Lessons Learned from Custer's Last Stand for Developing Acquisition Scouts

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Abstract

Armies have been using scouts since their inception to be the eyes and ears for the commander, and to "obtain, distribute and share vital combat and battlefield information on the enemy and on combat" (FM 3-20.98, 2009). Scouts have made the difference between winning and losing many battles, but have also made important differences in the acquisition environment, albeit, in a different information-gathering capacity.

Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer understood the need to gather information before his final battle at Little Bighorn where his forces were decimated by the combined forces of the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians in the plains of Montana. Unfortunately, Custer had a history of discounting the information provided by his scouts if it conflicted with what he wanted to hear. The results in this case were disastrous for Custer and the 7th Calvary. Custer ignored the reports his scouts provided him, split his limited forces into four groups, and was annihilated by an overwhelming number of prepared enemy forces in just a few hours later that same afternoon, 25 June, 1876.

Acquisition leaders also must gather information from many sources prior to making decisions. While they do not risk the death of their command, identifying the information to gather, how to gather and use it, and with whom to share it are critically important to effective acquisition and sustainment of equipment for the Army.

Chapter 1 - Introduction

Armies have been using scouts since their inception to be the eyes and ears for the commander and to "obtain, distribute and share vital combat and battlefield information on the enemy and on combat" (FM 3-20.98, 2009). Scouts have made the difference between winning and losing in military battles, but have also made differences in the acquisition environment, albeit, in a different capacity, gathering information.

Leaders at all levels of the company need to institute a simple but effective routine for collecting the information needed to take strategic action. There are three basic steps to strategic decision-making: getting the right information, making a good decision and then implementing that decision. Success in the information stage translates into knowing the types of information needed to make the decision, finding it, and transmitting it quickly to the decision-makers.

The information required falls in three categories: knowledge about the competition, knowledge about your own company, and knowledge about your marketplace. It is not enough to merely gather the information; an infrastructure must be in place to ensure that market information is getting back to the decision-makers. (McNeilly, 2002, pp.29 – 34).

Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer (*Figure 1*) understood the need to gather information before his final battle at Little Bighorn where his forces were decimated by the combined forces of the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians in the plains of Montana. Unfortunately, Custer had a history of not trusting his scouts if their information conflicted with what he wanted to hear and demanded to personally verify every significant report prior to taking any action.



Figure 1, George Armstrong Custer, (Strom, K., 2017).

A particular report that Custer received and should have heeded on the 25th of June 1876, was the initial, early morning report from Lieutenant Charles Varnum, (*Figure 2*) his chief of scouts, who reported that there was a “big village” in the divide between the Rosebud and Little Bighorn River valley (Philbrick, 2010, pp. 139).

Figure 2, 2LT Charles Varnum, (Grahm, W., 1953).

Custer rode to the hilltop, and "sat on the rocky outcropping, staring for several long and unsatisfactory minutes into the distance and allegedly told Varnum that "I have got mighty good eyes and I can see no Indians" (Philbrick, 2010, pp. 147). Whether this is true, or Custer did not want to hear what his scouts reported is open to debate. The results, however, are not; Custer ignored the reports his scouts provided him, split his limited forces into four groups, and was annihilated by an overwhelming number of prepared enemy forces in just a few hours later that same afternoon, 25th of June 1876.

Acquisition leaders also must gather information from many sources prior to making decisions. While they do not risk the death of their command, identifying the information to gather, how to gather and use it, and with whom to share it are critically important as they pursue the acquisition and sustainment of new equipment for the Army.

Background

Scouting is a critical means of gathering critical information, and is a significant force multiplier in many ways.

Sun Tzu, in the classic strategy book, *The Art of War, (1963)* made multiple references to the significance of scouts. Some of the more relevant references come from Chapter VII, Manoeuvre (sic) including: “Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army” and “Those who do not use local guides are unable to obtain the advantages of the ground” (Sun Tzu & Griffin, 1963, pp. 158). Sun Tzu also makes reference to scouts in Chapter XIII: Employment of Secret Agents where he stated “What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation (Sun Tzu & Griffin, 1963, pp. 232). These sacred writings, from arguably the most prominent developer of strategy and tactics, are relevant both in Custer’s defeat at the Little Bighorn and in today’s acquisition environment.

At the Battle of Little Bighorn, Custer did make efforts to gather information about the environment by using his scouts, which included Army Soldier scouts, Army civilian scouts, and local Indian scouts (Table 1).

Table 1 - 7th Cavalry Scouts and Interpreters Serving with the Seventh Cavalry at the Time of the Battle of the Little Bighorn

NP = Not Present ~ W = Wounded ~ KIA = Killed in Action

Name	**Status**	**Tribe**	**Rank/Company**
Baker, William	NP		Private, Scout
Barking Wolf	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Bear Comes Out		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Bear Running in Timber		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Bear's Eye	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Black Calf		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Black Fox	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Black Porcupine	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Bloody Knife	KIA	Arikara	Guide, Quartermaster
Bobtailed Bull	KIA	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Boyer, Mitch	KIA		Interpreter, Quartermaster
Bull		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Bull in Water		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Bush		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Climbs the Bluff	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Cross, William			Private, Scout
Curly		Crow	Private, Indian Scout
Curly Head	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Dorman, Isaiah	KIA		Interpreter, Quartermaster
Foolish Bear		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Forked Horn		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Girard, Frederic Francis			Interpreter, Quartermaster
Goes Ahead		Crow	Private, Indian Scout
Good Face		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Goose		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Hairy Moccasin		Crow	Private, Indian Scout
Half Yellow Face		Crow	Corporal, Indian Scout
Herendeen, George B.			Scout, Quartermaster
Horns in Front	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Howling Wolf	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Jackson, Robert	NP		Private, Scout
Jackson, William			Private, Scout
Left Hand	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout

Little Brave	KIA	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Little Sioux		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Long Bear	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Lying Down	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
One Feather		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
One Horn	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Owl	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Red Bear		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Red Foolish Bear	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Reynolds, Charles Alexander	KIA		Guide, Quartermaster
Round Wooden Cloud		Sioux	Private, Indian Scout
Running Wolf	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Rushing Bull		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Soldier		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Stab		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Strikes the Bear		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Strikes the Lodge		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Strikes Two		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
Wagon	NP	Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
White Cloud		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
White Eagle		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout
White Man Runs Him		Crow	Private, Indian Scout
White Swan	W	Crow	Private, Indian Scout
Young Hawk		Arikara	Private, Indian Scout

*(*Merkel, D., 2013*).*

The leader of the scouts for Custer’s Seventh Cavalry, was Second Lieutenant Charles Albert Varnum, a 27 year old officer whose command consisted of 36 – 40 scouts (Brown, 1973).

In a letter to his mother, published in the Lowell Weekly Journal, August 1876, Lieutenant Varnum shared his version of the battle of Little Bighorn with his mother. He wrote about the conflicting guidance and general lack of trust that Custer had for his scouts. His description of how Custer required an “intelligent white man” to accompany the civilian and Indian scouts reflected this mistrust, and was reinforced when after receiving information from an Indian scout that had seen the enormous Sioux village, Custer had to see it for himself prior to making a decision (Grahm, W., 1953). This action delayed the start of the attack until well after dawn, the preferred time to attack Indian villages, and rather than surprising the expected 1,000 – 2,000 Indians, he found 8,000 prepared Indians as Custer led his men to defeat (Philbrick, 2010, pp. 111).

Leaders in the acquisition workforce can learn valuable lessons from Custer’s defeat at Little Bighorn that can be applied to the information they gather, how they obtain this information, and with whom do they share it. Acquisition leaders use the five Executive Core Qualifications, (ECQ) developed by the Office of Personnel Management for the Senior Executive Service as the guiding competencies required to lead organizations and provide a framework for executive leadership (OPM.gov, 2017). The Executive Core Qualifications are:

Leading Change
Leading People
Results Driven
Business Acumen
Building Coalitions

These five competencies are not limited to personnel in the Senior Executive Service, but also serve as the guidelines for all acquisition leaders. How leaders embrace these competencies directly relates to how they interact with their employees, including those that gather information.

Similar to Lieutenant Colonel Custer’s use of scouts at the Battle of Little Bighorn, acquisition leaders must identify what information they need to gather, how to obtain the information, and identifying with whom they should share this information.

Purpose of this Study

The purpose of this paper was to determine how senior leaders at TACOM-LCMC can identify which of their personnel can and should be used as scouts for their organization and how awareness can be utilized to gain a competitive advantage in the business environment.

This research will link Lieutenant Colonel Custer's use of scouts at the Battle of Little Bighorn to how Acquisition leaders can use their personnel as scouts in conjunction with the Senior Executive Service Executive Core Qualifications. This research will describe how Lieutenant Colonel Custer failed at the Battle of Little Bighorn because he failed to listen to his scouts, and how leaders in the Acquisition Community can use the examples of Lieutenant Colonel Custer's defeat to improve their organizations by understanding how to use their personnel as scouts.

Significance of This Research

This research is significant because in the words of George Santayana, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" (Clairmont, N., 2017). If one leader in the acquisition community can learn one thing from the mistakes of Lieutenant Colonel Custer and his defeat at the Battle of Little Bighorn, our organization will be improved.

Overview of the Research Methodology

This research was conducted utilizing a descriptive research methodology. The descriptive research method describes situations. Accurate predictions are not created nor inferred, nor is cause and effect determined (Hale, n.d.). This research used a combination of case-study and survey methods from the descriptive research methodology.

The Case Study researched involves only the Battle of Little Bighorn and the impact of Lieutenant Colonel Custer's use of scouts during this battle and four, open-ended interview questions asked of five senior and diverse leaders of TACOM-Life Cycle Management Command.

Research Questions

1. How do you determine what is important information to gather?
2. How do you train your personnel to obtain information?
3. How do you determine who to choose to gather information?
4. How do you determine who should receive this information once it is obtained?

Objectives and Outcomes

The outcome of this research will be the correlation between how Lieutenant Colonel Custer used his scouts at the Battle of Little Bighorn and how leaders in the Acquisition Workforce can identify and use their personnel as scouts to gather information.

Limitations of the Study

This research was limited to using one case study, Lieutenant Colonel Custer and the Battle of Little Bighorn and five interviews with senior leaders from TACOM - Life Cycle Management Command. Due to circumstances beyond the control of this researcher, interviews were limited to less than 10 people. The target population for the interviews were senior leaders from different business areas with different responsibilities, in the acquisition community to gain a broad perspective of how different leaders consider what information to gather, how to obtain this information and choosing with whom to share this information.

Chapter 2 – Literature Review

Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer understood the need to gather information before his final battle at Little Bighorn where his forces were decimated by the combined forces of the Sioux and Cheyenne Indians in the plains of Montana. Unfortunately, Custer had a history of not trusting his scouts if their information conflicted with what he wanted to hear and demanded to personally verify every significant report prior to taking any action. The results, however, were clear; Custer ignored the reports that his scouts provided him, split his limited forces into four groups, and was annihilated by an overwhelming number of prepared enemy forces in just a few hours later that same afternoon, 25 June, 1876.

Acquisition leaders also must gather information from many sources prior to making decisions. While they do not risk the death of their command, identifying what information to gather, how to gather and use it and with whom to share it is critically important as they pursue the acquisition and sustainment of new equipment for the Army.

Chapter one outlined the significance of using scouts, this chapter presents a review of the research and literature on key factors that contributed to Lieutenant Colonel Custer's defeat as well as explains the Senior Executive Service Executive Core Qualifications and how they relate to gathering information for their business units.

Typing "The Battle of Little Bighorn" into Google produced 509,000 results in 0.73 seconds. This tremendous amount of information related to this historic battle reflects the historical significance for not only the lessons to be learned, but also reflects the interest in the dynamic character of Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer.

George Armstrong Custer

George Armstrong Custer was born in 1839 in New Rumley, Ohio, the son of a blacksmith, and he moved to Monroe, Michigan in his early years to live with an older half-sister. After high school, he earned a teaching certificate and taught grammar school for a while, but his ultimate ambition was to attend the military academy at West Point. His academic qualifications were lacking, so he convinced a local congressman to sponsor him and in 1857 he enrolled at West Point. While he ultimately graduated from West Point in 1861, due to his frequent misbehavior and regular discipline, he finished last in his class and graduated only due to the beginning of the Civil War and the desperate need for officers in the Army.

Upon entering the Army, he was placed in command of a cavalry troop and distinguished himself as bold, decisive, and ambitious. His ambition and bravery gained him the attention of General George B. McClellan, and while assigned to General McClellan’s staff, he was promoted to the brevet (temporary) rank of brigadier general in 1863, two years after earning his commission from West Point.

He was then assigned as the commander of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade and distinguished himself at the Battle of Gettysburg (July 1 – 3, 1863), the Battle of Yellow Tavern (May 11, 1864) and the Third Battle of Winchester (September 19, 1864) and earned the nickname, “Boy General” while continuing to distinguish himself and earning another promotion to Major General (brevet) before the age of 25 (Urwin, G., 2014).

Following the end of the Civil War, Custer was demoted to the rank of Captain in the Regular Army as was normal for officers after the war, but was soon promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and selected as the commander for the 7th Cavalry to pursue the defeat of the Lakota Sioux and the Southern Cheyenne in the far west (Urwin, G., 2014). He experienced success in several battles, which led to his belief in his invincibility and fed his need for personal glory.

The Battle of Little Bighorn

As part of the Great Sioux War of 1876 – 1877, Lieutenant Colonel Custer was part of a plan devised by General Phillip Sheridan, commander of the Military Division of Missouri, to confront the large body of Sioux and Northern Cheyenne tribes on the banks of the Little Bighorn River. This three column attack was led by Brigadier General Alfred Terry, Brigadier General George Crook, and Colonel John Gibbon.

While Brigadier General Crook was moving from the south, Brigadier General Terry and Colonel Gibbon were attempting to locate the main Indian camp from the North and West (*Figure 3*).



Figure 3, Converging Columns, (Collins, C., 2006).

On 10 June 1876, Major Marcus Reno (*Figure 4*), Lieutenant Colonel Custer’s second in command, was dispatched on a reconnaissance south to scout along the Powder and Tongue Rivers, Mitzpah Creek, and west to Rosebud Creek to identify any signs that the main Indian camp was near or in what direction it was moving.

Figure 4, Major Marcus Reno, (Grahm, W., 1953).

Using initiative and not in strict compliance with orders (he was strictly ordered not to go west of the Tongue River) Reno went west of the Tongue River and discovered that the Indians had already moved from the Rosebud and were heading toward the Little Bighorn and that Brigadier General Terry’s original plan would not work (Collins, C., 2006). Major Reno estimated that there were 350 – 400 lodges at the site near the Rosebud which would equate to up to 1,000 warriors (Taylor, W., 1996).

This required Brigadier General Terry to create a new plan; he divided his forces into two forces, Brigadier General Terry and Colonel Gibbon would maneuver toward the West with their four cavalry companies and five infantry companies (723 men) and Lieutenant Colonel Custer would maneuver South West with his regiment consisting of 12 companies (652 men). The two forces departed on 21 June 1876 with the plan to meet on 27 June 1876 at the Little Bighorn (*Figure 5*).



Figure 5, General Terry's Plans, (Collins, C., 2006).

Lieutenant Colonel Custer departed the group with his famous 7th Cavalry with every expectation to meet and engage with the enemy in a glorious battle and refused Brigadier General Terry's offer of an extra battalion of infantry (2d Cavalry) and two Gatling guns. Why he declined these additional offensive capabilities has been argued by historians for years. The general agreement is that he believed the Gatling guns (*Figure 6*) would impede his rate of march, as they were mounted on carriages and had to be pulled by four horses, were known to frequently jam, and the inclusion of Soldiers that were not part of the 7th Cavalry would detract from the glory of Custer's command.



Figure 6, Gatling gun, (Weaver, M., 2012).

> He'd (Custer) opted against the Gatling guns, he explained, so as not to "Hamper our movements." He'd decided against the offer of an extra battalion from the Second Cavalry because he felt that "the Seventh "could whip any force" of Indians it was likely to meet." He had also claimed that he had conducted some research that spring at the Indian Bureau in Washington, D.C., and he was confident that even with infusions from the agencies, there were no more than fifteen hundred warriors under Sitting Bull. And besides, if in the unlikely event they should encounter an overwhelming force of Indians, the extra troopers from the Second Cavalry, which would inevitably create "jealousy and friction" between the two regiments, would not, in all probability, enough to "save us from defeat." The most important consideration, he insisted, was that there be 'sure harmony" within the Seventh. (Philbrick, 2010, pp. 114).

The enormous advantage to take the Gatling gun was the rate of fire for this gun. Each gun was hand cranked and had six to ten rotating gun barrels, each with its own firing mechanism, and could fire up to 200 rounds per minute (Weaver, M., 2012). Another significant argument for taking the Gatling guns was the individual weapon of the 7th Cavalry Troopers. Each trooper carried a single shot, breach loading, 1873 Springfield rifles (*Figure 7*) and the 1873, Colt single-action revolver into battle that were acquired by the Army Ordnance Board in 1872.

Figure 7, Springfield Model 1873, (Jarvis, 2011).

Coincidentally, Major Marcus Reno and Brigadier General Alfred Terry were on the selection board for the 1873 Springfield rifle (Donovan, 2008).

> Springfield Master Armourer (Sic.) E.S. Allin had made only five versions of the Allin trapdoor design prior to the Model 1873. These rifles were named for their hinged breechblock design that opened upward like a trapdoor, allowing shooters access to the chamber and in turn faster, cleaner loading. In the wake of the Civil War the U.S Government had 1.5 million surplus muzzle loading M 1863 percussion rifles and numerous attempts were made to modify these weapons to function with Allin breach loading mechanism. The initial Allin conversion was for a .50-70 cartridge, though by this point, after five earlier attempts, the design had morphed into a completely new weapon the Model 1873.
>
> The Model 1873 was a very powerful rifle for the era with a muzzle velocity of 1,350 feet per second with a .45-70-405 (405 grain) cartridge. The recoil proved too robust for mounted troops as it tended to unhorse the soldier. A reduced load (350 grain) was created specifically for cavalry, restricting the muzzle velocity to a more manageable 1100 feet per second for the horsemen.
>
> The rifle was initially issued with a significant inventory of copper cartridges and this created a major problem. Shooters discovered almost immediately that the copper would expand upon discharge and repeatedly jam in the breech, requiring manual extraction using a knife edge to pry loose the hot spent shell. This rendered the weapon a second-rate club in battle and not too effective in a gun fight.

> The barrel length of the infantry model was 32 5/8 inches and the cavalry carbine had a much reduced 22 inch barrel to permit additional manoeuvrability (Sic.) while on horseback.
>
> General George Armstrong Custer’s battalion was armed with the carbine version of the Springfield Model 1873 at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, also known as the Battle of the Greasy Grass in June, 25 and 26, 1876 (Jarvis, 2011).

The army did not issue repeating rifles to their Soldiers at the time because the overwhelming theory was to limit the rate of fire to conserve ammunition, to reinforce the need for accuracy and longer range, and decrease the weight of supplies carried (Donovan, 2008). Historians have proven that many of the Indians at the Battle of Little Bighorn had better weapons, including Winchester and Henry repeating rifles (National Park Service, n.d.).

On the morning of 24 June, Lieutenant Colonel Custer’s scouts reported an increased number of fresh trails coming in from the east and Custer was concerned that the Indians might scatter before he could attack the village. Custer’s scouts informed him that the new trails identified were Indians coming from the agencies, but Custer chose to ignore this advice. He believed that the trails were going east and the large gathering of Indians were dispersing instead of gathering (Philbrook, 2010).

Lieutenant Colonel Custer’s scouts were diverse. His chief of scouts, Lieutenant Varnum had 39 recorded scouts present from three different Indian tribes (25 - Arikara and 6 – Crow, 1 – Sioux), four experienced white scouts (Charley Reynolds, George Herendeen, William Cross, and William Jackson and three interpreters (Mitch Boyer, Isaiah Dorman, and Frederic Girard).

The Indian scouts had been trained as hunters and warriors since birth and many of them had served the Army for years as scouts because this duty allowed them to be warriors. The most famous Arikara scout, Bloody Knife, had served the Army for over five years and while his heritage was half Lakota Sioux and half Arikara, he still considered the Sioux his enemy as did his parent tribe of the Arikara (Bismarck, 1876).

Lieutenant Colonel Custer made many mistakes with the use of his scouts. He had served on the plains for almost 10 years and did not understand the Indian culture. His lack of knowledge did not enable him to correctly predict how the Indians would react in certain situations. His comments that his 7th Cavalry could "whip any force" of Indians they were likely to meet, set the tone for this failed battle (Philbrick, 2010). His expectations were established due to previous successful operations at the Battle of Washita and because of his recurring optimism and pride, he refused to believe that he could fail at anything, in particularly, a battle.

The Battle of Washita took place near Cheyenne, Oklahoma on 27 November 1868 where Lieutenant Colonel Custer chose not to conduct any scouting prior to the dawn attack and did not discover that the tribe of Cheyenne Indians following Black Kettle were peaceful and that their village was on reservation land. The commander of the nearest fort, (Fort Cobb) had guaranteed the tribe safety and a white flag was found flying from one of the main tents. Lieutenant Colonel Custer led the massacre and within 15 minutes had killed 103 Cheyenne's, including warriors, women, and children (History.com Staff, 2009). While this battle was recorded in the record books as a victory, it was ultimately a failure by Lieutenant Colonel Custer, because of his lack of preparation and scouting.

At the Battle of Little Bighorn, Lieutenant Colonel Custer was provided advice from his Chief of Scouts (Lieutenant Varnum) about the huge size of the village, which he ignored. Likewise, he ignored the advice of the respected frontier scout, Mitch Boyer, who warned one of his company commanders, Lieutenant Edward Godfrey that a huge encampment was up ahead. He ignored the warnings of his Crow Scouts and Charley Reynolds earlier in 1876 that "the Lakota's under Sitting Bull were gathering in force and amassing weapons including Winchester repeating rifles and abundant ammunition" (Dononvan, 2008, pp. 118). He also failed to use his scouts correctly when, upon the approach to the Rosebud and Little Bighorn valley, he sent them two miles ahead of his regiment and limited his ability to gather information or to use any information he did gather in a timely manner (Godfrey, 1976).

Lieutenant Colonel Custer received information from a small detachment that was dispatched to recover supplies that had been lost from a mule during the previous days march. The detachment discovered several Indians going through the packs and fired upon them but did not kill them. Upon returning to the command, they reported this information and Custer decided that his approach had been compromised and he must attack immediately instead of waiting for Brigadier General Terry and Colonel Gibbons arrival on the 26th of June (Collins, 2006).

Lieutenant Colonel Custer's new plan was to split his forces into four small units Benteen's Battalion (120 men), Reno's Battalion (175 men), Custer's Battalion (221 men), and Captain Thomas McDougall's augmented company with the pack train (136 men) and attack immediately (*Figure 8*).



Figure 8, Custer's Approach to Little Bighorn, (Collins, C., 2006).

Custer ordered Benteen to scout to the South to determine if the Indians were escaping. Benteen did not find any evidence that the Indians were escaping and determined that he was being excluded from the fight and delayed his return to the regiment (Collins, 2006).

At 1518, on 25 June, Major Reno determined that he could not successfully attack the village with his limited force and formed a defensive skirmish line and wait for the promised reinforcement from Lieutenant Colonel Custer (*Figure 9*).



Figure 9, Reno's Attack in the Valley (Collins, C., 2006).

From Custer's vantage point, he could see that Reno was engaged and still not knowing the full extent of the size of the village and being separated by rough terrain, he chose to split his battalion into two companies and attack the village from the North West expecting to hold in place until Benteen arrived with reinforcements (*Figure 10*).



Figure 10, Custer's Attack, (Collins, C., 2006).

Benteen never arrived, Reno retreated to Reno Hill (*Figure 11*) and Lieutenant Colonel Custer and his men were massacred on Calhoun Hill (*Figure 12*).



Figure 11, Reno’s Retreat, (Collins, C., 2006).



Figure 12, Custer's Last Stand, (Collins, C., 2006).

Leaders need information to make decisions. This has been a fact for as many years as there has been leaders. Sun-Tzu wrote in *The Art of War* that: "What is called foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation" (Sun-Tzu & Griffin, 1963, pp. 232). His understanding of the need to gather information, using personal interaction was as true in the 6th century B.C. as it is today.

Information Gathering for Leaders in Acquisition

Acquisition executives are no exception to needing information prior to making decisions. While they do not risk the death of their command, identifying what information to gather, how to gather and use it and with whom to share it is critically important as they pursue the acquisition and sustainment of new equipment for the Army. Acquisition leaders also must gather information from many sources prior to making decisions.

Joel Trammell, Founder and Chief Executive Officer of Khorus Software wrote in an article for Inc.com about the three types of information all CEO's must have that include:

1. Information that is normalized. This means that the CEO cannot reasonably understand the intricacies of all parts of his organization. The subject matter experts must be able to put the information into the proper context to help him understand. This information is focused on the mission of the organization and the foundation of a clear mission statement will enable his subordinates to focus on what the CEO sees as his priority.

2. Information that is predictive. The CEO establishes the vision for the company by providing the future direction of the business. Rather than focusing on what has happened in the past, looking at the goals or individual groups will help him predict the future and move closer toward achieving the vision.

3. Information from the entire organization. The best CEO's do not limit their information gathering solely from the executive team. Whether he uses the "walking around" method, suggestion boxes, surveys, or any other method; in order to get a clear picture of how the organization is operating, he needs information.

The type of information required for an executive varies in specificity, but it is always related to the type of business in which the executive is involved. For the Army Acquisition Executive, this information is centered on:

> A directed, funded effort that provides a new, improved, or continuing materiel, weapon or information system or service capability in response to an approved need. Acquisition programs are divided into different categories that are established to facilitate decentralized decision making, execution, and compliance with statutory requirements (DA PAM 70-3, 2014, pp. 264).

Army acquisition leaders are extensively trained in the process of acquisition and in leadership. A study completed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics – Human Capital Initiatives identified 161,469 Department of Defense personnel as part of the Acquisition Workforce in 2016 (Table 2), 3,240 of these personnel support the Army (Table 3) and 446 of these personnel are in Key Leadership Positions (Table 4), (Evertson, 2016).

Table 2 - Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce Demographics

Human Capital Fact Sheet								
Defense Acquisition Workforce Program Management	FY 2008				FY2016Q4			
	PM Civilian (Civ)	PM Military (Mil)	Total PM (Civ+Mil)	Defense Acquisition Workforce	PM Civilian (Civ)	PM Military (Mil)	Total PM (Civ+Mil)	Defense Acquisition Workforce
Size & Composition								
Workforce Size	8,070	4,711	12,781	125,879	12,392	4,610	17,002	161,469
Change in size from 2008	-	-	-	-	54%	-2%	33%	28%
Civilian/Military Composition	63%	37%	-	88% / 12%	73%	27%	-	90% / 10%
Educational Attainment								
Bachelor's Degree or Higher	75%	92%	82%	77%	84%	95%	87%	84%
Graduate Degree	37%	62%	46%	29%	50%	73%	57%	39%
Certification								
Level I or Higher Achieved	71%	76%	73%	72%	88%	83%	86%	85%
Level II or Higher Achieved	62%	61%	61%	61%	77%	63%	73%	73%
Level III Achieved	46%	31%	40%	36%	50%	35%	46%	43%
Position Certification Requirement Met or Exceeded	56%	55%	55%	58%	75%	62%	71%	75%
Within 24 Months of Certification Requirement	26%	38%	30%	27%	20%	33%	24%	22%
Does Not Meet Certification Requirement	19%	8%	15%	14%	5%	4%	5%	3%
Planning Considerations								
% Baby Boomer / Traditional Gen.	82%	24%	61%	62%	44%	2%	32%	33%
Average Age	49.8	39.0	45.8	45.7	49.0	37.5	45.9	44.9
Workforce Life-Cycle Model (YRE)* % Future/Mid-Career/Senior	8/26/66(%)	-	-	20/23/57 (%)(Civ)	13/26/60(%)	-	-	26/25/50(%)
Average Years of Service	19.0	15.5	17.7	17.3	15.6	15.2	15.5	15.0
Retirement Eligible*	1,470(18%)	-	-	19,051(17%) (Civ)	2,266(18%)	-	-	25,712(18%)
Retirement Eligible w/in 5 Years*	1,854(23%)	-	-	21,315(19%) (Civ)	2,746(22%)	-	-	25,920(18%)
Total Gains/Losses*	2,179/1,993	-	-	14,245/15,030 (Civ)	1,692/1,377	-	-	15,815/10,997

Source: The Human Capital Fact Sheet is based on end of FY2008 and FY2016Q4 data and was generated by OUSD(AT&L)/Human Capital Initiatives using the AT&L Workforce Data Mart.
*Analysis support from RAND using FY2008 and FY2016Q4 DMDC data.

(Evertson, 2016)

Table 3 - Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce by Component

Program Management Defense Acq Workforce	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	% Change Since FY08	% Change Since FY15
ARMY	3,690	3,452	3,438	3,491	3,336	3,378	3,263	3,281	3,240	-12%	-1%
DoN	4,085	4,598	5,258	5,601	5,793	5,939	5,949	6,335	6,362	56%	0%
AIR FORCE	4,105	4,461	5,026	5,361	5,357	5,438	5,242	5,366	5,681	38%	6%
DCMA	309	334	342	337	341	386	388	393	381	23%	-3%
DLA	16	7	10	10	40	55	88	113	181	1031%	60%
DCAA	-	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-		
MDA	136	150	253	287	304	341	339	349	349	157%	0%
DISA	122	81	134	151	146	154	242	231	257	111%	11%
DHA	26	31	78	119	93	90	91	74	78	200%	5%
DTRA	79	75	89	108	131	132	133	138	133	68%	-4%
DAU	91	125	148	149	168	138	139	165	154	69%	-7%
NRO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	42		
OSD	42	30	42	53	68	66	70	79	76	81%	-4%
JCS	1	1	-	1	36	38	32	29	27	2600%	-7%
DeCA	1	1	1	1	1	2	5	4	5	400%	25%
WHS	5	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	-80%	0%
DFAS	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	5	400%	400%
DMEA	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-		
DoD HRA	10	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	3	-70%	200%
TRMC	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2		100%
DSCA	5	1	2	1	-	2	3	3	-	-100%	-100%
DSS	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-100%	
DTIC	-	-	-	-	3	7	12	16	22		38%
NDU	6	-	2	4	4	3	4	5	3		
ASD	-	3	5	4	-	-	-	-	-		
4th Estate Other	50	69	84	2	-	-	-	-	-		
TOTAL	12,781	13,422	14,915	15,683	15,824	16,171	16,003	16,585	17,002	↑ 33%	↑ 3%

(Evertson, 2016)

Table 4 - Program Management Demographics



Occupied Position Type	PM		Entire DAW	
Key Leadership Positions (KLPs)	446	2.6%	1,197	0.7%
Critical Acquisition Positions (CAPs) *	3,828	22.5%	15,791	9.8%
Non-CAP Positions	12,728	74.9%	144,481	89.5%
TOTAL	**17,002**		161,469	

* = Number of CAPs, excluding KLPs (no double counts)

Highest Level of Education	PM		Entire DAW	
Post Grad	9,613	56.5%	63,772	39.5%
Bachelors	5,123	30.1%	71,199	44.1%
Some College	882	5.2%	12,023	7.4%
High School	1,152	6.8%	12,767	7.9%
Other	232	1.4%	1,708	1.1%
TOTAL	17,002		161,469	

Military / Civilian	PM		Entire DAW	
Civilian	12,392	72.9%	145,988	90.4%
Military	4,610	27.1%	15,481	9.6%
TOTAL	17,002		161,469	

Race	PM		Entire DAW	
WHITE	13,483	79.3%	119,897	74.3%
BLACK	1,772	10.4%	19,270	11.9%
ASIAN	620	3.6%	10,551	6.5%
MULTI	331	1.9%	3,591	2.2%
AMI/AN	70	0.4%	898	0.6%
PI	56	0.3%	787	0.5%
Unspecified	670	3.9%	6,475	4.0%
TOTAL	**17,002**		161,469	

Gender	PM		Entire DAW	
Males	12,507	73.6%	113,498	70.3%
Females	4,338	25.5%	46,704	28.9%
Unspecified	157	0.9%	1,267	0.8%
TOTAL	**17,002**		161,469	

(Evertson, 2016)

These personnel in Key Leadership Positions follow the framework of the Executive Core Qualifications.

Senior Executive Service Executive Core Qualifications

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has identified five executive core qualifications (ECQs). The executive core qualifications define the competencies needed to build a federal corporate culture that drives for results, serves customers, and builds successful teams and coalitions within and outside the organization. The Executive Core Qualifications are required for entry to the Senior Executive Service and are used by many departments and agencies in selection, performance management, and leadership development for management and executive positions. The ECQs were designed to assess executive experience and potential-not technical expertise (OPM.gov, 2017).

The five Executive Core Qualifications are:

ECQ 1: Leading Change: This core qualification involves the ability to bring about strategic change, both within and outside the organization, to meet organizational goals. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to establish an organizational vision and to implement it in a continuously changing environment.

> ECQ 2: Leading People: This core qualification involves the ability to lead people toward meeting the organization's vision, mission, and goals. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to provide an inclusive workplace that fosters the development of others, facilitates cooperation and teamwork, and supports constructive resolution of conflicts.
>
> ECQ 3: Results Driven: This core qualification involves the ability to meet organizational goals and customer expectations. Inherent to this ECQ is the ability to make decisions that produce high-quality results by applying technical knowledge, analyzing problems, and calculating risks.
>
> ECQ 4: Business Acumen: This core qualification involves the ability to manage human, financial, and information resources strategically.
>
> ECQ 5: Building Coalitions: This core qualification involves the ability to build coalitions internally and with other Federal agencies, State and local governments, nonprofit and private sector organizations, foreign governments, or international organizations to achieve common goals.
>
> **ECQ 1: Leading Change**
>
> A. Creativity and Innovation: Develops new insights into situations; questions conventional approaches; encourages new ideas and innovations; designs and implements new or cutting edge programs/processes.
> B. External Awareness: Understands and keeps up-to-date on local, national, and international policies and trends that affect the organization and shape stakeholders' views; is aware of the organization's impact on the external environment.
> C. Flexibility: Is open to change and new information; rapidly adapts to new information, changing conditions, or unexpected obstacles.
> D. Resilience: Deals effectively with pressure; remains optimistic and persistent, even under adversity. Recovers quickly from setbacks.
> E. Strategic Thinking: Formulates objectives and priorities, and implements plans consistent with the long-term interests of the organization in a global environment. Capitalizes on opportunities and manages risks.
> F. Vision: Takes a long-term view and builds a shared vision with others; acts as a catalyst for organizational change. Influences others to translate vision into action.

Leading Change directly links to the need for gathering information. It requires the understanding of divergent information to make determinations about how to create and guide change in an organization. Understanding external relationships and looking at long term possibilities all correlate to the necessity of gathering, analyzing, and using information.

ECQ 2: Leading People

A. Conflict Management: Encourages creative tension and differences of opinions. Anticipates and takes steps to prevent counter-productive confrontations. Manages and resolves conflicts and disagreements in a constructive manner.
B. Leveraging Diversity: Fosters an inclusive workplace where diversity and individual differences are valued and leveraged to achieve the vision and mission of the organization.
C. Developing Others: Develops the ability of others to perform and contribute to the organization by providing ongoing feedback and by providing opportunities to learn through formal and informal methods.
D. Team Building: Inspires and fosters team commitment, spirit, pride, and trust. Facilitates cooperation and motivates team members to accomplish group goals.

Leading People is directly related to gathering information. Choosing which of your employees to gather a particular type of information is paramount to successful information gathering. Knowing their skills and abilities will provide you the information you need to determine how and when to train your personnel in gathering information. Additionally, sharing information with your personnel will encourage team building and will contribute to the internal team motivation to complete goals.

ECQ 3: Results Driven

A. Accountability: Holds self and others accountable for measurable high-quality, timely, and cost-effective results. Determines objectives, sets priorities, and delegates work. Accepts responsibility for mistakes. Complies with established control systems and rules.
B. Customer Service: Anticipates and meets the needs of both internal and external customers. Delivers high-quality products and services; is committed to continuous improvement.
C. Decisiveness: Makes well-informed, effective, and timely decisions, even when data are limited or solutions produce unpleasant consequences; perceives the impact and implications of decisions.
D. Entrepreneurship: Positions the organization for future success by identifying new opportunities; builds the organization by developing or improving products or services. Takes calculated risks to accomplish organizational objectives.
E. Problem Solving: Identifies and analyzes problems; weighs relevance and accuracy of information; generates and evaluates alternative solutions; makes recommendations.
F. Technical Credibility: Understands and appropriately applies principles, procedures, requirements, regulations, and policies related to specialized expertise.

Results Driven requires information. Successful leaders monitor the completion of tasks in order to set expectations and standards. Supervising or monitoring the actions and results of subordinates is a process to gather information; both by personal observation as well as interacting with your personnel in their environment. Anticipating the needs of customer's starts with determining what is important to your customers. This is accomplished by focusing the employees that interact with the customers on how to recognize and obtain important information. Identifying new opportunities starts with learning about the new opportunities, this can be accomplished by either personal research or using your employees to gather information. Problem Solving by its definition, requires information to analyze to determine possible solutions.

ECQ 4: Business Acumen

A. Financial Management: Understands the organization's financial processes. Prepares, justifies, and administers the program budget. Oversees procurement and contracting to achieve desired results. Monitors expenditures and uses cost-benefit thinking to set priorities.
B. Human Capital Management: Builds and manages workforce based on organizational goals, budget considerations, and staffing needs. Ensures that employees are appropriately recruited, selected, appraised, and rewarded; takes action to address performance problems. Manages a multi-sector workforce and a variety of work situations.
C. Technology Management: Keeps up-to-date on technological developments. Makes effective use of technology to achieve results. Ensures access to and security of technology systems.

Business Acumen measures the ability to manage human, financial and information resources. Whether using information from subordinate subject matter experts or analyzing information using personal time and knowledge, leaders cannot be successful unless they understand their business. It is not feasible to expect a leader to know every nuance of every department under their span of control; they must understand enough about the intricacies of their entire business to make timely and consistent decisions. This requires a mix of identifying what information to gather, how to obtain it and choosing with whom to share it in order to maximize the full use of the information.

ECQ 5: Building Coalitions

A. Partnering: Develops networks and builds alliances; collaborates across boundaries to build strategic relationships and achieve common goals.
B. Political Savvy: Identifies the internal and external politics that impact the work of the organization. Perceives organizational and political reality and acts accordingly.
C. Influencing/Negotiating: Persuades others; builds consensus through give and take; gains cooperation from others to obtain information and accomplish goals.

Building Coalitions also requires information. Identifying what potential allies or business partners want and need in order for them to be successful is the starting point for establishing a congruent need for a coalition. Philip Rabinowitz, chair of the public policy committee and a board member of the Massachusetts Coalition for Adult Education (MCAE), wrote that “coalitions can only form when the possibility – in the form of mutual trust and a perceived need – exists” (Rabinowitz, P., 2016) Leaders are responsible to decide when that need exists and must be the core to build the mutual trust.

Fundamental Competencies

In addition to the five executive core qualifications, there are also six fundamental competencies that create the foundation for the core qualifications. These basic skills are required for any successful leader in any federal agency and include (OPM.gov, 2017):

1. Interpersonal Skills: Treats others with courtesy, sensitivity, and respect. Considers and responds appropriately to the needs and feelings of different people in different situations.
2. Oral Communication: Makes clear and convincing oral presentations. Listens effectively; clarifies information as needed.
3. Integrity/Honesty: Behaves in an honest, fair, and ethical manner. Shows consistency in words and actions. Models high standards of ethics.
4. Written Communication: Writes in a clear, concise, organized, and convincing manner for the intended audience.

5. Continual Learning: Assesses and recognizes own strengths and weaknesses; pursues self-development.
6. Public Service Motivation: Shows a commitment to serve the public. Ensures that actions meet public needs; aligns organizational objectives and practices with public interests.

Each of these competencies are integral to leaders collecting information. Knowing how to interact with your subordinates, peers and superiors with oral and written communication skills will allow the leader too clearly and succinctly explain what they need and to provide guidance to their network. Integrity and honesty creates trust where individuals want to assist them. A leader that continues to learn, as he must when obtaining and analyzing information, is imperative.

Chapter 3 – Research Methodology

Research Process

This research was conducted utilizing a descriptive research methodology. The descriptive research method describes situations. Accurate predictions are not created nor inferred, nor is cause and effect determined (Hale, n.d.). This research used a combination of case-study and survey methods from the descriptive research methodology.

> The Case Study Method enables a researcher to closely examine the data within a specific context using a small geographical area or a very limited number of individuals as the subjects of the study. Case studies also permit researchers to investigate contemporary real-life phenomenon through detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions, and their relationships (Zainal, 2007).

The Case Study researched involves only the Battle of Little Bighorn and the impact of General Custer's use of scouts during this battle.

The survey method provides information to the researcher through asking participants to answer specific questions through interviews or questionnaires. The researcher will then describe the responses given, not draw conclusions about the results (Hale, n.d.).

This research included limited personal interviews using only four open ended questions for each participant. These questions were vetted through Senior Service College Fellowship advisors, Thomas Marx, PhD, Director of the Senior Service College Fellowship program at Lawrence Technical University, Michael Roche, Advisor for the Senior Service College, and the Lawrence Technological University Internal Review Board Chair, Matt Cole, PhD. These questions were rehearsed with non-interviewees prior to using them for the interviews. The four research questions were:

1. How do you determine what is important information to gather?
2. How do you train your personnel to obtain information?
3. How do you determine who to choose to gather information?

4. How do you determine who should receive this information once it is obtained?

Research Participants

The researcher chose to interview a variety of leaders from TACOM-Life Cycle Management Command including a Chief of Staff for a Program Executive Office Product Director, a Deputy Product Manager, a Program Manager, and a Project Manager Level Business Manager. The researcher gained varied viewpoints from the experience of these different leaders, all of which had a different viewpoint and perspective towards the questions asked. All interviewees will remain anonymous as the data is important, not the actual source.

The United States Army Acquisition community starts with the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE). The AAE is responsible for the overall administration and oversight of all acquisition programs for the United States Army. They promulgate all policies and procedures, act as the final authority on all acquisition matters and serve the approval authority for major acquisitions and appoint Program Executive Officers, Program, Project, and Product Managers to execute the acquisition strategy.

The Program Executive Officers (PEO) are the primary person responsible for the cost, schedule, and performance of a Department of Defense acquisition program. The PEOs are either General officers or civilian executives in the Senior Executive Service. They provide guidance, support, and oversight to the Program, Project, and Product Managers.

Program, Project, and Product Managers serve as the Material Developers for Army Equipment as their primary job. They are singularly responsible for the planning and management of new acquisitions including all aspects of cost, schedule and performance (Army Regulation 70-1, 2011).

Through the use of their supporting staff at all four levels, these leaders execute their charters in accordance with Army policy and regulations. Their support staff includes the personnel interviewed by the researcher including: a Chief of Staff for a Program Executive Office Product Director, a Deputy Product Manager, a Program Manager, and a Project Manager Level Business Manager.

The Chief of Staff for a Program Executive Office is a senior Army Officer (Colonel) or a General Schedule (GS) 15 civilian senior leader that has the overall responsibility to manage the staff of the Program Executive Office. The staff consists of up to 100 personnel including: personnel, security, operations, training, logistics, finance, and any special staff members.

The Product Director, Deputy Product Manager, Program Manager, and Business Manager are either Army officers (Lieutenant Colonel or above) or GS-14 or 15 Army civilian personnel that have extensive experience and qualifications. These personnel are considered to be critical acquisition positions which are senior-level acquisition positions. These personnel must be acquisition corps members, Level III certified by the Defense Acquisition University in their respective areas of expertise, and must execute a three-year tenure agreement (Army Regulation 70-1, pp. 64, (2011).

The Honorable Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, wrote in a policy memorandum that each of these positions are Key Leadership Positions for the United States Army. These Key Leadership Positions are competitive and each person must meet the requirements of a Joint Key Leadership Personnel Qualification Board. The prospective candidates are independently evaluated based on the Senior Executive Service Executive Core Qualifications (Kendall, 2013).

Each of the interviewees has many successful years of acquisition experience and had served in a myriad of differing and complex positions of responsibility prior to their current position.

Chapter 4 – Findings

All leaders must gather information in order to make informed decisions. The criteria determining what information to gather, whom to choose to gather it, and how to use it once it is acquired.

This chapter presents the findings from two sets of data. The first set of data included 13 books and 26 articles and papers in the literature review. The second set of data included qualitative interviews with five experienced acquisition leaders from TACOM – Life Cycle Management Command. The interviews were conducted individually; four in person and one by telephone. The information from the interviews was analyzed using a thematic analysis and compared to the information in the literature review to develop a list of key questions including:

What is important information?

Who is chosen to collect information?

How do you train personnel to collect information?

Who should receive this information?

The researcher interviewed a variety of leaders from TACOM-Life Cycle Management Command including a Product Director, a Deputy Product Manager, a Program Manager, a Business Manager and a Chief of Staff for a Program Executive Office. The researcher gained varied viewpoints from the experience of these different leaders, all of which had a different viewpoint and perspective towards the questions asked.

The Battle of Little Bighorn

What is important information?

Lieutenant Colonel Custer believed that the important information at the Battle of Little Bighorn could be described by using the U.S. Army Scouts SALUTE (FM 2-22.3, 2006, pp. H2) report:

> Size: How many Indians are there; Warriors and non-combatants.
> Activity: What are they doing? Are they preparing for battle or running away?
> Location: Where, exactly, is the Indian village?
> Unit: What tribes are at the Indian village?
> Time: When was this information collected?
> Equipment: How are the Indians armed?

Lieutenant Colonel Custer was informed before departing for the Little Bighorn that there could be up to 1,000 Indian Warriors upon his arrival. When Lieutenant Varnum's scouts and interpreter Mitch Boyer reported that there was a "huge village" Custer ignored this advice.

Who is chosen to collect information?

Lieutenant Colonel Custer chose his chief of scouts, Lieutenant Varnum as his primary information gatherer. With Varnum's 39 scouts that were present for the battle (18 were not present due to multiple reasons), Custer had adequate, trained personnel to conduct thorough scouting for his expedition.

How do you train personnel to collect information?

Lieutenant Colonel Custer's scouts were diverse. Lieutenant Varnum had 39 recorded scouts from three different Indian tribes (25 - Arikara and 6 – Crow, 1 – Sioux) as well as four experienced white scouts (Charley Reynolds, George Herendeen, William Cross, and William Jackson and three interpreters (Mitch Boyer, Isaiah Dorman, and Frederic Girard) (Table 1).

The Indian scouts had been trained as hunters and warriors since birth and many of them had served the Army for years as scouts because this duty allowed them to be warriors. The most famous Arikara scout, Bloody Knife, had served the Army for over five years and while half

Lakota Sioux, still considered the Sioux his enemy as did his parent tribe of the Arikara (Bismarck, 1876).

Who should receive this information?

Lieutenant Colonel Custer was the ultimate recipient of all scouting information. While he was provided information from some of his Indian scouts, he preferred to verify it himself or from one of his white scouts. While numerous scouts advised Custer to not attack due to the size of the enemy and to wait until Brigadier General Terry's and Colonel John Gibbon's columns were available to provide reinforcements, Custer chose to attack one day early and after losing the element of surprise.

Acquisition Leadership Interviews

What is important information?

There were a variety of answers during the interviews relating to how to identify what is important information. Primarily the responses centered on the mission requirements for the organization. One respondent used the phrase "Identify what is important to my stakeholders and determine how their view of the future matches up with mine." According to the Project Management Institute, the term project stakeholder refers to "an individual, group, or organization, who may affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by a decision, activity or outcome of a project" (Project Management Institute, 2009). Another similar response was to "Identify the Essential Elements of Friendly Information" (EEFI). According to Victor Duckarmenn, Operations Security Manager, "Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) are defined as the answers to an intelligence agent's questions about your system, support, deployments and force protection, otherwise known as the mission" (Duckarmenn, V., 2009).

A different response included conducting a detailed mission analysis including specified and implied tasks ensuring that the leader understood the facts and the assumptions bucketed by the impacted stakeholders. The key information needed to be gathered is information related to turning assumptions into facts. Scouts should be sent to determine the validity of assumptions. Any assumption not validated as a fact becomes a risk.

Who is chosen to collect information?

The general school of thought from the interviewees was that the subject matter experts should be the first choice when choosing whom to choose to collect information. Contracting personnel should research contracting, Logisticians should research logistics, etc. If a true subject matter expert is not available, then use a reliable employee that has good interpersonal skills and has the drive to dig for information. One leader stated that if the leader focuses the “scout” on Cost, Performance, Schedule, and Risk, then the scout will feel more empowered to search for information because they have a clear focus.

Other responses addressed the need for the leader to conduct the scouting. This can be accomplished by formal or informal meetings, inter-related reports, and internal and external communications. One respondent stated that they would consider using a “scout” if there is anticipated resistance to an action or an idea and use the “scout” to “test the water” prior to implementation of the idea.

How do you train personnel to collect information?

All respondents initially answered this question with “we don’t train our personnel to gather information.” After further conversation, all respondents revised their answers to “we don’t formally train our personnel to gather information.” The continuing conversation provided the interviewees with the opportunity to identify how their personnel learn to ask the right questions of the right people in order to elicit the required responses. This training was accomplished by exposing subordinates to planning and strategy sessions, recurring meetings, one-on-one mentoring, and setting the example.

All interviewees remarked that conducting formal training to teach subordinates how to gather information would be beneficial.

Who should receive this information?

Interviewees were consistent with two parts of this question. They believed that they, as the leader, should receive information, but also that the key stakeholders should also receive information. There was a significant acceptance that the more transparent they could be with their employees and stakeholders, by sharing information, the more successful the team would be in the end. While sharing information with stakeholders was consistent, there were exceptions.

One leader stated that the choice to share information with stakeholders should be balanced by risk and opportunity. Some information is not meant to be shared with everyone and calculating what the risk of sharing this information compared to the opportunity for a competitive advantage should be considered. If sharing information can produce the behavior that is desired with minimal risk, then by all means, share the information.

Another leader stated that all non-classified, programmatic information should be shared with all stakeholders. Trust is the foundation of a successful team and by sharing information, they can build trust in all of the stakeholders.

Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations

The purpose of this paper is to determine how senior leaders at TACOM-LCMC can identify their personnel as scouts and how this realization can be utilized to gain a competitive advantage in our business environment.

The objective of this research will be the correlation between how General Custer used his scouts at the Battle of Little Bighorn and how leaders in the Acquisition Workforce can use their personnel as scouts to gather information.

The literature review showed how Lieutenant Colonel Custer knew what information to gather, how to obtain it, and with whom to share it, namely him. His critical failures were his arrogant belief that he was undefeatable, his overwhelming pride that caused him to choose not to wait on reinforcements, and his disbelief of the information that several of his scouts shared with him that the village was too large for his small force to attack.

Acquisition leaders face similar circumstances on a regular basis where they must gather information prior to making decisions. While these decisions are not life or death, there are significant impacts to the decisions they make on the overall readiness of our Army and the prudent expenditure of tax dollars.

Acquisition leaders have been trained to lead using the framework of the Senior Executive Service Executive Core Qualifications (Leading Change, Leading People, Results Driven, Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions) and six fundamental competencies that create the foundation for the core qualifications (Interpersonal Skills, Oral Communication, Integrity/Honesty, Written Communication, Continual Learning, and Public Service Motivation. Both the qualifications and the competencies are linked to gathering information, whether personally or by using their subordinates.

The three basic questions for scouts are and have been:

1. What information to gather?
2. How to obtain the information?
3. With whom should I share the information?

While having information is critical to accomplishing any mission and daily business interactions require the obtaining and using information, the recurring question is how do leaders train their personnel to serve as scouts?

One suggestion is developing a training program for employees to teach them the skills necessary to serve as efficient scouts. This training program would be thorough and focused on key skills determined by interviewing leaders in the acquisition community. The method or framework used to implement this program can be one of many including the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunity and Threats (SWOT) model or the Strengths, Opportunities, Aspirations, and Results (SOAR) framework. Either of these would provide the necessary guide to develop this program.

Several ideas were discussed during the interview process that could be considered in developing this training program. These include:

1. Understand what your supervisor likes and doesn't like, i.e. written or verbal briefings, lengthy or brief content, contact at any time or only during office hours, etc.
2. Understand how to present different information to different audiences.
3. Stakeholder analysis
4. Decision making processes, i.e. Military Decision Making Process
5. Identifying the true problem to increase the odds of searching for the correct information by learning how to identify the current state and the desired end state.
6. Relationship building
7. Stakeholder management
8. Analysis of information
9. Identifying Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)
10. Risk associations with Cost, Performance, and Schedule
11. How to analyze the correlation between Risk and Opportunity
12. Understanding Stakeholder equity

13. Critical Thinking
14. Detailed mission analysis

This development of this program can use the ADDIE model (*Figure 13*) to develop the instructional program. The ADDIE model, Analysis, Design, Development, Implementation, and Evaluation is a framework for instructional development in the educational community. This model can guide a developer through the process of creating educational training material. While many civilian educational organizations use this model for training development, the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command has also implemented the ADDIE process in 2011 when they replaced the Systems Approach to Training framework (TRADOC Regulation 350-70, (2011).



Figure 13, ADDIE Model, (Shoemaker, D., 2014).

> The **Analysis** is the most important step in the process. It helps you to determine the basis for all future decisions. A mistake that many beginners make is not conducting a proper analysis at the beginning. It is this analysis that helps you identify your audience, limitations or opportunities, or other important points that will be useful in the design process.
>
> The **Design process** is the brainstorming step. This is where you use the information obtain in the Analysis phase to create a program or course that meets the needs of your customer or audience. There are many forms of the design process and it can be very tedious at times. Testing your concepts in the design phase will save you time and money.
>
> The **Development phase** focuses on building the outcome of the design phase. This process consumes much of the time spent in creating a sound educational program or course. It includes various steps such as initial drafts, reviews, re-writes, and testing. For larger corporations, this phase can involve numerous individuals to include subject matter experts (SME), graphic artists, and technical experts. For e-learning courses, this phase could require additional assistance for managing server space and technology.
>
> The **Implementation phase** includes more processes than simply presenting the materials developed. While the concepts and materials have been tested throughout the process, the implementation phase can uncover topics that require further development or re-design work. The processes for this phase vary based on the size of the organization, the complexity of the program or course, and the distribution of the materials. This includes such concepts as test pilots, train-the-trainer sessions, and other delivery methods to present the materials.
>
> The **Evaluation phase** plays an important role in the beginning and at the end of the process. Evaluation objectives reflect much of the discoveries found in the Analysis process. These discoveries include the objectives and expectations of the learner. When looking at the process, you must avoid the thought that it is structured in a chronological order. Rather, the ADDIE Model is a continuous circle with overlapping boundaries. Of all of the process phases, the evaluation phase is the least understood.
>
> Shoemaker, D. (2014).

The execution of the program is dependent upon the analysis of the subject material and the composition of the audience. Each of the phases should include not only the leadership, but also key members of the target audience. This will determine their current level of understanding and will provide additional topics of interest to add to the training program.

Opportunities for Further Research

The opportunities for further research are many and varied. During the Battle of Little Bighorn it was easy to identify where Lieutenant Colonel Custer made poor decisions that led his valorous Seventh Cavalry Regiment to defeat. However, there are many areas where he was successful. Custer was a phenomenal motivator, aggressive and mission focused. His leadership traits were laudable and he clearly understood what is now called the Senior Executive Service Executive Core Qualifications (Leading Change, Leading People, Results Driven, Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions) and six fundamental competencies that create the foundation for the core qualifications (Interpersonal Skills, Oral Communication, Integrity/Honesty, Written Communication, Continual Learning, and Public Service Motivation).

Focusing on the positive traits Lieutenant Colonel Custer exhibited during his meteoric rise to earning the rank of Major General (Brevet) before he was 25 would be a fascinating case study.

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Appendix 1 – LTU IRB Approval

Lawrence Tech

THEORY AND PRACTICE 1932

Institutional Review Board
Office of the Provost
research.ltu.edu irb@ltu.edu

December 14, 2016

Michael Fraley, MBA Candidate, DAU SSCF Global Leadership and Management
Lawrence Technological University
College of Management
mfraley@ltu.edu

Dear Mr. Fraley,

I am pleased to report that the IRB application to conduct research with human participants for your MBA these “"Understanding the Importance and Practice of using scouts to gain competitive advantage in the business environment".” has been approved under the Expedited review path for a period of one year, December 14, 2016 – December 14, 2017.

The IRB is satisfied that the following three ethical concerns regarding the treatment of your human participants have been addressed in your research protocol: (1) The research involves interviewing participants who will voluntarily consent to participate in the study; (2) Participants who will voluntarily consent to complete the survey are free to withdraw from the study at any time; (3) You do not have any copyrighted devices in your survey and/or you are using original devices and/or devices in the public domain and/or devices you are permitted to use via fair use for educators; (4) You have identified potential risks to you and the participants; and (5) You have assured that a balance exists between potential benefits of the research to the participants and/or society and the risk assumed by the participants.

Please contact the IRB if you require an extension to your project after one year. Please note you must contact the IRB if you make a change to your research protocol that impacts the ethical treatment of your research participants. Please do not hesitate to contact the IRB if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Matthew Cole, Ph.D.
Chair, Institutional Review Board (IRB)
Lawrence Technological University
irb@ltu.edu o: 248.204.3096 f: 248.204.3099

The Lawrence Tech IRB is organized and operated according to guidelines of the United States Office for Human Research Protections and the United States Code of Federal Regulations and operates under Federal Wide Assurance No. FWA00010997 that expires 02/23/2021.

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Appendix 2 – OPSEC Approval

E-mail Form | Print Form

TACOM OPSEC REVIEW CERTIFICATION

(OPSEC Program is Governed by AR 530-1, Operations Security)

I am aware that there is foreign intelligence interests in publicly available information; I have sufficient technical expertise in the subject matter to certify that it is appropriate to release this information to the public, because there are no operational, legal, or security reasons for withholding its release. Information that was given a previous OPSEC Review does not require a second review, unless the original information has been changed.

DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION TO RECEIVE OPSEC REVIEW

Title/Description of item to be released:
Lessons Learned from Custer's Last Stand for Developing Acquisition Scouts

(STEP 1) Author/Originator	Organization	Phone #:
Michael Fraley	AMSTA-LC-L	248-854-8929

Are you a contractor? YES ( ) NO (•) If YES, Contract #:

Forum where this information is to appear:
DAU Library - DTIC & Lawrence Technological University Submission for Master's Degree

Purpose of release:
Requirement for Senior Service College Fellowship Publishing requirement

Product Format (check one): (•) Article ( ) Briefing ( ) Web Site ( ) Equipment Display ( ) Video Tape ( ) Brochure ( ) CD

(STEP 2) TECH REVIEWER/TEAM LEADER:	Grade:	Position:
Chad Stocker	NH-IV	Tech Reviewer
Signature: STOCKER.CHAD.PHILIP.1362612000 Digitally signed by STOCKER.CHAD.PHILIP.1362612000 DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD, ou=PKI, ou=USA, cn=STOCKER.CHAD.PHILIP.1362612000 Date: 2017.04.21 13:48:19 -04'00'		Phone: 586-216-8904

(STEP 3) Gov't Supervisor/Assoc Dir:	Grade:	Position:
Deborah DiCesare	GS-15	Director
Signature: DICESARE.DEBORAH.A.1230464495 Digitally signed by DICESARE.DEBORAH.A.1230464495 DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD, ou=PKI, ou=OSD, cn=DICESARE.DEBORAH.A.1230464495 Date: 2017.04.21 14:17:41 -04'00'		Phone: 586-276-2171

(STEP 4) Gov't Contracting Officer (if applicable):

Signature: | Phone:

(STEP 5) Legal Office Review (if applicable):

Signature: | Phone:

(STEP 6) G2/G3 (OPSEC Officer):	Position:
David A. Hazelip	Security Supervisor
Signature: HAZELIP.DAVID.ALAN.1107213127 Digitally signed by HAZELIP.DAVID.ALAN.1107213127 DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD, ou=PKI, ou=USA, cn=HAZELIP.DAVID.ALAN.1107213127 Date: 2017.05.01 10:34:11 -04'00'	Phone: 586 282-5660

(STEP 7) Public Affairs Reviewer:	Position:
Donald Jarosz	Public Affairs Officer
Signature: JAROSZ.DONALD.F.1230518269 Digitally signed by JAROSZ.DONALD.F.1230518269 DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD, ou=PKI, ou=USA, cn=JAROSZ.DONALD.F.1230518269 Date: 2017.05.04 14:56:20 -04'00'	Phone: 586-282-8820

Initial and Date in the appropriate box	Author	Tech Reviewer	Gov't Supervisor	Gov't Cont. Officer	Legal	G2/G3 (OPSEC Off)	Public Affairs
a. Concur for Public Release	FRALEY.MICHAEL.R.1103943520	STOCKER.CHAD.PHILIP.1362612000	DICESARE.DEBORAH.A.1230464495			HAZELIP.DAVID.ALAN.1107213127	JAROSZ.DONALD.F.1230518269
b. Concur for Public Release w/Comment							
c. Nonconcur							

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Author Biography

Michael Fraley is a Senior Service College Fellow and most recently served as a Group Leader for the Materiel Fielding and Training Directorate, U.S. Army TACOM-LCMC, Integrated Logistics Support Center (ILSC) from 2010 to 2016. Mr. Fraley led 110 Soldiers and civilian employees supporting the overall management, planning, coordination, and execution of the worldwide Total Package Fielding (TPF) and New Equipment Training (NET) activities supporting 11 Product Managers: Security Assistance Management Division, Foreign Military Sales (SAM-D FMS), Force Sustainment Systems (FSS), Combat Engineer/Material Handling Equipment (CE/MHE), Bridging, Sets Kits Outfits and Tools (SKOT), Army Watercraft, Petroleum and Water Systems (PAWS), Area Denial, Counter Explosive Hazard, Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment, and Combat Support Systems-Marine Corps System Command.

Mr. Fraley’s previous assignments include: Command and General Staff College – Intermediate Level Education, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (2009-2010), where he earned the distinction of being the first civilian to be designated as a Master Logistician; Branch Chief, Force Projection, Materiel Fielding and Training Directorate, ILSC, U.S. Army TACOM-LCMC (2006-2009); New Equipment Training Manager/Instructor, Materiel Fielding and Training Directorate, ILSC, U.S. Army TACOM-LCMC (2004-2008). Mr. Fraley also served 10 years on active duty as an officer in the U.S. Army as a Multifunctional Logistician (1990 - 2001).

Prior to joining TACOM-LCMC, Michael worked as the replenishment and allocation analyst for fine and precious jewelry supporting 1,512 stores, managing an inventory of $486 million, Kmart Resource Center, Troy, MI, (2001-2004).

Mr. Fraley is currently enrolled in the Global Leadership and Management graduate program at Lawrence Technological University (Graduate May, 2017). He has previously earned a Masters of Business Administration degree from Columbia Southern University (2004) and a Bachelor of Arts from Eastern Kentucky University (1990).

Mr. Fraley has been an Army Acquisition Corps member since 2009, Level III certified in Life Cycle Logistics (2007), Level I certified in Program Management (2005), and is Advanced Course certified in the Civilian Education System (2010).

Mr. Fraley has earned numerous military and civilian awards including: The Ordnance Order of Samuel Sharpe, the Honorable Order of Saint Barbara, Airborne, Air Assault, and German Airborne wings, as well as being a Distinguished Military Graduate.

(Current as of 29 July 2016)