

2018 JOINT ANNUAL NDIA/AIA INDUSTRIAL SECURITY COMMITTEE SPRING CONFERENCE



May 14 - 16, 2018

JW Marriott Scottsdale Camelback Inn Resort & Spa

Scottsdale, AZ

NDIA.org/ISCSpring18

SCHEDULE AT A GLANCE

MONDAY, MAY 14

AM Industry Only Session Salon I, J, K, L 8:00 am – 11:45 am

PM Full Session (Industry and Government) Salon I, J, K, L 1:00 pm – 4:45 pm

Optional Concurrent Sessions 4:45 pm Networking Reception North Garden 6:30 pm

TUESDAY, MAY 15

Full Session (Industry and Government) Salon I, J, K, L 8:00 am – 4:00 pm

Optional Concurrent Sessions 4:15 pm Networking Dinner Mummy Mountain 6:30 pm

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16

Full Session (Industry and Government) Salon I, J, K, L 8:00 – 11:45 am

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SCHEDULE AT A GLANCE	2
WHO WE ARE	2
EVENT INFORMATION	3
AGENDA	4
VENUE MAP	13
THANK YOU TO OUR SPONSORS	14



NDIR

WHO WE ARE

The National Defense Industrial Association is the trusted leader in defense and national security associations. As a 501(c)(3) corporate and individual membership association, NDIA engages thoughtful and innovative leaders to exchange ideas, information, and capabilities that lead to the development of the best policies, practices, products, and technologies to ensure the safety and security of our nation. NDIA's membership embodies the full spectrum of corporate, government, academic, and individual stakeholders who form a vigorous, responsive, and collaborative community in support of defense and national security. For more information, visit **NDIA.org.**

AIA

WHO WE ARE

The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) was founded in 1919 and is the largest and oldest U.S. aerospace and defense trade association, representing 347 aerospace and defense manufacturers and suppliers with approximately 844,000 employees. Our members represent the leading manufacturers and suppliers of civil, military and business aircraft, missiles, space systems, aircraft engines, material and related components, equipment services and information technology. Visit **aia-aerospace.org** for more information.



EVENT INFORMATION

LOCATION	JW Marriott Scottsdale Camelback Inn Resort & Spa 5402 E Lincoln Drive Scottsdale, AZ 85253	
EVENT WEBSITE	NDIA.org/ISCSpring18	
EVENT CONTACT	Elizabeth Richards Meeting Manager, NDIA (703) 247-2588 erichards@ndia.org	Jason Timm Assistant Vice President National Security Policy, AIA (703) 358-1043 jason.timm@aia-aerospace.org
ATTIRE	Appropriate dress for the conference is business casual for civilians and Class B uniform or uniform of the day for military personnel. The reception and dinner are casual dress.	
SURVEY AND PARTICIPANT LIST	A survey and list of attendees (name and organization only) will be emailed to you after the conference. NDIA would appreciate your time in completing the survey to help make our event even more successful in the future.	
SPEAKER GIFTS	In lieu of speaker gifts, a donation is being made to the Fisher House Foundation.	
PROCEEDINGS	Proceedings will be available 10-14 business days from the last day of the conference. All proceedings require release confirmation from the presenter. A secure, direct link to the proceedings will be sent to attendees after review from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).	
HARASSMENT STATEMENT	NDIA is committed to providing a professional environment free from physical, psychological and verbal harassment. NDIA will not tolerate harassment of any kind, including but not limited to harassment based on ethnicity, religion, disability, physical appearance, gender, or sexual orientation. This policy applies to all participants and attendees at NDIA conferences, meetings and events. Harassment includes offensive gestures and verbal comments, deliberate intimidation, stalking, following, inappropriate photography and recording, sustained disruption of talks or other events, inappropriate physical contact, and unwelcome attention. Participants requested to cease harassing behavior are expected to comply immediately, and failure will serve as grounds for revoking access to the NDIA event.	

AGENDA

SUNDAY, MAY 13

6:30 – 7:30 pm REGISTRATION ARIZONA REGISTRATION DESK SOUTH

7:00 – 9:00 pm OPENING RECEPTION GARDEN LAWN

Sponsored by Canda Solutions

MONDAY, MAY 14

- 7:00 am 4:45 pm REGISTRATION ARIZONA REGISTRATION DESK SOUTH
- 7:00 8:00 am **NETWORKING BREAKFAST** CAMELBACK PATIO
- 8:00 11:45 am AM INDUSTRY ONLY SESSION
- 8:00 8:15 am OPENING REMARKS

SALON I, J, K, L

Mitchell Lawrence CEO, Lawrence Solutions Chair, NDIA Industrial Security Division Steven Kipp Director, Information Systems Security, L3 Technologies *Chair, AIA Industrial Security Committee*

8:15 – 9:30 am NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM POLICY ADVISORY COUNCIL (NISPPAC) POLICY PRESENTATION

SALON I, J, K, L

Michelle Sutphin Vice President, Security Platforms & Services, BAE Systems, Inc.

9:30 – 9:45 am SECURITY REFORM CAMPAIGN UPDATE SALON I, J, K, L

> Michael Tillison Senior Vice President Corporate Security, ManTech International



9:45 – 10:00 am **REFRESHMENT BREAK** CAMELBACK PATIO

10:00 – 10:45 am LEGISLATIVE DISCUSSIONS SALON I, J, K, L

CONCURRENT BREAKOUT SESSIONS

10:45 – 11:45 am NDIA Membership Meeting SALON H,M

Mitchell Lawrence CEO, Lawrence Solutions *Chair, NDIA Industrial Security Division*

AIA Membership Meeting SALON I, J, K, L

Steven Kipp Director, Information Systems Security, L3 Technologies Chair, AIA Industrial Security Committee

11:45 am – 1:00 pm LUNCH NOT PROVIDED

1:00 – 4:30 pm PM FULL SESSION (INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT)

1:00 – 1:15 pm OPENING REMARKS SALON I, J, K, L

> Wesley Hallman Senior Vice President for Policy, NDIA

1:15 – 1:45 pm KEYNOTE PRESENTATION SALON I, J, K, L

> Sina Beaghley Senior International/Defense Policy Researcher, RAND Corporation

1:45 – 2:30 pm NATIONAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION BUREAU UPDATE SALON I, J, K, L

DALON I, J, K, L

Charlie Phalen Director, National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), Office of Personnel Management

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR DEFENSE 2:30 - 3:15 pm (INTELLIGENCE) (OUSD(I)) SECURITY UPDATE SALON I, J, K, L Garry Reid OSD/USD(I), Director for Defense Intelligence (Intelligence and Security) (DDI (I&S)) 3:15 - 3:30 pm REFRESHMENT BREAK CAMELBACK PATIO OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI)/ 3:30 - 4:15 pm NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) UPDATE SALON I, J, K, L Brian Dunbar Assistant Director, Special Security Directorate, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, ODNI **INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE (ISOO) UPDATE** 4:15 - 4:45 pm SALON I, J, K, L Greg Pannoni Associate Director, Information Security Oversight Office

4:45 pm ADJOURN FOR THE DAY

OPTIONAL CONCURRENT SESSIONS

4:45 – 5:45 pm

DSS Regional Directors "Help Desk"

SALON H, M

Kai Hanson Director, Global Industrial Security, Honeywell Vice Chair, AIA Industrial Security Committee Moderator

Mike Halter

ISFO Deputy Director, Defense Security Service *Moderator*

Regina Johnson Regional Director Southern, Defense Security Service

Cheryl Matthew Regional Director Northern, Defense Security Service Dave Bauer Regional Director Western, Defense Security Service

Justin Walsh Regional Director Capital, Defense Security Service

Heather Green Director, Personnel Security Management Office -Industry (PSMO-I)



4:45 – 5:45 pm Premiere Event Sponsor Session – Canda Solutions SALON I, J, K, L Fresh Haystack Enterprise Security Case Management software demonstration and discussion

- 4:45 6:15 pm Air Force Breakout SALON G
- 6:30 8:00 pm NETWORKING RECEPTION (CASUAL DRESS) NORTH GARDEN

Two drink tickets per person provided; you may purchase additional drinks with cash.

TUESDAY, MAY 15

- 7:00 am 4:15 pm **REGISTRATION** ARIZONA REGISTRATION DESK SOUTH
- 7:00 8:00 am **NETWORKING BREAKFAST** CAMELBACK PATIO
- 8:00 8:15 am OPENING REMARKS SALON I, J, K, L

Mitchell Lawrence CEO, Lawrence Solutions *Chair, NDIA Industrial Security Division* Steven Kipp Director, Information Systems Security, L3 Technologies *Chair, AIA Industrial Security Committee*

8:15 - 8:45 am PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY COUNCIL, PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PAC PMO) UPDATE

SALON I, J, K, L

Matt Eanes

Director, Performance Accountability Council, Program Management Office

8:45 - 10:00 am

DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE AND "DSS-IN-TRANSITION" UPDATES

SALON I, J, K, L

Daniel Payne Director, Defense Security Service Gus Greene Director of Industrial Security Field Operations, Defense Security Service

10:00 – 10:15 am **REFRESHMENT BREAK**

CAMELBACK PATIO

10:15 - 11:15 am NATIONAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION BUREAU (NBIB)/ DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE (DSS) TRANSITION PANEL

SALON I, J, K, L

Mitchell Lawrence

CEO, Lawrence Solutions Chair, NDIA Industrial Security Division *Moderator*

Mark Pekrul

Deputy Associate Director for Customer Service, Communication and Engagements, National Background Investigation Bureau

Tricia Stokes

Director, Defense Vetting Directorate (DVD), Defense Security Service Christy Wilder Chief of Staff, National Background Investigation Bureau

Ben Richardson

Director for Information and Industrial Base Protection, Counterintelligence and Security Directorate, OSD/USD(I)

Matt Eanes

Director, Performance Accountability Council, Program Management Office

11:15 am – 12:15 pm PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE PANEL

SALON I, J, K, L

Charlie Sowell COO, iWorks Corporation *Moderator*

Matt Eanes Director, PAC PMO

Heather Green Director, PSMO-I

Perry Russell-Hunter

Director, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals, DoD

Steve Demarco Adjudications Division Chief, DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility

Kiral "Tom" Thompson Chief of Field Operations, Western Region, OPM, National Background Investigations Bureau

12:15 – 1:30 pm LUNCH

NOT PROVIDED

1:30 - 1:45 pm

OPENING REMARKS

SALON I, J, K, L

Mitchell Lawrence CEO, Lawrence Solutions Chair, NDIA Industrial Security Division Steven Kipp Director, Information Systems Security, L3 Technologies Chair, AIA Industrial Security Committee



1:45 – 2:45 pm

SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAM (SAP) SECURITY DIRECTORS PANEL

SALON I, J, K, L

Brian Mackey Vice President, Security, BAE Systems Moderator

Wendy Kay Director, Security, Special Program Oversight

and Information Protection, USAF

Terry Phillips SAP Security Director, USAF PJ

Kevin Flaherty

Assistant Director, Policy and Oversight, Security and Intelligence Directorate, DARPA

Paul Akerley Office of the Secretary of Defense

Kristina Glines Director, USN SAPCO

2:45 – 3:00 pm **REFRESHMENT BREAK**

CAMELBACK PATIO

3:00 – 4:00 pm INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (IC) SECURITY DIRECTORS PANEL

SALON I, J, K, L

Jon Hildebrand Security Director, General Dynamics Information Technology Moderator

Mike Londregan Director of Security, DIA Mike Mahoney Director of Security, CIA

Martha Courtney Director of Security and Counterintelligence, NRO Nancy Spaulding Division Chief, Personnel Security Division, NGA

Kemp Ensor Director of Security and Counterintelligence, NSA

4:00 pm ADJOURN FOR THE DAY

OPTIONAL CONCURRENT SESSIONS

4:15 - 5:15 pm

Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence (FOCI) Roundtable

SALON I, J, K, L

Jennifer Brown Director of Security, iDirect Government *Moderator*

Dr. David Grogan Deputy Director, Integration and Application, Defense Security Service Maria Ong FOCI Specialist, Defense Security Service

4:15 - 5:15 pm Cyber Security: Risk Managed Framework (RMF) Breakout

SALON H, M

Steven Kipp

Director, Information Systems Security, L3 Technologies Chair, AIA Industrial Security Committee *Moderator*

Karl Hellman

National Industrial Security Program Authorizing Official, Defense Security Service

6:30 pm

NETWORKING DINNER (CASUAL DRESS)

MUMMY MOUNTAIN

Two drink tickets per person provided; you may purchase additional drinks with cash.

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16

- 7:30 11:30 am **REGISTRATION** ARIZONA REGISTRATION DESK SOUTH
- 7:00 8:00 am **NETWORKING BREAKFAST** CAMELBACK PATIO
- 8:00 8:15 am OPENING REMARKS SALON I, J, K, L

SALON I, J, N, L

Mitchell Lawrence CEO, Lawrence Solutions *Chair, NDIA Industrial Security Division* Steven Kipp Director, Information Systems Security, L3 Technologies *Chair, AIA Industrial Security Committee*

8:15 - 9:15 am CORPORATE CHIEF INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER (CISO) PANEL

SALON I, J, K, L

JC Dodson VP & CISO, BAE Systems Moderator

Jeff Brown VP & CISO, Raytheon Corporation

Jim Connelly VP & CISO, Lockheed Martin Corporation **Mike Papay** VP & CISO, Northrop Grumman Corporation

9:15 – 9:30 am **REFRESHMENT BREAK** CAMELBACK PATIO



9:30 – 10:15 am SAP IT TRANSFORMATION

SALON I, J, K, L

Kenny Bowen DoD SAP CIO

10:15 - 10:45 amKEYNOTE PRESENTATION - INSIDER THREAT

SALON I, J, K, L

Andrée Rose PERSEREC

10:45 – 11:45 am INSIDER THREAT PANEL

SALON I, J, K, L

Dan McGarvey Senior Advisor, Alion *Moderator*

Mike Seage

Director, Defense Insider Threat Management and Analysis Center, Defense Security Service

Robert Rohrer

DNI/NCSC, Deputy Director, National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF)

Bill Stephens Director, Counterintelligence, Defense Security Service

Gus Greene Director of Industrial Security Field Operations, Defense Security Service

11:45 am – 12:00 pm FALL 2018 CONFERENCE PLANNING

SALON I, J, K, L

12:00 pm

CLOSING COMMENTS AND CONFERENCE ADJOURNS

SALON I, J, K, L

The NDIA has a policy of strict compliance with federal and state antitrust laws. The antitrust laws prohibit competitors from engaging in actions that could result in an unreasonable restraint of trade. Consequently, NDIA members must avoid discussing certain topics when they are together at formal association membership, board, committee, and other meetings and in informal contacts with other industry members: prices, fees, rates, profit margins, or other terms or conditions of sale (including allowances, credit terms, and warranties); allocation of markets or customers or division of territories; or refusals to deal with or boycotts of suppliers, customers or other third parties, or topics that may lead participants not to deal with a particular supplier, customer or third party.

SPONSORS



CANDA SOLUTIONS

PREMIER SPONSOR

CANDA Solutions, LLC has been building Personnel Security Case Management systems for both Federal Agencies and Government contractors for over 10 years. We've taken Business Process Management systems, major label ERP systems, and generic case management systems and customized them to fit the Personnel Security processes for our customer's usage. What we learned was that Personnel Security systems usually end up as the heart-beat of an organization and they are unique in many ways. Based on these experiences, CANDA decided to invest time and money in the development of an integration-friendly COTS system specifically built for Personnel Security Case Management. We launched this system as Fresh Haystack.

Over the last 3 years, CANDA has deployed Fresh Haystack into multiple production releases of a Security Clearance Processing Case Management System designed to navigate all clearancecentric business cases while integrating multiple internal and external core systems. Our multi-organizational users experience a seamless, role-based, easy to navigate, modular interface that guides the security clearance process through the many touchpoints of a fully adjudicated security clearance lifecycle. Fresh Haystack is a "game-changer", as some of our clients have described it post implementation. A comprehensive, logically structured, user friendly case management system, Fresh Haystack (FH) is a paperless, workflow based and automated Case Management solution built for the specific purpose of streamlining the complex security and background investigation management processes. FH was built to cut cost, increase efficiency, increase productivity, enable automation and deliver visibility into the security clearance process. FH brings clarity to candidates, security personnel, adjudicators, investigators and internal auditors. Our modular system is easy to implement, allowing for a rapid, staged deployment with follow-on releases of enhanced features to accommodate program breadth, secure integration needs and evolving requirements.

We developed Fresh Haystack to provide the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), responsible for our National Security, what is needed in the domain of Personnel Security and Human Resources out of the box, allowing us to focus on the unique challenges within each organization. Fresh Haystack allows quick, Agile delivery – our solution can be configured, installed and used in a matter of weeks.




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NOTES

SAVE THE DATE



2018 JOINT ANNUAL AIA/ NDIA INDUSTRIAL SECURITY COMMITTEE FALL CONFERENCE

October 22 – 24, 2018 San Antonio, TX





NISP Authorization Office (NAO) Update May 15, 2018

Defense Security Service Industrial Security Field Operations

Karl Hellmann Authorizing Official



- 2018 DSS NAO Projects and Priorities
 - Transition to eMASS
 - Update DAAPM to align with eMASS processes and other identified edits
 - Engagement with the Government customer community to support unique requirements
 - Continue to mature RMF processes and oversight



Transition to eMASS

- Transition to eMASS will occur October 2018
- DSS conducted an Industry eMASS workshop recently to broaden input and coordinate timelines for transition
- Access to the DISA training site will be available beginning July. Industry will be provided guidance to access the site in mid-June
- DSS will begin building high level (SA) eMASS accounts in August. Industry will build their organizational structures from those accounts



DAAPM Update

- To better define roles and responsibilities DSS will update the DAAPM soon based on lessons learned. The goal of this update is to better define workflow between Industry and DSS for better consistency in implementation
- DSS will add recommended submission guidance encouraging 90 day submission timeline before need from Industry in order to allow for resource planning, interactions between ISSM & ISSP regarding SSP's and processing
- DSS will also update the DAAPM in conjunction with transition to eMASS



- Engagement with the Government customer
 - Overlays. DSS is working with government customers on MOU's for defining categorization and control sets based on Information Owner inputs
 - DSS will publish agreed overlays prior to implementation.
 Overlays will promote reciprocity when we transition to eMASS



RMF Processes

- Consistency. IO Senior Leadership has been engaged to improve consistency in the application of RMF by DSS field elements
- Re-enforced ATO guidance to field. Based on submission timeframe and DSS resources we will use ATO's and ATO-C's to ensure that DSS resources do not adversely effect Industry contract performance
- Lack of documentation regarding tailoring of controls is the largest reason for SSP return
- RMF guidance and artifacts are available at www.dss.mil/rmf



RMF Process Walk Through



6. MONITOR Security Controls (Industry & DSS)

Facility continuously tracks and reports IS changes to the ISSP IAW the Continuous Monitoring Plan/Strategy.

> 5. AUTHORIZE Information System (DSS)

AO determines risk. If acceptable, AO formally authorizes system to operate.



Starting Point

1. CATEGORIZE Information System (Industry)

Facility conducts risk assessment to determine system categorization (confidentiality, integrity, and availability).

NISP Assessment & Authorization Life Cycle

4. ASSESS Security Controls (Industry & DSS)

Facility conducts self-assessment and updates the SSP to reflect the actual state of the IS. ISSP reviews submitted SSP and assesses the IS.



2. SELECT Security Controls (Industry)

Facility selects security controls and applies tailoring and supplemental controls as needed based on risk assessment.

3. IMPLEMENT Security Controls (Industry)

Facility implements security controls selected for the IS.

ALION

The State of Security Risk Management

Caleb Jones Manger – Security Risk Management Practice CLJones@AlionScience.com

The setting...security always mattered





The complexity of information protection and security has changed ALION

Thoughts for today

- Where we're coming from The 'preconditions' on which the industry currently stands
- Where we're at The capabilities that are currently being achieved
- Where the industry is going What senior managers and security professionals can expect to see...soon
- What can you do What will drive innovation in the future for security enterprise risk management

ALION

What was the universal condition?


"DoD lacks a common business process to assess security risks. Currently, components assess risk through a variety of assessments. These assessments are frequently conducted manually and occur at different times throughout the year with <u>no coordinated</u> mechanism for enterprise reporting of findings."

Air Force Security Business Process Review 2010

ΔΙΟΝ

What changed?

"Current enterprise security is based upon disjointed organizations, manual processes, and an army of disconnected point tools. <u>I</u> firmly believe we are at the beginning of a tipping point. Enterprises need a vast improvement in enterprise security analytics, automation, efficacy, integration, and intelligence soon."



CSO Mag "The Enterprise Security Model Is Experiencing "Death by a Thousand Cuts" AUG 15, 2013, Jon Oltsik

ΔΙΟΝ

The automation of security assessment and other data has allowed us to aggregate data and converge it into a unified picture for leadership.



ALION

"As quality and volume of data within the security enterprise increases, the opportunity exists to leverage advances in machine learning to develop predictive modeling and allow security practitioners to become truly proactive."



Empower your organization to break compliance-based security paradigms and provide resources to promote the transition to data-driven and risk-based security enterprises.



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ALION

The State of Security Risk Management

Caleb Jones Manger – Security Risk Management Practice CLJones@AlionScience.com

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Information Security Oversight Office

Protect • Inform • Assess



Greg Pannoni, Associate Director

May 2018



The Evolving NISP: Navigating the Road Ahead

NISPOM revision

Revision to NISP Directive (32 CFR 2004)

CUI program implementation



National Industrial Security Program (NISP) (E.O. 12829)

"...single, cohesive, integrated program to ensure the protection of classified information in the hands of industry"

- Requirements based on consideration of 3 pillars:
 - Damage to national security
 - Threat to disclosure
 - Cost of requirements

"To the extent that is practicable and reasonable," those requirements shall be consistent across government and industry.

Implemented through 32 CFR Part 2004, NISP Directive



NISPOM Reissuance

Who:

- DoD as Executive Agent
- NISPPAC NISPOM Rewrite Working Group chaired by ISOO

What:

- Updates 2006 NISPOM version, includes Changes 1-3
- Goal: up-to-date NISP operations
 - Changing threat landscape
 - Cybersecurity environment


Major changes:

- Focuses solely on classified information. Removes references to "unclassified".
- Removes government agency responsibilities
- Incorporates Risk Management Framework (RMF) for information systems
- Incorporates new national-level reporting requirements
- References other national-level policies as they apply, vice duplicating within the NISPOM

When:

Estimated CY 2019 as a Federal Rule





NISP Directive (32 CFR Part 2004)

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ISOO responsible for issuing the Directive to implement the NISP

New version issued on <u>May 7, 2018</u>
 Effective date: <u>June 5, 2018</u>

Establishes responsibilities for NISP agencies

- -IS00
- -Executive Agent
- -CSAs
- -GCAs



New 32 CFR 2004

- Adds insider threat responsibilities and requirements for NISP agencies (E.O. 13587)
- Recognizes ODNI as a CSA (Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act)
- Recognizes DHS as a CSA and incorporates White House approved provisions for the DHS Classified Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (E.O. 13691)
- Fills policy gaps for NISP agencies to align with NISPOM provisions for contractors
 - Consistent standards for determinations of contractor eligibility for access to classified information
 - Consistent standards to determine and mitigate FOCI and make NIDs
 - Contract security classification responsibilities
 - Oversight of contractor industrial security programs
 - Terminology and definitions to accommodate all 5 CSAs
- Focus on accountability of the government and better defines its responsibilities



National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee (NISPPAC)

Addresses policy issues and other NISP matters of interest and concern

- ISOO Director chairs
- 16 government and 8 industry members
 - Subject to FACA
 - Meeting notices in the Federal Register
 - Meets 3x/year
- Working groups
 - Clearance
 - NISP Information Systems Authorization
 - Insider threat
 - NID
 - NISPOM rewrite
- Next public meeting: Wed. July 19, 2018, National Archives



NISPPAC INDUSTRY MEMBERS

- Daniel McGarvey Term: 2017-2021`
- Dennis Arriaga
 Term: 2017-2021
- Michelle Sutphin * BA
 Term: 2014-2018 e-m
 * Industry Spokesperson
- Martin Strones Term: 2014- 2018
- Dennis Keith
 Term: 2015-2019
- Quinton Wilkes
 Term: 2015-2019
- Kirk Poulsen Term: 2016-2020
- Robert Harney Term: 2016-2020



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BAE Systems e-mail: <u>michelle.sutphin@baesystems.com</u>

Strones Enterprises e-mail: <u>mstrones@gmail.com</u>

Harris Corporation e-mail: <u>Dkeith@harris.com</u>

L-3 Communications Corporation e-mail: <u>Quinton.Wilkes@L3T.com</u>

Leidos, Inc e-mail: Kirk.A.Poulsen@leidos.com

Northrup Grumman e-mail: Robert.Harney@ngc.com

Controlled Unclassified Information Program

- Implementation Projection (3-4 years).
- Implementation Activities (Focus on: Leadership, Policy, Training, and Annual Report to the President).
- Registry and Marking Handbook Revisions.
- CUI Notice 2018-01 (Guidance for drafting agreements).
- CUI Notice 2018-02 (Recommendations for basic training).
- Federal Acquisition Regulation for CUI (FY19).
- Training videos (YouTube).
- CUI Blog (https://isoo.blogs.archives.gov/).



The National Archives

Blog of the Controlled Unclassified Information Program





ISOO Web Resources

- ISOO web page:
 - <u>http://www.archives.gov/isoo/</u>
- ISOO policy documents:
 - E.O. 12829:
 - <u>https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/policy-documents/eo-12829-with-eo-13691-amendments.pdf</u>
 - Implementing Directive (32 C.F.R. Part 2004):
 - https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/policy-documents/32-cfr-part-2004.pdf
 - <u>https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/policy-documents/32-cfr-part-2004-amendment.pdf</u>
- NISP and NISPPAC pages
 - Member listings
 - Charter and Bylaws
 - Minutes of NISPPAC meetings
- CUI web page:
 - <u>https://www.archives.gov/cui</u>











NISPPAC Security Policy Updates









Michelle J. Sutphin, ISP Vice President, Security, P&S Sector, BAE Systems NISPPAC Industry Spokesperson Michelle.Sutphin@baesystems.com

Updated: 5/11/2018

Intro to the NISP

- National Industrial Security Program established by Executive Order 12829 on January 6, 1993
 - The purpose of this program is to safeguard classified information that may be released or has been released to current, prospective, or former contractors, licensees, or grantees of United States agencies.
 - A quick video of the history of the NISP can be found <u>here</u>.
- As part of this EO, the NISP Policy Advisory Committee (NISPPAC) was also formed
 - Comprised of both Government and industry representatives, is responsible for recommending changes in industrial security policy through modifications to Executive Order 12829, its implementing directives, and the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual.

NISPPAC Members

3

				MOLL	
GOVERNMENT		INDUSTRY		MOU	
Mark Bradley, Chair	ISOO	Michelle Sutphin, Spokesperson	' BAE Systems	Steve Kipp	AIA
Michael Mahony	CIA			Bob Lilje	ASIS
Fred Gortler	DSS	Dennis Keith	Harris Corporation	Brian Mackey	CSSWG
David M. Lowy	Air Force	Quinton Wilkes	L3 Technologies	Shawn Daley	FFRDC/UARC
Patricia Stokes	Army	Kirk Poulsen	Leidos	Kathy Pherson	INSA
Thomas Predmore	Commerce	Dan McGarvey	Alion S &T	Marc Ryan	ISWG
Carrie Wibben	DOD	Dennis Arriaga	SRI International	Aprille Abbott	NCMS
Marc Brooks	Energy	Bob Harney	Northrop Grumman	Mitch Lawrence	NDIA
Steven Lynch	DHS	Martin Strones	Strones Enterprises	Matt Hollandsworth	PSC
Anna Harrison	DOJ				
Mark Livingston	Navy				
Kimberly Baugher	DOS				
Zudayyah L. Taylor-Dunn	NASA				
Amy Davis	NSA	Katie Timmons, Industry Coordinator*	ViaSat		
Denis Brady	NRC				
Valerie Kerben	ODNI				

NDAA 2017 Section 1647

- Formation of an "Advisory Committee on Industrial Security and Industrial Base Policy" and will terminate on September 20, 2022.
- They will review and assess:
 - (A) the national industrial security program for cleared facilities and the protection of the information and networking systems of cleared defense contractors;
 - (B) policies and practices relating to physical security and installation access at installations of the Department of Defense;
 - (C) information security and cyber defense policies, practices, and reporting relating to the unclassified information and networking systems of defense contractors;
 - (D) policies, practices, regulations, and reporting relating to industrial base issues; and
 - (E) any other matters the Secretary determines to be appropriate;
- 5 government and 5 non-government entities
- Charter filed April 30, 2017

NDAA 2018 Section 805

- DEFENSE POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY
- The Secretary of Defense shall form a committee of senior executives from United States firms in the national technology and industrial base to meet with the Secretary, the Secretaries of the military departments, and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to exchange information, including, as appropriate, classified information, on technology threats to the national security of the United States and on the emerging technologies from the national technology and industrial base that may become available to counter such threats in a timely manner.
- The defense policy advisory committee on technology...shall meet...at least once annually in each of fiscal years 2018 through 2022.

32 CFR 2004: NISP Implementing Regulation Update

- Released May 7, 2018
- https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/07/2018-09465/nationalindustrial-security-program

NISPOM CC2

- NISPOM Conforming Change 2 was published May 18, 2016
- The DSS ISL for NISPOM CC2 published May 25, 2016
- During 2017, the DSS focus on Insider Threat programs will be on BASIC compliance. They will want to validate that we have a program, the ITPSO is designated and that we are conducting the required training.
- To date, there has been an 8% increase in incident reports!
- DSS will be looking for industry's input on how they will start to assess effectiveness through the NISPPAC Insider Threat Working Group.


NISPOM Re-Write

- Full re-write is currently underway
- Different format and also a full review for revisions
- Coordination between government and industry took place at the NISPPAC level
- Over 80 industry participants reviewed and provided comments to the NISPPAC
- Final meeting took place October 19, 2017

The Clearance Process-What is Going on?

Let's start at the beginning, a very good place to start...

The Clearance Process



OPM Transformation – How Did We Get Here?

June: OPM Reveals USIS Investigation as a Result of Edward Snowden September: WNY Shooting October: PAC 120 Day Review

2013

April: OPM Breach Detected July: PAC 90 Day Review July: OPM Investigation Fees Increase October: Tier 3 Replaces NACLC

2015

June: Backlog Reaches 700,000

2017

October: House Hearing on DOD Clearances November: NDAA 2018 Authorizes Transfer of Clearances to DOD

February: Suitability and Security Processes Report to the President June: USIS Breach and Contract Termination August: Backlog hits 190,000 September: Keypoint Breach

2014

January: NBIB Creation Announced February: Backlog Hits 507,000 March: PSMO-I Starts Metering Cases Due to Lack of Funds August: NAC Required for Interim Secrets October: NBIB Launched/Tier 5 Replaces SSBI December: NDAA 2017 Passed


2016

January: GAO Adds Clearance Process to High Risk List March: Senate Intel Hearing on Clearances May/June: EO re: Investigations


2018

October: DSS to Start Secret PRs


Feeding the Meter at PSMO-I




It's Nice to Have a Goal...




Initial Top Secrets: 163 days to 533 days




Initial Secret & Confidential: 92 days to 220 days




Top Secret PRs: 272 days to 617 days



Secret PRs: 68 days to 220 days





115,558

-3,066

115,488

+778

119.685

+3,316

119.924

+66

End of Month Total

DC Area: Alexandria, Annapolis, Arlington, Ashburn, Chantilly, Columbia, Fairfax, Fails Church Fort Maade, Lourel Herridon McLean Reston

(.)

prioritized cases

closed in an

average of

60.5 days.1

Total Cases Aged

Total Cases Aged 61-90 Days

Total Cases Aged

Total Cases Aged

91-120 Davs

>120 Days

0-60 Days

Disclaimer: Placemat information is based on DSS provided information only

121.564

-1.606

122.440

+762

119.769


2,485

NATIONAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS BUREAU

partnership with Lockheed


Martin.

Distribution of Industry Cases



Top Industry Locations	Pending Items ²
DC Area ⁵	97,924
El Segundo/ LA County	16,223
San Diego	15,737
Fort Worth/ Irving	12,313
Newport News	8,103
Orlando	7,694
Huntsville	7,669
Tucson	5,495
Palmdale	3,017
Greenville	1,289

Industry Workload Management



Clearances Don't Expire!

- OUSD(I) Memo signed 12/7/2016:
 Personnel Security Clearances in Industry
 - "Personnel security clearances do not expire...An individual with current eligibility in JPAS should not be denied access based on an out-of-scope investigation, unless DOD is aware of relevant derogatory information related to an individual's continued eligibility for access. However, when the system of record flags an individual as having current adverse information, and eligibility is still valid, access may continue."



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-5000

INTELLIGENCE

DEC - 7 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Personnel Security Clearances in Industry

It has come to my attention that Department of Defense (DoD) Components are denying contractor employees access to defense facilities and classified information because the contractor employees have a personnel security clearance based on an out-of-scope investigation. Recent delays in processing background investigations have resulted in many periodic reinvestigations (PRs) being overdue.

Personnel security clearances (PCLs) do not expire. Contractor employees are eligible for access to classified information if current eligibility is indicated in the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) or replacement system of record. An individual with current eligibility in JPAS should not be denied access based on an out-of-scope investigation, unless DoD is aware of relevant derogatory information related to an individual's continued eligibility for access. However, when the system of record flags an individual as having current adverse information, and eligibility is still valid, access may continue.

Please ensure that this memorandum receives widest dissemination. The point of contact is Mr. Justin Walsh at (703) 692-3597 or justin.a.walsh.civ6@mail.mil.

Garry P. Reid

Director for Defense Intelligence (Intelligence & Security)

The Move from Five to Six

- OUSD(I) Memo signed 1/17/2017: Extension of Periodic Reinvestigation Timelines to Address the Background Investigation Backlog
 - Tier 3 PRs (SECRET) will continue to be initiated 10 years after the date of the previous investigation.
 - Tier 5 PRs (TOP SECRET) will temporarily be initiated six years after the date of the previous investigation rather than five years.
 - December 22: 2017: The temporary change in periodicity from five to six years for T5Rs will remain in effect until notified otherwise. Facility Security Officers should continue to submit T5Rs at the six year periodicity mark. Previously established exceptions will remain in effect. This will result in T5Rs continuing to be within the seven year reciprocity guidelines.



OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 5000.DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

JAN 17 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Extension of Periodic Reinvestigation Timelines to Address the Background Investigation Backlog

References: (a) Tri-Services Memorandum, "Personnel Security Investigations Backlog and Operational Impacts to the Military Departments," July 29, 2016

(b) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Personnel Security Investigations Backlog and Impacts," November 14, 2016

(c) Director of National Intelligence, "Personnel Security Investigations Backlog and Impacts," December 10, 2016


In July 2016, the Service Secretaries expressed concern to the Secretary of Defense regarding the personnel security investigations (PSI) backlog of over 524,000 cases in a jointly signed memo (Reference A). This backlog negatively impacts the Department of Defense's (DoD) mission readiness, critical programs and operations. The growing investigation timelines are nearly two and a half times longer than the timeliness requirements outlined in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The Service Secretaries offered suggestions to the Secretary to address the growing backlog.

Based on the concerns raised by the Service Secretaries, the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) sent a memorandum to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) (Reference B) that explained what actions DoD was prepared to take to address the current backlog. The DNI responded (Reference C), endorsing DoD's proposed actions. Effective immediately, DoD Components and Agencies will implement the following actions to address the backlog:

- Until further notice, Tier 3 periodic reinvestigations (PRs) will continue to be conducted at ten year periodicity. The Department will delay implementation of five year Tier 3 PR requirements until OPM eliminates their backlog or a modernized solution is available that meets or exceeds the Federal Investigative Standards.
- 2. Until further notice, Tier 5 PRs submitted by DoD to the National Background Investigation Bureau will be initiated six years after the date of the previous investigation versus at the five year mark. This change in Tier 5 PR submissions will keep DoD's Tier 5 PR investigations within the current seven year reciprocity guidelines and will continue reducing the backlog. This change in periodicity will be reevaluated prior to December 31, 2017. PRs should only be submitted at a five year periodicity if:
- It is specifically required by other DoD policy (i.e. for a specific Special Access Program, or for Industry cases if directed by Defense Security Service).

SAPs Get on Board

- DOD SAPCO signed 2/10/2017: Temporary Periodicity and Clearance Submission Implementation Guidance for Special Access Programs
 - Tier 3: A SECRET SAP requires a minimum of a final SECRET clearance based on a investigation within 6 years.
 - Tier 5: A TOP SECRET SAP requires a final TOP SECRET clearance based on an investigation within 6 years.
- CSSWG coordinating with SAPCO on revision to memo.



A current investigation is an investigation not older than 6 years from the closed date of the last investigation. DSS has not granted an exception for Tier 3 PR submissions at this time. If a candidate with current SAP access is outside the 6-year investigative scope, then the individual will retain existing SAP access provided that no potentially disqualifying information

Air Force Gets Involved

- Air Force has over 90,000 backlogged investigations.
- Creating NBIB Hubs at Air Force installations to schedule and interview personnel.



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO



MEMORANDUM FOR ALHQCTR/CC/CL ALHQSTAFF ALINST/CC/CL

FROM: AFMC/CD 4375 Childlaw Road Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433-5001

SUBJECT: Air Force and National Background Investigation Bureau Hubbing Event

 The Air Force has over 90,000 backlogged investigations. To address this, the SECAF tasked SAF/AA to collaborate with the National Background Investigation Bureau (NBIB) to reduce AF's backlog of personnel security investigations (PSI). One of the approved mitigation approaches is to establish temporary NBIB satellite offices or "hubs" at AF installations with large numbers of backlogged PSIs.

2. Beginning 30 Oct 17 and ending 19 Jan 18, WPAFB will host the first NBIB hub. My goal is to clear the Dayton OH region's PSI backlog over the next 12 weeks. NBIB will have a very short window of time to schedule and interview approximately 2,000 personnel at the WPAFB hub. I expect Commanders, Directors and Supervisors provide their full support to this effort and ensure all applicable military and civilian personnel schedule and attend their PSI interviews when contacted by my Information Protection (IP) staff or their representatives. This should be considered a mandatory appointment once finalized.

3. AMFC/IP will began to generate information on scheduling and attendance procedures soon. My point of contact for this matter is Mr. Tim Jennings, HQ AFMC/IP, (937) 257-1717 or timothy.jennings@us.af.mil.

WARREN D. BERRY Major General, USAF Deputy Commander

NBIB Addressing the Backlog

- Current State as of March 14, 2018:
 - 700,000 cases in queue
 - 230,000 are T3, 107,000 are T5
 - 65,000 are industry
 - Receive ~50,000 cases a week and close ~53,000 cases a week = 4.13 years to work the backlog at this rate
- NBIB Coordinating with Industry on ideas to lessen the backlog
 - Industry to host "hubs"
 - ITIP (Industry Trusted Information Provider) Pilot

I've Laughed, I've Cried, Where's the Happy Ending?

- To return back to a steady state, NBIB:
 - Hired 600 investigators since 2016 for a total of 7,200.
 - Increased contractor workforce to 4 companies for a total of 1,091 contract investigators.
 - Is streamlining the interview process to include telephone interviews.
 - Is creating a new system called NBIS which will track individuals background information throughout their entire career (government, industry, military).
 - Is converting eQIP to eAPP which will ask more questions up front to eliminate the need for investigators to track down information (ex: pulling a credit report on the spot and asking questions for resolution).
 - Is placing investigators at hubs in both government and industry to work through high volumes of cases.
 - Charlie Phalen is hopeful for 15-20% drop in cases by the end of the FY 2018.
 - "Trusted Workforce 2.0" will launch at ODNI. The goal is "to bring together leadership across government to approach 'transformative' changes to the security clearance process with a 'clean slate'.
 - Charlie Phalen's Congressional Testimony can be read <u>here</u>.

NDAA 2018, Section 938: Splitting the Baby (Signed!)

- ...the Secretary shall, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, provide for a phased transition from the conduct of such investigations by the National Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB) of the Office of Personnel Management to the conduct of such investigations by the Defense Security Service...not later than October 1, 2020...
- This will include DSS taking over:
 - All DOD clearance and suitability investigations (in addition to the current Continuous Evaluation mission for the DOD)
 - The DOD CAF
- Four Phases:
 - Phase 1: October 2018: All T3Rs for DOD
 - Phase 2: T3s for DOD
 - Phase 3: T5s and T5Rs for DOD
 - Phase 4: All cases in all of government? Executive Order to be released at the end of May/beginning of June which could change all of the above.

S. 1761: Intelligence Authorization Act of 2018 *(Introduced)*

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence...shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that includes the following:

- An assessment of whether [the SF86] should be revised to account for the prospect of a holder of a security clearance becoming an insider threat.
- Recommendations to improve the background investigation process.
- A review of whether the schedule for processing security clearances included in section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 should be modified.
- Evaluation of Splitting the Background Investigation Function
- A policy and implementation plan for agencies and departments of the United States Government, as a part of the security clearance process, to accept automated records checks
- A policy and implementation plan for sharing information between and among agencies or departments of the United States and private entities that is relevant to decisions about granting or renewing security clearances.

HR 3210: SECRET Act of 2017 (Passed House, Passed Senate)

- Securely Expediting Clearances Through Reporting Transparency Act of 2017
 - Requires NBIB to report on the backlog of security clearance investigations.
 - The NBIB must report on the process for conducting and adjudicating security clearance investigations for personnel in the Executive Office of the President.
 - The NBIB must report on the duplicative costs of implementing a plan for the Defense Security Service to conduct, after October 1, 2017, security investigations for Department of Defense (DOD) personnel whose investigations are adjudicated by DOD's Consolidated Adjudication Facility.

Fee for Service Study: June through Sept 2017

- The Study will:
 - Examine the feasibility of charging cleared contractors a fee-for-service, creating a working capital fund or using an industrial funding fee (IFF) from DoD acquisitions to DSS to fund contractor personnel security clearance investigations. It will include analysis of the impact on overall contract costs
 - Take into account prior personnel security clearance investigation cost studies from the past 20 years.
- 29 small, medium and large cleared companies to be interviewed as part of the Study. NISPPAC industry representatives have submitted a white paper with our position.



Security Executive Agent Directives (SEADs)

- SEAD 1: SECEA Authorities and Responsibilities
 - Establishes the DNI as the Security Executive Agent for all policies concerning investigations, adjudications and ability to maintain eligibility.
- SEAD 2: Use of Polygraphs
 - Outlines procedures surrounding usage of polygraphs.
- SEAD 5: Social Media usage in Investigations and Adjudications
 - Effective May 12, 2016.
 - Allows agencies to use PUBLICALLY AVAILABLE information from social media to include in investigations and adjudications.
- SEAD 6: Continuous Evaluation
 - Effective January 12, 2018
- SEAD 7: Reciprocity (IN DRAFT)
- SEAD 8: Interim Clearances (IN DRAFT)

SEAD 3: Minimum Reporting Requirements

- Signed December 14, 2016 Implementation June 12, 2017.
- All covered persons are to report "CI Concerns" on any other covered person. Previously was limited to only those within an organization. Change raises possible legal and other concerns.
- "Failure to comply with reporting requirements...may result in administrative action that includes, but is not limited to revocation of national security eligibility."
- Pre-approval for foreign travel will be required for collateral clearance holders once it is incorporated into the new NISPOM. This will impose a new and large burden on industry and CSAs to handle the influx of reports that this will now generate.
- DNI SEAD 3 TOOLKIT is online.
- Collateral under the NISP will not have to comply until incorporated into NISPOM Conforming Change 3 and resulting ISL.
- Other CSAs will issue their own implementation guidance.



REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONNEL WITH ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR WHO HOLD A SENSITIVE POSITION

(EFFECTIVE: 12 JUNE 2017)

A. AUTHORITY: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended; Executive Order (EO) 10450, Security Requirements for Government Employment, as amended; EO 12968, Access to Classified Information, as amended; EO 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information; EO 13549, Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal and Private Sector Entities; Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-12, Security Awareness and Reporting of Foreign Contacts; Performance Accountability Council memorandum, Assignment of Functions Relating to Coverage of Contractor Employee Fitness in the Federal Investigative Standards, 6 December 2012; and other applicable provisions of law.

B. PURPOSE: This Security Executive Agent (SecEA) Directive establishes reporting requirements for all covered individuals who have access to classified information or hold a sensitive position. Nothing in this Directive should be construed to limit the authority of agency heads to impose additional reporting requirements in accordance with their respective authorities under law or regulation.

C. APPLICABILITY: This Directive applies to any executive branch agency or covered individual as defined below.

D. DEFINITIONS: As used in this Directive, the following terms have the meanings set forth below:

 "Agency": Any "Executive agency" as defined in Section 105 of Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.), including the "military department," as defined in Section 102 of Title 5, U.S.C., and any other entity within the Executive Branch that comes into possession of classified information or has positions designated as sensitive.

 "Classified national security information" or "classified information": Information that has been determined pursuant to EO 13526 or any predecessor or successor order, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure.

 "Cohabitant": A person with whom the covered individual resides and shares bonds of affection, obligation, or other commitment, as opposed to a person with whom the covered individual resides for reasons of convenience (e.g. a roommate).

4. "Controlled Substance": Any controlled substance as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802.

"Covered Individual":

UNCLASSIFIED

NCLASSIFIED

5. "Covered Individual":

"Controlled Substance": Any controlled substance as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802.

SEAD 4: Adjudicative Guidelines

- Signed December 10, 2016 Implementation June 8, 2017
- Same 13 Guidelines as before. Requires all adjudicative agencies to use ONE STANDARD.
- Incorporates the Bond Amendment which states:
 - You are prohibited from a clearance if you are actively using illegal drugs or are addicted to drugs.
 - You cannot obtain an SCI, SAP or access to RD if you have been convicted of a crime in the US and have served in prison longer than a year, are mentally incompetent or received a dishonorable discharge.
- Passports will no longer need to be relinquished/destroyed for cases adjudicated after June 8th.
- Adverse information reporting will NOT need to take place if a foreign passport is used to enter/leave a foreign country. It WILL need to take place if they use the foreign passport to enter/leave the US.
- **ISL is currently under review.**

	UNCLASSIFIED	
	SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT DIRECTIVE 4	
Contraction of the second	NATIONAL SECURITY ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES	
	(EFFECTIVE: 08 JUNE 2017)	

A. AUTHORITY: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended; Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), as amended; Executive Order (EO) 10450, Security Requirements for Government Employment, as amended; EO 12968, Access to Classified Information, as amended; EO 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information; EO 13549, Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal and Private Sector Entities; Performance Accountability Council memorandum, Assignment of Functions Relating to Coverage of Contractor Employee Fitness in the Federal Investigative Standards, 6 December 2012; and other applicable provisions of law.

B. PURPOSE: This Security Executive Agent (SecEA) Directive establishes the single, common adjudicative criteria for all covered individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. The Guidelines reflected herein supersede all previously issued national security adjudicative criteria or guidelines.

C. APPLICABILITY: This Directive applies to any executive branch agency authorized or designated to conduct adjudications of covered individuals to determine eligibility for initial or continued access to classified national security information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.

D. DEFINITIONS: As used in this Directive, the following terms have the meanings set forth below:

 "Agency": Any "Executive agency" as defined in Section 105 of Title 5, United States Code (USC), including the "military departments," as defined in Section 102 of Title 5, USC and any other entity within the Executive Branch that comes into possession of classified information or has positions designated as sensitive.

 "Authorized adjudicative agency": An agency authorized by law, executive order, or designation by the SecEA to determine eligibility for access to classified information in accordance with EO 12968, as amended, or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.

 "Authorized investigative agency": An agency authorized by law, executive order, or designation by the SecEA to conduct a background investigation of individuals who are proposed for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position or to

UNCLASSIFIED
CONTRACTOR REALIZED

NCLASSIFIE

 "Authorized Investigative agency": An agency authorized by law, executive order, or gration by the SeeEA to conduct a background investigation of individuals who are posed for access to classified information or cligibility to hold a sensitive position or to

SEAD 6: Continuous Evaluation

- Pilots underway for both Government and Industry: 1,100,000 CE cases tested by end of 2017.
 - 308,000 cases are industry.
 - 8% of cases are triggering an alert. Alerts are scored as Low-Med-High. Low get adjudicated right away, Med have an adverse submitted, and High will necessitate an immediate call to the FSO.
 - 74% of hits are financial, 18% are criminal
 - Privacy Act concerns as industry is not able to know the reasons for CE flags on their own employees
- There is a possibility that CE will eventually replace the need for PRs.
- OUSD(I) Memo dated 12/19/2016: DSS will be responsible for the CE mission.
- NBIB Memo dated 2/3/2017: Offering agencies a CE SAC (Continuous Evaluation Special Agreement Check) for \$45. Agencies will be responsible for adjudication.
- SEAD 6: Continuous Evaluation signed January 12, 2018 with implementation TBD.

C	UNDER SECRETARY (5000 DEFENSE PE WASHINGTON, DC 2	ENTAGON			
INTE	LIGENCE	[DEC 1 9 2016		
	UNDER SECRETARY O DIRECTOR, COUNTERIN	E OF THE UNDER SECRE LIGENCE E INTELLIGENCE, INTEL MS & RESOURCES, OFFI DF DEFENSE FOR INTEL	LLIGENCE CE OF THE LIGENCE TV,		
	SUBJECT: Realignment of the Department of Defense Resources to the Defense Security Servic		Aission and		
	I hereby realign the Department of Defense and CE Validation Cell resources from the Security Defense Security Service (DSS). Upon this realig the DSS Personnel Security Management Office fc prepare the Department to meet its goal of implem		UNCLASSIFIED		
	the end of calendar year 2017. The Security Policy and Oversight Division CE Program of Record. Additionally, SPOD will associated responsibilities, functions, relationships		SECURITY EXECUTIVE AGENT DIRECTIVE 6		
	DSS will provide quarterly progress update In accordance with the Office of the Secretary of D Secretary of Defense for Intelligence will retain all		CONTINUOUS EVALUATION (EFFECTIVE: 12 JANUARY 2018)		
	Marc ec: Director for Defense Intelligence (Intelligence & S	A. AUTHORITY: The National Security Act of 1947, as amended: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, as amended; Security Clearance Information Act, as amended: Executive Order (EO) 12968, Access to Classified Information, as amended; EO 13467, Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information, amended; EO, Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Trib and Private Sector Emilies, and other applicable provisions of law.			
		B. PURPOSE: The requirements for the eligibility for access	his Security Executive Agent (SecEA) Directive establishes policy and e continuous evaluation (CE) of covered individuals who require continued s to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.		
		C. APPLICABIL adjudicative agency	JTY: This Directive applies to any executive branch agency, authorized y, authorized investigative agency, and covered individuals as defined belo		
	ee: Director for Defense Intelligence (Intelligence & S	D. DEFINITION: below:	S: As used in this Directive, the following terms have the meanings set for		
	Nur-	Code (U.S.C.), incl and any other entity	Any "executive agency" as defined in Section 105 of Title 5, United State- luding the "military departments," as defined in Section 102 of Title 5, U.S. y within the executive branch that comes into possession of classified positions designated as sensitive.		
		designation by the	d adjudicative agency": An agency authorized by law, executive order, or SecEA to determine eligibility for access to classified information in D 12968, as amended, or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.		
		designation by the proposed for access ascertain whether s	d investigative agency": An agency authorized by law, executive order, or SeeEA to conduct a background investigation of individuals who are s to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position or to uch individuals continue to satisfy the criteria for retaining access to such ibility to hold such positions.		
		"Classified	national security information" or "classified information": Information the		

has been determined, pursuant to EO 13526, any predecessor or successor order, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure


NISPPAC Requesting Ability to View Drafts



New: SF 86 Reform

- The new SF86 went live August 27, 2017. Changes include:
 - Section 7: Changes to phone numbers
 - Section 11: Landlord information
 - Section 12: Links to help find school addresses
 - Section 13: Employment information changes
 - Section 17, 19, 20: Civil marriages and civil unions
 - Section 20: Official government travel clarification
 - Section 21: Mental Health Revisions
 - Section 23: Will clarify that drug use while legal in states still needs to be disclosed as it is against federal law: *"The following questions pertain to the illegal use of drugs or controlled substances or drug or controlled substance activity in accordance with Federal laws, even though permissible under state laws."* Why? Because...

Just Say No?



Legality of medical cannabis in the United States

No doctor's recommendation required Doctor's recommendation required Limited THC content Prohibited

New: Question 21

- September 2012, James Clapper issued a memo stating "an applicants decision to seek mental health care should NOT, in and of itself, adversely impact that individual's ability to obtain or maintain a national security position."
- A new memorandum was signed by Clapper on November 16, 2016 and was implemented July 2017.
- Memo here: <u>https://clearance-jobs-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/S21%20DNI%20ExecComm%20FOR%20RELEASE.PDF</u>
- Significantly revises the questions surrounding mental health by asking if the person has:
 - Been declared mentally incompetent by a court or administrative agency
 - Been ordered to consult with a mental health professional by a court or administrative agency
 - Been hospitalized for a mental health condition (includes PTSD!)
 - Been diagnosed by a physician or other health professional with <u>specifically listed</u> diagnoses
 - A mental health or other health condition that substantially adversely affects judgment, reliability or trustworthiness

Commerce/DSS Critical Facilities Survey

- Initiative started by DSS in July of 2015 that will continue through 2017.
- Purpose is to get a better understanding of the supply chain and the threats/risks to the Cleared Defense Contractors.
- Survey is MANDATORY & will take considerable effort 40+ pages of responses needed that will involve contracts, legal, finance, supply chain and security.
- Large MFOs will be able to coordinate directly with commerce to determine best way to answer.
- The Facility Security Officer should be notified via mail.
- More info here.

Commerce/DSS Critical Facilities Survey

<u>Next Page</u> OMB Control Number: 0694-0119 Expiration Date: 12/31/2017

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT: Critical Facilities Survey



SCOPE OF ASSESSMENT

The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Office of Technology Evaluation (OTE), in coordination with the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Security Service (DSS) is conducting a survey and assessment of organizations responsible for the research, design, engineering, development, manufacture, test, and integration of defense and high-technology products, components, and related services. The resulting data will provide a baseline understanding of the structure and interdependencies of organizations that participate in DOD acquisition programs and their associated supply chains. This survey will cover all operations at respondents' locations including but not limited to the DSS-cleared areas. This effort will also assist DSS in its mission to provide security oversight and education on behalf of the DOD and other U.S. Government departments and agencies.

RESPONSE TO THIS SURVEY IS REQUIRED BY LAW

A response to this survey is required by law (50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 2155). Failure to respond can result in a maximum fine of \$10,000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both. Information furnished herewith is deemed confidential and will not be published or disclosed except in accordance with Section 705 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C App. Sec. 2155). Section 705 prohibits the publication or disclosure of this information nulless the President determines that its withholding is contrary to the national defense. Information will not be shared with any non-government entity, other than in aggregate form. The information will be protected pursuant to the appropriate exemptions from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), should it be the subject of a FOIA request.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is required to respond to nor shall a person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that collection of information displays a currently valid OMB Control Number.

BURDEN ESTIMATE AND REQUEST FOR COMMENT

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 10 hours per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information to BIS Information Collection Officer, Room 6883, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (OMB Control No. 0694-0119), Washington, D.C. 20503.

BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL - Per Section 705(d) of the Defense Production Act

Previous Page

ction 3b: Product and Service List

Table of Contents


Next Page

For each area in which your location provides a product or service (including R&D), indicate the type of participation, whether your location performs R&D, and provide a description of the products or services. Then, identify the expected end usage of your product/service, and whether the product/service is subject to U.S. export control regulations. Finally, state whether the product/service has supported a classified contract within th past three years. While many specific product/service areas are listed, not every possible product and service has been included. If the product or service your location provides is not listed, use the "other" listing within the relevant category.

Do not disclose any classified information in this survey form

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Comments:				
BUSINESS CONFIDENTIAL - Per Section 705(d) of the Defense	Production	Act		

DiT: DSS in Transition



DiT as of September 2017



Security Baseline

·Looks to Industry to identify assets

- •Includes security controls currently implemented by Industry
- •Provides for DSS review and establishes foundation for Tailored Security Program



Security Review

Focuses on protection of assets identified in the Security Baseline
Assesses facility security posture, considers threats, and identifies vulnerabilities
Results in Summary Report and POA&M to develop the Tailored Security Program



Tailored Security Program (TSP)

•Builds on Security Baseline, Summary Report, POA&M, and recommendations developed during TSP •Documents effectiveness of security controls


•Applies countermeasures to TSP based on threat




Continuous Monitoring

Establishes recurring reviews of TSPs by DSS and Industry
Provides recommendations from DSS based on changing threat environment
Ensures security controls documented in TSP are still effective


DiT Implementation: Engagement Types



DSS System Updates: CURRENT STATE



DSS System Updates: FUTURE STATE




Controlled Unclassified Information

- 13,500 Cleared facilities accessing classified vs ~300,000 facilities that access CUI
- Will attempt to categorize all SBU into two CUI Areas:
 - CUI Basic
 - CUI Specified




CUI/CDI/Federal Contract Information



In Summary

UNCLASSIFIED




Risk Management Framework (RMF)


- Implemented by NAO (NISP Authorization Office) formerly ODAA
- Phase 1 (Standalones) started October 2016.
- Phase 2 started January 1, 2018 for all other systems.
- DAAPM Update, Version 1.2 released on October 31, 2017.
- Moving from OBMS to eMASS not before September 2018.
- NIST 800-53 version 5 underway DSS reviewing to see if the 3 new control families will affect RMF.
- Formerly 11,000 total accredited systems, there are now 9,000 accredited systems.
 One reason is small businesses are opting out of systems altogether.

1,126 ATOs from June 2017-Jan 2018

June – Sept 2017




Oct 2017 – Jan 2018




Timelines of ATOs June 2017 – Jan 2018

Average Number of Days Per Region/Month



Small Business in Crisis?

- How will this affect our supply chain?
- What will happen when DiT, CUI, & NIST 800-171 takes hold?
- We need better policies for consultants/security services companies to support these small companies.
- Security Consultant Industry Subcommittee of NCMS published and submitted a white paper to DSS on March 1, 2018.



Industry NISPPAC on the Web

https://classmgmt.com/nisppac.php



NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (NIPPAC)

номе

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	Events
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	NCMS Speaker Databa

Scholarship Program

Member Résumés

Contact

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (NISPPAC)

Industry Representatives' Informational Site

About	NISPPAC Industry	MOU	Working	News &	Policy	Official
	Members	Group	Groups	Resources	Timeline	Website

In April 1990, President George Bush directed the National Security Council to explore the creation of a single, integrated industrial security program that might result in cost savings and improved security protection.

Recommendations from representatives from government and industry were invited to participate in an initiative intended to create an integrated security framework. This initiative led to the creation of Executive Order (EO) 12829, which established the National Industrial Security Program (NISP), a single, integrated, cohesive security program to protect classified information and to preserve our Nation's economic and technological interests.

EO 12829 also established the National Industrial Security Program Policy Advisory Committee (NISPPAC). The NISPPAC is chaired by the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), who has the authority to appoint sixteen representatives from Executive Branch agencies and eight non-governmental members. The eight non-governmental members represent the approximately 13,000 cleared defense contractor organizations and serve four year terms.

This website serves as a way for industry to gain a better understanding of the non-governmental members involvement in order to help the community stay abreast of the ever-changing security posture.


To watch a short video on the history of the NISP, click here

Charter 🔂 | Bylaws 🔂 | Upcoming Public NISPPAC meeting

Industrial Security Timeline of Major Events



Industrial Security Timeline of Major Events



*Projected Dates Only--Subject to Change

Questions?

