that a state’s inability to ensure security within its own borders will aid ISIS to establish a front there. Whether the state’s weakness is due to ineffective security forces, laws, or deradicalization strategy, that country will be more vulnerable to ISIS’s spread. Countries that have great CT capacity will have a lesser propensity to become ISIS’s next front.

Any one of the conditions found within a country could be cause for alarm, however, the likely candidate for ISIS’s next front will have a combination of multiple conditions present. Simply put, if a country in Southeast Asia has more than one condition, that country is more susceptible. ISIS’s brand of terrorism is likely to spread to a country that is overwhelmed by two, three, or all of the conditions described earlier.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

If ISIS’s next front is predicated on the presence of the essential conditions proposed in previous sections, three countries within Southeast Asia stand out among the rest—Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. As of November 2017, these countries have few factors in common, namely, the presence of ISIS-aligned terrorist groups and FTFs. However, each country has its own relationship with the remaining two factors—ISIS-related activities and the government’s overall capacity in combatting those activities.

Source material of several types will be used. First, this author will research historical accounts and analysis of extremist groups by country and reports on state responses to terrorism and home-grown radicalization. Second, data from the many centers on transnational threats to include the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), Brookings, RAND, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC), Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre from IHS Markit, and various schools of international relations will be examined.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will be organized into three chapters: an introduction, a chapter examining the first two hypotheses among the countries mentioned above, and a third chapter examining hypotheses three and four. The nature of each hypothesis makes grouping them easier for research purposes. The first two deal with support for ISIS through the presence of ISIS-linked groups and FTFs. These hypotheses support the “supply” side of the equation of how terrorism is spreading to the region. The last two hypotheses deal more with the “demand” side—the state’s hand in creating conditions that may inadvertently perpetuate the spread ISIS ideology.

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II. LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR ISIS

A. INTRODUCTION

When examining the conditions that could lead to the establishment of a new ISIS front in Southeast Asia, two conditions stand out—the presence or absence of ISIS-aligned groups and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). The second chapter of this thesis is centered on two simple hypotheses: (1) that countries with a greater presence of groups that have pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are more vulnerable to become ISIS’s next front than those countries with fewer groups; and (2) countries that produce and contain a greater number of regional FTFs have a greater propensity to become ISIS’s next front than those with fewer. A greater presence of groups associated with ISIS and a greater number of FTFs indicate greater levels of support for the global terrorist organization. This chapter will examine data on these conditions across Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, display the varying levels of support for ISIS’s ideology found in each country, and argue that the country with highest levels of support may unfortunately become a prime location for ISIS’s next front.

B. FACTOR ONE: ISIS-ALIGNED GROUPS

A key condition that could help ISIS establish a new front within Southeast Asia is the alignment of local terrorist groups with ISIS. A pledge of allegiance to ISIS is a significant indicator that highlights a domestic group’s aspirations in expanding ISIS’s footprint globally.⁸³ However, in order for a new front to be established, a few key requirements must be met. In a November 2014 issue of *Dabiq* magazine, ISIS wrote in order for a new front to be established, all local groups must unify under the banner of ISIS under a single leader.⁸⁴ Additionally, that leader must be approved by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself.⁸⁵ This step is critical. If local terrorist groups within one country

⁸³ Day, “The ISIS Bandwagon,” 1.

⁸⁴ V. Arianti, “Aman Abdurrahman: Ideologue and ‘Commander’ of ISIS Supporters in Indonesia,” *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis* 9, no. 2, RSIS, February 2017, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CTTA-February-2017.pdf>, 5.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

compete for power or simply cannot cooperate, that environment is less likely to become a new ISIS front. Conversely, if local groups can unite, but individual group leaders compete for the top leadership position, ISIS will be less likely to establish a new front in that country.

In addition to legitimacy, pledges of allegiance can also bring about negative consequences for individual groups. Negative consequences include ideological fractures among individual members and unwanted attention from security forces at the local and international levels. The presence of groups that overlook such negative consequences in order to ally with ISIS shows a willingness to adopt ISIS doctrine and thus an eagerness to form a new governorate or front. Since 2014, some terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia pledged allegiance, while others rejected the organization completely.⁸⁶ An evaluation of the overall structure and strength of ISIS-aligned groups can highlight which countries will likely have a greater struggle in countering ISIS's brand of extremism. Pro-ISIS Groups across the region range in size and strength considerably. Some groups remain weak with only a few active members, while others remain very strong, with hundreds. However, one should not forget that even the smallest jihadist cell can create great hysteria and chaos when cooperating with a wide and resource rich terrorist network like ISIS.

1. Indonesia

The global organization known as ISIS has created cleavages across Indonesian jihadist organizations. This rift dates back to 2013, when ISIS split from Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), a known al-Qaeda affiliate.⁸⁷ The split essentially forced prominent jihadist networks like JI, a long time al-Qaeda ally, to pick sides. The matter was further complicated on June 29, 2014, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed the formation of the caliphate and named himself caliph.⁸⁸ On these divisive developments, Fealy states,

⁸⁶ U.S. Congress, *ISIS in the Pacific*, 6–15.

⁸⁷ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 5.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

Initially many jihadists in Indonesia were sympathetic or at least neutral to ISIS, particularly when in May and June 2014 it won major victories in Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul against US-backed Iraqi and Kurdish forces. But al-Baghdadi's declaration of an Islamic state and his own elevation to caliph proved highly divisive. While for some jihadists, the caliphate was a long-awaited restoration of a transnational Islamic government and focus, for its detractors, it was an illegitimate state that was brutally attacking its fellow Sunni Muslims. The exchanges between both sides were often vitriolic and personal, with many well-established relationships rent over conflicting attitudes towards ISIS.⁸⁹

The rift between opposing sides can be seen in electronic and print media. For example, *Annajah Magazine* openly criticized ISIS.⁹⁰ One prominent ideologue named Muhammad Jibril Abdurrahman, who runs a website called *Arrahmah media*, explicitly rejected and denounced Baghdadi.⁹¹ An anti-ISIS group known as MMI even suggested that ISIS as an organization was “a conspiracy by the Shiites and Jews to destroy Islam.”⁹²

In addition to rifts centered on competing ideologies, several prominent ideologues from Indonesia compete for power. On this competition, TRAC reports,

These three Indonesians—BahrumSyah, aka Abu Ibrahim; [Abu Jandal] and Bahrun Naim—are based with the Islamic State in Syria and are competing with each other to encourage their contacts in the Pacific Rim to undertake terrorist attacks... By late 2015, each contender for leadership in Syria had his own recruitment channels: one controlled by BahrumSyah, another by Aman Abdurrahman / Abu Jandal, and a third by Bahrun Naim.⁹³

The rivalry among key Indonesian leadership in Syria indicates a key point—no single Indonesian leader has achieved a position of total authority. Two other top pro-ISIS

⁸⁹ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 13.

⁹⁰ Robi Sugara, “New Map of Indonesian Jihadists: Pro-IS and Non-IS?” *RSIS Commentaries* 204, October 16, 2014, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/CO14204.pdf>, 2.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ “From the Pacific Rim to Syria, and back: The Jihadists’ Underground River: Masterminds, facilitators, and leaders: the connections to other IS-supporting groups,” Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, accessed August 14, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/pacific-rim-syria-and-back-jihadists-underground-river/masterminds-facilitators-and-leaders->.

ideologues within Indonesia, Abu Bakr Bashir and Aman Abdurrahman, have “fallen out” and no longer cooperate.⁹⁴ Without a single prominent leader, ISIS’s establishment of a new front in Indonesia is less likely.

The foundation of a jihadi ideology in line with ISIS within Indonesia can be traced back to an Indonesian activist named Muhammad Fachry.⁹⁵ In 2005, he set up an online jihadist website and video chat forum known as Al-Muhajiroun.⁹⁶ The website—originally established by the Syrian jihadi organization known as Hizb ut-Tahrir—enabled Fachry to network with Syrian and Indonesian jihadists, organize databases for recruitment, and facilitate the translation of extremist literature from Arabic into Indonesian.⁹⁷ In addition to his vast online operations, Fachry also created a print magazine named *Al-Muhajirun*.⁹⁸ On this development, IPAC describes,

In 2007, the first edition of the magazine *Al-Muhajirun* was published, with the lead article entitled “Staying on the Road to Jihad.” It included translations of works by radical ulama and an interview with Osama bin Laden. The second edition, in mid-2007, featured a profile of the Islamic State in Iraq, the precursor of ISIS. In it, the authors explained how the establishment of a caliphate would take place via the building of smaller Islamic polities (*imarah Islam*) that would eventually be joined together.⁹⁹

The online website and the print magazine gave Fachry legitimacy in Indonesian jihadist circles.¹⁰⁰ Throughout the following few years, Fachry joined efforts with another prominent jihadist named BahrumSyah.¹⁰¹ These two men are credited with creating the Forum of Islamic Law Activists (FAKSI), one of the three largest pro-ISIS groups within Indonesia. Other notable groups include Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) and Mujahideen

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ *The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia*, IPAC Report No. 13 (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2014) 2, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/09/IPAC_13_Evolution_of_ISIS.pdf.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. 7–8.

Indonesia Timor (MIT).¹⁰² The two most notable groups that remain at odds with ISIS are Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jamaah Anshorul Syariat (JAS).¹⁰³

This section surveys a few of the strongest and most vocal groups in support of ISIS and contrasts them with those groups who are most at odds with ISIS. It is important to note that the lines between pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia are often blurred or, at times, seemingly nonexistent. The connections between group leaders are the product of decades of overlapping efforts and cooperation. It should be known that while it might seem like these groups are separate entities, some work closely together. Thus, it remains difficult to establish where one group ends and another begins.

a. PRO-ISIS Groups

(1) Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD)

JAD is an ISIS-linked group known as ISIS’s “main weapon in Indonesia.”¹⁰⁴ General Suhardi Alius, head of Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), said at a recent seminar, “JAD is the [group we are] most wary of but there are still other networks too. But the one that has a direct connection with global networks is JAD”¹⁰⁵

Since 2014, the group’s leader—a tech-savvy engineer named Bahrun Naim—has served as the intermediary between ISIS and local Indonesian contacts for radicalization and recruitment.¹⁰⁶ While operating alongside ISIS fighters in Syria, Naim uses various encrypted communication tools and popular social media sites to communicate with subordinate cells, provide funds for operations, and conduct tactical training.¹⁰⁷ For

¹⁰² Samuel, “Radicalization in Southeast Asia,” 80; Peter Chalk, *Black flag rising: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia*. Barton, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195330/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf, 11-14.

¹⁰³ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 14.

¹⁰⁴ “Bahrun Naim Cell Network (JAD in Java, Indonesia / IS Indonesia) CELLPROFILE,” TRAC, accessed August 8, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/bahrun-naim-cell-network-jemaah-ansharut-daulah-java-indonesia-jad-indonesia-cell-profile>.

¹⁰⁵ Safrin Batu, “IS setting up base in Philippines,” *Jakarta Post*, December 7, 2016, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/07/is-setting-up-base-in-philippines.html>.

¹⁰⁶ TRAC, “Bahrun Naim Cell Network.”

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

example, on January 9, 2017, Indonesia's elite CT unit Detachment 88 detected and intercepted large transfers of money in the form of bitcoin from Naim to his various cells throughout the country.¹⁰⁸ It is important to note that Aman Abdurrahman, a notorious jihadi ideologue, was JAD's overall leader until his arrest in 2010.¹⁰⁹ He remains influential from Indonesian prison. JAD has been linked to approximately a dozen attack plots within Indonesia, including a thwarted 2016 female suicide-bombing plot which targeted the presidential palace.¹¹⁰

Indonesian authorities uncovered several JAD cells in Solo, Tangerang, and Majalengka. In Solo, CT raids led to the arrests of ten JAD members and the recovery of three kilograms of high-grade triacetone triperoxide explosives and 42 bottles of bomb-making chemicals.¹¹¹ In Tangerang, raids led to the death of six militants, the arrest of four, and recovery of over a dozen live bombs.¹¹² In West Java, authorities made four arrests and uncovered an upscale bomb-making lab with "high-grade" explosives.¹¹³ The discovery of these operational cells, the capture/kill of several JAD militants, and the recovery of highly advanced illicit materials highlights the groups operational capability. While the group's overall size is difficult to assess, the large number of arrests may indicate that the group's overall strength remains high.

(2) The Forum of Islamic Law Activists (FAKSI)

One of the largest and most active pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia is FAKSI, which was formed in 2013.¹¹⁴ As Chalk describes, "The group's ostensible aim is to impress on

¹⁰⁸ Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, "Militant Bahrn Naim used PayPal, bitcoin to transfer funds for terror attacks in Indonesia," *Straits Times*, accessed August 8, 2017, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/militant-bahrn-naim-used-paypal-bitcoin-to-transfer-funds-for-terror-attacks-in>.

¹⁰⁹ "Bahrn Naim Challenges Aman Abdurrahman As The Islamic State's Main Weapon In Indonesia," TRAC, accessed August 8, 2017, <https://www.trackingterrorism.org/chat/trac-insight-bahrn-naim-challenges-aman-abdurrahman-islamic-states-main-weapon-indonesia>.

¹¹⁰ "Bahrn Naim Cell Network," TRAC.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Chalk, "Black Flag Rising," 11–12.

the public the theological criticality of the current struggle in Syria, presenting it as the fulfilment of an ancient Islamic prophecy that the final battle at the end of the world will begin and end in the Levant.”¹¹⁵ In 2014, FAKSI leader BahrumSyah joined ISIS in Syria and was quickly appointed leader of Khatibah Nusantara, or Malay-archipelago unit.¹¹⁶ FAKSI’s grass roots campaign attracted several prominent jihadi ideologues such as Aman Abdurrahman and Halawi Makmun.¹¹⁷ Aman Abdurrahman is thought of by many as the head of the active terrorist group known as Tawhid wal Jihad.¹¹⁸

FAKSI promotes ISIS’s message and solicits local support through social media, online discussion forums, and print magazines.¹¹⁹ One indication of FAKSI’s strength is the vast crowds that attend group pledges of allegiance to ISIS. For example, on July 6, 2014, the FAKSI gathered a group of approximately 600 people, which included dozens of children, at the Islamic State University in Jakarta to pledge allegiance to ISIS.¹²⁰ Because the group is new and has not suffered the same police raids like JAD, the overall size and strength of the group remains unclear.

(3) Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT)

JAT is a group that splintered from JI and has been aligned with ISIS since 2014.¹²¹ The group emerged in 2008 when the former JI emir, Abu Bakar Bashir, split from his former organization, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), or Indonesian

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 14.

¹¹⁷ V. Arianti and Robi Sugara, “Declaration of a State of Islam ‘Caliphate:’ Will discord among Indonesian jihadists breed violence?” in *RSIS Commentaries* 135, July 10, 2014, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO14135.pdf>, 5–6.

¹¹⁸ Robi Sugara, “New Map of Indonesian Jihadists: Pro-IS and Non-IS?” in *RSIS Commentaries* 204, October 16, 2014, <http://pstpg.fisip.uinjkt.ac.id/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Commentaeris-New-Map-of-Indonesian-Jihadists-Pro-IS-and-Non-IS-1.pdf>, 2.

¹¹⁹ Chalk, “Black Flag Rising,” 12.

¹²⁰ Sugara, “New Map of Indonesian Jihadists,” 2.

¹²¹ Mochammad Achwan, “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Calls On Followers To Support ISIL,” *Jakarta Post*, last modified on July 14, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/07/14/abu-bakar-ba-asyir-calls-followers-support-isil.html>.

Mujahidin Council.¹²² Disputes arose when Bashir was released from prison in 2006 and found that MMI no longer had a strict hierarchical structure.¹²³ Instead, the group was controlled by a council—a key detail that Bashir viewed as un-Islamic.¹²⁴ Bashir, who was thought to be influenced by Aman Abdurrahman, took several loyal members of MMI and JI along with him to form JAT.¹²⁵ At the group’s height in 2010, membership among Southeast Asians ranked in the thousands across the region.¹²⁶ Indonesian security forces arrested Bashir in 2010—the group continued to operate under the command of interim leader, Mochamad Achwa.¹²⁷

In a 2014 letter from prison, uploaded onto a FAKSI website, Bashir along with 24 other prisoners pledged allegiance to ISIS and called on Muslims to “do all in their power to free co-religionist prisoners held in *kafir* (infidel) hands.”¹²⁸ Chalk writes,

Bashir followed up the letter with a proclamation that it was obligatory for all members of JAT to both respect and obey his *bai’at*, declaring that any who refused to do so would be thrown out of the group. Some did indeed rebuff allegiance to ISIS and were duly expelled. Among them was Bashir’s own son, Abdurrahim, and in August 2014 he and other so-called ‘detractors’ moved to establish a new movement that they named Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS).¹²⁹

JAT has been the facilitator for several incidents within the past decade. Some of these incidents include: in 2009, a failed kidnapping of foreigners in Aceh and an attack on the offices of UNICEF; in 2010, the group attempted to assassinate the president of Indonesia and top cabinet members at an Indonesian independence day celebration. In 2011, the

¹²² “Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT),” Jane’s by IHS Markit, last updated October 2, 2013, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyCentre/Display/1320911>.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ “Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS),” TRAC, accessed August 13, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jamaah-ansharusy-syariah-jas>.

¹²⁶ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 13.

¹²⁷ “Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT),” Jane’s by IHS Markit, last updated October 2, 2013.

¹²⁸ Chalk, “Black Flag Rising,” 13.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

group conducted a suicide bombing of a church in Java which led to several casualties; and in 2012, JAT staged an attack on policemen in Poso.¹³⁰

In addition to attacks, the group has been instrumental in producing key pro-ISIS leadership. According to Indonesian authorities, JAT as an organization produced four notable figures: (1) Santoso, an iconic Indonesian jihadist and the former leader of the East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) before he was killed in 2016; (2) Bahrumsyah, commander of the West Indonesia Mujahidin (MIB); (3) Bahrun Naim, which as described above was behind the 2016 attacks in Jakarta and leads the group JAD; and (4) a known jihadist named Salim Mubarak At Tamimi, who recently joined ISIS in Syria.¹³¹ Clearly, JAT is a notable group with several ties to jihadist entities in the country.

(4) Mujahideen Indonesia Timor (MIT)

MIT “acts as an umbrella movement for militants based in the simmering conflict zones of Poso, Palu and Bima and has been linked to numerous attacks on the police.”¹³² Originally formed in 2011, MIT operates cells in Central Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Kalimantan.¹³³ The group was led by former JAT field commander Santoso until his death in 2016.¹³⁴ After his death, another jihadist known as Ali Kalora became the de facto leader.¹³⁵ The group’s overall strength was originally assessed at approximately 40 members, however, due to recent successful CT operations by Indonesian security forces, numbers have dwindled to under 20.¹³⁶ Funding comes through various criminal activities and MIT’s funding arm, Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB).¹³⁷ Notable incidents include the 2010 killing of two policemen in Poso, the 2012

¹³⁰ “Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT),” TRAC, accessed August 12, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jamaah-anshorut-tauhid-jat>.

¹³¹ Samuel, “Radicalization in Southeast Asia,” 42.

¹³² Chalk, “Black Flag Rising,” 13.

¹³³ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 13.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ “Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT),” TRAC, accessed November 9, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/mujahidin-indonesia-timur-mit>.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

attack which resulted in the deaths of four policemen in Poso, and a 2014 shootout with police in Kilo village, Poso.¹³⁸

MIT's Poso-based area of operations is an important part of what gives the group strength. Geographically, Poso is a much closer destination for Southeast Asian FTFs than Syria. Several detainees who had been captured by Indonesian security forces told police that they chose to travel to Poso over Syria due to geographic proximity and lower cost.¹³⁹ This logistical fact helps MIT replenish its numbers of active fighters after it suffers losses. While the group's overall strength has dwindled within the past few years due to successful CT operations, some terrorism experts fear that MIT militants will cross the Makassar Strait and find local support in Eastern Sabah.¹⁴⁰ This could lead to the absorption of the remaining vestiges of MIT into one of the leading Philippines-based pro-ISIS groups, like ASG.¹⁴¹

b. Anti-ISIS Groups

(1) Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

JI has been the largest and most widely known armed militant jihadist organization in the region for the past two decades.¹⁴² The creation of JI can be traced back to Indonesia in the 1960s, when two Indonesian Islamic teachers—Abu Bakr Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar—met for the first time.¹⁴³ Both men, while not a major part of mainstream Islamist movements at the time, took up the cause to establish an Islamic state within Indonesia.¹⁴⁴ It was not until the 1990s—when both men were met by radicalized Malaysian imams, many of whom spent years fighting with mujahidin in

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Muh Taufiqurrohman, "Indonesia," *CTTA* 7, no. 11 (December 2015-Jan 2016), <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-January-2016.pdf>, 13.

¹⁴⁰ "Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT)," TRAC.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 14.

¹⁴³ Greg Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam* (New South Wales, UNSW Press 2004) 13.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 14.

Afghanistan—that the formal organization of JI began.¹⁴⁵ The group’s overarching goal was to establish a pan-Islamic state across much of the region.¹⁴⁶ JI was responsible for a deadly coordinated bombing in 2000, the notorious Bali bombings in 2002, and a suicide bombing attack in Bali in 2005.¹⁴⁷

In 2013, JI became a critical voice against ISIS after the organization formally rejected al-Qaeda and split from JN.¹⁴⁸ Sidney Jones notes, “In 2014 JI began to actively campaign against [ISIS] as an organization that too quickly condemned anyone who refused to join as a *kafir* or non-believer.”¹⁴⁹ It is important to note two critical points: (1) some former members of JI have pledged support to ISIS while the group remains loyal to JN; and (2) while JI is formally a staunch critic of ISIS and plays a pivotal role in de-legitimizing ISIS’s strategic messaging, the group is far from benign. In the shadow of ISIS, JI activity within Indonesia has increased as the group continues to build a clandestine armed wing.¹⁵⁰ The sudden increase in JI activity and arrests by law enforcement has led some terrorism experts to coin the term “neo-JI” to describe this new emerging threat.¹⁵¹ Some estimate JI’s current strength at approximately 2,000 members, a similar size to the group in 2001–2002.¹⁵²

(2) Jamaah Anshorul Syariat (JAS)

JAS was created in 2014 immediately after JAT leader Abu Bakar Bashir pledged allegiance to ISIS.¹⁵³ Mochammad Achwan, a former chairperson of JAT, leads the

¹⁴⁵ Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, 13.

¹⁴⁶ Jemaah Islamiyah (JI),” TRAC, accessed August 13, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jemaah-islamiyah-ji>, accessed Sunday.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ IPAC Report No. 36, “The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” April 27, 2017, 8, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/04/IPAC_Report_36.pdf.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Francis Chan, “JI still a clear and present danger, say experts,” *Straits Times*, last modified on May 7, 2017, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/ji-still-a-clear-and-present-danger-say-experts>.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 15.

group along with Bashir's two sons, Abdul "Iim" Rohim and Rosyid Ridho.¹⁵⁴ Much of the rift between JAS and JAT is centered on Bashir's failure to consult with other founding members before making the pledge.¹⁵⁵ The group aims to recruit and unite Islamists in support of the full implementation of Sharia in Indonesia.¹⁵⁶ JAS rejects cooperation with ISIS and has made several statements in direct opposition to the group.¹⁵⁷ In an interview with *The Jakarta Post*, on the topic of ISIS, Iim said, "It's just horrendous. How can you throw support behind a group that is massacring fellow Muslims?"¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, like JI, the group is known to have close ties to JN, a fact that drives a wedge between JAS and ISIS.¹⁵⁹ Several JAS members have been sent to Syria in support of JN operations.¹⁶⁰ The group claims to have approximately 2,000 members and operates in Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara and Bengkulu.¹⁶¹

c. Conclusion

The emergence of ISIS has created a clear divide among Indonesian jihadist groups. Simply put, jihadist networks within the country are split into two factions—those aligned with ISIS and those aligned with JN. This divide is significant as it creates disunity within jihadist circles. As described above, in order for ISIS to establish a new front, or province, local groups must unify under one leader, under the banner of ISIS. The creation of JAS from JAT is a clear example of how this divide works. Groups like JAS blend with other groups, recruit, build up support, splinter, and simply repeat this

¹⁵⁴ "Jemaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS)," TRAC, accessed August 13, 2017.

¹⁵⁵ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 15.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ "Jemaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS)." TRAC, accessed August 13, 2017.

¹⁵⁸ Rendi Witular, "Sons, top aides abandon Ba'asyir over ISIS, form new jihadist group," *Jakarta Post*, August 13, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/13/sons-top-aides-abandon-ba-asyir-over-isil-form-new-jihadist-group.html>.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ "Jemaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS)," TRAC, accessed August 13, 2017.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

cycle.¹⁶² Because of the great divide, and the growing disunity among individual groups, an ISIS front in Indonesia remains unlikely. Furthermore, Indonesia has several competing pro-ISIS ideologues that compete for power. This competition highlights a major problem for ISIS as no single leader has consolidated enough power to head a new front.

2. The Philippines

Like in Indonesia, several ISIS-aligned groups operate in the Philippines. The four main pro-ISIS groups include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP), the Maute Group (MG), also known as IS-Ranao, and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).¹⁶³ What makes Philippines-based pro-ISIS groups unique is that while they were once separated by ethnic differences, they have now been brought together under the banner of ISIS.¹⁶⁴ On this development, IPAC clarifies,

Support for [ISIS] in Mindanao has meant more than a repackaging of old kidnapping-for-ransom groups. It has facilitated cooperation across clan and ethnic lines, widened the extremist recruitment pool to include computer-savvy university students and opened new international communication and possibly funding channels.¹⁶⁵

This new cooperation has led to the unification or alignment among pro-ISIS groups in the country. On June 21, 2016, in an ISIS propaganda video, Philippines based ISIS-aligned fighters announced the unification of pro-ISIS groups throughout the country.¹⁶⁶ This development is significant as no other consolidation has occurred elsewhere in Southeast Asia. As mentioned previously, the consolidation of disparate groups under the banner of ISIS is the first requirement for the establishment of a new front.

¹⁶² Damian Kingsbury, "Jokowi's Indonesia," *Dialogue Proceedings*, Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales (2015), <http://www.rusinsw.org.au/Papers/20150527C.pdf>, 16.

¹⁶³ *Pro ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia*, IPAC Report No. 33, 1.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ Caitlin Forrest, "ISIS linked activity in Southeast Asia," *ISW* (April-June 2016) <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-linked-activity-southeast-asia-april-22-june-23-2016>.

In addition to the cooperation of local pro-ISIS groups, a single leader was chosen to lead all regional operations. In the same propaganda video from June 2016, ISIS officially endorsed the late ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon as Amir to all Southeast Asian operations.¹⁶⁷ This announcement was significant because it gave the country legitimacy and fulfilled the second requirement for the declaration of a new front. On May 23, 2017, the city of Marawi became the first city outside of the Middle East and Africa to fall to ISIS.¹⁶⁸ Hapilon, along with approximately 300 ISIS fighters, assaulted, overran, and held a town of 200,000 for five months.¹⁶⁹ Such a coordinated and successful effort indicates a high level of cooperation among pro-ISIS factions. However, after five months of ongoing conflict during the battle of Marawi, Filipino security forces successfully liberated the city and killed Hapilon.¹⁷⁰ This section surveys the network of ISIS-aligned groups within the Philippines.

a. Abu Sayyaf Group

Zachary Abuza proposes, “The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has re-emerged as one of the more important terrorist groups confronting the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the United States, and our allies in Southeast Asia.”¹⁷¹ The ASG was established as an offshoot of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1991 by a man named Ustaz Abdurajak Janjalani, whose experience as an “Afghan Alumni” in the 1980s propelled him to incorporate Salafi jihadism into Moro separatist movements.¹⁷² While the group officially seeks an Islamic State in Mindanao, its underlying activities

¹⁶⁷ Safrin La Batu, “IS setting up base in Philippines,” *Jakarta Post*, last modified December 7, 2016, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/12/07/is-setting-up-base-in-philippines.html>.

¹⁶⁸ Rohan Gunaratna, “Marawi: A Game Changer for Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” *CTTA* 9:7 (July 2017), <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CTTA-July-2017.pdf>.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁰ Ted Regencia, “Marawi siege: Army kills Abu Sayyaf, Maute commanders,” *Al Jazeera*, October 16, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/marawi-siege-army-kills-abu-sayyaf-maute-commanders-171016072551985.html>.

¹⁷¹ Zachary Abuza, *Balik Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA439349>.

¹⁷² Samuel, “Radicalization in Southeast Asia,” 97–98.

consist of KFR and extortion, among other organized crimes.¹⁷³ TRAC reports, “Since its inception in the early 1990s, the group has carried out bombings, kidnappings assassinations, and extortions in what they describe as their fight for an independent Islamic province in the Philippines.”¹⁷⁴ Primarily operating in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines, two separate ASG entities exist, one entity in Basilan and the other in Jolo.¹⁷⁵ While the Basilan-based ASG has pledged allegiance to ISIS, the Jolo-based ASG does not identify itself as fighting with or for ISIS at all.¹⁷⁶ Because of this split, it is often difficult to accurately portray the connections between ASG in Jolo and ISIS. However, former ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon has been known to coordinate, travel, and bridge the gap between both groups.¹⁷⁷ In 2014, Hapilon, along with a handful of ASG fighters, uploaded a YouTube video in which they pledged allegiance to Baghdadi.¹⁷⁸

In mid-2001, the group’s peak fighting strength was estimated at 800–850 fighters.¹⁷⁹ Due to successful CT operations in the mid-2000’s, this number dropped to approximately 400 fighters, as of 2015.¹⁸⁰ However, the overall strength of the group comes not from a large base of fighters, but through its affiliations with other jihadist organizations. Within the Philippines, known allies include the AKP, BIFF, and MG. On the importance of ASG’s ties to other groups, Sidney Jones contends,

The ASG has been under more or less constant attack from Philippine security forces since 2002. It has survived through the strength of clan ties, the support of local politicians and its willingness of different factions to build tactical alliances to expand their reach. This last characteristic is

¹⁷³ Ibid., 98.

¹⁷⁴ “Islamic State Philippines (ISP, ISISP) - Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” TRAC, accessed August 16, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/islamic-state-philippines-isp-isisp-abu-sayyaf-group-asg>.

¹⁷⁵ *Pro ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia*, IPAC Report 33, 1.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Chalk, “Black Flag Rising,” 15.

¹⁷⁹ “Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),” Jane’s by IHS Markit, accessed October 23, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyCentre/Display/1320727>.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

what makes the fighters on Basilan more deadly than their numbers or skills would suggest.¹⁸¹

A key development that indicates ASG's willingness to cooperate with other pro-ISIS factions is the relationship between ASG and MG during the battle of Marawi. Specifically, members from formerly separate groups—ASG, AKP, and the MG—formed a unified combat unit to repel Filipino security forces from Marawi.¹⁸² Furthermore, Hapilon, MG commander Omar Maute, and seven other fighters were killed while working together in the conflict.¹⁸³

b. Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP)

AKP is an ISIS-aligned jihadist group previously led by Mohammad Jaafar Maguid (alias Tokboy) a former Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Special Operations Group (SOG) commando.¹⁸⁴ The group formed as a local offshoot of MILF and operates in Maguindanao, Mindanao.¹⁸⁵ AKP has close ties to Indonesia's JAD and MIT, Khatibah Nusantara, the active Southeast Asian brigade operating in Syria, as well as the three other parts of the Philippines-based pro-ISIS groups—ASG, BIFF, and MG.¹⁸⁶ These connections can be seen in the September 2016 AKP/MG IED attack at a market in Davao which resulted in 14 dead and 60 injured.¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, the group has had a long history of cooperation with other jihadist groups within Southeast Asia with

¹⁸¹ *Pro ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia*, IPAC Report 33, 3.

¹⁸² Joseph Franco, "The Maute Group: New Vanguard of IS in Southeast Asia?" in *RSIS Commentary* 107 (May 2017): 1, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/CO17107.pdf>.

¹⁸³ Jinky Jorgio, Joshua Berlinger and James Griffiths, "ISIS-affiliated leaders killed in Southern Philippines," *CNN*, last modified on October 16, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/15/asia/philippines-isis-marawi/index.html>.

¹⁸⁴ *Pro ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia*, IPAC Report 33, 14.

¹⁸⁵ "Ansar al-Khilafah Philippines (AKP) / Islamic State Philippines (ISPH)," TRAC, accessed August 16, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/ansar-al-khilafah-philippines-akp-islamic-state-philippines-isph-isisph>.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ "Philippines: Bomb attack on Davao market kills 14," *BBC News*, last modified on September 3, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37262499>.

especially close ties to groups in Indonesia and Malaysia.¹⁸⁸ On AKP's transnational connections, Gunaratna explains,

After pledging allegiance to [ISIS], [AKP] released a video threatening to deploy suicide bombers in the Philippines and make the country a "graveyard" for American soldiers. On two occasions, attempts by the group to transport weapons to Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) were disrupted by the Philippine National Police working with their Indonesian counterparts.¹⁸⁹

While AKP is a newer than ASG, it facilitates the recruitment and training for a plethora of regional jihadis.¹⁹⁰ On January 5, 2017, AKP leader Tokboy was killed a joint military-police raid in Sarangani leaving a man named Abu Sharifah in charge.¹⁹¹ The death of Tokboy seemingly crippled AKP because the group relied heavily on Tokboy's connections to other transnational jihadi elites.¹⁹² Without those connections still intact, the group remains either largely underground or inoperative.¹⁹³

c. The Maute Group, "IS-Lanao"

Of the pro-ISIS terrorist groups in the Philippines, MG remains the most sophisticated, well-educated, and active.¹⁹⁴ Founded by brothers Abdullah and Omar Maute, the group is involved in fielding candidates for local government.¹⁹⁵ However, before pledging allegiance to ISIS, the Maute brothers headed a private militia that was

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Rohan Gunaratna, "Islamic State Branches in Southeast Asia," *RSIS Commentary* 4 (January 2016): <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/co16004-islamic-state-branches-in-southeast-asia/>, 2.

¹⁹⁰ "Ansar al-Khilafah Philipines (AKP) / Islamic State Philippines (ISPH)," TRAC.

¹⁹¹ CNN Philippines Staff, "'Most wanted' leader of ISIS-linked group killed in Sarangani," <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/01/05/Ansar-Al-Khilafah-leader-Tokboy-killed.html>.

¹⁹² TRAC, "Ansar al-Khilafah Philipines (AKP) / Islamic State Philippines (ISPH, ISISPH)," <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/ansar-al-khilafah-philippines-akp-islamic-state-philippines-isph-isisph>, accessed Thursday, November 9th, 2017.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ *Pro ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia*, IPAC Report 33, 14.

¹⁹⁵ Franco, "The Maute Group."

heavily involved in KFR operations.¹⁹⁶ An example of this came in April 2016, when the group took six sawmill workers hostage in Butig and later beheaded two.¹⁹⁷

Based in Lanao del Sur, the group has extensive connections to other transnational terrorist entities and remains successful at recruiting students and teachers at Mindanao State University.¹⁹⁸ After MG's pledge of allegiance to ISIS in 2015, ASG recognized it as an ally in the area.¹⁹⁹ On the alliance between MG and ASG, Franco contends,

The MG pledge was a calculated move by the Maute brothers to project a fiercer image. For Hapilon, the pledge made MG an attractive partner to enhance his status as emir. Merging the MG with Hapilon's armed group could lead to greater fighting capability and territorial control. In Western Mindanao, other Abu Sayyaf factions (i.e. ASG in Sulu Province) appeared to focus their armed activities on lucrative cross-border kidnapping. Hapilon's Basilan-based ASG faction struggled to find similar sources of illicit funds.²⁰⁰

In addition to connections with ASG, MG holds close ties with the MILF, an armed separatist group operating in Mindanao. Connections between groups are often along clan ties and through marriage.²⁰¹ For example, the Maute brothers' familial connections to prominent families—the Mimbantas clan of Lanao del Sur—provides the essential legitimacy to recruit young fighters to their cause.²⁰²

Recent events are critical to assess the group's overall strength. In February 2016, approximately 180 Maute-led fighters attacked Philippine military forces and established a fortified camp in Butiq, Lanao Del Sur.²⁰³ This led to tense clashes, five Philippine

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁹⁷ *Pro ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia*, IPAC Report 33, 15.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Franco, "The Maute Group."

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² "Maute Group / Islamic State of Lanao / Daulat Ul Islamiya / Daulah Islamiyah," TRAC, accessed August 16, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/maute-group-islamic-state-lanao-daulat-ul-islamiya-daulah-islamiyah>.

²⁰³ Ibid.

soldiers killed, 55 militants killed, and approximately 20,000 residents displaced.²⁰⁴ As mentioned previously, in September 2016, a joint IED attack conducted by MG, ASG and AKP resulted in the deaths of 14. The most critical recent event was the crisis known as the battle of Marawi. On May 23, 2017, Philippine security forces attempted to conduct a raid to capture ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon. In response, militants from MG, ASG, and several other groups “coalesced into an ad hoc combat unit to resist the Philippine security forces.”²⁰⁵ Clashes increased as fighters captured government buildings and set Christian churches and schools on fire.²⁰⁶ Approximately 350,000 residents have been forced to flee causing a vast humanitarian crisis.²⁰⁷ On October 17, 2017, President Duterte announced the liberation of Marawi after five months of conflict. Official military records indicate that the MG threat has largely been neutralized with 962 ISIS-linked terrorists killed.²⁰⁸ While these seem like positive developments, the experience of Marawi highlights what could happen if pro-ISIS groups consolidate and coordinate in one location. The state’s delay in combatting this threat is concerning. As mentioned previously, Marawi was the first city outside of the Middle East to fall to pro-ISIS. The trouble caused for Filipino security forces and the long period of time under ISIS control, makes Marawi stand as a powerful symbol for extremists across the region.

d. Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)

BIFF is another pro-ISIS jihadist group that operates in Maguindanao and is known for mass murder, harassment, and the theft of “revolutionary taxes” from local families in the area.²⁰⁹ While BIFF swore allegiance to ISIS shortly after Baghdadi’s claim of the formation of the caliphate, the group has become weaker after its founder,

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Franco, “The Maute Group.”

²⁰⁶ Euan McKirdy, “Bloodied and broken: Rising toll of Philippines’ war with ISIS,” *CNN*, last modified August 24, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/25/asia/philippines-marawi-isis/index.html>.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ Dempsey Reyes, “Islamic freedom fighters, Abu Sayyaf next after Maute ‘wipeout’ — defense chief,” *Manila Times*, last modified on October 24, 2017, <http://www.manilatimes.net/islamic-freedom-fighters-abu-sayyaf-next-maute-wipeout-defense-chief/358410/>.

²⁰⁹ “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF),” TRAC, accessed August 18, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/bangsamoro-islamic-freedom-fighters-biff>.

Ameril Umbra Kato, died in 2015.²¹⁰ Since then, BIFF split into two separate factions—one led by Kagi Karialan and the other led by Kumander Bungos.²¹¹ Before the split, BIFF’s had approximately 500 fighters.²¹² It is still unknown how many fighters followed each leader after the split.²¹³ On the split, IPAC writes, “The fracturing suggests that BIFF as an organization may not survive too long without Kato, but it remains the important lesson of what happens in the MILF if the peace process breaks down.”²¹⁴ Bungos’s faction, loyal to ISIS, sought an alliance with the MG.²¹⁵ An example of this eagerness came in June 2016, when Bungos sent a platoon of his fighters to aid MG fighters who were battling Philippine security forces in Lanao del Sur mentioned previously.²¹⁶ Bungos’s faction of BIFF formed an official alliance with MG on December 30, 2016.²¹⁷ A recent event that highlights the group’s strength came on June 21, 2017, when approximately 300 BIFF fighters ambushed a Philippine army outpost less than 120 miles from Marawi.²¹⁸ However, after the battle of Marawi, BIFF’s overall strength is likely severely degraded.

e. Conclusion

Terrorist groups in the Southern Philippines consolidated under the banner of ISIS, but have been weakened due to successful CT campaigns. A clear and alarming example of this unification can be seen in the battle of Marawi—where once separate entities fought together in support of a single goal. Unlike Indonesia, there is not a clear line between those groups loyal to ISIS and those that reject it. While in some organizations, there seems to be an ideological split among individual fighters, the

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ TRAC, “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).”

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ *Pro ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia*, IPAC Report 33, 19.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ TRAC, “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).”

²¹⁸ Ibid.

majority of groups tend to support ISIS. Regardless of Philippine security forces' successes, the high number of pro-ISIS groups within the country, along with the attempted unification of those groups across ethnic and clan lines, highlights a major vulnerability for the Philippines.

3. Malaysia

Malaysia has been a major target for ISIS recruitment because of its large Muslim population.²¹⁹ While there seems to be some support for ISIS through individual FTFs, support among local, organized groups is less common.²²⁰ Fealy illustrates,

It is clear, however, that Malaysian support for [ISIS] appears less organizationally based and more dependent on networks. Moreover, unlike in Indonesia, JI is no longer active in Malaysia. The once tightly-organized JI regional command (mantiqi) based in Malaysia and Singapore ceased to exist more than a decade ago, due not only to the deaths and arrests of most of its leadership but also a sustained crackdown by security agencies on any JI-related activity.²²¹

Local connections between Malaysian, Filipino, and Indonesian terrorists date back decades.²²² Furthermore, Malaysian involvement with ISIS centers more on individual relationships and less on group structures. For example, two Malaysian terrorists Jeknal Adil and Amin Baco, were both reportedly working with Isnilon Hapilon to facilitate the recruitment and training of Malaysian fighters in Mindanao.²²³ Three other highly educated Malaysian terrorists—Abu Anas al-Muhajir, Abu Nur, and Dr. Mahmud Ahmad—moved to Basilan to work directly for ASG.²²⁴ On this development, IPAC contends, “The fact that Malaysians of the caliber of Abu Anas and Mahmud Ahmad were motivated to move to Basilan suggests that the attraction was jihad, and their

²¹⁹ Elani Owen, “The Next Frontline in the Battle Against the Islamic State,” *Cornell International Affairs Review* 10, no. 2, <http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1648/the-next-frontline-of-the-battle-against-the-islamic-state-southeast-asia>.

²²⁰ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 16.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² *Pro ISIS Groups in Mindanao and their Links to Indonesia*, IPAC Report 33, 8.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.

commitment would likely have deepened with the pledge to [ISIS].”²²⁵ Of note, Dr. Mahmud Ahmad was responsible for channeling approximately \$600,000 to the southern Philippines to carry out attacks in Marawi.²²⁶ Clearly, pro-ISIS groups in the Philippines receive a great deal of support from operatives in Malaysia. While no group within Malaysia has pledged allegiance to ISIS, a terrorist network known as Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) continues to operate underground.

a. Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia

KMM is a Sunni Islamist organization that formed in the 1980s and has direct ties to other militant groups throughout the region to include JI, ASG and MILF.²²⁷ KMM’s overall goal is to establish an Islamic state that spans across Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.²²⁸ Underground KMM cells operate in all nine states of Malaysia and have been known for assassination attempts, rudimentary IED attacks, and bank robberies.²²⁹ Recent incidents include an April 2011 attack on a police outpost, an August 2011 IED-attack on a Malaysian government building, and a thwarted IED attack in which seven KMM members were arrested.²³⁰ While KMM attacks have slowed down in the past decade, several prominent members of the group remain at large.²³¹ For example, on August 8, 2013, a MILF spokesperson claimed that Zulkifli bin Hir, a top KMM commander, was working alongside BIFF fighters in the Philippines.²³² While some KMM members may have close ties to pro-ISIS groups within Indonesia or the Philippines, KMM as an organization has not pledged allegiance to ISIS. Additionally, as

²²⁵ Ibid., 10.

²²⁶ *Marawi, The ‘East Asia Wilayah’ and Indonesia*, IPAC Report 38 (Jakarta: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2017) 8, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/07/IPAC_Report_38.pdf.

²²⁷ “Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM),” Jane’s by IHS Markit, last modified on January 17, 2014, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyCentre/Display/1320796>.

²²⁸ “Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM),” TRAC, accessed August 18, 2017, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/kumpulan-mujahidin-malaysia-kmm>.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid

²³¹ “Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM),” Jane’s by IHS Markit.

²³² Ibid.

KMM continues to remain dormant, the group’s overall strength and capacity to conduct attacks remains unclear.

b. Conclusion

The pro-ISIS movement within Malaysia is more centered on facilitating financial support and foreign fighters to ISIS-aligned groups in other countries. The absence of pro-ISIS groups within Malaysia makes the declaration by ISIS of a new front or province within the country highly unlikely.

4. Conclusion

Both Indonesia and the Philippines have a high number of groups loyal to ISIS. However, within Indonesia, ISIS ideology created a major cleavage between groups that used to be connected. This dynamic has not been seen to the same extent within the Philippines. In fact, ISIS’s effect on Philippines-based groups has largely been the opposite. Separate Filipino terrorist groups display much greater cooperation since Baghdadi’s declaration of the caliphate. The consolidation of the four main pro-ISIS groups under one leader highlights the potential for ISIS to declare a new province. As a key condition that could enable a wilayat declaration, the presence of pro-ISIS groups points to the Philippines as the most likely country for ISIS’s next front. Table 1 displays the varying levels of pro-ISIS groups by country.

Table 1. Factor One

	Chapter II		Chapter III	
	Pro-ISIS Groups	FTFs	ISIS’s Direct Efforts	State Weakness
Indonesia	√			
The Philippines	√+			
Malaysia	-			

The values (-), (√), and (√+) indicate low, medium, and high levels within each country.

C. FACTOR TWO: FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

As ISIS loses control over territory in the Middle East, fears of Southeast Asian FTFs returning to the region have mounted. For example, on October 17, 2016, Malaysia's defense minister, Hishammuddin Hussein, ordered the military to "keep an eye on [developments] in Iraq and Syria because we are worried that [ISIS FTFs] might come here and it won't be a small number."²³³ Almuttaqi mirrors this fear. He asserts, "The key question worrying security analysts and policymakers in the region is what will happen once the Islamic State recruits return to Southeast Asia armed with battle-hardened experience, skills, and training."²³⁴ On the potential threat these FTFs pose, Habib argues, "I think this is going to be an imminent threat. When the fighters return to countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, they will build a kind of alumni network, like the fighters from Afghanistan nearly two decades ago."²³⁵

ISIS recruitment in the region has already led to the facilitation of approximately 1000 FTFs from Southeast Asian countries.²³⁶ What remains lesser known is where these individuals originate from. An FTF may travel to and from the Middle East or simply cross the porous borders between countries. For example, Philippine security forces found approximately 10 percent of all terrorists fighting in the battle of Marawi were of foreign origin.²³⁷ It is unknown whether these fighters are returnees who fought in the Middle East or simply traveled from neighboring countries. Regardless, their presence will likely play a major role in spreading ISIS's influence. With ISIS quickly losing ground in the Middle East, recruitment of new fighters to replenish those lost is essential. If a country produces more FTFs than other countries in the region, it displays a greater susceptibility to radicalization among social groups. More importantly, if recent

²³³ Bhavan Jaipragas, "Why are Malaysia, Singapore Nervous as Iraq Looks to take Mosul from Islamic State," *This Week in Asia*, accessed 3 April, 2017, <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2029110/jihadist-alumni-what-southeast-asia-has-fear-if-iraq-retakes>.

²³⁴ Ibrahim Almuttaqi, "The Islamic State and the Rise of Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia," ASEAN Studies Program, accessed April 3, 2016, <https://thcasean.org/read/articles/171/The-Islamic-State-and-the-rise-of-violent-extremism-in-Southeast-Asia>.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ The Soufan Group, "Foreign Fighters," 8.

²³⁷ Gutanara, "Marawai: A Game Changer in Terrorism for Asia."

developments highlight the consolidation of Southeast Asian FTFs within one country, the establishment of a new front within that country is more likely.

1. Indonesia

As the world's most populous Muslim country, it should be no surprise that the largest group of Southeast Asian FTFs hails from Indonesia. As of 2016, an estimated total of 500–700 Indonesians have traveled to the Middle East to join ISIS.²³⁸ This is a much larger number than those from Malaysia and the Philippines combined. The question arises, if such a large group of Indonesians joined ISIS in the Middle East, where have they all gone? While accounting for every single FTF is impossible, trends can be found by examining two potential avenues: (1) those who have been arrested by security forces and (2) those who have turned up in other countries.

Arrests at the international and local levels have stopped FTFs from reaching Iraq and Syria. From 2015 to 2017, 430 Indonesians attempting to travel to the Middle East to join ISIS were arrested and sent back.²³⁹ It is important to note that not all Indonesian FTFs are young men. Sidney Jones argues that approximately 45 percent of all Indonesian FTFs are women and children.²⁴⁰ At the local level, from 2015 to 2016, Indonesian security forces made 282 arrests of alleged terrorists affiliated with ISIS.²⁴¹

In addition to the FTFs arrested by security forces, some Indonesian FTFs have been found operating in other countries. For example, as Filipino security forces retook Marawi, they captured or killed as many as 40 Indonesian and Malaysian FTFs alongside Filipino ISIS fighters.²⁴² This is significant because it supports the notion that Southeast

²³⁸ Benmelech and Klor, "What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS," 20.

²³⁹ Sidney Jones, "Battling ISIS in Indonesia," *New York Times*, last modified on January 18, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/battling-isis-in-indonesia.html?_r=0.

²⁴⁰ Joseph Liow, "ISIS reaches Indonesia: The terrorist group's prospects in Southeast Asia," *Brookings Institute*, last modified on February 8, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/isis-reaches-indonesia-the-terrorist-groups-prospects-in-southeast-asia/>.

²⁴¹ Jewel Topsfield, "Indonesian police point to Islamic State after 2016 spike in terrorism cases," *Sydney Morning Herald*, December 29, 2016, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/indonesian-police-point-to-islamic-state-after-2016-spike-in-terrorism-cases-20161229-gtjeug.html>.

²⁴² Gunaratna, "Marawi: A Game Changer in Terrorism for Asia."

Asian FTFs may consolidate within one country in order to broaden the base of support and declare a new ISIS front. The flow of Southeast Asian FTFs into Marawi highlights a strength for Indonesia as well as a vulnerability for the Philippines. Indonesian CT forces' capacity may overshadow ISIS's ability or will to declare of a new front within Indonesia

2. The Philippines

Initial estimates report that the Philippines has produced approximately 100 FTFs.²⁴³ However, the battle of Marawi indicates that the number of FTFs within the Philippines is far greater. On the number of FTFs in the southern Philippines, Gunaratna remarks,

It was estimated that [ISIS] had some 300 fighters at the start of the attack in Marawi. They comprised 150 [MG] fighters (Maranaos), 40 foreign fighters (mostly Indonesians and Malaysians), 50 Yakans and Tausog from the Abu Sayyaf Group, 30 Balik Islams (converts to Islam) and 30 Maguindanaon people. Reports reveal that all these fighters with the exception of Cayamora Maute, Omar and Abdullah's father, stayed in Marawi and fought against the AFP and ANP.²⁴⁴

This is an alarming estimate because it only speaks to the ISIS fighters operating in Marawi. It does not include ISIS fighters in the rest of the country. Furthermore, what remains unclear is if these fighters, primarily of Filipino nationality, traveled to Iraq and Syria to become FTFs in the first place. As described above, most of these fighters originated from some place within the Philippines. Therefore, an accurate assessment of the total number of FTFs within the country remains unclear. However, on June 4, 2017, Indonesian defense minister General Ryamizard Ryacudu announced at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, that there are approximately 1,200 ISIS fighters currently in the Philippines.²⁴⁵ Even if this is an overestimation, it indicates a far larger number of FTFs than previously assessed.

²⁴³ Ibid.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

²⁴⁵ "Indonesia says 1,200 ISIS operatives in Philippines, 40 of them from Indonesia," *Straits Times*, last modified on June 4, 2017, <http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/indonesia-says-1200-isis-operatives-in-philippines-40-of-them-from-indonesia>.

3. Malaysia

Malaysia has produced approximately 100 FTFs.²⁴⁶ The relatively low number of Malaysian-born FTFs could possibly be attributed to successful CT operations. For example, on March 25, 2017, authorities conducted a five-state wide sting operation which led to the arrest of nine Malaysian ISIS-linked fighters—members of a notorious ISIS cell called “black crow.”²⁴⁷ Members of the cell “were either recruiting for ISIS, making plans to join the group in Syria or its branch in southern Philippines, or channeling funds to the terrorist group.”²⁴⁸ Furthermore, from 2013 to 2016, Malaysian police arrested more than 250 ISIS-linked suspects, charged at least 90, and jailed approximately 50.²⁴⁹ Like Indonesia, these successful CT operations highlight the country’s capacity in combating ISIS.

While the country’s security forces have been successful in thwarting plots within Malaysia and arresting FTFs, some have managed to join ISIS in other countries. For example, 28 Malaysians joined the ISIS-linked fighters battling Filipino security forces in Marawi.²⁵⁰ Furthermore, funding for the battle of Marawi came from Khatibah Nusantara in Syria to the Philippines through notorious Malaysian ISIS facilitator Dr. Mahmud Ahmad.²⁵¹ On this development, IPAC reports,

Khatibah Nusantara in turn sent funding through Dr Mahmud Ahmad, a Malaysian who sits in the inner circle of the Marawi command structure. Dr Mahmud controlled recruitment as well as financing and has been the contact person for any foreigner wanting to join the pro-ISIS coalition in the Philippines.²⁵²

²⁴⁶ Benmelech and Klor, “What Explains the Flow of Foreign Fighters to ISIS,” 20.

²⁴⁷ Trinna Leong, “Malaysian police arrest nine ISIS suspects in diverse occupations,” *Straits Times*, last modified on March 25, 2017, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysian-police-arrest-nine-isis-suspects-in-diverse-occupations>.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ “28 Malaysians ‘joined militants in Marawi City,’” *Straits Times*, May 29, 2017, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/28-malaysians-joined-militants-in-marawi-city>.

²⁵¹ *Marawi, The ‘East Asia Wilayah’ and Indonesia*, IPAC Report 38, 8.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

While it seems unlikely that FTFs will consolidate within Malaysia, the country remains an important stop for FTFs traveling from the Middle East to the Philippines. Additionally, the possibility of FTFs from other Southeast Asian countries flowing into Malaysia seems unlikely as successful CT operations continue.

4. Conclusion

The second factor that indicates a potential location of ISIS's next front is predicated on the production and location of FTFs. Southeast Asian countries that exhibit higher proportions of their own citizens traveling either to Iraq and Syria or neighboring countries to fight, remain more vulnerable to ISIS ideology. This is an important indicator of potential insecurity as many returnees will push back into their own countries of origin after ISIS territory is lost in the Middle East. The more critical indicator for ISIS's next front is the location and size of the FTF population who have already returned home. The country that has the largest presence of returnees, whether they came from that country or any other in the region, will be most vulnerable. The data suggests that the Philippines is the most vulnerable country simply because it contains the largest portion of FTFs in the region. Table 2 displays these findings.

Table 2. Factors One and Two

	Chapter II		Chapter III	
	Pro-ISIS Groups	FTFs	ISIS's Direct Efforts	State Weakness
Indonesia	√	√		
The Philippines	√+	√+		
Malaysia	-	√		

The values (-), (√), and (√+) indicate low, medium, and high levels within each country.

D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

Chapter II seeks to explain the dynamics of the threat of ISIS in the region. Factor one established which country has the greatest presence of unified, ISIS-aligned groups within its borders. Factor two established which country produces the highest number of FTFs who have traveled to the Middle East and contains the greatest amount of FTFs who have returned. These first factors are based on the hypothesis that if a country simply experiences a greater presence, that country is more likely to become ISIS's Southeast Asian or front. By this logic, one country clearly stands out among the others—the Philippines. So far, the Philippines is the most likely candidate to become an ISIS front because it boasts a consolidated and mostly unified set of ISIS-aligned groups under one leader and contains the largest number of FTFs in the region. However, what has not yet been examined is the other half of the story—the dynamics of ISIS-linked efforts in the region and the state's role in combatting the transnational organization.

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III. ISIS-LINKED ACTIVITY AND STATE WEAKNESS

A. INTRODUCTION

ISIS's direct efforts to influence a country and each government's ability to combat ISIS are two important factors that may foreshadow the location of ISIS's next front. This chapter focuses on two hypotheses: (1) countries that experience higher volumes of ISIS's direct efforts—attacks, actions, and statements—are more vulnerable to become a new front; and (2) countries that lack CT capacity will also be more vulnerable. The last chapter focused on groups and fighters aligned with ISIS throughout the three most vulnerable countries. This chapter focuses both on the presence of ISIS-related activity and the level of each state's CT capacity. First, it examines data on where ISIS-linked militants have been successful in carrying out attacks, actions, and statements. The data on ISIS-linked activities will provide insight into the severity of the threat in each country. Second, this chapter examines how individual states combat the transnational threat of ISIS through the following parts: security forces, anti-terror laws, and de-radicalization programs. Examining both sides of the equation—the terrorist threat and the state's ability to combat that threat—may indicate which country is the most vulnerable in becoming ISIS's next front.

B. FACTOR THREE: ISIS-LINKED ACTIVITY

Factors one and two centered on specific Southeast Asian groups and individuals connected to ISIS. Factor one focused on the presence of ISIS-aligned groups by country and factor two focused on the presence and production of FTFs who have traveled to and from the Middle East. What has not yet been examined is the data on specific activities that ISIS-linked supporters, fighters, or groups have taken against local governments to destabilize the region. Evaluating the vulnerability of countries on the presence of loosely-aligned groups or FTFs only tells part of the story. The ability of these ISIS-linked elements to carry out attacks in individual countries also requires evaluation. This section focuses on the volume and severity of ISIS-linked activities by examining three separate data points by country: attacks, actions and statements.

Data on ISIS-linked activity was collected from the Jane's IHS Markit Terrorism & Insurgency Centre. As described at length in chapter one, the following parameters were set: (1) ISIS-linked activity must have taken place from June 29, 2014 to August 23, 2017; (2) individual ISIS-linked activities must have taken place in the territorial boundaries of the three countries being evaluated; and (3) for activity to be considered ISIS-linked, it must have been conducted by, with, and through any of the ISIS-aligned groups described in chapter two.

1. Indonesia

From 2014 to 2017, ISIS affiliates were responsible for 15 attacks, one action, and five statements within Indonesia. Notable attacks include armed clashes with government forces that resulted in the death of former MIT leader Santoso, a coordinated IED and small arms attack in Jakarta that resulted in seven dead and 20 wounded, a suicide attack that resulted in the death of three police officers, and a JAD-led attack on government forces in Java.²⁵³ The one ISIS-linked action in Indonesia was the August 5, 2016, surrender of a Poso-based MIT militant after several successful arrests of suspected MIT fighters in the area.²⁵⁴

In the timeframe, ISIS-affiliated fighters in Indonesia made several direct statements. Most of these statements were pledges of allegiance, however, one aspirational piece of propaganda was also made. JAD, FAKSI, JAT, and MIT all pledged allegiance to ISIS. Additionally, on July 5, 2017, a suspected ISIS-linked militant posted a video threatening to target state authorities in Indonesia and Malaysia. In the video, the militant stated “we are no longer your citizens, and have liberated ourselves from you, with His permission and His assistance; we will come to you with a military forces that you cannot overcome.”²⁵⁵

²⁵³ “Armed Clashes Kill Six JAD Militants in Indonesia’s East Java,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyEvents/Display/JTIC_711359,

²⁵⁴ “MIT Militant Surrenders To Police in Indonesia’s Sulawesi,” by Jane’s IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyEvents/Display/JTIC_682192.

²⁵⁵ Ibid.

2. The Philippines

From 2014 to 2017, ISIS affiliates were responsible for 344 attacks, 57 actions and 48 statements in the Philippines. ISIS-linked attacks in the Philippines have gradually increased since 2014 and have been more severe and consistent than those elsewhere in Southeast Asia. A clear indicator of this heightened level of severity was displayed throughout the battle of Marawi, where 165 soldiers and 47 civilians were killed.²⁵⁶ It should be noted that the experience of Marawi does not artificially inflate the total number of attacks that took place in the timeframe. While the battle of Marawi began and ended in 2017, the numbers of attacks taking place in separate, previous years were very similar. For example, in 2015, ISIS-affiliates conducted 82 attacks. In 2016, they conducted 123 attacks and as of August 2017, they conducted 97. Clearly, the battle of Marawi is not solely responsible for the large number of ISIS-linked attacks in the country. It should also be noted that major combat operations in Marawi ceased on October 23, 2017, outside of the data timeframe. Therefore, the number of ISIS-linked attacks in 2017 will likely continue to rise. Even before the battle, attacks in the Philippines were some of the most severe in the region. On June 13, 2017, ISIS fighters detonated several IEDs, killing 13 Filipino Marines and wounding 40.²⁵⁷ Another example came on April 9, 2016, when ASG fighters ambushed a group of soldiers in the village of Baguindan in the Basilan province.²⁵⁸ This attack left 18 soldiers dead and 53 wounded. Examples like these show an elevated threat that has been unique to the Philippines in recent years.

²⁵⁶ “Islamic Freedom Fighters, Abu Sayyaf Next After Maute ‘Wipeout’ — Defense Chief,” *Manila Times*, October 24, 2017, <http://www.manilatimes.net/islamic-freedom-fighters-abu-sayyaf-next-maute-wipeout-defense-chief/358410/>.

²⁵⁷ “Armed Clashes Kill At Least 13 Marines in the Philippines’ Lanao del Sur,” *Jane’s* by IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/twrn0354-twr-2017>.

²⁵⁸ “ASG Militants Kill 18 Soldiers in the Philippines’ Basilan,” *Jane’s* by IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, <https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/twrl4265-twr-2016>.

ISIS-linked actions in the Philippines include several escapes of ASG militants from jails in Basilan, the kidnapping of five Malaysian sailors at sea in Dent Haven bay, and the beheading of two Vietnamese sailors held by the ASG since November 2016.²⁵⁹

Most statements made by ISIS-affiliates in the Philippines centered on pledges of allegiance, videos of executions, and threats directed at the state. As mentioned previously ASG, AKP, MG, and BIFF, now under the banner of ISIS, all pledged allegiance to the group in the timeframe. On May 2, 2016, ISIS-linked militants released an execution video of 68-year-old Canadian national John Ridsdel.²⁶⁰ While only his execution was shown in the video, three other individuals were kidnapped with him on September 21, 2015.²⁶¹ On April 23, 2015, AKP released a video “threatening to deploy suicide bombers in the Philippines and make the country a ‘graveyard’ for American soldiers.”²⁶²

3. Malaysia

From 2014 to 2017, ISIS affiliates were responsible for seven attacks, two actions and two statements within Malaysia. However, unlike ISIS-linked activity in Indonesia and the Philippines, the majority of ISIS-linked activity in Malaysia is a continuation of common KFR activities. For example, on July 9, 2016, three Indonesian tugboat crew members were kidnapped by ISIS-linked militants off the coast of Kampung Sinakut beach in Malaysia’s Sabah province.²⁶³ While no specific group immediately took

²⁵⁹ “ASG militants demand ransom for release of Malaysian sailors in the Philippines’ Sulu,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyEvents/Display/JTIC_692923; Elmore Santose, “Abu Sayyaf beheads 2 Vietnamese hostages – military,” *CNN*, July 6 2017, <http://cnnphilippines.com/regional/2017/07/05/Abu-Sayyaf-beheads-Vietnamese-hostages.html>.

²⁶⁰ “ASG militants release video of alleged execution of Canadian national in the Philippines,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyEvents/Display/JTIC_477392.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² “Ansar al-Khilafah in the Philippines Threatens Philippine Government, American Soldiers,” *Intelligence Group*, April 23, 2015, <https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/ansar-al-khilafah-in-the-philippines-threatens-philippine-government-american-soldiers.html>.

²⁶³ “Unidentified militants kidnap three Indonesian sailors off Malaysia’s Sabah,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyEvents/Display/JTIC_661983.

responsibility for the attack, the Indonesian fishermen were released by ASG on September 17, 2016.²⁶⁴ Another example of this type of attack came on July 13, 2014, when ASG militants killed one police officer and kidnapped another from a tourist resort in Sabah.²⁶⁵ These activities are far less severe than the ISIS-linked activities in Indonesia and the Philippines. Regardless, even the smallest ASG operation in Malaysia, if successful, can contribute to the group’s efforts to establish a new front elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

4. Conclusion

It should be no surprise that after examining the data on ISIS’s direct efforts, the Philippines remains the most likely candidate for becoming ISIS’s next front. From 2014 to 2017, the Philippines experienced nearly 16 times more attacks than Indonesia and Malaysia combined. Additionally, ISIS’s efforts in the Philippines were far more devastating, even before the battle in Marawi. Clearly, the high volume of attacks coupled with the high degree of lethality makes the Philippines the most vulnerable country. Table 3 displays the levels of the first three factors by country.

Table 3. Factors One, Two, and Three

	Chapter II		Chapter III	
	Pro-ISIS Groups	FTFs	ISIS’s Direct Efforts	State Weakness
Indonesia	√	√	√	
The Philippines	√+	√+	√+	
Malaysia	-	√	-	

The values (-), (√), and (√+) indicate low, medium, and high levels within each country.

²⁶⁴ “Three Indonesians abducted in Sabah waters freed by militant Abu Sayyaf group,” *New Straits Times*, September 18, 2016, <https://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/09/174118/three-indonesians-abducted-sabah-waters-freed-militant-abu-sayyaf-group>.

²⁶⁵ “Suspected ASG militants kill a police officer in Malaysia’s Sabah,” *Jane’s* by IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyEvents/Display/JTIC_360712.

C. FACTOR FOUR: STATE WEAKNESS

Individual states must remain strong in order to combat the threat of ISIS. Combatting terrorism requires more than simply making arrests because if a state's security forces effectively make arrests, but the state lacks effective anti-terrorism laws to make convictions, ISIS-aligned fighters may continue to operate unimpeded. Furthermore, if a state successfully arrests, convicts, and incarcerates terrorists, but lacks the ability to prevent those terrorists from returning to terrorism upon release, the threat may continue. On the necessity of developing capacity through different realms, Greer and Watson argue, "In opposing terror, governments need to both refine and improve retributive measures that deter and punish terrorism, and heavily invest in restorative approaches that disrupt the cycles of radicalization. States should be careful to not neglect one course of action at the expense of the other."²⁶⁶ Strong states must use several approaches to stop the threat of ISIS. If a country's CT efforts focus on a single approach and do not incorporate others, that country will simply be weaker. For the purposes of this thesis, three categories will be examined in order to evaluate a state's level of weakness: (1) the effectiveness of security forces; (2) the effectiveness each state's anti-terrorism laws; and (3) the effectiveness of state-run de-radicalization programs. The evaluation of each state's security forces is based on their ability to make arrests and thwart attacks. The effectiveness of each state's anti-terrorism laws and de-radicalization programs will be evaluated on clarity and frequency of use.

1. Indonesia

Indonesia began developing its CT capacity after the Bali bombings in 2002. These attacks represented a deadly reminder of what can happen when a state lacks the capacity to prevent terrorist plots. In the immediate aftermath, Jakarta was forced to quickly strengthen its CT capacity and make changes to the state's legal framework.²⁶⁷ Indonesian authorities immediately signed the Emergency Decree on the Prevention of

²⁶⁶ Adam Greer and Zachary Watson, "How to Counter Terrorism in Southeast Asia," *The Diplomat*, August 17, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/how-to-counter-terrorism-in-southeast-asia/>.

²⁶⁷ Gentry White, Lorraine Mazerolle, Michael D Porter and Peter Chalk, "Modelling the effectiveness of counter-terrorism interventions," *Trends and Issues in crime and criminal justice* 475 (June 2014), http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/tandi_pdf/tandi475.pdf.

Terrorism and implemented new anti-terrorism laws that enabled Indonesian police to detain suspects for up to six months.²⁶⁸ In April 2003, Indonesia began working with the U.S., through the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA), to train and equip Indonesian National Police (INP) officers to become the country's first National-Level Counterterrorism Task Force.²⁶⁹ This helped establish Indonesia's elite CT police unit known as Detachment 88, an organization credited with making sweeping arrests of suspected terrorists and collaborators.²⁷⁰ While progress was being made, it was not enough to thwart terrorists from conducting another series of bombings in Bali on October 1, 2005. This attack, a triple suicide bombing which killed 20 and injured 120, was considered the most severe terrorist attack since the initial Bali bombings.²⁷¹ The failure to prevent such a large attack highlighted the country's lack of CT capacity.

After the second Bali bombings, Indonesian CT capacity increased. On successes by CT forces in the immediate aftermath of the bombings, the U.S. Department of State Country Report on Terrorism 2005 reports, "The ongoing Indonesian police investigation into the attacks led to the November 9 police raid on a terrorist safe house in Malang, East Java, and the death of Malaysian bomb maker Azahari bin Husin in the ensuing shootout. Azahari's death ended a three-year manhunt and marked a major victory for Indonesian counterterrorism efforts."²⁷² Furthermore, Indonesian security forces recovered 35 active bombs ready for use in other attacks.²⁷³

Several other notable developments highlight a shift toward increasing Indonesia's CT capacity. In 2006, Indonesia established a new task force called the

²⁶⁸ Senia Febrica, "Scrutinizing Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Accounting for the Varying Responses of Singapore and Indonesia," *Asian Survey* 50, no. 3 (May-June 2010): 582, http://www.glasgowheart.org/media/media_157983_en.pdf.

²⁶⁹ Department of State, *The Antiterrorism Assistance Program: Report to Congress Fiscal Year 2003* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2004), <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/35833.pdf>.

²⁷⁰ Kirk A. Johnson, "The longue Duree: Indonesia's Response to the Threat of Jihadist Terrorism 1998-2016," (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012) 8, <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/49499>.

²⁷¹ Department of State, *Country reports on terrorism 2005*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2006), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2005/64336.htm>.

²⁷² Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 - Indonesia* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2006) <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2005/64336.htm>.

²⁷³ Ibid.

Attorney General's Office Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime, which was designed to help the country cope with the increasing number of terrorist-related trials in the post-2002 period.²⁷⁴ From 2006-2008, the task force prosecuted 43 terrorists, 26 of which were members of JI.²⁷⁵ In 2012, Indonesian security forces conducted several raids which resulted in 150 suspected terrorists arrested, and ten killed.²⁷⁶

Indonesia has been actively involved in several regional meetings to share lessons learned with other countries. Indonesia was the 2010-2013 co-chair of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts Working Group on Counterterrorism (EWG-CT) and actively participates in several international organizations to include the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), ASEAN, and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).²⁷⁷ One of Indonesia's recent focuses has been to stop the cross border movement of FTFs in the region.²⁷⁸ A clear example of this emphasis can be found through two important Indonesian-hosted regional meetings: (1) the August 2016 ministerial meeting focusing on countering the problem of FTF freedom of movement; and (2) the November 2016 INTERPOL general assembly.²⁷⁹

The current strength of Indonesian security forces is far higher than what it was immediately after the first Bali bombings. A prime example is the 2015 joint military-police operation named OPERATION TINOMBALA, which led to the death of former

²⁷⁴ White, Mazerolle, Porter and Chalk, "Modelling the effectiveness of counter-terrorism interventions."

²⁷⁵ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2008/122413.htm>.

²⁷⁵ White, Mazerolle, Porter and Chalk, "Modelling the effectiveness of counter-terrorism interventions."

²⁷⁶ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2012* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2013), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209980.htm>.

²⁷⁷ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2017), <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/272488.pdf>; Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2014), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224821.htm>.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

MIT leader Santoso.²⁸⁰ OPERATION TINOMBALA marks a major step toward greater capacity for Indonesian security forces. On this development, Singh writes, “The success of Operation Tinombala, significant for trailblazing a major joint army-police counter-terrorism operation—the first since 1998—showed how joint army-police operations can effectively deal with the threat posed by the quick-morphing threat of terrorism in the country.”²⁸¹

a. The Strength of Security Forces

Indonesian CT forces consist of three main components: The National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Special Detachment 88, and the Indonesian military’s (TNI) CT forces. The BNPT is the overarching organization tasked with overseeing and coordinating the other components. In order to evaluate the overall strength of Indonesian security forces, each component will be examined individually.

The Indonesian government established the BNPT in 2010.²⁸² With a staff of roughly 300 people and an annual budget of approximately \$54 million, the BNPT is “responsible for coordinating terrorism-related intelligence and information among stakeholder agencies, and comprises agents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the [TNI], and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI).”²⁸³ While the BNPT’s mission and responsibilities seem positive, the organization has at times failed to coordinate subordinate agencies. These failures have led to poor performance. On the sources of the BNPT’s poor performance, Fealy argues,

BNPT, almost from the outset, has been a poorly performing agency that has had far less impact than its budget and resources suggest that it should. Some of its problems are structural and some relate to personnel and internal culture. One key issue has been the division of responsibilities between the police and TNI within BNPT...Rivalry between the two

²⁸⁰ Jasminder Singh, “Operation Tinombala: Indonesia’s New Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” *RSIS Commentaries* 251, October 7, 2016, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CO16251.pdf>.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

²⁸² “Indonesia Extremism and Counter-Extremism,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed September 16, 2017, <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/indonesia>.

²⁸³ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 - Indonesia* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2016), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257515.htm>.

services, whether within or without BNPT, is intense and cooperation between the prevention and operations personnel is grudging at best.²⁸⁴

IPAC mirrors this sentiment. They report, “The BNPT structure effectively puts the police in charge of intelligence and operations and the military in charge of prevention, which does not make for smooth cooperation... Many agencies and ministries that BNPT is supposed to be coordinating have little interest either in the subject of countering extremism or in being coordinated.”²⁸⁵ While the BNPT may occasionally fail to aid individual CT units like Detachment 88, it has not completely inhibited success, either.

Individual units seem to remain effective despite setbacks. The POLRI’s elite CT unit, known as Detachment 88, spearheads the bulk of the country’s CT efforts. Detachment 88 was created in 2003 in response to the first Bali bombings and is known as the organization responsible for containing the wave of AQ and JI elements in the aftermath.²⁸⁶ The elite group, having been trained by Australian and U.S. CT forces, has been very successful. Between 2005 and 2009, Detachment 88 was responsible for the neutralization of 450 terrorists.²⁸⁷ In 2010 alone, it prevented at least 54 terrorist attacks.²⁸⁸ On the effectiveness of this elite unit, RAND reports, “The unit has enjoyed considerable success in breaking and disrupting jihadist cells in Indonesia and is now generally considered a highly proficient and capable elite law enforcement entity.”²⁸⁹ Furthermore Fealy writes,

Since 2002, [Detachment 88] has arrested more than 1,000 suspected terrorists, successfully prosecuting more than 700 of them. Indeed, it has a near 100 percent conviction rate. Moreover, over the past six years, it has

²⁸⁴ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*, 22.

²⁸⁵ IPAC report No. 11, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need For a Rethink,” June 30, 2014, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/06/IPAC_11_Rethinking_Countering_Extremism.pdf.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ Peter Chalk, Angel Rabasa, William Rosenau, and Leanne Piggott, *The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG846.pdf.

²⁸⁸ Tom Allard and Kanupriya Kapoor, “Fighting back: How Indonesia's elite police turned the tide on militants,” *Reuters News*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-security/fighting-back-how-indonesias-elite-police-turned-the-tide-on-militants-idUSKBN14C0X3>

²⁸⁹ Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, and Piggott, *The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia*, 154.

proven highly effective at detecting new terrorist plots and disrupting emerging terrorist cells.²⁹⁰

The unit continues to succeed in the fight against ISIS. In 2016, Detachment 88 thwarted at least 14 terrorist attacks and arrested over 150 suspected terrorists.²⁹¹ On August 5, 2016, Detachment 88 conducted a raid on an ISIS-linked cell known as Katibah-GR, which resulted in the arrest of six terrorists in the city of Bantam.²⁹² These operational successes highlight a very high level of capacity throughout the organization.

In addition to Detachment 88, portions of the Indonesian military (TNI) also conduct CT, albeit in a much more limited capacity. Specifically, a unit known as Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus, or special forces command) conducts some CT operations and is among the best-trained and resourced.²⁹³ On this unit, RAND reports,

The bulk of its CT activity is directed either at deep-cover infiltration of organizations considered to represent a threat to national security (the responsibility of Group IV) or at anti-hijacking and special recovery missions (the responsibility of Group V, also referred to as Satuan Gulangan 81, which works closely with Detachment 88's crisis response team).²⁹⁴

While Kopassus's efforts seem promising, key human rights abuses by Kopassus commandos have led to a great deal of controversy. For example, in 2003, four Kopassus commandoes were found guilty of unlawfully killing Theys Eluay, Papua New Guinea's most prominent separatist leader.²⁹⁵ Kopassus was also implicated in the murder of one Indonesian and two American teachers in September 2002.²⁹⁶ In addition to highlighting

²⁹⁰ Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State*.

²⁹¹ "Fighting back: How Indonesia's Elite Police Densus 88 Turned The Tide On Militants," *Straits Times*, December 23, 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/fighting-back-how-indonesias-elite-police-densus-88-turned-the-tide-on-militants>.

²⁹² Arlina Arshad, "Plot to attack Marina Bay with Rocket from Batam foiled," *Straits Times*, August 6, 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/plot-to-attack-marina-bay-with-rocket-from-batam-foiled>.

²⁹³ *Ibid.* 155

²⁹⁴ Chalk, Rabasa, Rosenau, and Piggott, *The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia*, 155.

²⁹⁵ Matthew Moore, "Kopassus Guilty of Eluay Murder," *Fairfax Digital*, April 22, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/04/21/1050777211770.html>.

²⁹⁶ Damien Kingsbury, "Australia's Renewal of Training Links With Kopassus, A Critique," Working Paper, Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, 2004, 8, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/2016-03/WP-SDSC-387_0.pdf.

the group's unprofessionalism, controversies like these foster a great deal of distrust among the public. Throughout the past year, Indonesian lawmakers have been trying to give the TNI a greater role in conducting CT operations.²⁹⁷ If lawmakers decide to amend the anti-terrorism bill of 2003, it will give the TNI the ability to "act on terror threats against foreign embassies, special economic zones, commercial vessels and aircraft, as well as terror cells in jungles or mountainous areas in Indonesia."²⁹⁸ This change, if implemented, may ease the operational burden on CT units like Detachment 88 and broaden Indonesian CT capacity.

Successes by Indonesian security forces have been frequent and steady. Individual organizations like Detachment 88 are on the forefront of the country's war against terrorism. Examples like OPERATION TINOMBALA highlight a positive trend toward greater cooperation among separate security organizations in Indonesia. Legal changes that could shape the TNI into a greater CT force could help the country's CT efforts. Overall, Indonesia has a very high level of CT capacity, even though institutional constraints of the BNPT hamper cooperation.

b. De-radicalization

The major organizations tasked with de-radicalization are the BNPT and Detachment 88. Some Indonesian de-radicalization efforts have been successful while others have failed. On March 21, 2016, BNPT de-radicalization director Irfan Idris said that current de-radicalization efforts in Indonesia were not "optimum enough" to return terrorists to society after prison.²⁹⁹ A prime example of the ineffectiveness of Indonesia's de-radicalization efforts arose from the investigation into those responsible for the ISIS-linked January 14, 2016, Jakarta attack. One of the five terrorists who conducted the

²⁹⁷ Wahyudi Soeriaatmadja, "Military Set To Play Larger Role In Jakarta's Anti-Terror Fight," *Straits Times*, February 27, 2017, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/military-set-to-play-larger-role-in-jakartas-anti-terror-fight>.

²⁹⁸ Francis Chan, "Indonesian Military Role In Terror Fight Prompts Debate," *Straits Times*, June 8, 2017, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-military-role-in-terror-fight-prompts-debate>.

²⁹⁹ Marguerite Afra Sapiie, "Indonesia Needs Stronger Deradicalization Program," *Jakarta Post*, March 21, 2016, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/03/16/indonesia-needs-stronger-deradicalization-program.html>.

attack was a former terrorist convict named Sunakim.³⁰⁰ After release from prison, he immediately returned to terrorism. Sunakim stands as a recent example of what can happen if state de-radicalization programs fail.

Some Indonesian de-radicalization efforts have succeeded. Successful Indonesian approaches to de-radicalization center on gathering intelligence on terrorist networks and returning detainees to society.³⁰¹ On Indonesia's de-radicalization program, Banlaoi writes,

In Indonesia, deradicalization programs concentrated on Muslim prisoners involved in several jihadi crimes such as bombings, murders, and homicides. The Indonesian Police spearheaded the implementation of deradicalization programs through a special branch called Detachment 88. The programs involved religious counseling, ideological dialogues and material inducements.”³⁰²

Additionally, Detachment 88 officers use a variety of soft-approaches to promote cooperation. For example, police provide financial assistance, travel, and accommodations to the families of convicted terrorists.³⁰³ These soft approaches seem to encourage other detainees to cooperate with Detachment 88 officers. On this dynamic, Banlaoi writes,

A practical aspect of deradicalization program is the provision of financial incentives and support to detainees and their families. This scheme has been effectively applied in Indonesia. The Indonesian government not only fed and clothed the family of detainees but also gave greater family access to visit the detainees. The Indonesian government even went on supporting the travel expenses of families to allow them to visit their love ones in jail. This form of economic inducements can encourage detainees to join the deradicalization program.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

³⁰¹ Angel Rabasa, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Jeremy Ghez, and Christopher Boucek, *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 106, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf.

³⁰² Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Deradicalization Efforts in the Philippines: Options for Disengagement Strategy* (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2014), 8.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., 15.

These efforts have led to several successes. An estimated 85 percent of convicts respond in some positive way, which range from accepting some form of support to publically recanting their crimes and terrorist affiliations.³⁰⁵ As of 2014, Detachment 88's deradicalization program has rehabilitated approximately 150 former terrorists.³⁰⁶ However, one problem with Indonesian deradicalization centers on a lack of funding. RAND observes, "Police officers who have been involved in the rehabilitation of detainees acknowledge that there is insufficient institutional support."³⁰⁷ Furthermore in 2013, the BNPT issued a blueprint for the de-radicalization of jihadis incarcerated in the country's overcrowded prison system.³⁰⁸ Unfortunately, as of 2016, the blueprint has yet to be fully implemented.³⁰⁹ While individual de-radicalization efforts in Detachment 88 and the BNPT have led to some successes, a lack of resources coupled with the slow implementation of a consistent top-down de-radicalization strategy highlights potential vulnerabilities in Indonesia.

c. Anti-terrorism Laws

One key vulnerability with the Indonesian state CT apparatus comes from weak anti-terrorism laws. For example, as of November 2017, security forces remain unable to legally arrest returnees who have come home to Indonesia after fighting alongside ISIS in the Middle East.³¹⁰ Shortly after the Bali bombing in 2002, the Indonesian parliament passed anti-terrorism laws 15/2003 and 16/2003. Law 15/2003 "empowered the police to detain terrorism suspects for up to six months before indictment and gave prosecutors and judges the right to block bank accounts belonging to individuals or organizations

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Banlaoi, *Deradicalization Efforts in the Philippines: Options for Disengagement Strategy*.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., 116.

³⁰⁸ Cameron Sumpter, "Countering Violent Extremism In Indonesia: Priorities, Practice And The Role Of Civil Society," *Journal of Deradicalization 11* (Summer 2017), 128, <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/103>.

³⁰⁹ Department of State, "Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 – Indonesia," (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2017) <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272230.htm>.

³¹⁰ "Indonesia to Strengthen Anti-Terror Law Following Jakarta attacks," *Straits Times*, January 18, 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesia-to-strengthen-anti-terror-law-following-jakarta-attacks>.

suspected of funding terrorist activities.”³¹¹ Law 16/2003 “allowed the retroactive prosecution of those implicated in the bombings.”³¹² As of November 2017, despite the attention given to terrorist activities in Southeast Asia, the standing laws have not been changed. Unfortunately, the delay in updating these laws continues to constrain Indonesian CT forces. On the weak nature of the laws, Chan writes,

Indonesia's Anti-Terrorism Bill, first enacted the year after the 2002 Bali bombings that killed 202 people, makes it illegal for anyone who runs a terrorist cell. However, it falls short of extending punishment to anyone pledging support to or joining groups such as ISIS, for instance... often hampering their ability to put terrorists behind bars or prevent terror suspects from carrying out attacks.³¹³

An example of the weakness of the current anti-terrorism laws came in February 2016, when Detachment 88 raided a jihadi camp in central Java. During the raid, Detachment 88 officers detained 38 militants after finding weapons, jihadi literature and propaganda.³¹⁴ Without substantial proof, all 38 militants were released after just 24 hours.³¹⁵

Resistance to change the laws is partially due to the public's fears of abuses of power. Singh writes,

There is also concerted opposition from the main secular and Islamist political parties as well as civil society groups. Issues have been raised about the new laws being too restrictive and arbitrary. There is fear that the new laws could be abused and used against political dissenters rather than the terrorists and to trample on human rights.”³¹⁶

³¹¹ White, Mazerolle, Porter and Chalk, “Modelling The Effectiveness Of Counter-Terrorism Interventions.”

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Francis Chan, “Indonesian Lawmakers Push For Tougher Anti-Terror Laws After Solo Suicide Bombing,” *Straits Times*, July 7, 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-lawmakers-push-for-more-powerful-anti-terror-law-in-wake-of-solo-suicide>.

³¹⁴ “Most suspects Freed In Indonesia Raid As Tough Law Pending,” *New Straits Times*, February 21, 2016, <https://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/02/128668/most-suspects-freed-indonesia-raid-tough-law-pending>.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

Clearly, if the 2003 anti-terrorism laws are not amended, Indonesian CT capacity will suffer.

d. Conclusion

As a whole, Indonesia's CT efforts have led to more successes than failures. At the tactical and operational levels, individual CT units remain highly trained, effective, and ready to combat individual terrorist cells and networks alike. Detachment 88 is the central organization that leads these efforts. However, two vulnerabilities may hamper success. The lack of internal coordination among individual agencies and outdated anti-terrorism laws may constrain CT forces from thwarting terrorist attacks in the future. Domestic ISIS-linked elements could capitalize on these vulnerabilities. While individual units continue to make arrests, without fixing these vulnerabilities, Indonesia may experience a rise in terrorist activity.

2. The Philippines

The Philippines is no stranger to terrorism. Dodwell and Ness argue that in Southeast Asia, the country faces the greatest security threat as separatist groups in Mindanao have continuously sought autonomy for centuries.³¹⁷ In addition to separatist movements, terrorist organizations like ASG emerged in the 1990s. In 1995, the nature of the threat was realized when Philippine security forces uncovered

A multipronged plot aimed at assassinating the pope and President Bill Clinton, bombing Washington's embassies in Manila and Bangkok, and sabotaging U.S. commercial airliners flying trans-Pacific routes from U.S. West Coast cities. The plan was hatched by Ramzi Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center in New York, and was foiled only when volatile explosive compounds ignited a fire in the apartment that he was renting in Manila.³¹⁸

³¹⁷ Brian Dodwell and Marielle Ness, "A View from the CT Foxhole: An Interview with Captain Robert A. Newson, Military Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations," *CTC Sentinel* 8, no. 2 (February 2015), 19, <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue28.pdf>.

³¹⁸ Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1236.html.

The severity of the plot, its connections to other transnational terrorist organizations, and a general rise of terrorism in the country led the Philippine state to accept international CT assistance. After the September 11 attacks, the Philippines and the U.S. began a series of joint operations known as Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) and more specifically, Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines (JSOTF-P). On these developments, RAND reports,

Hostage-taking and attacks by the ASG, founded in 1991, and other al Qaeda-linked plots in the Philippines, led the Manila government to accept the U.S. proposed assistance to train and equip a CT unit in 2001 before the 9/11 attacks. After the 9/11 attacks, the Philippine president pledged support to the U.S. government in global CT efforts, and the two governments reached agreement on a package of aid and assistance. Under laboriously negotiated terms, approximately 1,300 U.S. forces deployed to the southern Philippines in 2002; thereafter, the effort averaged 500 to 600 troops.³¹⁹

JSOTF-P directly led to a decline in ASG attacks, reductions in terrorist groups' strength and capacity, and a decrease in support for the group among the local populace.³²⁰ However, elements of the terrorist groups endured. Significant incidents, like the recent battle of Marawi, indicate that the threat of terrorism persists and that Filipino security forces may lack the ability to repel them. This section highlights the strengths and weaknesses of Filipino CT capacity.

a. The Strength of Security Forces

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) are the two main organizations responsible for carrying out CT operations in the country. Several other organizations play some role in combatting terrorism to include the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the PNP Special Action Force (PNP-SAF), and the Bureau of Immigration. Key weaknesses in the PNP have forced the bulk of the CT responsibility to fall on the AFP.³²¹ On this dynamic, White adds,

³¹⁹ Ibid., xv.

³²⁰ Ibid. 114.

³²¹ White, Mazerolle, Porter and Chalk, "Modelling the effectiveness of counter-terrorism interventions." 2.

The PNP has played a secondary role in counter-terrorism for several reasons, including a legacy of suspicion of the police from their role in the Marcos era, a history of nepotism and corruption, a lack of continuity in leadership and a history of poor investigative techniques and an over-reliance on questionable confessions. The weakness of and suspicion surrounding the PNP has, by default, thrust the Armed Forces of the Philippines into the forefront of Philippine counter-terrorism.³²²

A clear example of the PNP's inability to conduct successful CT operations came on January 25, 2015, when PNP forces conducted a raid on suspected terrorists in Mindanao. During the raid, 44 elite PNP officers were killed.³²³ Furthermore, a major problem for Philippine security forces is that there are simply too many agencies with overlapping responsibilities.³²⁴ On this dynamic, the State Department asserts,

Multiple agencies have jurisdiction over counterterrorism efforts, leading to inefficient investigations and response to terrorist incidents. Responsibilities between law enforcement and military units involved in counterterrorism missions are often not clear, information sharing is moderate, and command and control arrangements often depend on personal relationships between incident commanders.³²⁵

Regardless of other agencies' failures, the AFP has become very effective in rural environments. Since 2001, collaboration under OEF-P allowed AFP forces to make several key improvements at the tactical, operational, and institutional levels.³²⁶ At the tactical level, U.S. special operations forces (SOF) trained and equipped individual AFP units.³²⁷ In turn, these units made several arrests which in turn decimated ASG's base. From 2000 to 2015, the ASG network was degraded from approximately 1,250 fighters to 300.³²⁸ At the operational level, U.S. SOF advised and assisted several capacity-building efforts to include the integration of command and control, planning, and intelligence

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 – The Philippines* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2016), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257515.htm>.

³²⁵ Ibid.

³²⁶ Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014*.

³²⁷ Ibid.

³²⁸ "The Philippines Battles Abu Sayyaf," The Soufan Group, April 13, 2016, <http://www.soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrief-the-philippines-battle-abu-sayyaf/>.

functions into operations centers throughout the country.³²⁹ This effort improved Philippine CT forces' integration into predominately conventional force operations.³³⁰ At the institutional level, Philippine security forces streamlined CT training pipelines.³³¹ On this development, RAND reports,

With U.S. SOF assistance, Philippine SOF developed a training cadre, schoolhouse, selection criteria, courses, doctrine, and an NCO academy. For many years, this has been a self-sustaining capability. Most recently, U.S. SOF assisted in the standardization of programs of instruction across the various SOF units... Battlefield results from 2001 to 2014 support the assertion that the AFP have become more capable of planning and executing complex joint operations, resupplying their forces, evacuating their casualties, and minimizing collateral damage and displacement of civilians.³³²

AFP capacity greatly increased since 2001 while organizations like the PNP remain less capable. In 2011, the government enacted the 2011-2016 Internal Peace and Security Plan, the country's first effort to transfer internal security responsibilities from the AFP to the PNP. Unfortunately, this transition has been slow and ineffective.³³³ The AFP continues to lead the country's CT efforts. Furthermore, President Duterte's war on drugs has forced many agencies to focus on counter-narcotics in addition to CT. This has increased the workload and spread several agencies too thin.³³⁴

While it may seem as though AFP CT capacity is high, the battle of Marawi is a clear indicator of the opposite. The loss of the city for five months highlights a major weakness in the AFP's abilities—fighting in an urban environment.³³⁵ ISIS-linked elements involved in the battle sought to “turn the residents of Marawi against the

³²⁹ Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014*, 119.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid., 120-121.

³³³ “The Philippines Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Counter Extremism Project, accessed September 16, 2017, <https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/philippines>.

³³⁴ Ibid

³³⁵ Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Jani, “The Siege of Marawi City: Some Lessons,” *RSIS Commentaries* 153 (August 2017), <https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/43672/CO17153.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.

military, the government, and countrymen; expose the state's inability to protect its citizens; and slowly weaken the state's resolve to secure its peripheral territories."³³⁶ In order to achieve these objectives, ISIS-linked planners developed a strategy. On this strategy, Singh writes,

The Mautes' strategy involves two prongs. Firstly, instead of fighting in the jungles and hills, [ISIS-linked fighters] drew the military into an urban environment which they had prepared for in advance. As they engaged the military, [the terrorists] pulled deeper into Marawi. Although they had ceded the advantage to the military which have encircled them, this made fighting the terrorists much harder and forced the military into bombing houses to clear sniping positions and tunneled strongholds.³³⁷

While Philippine security forces eventually retook the city, success came at great cost. Large portions of Marawi were destroyed by AFP artillery and airstrikes, approximately 360,000 residents were displaced, and 47 civilians were killed in the conflict.³³⁸ The AFP's inexperience conducting CT operations in an urban environment and the inability to regain control of the city without destroying it, highlights a great level of state weakness.

b. De-radicalization

Philippine security forces have arrested hundreds of suspected terrorists in the past decades without investing in de-radicalization programs seen elsewhere in Southeast Asia.³³⁹ On the absence of developed prison de-radicalization program, Banlaoi writes, "Though the Philippine government recognizes the importance of deradicalization program as soft counter-terrorism measures, the government, however, has failed to implement a coherent and systematic deradicalization program that can approximate exemplary programs implemented in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore."³⁴⁰ While the

³³⁶ Singh and Jani, "The Siege of Marawi City: Some Lessons."

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Amnesty International, *The Battle of Marawi: Death and Destruction in the Philippines* (London, UK: 2017), 5, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa35/7427/2017/en/>.

³³⁹ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Deradicalization Efforts in the Philippines: Options for Disengagement Strategy* (Quezon City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research, 2014), 8.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

Philippines has not heavily invested in de-radicalization programs, the country has experimented with limited de-radicalization efforts in some prisons. Within the prison system, these efforts include,

Educating correctional staff about terrorism; creating staff awareness about the radicalization threat and about prisoner manipulation... developing methods to improve existing rehabilitation programs, including developing greater opportunities for inmate vocational training and education; and, as part of a broader regional counterterrorism strategy, examining how other countries (including Australia) run de-radicalization programs.³⁴¹

Furthermore, the country has attempted to incorporate soft measures to include support to detainees' families and counseling.³⁴² However, these efforts remain very limited and it is unclear if they have led to any notable successes. Banlaoi argues that as of 2014, "there has been no actual implementation of programs of the Philippine government focusing on the deradicalization and rehabilitation of Muslim detainees. Deradicalization and rehabilitation plans" remain in the conceptual and preparatory stage.³⁴³ The lack of a consistent, developed, and organized de-radicalization program makes the Philippines much more vulnerable in keeping incarcerated terrorists from returning to terrorism upon release.

c. Anti-Terrorism Laws

The principal anti-terror law of the Philippines is the 2007 Human Security Act (HSA). The act established the country's anti-terrorism framework, provided methods for law enforcement to conduct investigations, and created the Anti-Terror Council, an organization that oversees the implementation of the law.³⁴⁴ However, problems within the bill persist. For example, there is an absence of a clear definition of terrorism, "which

³⁴¹ Clarke Jones and Resurrecion Morales, "Integration versus Segregation: A Preliminary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities for De-Radicalization," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 35, no. 3 (February 2012), 215.

³⁴² *Ibid.*

³⁴³ Rommel C. Banlaoi, *Deradicalization Efforts in the Philippines: Options for Disengagement Strategy*.

³⁴⁴ "The Philippines: Extremism & Counter-Extremism," Counter Extremism Project.

makes the law vague, ambiguous, and highly susceptible to abuse.”³⁴⁵ The act defines a terrorist as “anyone that commits an offence under various provisions of the Revised Penal Code ‘thereby sowing a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.’”³⁴⁶ Thus, many fear that the Philippine state could label peaceful protestors as terrorists.³⁴⁷ Additionally, there is a contradiction between the terms “terrorism” and “crime,” within the law. On this notion, Eadie writes,

A dichotomy seems to exist whereby security threats in the Philippines from groups such as the NPA and the ASG are articulated as terrorist threats but dealt with as criminals in law... Ironically criminals and crime seem to be articulated as terrorists and terrorism by the Philippines government however this has not been tested in court. There is the inclination to inflate the insurgent threat to the level of “emergency” and thus a threat to national security but a lack of desire to follow the designation of this threat through under the law.³⁴⁸

Two pieces of evidence indicate HSA’s inherent weakness. First, the law simply has never been used in any landmark case.³⁴⁹ Second, the law’s ambiguity makes it difficult for courts to accurately label certain crimes. This weakness has come to light in the aftermath of the battle of Marawi. On this development, Cabalza writes,

The bone of contention in the Marawi siege today...is how to differentiate rebellion from terrorism. The Philippine court defines rebellion as something that cannot be combined with murder, arson, robbery, and/or other common crimes. Political crimes are directly aimed against the political order, but common crimes may also be committed to achieve a political purpose. As the current terrorist conundrum in Mindanao shows, there is lack of clear parameters for defining common crimes as acts of terrorism. Rebellion or insurrection is a crime against public order and is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the government—this would necessarily sow and create a condition of widespread and

³⁴⁵ Chester Cabalza, “Marawi Siege: Testing the Philippines’ Anti-Terror Law,” *The Diplomat*, June 2, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/marawi-siege-testing-the-philippines-anti-terror-law/>.

³⁴⁶ Pauline E. Eadie, “Legislation for Terrorism: Human Security Act of 2007,” *Journal of Terrorism Research* (2011), <https://jtr.st-andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.226/>.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Ibid.

³⁴⁹ Cabalza, “Marawi Siege: Testing the Philippines’ Anti-Terror Law.”

extraordinary fear and panic among the populace. That means the anti-terror law, in effect, should supplant rebellion and insurrection in Philippine criminal laws. Rather than separate crimes, such acts should be considered the crime of terrorism.”³⁵⁰

Without changes to the HSA, the law's inherent ambiguity may inhibit the Philippine government's ability to prosecute suspected terrorists in the future. Problems with the HSA have been officially acknowledged by top officials in the AFP and the PNP.³⁵¹ On October 9, 2017, the AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Eduardo Año and PNP Chief Dela Rosa called for stricter anti-terrorism laws.³⁵² The lack of effective anti-terrorism laws in a country that faces the greatest level of ISIS-linked activity, indicates a key vulnerability for the Philippines.

d. Conclusion

The strength of Philippine CT forces is high among AFP units in some environments. Clearly, that same strength has not been translated into the urban environment. The country's slow transition to incorporate the PNP, a lack of an organized, state-run de-radicalization program, and ineffective anti-terror laws make the country more vulnerable to ISIS. Additionally, the volume of organizations that have some role in CT brings down the government's effectiveness in combatting terrorism. Recent events indicate that the threat of ISIS is the highest in the Philippines. In order to combat this threat, the Philippine state must remain even more vigilant in broadening state CT capacity.

3. Malaysia

While Malaysia has the lowest amount of ISIS-linked activities, Malaysian CT capacity remains very high. Malaysian security forces do have some experience fighting domestic terrorists. In 2000, 15 members of a Malaysian Islamist group known as al-Ma'unah raided a military arms depot, took several hostages, and murdered a Malaysian

³⁵⁰ Ibid.

³⁵¹ Frances G. Mangosing, "AFP, PNP Chiefs Call For Stricter PH Anti-Terror Laws," *Inquirer.net*, October 9, 2017, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/936658/afp-pnp-ph-anti-terror-law-national-id-system>.

³⁵² Ibid.

soldier and a police officer.³⁵³ The stand-off came to an end when approximately 3,000 Malaysian soldiers and police officers stormed the terrorist camp and arrested the terrorists.³⁵⁴ Events like this have been rare in Malaysia. Most of the terrorist activity in the country takes place in the coastal waters near Sabah, where members of extremist groups like ASG conduct KFR operations.³⁵⁵ For example, on November 6, 2016, ASG members attacked a yacht off the coast of Tanjong Luuk Pisuk, Sabah, killing one woman and abducting a 70 year-old man.³⁵⁶ These attacks, or criminal activities, remain small in scale and take place in remote areas. Regardless of the low severity of these attacks, the looming threat of ISIS has motivated Malaysian security forces to greatly develop their capacity.

a. *The Strength of Security Forces*

The Pasukan Gerakan Khas (PGK), or Royal Malaysian Police Special Branch Counterterrorism Unit, is the country's lead CT organization. The unit "proactively identifies terrorist threats on soft targets" and is credited for foiling several attacks in 2016 alone.³⁵⁷ For example, the organization uncovered and thwarted a plot that consisted of multiple attacks on popular tourist destinations planned for August 31, 2016, Malaysia's Independence Day.³⁵⁸ Clear evidence of the PGK's effectiveness can be found in the group's high volume of arrests. In 2014, Malaysian security forces arrested approximately 50 ISIS supporters in the country.³⁵⁹ In 2015, the number of arrests rose to

³⁵³ "Malaysian Arms Raid Cult Charged," *BBC News*, August 8, 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/870776.stm>.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁵ "Unidentified Militants Kidnap Three Indonesian Sailors off Malaysia's Sabah." Jane's by IHS Markit, accessed September 16, 2017, https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/TerrorismInsurgencyEvents/Display/JTIC_661983

³⁵⁶ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 – The Philippines* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2016), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257515.htm>.

³⁵⁷ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2017), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272230.htm>.

³⁵⁸ United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2015* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2016), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272230.htm>.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

90.³⁶⁰ As of October 6, 2017, the PGK arrested 45 ISIS-linked fighters.³⁶¹ Of this group, 30 were active ISIS members, three of which have been found to be high ranking Iraqi commanders.³⁶²

Malaysian security forces continue to develop domestic CT skills. On October 27, 2016, Prime Minister Najib Razak announced the formation of the National Special Operations Force (NSOF), an integrated organization comprised of members of the armed forces, police, and the Maritime Enforcement Agency.³⁶³ This elite organization is said to be comprised of 170 personnel and is designed to serve as a quick reaction force in response to dynamic threats.³⁶⁴ The establishment of such a force is a clear indication of the attention and resources placed on CT in Malaysia.

b. De-radicalization

Of the countries being evaluated, Malaysia has the strongest de-radicalization program. Malaysian security forces view de-radicalization as the most important tool in countering terrorism.³⁶⁵ On the great importance placed on de-radicalization's role, Hamidi writes, "Malaysia maintains the view that the mere use of penalty and criminalization approach will not solve the problem of extremism, and the blending of soft approach and the conventional methods offer a better alternative."³⁶⁶ Furthermore, he argues,

³⁶⁰ Ibid., and Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2014* (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2015), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272230.htm>.

³⁶¹ Teoh Pei Ying, "45 Foreign Terrorist Fighters Arrested In Malaysia This Year," *New Straits Times*, October 13, 2017, <https://www.nst.com.my/news/crime-courts/2017/10/290729/45-foreign-terrorist-fighters-arrested-malaysia-year>.

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ "Malaysia Launches Special Ops Force To Counter Terror Threats," *Straits Times*, October 27, 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysia-launches-special-ops-force-to-counter-terror-threats>.

³⁶⁴ Prashanth Parameswaran, "Malaysia's New Anti-Terror Force," *The Diplomat*, November 1, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/malysias-new-anti-terror-force/>.

³⁶⁵ M. Aslam, I. Othman, and N. Rosili, "De-radicalization Programs in South-East Asia: A Comparative Study of Rehabilitation Programs in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia & Singapore," *Journal of Education and Social Sciences* 4 (June 2016), http://jesoc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/KC4_81.pdf.

³⁶⁶ Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, "Malaysia's Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalization Strategy," *Journal of Public Safety and Security* 6, no. 2 (2016), 18 <http://www.moha.gov.my/images/terkini/WORD.ARTIKEL-TPM-JURNAL-VOL.6-2016.pdf>.

Malaysia has initiated several [de-radicalization] programmes to address the problem of radicalism due to religious misconceptions, with the specific purpose to rehabilitate and subsequently reintegrate the radicals into the society. This initiative is a collaborative and holistic effort between the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) and other relevant agencies, including the Department of Islamic of Development Malaysia, Malaysian Prison Department, Ministry of Education and higher education institutions.³⁶⁷

Like in Indonesia, Malaysian de-radicalization efforts place an emphasis on providing assistance to the families of incarcerated terrorists.³⁶⁸ Family members receive financial assistance and meet regularly with hand-picked religious clerics.³⁶⁹ This support eases the suffering of the families whose primary bread winners remain incarcerated. Furthermore, Malaysia emphasizes post-release engagement to ensure former militants refrain from returning to criminal activities.³⁷⁰ On these programs Hamidi writes, “Engagement sessions between case officers and ex-detainees are held continuously. Assistance and support are provided to ensure they can continue living without succumbing to extremism.”³⁷¹ These efforts have not gone unnoticed by the international community. In January 2016, Malaysia hosted the International Conference on De-radicalization and Countering Violent Extremism for members of ASEAN and strategic partners alike.³⁷²

Unfortunately, while it seems like a great amount of attention and resources have been funneled to de-radicalization, there is not much clarity on how successful these efforts are among individual jihadis. On January 26, 2016, Special Branch director Datuk Seri Muhammad Fuzi Harun claimed that from 2001-2011, Malaysia’s deradicalization

³⁶⁷ Aslam, Othman, and Rosili, “De-radicalization Programs in South-East Asia.”

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Hamidi, “Malaysia’s Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalization Strategy,” 13.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2016*.

program had a 95 percent rate.³⁷³ This success rate seems inflated. On the general lack of transparency, Rand reports,

Because of the paucity of information about Malaysia's deradicalization program, it is difficult to assess its effectiveness, or even its strengths and weaknesses. Some of the rehabilitated extremists have taped personal recantations that have been aired on Malaysian television; however, the government does not permit independent journalists and scholars to speak to any of these individuals. One ex-militant explained that he could not discuss the deradicalization program without violating the terms of his release.³⁷⁴

Clearly, more research needs to be done to assess the overall effectiveness and success of Malaysian de-radicalization efforts. However, de-radicalization programs in Malaysia remain more developed and better funded than programs elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

c. Anti-terrorism Laws

Malaysia has strong and effective anti-terror laws. However, this has not always been the case. In April 2012, the Malaysian parliament passed the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA).³⁷⁵ Essentially the law "provides the procedures for arrest for serious offences under Chapter VI and VIA of the Penal Code which include offences against state and terrorism-related offences, among others."³⁷⁶ While seemingly a positive development, SOSMA was ineffective. For example, Yazid Sufaat, an AQ-linked biochemical weapons expert "charged with inciting or promoting the commission of terrorist acts under Section 130G(a) of Malaysia's penal code," was dismissed and released by the Malaysian High Court on "constitutional grounds."³⁷⁷ A failure like the case of Sufaat indicates SOSMA's inherent weakness. Thus, the Malaysian government strengthened its anti-terrorism laws in light of the dynamic and evolving threat of ISIS. In

³⁷³ Laili Ismail, "Police: Malaysia's Deradicalization Programme Has 95 Per Cent Success Rate," *New Straits Times*, January 26, 2016, <https://www.nst.com.my/news/2016/01/124116/police-msias-deradicalisation-programme-has-95-cent-success-rate>.

³⁷⁴ Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek, "Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists," 106.

³⁷⁵ Hamidi, "Malaysia's Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalization Strategy," 4.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁷ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2013*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2014), <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257515.htm>.

2015, the Malaysian government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA).³⁷⁸ POTA “provides for the prevention of the commission or support of terrorist acts involving listed terrorist organizations in a foreign country or any part of a foreign country and for the control of persons engaged in such acts.”³⁷⁹ SMATA provides “special measures to deal with persons who engage in the commission or support of terrorist acts involving listed terrorist organizations in a foreign country or any part of a foreign country.”³⁸⁰ These new CT laws allowed for the preemptive arrest of terrorists plotters. For example, between 2013 and 2016, Malaysian authorities arrested over 250 people with suspected links to ISIS.³⁸¹ Clearly, these laws show Malaysia’s steadfastness in thwarting any form of support for ISIS. Additionally, they allow security forces to go far beyond security forces in Indonesia or the Philippines. However, it is important to note that there are many critics of the new anti-terrorism laws. Some fear that these measures could be used to silence or detain members of the political opposition.

4. Conclusion

Malaysia has an effective CT force, a developed deradicalization program, and an aggressive set of anti-terrorism laws. As the threat of ISIS continues to evolve, Malaysia will likely play a pivotal role in countering the threat. A lack of successful ISIS attacks, coupled with numerous thwarted attacks and arrests indicate the most encompassing CT capacity among the three threat countries. Furthermore, as most ISIS-related activity takes place on the fringes of society and near remote islands and waterways, an ISIS front within Malaysia seems unlikely.

³⁷⁸ Hamidi, “Malaysia’s Policy on Counter Terrorism and Deradicalization Strategy,” 4.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ “Malaysian Police Arrest Suspected Abu Sayyaf leader, seven others,” Reuters September 3, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-arrests/malaysian-police-arrest-suspected-abu-sayyaf-leader-seven-others-idUSKCN1BE0ES>.

D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The first part of this chapter focused on the varying levels of ISIS-related attacks, actions and statements throughout individual countries. The Philippines had the highest number of ISIS-related direct efforts—far greater than Indonesia and Malaysia combined. This makes the nature of the threat far more serious in the Philippines than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. If the nature of the threat differs in each of the three countries, so too should each state’s strength and effectiveness in combatting that threat. The second part of this chapter focused on evaluating varying levels of state weakness. By examining each state’s CT capacity, anti-terrorism laws, and deradicalization programs, certain conclusions can be made about probable locations for a new ISIS front in the region. The Malaysian state’s readiness to develop CT capacity highlights the country’s overall strength. Indonesian CT capacity remains very high and the country’s security forces have had some success in de-radicalizing incarcerated jihadis. An ISIS front in either of these two countries remains unlikely. Unfortunately, the Philippine state’s experience in Marawi is a clear indicator of a high level of state weakness that is not shared by Indonesia or Malaysia. Thus, as in chapter two, the Philippines remains the most vulnerable country to become ISIS’s next front. Table 4 displays the varying levels of all four factors.

Table 4. All Factors

	Chapter II		Chapter III	
	Pro-ISIS Groups	FTFs	ISIS’s Direct Efforts	State Weakness
Indonesia	√	√	√	√
The Philippines	√+	√+	√+	√+
Malaysia	-	√	-	-

The values (-), (√), and (√+) indicate low, medium, and high levels within each country.

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IV. CONCLUSION

This thesis examined four factors that may indicate the potential location for ISIS's next front in Southeast Asia. First, it examined the structure, size, and strength of groups affiliated to ISIS. ISIS's effect on jihadist groups differs between countries. In Indonesia, jihadist networks in the country generally split into two factions—those in support of ISIS and those opposed to it. This disunity is significant. The Philippines demonstrates a very different situation. There, the majority of once separate jihadist entities now fight together under the banner of ISIS. Malaysia lacks both the numbers and strength of pro-ISIS groups, however, the country remains a pathway for fighters and funding moving through the region. Dr. Mahmud Ahmad's role in funding the battle of Marawi is a clear example of this.

Second, this thesis examined the numbers and location of FTFs. Indonesia produced a great number of FTFs, but due to successful security forces, large portions were either arrested or simply left the country. The Philippines is the most vulnerable because, in addition to large numbers of FTFs currently operating in the country, dozens of Indonesian and Malaysians have been found fighting there, as well. Again, Malaysia is the outlier with the lowest number of FTFs. Furthermore, the number of Malaysians captured or killed fighting Philippine security forces in Marawi indicates an intent to support ISIS's efforts in other countries.

Third, this thesis examined the number and severity of ISIS-linked activities in each country since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's declaration of the caliphate in 2014. After the proclamation, many jihadist organizations pledged allegiance to ISIS and began perpetuating ISIS's message through attacks, actions, and statements. In comparison to the Philippines, both Indonesia and Malaysia had relatively low numbers of ISIS-linked activities. The severity of attacks in these countries is far less significant. In the Philippines, the loss of approximately 165 Philippine soldiers during the battle of Marawi highlights an elevated threat.

Fourth, this thesis examined varying levels of state weakness through three realms: the strength of CT forces, the effectiveness of each state's anti-terror laws, and the effectiveness of domestic de-radicalization efforts. In Indonesia, individual CT units like Detachment 88 are highly effective at making arrests and thwarting potential terrorist attacks. Other units in the country remain less so. A lack of unity and coordination across CT organizations in the country inhibits some success. In comparison to Malaysia, Indonesia's anti-terror laws are weak and outdated. The effectiveness of the country's under-developed de-radicalization program remains questionable. In the Philippines, individual SOF units are highly capable in some environments, however, these units will not be able to combat the threat of ISIS alone. The slow transition of CT responsibility to the police indicates an overreliance on the military and a lack of capacity in the PNP. Additionally, the Philippines has by far the weakest anti-terror laws and those laws have never been used in any landmark case. De-radicalization in the Philippines is underdeveloped and does not seem to successfully transition reformed terrorists back into society. By contrast, Malaysian CT forces and the country's anti-terror laws remain highly effective in putting ISIS-linked terrorists and supporters behind bars. While Malaysian de-radicalization efforts seem to be successful, the government's monopoly on information makes the overall effectiveness hard to prove.

While the threat environment is ever-changing and ISIS continues to evolve as the organization loses territory in Iraq and Syria, one country stands out among the others as the most likely candidate for ISIS's next front—the Philippines. If the Philippines expands CT capacity across multiple organizations, strengthens the state's ability to convict and incarcerate ISIS supporters, and heavily invests in new de-radicalization programs, the rise of a new ISIS front may be less likely. However, if the Philippine state cannot implement these changes, they will remain the most vulnerable environment for ISIS's next front in Southeast Asia.

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