

THE RELEVANCE  
OF  
BORDERS IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY  
BY  
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## APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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## DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University; the French Government, the Ministry of Defense, or the French Air Force.



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## ABSTRACT

This study assesses the relevance of borders in the 21st century. The author analyses the different approaches of the concept of border throughout history and cultures. Borders occupy different functions with respect to rulers, people and territories. The reality of borders stretches from *border-line*, to *border-area*, and to *frontier*, as no universal definition exists. The sociological study demonstrates the importance of cross border integration in the shaping of borders. By contrast, the modern state and the bordering process have introduced a global set of norms of delineation. Official borders are relative to a specific domain, and do not ensure a definitive consistent norm with respect to population and global trends. Globalization and the main disequilibrium of the 21st century have challenged the normative definition of the *border-line*. The traditional lines of division have disappeared, and the changing level of openness of borders has become the criteria of analysis. The world oscillates between a borderless and a gated approach. This study concludes the need to redefine a less normative approach of borders with respect to people and local context.



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## INTRODUCTION

*The border sits at the intersection of three sociological concepts: territory, the nation-state, and historical heritage. Outlining a homogeneous space, a border is at the origin of the nation-state. Historically, the demarcation of borders has been a source of conflict when residents cannot be physically divided neatly according to their ethnic origins, religion and culture as was the case with the decolonization of Africa or the break-up of the former Eastern bloc. The result of compromises, unstable, and ever-evolving, it is evident that there is no such thing as an ideal border.*

*Jean-Marc Sorel  
La frontière comme enjeu de droit international*

Some key phenomena have influenced the shape of international relationships since the end of the Cold War. Globalization, the information revolution, and transnational movements have directly influenced strategic choices and the conduct of defense organizations. Some assumptions, supposedly universally shared by every country, shape international organizations and the structure of global relationships. Among them, borders appear as a fundamental element for the internal and external definition of states. The concept of border has a direct relationship with human history, and its uses echo the build-up of civilizations. The concept of border has evolved throughout history with respect to trends attached to each period. Nevertheless, the current structure of international relationships relies on a legal and juridical system defined in another historical context. Borders have been evolving through a dynamic process across history, but international laws currently define them as a static element.

Is the legal concept of border still relevant in our current world? What are the elements shaping the concept of borders? How have the evolution of sovereignty, economic liberalism, the rise of new powers, globalization and the information revolution impacted the status of

borders? Does the concept of border apply in a unique way or in different ways across the world?

I argue that the concept of border is still relevant but its legal and juridical definition currently does not provide a comprehensive framework. Globalization and the information revolution have modified the initial assumptions giving sense to borders within nation-states for the last two centuries. The normative definition of borders is asynchronous and applies an old framework, which does not match the real world. A new international approach must redefine its nature and its dynamic.

First, I synthesize some historical approaches explaining the concept of borders across history. The final trend was the spreading of the European perspective about borders, which shaped the current international legal framework of borders.

Second, I explain how the legal and normative definitions of borders limit its understanding. The concept of border encompasses various definitions, roles, and approaches with respect to narratives, etymologies and cultures. The Western approach, mostly influenced by European countries, has shaped the official definition but other sociological and practical elements provide relevant trends in a globalized world.

Third, I focus on the new global context shaping international relationships, and how it does not match the juridical approach of borders. Globalization and the information revolution make our normative approach to borders asynchronous. Some research provides insights about a more dynamic, contextual and multiple layered perspective about borders.

## CHAPTER 1

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF BORDER

#### **Elements of Studies**

An historical approach of the concept of border and its evolution from antiquity to the Modern Ages can provide insights. It is relevant to study what the nature of border is, its functions and the links with political power. The perception of border as a cultural and mental construction and its interaction with the organization of the state is also a key approach.

The questions I will attempt to answer:

- How the meaning of borders across history developed?
- How a state's organization influences its definition of border and the way political power applies? How do states control borders?
- What are the links with cultural identity or defense for example?
- How do borders influence the way a society's development, and potential political options? What are the role of imaginaries and intelligence in the bordering process?

#### **Preliminary Definitions**

This survey will encompass different approaches about borders. As an element of clarity, the following definitions will be helpful to introduce the fundamental lexicon.

*Border* refers to the general concept and nowadays encapsulates the international normative concept of border as the line of separation between two sovereign states.

As sub-elements, *border-line*, *border-area*, and *frontier* provide nuances. *Border-line* refers to the normative and modern approach, as a line of separation. *Border-area* refers to areas of exchange adjacent to different entities and not clearly bounded, as it is in a *border-line*.

*Frontier* has an historical nuance related to the American construction of

the nation from the 19th century, and to the differences between the settled and uninhabited parts of the country. It refers to areas of influence not definitively bounded, as they are with a *border-line*.

The *Self/Ego* and the *Other/Alter* refer to sociological and psychological fields. The general meaning concerns the ways in which people understand and define their characteristics, the influence of personal standards, expectations, and values on perception of *Others*, and how people maintain desired self-images. It includes the motives that can potentially bias the way information regarding the *Self* is obtained, processed, and recalled, as well as the ordinary cognitive processes.<sup>1</sup>

The use of the adjective *normative* in this thesis refers to the establishment of a standard of correctness through prescribed norms, rules, or recommendations.<sup>2</sup> *Normative* not only provides a mere description of statements of facts related to borders but a way to understand the underlying phenomenon. By extension, *normative* can lead to a *juridical* perspective with the creation and the acceptance of international laws.

### **The Pre-Westphalia Approach and the Comprehension of Borders (see APPENDIX A, Figure 45)**

Before the creation of the Westphalian order, civilizations and political organizations developed through specific ways. Internal structure, self-perception as an entity, and comprehension of the world provide insights about the concept of border. In *War and Clash of the Ideas*, Adda Bozeman advised us to accept the world as a “manifold of civilizations” even as she continues to perceive it as a “manifold of

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<sup>1</sup> Corey L. Guenther and Mark D. Alicke, “Psychology of the Self”, *Oxford Bibliographies*, accessed April 5, 2017, <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199828340/obo-9780199828340-0093.xml> DOI:10.1093/obo/9780199828340-0093.

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/normative>

states.”<sup>3</sup> She argues that civilization can be more comprehensive for an enduring process and neutral instead of the notion of the state, mainly associated with Western norms. An overview of the concept of borders, and the use of violence in different civilizations provide a relevant picture before the rise of the European modern state. The analysis focuses on the mental and physical construction of the border, the potential existence of a norm, and the associated narrative. The examples do not constitute an exhaustive list but offer a broad perspective about the absence of a definitive norm, as well as the representation and use of borders across history and cultures.

### **The Roman Empire**

The Roman Empire expanded during centuries throughout Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northern Africa. Its statecraft relied on a combination of centralized and integrated political control. Rome, as the capital of the Empire, was the official recognized ruler. Nevertheless, a network of alliances with tribes and other local kingdoms enabled the Empire to grow. The development of effective command, control, and military capability across the territories provided the coercive means necessary to apply power. The Mediterranean Sea, at that time, was not a *border* as in our modern perception, but an essential way of communication and power.

The Empire mostly increased its size within the concept of frontiers. The expansion of territory reflected the maximum means capable of holding geographic space. The delineation relied on natural landmarks and human constructions. In the former case, the Empire used the left bank of the Rhine and the right bank of the Danube, to delineate eastern borders, and deserts and mountains, in the near East and in Northern Africa. In Britain, the construction of the Hadrian’s Wall and the Antonin’s Wall were to compensate for the absence of natural

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<sup>3</sup> Stephen Blank, Lawrence Grinter, Karl Magyar, and Lewis Ware. *Conflict, Culture and History: Regional Dimensions*. Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1991.



obstacles and provided protection from northern Caledonian tribes. Nevertheless, the purpose of defining these walls as *border-lines* was an interpretation of the 19th and 20th centuries, which does not correspond with the real densities of settlement of that time (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1: Frontiers of the Roman Empire**


Source : [www.voluspia.org/germanyromanempire.htm](http://www.voluspia.org/germanyromanempire.htm)

Land survey and boundaries were mostly a means of internal control and not a clear limitation of power over territories.<sup>4</sup> Malcom Anderson explains how the Roman Empire organized a hierarchy of spaces and functions to reinforce the bordering process.<sup>5</sup> For example,

<sup>4</sup> Kimmo Katajala, "Drawing Borders or Dividing Lands? The Peace Treaty of 1323 Between Sweden And Novgorod In a European Context", *Scandinavian Journal of History* Vol. 37, No. 1. February 2012, 26.

<sup>5</sup> Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*

soldier settlements were part of the political conquest to assimilate and stabilize populations around the borders. Kimmo Katajala concludes that the borders of the Roman Empire were not “outer borders in the modern sense of defensive demarcation lines.”<sup>6</sup> The *limes*<sup>7</sup> could take on a “linear form in the terrain, whether natural, such as a river, or artificial, such as a wall, or else they could constitute a zone, such as a forest, moor or desert.” The outer borders of the Roman Empire were not a “defensive, militarily fortified, enclosing demarcation lines, but administrative and economic outposts and permeable borderlands” (see Figure 2 and 3).<sup>8</sup>



**Figure 2: The *Limes* in Germany (2nd century A.D)**

Source : [www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org)


(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996) Introduction and Chapter 1.

<sup>6</sup> Katajala, "Drawing Borders or Dividing Lands? The Peace Treaty of 1323 between Sweden and Novgorod in a European Context", 26.

<sup>7</sup> Definition of *limes*: a boundary, especially the fortified *border* or *frontier* of a country.

<sup>8</sup> Hans-Werner Goetz, "Concepts of Realm and Frontiers", 73; cf. Schmauder, "Überlebungen zur Östlichen Grenze", 75–6.





**Figure 3: Roman Britain Military Organization (155 A.D), the Hadrian's Wall and the *Limes* in Britain (122 A.D)**

Source : [www.emersonkent.com](http://www.emersonkent.com)

The definition of the *Self* and the *Other* relied on the opposition between the citizens or assimilated members of the Empire, and the designated *barbarians* in the imaginary. Nevertheless, borders were not clearly constructed with respect to ethnical, religion or linguistic difference. *Otherness* was not correlated to the border itself.

### **Sub-Saharan Africa**

The principal unit relied on tribes, clans, villages, other sub groups, and divisions. Empires and kingdoms were mostly a conglomerate rather than a Pan-African structure. Bozeman explains how the absence of writing traditions and reliable communications limited the radius of intercommunity relations in comparison to the lines of modern states. African culture has also encompassed its own perspective about violence, death, and order. With respect to the concept of border, Bozeman adds that warfare contributed to continual

displacements and migrations, resulting in a lack of interest in strictly territorial jurisdiction and thus inhibiting the evolution of a “reliable political structure on the order of the European state.” Furthermore, war and martial activities embodied the meaning of manhood in tribal life and symbolized the workings of the universe, which was envisioned throughout the continent as the abode of constantly contending, essentially malevolent forces.<sup>9</sup>


The organization of space relied on two principal trends. First, at the local or at the tribe level, hunters or agricultural groups were living in areas bounded by rivers or other natural features. Second, at a higher level, a feudal system existed with vassals and specific allegiances, but not oriented to an effective control over territories or the need to delineate borders. For example, the Empires of Mali or Songhai were extended over sub-Saharan Africa with different ethnicities and cultures. A *ferba*, representing the central power was sent to each territory, but the local chiefs were still effectively ruling the area.<sup>10</sup> Borders were mobile according to new allegiances. After wars or disease, some areas were also officially abandoned without any sovereignty or borders (see Figure 4).

The main cultural view of war was not to extend a territory, to integrate conquered people, to set definitive borders, or to impose a morality. Moreover, violence was an endemic phenomenon, shared as a common value and part of the system of thought. It provided principles for the education of men and the administration of society.

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<sup>9</sup> Blank, Grinter, Magyar and Ware. *Conflict, Culture and History: Regional Dimensions*, XXXIX.

<sup>10</sup> Louis Joos, “Des Frontières Trop Souvent Etablies Au Gré Des Colonisateurs”, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, February 1965.



**Figure 4: African Empires during the Middle Ages**  
Source : <http://www.lhistoire.fr>


## **The Middle East**

According to Bozeman, Islam and the expansion of the Islamic Empire have been the key structural elements of political and cultural organization in the Middle East, and partially in Europe from the 7th century. The Koran established rules and norms in political domains, family organization, and individual behaviors. The pursuit of victories to rule new territories and the expansion the Islamic Realm of Peace are similar to the concept of *frontier*. Inside the Empire, many different caliphates, sultanates, and dynasties competed and shared effective control over fragmented territories. The Ottoman Caliphate was the most stable political organization controlling external borders and ruling territories from 1453 to 1918.<sup>11</sup> The concept of *Otherness* developed in correlation with the conversion to Islam as did the bordering process, rather than in correlation with the religion belonging to specific territories (see figure 5).

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<sup>11</sup> Blank, Grinter, Magyar and Ware. *Conflict, Culture and History: Regional Dimensions*, XLVII.






**Figure 5: Evolution of the Expansion of the Islamic Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire between 1450 and 1925**

Source: [www.geocrusader80.wordpress.com](http://www.geocrusader80.wordpress.com)

## India



**Figure 6: Mughal Empire in India (1530-1707)**

Source : [www.mapsofindia.com](http://www.mapsofindia.com)



Indian political organizations before the European invasions were a combination of different kingdoms and dynasties influenced by Mongol, Persian, Muslim, and Hindu civilizations. Bozeman explains how the history of inter-kingdom relations, before and after the Muslim conquests, reflects the dictate of the *artha*<sup>12</sup> philosophy: endemic anarchy and warfare.<sup>13</sup> The size and the particular shape of the country directly influenced the perception of the concept of border. The North-West Frontier referred to the area between the south side of the Himalayas, the Hindu Kush, and the Indus River. Before the European invasions, most of the foreign intrusions occurred through the northern border. The *Pakhtun*, the local tribe of this part of India, designated as savages in the Indian imaginary, reinforced the mental construction of the *border* and *Otherness* (see figure 6).<sup>14</sup>

### **China**

Chinese statecraft relies on a long tradition of unified control over territories. From the first unification in 221 B.C, statesmen organized and occupied the land by using the army as a coercive means to maintain order and to crush rebellions. They also developed agriculture with hydraulic works and the cultivation of crops. Bozeman explains how “the Maoist use of agro-military communes and the maintenance of rural base areas under strict military control refers to this long cultural tradition.”<sup>15</sup> The acceptance of war by Confucian and Maoists philosophies legitimized the duty to punish badly ruled states and to chastise unruly *barbarians* at the border. The definition of the *Self* is

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<sup>12</sup> *Artha* defined as that science which treats of the means of acquiring and maintaining the earth, and how to be engaged in government, economics and foreign relation.

<sup>13</sup> Blank, Grinter, Magyar and Ware. *Conflict, Culture and History: Regional Dimensions*, XLIX.

<sup>14</sup> Michel Renouard, “La frontière du Nord-Ouest dans la Mythologie anglo-Indienne”, Centre d’études des relations interculturelles (France), ed. *Frontière et Frontières dans le Monde Anglophone. Frontières 1*. Paris : Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1991, 174.

<sup>15</sup> Blank, Grinter, Magyar and Ware. *Conflict, Culture and History: Regional Dimensions*, XL.

clearly amplified by the choice of the expression *Middle Kingdom*. The perception of the *Other* was a combination of ethnic and territorial considerations. The Han was considered the superior ethnicity. The extension of borders was in correlation with the occupation and the migration of the Han into these new territories.

The concept of border appears with different nuances. The construction of the Great Wall, with a total length of 21,000 kilometers, at the northern border to watch the tribes, and to stabilize the territory under control was a first step. From the geographical perspective, Chinese statesmen needed a physical wall because the semi-arid desert separating them from the Mongol tribes was not an effective physical barrier (see Figure 7 and 8).<sup>16</sup>




**Figure 7: The Chinese Wall and Geographical Environment**

Source : <http://www.worldatlas.com/>

<sup>16</sup> Giuliano Bellezza, "On Borders: From Ancient to Postmodern Times", *The International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences*, Volume XL-4/W3, 2013.





**Figure 8: Evolution of the Chinese Empire**

Source: [www.herodote.net](http://www.herodote.net)

The second step relied on the establishment of spheres of influence and encirclement, similar to the concept of frontier, created by means of cultural and deceptive warfare. The outcome is to enclose and to extend control gradually over dispersed territories, undermining the adversary from the inside.

### **From Antiquity to the 17th Century**

The concept of borders during the Middle Ages was a combination of *border-lines*, *border-areas*, and undefined areas. Few kingdoms had fixed borders, and the definition of clear borders was not a real concern for the rulers. The delineation of limits could be in correlation with natural features such as rivers or roads, but also between fortified areas. In some wild areas, sovereignty could be unclearly defined or shared between different kingdoms. Interests were not about territories, but about people providing resources, paying taxes as subjects, and serving as vassals. Most of the city walls and fortifications built were more elements consolidating internal power rather than protecting against external threats. Treaties intended not so much to shape borders between territories but to divide up properties and the rights over natural resources, and taxation.<sup>17</sup>

The relation to *Otherness* was mostly built with respect to the vassal system and fluctuated according to alliances. Borders were not divided according to religious, ethnic, or linguistic criteria. Katajala even argues that the appropriate concept in the Middle Ages would be more “divisions than borders.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Katajala, "Drawing Borders or Dividing Lands? The Peace Treaty Of 1323 Between Sweden And Novgorod In a European Context", 39.

<sup>18</sup> Katajala, "Drawing Borders or Dividing Lands? The Peace Treaty Of 1323 Between Sweden And Novgorod In a European Context", 40.

## **The Westphalian Order and the Invention of the Modern State (see APPENDIX B, Figure 46)**

The Westphalian order introduced the correlating concepts of sovereignty and the modern state. The origins of the Westphalia Treaty took root in the resolution of the Thirty Years' War. Protestant and Catholic states supported by large armies of mercenaries had been fighting between 1618 and 1648. The war bankrupted most of the combatant powers, and highlighted the need for a new set of rules establishing peace. In the aftermath, the Great Powers decided to change the relationship between the subjects and their rulers.

The authority of the state was now established over the inhabitants living within territorial boundaries. The main objective was to build a set of juridical rules, to pacify states after years of violence, and to define the sovereignty of rulers.<sup>19</sup> The establishment of a clear distinction between the spheres of foreign and domestic politics aimed at creating stability.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, the exclusive *border-line* was not an indispensable element to exercise sovereignty. Countries were still in the process of consolidation through different types of organization such as empires, small states, or kingdoms.<sup>21</sup>

The rise of nationalism and self-determination were the next step in the process of normalization of the *border-line*. The hardened materialization of *borders-lines* enhanced the perception of the *Self* within the nation, and the *Otherness* elsewhere. Kolossov argues that “historicism and cultural determinist traditions (inspired by specific interpretations of Herder, Hegel, Darwin, Fichte and others) – in which the emergence of nation states and their borders was understood as an

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
<sup>19</sup> Claire Gantet, “Le tournant westphalien, Anatomie d’une construction historiographique”, *Critique internationale* n°9, October 2000, 55.

<sup>20</sup> Vladimir Kolossov, “State of the Debate Report I”, *EU Bordescares*, December 2012, 11

<sup>21</sup> Beatrix Haselsberger, “Decoding borders. Appreciating border impacts on space and people”, *Planning Theory & Practice*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2014, 507, accessed March 17, 2017, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2014.963652>.



expression of historical necessity and/or God's will" has influenced the modern normative process.<sup>22</sup> The legitimacy of the monopoly of violence was now applied within national borders. The exclusive source of power, and the prerogative of laws induced the sealing off of borders from any intrusion. Nationalism gave rise to the principle that "every nation needs and deserves the protective shell of a sovereign state in order to fulfill its potential."<sup>23</sup> (See Figure 9)



**Figure 9: Evolution of The Border-Line Process**

Source : Foucher, *Fronts et Frontières*

<sup>22</sup> Kolossov, "State of the Debate Report I", 11.

<sup>23</sup> Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History". *Alternatives*, 1991, 16:439.

The normative process also encompasses the choice of words to express what is a border. The invention of the *natural border* with the nation-state influenced the use of references to *border-lines*. From the 17th to the 18th centuries, the idea of *natural borders* took roots in juridical discourses. The definition of the French historical area in the hexagon between the Pyrenees and the Rhine underlined the homogeneity of that space as a natural territory. The perception of ethnic unity through regions such as Gascony, Limousin, and Provence was the official top-down narrative.<sup>24</sup> Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly explains how nationalism and the state-building process have transformed buffer zones into military regions.<sup>25</sup> The physical implementation of the *border-line* began with a network of fortresses with landmarks and expanded to total lines of defense close to the borders like the Maginot Line in France and the Siegfried Line in Germany (see Figure 10).



**Figure 10: The Maginot and the Siegfried Lines**

Source: adapted from [www.herodote.net](http://www.herodote.net)

<sup>24</sup> Peter Sahlin, *Natural Frontier*, 1990, 1423–1451.

<sup>25</sup> Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, "The State of Borders and Borderlands Studies", *The Journal of Borderlands Studies*, 2009.

### **The Extension of the Westphalian Order**

The extension of the Westphalian order spread to Central and South America. The process of decolonization of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires occurred during the 19th century. The political emancipation with Bolívar and the geographical and environment features of the continent influenced the shaping of borders. As a result, 26.8% of borders are former colonial delineations, 26% were decided after wars, 34% negotiated or imposed, and 12.8% arbitrated or style being disputed.<sup>26</sup> The model of *border-lines* applies, but not in relation to the European model. In comparison to the high density of European settlements, most of the Latin borders are characterized by less than one inhabitant per square kilometer. Moreover, the linguistic homogeneity, the tradition of territorial integration, and the lack of influence of the idea of *frontier* have affected the nature of *border-lines* (see Figure 11 and 12).

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<sup>26</sup> Michel Foucher, *L'Invention des frontières*, i books, 550.



**Figure 11: Density of Population in Central and South America**  
 Source : Foucher, *L'Invention des Frontières*, 550.



**Figure 12: Origins of Borders in Central and South America**

Source : Foucher, *L'Invention des Frontières*, 550.



The second extension of the Westphalian order took place in Africa. European powers established and defined borders with respect to their conquests, and with little relation to geographical, linguistic or historical realities. The colonization of African territories, the exportation of the European concept of state sovereignty, and *border-lines* progressed in different steps. First, the exploration of the land by Westerners influenced the initial colonization and the appropriation of territories by European countries, regardless of local African tribes or kingdoms.


Second, from the geopolitical perspective, European powers decided to share African territories, and established rules for their internal regulations during the Berlin Conference of 1884.<sup>27</sup> An initial agreement with local tribes and an effective administration of the territories were the two final rules agreed upon. Nevertheless, some tensions and limited conflicts occurred as the process of delineation had not been effectively achieved. The major European powers competed to build a contiguous empire without enclaves, reproducing an equivalent European spatial organization.

Third, the areas not effectively administered became areas of influence. European powers draw the borders on the maps thanks to astronomical observations and rivers. The effective administration came later. Moreover, the geopolitical situation of the late 19th century influenced the division. Some borders were changed with respect to bargains made between the European powers. For example, Germany was awarded additional territories in Cameroon to compensate for abandoning its claims in Morocco. The territory of Oltregiuba was awarded to Italy for its support during WW I (see Figure 13).<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Germany, France, UK, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, Russia, USA, Turkey.

<sup>28</sup> Joos, "Des Frontières Trop Souvent Etablies Au Gré Des Colonisateurs", *Le Monde Diplomatique*.




**Figure 13: Colonization of Africa by European Countries (1914)**

Source : [www.lhistoire.fr/carte/le-partage-de-lafrique-en-1914](http://www.lhistoire.fr/carte/le-partage-de-lafrique-en-1914)

Nevertheless, “values, norms and structures have survived to a significant extent everywhere, even where their existence was not legally recognized during the colonial era” Aristide Zolberg argues.<sup>29</sup> Two mental constructions existed at the same time where the idea of the modern European state overlapped that of the traditional framework of the local peoples (see Figure 14).

<sup>29</sup> Blank, Grinter, Magyar and Ware. *Conflict, Culture and History: Regional Dimensions*, XLII.



**Figure 14: Ethnolinguistic Groups in Africa**

Source: adapted from G.P. Murdock, *Africa, Its Peoples and Their Cultural History*, 1959



Fourth, the aftermath of the two world wars had consequences on the spatial organization in Europe and the Middle East. After WW I, in Europe, the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of Germain-en-Laye, and the Treaty of Trianon dismembered the old Austro-Hungarian and German Empires. The ideas of self-determination, as inspired by President Wilson, and the *border-line* process were a guideline to shape the new spatial organization in Europe. New countries appeared on the map, and others such as Romania saw their borders radically redrawn. Germany lost land - mostly to Poland - and there were now German speaking enclaves in every country around the German border (see Figure 15).<sup>30</sup>




**Figure 15: The New Spatial Organization in Europe after WW I**

Source: BBC News


In the Middle East, France and Great Britain shared territories with respect to geopolitical interests. The *border-line* process was not in accordance with the reality of ethnics, religious, and cultural realities of the people living there (see Figure 16 and 17).

<sup>30</sup> Bridget Kendall, "Does the Peace that Ended WW I Haunt Us Today?", *BBC News*, accessed April 18, 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/guides/zp3ncdm>



**Figure 16: The New Spatial Organization of The Middle East after WW I**

Source: BBC News




**Figure 17: Ethnic Groups of the Middle East**

Source: adapted from Michael Izadi, [www.Gulf2000.Columbia.edu](http://www.Gulf2000.Columbia.edu)



The last wave of reordering through a normative principle occurred at the end of the Cold War. The spatial organization of Europe after WW II was the representation of ideological and geopolitical interests. In Eastern Europe, the *border-lines* were a misrepresentation of the local identities (see Figure 18).



**Figure 18: Spatial Organization of Europe after WW II**

Source: Allen, *Student Atlas of World Politics*, 1996

Moreover, the shaping of the new borders contributed to the migration of millions of people across Europe with respect to the new delineations (see Figure 19).



## **The State and the Concept of Sovereignty: The Rising of a Norm.**

The bordering process has not always been in correlation with a norm. During the Roman Empire, the emperors unilaterally decided the location of the *limes*. The choice to establish a limit between the empire and the outside was directly correlated with the notion of *Otherness* – the *Barbarians*- and the capability to defend the Empire.

After the death of Charlemagne in 814 and the split of his Empire among his successors in 843, the first idea of the delineation of territories with equal rights and limits introduced a new juridical concept (see Figure 20).<sup>33</sup>



**Figure 20: Division of the Carolingian Empire in 843**

Source: [www.Thinglink.com](http://www.Thinglink.com)

<sup>33</sup> Paul Klotgen, “Les Frontières : une condition nécessaire à la vie du droit”, *Questions internationales*, N° 79-80, May-August 2016.



Until the 18th century, the political organization of Europe mostly depended on kingdoms and a feudal system. The Pope and the Church gave legitimacy to kings and dynasties. Borders were changed throughout history according to alliances and wars.

Ignacio Ramonet explains the different meanings of sovereignty throughout history. Before the 18th century, sovereignty was an aspect of kingship *par la grâce de Dieu*.<sup>34</sup> Under the influence of the American and French Revolutions, sovereignty became embedded in the nation, as for example the third article of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1798 states.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to the origin of sovereignty, the organization inside the state, and the rising of the balance of power in Europe interacted with the definition of borders. The diplomats in charge of negotiating and writing treaties transformed undefined areas into independent entities closed by borders and functioning as buffer zones. For example, the treaties between the Ottoman Empire and Russia defined borders for geopolitical purposes in the 18th century. On the one hand, the Ottoman Empire set up a defensive position. On the other hand, Russia reinforced its access to the Black Sea. The creation of an independent Crimea was the buffer zone stabilizing the two powers (see Figure 21).<sup>36</sup> With respect to these examples, the bordering process has not always been a correlation to the *border-line* throughout history.

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<sup>34</sup> *Par la grâce de Dieu* means *by the grace of God*.

<sup>35</sup> Ignacio Ramonet, "Nouvel ordre Global", *Le Monde diplomatique*, June 1999.

<sup>36</sup> Foucher, *L'Invention des Frontières*, 168.




**Figure 21: Evolution of Ukrainian Lands between the 17th and the 18th Centuries**

*Source: Paul Robert Magocsi, A History of Ukraine*

## Technology and the Mapping Process

Technology has modified the bordering process throughout history. Its influence has stretched from the representation of the world to the capability to enforce the control of borders. The mapping process depends on the audience and the narrative about the understanding of the world. Until the Middle Ages, the main purpose of maps was an esthetic and sacred representation of the world, “more ecclesiastic than cartographic, more symbolic than realistic.”<sup>37</sup> The inherent technical limitations of measurement were in correlation with the absence of effective means to delineate territories. The new scientific technology of the 15th century improved the capabilities to travel, and to represent the world. In 1494, the Treaty of Tordesillas introduced a new delineation of the world between Spain and Portugal, and allocated new territories even though they had not yet been discovered (see Figure 22).<sup>38</sup>



**Figure 22: Separation of the World between the Spanish and Portuguese Empires**

Source: Lascelles, *A Short History of the World*

<sup>37</sup> John Noble Wilford, *The Mapmakers*. 2. Vintage Books ed., rev. ed. New York: Vintage Books, 2001, 40.

<sup>38</sup> *Treaty of Tordesillas*, Oxford Public International Law, accessed March 27, 2017, <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2088>.

In the process of discoveries, maps and compasses were becoming key elements for navigation and representation of the world. Consequently, maps were evolving into an element of power as the key evidence to locate and claim territories. The process has continued with the rise of the modern state and the need to consolidate power.

These early works of geographers and historians contributed to the formation of the modern political order. The new set of rules required international recognition, by other states, of the boundaries of sovereign and territorially demarcated states. The Treaty of Westphalia established boundaries for the territorial possessions of England, France, Holland, the German princedoms, Muscovy, Poland, the Ottoman Empire, Spain, and Sweden. It marked the beginning of the era of the nation state and nationalism, which historians and geographers studied and explained during the 19th and 20th centuries.<sup>39</sup>

In 1684, Cassini established the first accurate maps of French territories at the request of Louis XIV in order to ascertain the real extent of his kingdom.<sup>40</sup> The design of the maps was directly correlated to this post-Westphalian element of power. The comparison of maps from the 16th and the 21st centuries is a compelling case in point. The former is depicted with few obvious borders, and several natural elements, such as rivers or mountains. The latter was becoming more accurate, accentuating the effects of natural obstacles, using dashed or dotted lines, two-color borders, and solid state colors (see Figure 23 and 24).<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Brunet-Jailly, "The State of Borders and Borderlands Studies", 3.

<sup>40</sup> Foucher, *L'Invention de Frontières*, 44.

<sup>41</sup> Steve Pickering, "Borderlines: Maps and The Spread Of The Westphalian State From Europe To Asia Part One – The European Context", *The International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences*, Volume XL-4/W3, 2013 ISPRS/IGU/ICA Joint Workshop on Borderlands Modelling and Understanding for Global Sustainability 2013, 5-6 December 2013, Beijing, China





**Figure 23: Representation of Borders during the 16th Century**  
 Sources: [www.geographicus.com](http://www.geographicus.com)



**Figure 24: Representation of the Borders during the 21st Century**  
 Source: [www.cartograf.fr](http://www.cartograf.fr)

The representation of borders was linked to the normative approach of the *border-line* and the modern state. Mapping technology allowed rulers to have a spatial view of their possessions. Borderlands and border regions progressively became *borders* and *frontiers*, the new words expressing a political meaning.<sup>42</sup>

The last step in this process occurred during the 19th century in Africa and Asia. Before 1885, only one-ninth of the world was effectively surveyed, and no official rules of mapping existed. The theoretical final *border-line* delineation occurred in 1892 in Africa, in 1893 with the “Durand Line” in Asia, and 1923 in the Middle East (see Figure 25).<sup>43</sup>



**Figure 25: The "Durand Line"**


Source: [www.globalsecurity.org](http://www.globalsecurity.org)

The choice of projections to represent the world also influences the way to imagine and perceive the world. For example, the projection of Mercator, a map which was commonly used, misrepresents the real size of continents. European countries appear bigger than their real size in comparison with Africa and areas close to the equator. Peters' Projection

<sup>42</sup> Brunet-Jailly, "The State of Borders and Borderlands Studies", 2.

<sup>43</sup> Fouchet, *L'Invention des Frontières*, 442.

introduces some distortion but respects the relative sizes between areas (see Figure 26).




**Figure 26: Comparison of Projections of Mercator and Peters**

Source : *La Voix Francophone*

During the second part of the 20th century, aerial and satellite photography, a Global Positioning System, and data electronic processing have provided definitive accuracy in effectively delineating a *border-line* on the ground (see figure 27).





**Figure 27: Satellite Mapping of Asia**

*Source: [www.geology.com](http://www.geology.com) and [worldmapsonline.com](http://worldmapsonline.com)*

The concept of border has encompassed various approaches throughout history and civilizations from *border-area*, to *frontier* and, to *border-line*. The delineation and the organization of space has not always been accomplished with respect to linguistic, ethnic or cultural differences. The bordering process developed according to two principal trends: socialization and self-identification of people with territory or by differentiation and construction in opposition to others. The security or the power provided and accepted by rulers created a degree of legitimacy. The (de)construction and the constitution of borders were a consequence of the mechanisms of power and an adaptation to a combination of internal and international pressures. The bordering process, including delimitation, demarcation, management, and control, highlights the role of power at the national and local level.

Nevertheless, different styles of bordering with a spectrum from *border-line* to *border-area*, respected these principles. Different systems coexisted during equivalent periods. Accurate delineations and the need to enforce specific controls have been modern phenomena. Nationalism and the definitive monopoly of power exerted by the state have imposed international rules. How have these rules become a global norm? What is the real consistency across domains?

## CHAPTER 2

### THE COMPREHENSION OF THE CONCEPT OF BORDER

The comprehension of the concept of border depends on many factors, and is not limited to the traditional approach of a line of separation between two countries. The concept of border appears as a universal element of modern relationships between states. Nevertheless, its complex nature and its functions make it difficult to define with respect to the reality of international relationships. The concept of border encompasses various definitions and approaches with respect to narratives, etymology, and cultures. Borders occupy different functions according to space and time, and cannot be limited to a continuous element of sovereignty.

#### **Various Definitions and Approaches to the Concept of Border**

##### **The Current Juridical and Normative Framework**

Borders exist according to a juridical framework and in relation to specific domains, such as land, sea, air, and space.

##### **Land Borders: a Fragmented Juridical Framework**

If some countries or non-state actors contest the location or the legitimacy of specific borders across the world, the very nature of a border still applies in principle. A generic border-making process and an official international definition do not exist. Daniel Bardonnet explains how the land bordering process has a political dimension.<sup>44</sup> There does not exist any official juridical laws or principles to justify the process defining the choice of borders between two countries.

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<sup>44</sup> Daniel Bardonnet, "Frontières terrestres et frontières maritimes", *Annuaire français de droit international*, volume 35, 1989, 3, accessed March 27, 2017, doi:10.3406/afdi.1989.2887, [http://www.persee.fr/doc/afdi\\_0066-3085\\_1989\\_num\\_35\\_1\\_2887](http://www.persee.fr/doc/afdi_0066-3085_1989_num_35_1_2887).

The delineation of borders is a negotiation between sovereign entities and encompasses principles such as geographical, historical, economic, and strategic interest. Each border has its own background and its recognition with respect to specific treaties or agreements. For example, the French and Italian governments signed 18 different treaties between 1601 and 2012. These treaties defined and modified the official status of portions of territories, tunnels and bridges between the two borders.<sup>45</sup> The delineation of borders between France and Belgium only relies on the treaty of Courtrai signed in 1820.<sup>46</sup> France and the United Kingdom only signed a treaty in 1982 when creating the Channel tunnel to delineate an official border on the continental shelf.

Besides the lack of a generic making process, the physical existence of landmarks or visible markers on the ground along the full length of a border are not compulsory to justify a juridical existence. A broad range of land borders exists. First, natural obstacles such as a river or a mountain can clearly define a border on the ground. It implies a potential change across time of the location of the border because of natural evolution. Second, artificial landmarks and human constructions can be the official marks on the ground, but there are no worldwide rules. For example, 40% of African borders do not have any marks on the ground.<sup>47</sup> The use of the 49th parallel between Canada and the USA is another compelling case in point. The demarcation on the ground does not constitute a key element to officially characterize a border.

The *uti possidetis juris*<sup>48</sup>, a juridical principle, protects its existence as soon as it is created. A state newly created must respect the administrative borders defined by the former sovereign entity. This

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<sup>45</sup> *Code Officiel de la Géographie*, Ex-Direction De La Coordination Statistique et Des Relations Internationales, 2016, 74.

<sup>46</sup> *Code Officiel de la Géographie*, 79.

<sup>47</sup> Fouchet, *L'Invention des Frontières*, 43.

<sup>48</sup> *Uti possidetis juris* (Latin for "as you possess under law") is a principle of international law which provides that newly formed sovereign states should have the same borders that their preceding dependent area had before their independence.

principle initially appeared during the Angostura Congress in 1819 during the Wars of independence of Colombia and Venezuela. Thereafter, it applied to all new South American republics. It was also a reference during the decolonization period in Africa where the former colonizing countries had defined 80 % of the current borders. The dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia are the last modern examples of how this principle applies.<sup>49</sup>

As an exception to these international regulations, Antarctica's borders rely on a different combination of rules. The extreme natural conditions and its isolation make human settlement especially difficult. During the late 19th century, countries initially used the same rules as for the colonies in Africa. They claimed sovereignty over the territories they were discovering. Nevertheless, The Washington Treaty signed in 1959 by 12 countries defined an original set of rules over the territories located south of the 60th parallel.<sup>50</sup> Its approach is especially noteworthy as it created an original space system between the main powers. It decreased the crisis about sovereignty over territories especially in the context of the Cold War, and created a flexible structure to manage the space without any international organization above to control it.<sup>51</sup>

A supplementary treaty signed in Madrid in 1991 provided additional guarantees concerning the protection of the environment and the exploitation of potential mineral resources. Antarctica stands as a unique example of shared sovereignty without definitive agreement about borders and for the "common interest for humanity (see Figure 28)."<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Sorel, "La frontière comme enjeu de droit international", 5.

<sup>50</sup> South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chili, USA, France, Japan, Norway, New-Zeeland, USSR (currently Russia), the United-Kingdom.

<sup>51</sup> Julien Velcof, "Le statut International de L'Antarctique", Séminaire "Droit international public", 7 September 2009, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Lyon, 6.

<sup>52</sup> Velcof, "Le statut International de L'Antarctique", 82.



Nineteen of 26 Antarctic consultative nations have made no claims to Antarctic territory (although Russia and the United States have reserved the right to do so) and do not recognize the claims of the other nations.

**Antarctica**

Selected year-round research station

Scale 1:73,000,000

Azimuthal Equal-Area Projection

0 500 1000 Kilometers

0 500 1000 Nautical Miles

Source: [www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/polar.html](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/polar.html)

Land borders are a political creation providing rights but lack consistency and uniformity to be an efficient norm as claimed by international organizations. Its static and normative approach intends to settle the organization of space on the ground but does not rely on a clear process.

### **Maritime Borders: An Attempt to Create a Definitive Definition**

Contrary to land borders, maritime borders rely on normative definitions. Its approach is mostly juridical before being political, sacred and modern in comparison to land borders. Official juridical laws define the framing of maritime borders. It mostly depends on the will of countries, and no *jus cogens*<sup>53</sup> makes it absolute. As defined by the International Court of Justice in 1951, the possession of lands is a preliminary to determine the limits of maritime spaces and to carry out the process of bordering.<sup>54</sup>

The definition of the main rules is the result of an international consensual process. Its role is to deter the self-establishment of maritime borders by a country. The Law of the Sea Treaty, formally known as the 3rd United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS III, was adopted in 1982 replacing the former United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, one in 1958 (UNCLOS I) and another in 1960 (UNCLOS II), which were believed to be inadequate. Its introduction states that “the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, recognizes the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living


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<sup>53</sup> *jus cogens*: compelling/peremptory norms, the principles that form the norms of international law that cannot be set aside.

<sup>54</sup> International Court of Justice, *Recueil*, 1951, 133.

resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment.”<sup>55</sup>

The rules determine four areas with different characteristics and functions (see Figure 29).<sup>56</sup>



**Figure 29: Definition of Maritime Spaces**

Sources: Normal baseline, [www.linz.govt.nz](http://www.linz.govt.nz).

The first area defines sovereignty as to land borders within the territorial sea. Second, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) encompasses an area where the state has sovereign rights for exploitation over the seabed, sub-soil and their natural resources. Third, the area beyond a 200 nm limit and part of the continental shield can provide additional rights under specific conditions. Fourth, international maritime areas,

<sup>55</sup> *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, Part 1 Introduction, 26, accessed March 11, 2017,

[www.un.org/depts/los/convention\\_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos\\_e.pdf](http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf).

<sup>56</sup> *Normal baseline*, [www.linz.govt.nz/hydro/nautical-info/maritime-boundaries/definitions/index.aspx#tsb](http://www.linz.govt.nz/hydro/nautical-info/maritime-boundaries/definitions/index.aspx#tsb) , accessed March 11, 2017.

where no specific sovereignty applies, are exclusive of the last three.<sup>57</sup> With respect to this situation, some bilateral and multilateral agreements make definitive conclusions about the official delineation.

Bardonnet in *Frontières Terrestres et Frontières Maritimes* explores different case studies. No official rule of law exists to determine the point of departure of a maritime border. He explains how its delineation is the result of various technical assumptions. He illustrates his argument with the examples of the mouth of a river, a virtual point in the middle of the sea, and a point at low tide. As the bank of a river or the position at low tide may change over time, nature denies any attempt to define the definitive location of a border. The process of delineation amplifies the differences between land borders with respect to the conceptual and symbolic approach. He also points out new trends such as the political approach of maritime borders. For example, the final decision about the border between Guinea Bissau and Senegal in 1989 extended the *uti possidetis juris* to maritime borders. Whatever the domain, treaties and laws permanently intend to frame valid borders.<sup>58</sup>

Initially organized through a juridical process, maritime borders tend to correspond to the political concept of land borders. A consensual set of rules provides a technical and normative frame to physically define maritime borders. Nevertheless, the reality of the natural environment challenges any attempt to create a definitive normative process.

### **Air borders: adaptation and political approach**

The definition of air borders has its origins with the development of aviation and its coercive use during the first two world wars. The international community perceived the need to define a set of rules and regulations with respect to the sovereignty of each country and the development of civil aviation. The Convention on International Civil

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<sup>57</sup> Didier Cormorand, "Droits maritimes, une enjeu géopolitique", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Juin 2016.

<sup>58</sup> Daniel Bardonnet, "Frontières terrestres et frontières maritimes", *Annuaire français de droit international*.



Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 is the pillar of the international definition and delineation of air borders. As for maritime borders, land borders provide an initial preliminary to define the location of air borders. The first two articles express “that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory the land areas and territorial waters.”<sup>59</sup>

Air borders rely on a normative and political approach as defined for land borders. The normative process is consistent by itself and can apply worldwide with no constraint.

### **Space Borders: A Borderless Creation**

Unlike other domains, space has a specific status. The regulation of space relies on the Outer Space Treaty initially signed in 1967. The United Nations General Assembly released in 2002 an updated compilation of the juridical treaties and principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space. The second article states “outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”<sup>60</sup> Each country retains sovereignty over its satellites and orbital machines, but the domain is considered a shared international space, even taking precedence over national territories.

Space constitutes an exception to the normative process as an international consensus specifies the absence of borders.

### **The International Jurisdictions Maintaining the Norm**

The United Nations in its founding Charter declared that all member states should “refrain in their international relations from the

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<sup>59</sup> *International Convention of Chicago*, December 7, 1944, accessed March 18, 2017, <http://www.icao.int/publications/Pages/doc7300.aspx>

<sup>60</sup> *United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space: Text of Treaties and Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly*. New York: United Nations, 2002, Article 2.

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”<sup>61</sup> It promotes equality and legal existence of all states before the law, protects against the promotion of secession by some states in other states’ territory and guarantees territorial independence and preservation.<sup>62</sup> By claiming that war is illegal except for self-defense, the UN Charter promotes the resolution of tensions about territorial disputes thanks to an International Court of Justice. International conferences have often reinforced the inviolability of borders. For example, the Helsinki Accords and the related establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) set fixed borders as a coded principle of the European and North Atlantic community in August 1975. The Western agreement to freeze and confirm the territorial status quo of European Eastern borders was practical evidence of this.<sup>63</sup>

The creation of the International Court of Justice has represented the culmination of a long development of methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes since the 18th century. After The 1899 Hague Conference, the international community intended to create a supra authority to deal with international juridical issues between states regarding borders.<sup>64</sup> Nowadays, the International Court of Justice is competent to provide judgment about disputes between states that are submitted to it. Its decisions do not question the concept of borders or its nature per se, but the juridical interpretation and approach of a treaty, or the violation of international laws.

The delineation of maritime borders needs a specific study for each case. For example, the juridical status of a rock or an island, and some

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<sup>61</sup> *United Nations Charter*, June 26, 1945, Chapter I, Article 2, Section 4.

<sup>62</sup> Nick Vaughan-Williams, *Border politics: the limits of sovereign power*. Edinburgh: Univ. Press, 2009, 2.

<sup>63</sup> Boaz Atzili and Anne Kantel, “Accepting the Unacceptable: Lessons from West Germany’s Changing Border Politics”, *International Studies Review* (2015) 17, 603.

<sup>64</sup> International Court of Justice, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=1&lang=en>

elements of proportionality in relation to the size of conflicting land territories, are preliminaries to fixing the border. The potential arbitration also needs the states to be part of the international convention.<sup>65</sup> The South Asian Sea and Arctic Sea are disputed areas in which some agreements have been signed but some tensions still exist.

### **Changing a border ...or not**

After WW II, the new geopolitical order and the nature of international institutions modified the official perspective about war and borders. As war had become illegal and the modification of borders restrained, the migration of people was an option to decrease conflicts. The concept of the modern state introduced the principle of generic identity. The movement of populations across territories has occurred with respect to the definition of a dominant group according to ethnic, cultural or religious criteria. For example, more than twelve million people migrated during the partition between India and Pakistan. This historical phenomenon found its roots not only in ethnic and religious tensions, but also in the principle of national identity within a modern state. The delineation of definitive borders and the refusal of any Indian or Pakistani foreign enclaves fueled the migration of people.

Unlike other post-WW II migrations, the case study of the former Yugoslavia is singular as a modern border making process. The Badinter Commission created by the European Community set the borders of the successor states of Yugoslavia with respect to specific principles. Cornelia Navari explains how “this method of requiring an application for recognition which is examined by an arbitrator and then decided upon according to a set timetable is virtually unprecedented in recognition practice.” The different actors “have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations

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<sup>65</sup> Didier Cormorand, “Droits Maritimes, un enjeu politique”, *Le Monde Diplomatique*.

and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to negotiations.”<sup>66</sup> The guidelines developed most of the criteria of international rules: respect of the UN Charter, the final Act of Helsinki and the 1990 Charter of Paris, establishing democracy as the only system of government for nations. They also reaffirmed rights for ethnic, national groups and minorities. As a key element, the Badinter settlement separated territoriality and self-determination from the ethnic principle. Nevertheless, the commission induced a tough version of the principle of *uti possidetis*, that there should be no change not only *by force* but not *at all*. This perspective to prevent people from redefining their territories questions real self-determination and highlights the *normative* process. It appears that the contextual approach of self-determination only refers to the post-WW II decolonization process. The UN Charter, as a pillar of international regulations, defines the right of people for self-determination, but it does not define either processes or legitimacy to do it practically.

If some countries use violence and wage war to modify borders, the international community mostly denies the official recognition of annexation. For instance, the purpose of the First Gulf War was to deny the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991. The official support for the international community to Great Britain in the Falkland War is another example. Neither is the recent modification of borders by Russia in Ukraine officially recognized.

### **Lessons Learned from the Current International Norms**

The normative approach to the concept of borders provides key insights:

- Its dependence on the medium.

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<sup>66</sup> Cornelia Navari, “Territoriality, self-determination and Crimea after Badinter”, *International Affairs* 90: 6 (2014), 1300.



- Specific treaties give each border a different nature, creates a paradoxical situation, and an illusion of uniformity.
- The international status of borders intends to shape a static organization of space with no real ways to modify it peacefully.
- The examples of Antarctica and space stress that a different system can peacefully exist outside of the norm.
- Most of the borders rely on a *normative* process and a juridical control shaped during the beginning of the 20th century.

### **The Concept of Border is Relative to a Culture and a Language**

The *normative* approach and set of rules do not mean that the concept of border has the same definition worldwide. The study of the meaning and the choice of words to express the concept of border provide some relevant insights.

In the English language, three words are related to the concept of delineation: *border*, *frontier*, and *boundary*. *Border* has a specific meaning and nowadays encapsulates the international *normative* concept of border as the line of separation between two sovereign states. *Border* derives from the French term *bordure*, which refers to the outer edge of an object.<sup>67</sup> Nevertheless, the American approach also exists with the use of two other words such as *boundary* and *frontier*. *Frontier* initially had the sense of a neutral zone between empires or states and took the shape of a relative empty territory with few human settlements.<sup>68</sup> In *L’Invention des Frontières*, Foucher provides different explanations and cultural meanings. He explains how the word *frontier* has an historical nuance related to the American construction of the nation from the 19th century, and to the differences between the settled and uninhabited parts of the country. It encompasses a notion of uncertainty and the unknown

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<sup>67</sup> Haselsberger, “Decoding Borders”, 509.

<sup>68</sup> Haselsberger, “Decoding Borders”, 509.

beyond that mobile line.<sup>69</sup> According to Wilson and Donnan, *frontiers* are “territorial zones of varying width which stretch across and away from *borders*, within which people negotiate a variety of behaviors and meanings associated with their membership in nations and states.”<sup>70</sup> Finally, the word *boundary* derived from *bound* and the Latin *bonnarium*, which means “a linear concept demarcating one particular facet.”<sup>71</sup> On the one hand, natural boundaries refer to natural features such as rivers, mountains, or coastlines. On the other hand, social or political agents refer to artificial boundaries to distinguish between national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences. They are typically deemed to be imprecise or indeterminate, and are frequently contested.<sup>72</sup> Haselberger synthesizes the modern understanding of *frontier*, *border* and *boundary* by means of geopolitical, sociocultural, economic and biophysical criteria (see Figure 30).

### BOUNDARY

linear concept, demarcating one single facet.

Boundaries can be grouped into 4 categories:

Geopolitical Boundaries

Sociocultural Boundaries

Economic Boundaries

Biophysical Boundaries



### BOUNDARY SETS:

**BORDER** (line in space)  
linear, hard and static dividing element,  
fixed in a particular territory  
as well as on the map.

**FRONTIER** (border region)  
zonal, soft and fluid dividing element,  
defining an area immediately beside  
a state border. (Two adjoining border  
regions constitute a cross-border region.)

**Figure 30: Interrelationship of Border, Boundary and Frontier Edge Concept**

Source: Haselberger, *Decoding Borders*

<sup>69</sup> Fouchet, *L'Invention des Frontières*, 74.

<sup>70</sup> Haselsberger, “Decoding Borders”, 509.

<sup>71</sup> Haselsberger, “Decoding Borders”, 509.

<sup>72</sup> Haselsberger, “Decoding Borders”, 509.

In the French language, *front*, *frontière*, *limite* and *marche* could be the four words referring to the concept of border.<sup>73</sup> The word *frontière* is the most common word and is etymologically related to the word *front* in a military sense. The *frontier* was thus the line that separated the polity from the enemy, an eminently mobile line of both contact and separation. The *front* as the line of contact between two armies has evolved into a symbolic line of separation between two states.


In the German language, the word *grenze* has an intriguing variety of meanings: it means *boundary*, but also *limit(ation)*, *frontier*, and *border* (control), explains Michael Wohlgemuth in his study *The Boundary of the State*.<sup>74</sup> In another comparative survey, Tomke Lask compares the meaning and the representation of the idea of border in France and Germany. Originally, *grenze* was a Slavic word meaning a landmark but with no military sense as in French. The use of the word *grenze* expanded to a metaphoric understanding of the border of a state after the 18th century.<sup>75</sup> Nowadays, a French *frontière* and a German *grenze* literally express the concept of border but their metaphorical meaning is different. *Grenze* gives the sense of horizon with an origin from the inside. *Frontière* appears as the limit of an area. The difference of meaning demonstrates how the cultural approach directly impacts the supposedly normative concept in international law (see Figure 30).

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<sup>73</sup> Haselsberger, "Decoding Borders", 508.

<sup>74</sup> Michael Wohlgemuth, "The Boundaries of the State", *Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik*, No. 11/3, 2011, 1, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55034>

<sup>75</sup> Lask Tomke, "Grenze/Frontière : le Sens de la Frontière", *Quaderni n°27 Penser la frontière*, Autumn 1995, 68, accessed March 18, 2017, doi : 10.3406/quad.1995.1124 [http://www.persee.fr/doc/quad\\_0987-1381\\_1995\\_num\\_27\\_1\\_1124](http://www.persee.fr/doc/quad_0987-1381_1995_num_27_1_1124)



**Figure 31: Differences in the Metaphorical Approach between the French *Frontière* and the German *Grenze*.**

Source: Lask Tomke. *Grenze/Frontière : le Sens de la Frontière*.

In Asia, other perspectives exist about the concept of borders. In Japan, the word *sakai* means at the same time *place of meeting* and *slope*. Philippe Pelletier explains the origins, and the idea related to this concept. The reference is linked to the natural use of mountains, summits or rivers to organize the space between communities. The concept also encompasses religion and cosmogony. Island as the reference influences the perception of territory. The sea is described as a place of exchange between life and death, and provides this idea of exchange and transition instead of the *finite* European border. For example, sanctuaries and public agora were not in the center of cities of the former rural places, but at the periphery, and close to the local limits of villages or communities. Beaches were the places of main celebrations in relation to the proximity to the sea as a space of exchange.<sup>76</sup> The other word with respect to the concept of frontier, *zen I chitai*, was related to

<sup>76</sup> Michel Pelletier, "La Distance Japonésienne, Une Approche Géohistorique Et Géoculturelle", *ATALA n° 12, La distance, Objet Géographique*, 2009, 240.



the expansion over the northern part of the Kyushu Island. Nevertheless, it does not have the political and rational meaning as does the American *frontier*.

In his study *On Ideas of the Border in the Russian and Chinese Social Imaginaries*, Franck Billé provides a relevant analysis of the difference of perception of the concept of border in Russia and China and how the lexical field provides insight into the physical materialization of the border between the two countries. “If in Russian there is a relative paucity of terms to refer to borders, Chinese lexical wealth suggests a much wider set of spatially overlapping concepts. Indeed, while in Russian the border tends to be conceptualized as a firm line, Chinese perceptions are significantly more zonal and frontier-like” he states.<sup>77</sup> He adds “the predominance of one particular model is not necessarily culturally specific but that both models coexist and fluctuate in a dialogical process.”<sup>78</sup>

In the Russian language, the concept is expressed by two terms, largely synonymous: *granitsa* (meaning *facet* or *edge*), and *rubezh* (meaning *cut* or *notch*). In the semantic field, *granitsa* indicates a linear demarcation and would be closer to *border*. *Rubezh* denotes a fuzzier differentiation between the *Self* and the *Other* and would be closer to *frontier*. In the modern period, *granitsa* and its perspective convey the Russian concept of border.<sup>79</sup>

In Chinese, a broad lexical landscape exists to refer to borders contrary to the Russian, German or French language. The numerous Chinese terms convey a range of images of border as a line, as a liminal zone and as a margin (see Table 1).

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<sup>77</sup> Frank Billé, “On ideas of the border in the Russian and Chinese social Imaginaries”, September 2012, 21, accessed March 11, 2017, DOI: 10.11647/OBP.0026.02.

<sup>78</sup> Billé, “On ideas of the border in the Russian and Chinese social Imaginaries”, 21.

<sup>79</sup> Billé, “On ideas of the border in the Russian and Chinese social Imaginaries”, 7.

**Table 1: The Chinese Words to Express the Concept of *Border*, *Boundary* and *Frontier***

界 (jiè: boundary, scope)		边 (biān: side, edge, margin, border, boundary)	
国界	guójiè – national boundary	边界	biānjiè – territorial boundary, border
疆界	jiāngjiè – border, boundary	边境	biānjīng – border (area), frontier
分界线	fēnjièxiàn – border, boundary	边境线	biānjīngxiàn – borderline, demarcation line
界限	jièxiàn – demarcation line	边疆	biānjiāng – border area, borderland, frontier
境 (jìng – border, boundary)		边缘	biānyuán – edge, fringe, periphery
国境	guójìng – national territory/border	边沿	biānyán – edge, fringe, margin
国境线	guójìngxiàn – national boundary	边民	biānmín – frontiersman
边境	biānjīng – border (area), frontier	边区	biānqū – border area, border region
境界	jìngjiè – boundary; realm	边塞	biānsài – frontier fort/fortress
疆 (jiāng – border, boundary, dominion)			
疆域	jiāngyù – territory		
边疆	biānjiāng – border area, borderland, frontier		
疆界	jiāngjiè – border, boundary		
缘 (yuán – margin, edge)			
边缘	biānyuán – edge, fringe, periphery		
塞 (sài: strategic pass)			
边塞	biānsài – frontier fort/fortress		

Source: Frank Billé, *On Ideas of the Border in the Russian and Chinese Social Imaginaries*

### Lessons Learned from the Etymological and Cultural Approach

According to these different examples, the semantic analyses provide some insights into the international perspective of the understanding of border. Both the cultural signifier and signified demonstrate that the international *normative* legal definition simplifies the reality of the concept as perceived worldwide. The scope of the significance can extend from the *border-line*, to the *border-area*, to the *frontier* when the norm only defines the *border-line*.

### Borders: A Social Construction from its Origins

The international normative process has defined and institutionalized borders with a juridical existence for two centuries. Nevertheless, before becoming a legal object, a border was a social construction, linked to the notion of project and its relationships to others.

The concept of border carries the meaning of the people living in and sharing spaces. As for every human construction and organization, a sociological approach provides an additional perspective. Thierry Paquot in his study of Georg Simmel, explains how the border appears and exists through a socialized process. He defines socialization as a process in which people are gathering for an undefined period with a common interest, material, or conceptual. In this perspective, a border is not a spatial fact with sociological consequences but a sociological fact that takes shape in a space.<sup>80</sup> The interdependence and the effects of relationships imply a dual consequence: the definition of a common project by the group or the society and the definition of the *Other* as not sharing the same construction. The *Self* needs the *Other* to exist.

### **A Border is in The Narrative of a Project**

Alexander Wendt in *Social Theory of International Politics* explains how the social structure of agencies is related to spatial organization. He argues that a “structure of shared knowledge or discourse enables individuals to engage in institutionalized collective action.”<sup>81</sup> The role of collective knowledge supports the reproduction of elements of stability through organizational structures such as boundaries, symbols and national interests. The process of “boundary-drawing receives much of its impetus from forces inside the space around which the boundary will be drawn.”<sup>82</sup> Moreover, Henk Van Houtoum explains how the process of border relies on a social interaction and socialization process even through a top-down political initiative. The people’s solidarity, the feelings of familiarity, security, and identity take shape in a bounded

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<sup>80</sup> Thierry Paquot, “En Lisant Georg Simmel”, *Hermès, La Revue*, 2012/2 (n° 63), 23, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://www.cairn.info/revue-hermes-la-revue-2012-2-page-21.htm>

<sup>81</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge Studies in International Relations 67. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 215.

<sup>82</sup> Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 74.

territory under the sovereignty of states.<sup>83</sup> The socialization process can be the result of a political construction. The nationalist movements from the 19th century is a compelling case in point. More recently the European Union building process is an original socialized process of bordering with a definition of values and a project held by its members. The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union states “the peoples of Europe, in creating an ever-closer union among them, are resolved to share a peaceful future based on common values. Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.”<sup>84</sup>

The mental construction of the border can also directly be part of the national identity. After the peace agreement signed in 1904 between Peru and Chile, Bolivia lost its own border on the Pacific Ocean and only had access via two Chilean ports for trade (see Figure 32 and 33). Nevertheless, Bolivia built up a part of its national identity with the sea. From the existence of the National Day of the Sea on March 23rd to the songs for kids, the concept of sea border remains part of the Bolivian culture.<sup>85</sup> Bolivia has been officially demanding a new definition of the border and a full access to the ocean at the International Court of Justice.

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<sup>83</sup> Henk Van Houtum, “Internalisation and mental Borders”, *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 90: 329–335, 1999, accessed March 11, 2017, doi:10.1111/1467-9663.00074.

<sup>84</sup> Charter of The Fundamental Rights of The European Union, Preamble, accessed March 18, 2017, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A12012P/TXT>.

<sup>85</sup> Cédric Gouverneur, “La Bolivie Les Yeux Vers Les Flots, Conflit Avec Le Chili Pour l’Accès à l’Océan”, *Le Monde diplomatique*, Septembre 2015.





**Figure 32: Evolution of the Chilean, Peruvian, and Bolivian Borders**  
 Source: [www.quora.com](http://www.quora.com)



**Figure 33: Evolution of the Chilean and Peruvian Borders after the Decision of the International Court of Justice**

Source: [www.quora.com](http://www.quora.com)

The mental construction can also evolve with respect to the narrative and the combination of domestic and international events.<sup>86</sup> Boaz Atzili and Anne Kantel illustrate it in the case study of Germany after WW II. They explain how the perspective about the Oder-Neisse line between Germany and Poland changed from a total non-recognition in 1945 to a final acceptance in the 1970s (see Table 2).

<sup>86</sup> Atzili and Kantel, "Accepting the Unacceptable", 589.

**Table 2: West Germany's Territorial Policy.**

<i>Chancellor</i>	<i>Foreign Policy Priority</i>	<i>Domestic Coalition and Domestic Border Narratives</i>	<i>International Norms</i>	<i>Border Policy Outcome</i>
Konrad Adenauer (1949–1963)	Western orientation; Emphasis of security threat from communists	Winning support of expellees to CDU/CSU coalition; Start of dominant narrative against border recognition	Weak border fixity norm	Strict rejection of Oder–Neisse
Ludwig Erhard (1963–1966)	Economy as priority; Easing relations with East Europe	Winning support of expellees to CDU/CSU coalition; Position against recognition becomes a dominant narrative	Strengthening border fixity norm	Status quo policy; Rejection of Oder–Neisse
Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1966–1969)	Easing relations with East Europe	Grand coalition: CDU and SPD; Gradual lifting of dominant narrative against recognition	Strengthening border fixity norm	Status quo policy; Rejection of Oder–Neisse
Willy Brandt (1969–1974)	Ostpolitik: Thawing relations with East Europe; Increasing interaction with East Germany	New coalition: SPD and FDP; No dominant border narrative; Change toward de facto recognition	Strengthening border fixity norm	Abrupt change of policy; De facto recognition of Oder–Neisse
Helmut Schmidt (1974–1982)	Maintaining West/East balance	Maintaining SPD and FDP coalition; Little discussion of borders	Strong border fixity norm; Institutionalization through the Helsinki Accords	Status quo policy; De facto recognition of Oder–Neisse
Helmut Kohl First phase (1982–1988)	Strong Western orientation	New coalition: CDU/CSU and FDP; Little discussion of borders; Beginning of a dominant narrative against non-recognition	Strong border fixity norm; Institutionalization through the Helsinki Accords	Status quo policy; De facto recognition of Oder–Neisse
Helmut Kohl Second phase (1989–1990)	German reunification	Maintaining CDU/CSU and FDP coalition; Keeping right wing in CDU; Strong public and international reaction against ambiguity on border issue	Strong border fixity norm; Helsinki Accords	Ambiguity about de jure border → Approving Oder–Neisse de jure

Source: Boaz Atzili and Anne Kantel, “Accepting the Unacceptable: Lessons from West Germany’s Changing Border Politics”

The model of development in association with economic organization also participates in the process of social bordering. The economist Claude Courlet explains that the existence of border is not arbitrary but fits the logic of project with an identified space facing others.<sup>87</sup> For example, the World Trade Organization with 164 members since 29 July 2016 has created a bounded space with an economic project supported by its members with special trade agreements.<sup>88</sup> The organization echoes the feature of socialized organization with the predictability of agreements and the secure flow of exchanges. The organization itself creates a border for the countries which are not members. It is the other part of the process of bordering: the relation to others.

### **A Border Is in Relation to Otherness**

The process of bordering not only creates an *ego* but also defines an *alter* which stands on the other side. Wendt develops this argument by using the examples of two actors, *Ego* and *Alter*, interacting and reinforcing their differences and self-existences. “By taking a particular role identity *Ego* is at the same time ‘casting’ *Alter* in a corresponding counter-role that makes *Ego*’s identity meaningful.”<sup>89</sup>

Van Houtum explains how the marginalization of defined groups according to specified differences, the control of flow, and the regulation of mobility, constructs and reproduces specific places on space. In a social perspective, “making others through the territorial fixing of border is intrinsically connected to our present image of borders.”<sup>90</sup> It also

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<sup>87</sup> Remigio Ratti and Martin Schuler, “Typologie des espaces-frontières à l’heure de la globalisation”, *Belgeo*, 2013, accessed March 11, 2017, URL: <http://belgeo.revues.org/10546>. doi: 10.4000/belgeo.10546.


<sup>88</sup> World Trade Organization, “Understanding the World Trade Organization”, accessed March 11, 2017, [https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/whatis\\_e/what\\_stand\\_for\\_e.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm).

<sup>89</sup> Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 329.

<sup>90</sup> Henk Van Houtum and Ton Van Naerssen, “Bordering, Odering and Gathering”, *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*-2002, Vol.93, N°2, accessed March 11, 2017, [www.ncbr.ruhosting.nl/html/files/TESG2002.pdf](http://www.ncbr.ruhosting.nl/html/files/TESG2002.pdf).



implies specific cross-border interactions, which rely on affection, cognitive and action space (see Figure 34).



**Figure 34: Actors and Cross Border Interactions**

Source: Van Houtum, 1998

The cross-border interaction enhances the sociological meaning of the border. According to the narrative on the two sides of a border, the understanding and the meaning of a border can evolve. Victor Ortiz analyses the cross-border interactions at the US-Mexican border and its consequences. He explains how the initial pervasive contrast and inequities create a vicious circle in which demarcation increases. “This constant challenging and reinforcing boundaries generates the contradictory perception of the border region at once as a linking area and a dividing zone under increasingly militarized intervention.”<sup>91</sup> As a result, today in the great majority of cases, borders are conceived of as

<sup>91</sup> Victor M. Ortiz, "The Unbearable Ambiguity of the Border", *Social Justice* Vol. 28, No. 2 (84), Gatekeeper's State: Immigration and Boundary Policing in An Era of Globalization (Summer 2001), accessed March 11, 2017, URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29768078>.

“institutions and symbols that are produced and reproduced in social practices and discourses.”<sup>92</sup>

The cross-border interactions exist also with respect to the perception of the peripheral regions by the states. When centripetal forces concentrate activities or interests in other regions and overlook the peripheries, people in these areas feel more inclined to interact with people from the other side of the border. The perception of the inhabitants relies on an affective perception of the landscape and extraterritorial people. *Otherness* as perceived by the state may differ from theirs. Maria De Fatima Amante qualifies that phenomenon as “an asymmetry between the interpretation of the state and that of the locals. Borderlanders considered the border not so much as a line of separation—as the state did— but as a way of life, discursively constructed as the ultimate resource.”<sup>93</sup> The survey mostly studies the Spanish-Portuguese border, but her observations make sense for generic cross-borders interactions.


Brunet-Jailly argues that even if borders officially separate two countries, some communities remain culturally unified. Religion, ethnicity, or language can deny the reality of the border. The Basques and the Catalans between Spain and France, or the Kurds between Iraq, Syria, and Turkey are a compelling case in point (see Figure 35, 36, and 37).<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Valentina Kostadinova, “The Commission, ENP and Construction of Borders”, *Geopolitics*, 2009, 14:235-255.

<sup>93</sup> Maria De Fatima Amante, “Recovering the Paradox of the Border: Identity and (Un)familiarity Across the Portuguese–Spanish Border”, *European Planning Studies* Vol. 21, No. 1, January 2013, 26.

<sup>94</sup> Brunet-Jailly, “The State of Borders and Borderlands Studies”.




**Figure 35: Cultural and Geographical Specificities of the Basques**

Source: [http://www.nabasque.org/old\\_nabo/NABO/dna.htm](http://www.nabasque.org/old_nabo/NABO/dna.htm)



**Figure 36: Catalan Speaking Area**

Source: [www.languagesoftheworld.info/uncategorized/new-york-times-list-potential-new-countries-others-well.html#ixzz4g55gcclc](http://www.languagesoftheworld.info/uncategorized/new-york-times-list-potential-new-countries-others-well.html#ixzz4g55gcclc)



**Figure 37: Spatial Organization of the Kurdistan**

Source: [www.defense-update.com/20141206\\_isis\\_and\\_the\\_kurds.html](http://www.defense-update.com/20141206_isis_and_the_kurds.html)

### Lessons Learned from The Sociological Approach

The bordering process relies on a dual social interaction. The gathering process of people through a project and identities counter balances the designation of others as excluded from it. The border is taking shape according to this mental construction. The narrative with respect to this perspective provides the characteristics and the level of inclusion or exclusion of the *Other*. In addition to its sociological origins, a border also makes sense by its functions.



### **Borders with Respect to Space and Time.**

In relation to its sociological and cultural construction, a border can serve various functions. Jacques Levy in *Dictionnaire de la Géographie et de l'Espace des Societies* defines the spatial meaning of border as a barrier, an interface, and a territory.<sup>95</sup> His definition stresses the relation with the state's organization and control. First, it can be an internal means to structure an entity as a state. Second, its position of interface is essential to the regulation of exchange. Finally, its functions are not directly related to its normative definition.

### **Internal Structural Element for A State**

By defining limits, borders shape a space in which an organized structure can apply authority. A border enables a state to define its sovereignty and control. Weber defines the state as “an organization possessing sovereignty and a territorial monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence.”<sup>96</sup> Borders enable internal order and external defense, which are the fundamental functions in the Weberian sense. Harald Bauder, in a comparison of studies of various scholars about borders, explains the relationship between borders and some key fundamental elements of a state. For example, “the dialectic between political actors and citizen groups shapes border practices, and borders define state identities by actualizing, institutionalizing and reifying cultural differences.”<sup>97</sup> Michel Foucher explains how borders echo the existence of the modern state and need a demarcation line to exist.<sup>98</sup>

Remigio Ratti and Martin Schuler argue that the border as a line of demarcation is a tool to reinforce the central power of states. They identify three functions. First, the legal function defines the areas where the juridical norms and rules of the state apply. Second, the function of

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<sup>95</sup> Jacques Lévy and Michel Lussault, *Dictionnaire de la géographie*. Paris: Belin, 2013.

<sup>96</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, 54.

<sup>97</sup> Harald Bauder, “Toward a Critical Geography of the Border: Engaging the Dialectic of Practice and Meaning”, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 101(5) 2011, 1133.

<sup>98</sup> Foucher, *L'Invention des Frontières*, 46.

control enables the territory to be secured. Finally, the fiscal role with the choice of taxes provides funds.<sup>99</sup>

In his analyses of the role of Great Walls, Sam Tangredi argues that they prevent “the penetration of forces or ideas that might challenge attempts to consolidate or maintain internal control.”<sup>100</sup> The Chinese Great Wall, the Roman Hadrian’s Wall in Britain, and the *limes* of Germanicus support his ideas. The fortifications were not an attempt to separate ethnics or to represent an official limit of power. The main purpose was to consolidate the absolute power within the limits of the wall and to avoid any infiltrations from outside forces which could challenge the central authority.

### **Interface and Exchange**

Border as a spatial limit between two different entities is a key element in regulating exchanges. Régis Debray in *Eloge des Frontières*, explains how a border can become a source of unequal income according to its resources. Variations exist with respect to each state the poorer it is and the more dependent on its customs taxes it is.<sup>101</sup> Borders can by their nature, also be a resource. Christopher Sohn develops two models of analyses to explain the nature of exchanges (see Table 3 and 4). His first model called *geo-economic* provides insights about the mobilization of the border as a “differential benefit and aims to generate value out of asymmetric cross-border interactions.” The second model, called *territorial project*, emphasizes “the border resources that involve a convergence of both sides of a border, either through a process of hybridization, innovation or via the territorial borders.”<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Ratti and Schuler, “Typologie des Espaces-Frontières à l’Heure de la Globalisation”.

<sup>100</sup> Sam J. Tangredi, *Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies*, Naval Institute Press, 2013, 3.

<sup>101</sup> Régis Debray, *Eloge Des Frontières*. Gallimard, 2013, 68.

<sup>102</sup> Christopher Sohn, “Modelling Cross-Border Integration: The Role of Borders as a Resource”, *Geopolitics*, 2014, 19:587–608.

**Table 3: The Border as a Resource**

Type of benefit	Border functions involved	Rationales
Positional benefit	Delimitation	Territorial gateway. Cross-border overflow.
Transaction benefit	Separation	Smuggling. Brokerage.
Differential benefit	Differentiation	Exploitation of cost differentials (value capture).
Locus of hybridisation	Differentiation	Confrontation of differences resulting in innovation and hybrid formations.
Object of recognition	Affirmation	Staging the international or multicultural character of a border region/city.

Source: Christopher Sohn, “Modelling Cross-Border Integration: The Role of Borders as a Resource”, *Geopolitics*.

**Table 4: Two Models of Cross- border Integration.**

	Type 1: “Geo-economic model”	Type 2: “Territorial project”
Main objective	Value capture.	Place-making.
Type of border resource mobilised	Differential benefits (often combined with positional and transaction benefits).	Locus of hybridisation/ innovation. Object of recognition.
Key variables	Tangible variables: cost, price, physical proximity.	Non-tangible variables: mutual learning capacities, common understanding, trust, sense of belonging.
Domains concerned	Labour market. Export-processing factories and low-wage manufacturing. Residential market. Commerce and services (shopping).	Culture (arts, languages, traditions, identities). Spatial planning. Economic positioning, territorial marketing. Knowledge-intensive activities. Cross-border residential mobility.
Type of interactions	Functional interactions leading to material interdependencies.	Knowledge interactions. Ideational ties (mutual affection, feeling of cohesion, sense of belonging).
Convergence process	Absence or selective territorial convergence (social polarization and/or spatial specialisation).	Convergence of social and cultural values. In the long term, territorial convergence is likely.
Willingness to cooperate of public authorities	Optional although desirable.	Essential.
Purpose of cross-border cooperation	Instrumental (enhancing utility, reducing uncertainties, solving problems, regulating negative externalities).	Identity-providing (gaining public awareness and mobilisation, building a shared spatial imaginary, a common territorial identity).

Source: Christopher Sohn, “Modelling Cross-Border Integration: The Role of Borders as a Resource”, *Geopolitics*.

## **The *Normative* Process and the Multiple Approaches of the Concept of Border.**

The *normative* international definition of borders does not reflect the reality of the concept. Different set of rules have attempted to create an international regulation, but they have not achieved the ability to impose a static approach. The nature of a border and its level of openness is a choice because it is, first and foremost, a human construction before becoming a technical construction. For example, the factors creating the entity or the project can be related to a specific identity. From one state to another, the determining factor will not be the same. The sense of a border can also evolve without changing physically. The external borders of the European Union and the new walls in the Middle East and the U.S. are a compelling case in point. Atzili and Kantel explain even if “domestic border narratives are fairly stable, they do not occur in a vacuum but are constantly challenged by alternative frameworks of perception, and are thus subject to change. These alternative border narratives are constructed, and institutionalized by small groups within the societal and political elite navigating between foreign policy priorities, dominant public opinion, and international norms. Stable conceptions of *Ours* can thus change over time into accepted narratives of *not Ours*.”<sup>103</sup> Political elites as agents of change play an important role in those identity shifts toward new narratives of borders. The *border-line* as a norm has been consistent with initial assumptions and international order only for two centuries. Does this model still apply? How have the new global trends modified its validity and consistency?

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<sup>103</sup> Atzili and Kantel, “Accepting the Unacceptable”, 611.



### Final analyses (see Table 5)

**Table 5: Comparison of Conceptual Approaches about Border**

	<b>Juridical/Domain</b>				<b>Functional</b>	<b>Cultural</b>	<b>Social</b>
	<b>Land</b>	<b>Maritime</b>	<b>Air</b>	<b>Space</b>			
<b>Theoretical Approach</b>	No Process	International Regulations	International Regulations	International Regulations	Role of the State Legitimacy of Violence Governance	Language and References	Narrative of a Project Relation to The Otherness Constructivism
<b>Means</b>	Treaties	Law of The Sea Treaty	Chicago Convention	Outer Space Treaty	Fiscalism Legality Security	Different Words Variety of Meanings	Organizations (Political, Economic, Identities.)
<b>Type of "Border"</b>	<i>Border-Line</i>	<i>Border-Line</i>	<i>Border-Line</i>	No Border	<i>Border-Line</i> Variable Degree of Openness	<i>Border-Line</i> <i>Frontier</i> <i>Boundary</i>	<i>Border -Line</i> Cross-Border
<b>Origins</b>	Political Construction	Technical Official Rules	Technical	Technical	Political Historical Economic Construction	Historical Sociological	Mental And Political Construction
		Attached to Land Borders Different Norms	Attached to Land Borders				
<b>Process of Change</b>	International Court of Justice <i>Utis Possidetis</i> War	International Court of Justice <i>Utis Possidetis</i> War	No	No	International Agreement Influence Liberal Order Influence State Control	People's acceptance Cultural Evolution Legitimacy	Historical Evolution Symbol Acceptance of Identities
<b>Exceptions</b>	Antarctica						
<b>Remarks</b>	Self-Determination	Political Approach in Progress			No International Norm	No International Consensus	Worldwide Similar Patterns of Behaviors

Source: Author's Original Work

## CHAPTER 3

### THE END OF THE NORMATIVE CONCEPT OF BORDER

*If a border is a frame, what matters is inside. His book explains how it is impossible to provide a definitive definition to border. He concludes with these statements:*

- *The geographer does not know any natural borders, nor areas physically closed, that can encompass states and nations.*
- *The geographer denies the illusion of the idea of the linear border-line.*
- *The geographer denounces the vanity of the historical idea of borders.*
- *The geographer concludes that the border is a political isobar, that fixes for a certain period of time, the balance between two zones of pressure.*

*Jacques Ancel quoting Lucien Febvre  
Géographie des Frontières*

In her final reflections on war and the clash of ideas, Bozeman draws conclusions about the different perception of war and peace with respect to culture and civilization. Her comments provide insights into the modern normative perspective about the concept of borders:

1. "Within a given society, norms, normative ideas, and notions about what is normal evolve from a continuous interaction between the ruling value system, on the one hand, and the society's perception of social and political reality, on the *other*."
2. "A society is virile and effective if it can count on stable patterns of perception, judgment and action. If, by way of contrast, the interaction between the commitment to certain values and the common perception of reality is seriously disturbed, the normative system becomes unreliable;

in such circumstances, the society is apt to be morally confused and politically ineffective.”

3. “This broad concurrence of non-Western traditions stands in marked contrast to the preferences registered in modern Western societies. It is also at odds with the priorities officially established in the charters of the United Nations and affiliated international organizations. To the extent, then, that the United Nations is supposed to reflect universally valid norms, it is a misrepresentation of reality.”<sup>104</sup>

Globalization and discordances between the significance and the reality of borders introduce new challenges. Mary Kaldor defines globalization as “the intensification of global interconnectedness – political, economic, military and cultural – and the changing character of political authority.”<sup>105</sup> With respect to these new issues, the *normative* concept of *border-line* and international norms do not correspond.

First, it is necessary to identify the factors of change. Globalization and technological improvements modify the role of the state as the single main actor, and erode its role. Second, it is relevant to analyze the different trends and developments. Third, I argue that a potential trend is not about the concept of border itself but the irrelevant *normative* process. The single *border-line* concept does not echo the reality of the diversity of cultures and organizations.

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<sup>104</sup> Blank, Grinter, Magyar, and Ware, *Conflict, Culture and History: Regional Dimensions*, LXIV,

<sup>105</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Third edition. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012, 4.

## **Factors of change in our modern area**

*The first assumption, and the one that is most fundamental theoretically, is the reification of state territorial spaces as fixed units of secure sovereign space. The second, is the division of the domestic from the foreign. The third geographical assumption is of the territorial state as existing prior to and as a container of society.*

*Kolossov*

*State of the Debate Report I*

### **Globalization.**

Globalization has modified the features of sovereignty and borders over the last decades. The paradigm of the Westphalian border ensures that security and economic development rely on accumulation of stocks (raw material, goods, human capital...) and, potentially, conquests. The Westphalian model provided advantages in mobilizing resources and people in comparison with other states' organization. After WW II, the former experiences of economic crisis influenced other options to ensure the political survival of the model. Christopher Rudolph argues that the choice for states to increase interdependence and to participate in the process of globalization was not out of weakness but out of a conscious consideration of trade off.<sup>106</sup> On the one hand, the patterns of flow and trade have been erasing the reality of borders within the influence of global economy. On the other hand, the control of migration enabled "the importance of territoriality as central component of sovereignty, and as an ordering principle in world politics."<sup>107</sup> Nicholas Onuf explains how in the European system of nations-states, sovereignty, people, and territory were intrinsically bound together: "the state is the land, the people, the organization of coercion and a majestic idea, each supporting and even

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<sup>106</sup> Christopher Rudolph, "Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in global age", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 7, No 1, March 2005, 1-20.

<sup>107</sup> Rudolph, "Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in global age".



defining the other so that they become indivisible.”<sup>108</sup> Globalization has modified this character of indivisibility.

### **Impact on the Dyad Sovereignty-Border**

Kolossov argues that the crisis of sovereignty is the result of “pressures” from above with the rise of supra national organizations, and from “below” with the changing identities.<sup>109</sup> With respect to his perspective, technological improvements directly undermine the dyad between sovereignty and *border-line*. The concept of the modern state defines the *border-line* as an effective way to protect the nation from external threats, to facilitate national growth, and to identify a single actor. First, technological improvements have modified the reality of protection and security claimed by a state. A *border-line* no longer symbolizes an effective and continuous means of security preventing external threats. Satellites overflying territories, recording communications, detecting movements and activities of a country, can weaken national integrity. The long range of nuclear weapons can directly threaten the survivability of countries despite hardened protections at the border. Communications by satellites and the development of the internet challenge national identities by enhancing other cultures or identities. A second impact is the new capability for a state to control and to organize surveillance at home and abroad. Technology enables the relocation of the real border, which is no longer the official limit of the state. Big data and the sharing of information between countries have expanded and blurred national and international limits. Biometric technologies connected to data bases constitute a tool for states to set a differentiated border with respect to the profiles of people. The high technology of walls with sensors and data surveillance increase the potential capabilities for a state to secure specific borders.

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<sup>108</sup> Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, “Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History”, *Alternatives*, 1991, 16:439.

<sup>109</sup> Kolossov, “State of the Debate Report I”, 9.

The outcome is to overcome the circulation/security dilemma by creating a smart border mainly dependent on high-tech solutions.<sup>110</sup> The Mexican-American and Canadian-American borders are a compelling case in point. The former is a high-technological barrier, the latter has almost no physical obstacle on the ground to identify it. Technological development demonstrates the inconsistency of the *border-line* as a single norm securing states.

Second, sovereignty has evolved from a state-centered approach to a combination of trans-nationalization and regionalization of governance. Kaldor argues that the modification of sovereignty occurs at the international and local levels.<sup>111</sup> On the one hand, the regulation of activities through international agreements or integrated transnational institutions decreases the real independency of states. A national currency no longer depends on internal economy, but mostly on international regulations, upon which a state may be unable to act. Custom taxes are no longer specific national decisions, but the acceptance of international agreements balancing an access to the global market. On the other hand, regional partnerships and cross-border integration no longer rely on exclusive control by the state. Kolossov argues that transboundary regionalism is a response to globalization and symbolic of “post-security geopolitics in which environmental and economic issues play an increasingly important role.”<sup>112</sup> This new emerging form of regionalism challenges the dominance of statism’s as an organizing principle of international relationship. Before the 1970s, states were cooperating with respect to transnational infrastructures and environmental issues at the border. During the 1980s, emerging transnational structures, still dominated by states, supported economic growth. After the 1990s, the volume and intensity of exchanges between

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<sup>110</sup> Kolossov, “State of the Debate Report I”, 9.

<sup>111</sup> Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 75.

<sup>112</sup> Kolossov, “State of the Debate Report I”, 45.





**Figure 39: SIJORI Area**

*Source: Association of American Geographer*

Third, the informal non-governmental transnational networks impact the traditional hierarchical and centralized control by the state. The 71st article of the United Nations Charter officially created Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in 1945.<sup>116</sup> An NGO can be any kind of organization “provided that it is independent from government influence and is not-for-profit.”<sup>117</sup> NGOs play an active role at the local level, and also at the international level, supported by specific global narratives. More than 10 million NGOs exist worldwide and they would represent the 5th largest economy in the world.<sup>118</sup> These networks stretch from a variety of cultural and sporting activities, to transnational religious and ethnic groups, to transnational crime or terrorist organizations. Transnational organizations are also a new actor impacting state sovereignty. With respect to these fields (humanitarian,

<sup>116</sup> United Nations Charter, Article 71.

<sup>117</sup> Council of International Development, “25 Facts and Stats about NGOs Worldwide”, accessed March 24, 2017, <http://www.cid.org.nz/news/25-facts-and-stats-about-ngos-worldwide/>.

<sup>118</sup> Council of International Development, “25 Facts and Stats about NGOs Worldwide”



ecology, human rights...), states are not all the time part of processes and actions.

Finally, the internet has also been challenging education and citizenship, which were cornerstones of nationalism and consolidation of the state. Long-distance training and exchange programs introduce a more cosmopolitan perspective about the world. For example, the European program Erasmus is “aimed at cross-border cooperation between states to aid the growth of international studying with over 4000 students involved.”<sup>119</sup>

### **Impact on Identities and the *Otherness***

Technological improvements have modified access to information, which impact the conditions of representation of the border and the capabilities to enforce controls. First, big data and the information revolution have modified the capability for connectedness. The information revolution and the democratization of connections enable a high volume of exchange worldwide erasing the potential limitations of borders. Construction of identities does not rely exclusively on the state and territories, but on cosmopolitan urban and virtual spaces. David Kilcullen explains how urbanization and connectedness have modified traditional national landmarks. Improved access to electricity, lower-cost mobile technology, rapidly expanding electronic connectivity, and new integration of the internet with social media have created new patterns of connectedness.<sup>120</sup> Urbanization has amplified the phenomenon as the relationship to space is different in mega cities. The Arab Spring is a compelling case in point of connectedness at local and transnational levels. Social media simultaneously enables the rapid mobilization of people within a country, and across main cities. On the one hand, they spread the movement across capitals such as Tunis and Cairo. On the

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<sup>119</sup> “The Erasmus Programme”, accessed March 22, 2017, <http://www.erasmusprogramme.com/>.

<sup>120</sup> David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*, 2015, 170.

other hand, the revolution also disseminated from capitals to the country and remote places.<sup>121</sup> Borders were not a filter preventing connections and the potential building of new identities.

Technology and globalization have modified the construction of the representation of the *Self* and the *Other*, as conceptualized in the Westphalian paradigm. *Border-lines* were a key element of the modern state, defining the nature of otherness and identities. The spread of the liberal order and the definition of global human rights impact the traditional schema enabling the mental construction of border though identities and the *Otherness*. Globalization has introduced new boundaries, different from the official *border-lines*. A paradox arises between this world unifying territories with connections at high speed, and the emerging trend of new boundaries at different levels.<sup>122</sup> The *Other* is no longer the one abroad, and identities are not especially related to territories. The democratization of travel for business and tourism across the world is a compelling case in point. Social media and mass media enable knowledge about other cultures and parts of the world unknown before, even without leaving one's own country.

These developments have two paradoxical consequences for the phenomenon of integration and migration. On the one hand, they have increased and facilitated the multicultural connections across the world, which have modified people's perception of the *Other*. The sense of universal values decreases the differences, the non-consideration of other cultures, and people, which was a cornerstone of nationalism. On the other hand, regional claims and transnational movements fuel the rise of new identities. In a globalized world, the movements of migrants, and the potential openness of borders do not necessarily imply a normalization of cultures but rather an identification with symbols. The decoupling

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<sup>121</sup> Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*, 184.

<sup>122</sup> Thierry Paquot and Michel Lussault, "Introduction. Étymologies contrastées et appel au franchissement des limites", *Hermès, La Revue* 2012/2 (n° 63), 9.

between culture and religion create new networks and boundaries where the traditional *border-line* disappears. The ideological perspective is to maintain separation between secular and religious systems. Their supporters rely on specific narratives with territorial claims, from the past or related to sacred texts.<sup>123</sup> Their extension, supported by connectedness around the world, is like the idea of *frontier*. For example, extremists from every religion use that process as a strategy. Islamic extremists refer to the *jahiliya*, the society before the rise of Muhammad, Jewish extremists refer to sacred locations quoted in the Bible to justify extensions of territory in the Middle East. The European far-right parties claim Christianity as a legacy to justify their opposition to the migration of people.

Third, the representation of the world does no longer relies only on a static delineation of borders but on dynamic diagrams. Maps played a key role during the rise of nationalist movements, the affirmation of alliances, and ideological conflicts. The purpose was to delineate and to create a narrative with respect to geographic differences. For example, the map of France without the region of Alsace-Lorraine was a cognitive educational argument to prepare young Frenchmen to go to war against Germany in 1914. During the Cold War, maps were essential for both sides to justify diplomatic and military actions. On the one hand, the USSR supported *border-lines* enhancing communist propaganda and the support of guerilla movements. Maps justified their perception of being surrounded and threatened by the Western alliance (see Figure 38). On the other hand, the Western politic of “containment” intended to limit the expansion of the communist threat.

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<sup>123</sup> Jean-Louis Schlegel, “Territoires des religions”, *Hermès, La Revue* 2012/2 (n° 63), 37.




**Figure 40: Map and Representation of the Cold War**

Source: From Tosevic, *The World Crisis in Maps*, 53 and <http://www.olderburger.us/gary/docs/TheColdWar.htm>

Maps are not only elements of representation but also a way to define the world. The reality is not only about geographical realities but about economic flows and the organization of the world with respect to




culture, religions, ethnicities and so many criteria. Representing a country according to the size of its GDP per inhabitant or the time of travelling or the volume of exchange provide a new dimension less correlated to spatial territories (see Figure 41 and 42).



**Figure 41: Most Visited Website per Country**

Source : [www.marginalrevolution.com](http://www.marginalrevolution.com)



**Figure 42: Weighted Map of the World, Circa 1500 and 2050**

Source : [www.marginalrevolution.com](http://www.marginalrevolution.com)

In that process, technology with big data modifies and introduces new perspectives about borders and the representation of the world. The state is not the only metric to give sense to and to create *Otherness*. The classic representation of the border has evolved through the impact of socialization agents such as Apple or Microsoft. Instead of referring to the exclusive narrative of the state as agent of power, different perspectives appear. Images of territorial partition can be influential in the way people understand the world and socialize.<sup>124</sup>

### **Trends and Evolutions**

The post-Cold War context highlights two contradictory trends. The first one envisions the construction of a borderless world with the potential disappearance of borders. The second one increases the need for hardened barriers.

#### **The Myth of a *Borderless Word* (see Figure 43)**

The context of the post-Cold-War, and the effects of globalization induced the potential for the openness of borders. The phenomenon took roots in economic globalization. Different treaties or agreements define the types of new openness and their purpose. The European Union's Schengen Treaty appears as the most relevant example in the spectrum of openness. It facilitates the free circulation of people, goods and capital without any specific borders inside its territories.

In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect, creating "one of the world's largest free trade zones and laying the foundations for strong economic growth and rising prosperity for Canada, the United States, and Mexico."<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Kolossov, "State of the Debate Report I", 38.

<sup>125</sup> *North American Free Trade Agreement*, accessed March 23, 2017, [www.naftanow.org/default\\_en.asp](http://www.naftanow.org/default_en.asp)



**Figure 43: International and Regional Integration**

Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development/ BBC News

In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand created the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Brunei Darussalam, Viet Nam, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia are also

now part of this association. ASEAN's aim is "to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership."<sup>126</sup> It directly acts for peace and regional stability with respect to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) are additional examples of initiatives creating economic integration and highlighting the trend for the openness of borders.

Nevertheless, the existence of these organizations, and the effective dematerialization of borders do not erase the reality of borders. In the case study of Europe, the widest example of openness, many researchers of the topic explain how the borders do not disappear but change their nature. Rumford argues that borders are a result of several social practices, multiplying, and "generalizing throughout society." Specifically, he identifies that not "only the state has the power to enforce the border" and that "conditions exist for developing border work, that is, the engagement of people in bordering activities."<sup>127</sup> Finally, Balibar explains how borders are moving from their customary peripheral sites in nation-states to the interior in numerous locations. In her survey about the Portuguese-Spanish border, Amante synthesizes their approaches. She concludes that the affective and social experience of the border

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<sup>126</sup> *Association of Southeast Asian Nations*, accessed March 23, 2017, [asean.org/asean/about-asean/](http://asean.org/asean/about-asean/)

<sup>127</sup> Amante, "Recovering the Paradox of the Border," 25.



maintains its existence even if not materialized or enforced.<sup>128</sup>

### **The Nightmare of a *Gated Globe***

A trend reacting to a borderless world has also been expanding across the globe. States or regional organizations have been hardening borders and developing processes to identify, control and filter flows of people beyond the *border-line*. They rely on diplomatic and coercive means to create an intelligent filter acting like a computer firewall. Doreen Massey explains how “power geometry is not only about who moves and who does not but also about who is in a position of control in relation to movement.”<sup>129</sup>


The relation to the *Other* and the *Self* applies through a new process. The *Self* is the one living inside, sharing a style of life, and an economy of common welfare. The *Other* is especially the migrants from less developed countries, who are trying to join the most developed countries. The *border-line* is effectively transformed into a combination of frontiers and soft borders enhancing the rise of sanctuaries. On the one hand, states building soft borders facilitate trade and the circulation of goods, money, and people. The Schengen system is a compelling case in point in Europe. On the other hand, juridical and coercive means are being developed to harden those external borders. Operation *Gate Keeper* at the American-Mexican border and surveillance operations on the Mediterranean coasts demonstrate coercive intentions (see Figure 44).<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Amante, “Recovering the Paradox of the Border”, 37.

<sup>129</sup> Kolossov, State of the Debate Report I”, 8.

<sup>130</sup> Olivier Clochard, “Vers la Sanctuarisation des Pays Riches”, *L'atlas Géopolitique 2006, Une nouvelle Géopolitique*, 58-69.



**Figure 44: A World of Hardened Borders**

*Source: Clochard, CNRS*

## **The End of the *Border-Line***

*What is clear is that the literature suggests that the unifying, symbolic, dividing, and exclusionary role of a border as a founding principle of a sovereign state is currently under pressure. What is also clear is that there is a wealth of scholarly characterizations of borders, boundaries, and borderlands, where non-central-state actors, pluri-national communities, and stateless nations perforate borders or undermine the integrity of state borders because of ethnic, religious, social, and economic identities.*

*Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly  
The State of Borders and Borderlands Studies*

## **The Asynchronous Principle of the *Border-line***

The concepts of border, sovereignty and state are related to a historical period, the post-eighteenth century and European cultural values. The new paradigm of the globalized and interconnected world challenges its consistency. Kolossov identifies globalization as a “normative-teleological project of transcending the various divisions and territorially bounded entities of the world with far-reaching unity as the end-goal.”<sup>131</sup> The analysis of the effects of globalization demonstrates that borders have not disappeared. Nevertheless, the flow of exchange and cross-border identities have undermined the reality of sovereignty within a territory exclusively bounded by a *border-line*. The *normative* process which has transformed the European concept of *border-line* into an international rule after 1945 is now asynchronous.

The current *normative* process has created laws without any global and definitive social adhesion to its principles. The concept of *border-line* as a universal norm is not consistent with international juridical organization. The official interdiction of war by the UN in 1945 deprived countries of the use of violence to settle their disputes. Nevertheless,

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<sup>131</sup> Kolossov, State of the Debate Report I”, 5.

conflicts have not stopped since that time. The absence of a supra organization definitively weakened the *normative* process and modified the relationship between rulers, border, people, and territories. Monique Chemillier-Gendreau explains how the right to intervene, the ambiguity of consensus, and the absence of obligation or sanction to adhere to an international law disable the *normative* process itself. She especially points out the paradox between sovereignty defined as an unlimited power and the juridical order which limits it.<sup>132</sup> For example, only 72 countries are members of the International Court of Justice, which decreases its legitimacy and highlights the absence of global adhesion. Moreover, the military interventions of the last 20 years in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Libya demonstrate that impassable and respected *border-lines* were subjective to discretionary values. The normalization of the *border-line* has introduced a sense of morality about territorial disputes.

The supra and regional organizations have modified the Westphalian paradigm about sovereignty and nation-state building. States are now sharing or delegating the state's prerogatives to other organizations at the international and local level. The new transnational movements and the reaffirmation of local cultures or beliefs have shaped new form of identities. In contrast, the *border-line* as an element of the paradigm, has become a norm, which questions the coexistence of different types of borders throughout history. The relationships between the different elements of the paradigm need a new equilibrium. All the patterns of the categorization of legal assumptions have evolved, except the *normative* approach to the *border-line*. Why shouldn't the normative feature of the *border-line* also be evolving?

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<sup>132</sup> Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, "L'état souverain aurait-il peur du droit international ?", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 1989, 24-25.



## **The Illusion of the Normative *Border-Line*, the Need for a New Approach**

*The map of the world will never be static. The rules by which diplomats and other policymaking elites have ordered the world these past few hundred years will apply less and less. Solutions, in the main, will have to come from within the affected cultures themselves.*

*Robert Kaplan,  
The Ends of the Earth*

One of the initial outcomes of the *border-line* was to increase stability by separating internal and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the system was maintaining a dynamic process with the potential to change borders and to define them with respect to region and political-economic intents. Beck explains how “contemporary borders are *mobile*: they can be created, shifted, and deconstructed by a range of actors.” The process of border-making is no longer an exclusive prerogative of the nation-state or state actors but potentially the project of a network of actors.<sup>133</sup> The *normative* process disables options to set border issues and decreases political actions. As no legal solutions exist, territorial issues stay unresolved and are a source of regional tension, making normal relations between countries even more difficult. The absence of a political or original set of solutions, despite the potential benefits, fuel passions and aggressive behaviors. The rigidity of the *border-line* turns the short-term status quo into militarization and seeds for wars. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan is a compelling case in point of an unsettled dispute for over 70 years.<sup>134</sup> The context of the South Asian Sea with the building of military airstrips on artificial islands is another example of militarization, as no legal issue exists.

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<sup>133</sup> Kolossov, “State of the Debate Report I” 4.

<sup>134</sup> Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “How the World Got the Concept of Borders Wrong. Rigid territorial norms make the resolution of contemporary territorial disputes almost impossible”, *The Diplomat*, June 12, 2014, accessed March 23, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/how-the-world-got-the-concept-of-borders-wrong/>

The human cell provides a living example of the contemporary features of the bordering process. At the macro level, a human cell is clearly independent, separated from its environment, and develops its own identity (chemical composition, role and ways to react according to internal and external elements). A *border-line* would be a closer element to define the separation between inside and outside, and the character of discontinuity. At the micro level, the process is different, many intermediary areas exist between inside and outside. The size of the area of exchange can be different with respect to each cell. A continuous area of change instead of a formal discontinuous one would be the best way to describe it. *Frontier* and *border-area* would be the closest way to define such zones.

With respect to this natural analogy and previous historical examples of human organizations, some key elements could enable the acceptance of coexisting legal types of borders. First, the modern state era has been existing only for only two centuries, a short period with respect to empires and other modes of societies. The creation of the *border-line* enabled the affirmation of people's sovereignty and stability within a specific context. The new current assumptions may inspire the acceptance of new or multiple ways of bordering, "namely that alternative border imaginaries are needed."<sup>135</sup> It begins with the acceptance that the Westphalian process and the modern state may not be the final spatial organization in the history of mankind. Technological improvements, new identities, and old patterns of society can make sense when thinking about the future.

First, the former models provide insights that serve to define new types of bordering processes and sovereignty related to inequality and diversity. Empires were enabling and organizing the flows of materials, capital and people. Moreover, they were relying on different tactics to

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<sup>135</sup> Vaughan-Williams, *Border politics: the limits of sovereign power*. 56.

govern people and organize space. Assimilation or differentiation were the two main trends. Roman citizenship in the latter case and the *mission civilisatrice*<sup>136</sup> for the European colonizers during the 19th century in the former case is a compelling case in point.<sup>137</sup> The bordering process was also adapted to each situation. The *limes* and later the *buffer zones* were coexisting with more tight borders.

Second, some analyses of current state patterns demonstrate that these states are already relying on a combination of bordering processes similar to Westphalian states and empires. The multiple layer of borders is already unofficially applied by states. For example, the rise of the “biometric border” and new security doctrines deny the idea of the internal/external Westphalian approach. The biometric border refers to “the encoding of the bodies of travelers before they move to enable the fixing of identities, classification according to perceived levels of risk, and filter into legitimate or illegitimate flows of traffic.”<sup>138</sup> Borders’ controls are now located outside of countries and with respect to specific and changing patterns. For example, the EU applies a combination of three models. The Schengen space where no control exists under regular conditions defines one. A second set of loose controls applies to countries members of the EU, but not to the Schengen space. Different types of control with respect to the country set the bordering rules. For example, the extension and the influence towards former USSR states can be related to the model of *frontier*. Specific agreements demonstrate this point.<sup>139</sup>

Third, the new pattern of *Otherness* modifies the process of bordering. Globalization has modified the perception of the *otherness*. After WW II, the Geneva convention and the Universal Declaration of

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<sup>136</sup> *Mission civilisatrice* means *civilizing mission*, and was the official European policy justifying the colonialization

<sup>137</sup> Jane Burkank and Frederick Cooper, “De Rome À Constantinople, Penser L’empire Pour Comprendre Le Monde”, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 2011.

<sup>138</sup> Vaughan-Williams, *Border politics: the limits of sovereign power*, 59.

<sup>139</sup> Kolossov, “State of the Debate Report I”, 22.

Human Rights developed some principles protecting people and legitimizing a right to move. Nevertheless, after the 1990s, a shift occurred with respect to this humanist trend. States were adopting rules of exclusions, NGOs, and international institutions were managing flows of population. In 2016, over 60 million people were considered forced displaced populations.<sup>140</sup> These figures will continue to rise because of environmental issues and international disequilibrium for the decades to come. In a globalized world, the *other* has a global symbolism, invisible, with no clear identity. New spaces appear with ambiguous status where the *Other* has no real spatial correlation.<sup>141</sup> For example, supposedly temporary refugee camps are becoming permanent, and retention housing in Western countries are areas legally undefined. These observations agree with Kaldor's cosmopolitan approach. She explains how the new legitimacy of patterns of violence and identities relies mostly on a new perspective crossing global and local lines.<sup>142</sup> The emergence of economic regions out of culturally homogenous borderland regions and highly urbanized spaces deny the formal identification of single citizenships, nationality, or origin. These arguments suggest that flows of goods, capital, and migrants not only limit the influence of central governments but also modify their local culture and political identity.

Finally, such trends could help us to think about original ways to shape the bordering process. Kolossov also synthesizes this perspective when he states:

To summarize then: contextually sensitive understandings of the concept of post-national borders in no way suggest a disappearance of states or the decline of state territoriality per se. They instead suggest the potential emergence of new

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<sup>140</sup> Adrian Edwards, "Global Forced displacement hits Record High", *The United Nations Refugee Agency*, 20 June 2016, accessed March 24, 2017, <http://www.unhcr.org/afr/news/latest/2016/6/5763b65a4/global-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html>.

<sup>141</sup> Michel Agier, "Frontières de l'exil. Vers une altérité biopolitique", *Hermès, La Revue* 2012/2 (n° 63), 92.

<sup>142</sup> Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, 12.



borders, new border functions and/or new methods of territorial control that go beyond traditional notions of state territoriality. Post-national borders might thus follow either sub- or supranational logics of political interaction. Such borders are post-national because they create new political functions of integration and interaction across state borders. Understood in these terms, post-national borders might define polities that transcend the jurisdictional and conceptual limits of state-centered orientations, for example as a community of states, as networks of cities or cross-border regions.<sup>143</sup>

The choice of type of borders relates to the combination of key questions.

- What could be the most appropriate type of governance and rules of accountability for populations?

Answering this question will define how different actors share sovereignty with respect to the local population, and what is their political aim. For example, the cross-border area could obtain an official status, and the role of buffer areas could enable the continuity of flow and the decrease of tensions. The type of governance will impact the relationships at the global and local level. Sovereignty would no longer be in control of territories but rather of flows, which enable the bordering process to be dynamic and to be performed anywhere.

- How to organize the different layers of territoriality and the level of cooperation?

Answering this question will interact with the perception of identities and the *Other*. The scale of discontinuity and the intensity of flows will define the scope of territoriality needed. Interactions between different areas will define the attributes of the type of borders. Legitimation of citizenships and enforcement of laws would set the level of security required. The level of integration and interaction, as demonstrated in cross border areas, support the effectiveness of major issues, such as crime, immigration, and security. The result could be the rise of regional and dynamic bordering processes instead of a global and static norm.

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<sup>143</sup> Kolossov, "State of the Debate Report I", 17.

## CONCLUSION

*The world geopolitical vision has three aspects: a historical (the attitude to the events of the past), a representational (ideas, principles, values and models which the state believes fundamental) and a relational (the attitude towards other actors and communities). It involves a comparison of the situation in the country with which an individual associate himself and in other countries, particularly its neighbors: here and there, good and bad.*

*Kolossov  
State of the Debate Report I*

The end of the Cold War, the rise of a multinational order and globalization have impacted the structures of the Westphalian modern state. Sovereignty and borders, key assumptions of the organization and legitimacy of the modern Western model, have evolved.

A historical approach demonstrates that the concept of border has encompassed various approaches throughout history and civilizations from *border-area* to *border-line* to *frontier*. The delineation and the organization of space has not always coincided with linguistic, ethnic, or cultural differences.

A representational and relational survey highlights that the bordering process developed according to two principal trends: socialization and self-identification of people with territory or differentiation and construction in opposition to *Others*. The security or the power provided and accepted by rulers created a degree of legitimacy. The (de)construction and the constitution of borders were a consequence of the mechanisms of power and an adaptation to a combination of internal and international pressures. The bordering process, including delimitation, demarcation, management, and control, highlights the role of power at the national and local level.

Nevertheless, different styles of bordering in a spectrum from *border-line* to *border-area* to *frontier*, respected these principles. Different systems were coexisting during equivalent periods. Accurate delineations and the need to enforce specific controls have been modern phenomena. Nationalism and the definitive monopoly of power exerted by the state has imposed international rules.

The *normative* principle of the *border-line* appears as the new element of our modern area as it claims to convert the dynamic bordering process into a universal and static one. The *normative* international definition of borders does not reflect the reality of the concept. Different sets of rules have attempted to create an international regulation but they have not achieved the ability to impose a static approach. The nature of a border and its level of openness is a choice because it is, first and foremost, a human construction before becoming a technical construction.

Two trends characterize the 21st century but do not decrease tensions or provide satisfying explanations of global issues about borders. First, the myth of a borderless world, mainly influenced by the liberal order and humanitarian norms, expects to erase borders. Practically, some regional organizations have accomplished innovations in this direction over the last decades. The European Union and the Schengen Space are the most open borderlands between nation-states. Nevertheless, this approach forgets the impact of identities and the need for accountability of people towards supra national organizations. The rise of nationalist parties and some regional claims for autonomy remind us what the reality for people is.

The second trend envisions a gated world, where borders will separate and filter people with respect to economic or cultural criteria. The external borders of the European Union and the rise of various walls in America and the Middle East are the material accomplishment of this fragmented world. Nevertheless, such a perspective forgets the reality of


cross border integration, the historical facts of migrations and global trends

No model can definitively explain the bordering process and address the global issue of migrations. On the one hand, the modern state relied on the vision of a government legitimate supported by a homogenous people within a territory bounded by *border-lines*. On the other hand, empires were mainly the expression of an extensive power supported by a diversity of populations and with sometimes no clear delineations. Different forms of sovereignty and dynamic/static bordering were applied. The future might be to accept new perspectives of shared sovereignty and multiple identities within territories instead of a single *normative* rule (see APPENDIX A figure 43, APPENDIX B Figure 44, and APPENDIX C Figure 45, APPENDIX D The Ukrainian Case, APPENDIX E The South Asian Sea Case).






APPENDIX A: RELATIONS TERRITORY/ PEOPLE/ BORDERS/ RULERS  
IN EMPIRES AND FEUDAL SYSTEMS



**Figure 45: Relations Territory/ People/ Borders/ Rulers in Empires and Feudal Systems**

*Source: Author's Original Work*


APPENDIX B: RELATIONS TERRITORY/ PEOPLE/ BORDERS/ RULERS  
IN THE WESTPHALIA SYSTEM



**Figure 46: Relations Territory/ People/ Borders/ Rulers in the Westphalia System**

*Source: Author's Original Work*

## APPENDIX C: RELATIONS TERRITORY/PEOPLE/ BORDERS/ RULERS IN THE 21ST CENTURY



**Figure 47: Relations Territory/People/ Borders/ Rulers in the 21st Century**

*Source: Author's Original Work*

## APPENDIX D: THE UKRAINIAN CASE

The use of the framework provided in the conclusion may help to set different perspectives to the current annexation of Crimea by Russia and the conflict in the eastern regions of Ukraine (see Figure 48).



**Figure 48: Spatial Organization in Ukraine after the Minsk Agreement II**

*Source : Eurasiangeopolitics.files.wordpress.com*

### Dyad Rulers/Territory: Representation (See Figure 49)

- Use of satellites and social media to watch and control the movements at the border;
- Narrative competition to define the official rulers over territories;





**Figure 49: Evolution of the Effective Rulers over Ukrainian Territories**  
Source: [www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews)

### Dyad Rulers/People: Legitimacy/ Security/Fiscalism

- Survey of the effective accountability between rulers and people;
- Level of security, effectiveness of fiscalism, level of corruption each side of the border;
- Level of people representation at the local and national levels;

### Dyad Rulers/Borders: Internal Control (see Figure 50)

- Survey of the role and the effectiveness of the control of the borders by the state (impact of technology, traditional measures of enforcement);
- Influence and interests of other supranational actors (EU, NATO, Russia, NGOs...);



**Figure 50: Spatial Interactions Ukraine-Russia-EU**


Source : *www.lhistoire.fr*

### Dyad Territory/People: Nationalism Vs Cosmopolitarism (see Figure 51)

- Relevance of the ethnic, religious and self-perception of Russian and Ukrainian citizenships in these regions;



- Local perception of openness of the territory to the neighbors and the rest of the world;



**Figure 51: Political and Cultural Identities in Ukraine**

Source: [www.vox.com](http://www.vox.com)

#### Dyad People/Borders: Cross-border Interactions, *Otherness*

- Survey of the cross-border interactions, and its historical and recent evolution: flow of people, capital and goods before and after the crisis;
- Level of political, economic and cultural discontinuity at the border;
- Level of decentralization and effective local political power;
- Interactions and level of differentiation between different communities inside each area and across the border (for example, inter group marriage, spatial separation of communities in cities and in rural areas);


### Dyad Territory/Borders: Potential of Change

- Armed conflict as the factor of change;
- No potential of change through the *normative* process of the border-line: continuous crisis;
- Example of other potential options:
  - self-determination;
  - local organization of the territory with shared sovereignty;
  - independent new territory;
  - *border-area* between the EU/NATO and Russia (separation between two *frontiers* as for the Ottoman-Russian agreement in the 18th century);
  - acceptance by the international community of the change of the location of the *border-line*;
  - acceptance and mental creation of a new border (as the example of the Oder-Neisse line in Germany after WW II).



## APPENDIX E: THE SOUTH ASIAN SEA CASE

The South Asian Sea dispute involves Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam about the control of islands (mostly Spatly and Paracel islands), and sovereignty over attached maritime areas (see Figure 52).



**Figure 52: South China Sea Maritime Claims**

Source : <http://www.southchinasea.org>

#### Dyad Rulers/Territory: Representation

- Use of maritime fleet, satellites and social media to watch and control the movements in the area;
- Narrative competition to define the official rulers over territories;
- Issue with respect to the official definitions and the implementation of the *border-line* of maritime borders (exclusive areas continental shell);
- New status of artificial islands;

#### Dyad Rulers/People: Source of Economic Growth

- Specificity of little islands scarcely settled;
- Importance of oil and fishing resources for national development;

#### Dyad Rulers/Borders

- Survey of effective control of the maritime areas;
- Type of control on claimed areas (loose/tight);
- Influence and interests of other actors (US, Japan, Australia, the international community and the free flow across international waters);

#### Dyad Territory/People: Nationalism Vs Cosmopolitarism

- Relevance of representation of the islands for people of the different countries;
- Local perception of openness of the territory to the neighbors and to the rest of the world;


#### Dyad People/Borders: Cross-Border Interactions, *Otherness*

- Survey of the cross-border interactions and its recent evolution: flow of people, capital and goods before and after the crisis;
- Level of political, economic and cultural discontinuity between different countries of the area and the potential change with new delineation of maritime borders;
- Level of decentralization and effective local political power in the islands;

- Interactions and level of differentiation between different communities in the contested areas;

#### Dyad Territory/Borders: Potential of Change


- Arm race and escalation of tension;
- Potential armed conflict as the factor of change and the control of maritime areas;
- Limitation of the normative definition of the *border-line* (continental shelf, artificial islands...);
- Limitation of the enforcement of the decisions of the International Court of Justice;
- Examples of other potential options:
  - model of *frontier* and *border-area* with respect to the rise of China;
  - shared sovereignty over resources (Antarctica/space scenario);
  - supra-national entity, allocation of resources and legitimacy to enforce a norm defined by the actors (see Figure 53 and 54).



**Figure 53: Overlapping Resources and Maritime Claims**

Source : [www.southchinasea.org](http://www.southchinasea.org)





**Figure 54: Oil and Gas Resources in the South China Sea**

Source : [www.southchinasea.org](http://www.southchinasea.org)



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