

GRAY ZONE LEGISLATION AND ACTIVITIES:
EVALUATING THE ORCHESTRATION OF CONVERGENCE WITHIN THE
GRAY ZONE

BY

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APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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DISCLAIMER

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the US Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.



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ABSTRACT

In *Gray Zone Legislation and Activities: Evaluating the Orchestration of Convergence within the Gray Zone*, Murphy examines military and intelligence activities within the Gray Zone and what directs their convergence. More specifically, the author analyzes the contemporary view that Title 10 and 50 legislation directs convergence based on legal context. Murphy then introduces classic military theory as a method to conceptualize two unconventional warfare and two counter terrorism case studies in the post-2001 security environment: toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan; the Syria Training and Equipping Program; efforts against the al-Qaeda Senior Leadership; and, the Counter-Lord's Resistance Army campaign. Each case study demonstrates how convergence and divergence is heavily influenced by public support and political will. Public support—a population's passion for a political object over time—varies within each case study. Political will—the resolution to accomplish ends in light of risks—also varies within each case study and takes cues from public support. The author concludes by illustrating how legislation had a minimal role in determining convergence or divergence. In the end, classical military theory directs the convergence and divergence of military and intelligence activities rather than legislation.

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Introduction

Threats and challenges characteristic of the post-2001 security environment have produced a marked convergence of military and intelligence activities. Belligerents increasingly attack or threaten American interests across the globe through political, economic, information and militant actions short of conventional warfare—an area called the Gray Zone.¹ Military and intelligence professionals' efforts have converged as they respond to the Gray Zone challenges through two paramilitary activities; unconventional warfare (UW) and counterterrorism (CT). Legislation found in Titles 10 and 50 of U.S. Code has not fundamentally changed in response to the Gray Zone and has sparked concern for the future of a seemingly inevitable convergence trend. Variations in convergence, however, refute the inevitability of the trend and suggest convergence and divergence are the product of military theory.

Irregular belligerents serve as the foundation of this convergence and divergence trend. These belligerents have received considerable attention while they successfully operate within the Gray Zone. The belligerents are either state or non-state actors whose goals involve rejecting or revising political power and governance. They use unprecedented access to technology, through globalization, to further their goals. They collaborate, coordinate, and communicate to perform operations that challenge conventional defense capabilities. This use of the Gray Zone presents a challenge to those who subscribe to the traditional “peace or war” paradigm, which has contributed to irregular belligerents' recent success. Separatists in the Ukraine, for example, seized key territory in Donbas and brought down a civilian airliner

¹ Joseph L. Votel et al., *Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2016), http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-80/jfq-80_101-109_Votel-et-al.pdf.

through supposed Russian training and equipment.² Destabilizing the Ukraine, a long-time goal of Russia, seems within reach without the latter engaging in overt hostilities.³ One thousand miles away in Iraq, the Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) leveraged Sunni grievances with the predominately Shia government through the effective use of propaganda to amass a power base in northern Iraq.⁴ Iraqi forces either unwilling or unable to respond to ISIL's advances southward ceded large swaths of the country's territory, nearly seizing the airport outside of Baghdad.⁵ As a result, the ambiguous character and success of Gray Zone competition have forced U.S. defense professionals to reconsider their approach.

This approach has forced military and intelligence professionals' efforts to converge to counter Gray Zone belligerents. Of the intelligence community's four broad activities—collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence—covert action has grown in capability and capacity to meet Gray Zone challenges.⁶ Covert action is “[a]n activity to influence political, economic or military conditions abroad where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be acknowledged publicly.”⁷ All twelve core activities address Gray Zone challenges within the military's special operations forces (SOF) specified roles and missions, but two have experienced unprecedented growth and attention since 2001: UW and CT. Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, the joint doctrine for special operations, defines UW as "operations and activities

² “Fighting and Winning in the ‘Gray Zone,’” *War on the Rocks*, May 19, 2015, <https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-and-winning-in-the-gray-zone/>.

³ “Russia’s Destabilization of Ukraine,” *U.S. Department of State*, accessed January 12, 2017, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2014/may/225773.htm>.

⁴ “How Can the U.S. Help Maliki When Maliki’s the Problem?,” *Washington Post*, accessed January 12, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/06/12/iraq-trapped-between-isis-and-maliki/>.

⁵ “ISIS Nearly Made It to Baghdad Airport, Dempsey Says - CNNPolitics.Com,” accessed January 12, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/12/politics/isis-baghdad-martin-dempsey/>.

⁶ Mark M Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 2017, 14, 17.

⁷ *War and National Defense*, 50, 2004.

that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”⁸ CT is “activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their networks to render them incapable of using unlawful violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.”⁹ UW and CT missions’ previously overt military characteristics have converged with the intelligence communities’ covert missions as SOF continues to drift away from overt action and deeper into the realm of Gray Zone competition. Convergent episodes have resulted in highly successful Gray Zone activities for USSOCOM forces. Convergence, however, is seemingly on a collision vector with legislation despite recent success.

Convergence in the Gray Zone poses a problem for a legislative framework that seeks to balance accountability to, and the protection of, the American people. Accountability and protection seem to be at odds with one another given the authorities and oversight requirements in Titles 10 and 50. Deriving the proper authorities for a particular activity poses challenges for military and intelligence professionals. Disparate oversight requirements, however, pose the biggest challenge to converging military and intelligence activities. These oversight requirements seem to direct the legal application of either covert or overt activities. As a result, some contend this directive language poses challenges for the seemingly inevitable trend towards convergence.¹⁰ The incompatibility between convergence and legislation has prompted several scholars to suggest a prompt re-write of legislation to avoid risk

⁸ Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations*, July 16, 2014.

⁹ Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations*.

¹⁰ Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities & Covert Action,” *Harv. Nat’l Sec. J.* 3 (2011): 141; Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” *Journal of National Security Law and Policy* 5 (2012): 629.

to Gray Zone operations.¹¹ Variations in convergence, however, would cast doubt on the imminent necessity of such a re-write and the source of Gray Zone risk.

Divergent trends suggest another variable might be at play in the direction of military and intelligence activities. Mutually exclusive efforts between covert and overt activities towards the same goal are one such example of divergence. The absence of either covert or overt action within a campaign is a more prominent example. Therefore divergence might result from factors other than legislation. This hypothesis begs the question: What directs the convergence of military and intelligence activities?

This paper uses a comparative case study methodology within a grounded theory approach to answering the thesis question.¹² A modified classical military theory heuristic provides a lens from which to view case studies. In turn, case studies reveal the unique politico-military context, existence of convergence, the origins of convergence, and the success or failure of potential convergence. Key questions to extract data from each case study, and ultimately lead to a grounded theory conclusion, include: What was the political reason for employing the military or intelligence community? Was the military or intelligence community response commensurate with that political reason? Was convergence present? Was it successful? Finally, how much of a role did legislation have in directing convergence or divergence?

¹¹ Wall, "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate," 141; Chesney, "Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate," 649.

¹² Philip Bulawa, "Adapting Grounded Theory in Qualitative Research: Reflections from Personal Experience," *International Research in Education* 2, no. 1 (January 16, 2014): 146–48, doi:10.5296/ire.v2i1.4921. Grounded theory is an inductive methodology which constructs a theory based on the analysis of data. The data is collected, examined, and then analyzed to produce a theory. It is the opposite of traditional methodologies which test a hypothesis against available data and makes determinations based on the results.

In structure, this paper begins with a theoretical model and then moves to specific case studies before analysis yields recommendations.¹³ The author selected the UW and CT case studies for their occurrence within the Gray Zone. Four case studies of UW and CT campaigns—two for each activity—ensure the research sufficiently examines trends over longer periods of time rather than a single event. In effect, the case studies provide background and baseline knowledge to answer the thesis question. Chapter One explores the statutory delineation between Title 10 and Title 50 and how experts interpret its authorities. The chapter continues by examining the authorities vested in both USSOCOM. It then investigates the authorizations inherent in USSOCOM and how they have translated into UW and CT means, ways, ends, and risks.

Chapter Two provides a theoretical model based on military theory to explore the case studies in a more systematic manner. This theory, based on Carl von Clausewitz's trinity, examines the fundamental relationship between the people and their government as well as the relationship between the government and both the military and intelligence community. The first relationship is expressed through public support while the second is political will. The aspects of political will—ends, means, ways, and risks—are also examined to identify the calculus behind decisions which result in convergence or divergence. This model provides a conceptual lens for case study analysis.

Chapter Three examines the first of two UW case studies, the 2001-invasion of Afghanistan, to overthrow the Taliban regime suspected of harboring Al-Qaeda. The invasion consisted of 350 Special Operations Forces (SOF), 110 interagency operatives, 15,000 Afghan irregulars, and

¹³ The classified nature of activities in the Gray Zone makes researching and writing at an unclassified level difficult. A few details may be incorrect or omitted due to some reliance upon press accounts. Overall themes, however, remain thanks to biographies from various principals and deputies within the military and intelligence community.

many land and carrier-based air strikes.¹⁴ After three months, the alliance of anti-Taliban forces had taken the Afghan capital and dismantled the incumbent regime.¹⁵ The campaign marks a true convergence in which niche covert action combined with the capacity of SOF and airpower. The campaign to topple the Taliban, however, was not the last time UW was used to attempt to overthrow an adversary.

Chapter Four looks at another UW case study: Syrian Train and Equip Program in 2014. This program aimed to dislodge ISIL and its affiliates in Syria by vetting and training a proxy force of volunteers.¹⁶ Very few of the initial wave of SOF-trained recruits deployed to the battlefield and even fewer remained after contact with the enemy. After being routed by Al-Qaeda forces, only “four or five” of the SOF-trained recruits were either alive or actively fighting.¹⁷ The program ended following those battlefield setbacks.¹⁸ The program, conducted in a politically sensitive environment, was emblematic of a divergence in covert action and military activities. In the end, the divergent UW program to train and equip forces to rout ISIL was an abject failure.

¹⁴ Votel et al., *Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone*.

¹⁵ Charles H. Briscoe, ed., *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan* (Boulder, Colo: Paladin Press, 2006), 203.

¹⁶ Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, “Military Hates White House ‘Micromanagement’ of ISIS War: The Pentagon Brass Placed in Charge of Implementing Obama’s War against ISIS Are Getting Fed up with the Short Leash the White House Put Them on.,” *The Daily Beast*, October 31, 2014, sec. World, <http://search.proquest.com.aufric.idm.oclc.org/docview/1649043944/abstract/30D10354851C4054PQ/1>.

¹⁷ “Gen. Austin to Fischer: Only 4 or 5 Trained Rebels in Syria - Press - United States Senator Deb Fischer for Nebraska,” accessed January 13, 2017, <http://www.fischer.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/news?ID=a0de1438-8024-4587-9c54-0de82da067e1>.

¹⁸ Michael D. Shear Cooper Helene and Eric Schmitt, “Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS,” *The New York Times*, October 9, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html>.

Chapter Five shifts missions and focuses on the first of two CT case studies, the campaign against the Al-Qaeda senior leadership (AQSL). The campaign against AQSL began immediately after the September 11, 2001, attacks and the case study concludes with the 2011 mission to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden.¹⁹ The strategy against AQSL has remained relatively constant while the means and ways have changed drastically. These means and ways, in the form of DoD and CIA resources as well as covert action and military activities, initially diverged but then sharply converged as the campaign continued. The convergence derives from AQSL's transition to a political sanctuary within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan as well as a capacity shortfall. Ultimately, divergent means and ways were unsuccessful while the convergence was highly effective.

Chapter Six explores the second of two CT case studies, the campaign against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in sub-Saharan Africa, dubbed Operation Observant Compass (OOC). The LRA, headed by warlord Joseph Kony, has been the focus of OOC's coalition-led manhunt since he was designated "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" by Executive Order in 2008.²⁰ Kony and his hundreds of followers remain at large in the sub-Saharan jungles despite apprehending one of his top generals. OOC is the definition of divergence with only meager SOF means and ways comprising the overall effort.²¹ Not surprisingly, many question the strategic relevance of OOC and its lack of progress since inception.²²

¹⁹ Leon E. Panetta and Jim Newton, *Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace* (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).

²⁰ "National Counterterrorism Center: Groups," accessed January 12, 2017, <https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/lra.html>.

²¹ Joseph Trevithick, "On the Hunt for Kony (the Small and Secretive War against Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army)," *Air Force Magazine*, September 2014.

²² Alexis Arieff and Lauren Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army: The US Response," *Current Politics and Economics of Africa* 7, no. 2 (2014): 173.

The concluding chapter synthesizes the findings from each chapter to reinforce the theoretical model. As a result, the chapter concludes that classic military theory directs the convergence and divergence of military and intelligence activities—not legislation. The observations of how public support and political will interact throughout the case studies form the basis for the conclusion. The concluding chapter offers readers recommendations and key takeaways for the target audience of the thesis, action officers within USSOCOM as well as Congressional staffers.



Chapter 2

Background

Policy, leadership, and continuity—collectively, these are the sine qua non of effective covert action...If the people and policies change frequently or precipitately, the impetus is lost and confusion reigns. Skillful operators cannot prevail against it.

Hugh Tovar

Mission convergence between military and intelligence has sparked debates on both legal authorities and oversight. The authorities debate focuses on categorization based on activity or the organization conducting it. Oversight disputes concern the degree of Congress' awareness of covert activities conducted by either the intelligence community or the military. Both issues of authorities and oversight come into focus in light of USSOCOM's legislated roles and responsibilities; more specifically, the ends, means, and ways of UW and CT missions. A final consideration, risk, also presents challenges to UW and CT mission success. In the end, the relationship between legislation and both UW and CT missions reveals symptomatic tensions but does little to explain convergence.

The authorities debate begins with the Constitutional authority of the President and Congress. The President has the power to protect and defend the US from external threats as head of the executive branch and Commander-in-Chief of the military.¹ This authority allows the President to use the military and intelligence community to protect and defend the country.² In the system of checks and balances enshrined in the Constitution by the Founding Fathers, Congress has enumerated

¹ The Prize Cases, 67 635 (1863).

² The Prize Cases, 67 635 (1863).

authorities to regulate the use and resourcing of the military.³ Congress' authorities attach accountability on President's use of both the military and intelligence community back to the American people.

The legislative foundation for the modern day use of the military and intelligence community is the National Security Act of 1947, which established the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) within Title 50 of the U.S. Code.⁴ The 1947 Act was part of a larger effort to demobilize forces at the end of World War II and restructure government to address America's increased global responsibilities.⁵ The Legislative branch of government, Congress, removed DoD-related roles and responsibilities from Title 50 and placed them within the newly established Title 10 of U.S. Code in 1962.⁶ The President's principal DoD assistant, the Secretary of Defense, still retained control of Title 50 organizations like the National Security Agency and National Reconnaissance Office that are part of the DoD. Thus, the Secretary of Defense can exercise military *and* intelligence-related authorities. This seemingly innocuous distinction established a landmark precedent of delineating Title 10 and 50 authorities by direction, control, and funding—not specific capabilities.⁷

The delineation of authorities has been much more challenging in practice. Former CIA Director, Leon Panetta, sparked a new round of debates as he labeled the famous CT operation to capture or kill Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, as a "Title 50 covert operation" in which he had overall command.⁸ Panetta later walked back from his comments

³ James Madison, "Federalist No. 39," *The Federalist Papers*, 2007, 9.

⁴ *National Security Act of 1947*, 50, 1947.

⁵ "A Look Back ... The National Security Act of 1947 — Central Intelligence Agency," accessed January 12, 2017, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/national-security-act-of-1947.html>.

⁶ *National Defense Authorization Act*, 10, 1962.

⁷ Wall, "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate."

⁸ "Leon Panetta on Leadership and 'Worthy' Fights," *PBS NewsHour*, accessed January 12, 2017, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/leon-panetta-worthy-fight/>.

when he asserted that the military component commander, then-Vice Admiral William McRaven, had military command during the operation.⁹ These comments are incomprehensible for those who believe Title 50 strictly relates intelligence activities and not by direction, control, and funding. Andru Wall rightly points out that Panetta's comments are more relevant to oversight than authorities.¹⁰

Oversight is responsibility, exercised by Congress, to hold the President's use of the military and intelligence community accountable to the American people. Guaranteeing civil liberties has been a significant concern of the American people, which has required Congressional oversight.¹¹ The biggest perceived threat to civil liberties has been the notion of covert action.¹² The National Security Act of 1947 first set the groundwork for covert action in the following language: "it shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council-- ... to perform such other functions and duties as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."¹³ President Harry S. Truman made reference to this function when he directed the CIA to conduct covert human intelligence collection against the Soviet Union.¹⁴ Many characterized Congressional oversight of the CIA from 1947 until 1975 as trusting. For example, Senate Armed Service Committee Chairman

⁹ Chesney, "Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate," 539.

¹⁰ Wall, "Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate," 86.

¹¹ Chesney, "Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate," 585.

¹² Chesney, "Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate," 585. Stephen Knott and Christopher Andrew point out that so-called "clandestine activities" have been used by presidents since the founding of the republic. For details see Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (New York: Harper, 1996) and Knott, *Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

¹³ *National Security Act of 1947*.

¹⁴ Chesney, "Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate," 544.

(SASC), Sen. Richard Russell, noted of all the agencies of the government whose activities "had to be taken on faith," it was the CIA.¹⁵ The next SASC Chairman, Sen. Leverett Saltonstall, echoed a similar sentiment when he said: "There are things that my government does that I would rather not know about."¹⁶ Congressional oversight of the CIA, or rather minimal intervention and questioning of covert activities, was in its golden era.

The golden era of trust abruptly changed after plans emerged in the media and Congressional hearings for covert military operations and intelligence activities to assassinate foreign leaders and subvert governments.¹⁷ Congress immediately began to assert more oversight and control over the CIA. In 1974, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 requiring the President to find each operation was vital to national security and Congress was notified of such activity.¹⁸ Six years later Congress repealed the Amendment to specify that prior notification to either the intelligence committees, the House and Senate leadership, or no Congressional notification at all, must be based on circumstances and ultimately notification had to occur.¹⁹ Civil-liberties concerns peaked after the Iran-Contra scandal, and Congress approved a new set of statutory reporting requirements to provide the military and intelligence community with more specific guidelines and boundaries for covert action.²⁰ As a result,

¹⁵ L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill* (Government Printing Office, 2008), 8.

¹⁶ Lowenthal, *Intelligence*.

¹⁷ Marshall Erwin, *Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Question* (Congressional Research Service, April 10, 2013), 1. The watershed legislation for covert action oversight occurred as a result of a series of hearings headed by a Senator from Idaho, Frank Forrester Church III. The resulting testimony and hearings, collected together into 14 volumes, are known popularly as "the Church Committee." All 14 volumes are available online at <http://www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm>.

¹⁸ Erwin, *Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Question*, 1.

¹⁹ Erwin, *Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Question*, 2.

²⁰ Erwin, *Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Question*, 2.

the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 established the covert action definition above after considerable discussion between the legislative and executive branches.

The Act, however, included an exception for the oversight of covert action for anything considered as “traditional military activities” (TMA).²¹ These activities involved unacknowledged operations that were 1) commanded and executed by military personnel and 2) took place in a context in which overt hostilities were ongoing or anticipated.²² The difference between covert action and TMA is seen in Figure 1 while the process for establishing TMA is provided in Figure 2. These oversight requirements make a key distinction on the US role during either covert action or TMA. Both definitions provide for unacknowledged activities as seen in Figure 1. The US military can conduct unacknowledged activities so long as the overall operation is acknowledged publicly. For example, an unacknowledged military activity within a publicly available Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) is permissible. The US military can also conduct an unacknowledged activity so long as there is intent to acknowledge US sponsorship later. Therefore, the difference between covert action and TMA lies in the permanence of an unapparent or unacknowledged US role in an activity. DoD forces cannot conduct activities in which the US role is unapparent or unacknowledged indefinitely. Therefore, unacknowledged military activities must either fall under an overt overall operation or intended to be publicly apparent or acknowledged at a later time.

²¹ U.S. Congress House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991: Report (to Accompany H.R. 1455)* (102nd Congress, 1991), <https://www.congress.gov/bill/102nd-congress/house-bill/1455/actions>.

²² U.S. Congress House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991: Report (to Accompany H.R. 1455)*.

<p>“an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”</p>	<p>“(whether or not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged) preceding and related to hostilities which are either anticipated ... to involve U.S. military forces, or where such hostilities involving United States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly.</p>
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Figure 1 Covert Action vs. TMA. The difference of US role in covert action is highlighted in red while the US role in TMA is highlighted in green.²³

Source: House Report to accompany 102nd Congress H.R. 1455




Figure 2: Flowchart to Determine Traditional Military Activities Eligibility. Category separates report language at the top. Eligibility questions and caveats based on interpretations of report language intent.

Source: Author's Original Work

²³ Erwin, *Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Question*, 6.

These oversight requirements have become a focal point for Congressional oversight concerns as the CIA's covert actions, and USSOCOM's operations have converged. The committee report language for the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 stated "Clandestine military intelligence-gathering operations, even those legitimately recognized as [Operational Preparation of the Environment] OPE, carry the same diplomatic and national security risks as traditional intelligence-gathering activities. While the purpose of many such operations is to gather intelligence, DOD has shown a propensity to apply the OPE label where the slightest nexus of a theoretical, distant military operation might one day exist."²⁴

The presumed target of Congress' concern regarding OPE, USSOCOM, was formally established by the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act of 1986. The Act outlined USSOCOM's core activities and provided for a specific special operations funding stream.²⁵ A number of members of Congress, including William Cohen and Sam Nunn, perceived that the DoD had not given proper attention to addressing the conflicts most likely required of the US military in the future.²⁶ As a result, USSOCOM conducts "all affairs...relating to special operations activities."²⁷ Special operations activities include: 1) direct action, 2) strategic reconnaissance, 3) unconventional warfare, 4) foreign internal defense, 5) civil affairs, 6)

²⁴ U.S. Congress House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence., *Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2010: Report (to Accompany H.R. 2701)* (111th Congress, 2009), <https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/111th-congress/house-report/186/1>.

²⁵ Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997), 146.

²⁶ Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare*, 135. For an inside perspective on the legislative process that created USSOCOM, see James Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2003).

²⁷ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, 10, 1986.*

military information support operations, 7) counterterrorism, 8) humanitarian assistance, 9) theater search and rescue, and 10) such other activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of Defense.²⁸

The two activities that have seen recent convergence, UW and CT, are best expressed through a theory of military strategy composed of ends, means, ways, and risks. In this theory, the ends are objectives towards which one strives. The means are instruments to achieve an end, and ways are the courses of action one may take.²⁹ Risk occurs if any combination of ends, means, and ways are out of balance with one another.³⁰ For example, if a course of action is ill-suited to a particular scenario, then the overall strategy is at risk of failure. The ends, means, ways, and risks combine to form the three pillars of the overall strategy. This approach to conceptualizing strategy applies to the tactical, operational, and strategic level of war.³¹ Both UW and CT largely achieve strategic ends through operational and tactical means and ways.

The first activity, UW, contains ends that require coercion, disruption, or overthrow of a government or occupying power to accomplish the national strategy.³² UW's means are the indigenous component resistance and USSOCOM assistance, including training and equipping. The ways are the coordinated activities over time of both the indigenous resistance component and USSOCOM forces conducted in a campaign. The ends, means, and ways also occur across a spectrum of phases, domains, and social circumstances.

Policy objectives link the ends of a UW campaign to means and ways. For USSOCOM's lead UW-component, United States Army Special

²⁸ *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987.*

²⁹ Arthur F. Lykke Jr, "Defining Military Strategy," *Military Review* 77, no. 1 (1997): 179.

³⁰ Lykke Jr, "Defining Military Strategy," 183.

³¹ Lykke Jr, "Defining Military Strategy," 180.

³² Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations.*

Operations Command (USASOC), the UW campaign readily lends itself to a diverse range of policy objectives. Coercion, disruption, or overthrow of a hostile government can undermine its efforts against the US.

Undermining a hostile government threatens its very existence and requires much less investment of resources when compared to a conventional approach.

This smaller investment of resources comprises the four components of an indigenous resistance and SOF. The first, underground, is a "cellular organization within the resistance that can conduct operations in areas that are inaccessible to guerrillas."³³ The second, auxiliary, "refers to that portion of the population that provides active clandestine support to the guerrilla force or underground."³⁴ The third, guerrilla force, consists of irregular and likely indigenous personnel organized in a military organization who conduct military and paramilitary operations.³⁵ The fourth and final primary component of an indigenous resistance is the public component which represents the overt political movement of the resistance.³⁶ On US side, USSOCOM resources, trains, and equips forces for UW missions. It is the only organization in the DoD specifically charged with the UW mission. USASOC's strength lays in its application of social movement theory, cultural skills, language proficiency, and mediation skills in addition to traditional military skills proficiency and interoperability. USASOC accomplishes the mission in accordance with tactics that both USASOC and USSOCOM develop.

³³ United States Army Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide* (United States Army Special Operations Command, April 5, 2016), 8.

³⁴ United States Army Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 8.

³⁵ United States Army Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 8.

³⁶ United States Army Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 8.

These tactics—or ways—consist of four resistance activities conducted within the seven phases of the UW campaign. The ways of resistance are subversion, effective governance, and successful guerrilla warfare, all buoyed by information activities. Resistance movements subvert governments or occupying powers by leveraging existing social networks to undermine support.³⁷ Subversion messages speak to an instinctual desire to maximize ones' safety, local grievances, and identity politics with the intent to politically mobilize a population to produce strains on the existing government.³⁸ Guerrilla warfare, through a strategy of attrition, aims to inflict material, personnel, and morale damage upon the government's security forces and political will.³⁹ Effective resistance governance seeks to deepen local support while also fusing those local factions into broad alliances.⁴⁰ As Bernard Fall advocates, the goal of subversion and resistance is to not out-fight but to out-govern your enemy.⁴¹ Within its governed spaces, subversive and resistance leaders seek to quickly create a normal and predictable lifestyle to promote the movement's legitimacy.⁴² All three ways are tied

³⁷ Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare*, September 2008, 4–7; Paul Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse*, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 17.

³⁸ Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare*, 4–8; Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 124; David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla*, 2015, 114.

³⁹ Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, *Army Special Operations Forces: Unconventional Warfare*, 4–6.

⁴⁰ Staniland, *Networks of Rebellion*, 13.

⁴¹ Bernard B. Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” *Naval War College Review* 17 (2015): 3, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20151031_art009.pdf.

⁴² Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains*, 114.

together by information activities which promote a strategic narrative.⁴³ The narrative explains the resistance's motives for its operations which promote further support and legitimacy from the population. In conjunction with the resistance movement, USASOC conducts a seven-phase approach to a UW campaign to pace and identify progress in the campaign. The seven phases of UW identified by USASOC include: 1) prepare the environment, 2) initiate contact with resistance and external sponsors, 3) infiltrate operational area, 4) organize, train, and equip resistance, 5) buildup of resistance organization, 6) employment of UW forces, 7) transition resistance to national control, shift to regular forces, or demobilize.⁴⁴ This inherently destabilizing activity stands in stark contrast to the stability CT fosters.

CT is another USSOCOM core activity best understood through the lens of ends, means, and ways. CT ends include eliminating a terrorist organization's threat to the homeland.⁴⁵ The whole of government approach with a heavy reliance upon specially trained SOF is the means through which the nation achieves those ends.⁴⁶ CT's ways are leadership decapitation and methods to isolate the terrorist organization from support mechanisms like the local population, administrative and logistics infrastructure, and safe havens.⁴⁷ Much like UW, CT's ends, means, and ways also occur across a spectrum of phases, domains, and social circumstances.

National policy objectives guide CT's ends which ultimately seek to link means with ways. These objectives pursue the eventual dissipation of the threat posed by the terrorist organization. This dissipation occurs

⁴³ Emile Simpson, *War from the Ground up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics* (Oxford ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 61.

⁴⁴ United States Army Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide*, 10–16.

⁴⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, October 24, 2014, V-1.

⁴⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, V-1.

⁴⁷ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, V-1.

when a terrorist organization is unable or unwilling to conduct attacks against the homeland or other US interests.⁴⁸ Audrey Cronin points out that achieving this state of dissipation requires significant time and may a generation.⁴⁹ This time requirement levies a significant burden on CT means.

CT efforts require a holistic set of means in addition to time. USSOCOM's specially trained forces, including special mission units, are the primary means by which to conduct CT for a Joint Force Commander.⁵⁰ If USSOCOM is designated the primary CT force, it relies on interagency resources to simultaneously address terrorist organizations diplomatically, informationally, and economically.⁵¹ A relevant population is a final means that has the potential to diminish a terrorist organization's capabilities by reducing its ability to provide support and sanctuary. This amalgamation of means may interact at the theater-level, globally, or both depending on the nature of the terrorist organization but are ultimately integrated by the National Security Council.⁵²

The ways of a CT campaign are also holistic. The ways include an attrition-based strategy aimed at decapitation, information operations, and denial of resources. Operations to capture or kill terrorist leadership, decapitation, leverage a joint-interagency targeting process called F3EAD.⁵³ F3EAD, which stands for Find, Fix, Finish, Engage, Analyze, and Disseminate, is an operational counterterrorism methodology primarily designed for decapitation but can also help identify and target centers of gravity or key nodes in a terrorist network. Information

⁴⁸ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, V-1.

⁴⁹ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, 1. paperback print (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011), 8.

⁵⁰ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, V-3.

⁵¹ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, xi.

⁵² Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, viii.

⁵³ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, V-3.

operations are those who protect and defend friendly forces, deceive enemy forces, and influence target audiences.⁵⁴ A final way of the CT campaign, denial of resources, specifically targets funding, logistics, and ties to a relevant population.⁵⁵ Severing ties from a population helps deny shelter, a recruiting pool, sources of intelligence, and legitimacy for the terrorist group.⁵⁶ Denying resources through severing ties to a population requires an effective information operation or strategic narrative.⁵⁷ As a result, each one of the ways builds upon and requires the effectiveness of the other. This interconnectedness requires all three ways of the CT campaign to be fully integrated with one another to achieve CT ends successfully. Achieving the ends is not a given since the path to success is laden with numerous risks.

These risks are not limited to CT since they pervade UW missions as well. Political sanctuary is one risk that is accentuated by legislation and ultimately impacts the ends, means, and ways of both UW and CT. Political sanctuaries provide direct or indirect external support to irregular belligerents due to factors that may or may not associate with the Gray Zone activity. Political sanctuaries require a high degree of strategic vision, professionalism, and plausible deniability depending on what states are involved and for what purpose. The deniability aspect, in particular, relies heavily upon the covert action and TMA distinctions in legislation. In the end, the operating environment of irregular belligerents has a significant impact on USSOCOM's ability to conduct activities in the Gray Zone due to oversight requirements in Title 10 and 50 legislation.

⁵⁴ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, V-6.

⁵⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, V-7.

⁵⁶ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2011), 110–12.

⁵⁷ Simpson, *War from the Ground Up*, 180.

Political sanctuary is the product of direct or indirect external support to an irregular belligerent. Superpower states to third world countries may provide direct or indirect support. States' motivation for direct support spans the spectrum from a moral conviction to aid irregular belligerents all the way to using the belligerents as proxies in a war against a rival state. Direct support usually involves stated clients of a particular country. Indirect support stems from a diplomatic issue not connected with irregular belligerents but nonetheless stifles a state's ability to engage said belligerents. Irregular belligerents fighting one state but based in another creates sovereignty issues for the state that is being fought. Engaging irregular belligerents on another country's soil—especially one that is allied with a greater power—can result in serious diplomatic tension which creates an indirect political sanctuary for the belligerents. Areas are deemed a political sanctuary, regardless of the manner of assistance, due to the safe haven effect they provide irregular belligerents.

This safe haven effect creates conditions that frustrate policy makers. Some UW and CT means and ways may be either limited or neutralized if policymakers do not want to risk diplomatic catastrophe or all-out war. For example, the initial stages of UW require significant physical access to prepare the environment for follow-on UW phases. The overt appearance of UW forces on the sovereign land of a friendly nation without permission creates serious diplomatic tension. For CT, the first three phases of the F3EAD cycle also require significant physical presence for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). As a result, a rival nation may consider an overt aerial platform hunting terrorists within its borders a potential act of war. In other words, the ends of diplomatic catastrophe or greater conflict do not justify the means of overt UW and CT activities. Therefore, the potential diplomatic consequences limit the effectiveness of UW and CT activities. This limited

effectiveness presents immense risk to everyone from policy makers to SOF.

The absence of political sanctuary, on the other hand, limits the amount of overall risk to the UW or CT strategy. Irregular belligerents operating outside of political sanctuaries lack any protective measures. As a result, policymakers may use a much wider range of options than if a sanctuary existed which enables the employment of overt UW and CT activities without diplomatic repercussions. As a result, UW forces have full access to the operating environment to conduct any activities necessary to facilitate follow-on phases. CT forces' similar access to the operating environment allows for the employment of the entire F3EAD model with all available resources and methods. In the end, the absence of a political sanctuary grossly simplifies USSOCOM's activities in the Gray Zone. This simplification reduces the amount of risk to the overall strategy.

Legislation's requirement for USSOCOM's overt UW and CT activities, at first glance, seems to accentuate the political risk phenomenon. The legal framework, based on authorities and oversight, appears to prohibit the notion of convergence—USSOCOM's overt UW and CT means, ways, and ends blending with covert action. For example, covert action and TMA separate the two activities making them mutually exclusive and yet, convergence still exists. The existence of convergence suggests that the disparate oversight mechanisms do not dictate whether to use covert action, TMA, or both. Concluding that legislation is the ultimate arbiter of convergence fails to take into account the core philosophical truths about the character and nature of combat. As a result, the legislative argument does not adequately address the underlying motives for either convergence or divergence. A heuristic to help explain the essence of Gray Zone warfare within a democracy does, however, provide a way to address the primary factors behind convergence or divergence.

Chapter 3

Theoretical Model

Operational failure may also coincide with and quite possibly derive from a deteriorating domestic political environment, national uncertainty, a leadership vacuum, and bureaucratic confusion...If covert action is to have any reasonable chance of succeeding, it must bear a coherent relationship to the main thrust of US foreign policy. Once it transcends the latter's premises or begins to probe the limits of commitment its outlook is dubious.

Hugh Tovar

There is a wide range of options for evaluating the orchestration of convergence within the Gray Zone. Of the options available, few have captured the nature of warfare as remarkably as Carl von Clausewitz's treatise *On War*. He specifically identifies and presents a model to interpret the dynamic tension between the people, their government, and its army. He captures that tension in his trinity, which is the fundamental product of the following three primordial tendencies interacting in war: 1) Passion and enmity, 2) reason, and 3) the play of chance and probability.¹ The relationship between people and their government is the product of passion and enmity. The relationship between the government and its military is reflected through reason and ultimately, policy. The final relationship between the military and people is a product of chance and probability in which "creativity is free to roam."² Clausewitz purports that each aspect of the Trinity must balance with the others for combat to sustain itself.³ Otherwise, an imbalance produces dysfunction at some juncture of the Trinity: the people,

¹ Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret, *On War*, First paperback printing (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.

² Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, *On War*, 89.

³ Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, *On War*, 89.

government, or army. The interactions within Clausewitz's trinity, the result of an abstract model, continue to have value despite his focus on major combat operations in the 19th century.

Clausewitz's trinity has heuristic value but requires some modification to more accurately capture contemporary aspects of limited, irregular wars fought by representative democracies such as the US. Figure 3 below illustrates a few of these differences for the purposes of the discussion of convergence and divergence. These differences can be summarized as follows: 1) the "government" within the US is the National Command Authority consisting of the President and SECDEF; 2) the "army" is considered as both the military and intelligence community; and, 3) Congress becomes an intervening variable that both captures the passion of the people but reflects the influence of reason. Passion—the enthusiasm for the populous to conduct war—is represented by public support in the form of polling or election cycles. Political will—between National Command Authority and the military and intelligence community—is a function of policy and its inherent ends, means, ways, and risks such as a political sanctuary. In the end, these minor modifications to Clausewitz's theory enable a discussion of how the trinity operates within the increased political sensitivity of the US.




Figure 3: Clausewitz Trinity. Modified to depict the Trinity as it relates to limited war conducted by the US.

Source: Adapted from Carl von Clausewitz's Trinity

Higher levels of political sensitivity can be evident in the relationship between the American people and both Congress and the National Command Authority. The relationship, which is subject to passion, is ultimately expressed through various conduits such as polling, elections, and activism. Passion is a reflection of the object of the conflict and influences the scope and intensity of the effort a country commits to obtain it.⁴ On one hand, vivid experiences can evoke visceral responses over a long time, such as the image of aircraft hitting the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, which can impact public polling numbers and election cycles. On the other hand, a population's tangential interest may produce more limited and fickle reactions and a much less intense military response. This interaction of the object and

⁴ Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, *On War*, 80. Clausewitz references the political object as “the original motive for the war.” It is ultimately an expression of passion. This object can range from a humanitarian effort to retribution in response to a terrorist attack within the context of limited wars. In effect, the passion that feeds the value of the object is essential to the remainder of the trinity. The theory crumbles without an appropriate understanding of passion and the value of an object.

time within passion is also known as public support. Both Congress and the National Command Authority are acutely aware of public support since their political careers often depend on it.

Two aspects of Clausewitz's reason come into play once passion is captured and interpreted as public support. The first—and arguably the most direct—aspect is the relationship between the National Command Authority and the defense community comprised of the military and intelligence community. The second aspect is the relationship between Congress and the same defense community. These two aspects of reason are the driving force behind the political will to embark on a policy choice. The previously mentioned ends, means, and ways, along with potential risks, make up a potentially variable political will. The variability of will is determined by the interaction of the ends in support of strategic interest, means used to accomplish the ends, the ways that capability and capacity combine to support the ends, and the risk associated with the strategy. The output of this interaction, political will, should balance with the degree of public support. For example, weak public support for an issue must reflect an equally weak political will. Risks can also reduce political will due to the costs they potentially impose on strategy. This political will is not, however, the only variable to impact the military.

The role of chance also impacts the military as well as the American people. This final relationship is between the people and both the military and intelligence community. This relationship is the reality in which members of the military and intelligence community must operate. This reality fluctuates based on a countless number of unforeseen variables that may be physical or psychological. The reality gives way to what Clausewitz termed “the fog and friction of war.”⁵ Chance, in the context of limited wars within a democracy, is expressed

⁵ Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, *On War*, 101.

through the civil-military relationship. Chance military actions have the ability to impact the relationship and ultimately the people's perceptions. The My Lai Massacre in Vietnam is an example of how a chance military action can negatively impact the people's perceptions of the military.⁶ The relationship may also change based on the level of political dysfunction. For example, the recent Congressional dissatisfaction with Executive actions put at risk funds for the military through sequestration. The opportunity for chance events to occur also increases over time. Both time and the randomness of chance have the potential to imbalance this side of the trinity. This potential is important since balance between the elements of the trinity plays such a crucial role in convergence and divergence.

A balanced trinity gives way to either convergence or divergence based primarily on the interaction of public support and political will. Political will at the national level should be matched with a high level of public support for the trinity to remain balanced. The ends within political will are usually static once identified and set. Political sanctuary risks tend to also remain static and are difficult to eliminate with military or intelligence activities. Therefore, means and ways are the only two items that National Command Authorities can influence within the broader category of political will. As a result, public support plays the essential role in the application of means and ways and their ultimate expression in convergence or divergence.

A high degree of public support requires adjustments to means and ways in order to elevate political will. The adjustments to means require that both the military and intelligence community fully participate. The adjustments to ways require a similar modification to produce greater effects commensurate with a higher political will. In

⁶ For a concise overview of the Massacre and its effect on American public perception of the Vietnam War, see William Allison, *My Lai: An American Atrocity in the Vietnam War* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

other words, this increase in the output of ways requires a synergistic effect. In theory, both military and intelligence ways should converge ultimately to produce the synergistic effects. In effect, high public support sustains political will, which relies upon effective means and ways. In the end, these means and ways must converge to produce effects that satisfy higher political will. Ultimately, convergence cannot occur without significant public support.

Divergence, on the other hand, can occur without significant public support. Lower levels of public support, leading to minimal political will, requires a divestment or change of means and ways. The political will to sustain a campaign may be so low that only the military or intelligence community comprises the means. Military and intelligence ways cannot converge in this case. In other cases, both the military and intelligence community comprise the means but their ways are not required to achieve greater effects. As a result, the ways do not combine and they diverge. Both divergence and convergence, where identified and explained, reflect the insight that power public support holds over the political will and the continued relevancy of the Clausewitz's conceptualization of the trinity in the 21st Century.

The trinity, given its continued relevance and with minor modification, provides a heuristic that guides the analysis of case studies in the post-2001 security environment. These modifications enable a discussion that links public support to political will within a US context. The discussion reveals that political leaders scale means and authorize ways to account for public support. The net effect of scaling means and ways produces either convergence or divergence. As a result, the convergence or divergence results from the public support to obtain a political object. This hypothesis is confirmed in the next chapter, which outlines how the US sought to overthrow the Taliban after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.



Chapter 4

Overthrowing the Taliban

The al-Qaeda-led attacks of September 11, 2001 sealed the fate for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Their decision to provide al-Qaeda sanctuary caused President George W. Bush to approve plans, based on extensive authorities, to topple the Taliban regime to bring al-Qaeda to justice. Overthrowing the regime required a UW campaign involving the CIA, USSOCOM, American air power, and indigenous Afghan guerrilla forces. The 2001 invasion represented a convergence of military and intelligence activities enabled by a lack of political sanctuary for the Taliban. In the end, the 2001 UW campaign in Afghanistan was an example of a successful US Gray Zone activity.

Afghanistan was already a country of particular concern to American presidents as it provided haven to al-Qaeda after the twin US Embassy (Kenya and Tanzania) and USS Cole bombings, in 1998 and 2000 respectively.¹ United Nations and US sanctions, as well as diplomatic pressure in the wake of those events, put the Taliban regime on notice. Even so, the regime remained in power and was seemingly immune to outside military intervention so long as al-Qaeda did not further antagonize the US. The Taliban's apparent immunity from intervention changed following the September 11th, 2001 attacks.²

The attacks on the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and United Flight 93 galvanized the nation. Almost 90% of Americans supported military action to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan, following the attacks.³ The percentage of Americans who thought terrorism was the

¹ William Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000).

² Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age*.

³ Gallup Inc, "War on Terrorism," *Gallup.Com*, accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/5257/War-Terrorism.aspx>.

important problem the US faced skyrocketed from less than 1% before the attacks to 46% after the attacks.⁴ Astonishingly, nearly half of Americans polled said they would be willing to let the US government violate civil liberties to prevent terrorism.⁵ This overwhelming support set the stage for an aggressive pursuit of options using a large degree of latitude.

The leaders of the Executive branch recognized the domestic support and began working on courses of action. During a National Security Council (NSC) meeting later that evening, President George W. Bush expressed his determination to strike at al-Qaeda regardless of their sanctuary location.⁶ In the same meeting, the Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, circulated a paramilitary plan to engage al-Qaeda by toppling the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, on the other hand, indicated the inability of his Department to respond quickly in a large-scale conventional manner.⁷ The President offered broad guidance insisting he wanted to both punish al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and around the globe during the next day's NSC meeting.⁸ On 13 September, Director Tenet expanded on his paramilitary plan by stating "we will deploy a CIA paramilitary team inside Afghanistan to work with opposition forces...and prepare the way for the introduction of U.S. Special Forces."⁹ Director Tenet's staff continued to brief the President that CIA teams could immediately deploy and overthrow the Taliban "within weeks."¹⁰ The NSC staff realized through

⁴ Gallup Inc, "Sept. 11 Effects, Though Largely Faded, Persist," *Gallup.Com*, accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/9208/Sept-Effects-Though-Largely-Faded-Persist.aspx>.

⁵ Gallup Inc, "Sept. 11 Effects, Though Largely Faded, Persist."

⁶ Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir*, 2013, 346.

⁷ Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 346.

⁸ George Tenet and Bill Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, 1st ed (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 175.

⁹ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 175.

¹⁰ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 176.

these deliberations that whatever effort implemented against al-Qaeda also involved the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Members of Congress also aggressively pursued options to provide the executive branch with the authorities it required to address the attacks. A day after the attacks, the White House provided Congress with draft legislation which would authorize the President to take military action against those responsible and deter future attacks of terrorism or aggression against the US.¹¹ Congressional leaders, exercising their responsibilities, limited the open-ended authority requested by the White House. They narrowed the extent of the authorization to those responsible for the September 11th attacks after two days of floor debates.¹² On Friday, September 14, the Senate unanimously passed the bill. The House debated the bill into the evening with Rep. John Tierney arguing that the President report on his actions under the authorization every 60 days.¹³ Rep Tierney's motion was defeated, and the bill was passed into law by a vote of 420-1 later that evening. Rep. Barbara Lee voted against the bill citing vague and broad language which may give the President “a blank check to attack an unspecified country, an unspecified enemy for an unspecified period of time.”¹⁴ The President ultimately signed the bill authorizing the use of military force “against those nations, organizations, or persons [the President] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that

¹¹ Richard F. Grimmett, “Authorization For Use Of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (PL 107-40): Legislative History” (DTIC Document, 2006), <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA458316>.

¹² Grimmett, “Authorization For Use Of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (PL 107-40).”

¹³ Grimmett, “Authorization For Use Of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks (PL 107-40).”

¹⁴ Conor Friedersdorf, “Angry Letters to the One Member of Congress Who Voted Against the War on Terror,” *The Atlantic*, September 14, 2014, <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/09/the-vindication-of-barbara-lee/380084/>.

occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations...in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States” on 18 September.¹⁵

The NSC convened several more times to further refine operational concepts now that Congress had authorized the use of military force. During a 15 September meeting in Camp David, Secretary Rumsfeld and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers, briefed three potential responses: 1) retaliatory cruise missile strikes, 2) retaliatory cruise missile and air power strikes, and 3) retaliatory strikes with American boots on the ground.¹⁶ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz suggested that special operations forces be part of the ground option due their unique capabilities and their immediate availability, both of which were key to sustaining political support for the war.¹⁷ The President determined that military ground forces were essential to demonstrating the US’ resolve to bringing al-Qaeda to justice.¹⁸ The political advantages, however, of empowering indigenous Afghans to retake the “graveyard of empires” took primacy as the NSC refined the strategy.¹⁹

Empowering Afghans to retake their country required a unique set of means to achieve the ends. On 17 September, Director Tenet briefed a refined version of his earlier plan to emplace a CIA team in Afghanistan. The team would either establish or reaffirm relationships with indigenous Afghan resistance forces. The CIA had supplied Afghan mujahedeen forces covertly two decades earlier in the struggle against the occupying

¹⁵ *Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 2001.*

¹⁶ Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 359.

¹⁷ Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 359–60.

¹⁸ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 36.

¹⁹ Seth G. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), xxxiv. This book provides an authoritative view on the perils of large-scale invasions of Afghanistan and helps explain why military leaders opted for a lighter footprint.

forces of the Soviet Union.²⁰ On 21 September, Secretary Rumsfeld and GEN Tommy Franks, the Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), outlined a campaign that partnered Special Forces (SF) teams with the Afghan resistance forces.²¹ The SF teams and Afghan resistance forces would coalesce into a campaign that would levy the full weight of American air power onto Taliban positions.²² President Bush approved the plans and set the stage for a joint-interagency UW campaign to overthrow the Taliban regime which would facilitate actions against al-Qaeda.²³

The CIA began its work in Afghanistan just two weeks after the September 11th attacks.²⁴ The CIA's Counter Terrorism Chief, Cofer Black, selected Gary Schroen to lead the effort along with seven other CIA officers.²⁵ The team, called Northern Alliance Liaison Team (NALT), was selected for their knowledge of the area and preexisting relationships with senior Afghan warlords.²⁶ Three other similarly sized and organized teams, codenamed ALPHA, BRAVO, and ECHO, eventually joined and worked under the direction of the Schroen and the NALT.²⁷ Schroen was equivalent in rank to a three-star general and was, for a time, the US' only direct link to the Afghan resistance forces.

The Afghan resistance forces consisted of a loose alliance of ethnicities and tribes in 2001. Ahmad Shah Massoud, who many called "The Lion of the Panjshir," was a unifying force for the Afghan

²⁰ The seminal popular account of the "largest covert operation in history" remains George Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History* (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).

²¹ Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 371.

²² Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 371.

²³ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 208; Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 371.

²⁴ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 209.

²⁵ Gary C. Schroen, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan* (Presidio Press/Ballantine Books, 2005), 15.

²⁶ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 209.

²⁷ Schroen, *First In*, 183, 229, 273.

resistance.²⁸ Al-Qaeda suicide attackers, however, killed Massoud two days before the September 11 attacks. With Massoud gone, two main military commanders, Fahim Khan and Rashid Dostum, led the guerrilla forces.²⁹ Khan was the guerrilla face of the overt political component of the Alliance, led by Dr. Abdullah Abdullah.³⁰ Khan, Dostum, and Abdullah formed the core military and political arms of the Northern Alliance whose powerbase stretched along and north of the Hindu Kush mountain range. The member states of the United Nations initially viewed Khan and Dr. Abdullah as the political representatives for Afghanistan.³¹ That view eventually changed with the introduction of Hamid Karzai who led both the guerrilla forces and overt political arm of his ethnic Pashtun resistance to the Taliban.³² Karzai represented the Pashtun majority which resided south of the Hindu Kush. In all, these four men (Khan, Dostum, Abdullah, and Karzai) brought together two legitimate political movements to represent the Afghan people, in addition to a combined force of artillery, tanks, and 15,000 fighters to bear against the Taliban regime.³³

To assist these four Afghan men and their indigenous forces, Secretary Rumsfeld and GEN Franks relied on two elements of the military instrument of power: SF and air power. The SF tasking naturally fell on the 5th Special Forces Group given its focus on the region and its Central Asia expertise.³⁴ Twelve-man teams from 5th Special Forces Group, called Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA), were paired with

²⁸ Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown*, 372.

²⁹ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 59.

³⁰ Schroen, *First In*, 98.

³¹ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 59.

³² Schroen, *First In*, 99; Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 60.

³³ “BBC News | SOUTH ASIA | Who Are the Northern Alliance?,” accessed March 12, 2017, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1652187.stm; Schroen, *First In*, 124–26.

³⁴ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 52.

various Afghan guerrilla forces across the country.³⁵ A Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), dubbed Task Force Dagger, was positioned in Uzbekistan to provide staffing functions.³⁶ In total, 18 different ODAs from 5th Special Forces Group sprinkled across Afghanistan partnered with guerrillas in their bid to retake the country.³⁷

Air Force and Navy assets comprised American air power supporting the ODAs. Virtually every major command within the Air Force provided forces to CENTCOM while the Navy sent three aircraft carriers.³⁸ Nearly 500 US aircraft were positioned in the Middle East just under a week before Operation Enduring Freedom began.³⁹ Nearly the full spectrum of American aircraft operated out of three Persian Gulf states, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

These air power assets, along with SF, the CIA, and Afghan guerillas, were tied together in novel and previously unseen ways. The CIA quickly established reliable relationships with the indigenous Afghan resistance. That resistance swiftly dislodged the formidable Taliban and installed a legitimate interim government with the help of SF's seven-phase UW campaign and American air power.

The CIA enabled partnerships with the Afghan resistance opened the door for the military campaign. Gary Schroen and his forces fulfilled many of the duties outlined in the first three phases of a UW campaign using the authorities inherent in Title 50 covert action. The NALT sought and assessed internal and external support for potential resistance movements.⁴⁰ It set conditions for the introduction of US forces through

³⁵ Eric Blehm, *The Only Thing Worth Dying for: How Eleven Green Berets Forged a New Afghanistan*, 1st ed (New York: Harper, 2010), 9–10.

³⁶ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 60.

³⁷ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 411.

³⁸ John Andreas Olsen, ed., *A History of Air Warfare*, 1st ed (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2010), 258.

³⁹ Olsen, *A History of Air Warfare*, 258.

⁴⁰ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 209.

extensive negotiations and agreements.⁴¹ Schroen established personnel recovery mechanisms with indigenous forces.⁴² The NALT also conducted joint intelligence preparation of the environment through a robust Global Positioning System mapping effort, which enabled accurate target coordinates to be cataloged and sent to air planners for future air strikes.⁴³ Finally, CIA teams in Afghanistan established a logistics plan to support the Afghan resistance.⁴⁴

The Afghan resistance primarily utilized successful guerrilla warfare and the promise of effective governance to achieve their ends. Both the Northern Alliance and Hamid Karzai's forces conducted operations to overthrow the Taliban in various locations and at various times. General offensives led by Dostum and Khan in the north of the country began in early November while Karzai's forces began advancing in southern Afghanistan a few weeks later.⁴⁵ The guerrilla offensives consisted of artillery barrages and air power to soften Taliban positions followed by mounted advances supported by heavy machine gun fire—a tactic emblematic of the Soviet-Afghan War.⁴⁶ Dostum liberated the first major city, Mazar-e-Sharif, on 10 November.⁴⁷ Khan secured the capital of Kabul four days later.⁴⁸ Nearly all major cities north of the Hindu Kush were liberated by November 14th.⁴⁹ Three weeks later, on 7 December, Karzai and his forces secured the Taliban's original base of Kandahar.⁵⁰ Karzai was selected to lead the Afghan Interim Authority following the

⁴¹ Schroen, *First In*, 97–101; Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 210.

⁴² Schroen, *First In*, 100.

⁴³ Schroen, *First In*, 136.

⁴⁴ Schroen, *First In*, 222.

⁴⁵ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 100, 106.

⁴⁶ Ali Ahmad Jalali et al., *The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War* (Place of publication not identified: Books Express Pub., 2010), 178–85; Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 174–75.

⁴⁷ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 102.

⁴⁸ Schroen, *First In*, 351.

⁴⁹ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 103.

⁵⁰ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 108.

liberation of Kandahar.⁵¹ He immediately began appointing leadership positions, negotiating terms of Taliban surrender, and establishing basic public services.⁵²

SF teams' integration with the Afghan resistance served as the last four phases of the classic seven-phase UW model. Task Force Dagger developed and synchronized resistance campaign plans.⁵³ TF Dagger also integrated disparate resistance groups and increased recruitment with other ethnic minorities as additional ODAs filtered into the country.⁵⁴ ODAs enhanced targeting capabilities, expanded reconnaissance, and surveillance, and synchronized operational effects through both their headquarters and embedded Air Force Special Tactics Combat Controllers.⁵⁵ Embedded Psychological Operations units embarked on a campaign against the Taliban which recorded and broadcasted Karzai's addresses to the Afghan people.⁵⁶ The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, under the direction of Task Force Dagger, implemented a robust humanitarian aid and assistance program both on behalf of the US government and other non-government organizations.⁵⁷ The last phase of the UW campaign began its transition from UW to Foreign Internal Defense and Counter-Insurgency operations after liberating the major cities, establishing the Afghan Interim Alliance, and Karzai safely in Kabul as interim leader.

The marriage of air power with SOF ground personnel attached to the Afghan resistance was the decisive factor to the Taliban's collapse. American air power overwhelmed Taliban forces both in mass and precision. By the fall of Kandahar, over 6,500 strike sorties flew against

⁵¹ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 183.

⁵² Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 182–83.

⁵³ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 59.

⁵⁴ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 100.

⁵⁵ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 101.

⁵⁶ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 153.

⁵⁷ Briscoe, *U.S. Army Special Operations in Afghanistan*, 183.

Taliban and al-Qaeda.⁵⁸ Aircraft dropped a total of 17,500 munitions dropped on various personnel, 120 fixed targets, and 400 vehicles and artillery pieces with 75% accuracy.⁵⁹ In addition to air strikes, 4,800 airlift missions transported 125,000 tons of materiel to the Afghan theater resulting in the resupply of US and Afghan guerrilla forces as well as humanitarian missions for the Afghan people.⁶⁰ Over 1,300 sorties were devoted to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions that enabled not only successful targeting of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces but also provided force protection of and overwatch for Afghan resistance and US ground forces.⁶¹ Most importantly, American air power synchronized with ground forces in a way not seen before. Nearly 80% of all targets struck in Afghanistan were the product of dynamic targeting rather than pre-assigned missions.⁶² The mass, accuracy, and utility of air power were the key factor in breaking the previous stalemate between the Northern Alliance and Taliban.

Analysis

The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated a convergence of military and intelligence activities that resulted in a highly successful overt UW campaign. The first enabling function of the convergence was a high degree of public support and therefore political willpower to topple the Taliban. As a result, DoD and CIA personnel closely worked together as they performed tasks symbolic of each other's traditional functions. The Taliban quickly disintegrated as they had no political sanctuary in which to hide. This lack of sanctuary for the Taliban enabled a near-total application of both overt and covert UW means and ways for the US-led

⁵⁸ Benjamin S. Lambeth, *Air Power against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 2005), 248.

⁵⁹ Lambeth, *Air Power against Terror*, 249.

⁶⁰ Lambeth, *Air Power against Terror*, 251.

⁶¹ Lambeth, *Air Power against Terror*, 251.

⁶² Lambeth, *Air Power against Terror*, 259.

coalition. As a result, the convergence of military and intelligence activities helped SOF conduct UW within the Gray Zone effectively.

The level of American political will to oust the Taliban regime was unprecedented in recent American history, a reflection, in part, of the US being attacked directly. President Bush's approval rating, for example, was 89% in October of 2001.⁶³ Congress' approval rating was 84% at the same time.⁶⁴ Overall, 67% of Americans were satisfied with the way things were going in the country despite the unprecedented attacks just one month ago.⁶⁵ This remarkable level of public support translated into political willpower, which permitted the Administration and Congress embark on an unparalleled degree of political collaboration.

Political collaboration translated into DoD and CIA convergence at the operational and tactical levels; both worked as one entity to overthrow the Taliban. Aside from early covert actions to foster relationships with the principal resistance members, the NALT, and various ODAs integrated on the ground to perform a majority of the seven-phased UW model. Both DoD and CIA personnel shared responsibilities to conduct targeting, reconnaissance, and surveillance. The NALT and TF Dagger also worked operational-level details to facilitate and synchronize the Alliance's military and political activities to ensure the resistance was both credible and legitimate to the Afghan people. In effect, the DoD and CIA came together as one while within Afghanistan.

A lack of political sanctuary for the Taliban regime also enabled the convergence. The Taliban's original state-sponsor, Pakistan, made a conscious decision to part ways with the group's leaders after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Nearly every country, institution, and non-governmental organization—to include other terrorist organizations like

⁶³ Gallup Inc, "Sept. 11 Effects, Though Largely Faded, Persist."

⁶⁴ Gallup Inc, "Sept. 11 Effects, Though Largely Faded, Persist."

⁶⁵ Gallup Inc, "Sept. 11 Effects, Though Largely Faded, Persist."

Hezbollah—denounced the attacks.⁶⁶ The United Nations Security Council went further and expressed its willingness to support all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks.⁶⁷ President Pervez Musharraf discontinued his country's support for the Taliban. The US-led coalition then leveraged the full weight of global political support against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. This leverage, afforded by widespread support, enabled unfettered application of UW means and ways. The Taliban regime's fate was sealed once President Bush made the decision to proceed with the CIA-crafted plan. Few limitations constrained the planning or conduct of the UW campaign. As a result, both covert and overt means and ways combined to achieve their desired ends.

The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan serves as a model for successful UW campaigns. The politico-military context provided a noteworthy political will to attack the Taliban. The ends, toppling the Taliban regime to bring al-Qaeda to justice, enjoyed widespread domestic and international support. This support empowered President Bush to assemble the full range of US instruments of power. The support also enabled military and intelligence activities to converge and be applied in a focused, coherent manner. This convergence and total application of UW resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban regime. The next time the US attempted to conduct a substantial UW campaign, this time in Syria, would not be as successful.

⁶⁶ “Reaction to 9/11 - Facts & Summary,” *HISTORY.Com*, accessed April 18, 2017, <http://www.history.com/topics/reaction-to-9-11>.

⁶⁷ Security Council Resolution 1368, “Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts,” September 12, 2001, <https://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm>.

Chapter 5

Syria Training and Equipping Program

Confidences and commitments, like our friendship, are given not just for the moment but the long run.

Prince Bandar bin Sultan Al Saud

The Syria Training and Equipping Program (STEP) was created to combat the rise of Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL) and the direct involvement of Russia in the conflict. It nested within a broader US strategy to combat violent extremism. The US and coalition partners assembled military and intelligence forces to execute this strategy. The Program, however, achieved limited results early on and was retooled to reflect the realities of the situation. In the end, the STEP case study reveals critical observations about divergence, political will, and overt UW activities within a political sanctuary.

Syria's latest civil war precipitated a series of events which led to the STEP and ultimately divergence. The civil war was part of a broader uprising against governments in predominately Muslim countries known as the Arab Spring which began in late-2010 and early-2011. The Syrian portion of the revolution began when forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad assaulted young boys writing anti-regime graffiti in the town of Dara'a.¹ Protests against Assad's ethnic minority government turned violent, and the country plunged into chaos as both the regime and protesting militants clashed in cities across central and northern Syria.² Extremist groups began to rise and expand just as ungoverned space within Syria grew. Loyalists to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—a recently killed leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq who was counseled by Bin Laden for being too

¹ Glenn Robinson, "Syria's Long Civil War," *Current History* 111, no. 749 (December 2012): 333.

² Sami Moubayed, "Letter from Damascus: Will Syria Descend into Civil War?," *Current History* 110, no. 740 (December 2011): 334.

extreme—who were hiding after the 2009 Sunni "Awakening" now had ungoverned spaces to exploit.³ These loyalists, now under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, formed the splinter group ISIL and took swaths of territory in the north and eastern portions of Syria as well as western Iraq.⁴

ISIL shocked many by taking more territory quicker than any other terrorist group before them.⁵ As a result, ISIL seriously challenged Middle East stability prompting a US response. The response to ISIL in Iraq was diplomatically straightforward. Prime Minister Nouri Maliki requested American air power to help halt ISIL advances.⁶ The response to ISIL in Syria, however, has been much less forthright. Syria, a long-time ally of Russia, came under international condemnation for using chemical weapons in its fight against rebels. The condemnation grew to a US threat of overt air strikes on chemical weapons facilities.⁷ US intervention to counter ISIL in Syria has naturally faced a diplomatic challenge.

The intervention to counter ISIL also faced domestic challenges as well. A CNN poll in September of 2014 revealed 54% of Americans opposed providing weapons and military training to rebels in Syria to fight ISIL. Nearly 80% of Americans, on the other hand, favored airstrikes

³ Joby Warrick, *Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS*, First Anchor Books edition (New York: Anchor Books, a division of Penguin Random House LLC, 2016), 159. The group is known by a number of different acronyms and names, including the Islamic State (IS), the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Daesh. This chapter uses the official US government designation for the group: ISIL.

⁴ David Ignatius, "How ISIS Spread in the Middle East," *The Atlantic*, October 29, 2015, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/>.

⁵ Michael J Morell and Bill Harlow, *The Great War of Our Time: The CIA's Fight against Terrorism--from Al Qaeda to ISIS*, 2015, 307.

⁶ "Iraq Formally Asks US to Launch Air Strikes against Rebels," *BBC News*, June 18, 2014, sec. Middle East, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27905849>.

⁷ By Laura Smith-Spark and Tom Cohen CNN, "U.S., Russia Agree to Framework on Syria Chemical Weapons - CNNPolitics.Com," *CNN*, accessed March 25, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/14/politics/us-syria/index.html>.

against ISIL rather than ground forces.⁸ Finally, 61% of Americans felt that taking military action against ISIL was in the national interest.⁹ The moderate support for countering ISIL and low support for providing support to rebels in Syria was the first limiting factor for devising and implementing a strategy to counter ISIL.

The STEP was a newer aspect of the continued strategy against violent extremism but also sensitive to broader international relations. The advent of ISIL forced security analysts to broaden their focus beyond simply al-Qaeda. The 2015 National Security Strategy referred to violent extremism and singled out ISIL as one organization within the combative ideology.¹⁰ The strategy against ISIL was similar to al-Qaeda, discussed in Chapter Five, as it too sought to defeat the organization but contained nuances unique to the ISIL. President Barack Obama outlined nine lines of effort within the strategy: 1) Support effective governance in Iraq, 2) Deny ISIL safe havens, 3) Build partner capacity, 4) Enhance intelligence collection on ISIL, 5) Disrupt ISIL finances, 6) Expose ISIL's true nature, 7) Disrupt the flow of foreign fighters, 8) Protect the homeland, and 9) Provide humanitarian support.¹¹ The STEP directly influenced two (deny haven and build partner capacity) and indirectly affected five (enhance intelligence collection, disrupt finances, expose true nature, disrupt the flow of foreign fighters, and protect the homeland) of the nine lines of effort. The STEP also nested within strategy and policy related to Syria's sponsor, Russia. The policy towards Russia involved deterrence,

⁸ Polling Report, Inc, "ISIS," accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.pollingreport.com/isis.htm>.

⁹ Polling Report, Inc, "ISIS."

¹⁰ Barack Obama and United States, *National Security Strategy 2015* (Washington, D.C: The White House : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs, 2015), 9.

¹¹ "FACT SHEET: The Administration's Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Updated FY 2015 Overseas Contingency Operations Request," *Whitehouse.Gov*, November 7, 2014, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/07/fact-sheet-administration-s-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-leva>.

coercion, and an open door to peaceful and constructive collaboration.¹² While the deterrence and coercion strategies were at odds with US involvement in Syria, the STEP's potential to counter-ISIL provided a possible avenue for constructive collaboration with Russia.

The US marshaled all the domestic and international instruments of power available to counter ISIS and conduct the STEP. As in the UW campaign in the previous chapter, DoD's primary means for the STEP were Special Forces and air power. Just under 500 Special Forces soldiers, mostly from the 5th Special Forces Group, represent the ground element of the campaign.¹³ The air power elements were composed of strike, ISR, and airlift assets. A Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) tied the ground and airpower elements with interagency partners.¹⁴ Media reports suggest interagency contributors such as the CIA provided support to at least the fourth line of effort in the counter-ISIL strategy.¹⁵ The international aspects of the STEP were the coalition air strikes and the guerilla forces, which came from existing opposition groups within Syria.¹⁶ The guerrillas, called the New Syrian Forces, were initially comprised of 180 vetted, trained, and equipped soldiers.¹⁷ The joint and interagency efforts in concert with coalition and indigenous

¹² Obama and United States, *National Security Strategy 2015*, 25.

¹³ James Kraft, "Release of the Section 1209(d) Report-Department of Defense Assistance to Appropriately Vetted Elements of the Syrian Opposition" (SOTJF-OIR, April 1, 2016).

¹⁴ Kraft, "Release of the Section 1209(d) Report-Department of Defense Assistance to Appropriately Vetted Elements of the Syrian Opposition."

¹⁵ Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, "U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels," *The New York Times*, January 23, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html>.

¹⁶ Kraft, "Release of the Section 1209(d) Report-Department of Defense Assistance to Appropriately Vetted Elements of the Syrian Opposition."

¹⁷ "Pentagon's Failed Syria Program Cost \$2 Million per Trainee," *USA Today*, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/11/05/pentagon-isil-syria-train-and-equip/75227774/>.

contributions offered a promising array of resources to the counter ISIL strategy.

The promise and optimism for the STEP, however, gave way to early setbacks. According to press accounts, a covert training and equipping program under Title 50 authorities began sometime in 2013. The overt STEP under Title 10 authorities began with a funding request from the Obama Administration in late 2014 which established training camps in early 2015.¹⁸ The Program produced limited numbers of recruits considering its ambitious initial goal and experienced significant battlefield losses. As a result, the STEP was canceled shortly after the losses but has recently restarted under new guidelines. The Program continued with the newly adjusted focus and has demonstrated some success on the battlefield.

President Obama agreed to both a covert and an overt train and equip program to support Syrian rebels. Media reports suggested the Obama Administration began a covert Title 50 authorized program to support Syria's rebels—primarily against the Assad regime—in 2013.¹⁹ The program allegedly included lethal assistance to various rebel groups in Syria.²⁰ The overt program, on the other hand, began after a United Nations' ceasefire negotiation between regime and rebel forces failed to take root and ISIL began to spread out of control.²¹ Congress also agreed

¹⁸ Matthew C. Weed, "A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Issues and Current Proposals in Brief," *Congressional Research Service* 43760 (2015): 11, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc503658/m1/1/high_res_d/R43760_2015Feb20.pdf.

¹⁹ Mazzetti and Apuzzo, "U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels."

²⁰ Mazzetti and Apuzzo, "U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels."

²¹ Christopher M. Blanchard and Amy Belasco, "Train and Equip Program for Syria: Authorities, Funding, and Issues for Congress" (DTIC Document, 2015), 2, <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA622754>.

to authorize and appropriate funds to enact the STEP in mid-December 2014.²² The language provided authorization and appropriation for the following purposes: “1) Defending the Syrian people from attacks by ISIL, and securing territory controlled by the Syrian opposition, 2) Protecting the United States, its friends and allies, and the Syrian people from... terrorists in Syria, 3) Promoting the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.”²³ With the legislation in place, US officials embarked on a nearly \$500 million program to deploy forces, build infrastructure, and coordinate with Arab partners, which would lay the groundwork for the STEP.²⁴ The CJIAF identified more than 2,000 planned participants, vetted 400 of them, and began training for 90 recruits in early May 2015.²⁵

The winnowing down of recruits continued from the start of training through to their graduation from the STEP. According to press accounts, two months of training produced 54 Syrians who were ready to combat ISIL.²⁶ The graduates called themselves the New Syrian Forces (NSF) and subsequently took a two-week break to visit families under Syrian-regime bombardment.²⁷ Al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, ambushed NSF members on their way back from leave and took their commander, along with seven other NSF members into custody.²⁸ Two days later, on July 31, al-Nusra attacked the NSF headquarters which

²² Blanchard and Belasco, “Train and Equip Program for Syria,” 4.

²³ *Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015*, 2014, secs. 1209, 1510, 1534; *Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015*, 2014, sec. 9016.

²⁴ Joseph Trevithick, “The Pentagon’s War Effort in Syria Spans Five Countries,” *War Is Boring*, August 23, 2016, <https://warisboring.com/the-pentagons-war-effort-in-syria-spans-five-countries-23c76dfa8407>.

²⁵ Blanchard and Belasco, “Train and Equip Program for Syria,” 5.

²⁶ “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?,” *Mcclatchydc*, accessed March 25, 2017, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article50919765.html>.

²⁷ “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?”

²⁸ “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?”

ultimately led the remaining NSF forces to disperse.²⁹ Seventy more recruits graduated quickly after the first recruits dispersed.³⁰ These additional 70 recruits, also part of NSF, allegedly encountered early trouble during infiltration into Syria from Turkey. The new NSF graduates supposedly handed over a quarter of their issued equipment to al-Nusra intermediaries to guarantee safe passage into the battlefield.³¹ Shortly after, the group disintegrated and its members scattered in a final setback to the Program.

The setbacks prompted Congress and the DoD to re-evaluate the STEP. The Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing with CENTCOM commander, GEN Lloyd Austin. The hearing publicly revealed the dismal NSF results within Syria. GEN Austin revealed only “four or five” members of NSF remained.³² As a result, the DoD abandoned the 2015 approach to the STEP in October of 2015, which sought to build a guerilla force from scratch.³³ The DoD instituted an “operational pause” and considered altering the program to simply providing equipment and support.³⁴ Later in the year, Pentagon Spokesman Maj Roger Cabiness

²⁹ “Commander of U.S.-Backed Rebels Captured by Al-Qaeda Militants in Syria,” *Washington Post*, accessed March 25, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/commander-of-us-backed-rebels-captured-by-al-qaeda-militants-in-syria/2015/07/30/d90aef92-36f4-11e5-9739-170df8af8eb9_story.html.

³⁰ “70 More ‘New Syrian Force’ Fighters Enter Syria,” *VOA*, accessed March 27, 2017, <http://www.voanews.com/a/more-new-syrian-force-fighters-enter-syria/2974297.html>.

³¹ “US-Backed Rebels Handed over Equipment to Al Qaeda in Syria,” *FDD’s Long War Journal*, accessed March 26, 2017, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/09/us-backed-rebels-handed-over-equipment-to-al-qaeda-in-syria.php>.

³² CSPAN, *U.S. Strategy Against ISIS* (Washington, D.C), accessed March 27, 2017, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4551256/4-5-us-trained-syrians-fighting-islamic-state>.

³³ Cooper and Schmitt, “Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS.”

³⁴ Cooper and Schmitt, “Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS.”

said that 145 of the 180 total trainees in the STEP remained active—still far short of the anticipated 2,000 trainees.³⁵

The remaining active NSF reconstituted and transitioned into a new role within the New Syrian Army while the STEP was under review.³⁶ In March of 2016, the New Syrian Army forces seized and held a sliver of territory in the Homs province.³⁷ The New Syrian Army forces were operating under the banner and likely the support of the Authenticity and Development Front—a collection of ideologically moderate and Western-backed Syrian forces.³⁸ Later that month, however, the Authenticity and Development Front expelled the New Syrian Army for unspecified reasons.³⁹ Then in May, ISIL attacked and killed some the New Syrian Army forces at their base in Homs.⁴⁰ Two months later, the New Syrian Army conducted an attack against ISIL forces in the town of Bukamal 200 miles to the east of their base in Homs.⁴¹ The Pentagon-trained force was beaten back by ISIL and suffered heavy losses after planners diverted their air support to interdict ISIL forces in Iraq.⁴² In

³⁵ “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?”; Kristina Wong, “Pentagon wants to try again with Syrian rebel program,” Text, *TheHill*, March 8, 2016, <http://thehill.com/policy/defense/272230-pentagon-wants-to-restart-train-and-equip-program-for-syrian-rebels>.

³⁶ “The Last Remaining Pentagon-Trained Rebel Group in Syria Is Now in Jeopardy,” *Washington Post*, accessed March 26, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-last-remaining-pentagon-trained-rebel-group-in-syria-is-now-in-jeopardy/2016/05/27/91de194a-1c5f-11e6-82c2-a7dcb313287d_story.html.

³⁷ “The Last Remaining Pentagon-Trained Rebel Group in Syria Is Now in Jeopardy.”

³⁸ “Syria Rebel Coalition Cuts Ties with US-Backed Group,” accessed March 27, 2017, <https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/NewsReports/567253-syria-rebel-coalition-cuts-ties-with-us-backed-group>.

³⁹ “Syria Rebel Coalition Cuts Ties with US-Backed Group.”

⁴⁰ “The Last Remaining Pentagon-Trained Rebel Group in Syria Is Now in Jeopardy.”

⁴¹ “U.S. Jets Abandoned Syrian Rebels in the Desert. Then They Lost a Battle to ISIS,” *Washington Post*, accessed March 27, 2017,

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/06/u-s-jets-abandoned-syrian-rebels-in-the-desert-then-they-lost-a-battle-to-isis/>.

⁴² “U.S. Jets Abandoned Syrian Rebels in the Desert. Then They Lost a Battle to ISIS.”

August, New Syrian Army spokesman announced a partnership with Turkish special operations forces which easily seized the northern border town of Jarabulus in Operation Euphrates Shield.⁴³ The partnership continued into late 2016 when Turkish, and New Syrian Army forces advanced on the transport and border town of Al-Bab—an operation conducted independently from CJIATF-Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).⁴⁴ While the US-trained New Syrian Army forces have increased their operational effectiveness, their loyalty to US policy objectives seems to have waned.

As the New Syrian Army drifted from US control, the DoD adjusted the operational concepts behind the STEP. In March of 2016, GEN Austin requested funding to restart the program with an emphasis on supporting forces already on the battlefield through materiel and US military advisors.⁴⁵ The new program focused on training a small number of fighters who can act as forward observers for resupply and interdiction efforts.⁴⁶ The new facet of the STEP fixated on the Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC) which comprised the minority of the mainly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces.⁴⁷ Unofficial reports suggest the new STEP focus on the main members of the SAC has had some positive effects.⁴⁸ The first class of recruits produced 100 total fighters that the Pentagon

⁴³ Tim Arango Barnard Anne and Ceylan Yeginsu, “Turkey’s Military Plunges Into Syria, Enabling Rebels to Capture ISIS Stronghold,” *The New York Times*, August 24, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-isis.html>; “Riam Dalati on Twitter,” *Twitter*, accessed March 27, 2017, <https://twitter.com/Dalatrm/status/767005066624589824>.

⁴⁴ Jeremy Sharp and Christopher Blanchard, “Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response,” *Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East* 4, no. 3 (June 14, 2013): 10.

⁴⁵ Wong, “Pentagon wants to try again with Syrian rebel program.”

⁴⁶ “US Sees Successes in Revamped Syria Training Program,” *VOA*, accessed March 27, 2017, <http://www.voanews.com/a/pentagon-renewed-program-train-equip-syrians-growth/3399849.html>.

⁴⁷ “US Sees Successes in Revamped Syria Training Program.”

⁴⁸ “US Sees Successes in Revamped Syria Training Program.”

characterizes as meeting the goals of the new version of STEP.⁴⁹ The new commander of CENTCOM, GEN Joseph Votel, expressed satisfaction with the program and looked forward to continuing the revised methods of STEP.⁵⁰

Analysis

In the final analysis, the STEP case study represents a divergence of military and intelligence activities and an inability for overt UW activities to successfully navigate the Gray Zone. The first limitation to the overt UW campaign and incentive for a separate covert effort was a limited degree of popular support that limited political will. Not surprisingly, parallel covert and overt training and equipping programs arose. The overt STEP's lackluster results owe, in part, to the presence of Syria's sponsor, Russia, which indirectly provided indirect sanctuary for ISIL. This sanctuary impacted STEP recruitment and limited the NSF's effects on the battlefield. Ultimately, limited popular support and political will, combined with an indirect political sanctuary, gave rise to a divergence that witnessed the overt UW program flounder.

The lack of public support and as a result, political will, limited the response options available. Over half of Americans opposed sending materiel and providing training for rebel forces in Syria. With that limited support, the Administration embarked on a covert program alongside the overt STEP. Officials could commit a level of resources commensurate with the political will. The limited stateside support for the STEP was not the only restriction for the employment of an overt UW campaign.

⁴⁹ "Revamped U.S. Training Program, with New Goals, Has Trained Fewer than 100 Syrians so Far," *Washington Post*, accessed March 27, 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/06/27/pentagons-revamped-training-program-has-trained-fewer-than-100-syrians-officials-say/>.

⁵⁰ "General Joseph Votel Briefs Reporters Anti-ISIS | Video | C-SPAN.Org," accessed March 27, 2017, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?414544-1/general-joseph-votel-briefs-reporters-antiisis-operations>.

Syria's connection to Russia also constrained President Obama's ability to conduct the overt STEP. Syria and Russia have been long-time allies from which Russia benefits greatly by having access to a Mediterranean seaport and having a regional counterbalance to pro-US Arab states.⁵¹ As a result, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Russia would abandon its only remaining Arab ally. President Obama, on the other hand, saw Russia as vital to advancing US objectives, especially within the region. Obama Administration officials expressed, behind closed doors, a desire to continue nurturing relations with Russia at the time of the Syrian civil war.⁵² Administration officials viewed the relationship with Russia a key component of advancing a nuclear deal with Iran.⁵³ The Iranian nuclear deal markedly constrained the Syrian civil war response options. The question for the Administration then became, what responses in Syria would agitate a US-Russia relationship?

Any intervention policy that would violate international norms and threaten Russian access to Syria would likely strain further the US-Russia relationship. Overtly arming Syrian rebels who were hostile to the regime would likely result in a breakdown of the US-Russia relationship. Obama officials admitted as much when they backed off calls for Assad to step down.⁵⁴ President Obama even sought a diplomatic response to his previous declaration that the use of chemical weapons by Assad would induce a US military response.⁵⁵ Relations with Russia constrained the policy moving forward due to a perceived need not to threaten Russian access to Syria.

⁵¹ Patrick J. Buchanan, "The US and Russia in Syria: War Party Targets Putin and Assad," *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 34, no. 8 (2015): 25.

⁵² William Rugh, "Obama's Policy Towards Syria," *Fletcher F. World Aff.* 37, no. 3 (2013): 149.

⁵³ Rugh, "Obama's Policy Towards Syria," 149.

⁵⁴ "The Internationalist » Obama, Putin, and Syria: The Makings of a Deal?," *Council on Foreign Relations - The Internationalist*, accessed March 28, 2017, <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2012/06/19/obama-putin-and-syria-the-makings-of-a-deal/>.

⁵⁵ Sharp and Blanchard, "Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response," 6.

The Obama Administration took a more overt military tone in response to ISIL's rapidly spreading carnage. The overt military option of the STEP, however, still reflected US-Russia relations despite ISIL's atrocities. For example, STEP recruits had to swear only to fight ISIL and not the Syrian regime.⁵⁶ The requirement for recruits to fight only ISIL—which furthers Russian interests in Syria—severely hampered recruitment numbers.⁵⁷ Then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Ms. Christine Wormuth, stated that finding recruits who agreed to the requirement to only fight ISIL was a “pretty challenging recruiting mission.”⁵⁸ Even recruits who agreed to the requirement expressed dissatisfaction throughout training with not being allowed also to target the regime.⁵⁹ The exact number of recruits who turned away once knowing the requirement is not publicly available. Based on NSF interviews and DoD testimony, however, it is not difficult to assume a significant portion of the initial 2,000 participants who entered the vetting process turned away due to the requirement. In the end, the meager 180 total recruits who agreed to the requirement simply could not effect real change against an ISIL force of 31,500.⁶⁰ These meager results represented a culmination of public support and political will interacting to produce divergence.

Limited public support combined with high political sanctuary risk to yield a strategy with a limited investment of disparate means and ways. The early phases of the UW campaign consisted of covert UW means and ways reflective of public support against colluding with Syrian rebels. The Administration added overt means and ways to the

⁵⁶ “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?”

⁵⁷ CSPAN, *U.S. Strategy Against ISIS*.

⁵⁸ CSPAN, *U.S. Strategy Against ISIS*.

⁵⁹ “What Really Happened to the U.S. Train-and-Equip Program in Syria?”

⁶⁰ “CIA Says IS Numbers Underestimated - Al Jazeera English,” accessed March 28, 2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/cia-triples-number-islamic-state-fighters-201491232912623733.html>.

overall strategy once ISIL's carnage surfaced. Public support for restraint endured, however, despite their collective disapproval of ISIL's tactics. At the same time, the Russian-backed political sanctuary for ISIL forced overt activities to accommodate the diplomatic challenges. As a result, divergence emerged and so did failure. Divergence was not only limited to UW as the subsequent case studies demonstrate.



Chapter 6

Al-Qaeda Senior Leadership

The efforts against al-Qaeda's senior leadership from 2001 to 2011 reveal an ebb and flow of convergence between military and intelligence activities. Public support to pursue those responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001, similarly fluctuated as al-Qaeda's senior leadership (AQSL) moved to limit its exposure to US CT forces. The ends to address al-Qaeda were to deny, disrupt, and defeat the organization. To achieve these ends, the United States leveraged various departments and agencies within the executive branch as well as coalition partners. The ways in which these means came together evolved as the al-Qaeda organization adapted to increasing pressure. This particular blend of ends, means, and ways reveals a fluctuation of convergence and divergence as AQSL adapted. This case study demonstrates the fluctuation by focusing on the 2001 raid to capture Abu Zubaydah through to the 2011 raid for Osama Bin Laden to capture the lengthy and episodic conduct of major CT efforts against AQSL.

The public support for the campaign against AQSL saw significant crests and troughs from 2001 to 2011. A Pew Research Poll in 2001 reveals that 85% of the country supported retaliation against al-Qaeda.¹ Two years later, a Princeton Survey noted that 78% of American still supported the war against terrorism.² In 2005, however, approval of the war on terrorism sharply declined to only 39% according to a Wall Street Journal poll.³ Two years later in 2007, a CNN poll revealed that 52% of Americans felt that the US should not take military action in Pakistan

¹ Polling Report, Inc, "Terrorism (9)," accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.pollingreport.com/terror9.htm>.

² Polling Report, Inc, "Terrorism (7)," accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.pollingreport.com/terror7.htm>.

³ "Terrorism (6)," accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.pollingreport.com/terror6.htm>.

even if the US could target a high-ranking al-Qaeda member.⁴ A Roper poll revealed that almost 90% of Americans both approved of the Abbottabad raid and believed Bin Laden's capture justified the violation of sovereignty. The initial public support for US actions against al-Qaeda spiked but quickly dropped as the campaign wore on. It spiked again after the successful conduct of the Bin Laden raid.

Al-Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan became significantly more limited after the US response in 2001 discussed in Chapter 3. The group's leaders sought cover in the more extreme terrain of Afghanistan and political sanctuary of Pakistan after losing senior leaders and scores of foot soldiers through the course of the invasion.⁵ Most of AQSL escaped into Pakistan through four main routes which passed through either the Hindu Kush mountain range or Baluchistan's desert.⁶ Except for the members of the Management Council, who fled to Iran, virtually all of the members of the committees and the Shura Council arrived in various parts of Pakistan.⁷ AQSL members initially settled in various cities such as Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Lahore but emigrated to the largely lawless villages of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The consolidation of AQSL in the harsh Afghan terrain and shadows of Pakistani cities and villages had many effects on the organization's strategy and coherence.

The 10-year period between 2001 and 2011 produced relatively stable US strategies aimed to confront al-Qaeda and its terrorist tactics. These strategies produced a model consisting of three goals: defending the homeland; denying a haven for al-Qaeda; and the defeat of al-Qaeda itself. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both referenced

⁴ "Terrorism (3)," accessed April 19, 2017, <http://www.pollingreport.com/terror3.htm>.

⁵ Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer, *The Hunt for KSM: Inside the Pursuit and Takedown of the Real 9/11 Mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed*, 2013, 3, 181.

⁶ Seth G Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows: The Pursuit of Al Qaeda since 9/11* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2013), 85.

⁷ Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 85, 105.

homeland defense, sanctuary denial, and al-Qaeda's destruction in each of their National Security Strategies, National Strategies for Combating Terrorism, and various speeches. The model of defense, denial, and defeat is a mutually supportive element of the strategy. For example, defense of the homeland and defeat of al-Qaeda require the denial of safe havens. Various DoD strategy documents like the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Strategy, and National Military Strategy, were all guided by the "defend, deny, defeat" model as well.

This model served as a short-term solution which creates space for long-term solutions to take root. Presidents Bush and Obama, however, differed on their long-term approaches. President Bush believed democracy, which legitimately addressing grievances through policy discourse could counter al-Qaeda's ideology. President Obama, on the other hand, set economic prosperity and equal rights as tenets to his long-term strategy against extremist ideology. Nevertheless, a natural tension arose between the short-term "defend, deny, defeat" model and the long-term erosion of al-Qaeda ideology.

The "defend, deny, defeat" model, which stated a number of desired ends, required not only the military and intelligence community but coalition partners as well. Elements of USSOCOM's CT-relevant forces and American air power's strike, ISR, and airlift assets once again teamed up to provide the bulk of the military's weight against AQSL. The intelligence community—more specifically the CIA—was the lead organization for the strategy against al-Qaeda.⁸ The Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and relevant Station Chiefs, within the CIA, planned, coordinated, and executed various CT efforts.⁹ The National Security Agency (NSA) also provided its signals intelligence (SIGINT) and computer network operations (CNO) expertise to round out the intelligence

⁸ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 211.

⁹ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 211.

community's contributions.¹⁰ A task force was also created, upon Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's suggestion, to fuse the operations and intelligence of counterterrorism efforts in both communities.¹¹ The concept began as the Joint Intelligence Task Force but ultimately settled as the Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF).¹² Beyond the US government, the strategy also required the help of the indigenous forces and partner nations. Local Northern Alliance warlords provided men and materiel to assist in Tora Bora CT operations.¹³ A team-level detachment of the British Special Boat Service (SBS), similar in size to an SF ODA, joined the same fight as General Ali's forces.¹⁴ The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) also endeavored to capture AQSL members after they fled Afghanistan into Pakistani cities.¹⁵ The US military and intelligence community, as well as indigenous and partner nations, presented a seemingly formidable alliance of resources.

The robust set of CT means had to evolve their approach as AQSL adapted to enhance its survivability. The campaign against AQSL was a strategy of attrition, which required targeting key leaders and denying their resources. This strategy began with a CIA airstrike against Mohammed Atef, the top military commander for al-Qaeda, and a joint-interagency raid targeting Osama Bin Laden in Tora Bora.¹⁶ The CIA and Pakistan ISI conducted direct action raids in the cities of Pakistan after

¹⁰ Michael V. Hayden, *Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror* (New York: Penguin Press, 2016), 106, 133.

¹¹ Donald Rumsfeld, "JITF - CT," September 26, 2001, <http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/1508/2001-09-26%20to%20George%20Tenet%20re%20JITF-CT.pdf>.

¹² Stanley A. McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir* (New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2013), 119.

¹³ Dalton Fury, *Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Man*, 1st ed (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008), 263.

¹⁴ Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, xxii.

¹⁵ Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 84.

¹⁶ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 225.

Bin Laden and his associates escaped from Afghanistan.¹⁷ Some CT operations were conducted with limited success since AQSL moved from the vulnerable Pakistani cities to the largely lawless regions of the FATA.¹⁸ The inaccessibility of the FATA forced the CIA and DoD to conduct targeted killings using remotely piloted aircraft (RPA).¹⁹ Finally, the efforts against AQSL culminated with the joint-interagency direct action mission in Abbottabad to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden in 2011.²⁰ The actions and reactions between CT forces and AQSL reveal an ebb and flow of convergence, which began with an unprecedented merger of military and intelligence activities in late 2001.

The CT hunt for Atef and Bin Laden picked up momentum towards the end of the concurrent campaign to overthrow the Taliban. In mid-November, CIA analysts identified potential residences for AQSL members in Kabul and targeted the buildings with an MQ-1 Predator.²¹ Post-strike analysis and exploitation by SOF revealed the strike had killed Mohammed Atef, then the highest-ranking member of al-Qaeda to die.²² Intelligence sources believed Bin Laden, on the other hand, was hiding in the Tora Bora mountains near Jalalabad and close to the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.²³ The joint interagency and coalition team along with Northern Alliance counterparts infiltrated the mountain range with the intent to seize him.²⁴ Team members directed American air power onto cave entrances over 100 square kilometers

¹⁷ McDermott and Meyer, *The Hunt for KSM*, 5.

¹⁸ Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 225.

¹⁹ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 335.

²⁰ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 324.

²¹ Richard B. Myers and Malcolm McConnell, *Eyes on the Horizon: Serving on the Frontlines of National Security*, 1st ed (New York: Threshold, 2009), 199.

²² Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies since 9/11* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 57.

²³ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 225.

²⁴ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 226.

before clearing the complexes in close combat.²⁵ After just over two weeks of activity, Northern Alliance forces lost their motivation to continue the demanding close combat task and at one point turned their guns on SBS members in protest of a cave-clearing order.²⁶ This news fueled interagency suspicions that the Northern Alliance allowed Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri to escape.²⁷ Pakistani forces were unable to seal the border with Afghanistan, and senior US leaders did not deploy conventional forces to do the job for the Pakistanis.²⁸ In the end, over 200 al-Qaeda foot soldiers died while another 50 surrendered.²⁹ No members of AQSL, much less Bin Laden or al-Zawahiri, were killed or captured during the weeks-long endeavor in December 2001.

The US government had to adjust its CT approach once AQSL successfully crossed into Pakistan. The CIA, in conjunction with the ISI, embarked on countless raids over the course of two years once Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf agreed to pursue al-Qaeda figures within his country.³⁰ The first AQSL domino to fall to such raids was Abu Zubaydah whose intelligence trail began with a signals intelligence intercept.³¹ Zubaydah was a known facilitator of foreign fighters and ran several training camps in Afghanistan, including the Khaldan training camp which produced several of the September 11, 2001, hijackers.³² The capture of Zubaydah, it was believed, would facilitate additional information indicating when and where the next attack would occur.³³ The CIA received the intercept and pursued Zubaydah in Lahore and

²⁵ Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, xviii.

²⁶ Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 211.

²⁷ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 226.

²⁸ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 227.

²⁹ Fury, *Kill Bin Laden*, 277.

³⁰ Tenet and Harlow, *At the Center of the Storm*, 229; Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 99.

³¹ McDermott and Meyer, *The Hunt for KSM*, 4.

³² Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 91.

³³ McDermott and Meyer, *The Hunt for KSM*, 5.

Faisalabad for several weeks until his eventual capture in March 2002.³⁴ Another member of AQSL, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, was targeted when intelligence officials believed he might be at the center of the September 11, 2001, attacks.³⁵ Information gleaned from the interrogation of Zubaydah and the apprehension of another operative, Mohammad Rabbani, led to another CIA and ISI raid which eventually led to al-Shibh's capture.³⁶ Intelligence from successful raids produced more raids as the mastermind of the attacks on September 11, 2001, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, was captured in Rawalpindi in the spring of 2003.³⁷ The string of successful raids compelled Saif al-Adel, chief of the AQSL security committee, to comment that the setbacks were making al-Qaeda the "laughingstock of the world."³⁸ In all, Title 50 authorized operations led to the capture of eight AQSL members or their lieutenants in the cities of Pakistan during the two-year span between 2001 and 2003.³⁹

AQSL members entrenched themselves in the FATA following the setbacks in Pakistani cities. This move to the FATA, combined with the diversion of resources in the Iraq War, produced limited CT effectiveness from 2003 to 2005. Two dozen major operations took place in the FATA which netted no AQSL targets.⁴⁰ USSOCOM's lead CT organization in the fall of 2003, Task Force (TF) 714, gleaned intelligence suggesting AQSL members such as Abu al-Masri may be hiding in the remote Afghan mountains within the Nuristan and Kunar provinces.⁴¹ TF 714 set out on a long patrol in the remote mountains to net potential AQSL members

³⁴ McDermott and Meyer, *The Hunt for KSM*, 5; Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 92.

³⁵ Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 99.

³⁶ Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 101; McDermott and Meyer, *The Hunt for KSM*, 7.

³⁷ McDermott and Meyer, *The Hunt for KSM*, 244.

³⁸ Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 106.

³⁹ Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 104.

⁴⁰ Jones, *Hunting in the Shadows*, 231.

⁴¹ McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 108; Wesley Morgan, *Ten Years in Afghanistan's Pech Valley*, 2015, <http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR382-Ten-Years-in-Afghanistans-Pech-Valley.pdf>.

with little success.⁴² The lack of success on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between 2003 and 2005 fostered a resurgence of AQSL and al-Qaeda as a whole.⁴³ The lawless regions of the extreme Afghan terrain and Pakistan's FATA forced CT forces to evolve their approach.

The new approach CT forces used to counter al-Qaeda's move required RPAs to directly strike AQSL members in the inaccessible FATA region beginning in 2005.⁴⁴ While the exact details of this newer approach to CT remain classified, former CIA Director, General Mike Hayden, acknowledged that the "CIA plays a part [in targeted killing] and that the agency has acknowledged that it has an intelligence interest and operational role in the US government's use of drones."⁴⁵ The RPA strikes relied on human intelligence (HUMINT), SIGINT, and imagery intelligence (IMINT) to be effective.⁴⁶ According to press accounts, RPA strikes in the FATA accounted for 33 senior al-Qaeda operatives and seven AQSL members between 2001 and early 2011.⁴⁷ Osama Bin Laden himself expressed concern over the strikes and considered them the most effective method against al-Qaeda due to the overwhelming success of the program.⁴⁸ Gen Hayden remarked that AQSL "was made a shell of its former self" due to the highly successful RPA strikes.⁴⁹ That said, the RPA strikes came at a cost which former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta described as "if used too much, invited the condemnation of the world."⁵⁰

⁴² McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 109.

⁴³ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 335.

⁴⁴ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 334.

⁴⁵ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 333.

⁴⁶ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 337.

⁴⁷ Bill Roggio, "US Strikes in Pakistan, HVTs," *FDD's Long War Journal*, accessed March 24, 2017, <http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes-hvts>.

⁴⁸ Morell and Harlow, *The Great War of Our Time*, 137.

⁴⁹ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 341.

⁵⁰ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 391.

TF 714 forces conducted RPA strikes and direct action missions in Afghanistan at the same time as the CIA in the FATA in Pakistan. The Task Force had integrated RPAs into the F3EAD loop and were successfully engaging targets within Afghanistan. None of those targets, however, senior al-Qaeda leadership targets before the close of 2011.⁵¹ On the other hand, intelligence indicated Osama Bin Laden would reappear in Tora Bora in 2007.⁵² As a result, TF 714 conducted Operation Valiant Pursuit to kill or capture Bin Laden and other AQSL members.⁵³ After an intense “soak” of the area using ISR assets, TF 714 inserted SOF ground maneuver forces to search and clear the areas physically.⁵⁴ In the end, Operation Valiant Pursuit killed or captured no AQSL members.⁵⁵

At the same time as SOF were hunting targets in Afghanistan, the single most important mission for the CIA from 2008 to 2011 was the killing or capture of Osama Bin Laden.⁵⁶ Interrogation sessions with Khaled Sheikh Mohammed revealed one of Bin Laden’s couriers: Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti.⁵⁷ Analysts tracked Kuwaiti to a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan and observed the three-story building he repeatedly visited for nearly a year.⁵⁸ The analysis revealed a tall man, who did not own the compound but still lived in the nicest suite, would periodically stroll around the yard to seemingly get exercise.⁵⁹ The CIA believed a high-value target lived inside the compound and began looking

⁵¹ Sean Naylor, *Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command* (St. Martin’s Press, 2015), 365.

⁵² McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 266.

⁵³ McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 266.

⁵⁴ McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 266.

⁵⁵ McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, 266.

⁵⁶ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 290.

⁵⁷ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 291; Morell and Harlow, *The Great War of Our Time*, 272.

⁵⁸ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 294.

⁵⁹ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 295.

at several options to either engage or raid the residence.⁶⁰ One raid option was to assault the compound with just CIA paramilitary forces and another included SOF personnel.⁶¹ Once Bin Laden was thought to likely be in the house, Panetta decided to offer support for SOF personnel to raid the compound.⁶² The SOF personnel trained on a full-scale mock-up of the Abbottabad compound provided by the CIA.⁶³ President Obama concurred with the recommendation and authorized the mission to occur on the period of darkness between 1 and 2 May 2011.⁶⁴ The President indicated to Director Panetta and Deputy Director Mike Morell that the CIA would lead the operation making the mission ostensibly covert in its authorization as the Pakistani government was not informed.⁶⁵ Despite an incident with the helicopter assault force, the team assaulted the compound, killed Bin Laden in the process while also recovering a trove of electronic documents.⁶⁶ The 10-year manhunt for Osama Bin Laden was over.

Analysis

The decade-long effort against AQSL experienced varying degrees of success as military and intelligence activities initially converged, then diverged, and finally re-converged. Domestic public support for the campaign led each instance of convergence or divergence. The campaign witnessed an immediate convergence of military and intelligence activities and virtually no sanctuary in the December 2001 hunt for Bin Laden. DoD and CIA paramilitary activities diverged, however, in the mountains of Afghanistan and the cities of Pakistan which both represented little political sanctuary. Targeted killings emerged as the

⁶⁰ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 299.

⁶¹ Morell and Harlow, *The Great War of Our Time*, 156.

⁶² Morell and Harlow, *The Great War of Our Time*, 156, 160.

⁶³ Morell and Harlow, *The Great War of Our Time*, 157.

⁶⁴ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 321.

⁶⁵ Morell and Harlow, *The Great War of Our Time*, 157.

⁶⁶ Panetta and Newton, *Worthy Fights*, 322–24.

operational concept of choice once AQSL sought refuge in the FATA and continued the trend of divergence due to a confounding circumstance of political sanctuary for the CIA. Convergence reappeared during the Abbottabad raid in which Bin Laden benefited from a degree of sanctuary due to Pakistani sovereignty. In the end, convergence predictably fluctuated with the political will, degree of sanctuary, and capabilities, resulting in a successful CT campaign in the Gray Zone.

The initial phase of the CT efforts against AQSL, the strike on Mohammed Atef and the actions against Osama Bin Laden, saw nearly complete convergence as al-Qaeda had minimal sanctuary. Public support for actions against al-Qaeda was nearly unanimous. Means and ways combined and worked together in ways previously unseen. The strike against Mohammed Atef and the follow-on SOF raid to examine the strike was the first example of convergence against AQSL. The series of actions to capture or kill Osama Bin Laden in Tora Bora was another example of convergence. Both DoD and CIA personnel worked together to conduct a blend of paramilitary operations and direct action missions. Neither Atef nor Bin Laden, however, had political sanctuary in this initial salvo of converging operations. The complete convergence, backed by public support, in conditions of minimal sanctuary saw success against Atef but not initially against Bin Laden.

The CIA's campaign against AQSL in the cities of Pakistan began diverging again in the minimal sanctuary. Not surprisingly, public support had shifted away from AQSL and onto the 2003-Iraq invasion. As a result, means and ways began diverging when the CIA facilitated the intelligence for and joined the Pakistani-led raids against four prominent members of AQSL. The CIA also participated in the interrogations of the captured members to glean further intelligence. The covert paramilitary nature of these raids also enabled the CIA to conduct operations against AQSL without fear of violating political sanctuary. Musharraf could continue to support the CIA requests as long as the public viewed the

raids as Pakistani operations. The brief divergence during waning public support but decreased risks of political sanctuary achieved marked success for the CIA.

Divergence continued as AQSL members sought refuge in the FATA and public support continued to decline to its all-time low point. The inaccessibility of the FATA to both Title 10 and Title 50 forces paralyzed the concept to enable Pakistani forces to conduct their raids against AQSL. CIA efforts involving RPAs once again resembled military actions more than intelligence-related covert action. RPA operations operated less in the realm of covert action and more in the realm of warfare—much like the Atef strike. In contrast, the DoD-led long-range patrols of Operation Winter Strike in Afghanistan by CT forces resembled more traditional military activities but failed to achieve the desired effects. The operational success of CIA operations in the FATA was stunning considering the unique sanctuary in which they operated.

The convergence of intelligence with military activities after the period of divergence reached a pinnacle during the 2011 operation to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad. Nearly the entire country supported actions to bring Bin Laden to justice at the time of the raid. Means and ways reacted accordingly. The development of intelligence before the operation was representative of true covert action and analytical tradecraft within the CIA. The direct action mission against Bin Laden, however, was more representative of combat action synonymous with DoD CT forces. That said, the raid was conducted on Pakistan's sovereign territory and without the knowledge of Pakistani officials. This sanctuary dilemma forced Panetta and the President to authorize the mission under Title 50. The primarily DoD assault force worked extensively with and under cover of the CIA before, during, and after the mission. In this regard, military and intelligence activities had truly converged. The Bin Laden raid was another successful convergent operation in a political sanctuary with high public support.

The efforts against al-Qaeda's senior leadership from 2001 to 2011 reveals key insights into the convergence and divergence of military and intelligence activities due to public support and political will. The ends—deny, disrupt, and the defeat of al-Qaeda—remained the same throughout the campaign. The means and ways to achieve those ends, however, shifted as al-Qaeda sought refuge in the FATA. The CIA and USSOCOM could not have been more far apart during the initial RPA campaign. USSOCOM continued its focus on direct action activities but occasionally expanded its involvement in intelligence. This divergence came to a swift end when USSOCOM capabilities were required to prosecute the raid in Abbottabad successfully. The blend of CT ends, means, and ways experienced fluctuating convergence and success of military and intelligence activities during the campaign against AQSL. This convergence and success stand in stark contrast to another CT campaign in the jungles of sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter 7

Lord's Resistance Army

The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is another CT case study which reveals insights into the trend of convergence different from the previous chapter. The LRA's association with atrocities led to a regional humanitarian crisis which subsequently pushed Congress into action. As a result, the Obama Administration crafted a strategy to resolve the crisis through, among other things, a decapitation strategy against the LRA's leader, Joseph Kony. This strategy included mainly DoD SOF and related intelligence organizations alongside the Ugandan military. The DoD SOF and intelligence served to fill gaps in the Ugandan efforts against the LRA, which include ISR, logistics, and professionalism. The ends, means, and ways represented an interesting departure from convergence perhaps related to a limited sanctuary and the absence of vital US interests.

The LRA remained largely of international notoriety until word of their atrocities spread. Kony established the LRA in 1988 as a militant organization to the address grievances of his native people, the Acholi. The LRA's reputation for barbarism garnered the international community's serious attention in 2004. The LRA continued its atrocities despite political isolation from the international community for several years. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) lending assistance to nearby villages) publicized a brutal massacre by the LRA in 2009. The increased public awareness by NGOs and social media activists served as a catalyst for US involvement.

Before the US public and political leaders became interested in the LRA, Joseph Kony was primarily concerned with fighting his ethnic opponents. The LRA was born out of Acholi tribes in northern Uganda who fought the Ugandan government and its supporting southern

tribes.¹ Kony publicly stated that his goal is to overthrow the Uganda government and install a government based on the Ten Commandments.² The LRA represented a more extreme version of the Acholi resistance, though over time the local tribes began to distance themselves from the LRA.³ In a cruel twist, Kony turned his extremism on his Acholi kin and was quickly developed a reputation for murder, rape, mutilations, and employing child soldiers through the course of his raids on other villages.⁴ The irreconcilability of Kony's religious goals and the manner in which he tries to accomplish them has led many analysts to consider the LRA as more of a personality cult than a bona fide insurgency.⁵ This personality cult garnered a reputation for brutality remote from the original Acholi grievances that began the violence.

Awareness of the LRA's misdeeds began in 2001 but grew into outrage in 2005 as the international community took serious notice of the atrocities in Uganda. In 2001, the Department of State (DoS) placed the LRA on its Terrorist Exclusion List.⁶ Designating the LRA as a terrorist organization helped stigmatize and economically isolate the organization for its actions. Four years later, the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation into the LRA and indicted Joseph Kony and four other of his top lieutenants for war crimes and crimes against humanity.⁷ As a result, the ICC issued warrants for Kony and his lieutenants in 2005.⁸ Due challenging terrain and how the LRA acquired

¹ "National Counterterrorism Center | Groups."

² Robert L. Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," *Defense & Security Analysis* 24, no. 1 (March 2008): 45, doi:10.1080/14751790801903210.

³ "National Counterterrorism Center | Groups."

⁴ Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," 45.

⁵ "National Counterterrorism Center | Groups."

⁶ "Terrorist Exclusion List," *U.S. Department of State*, accessed April 16, 2017, <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm>.

⁷ "Situation in Uganda," accessed April 16, 2017, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda>.

⁸ "Situation in Uganda."

resources, primarily through coercion of the local population, the DoS and ICC's actions failed to produce demonstrable effects upon the terrorist organization of over 2,000 members.⁹

The LRA maintained its significant presence and continued its business for several years despite ongoing peace talks. The Ugandan government and Kony began the peace talks in 2006 mediated by the Southern Sudanese. Kony seemed to use the peace talks, however, as a way to reduce military pressure on his forces.¹⁰ President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda also looked reluctant to commit to peace talks fully.¹¹ The peace talks ultimately broke down in 2008 when Kony made the impossible demand that the ICC close his case.¹² Shortly after, Museveni ordered Operation Lightning Thunder to capture or kill senior LRA members.¹³ Despite an impressive multilateral effort involving Ugandan, Congolese, and Sudanese armies, with the materiel provided by the US, these forces were unable to achieve their objective.¹⁴ The multilateral operation did achieve some successes, primarily in breaking up the LRA into smaller groups that dispersed deeper into the jungle but continued their atrocities.¹⁵

One particular atrocity in 2009 gained international notoriety. In December, the LRA seized a village in Northeastern Congo and killed at least 321 civilians while abducting 250 others—80 of whom were children.¹⁶ The LRA members tied victims to trees, crushed their skulls

⁹ Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 1.

¹⁰ Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 7.

¹¹ Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 7.

¹² Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 7.

¹³ "National Counterterrorism Center | Groups."

¹⁴ "National Counterterrorism Center | Groups."

¹⁵ "National Counterterrorism Center | Groups."

¹⁶ "Kony 2017: From Guerrilla Marketing to Guerrilla Warfare," *Foreign Policy*, accessed April 8, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/02/kony-2017-from-guerilla-marketing-to-guerilla-warfare-invisible-children-africa/>.

with axes, and even burned a 3-year old girl to death.¹⁷ The international community was especially incensed when news of the horrific massacre broke in March of 2010. Several NGOs poured money into the area to provide early warning assistance to villages that may be the next targets for LRA attacks.¹⁸ Other NGOs lobbied Congress to take substantive action after word of the full extent of the atrocities in 2009 spread.¹⁹

The lobbying effort by the NGOs to Congress worked. Members of Congress took to the floor to advocate for legislation to address the LRA-related carnage.²⁰ There are no known polls to gauge the broader American public's broader support for action against the LRA despite the high interest by Congress. A few months later, Congress unanimously enacted the Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 in May 2010.²¹ The Act sought to "work with regional governments toward a comprehensive and lasting resolution to the conflict."²² The Act also required the Obama Administration to submit a strategy to resolve the conflict using humanitarian, security, and development tools at the US' disposal.²³ The atrocities conducted across sub-Saharan Africa finally caught up with the LRA once tangible legislation made its way through Congress.

¹⁷ "Kony 2017," 2.

¹⁸ "Kony 2017."

¹⁹ "Grassroots Advocacy," *Invisible Children*, accessed April 17, 2017, <https://invisiblechildren.com/program/grassroots-advocacy/>; Ryan Hendrickson, "Congress's Efforts to Defeat Joseph Kony and the Lord's Resistance Army: NGO Activism, Terrorism and Evangelism," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 14, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 115.

²⁰ Invisible Children, *Congress Passes LRA Bill: Highlights*, 2010, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=on1_vYugP0s.

²¹ *Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009*, 22, vol. 2151, 2010; Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 1.

²² *Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009*, 2151:2.

²³ *Lord's Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009*, 2151:3.

The legislation—and the strategy it required—coupled well with existing ends set forth by the Obama Administration. The 2010 NSS had specifically singled out the protection of human dignity and stability in Africa and advocated for a responsibility to protect those citizens affected.²⁴ The strategy set forth by the Obama Administration and required by Congress in the 2009 Act nested well within the 2010 NSS. The document, *Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord's Resistance Army*, described a desired end-state requiring the LRA no longer pose a threat to civilians and regional stability.²⁵ This end-state outlined six strategic outcomes with one primarily related to the DoD; Joseph Kony and senior commanders are apprehended or removed from the battlefield.²⁶ The strategy to apprehend or remove Kony described a requirement for “enhanced integrated logistical, operational, and intelligence assistance in support of regional and multilateral partners.”²⁷ In effect, this strategy leveraged US assistance and support to partner nations to counter the LRA terrorist threat.

The DoD portion of this counter terrorism effort, called Operation Observant Compass, required a vast range of means available to the US and partner nations. The Obama Administration, in concert with the legislation Congress passed, approved the deployment of military personnel and equipment—primarily SOF—in an advisory role in 2011.²⁸ Both Army and Air Force special operators and their equipment were the mainstays of the military effort.²⁹ The strategy to counter the LRA also relied upon the DoD elements of the Intelligence Community to analyze

²⁴ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy of the United States (2010)* (The White House : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs, 2010), 39.

²⁵ Barack Obama, “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army” (The White House, November 24, 2010), 8.

²⁶ Obama, “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army,” 9.

²⁷ Obama, “Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord’s Resistance Army,” 14.

²⁸ Arieff and Ploch, “The Lord’s Resistance Army,” 1.

²⁹ Joseph Trevithick, “The Hunt for Kony,” *Air Force Magazine*, September 2014, 62–64.

aerial intelligence.³⁰ Finally, the Ugandan military, which is known as the Ugandan People's Defense Force (UPDF), provided the main military effort within Observant Compass.³¹ The means of DoD SOF and intelligence, combined with the Ugandan military, came together in a variety of ways to accomplish the CT strategy outlined by the Obama Administration.

The primary method of employment for DoD forces was to enable the UPDF to perform their own F3EAD operations against the Kony and LRA. The UPDF lacked aerial ISR capability to find and fix the position of the scattered LRA forces as well as its leadership, including Kony. They also lacked the ability to quickly mobilize and deploy to locations where Kony and his associates may be hiding. Finally, while the UPDF was considered the most capable fighting force in the region, they still suffered from corruption as well as incompetence relative to the task at hand.³² As a result, DoD forces stepped in to provide intelligence, logistical support, and advice and assistance to empower the UPDF to find, fix, and finish Kony and the LRA.

The most gaping hole in the UPDF's mission against the LRA was their ability to find and fix Kony's position. Air Force assets and various contractors directly assisted UPDF in the find and fix role. This assistance required both manned and unmanned aerial ISR to peer through the region's dense jungle canopy and correlate Kony's position with other intelligence gleaned from defectors and adjacent villages.³³ The aerial assets used in the find and fix mission included an RC-135, U-

³⁰ "Contractors Run U.S. Spying Missions in Africa," *Washington Post*, accessed April 17, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/contractors-run-us-spying-missions-in-africa/2012/06/14/gJQAvC4RdV_story.html; Obama, "Strategy to Support the Disarmament of the Lord's Resistance Army," 3.

³¹ Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 2.

³² Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 1.

³³ "Contractors Run U.S. Spying Missions in Africa"; Trevithick, "The Hunt for Kony," 65.

2, RPA, multiple PC-12s, and two Beechcraft King Airs.³⁴ The information gleaned from both imagery and signals intelligence was then fused at a UPDF-led operations center to help synchronize both intelligence and operations by ground forces.

Aside from intelligence shortfalls, Ugandan ground forces also had challenges to their mobility and sustainment in the event they fixed Kony's position. The UPDF also lacked suitable roads and vehicles to travel on them.³⁵ The UPDF had only three functional Mi-17 Hip helicopters for aerial transport and assault.³⁶ As a result, Air Force special operators provided both fixed and tilt-rotor airlift capabilities. The M-28 turboprop and CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft provide critical logistics support for both UPDF and US SOF attached to the Observant Compass mission.³⁷ Logistics include not only materiel and equipment but also US SOF resupply.

The US SOF deployments consist mainly of Special Forces in an advise and assist role. The UPDF is regarded as one of the more effective fighting forces in the region but still suffers from a number of maladies, including the employment of heavy-handed tactics.³⁸ The combination of these UPDF shortcomings had alienated local villagers and failed to produce serious results against the LRA.³⁹ These shortcomings have necessitated the deployment of US SOF who can professionalize the UPDF through advising and assisting them. Professionalizing the UPDF can lead to rallying the support of local villagers. Such support can

³⁴ Trevithick, "The Hunt for Kony," 65.

³⁵ Mac William Bishop, "Exclusive: Inside the Green Berets' Hunt for Brutal Warlord," *NBC News*, March 6, 2017, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/inside-green-berets-hunt-warlord-joseph-kony-n726076>.

³⁶ Trevithick, "The Hunt for Kony," 65; Bishop, "Exclusive."

³⁷ Trevithick, "The Hunt for Kony."

³⁸ Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," 45–46.

³⁹ Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," 47.

translate into valuable intelligence leads, which in turn increases the likelihood of capturing or killing Kony and other LRA leaders.⁴⁰

The first 100 military advisors deployed in support of Observant Compass to help the UPDF reverse its fortune in October of 2011.⁴¹ Advisors provided assistance to the UPDF with basic military skills, military information support operations, and interoperability.⁴² Basic military skills focused on the range of activities from marksmanship to ethical standards during patrols and raids.⁴³ Military information support operations have concentrated on enhancing messages to promote additional defections from the LRA.⁴⁴ Finally, interoperability training focused on integrating UPDF with helicopter-borne raids, as well as coordinating aerial surveillance with ground operations.⁴⁵ This advice and assistance have markedly improved the UPDF's ability to conduct an effective F3EAD cycle against Kony on the LRA.

While Kony still eludes capture in the African jungle, his organization has suffered some under the increased pressure from UPDF. The LRA has decreased in size from over 3,000 to approximately 200 through to defections and combat casualties.⁴⁶ The number of usable hideouts for the LRA has also shrunk from 3,000 to approximately 125-

⁴⁰ Andre Le Sage, "Countering the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa," *Strategic Forum* 270 (2011): 10.

⁴¹ Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 10.

⁴² *Rare Access to the Hunt for African Warlord Joseph Kony*, 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30173284>.

⁴³ *Rare Access to the Hunt for African Warlord Joseph Kony*; "Kony 2013: As the Messianic Warlord Eludes Capture, the U.S. Intensifies Its Efforts to Aid in the Hunt.," *Washington Post*, accessed April 17, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kony-2013-us-quietly-intensifies-effort-to-help-african-troops-capture-infamous-warlord/2013/10/28/74db9720-3cb3-11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html.

⁴⁴ Bishop, "EXCLUSIVE."

⁴⁵ *Rare Access to the Hunt for African Warlord Joseph Kony*; Trevithick, "The Hunt for Kony," 65.

⁴⁶ Bishop, "EXCLUSIVE"; "National Counterterrorism Center | Groups."

150.⁴⁷ US intelligence personnel believe that Kony suffers from stomach ulcers and likely has AIDS, indicating that he does not have long to live.⁴⁸ Ultimately, the number of LRA-related attacks since the US direct involvement began has dropped by 80% from 215 in the first quarter of 2010 to 45 in the first quarter of 2017.⁴⁹ Analysts believe the 45 attacks are loosely attributed to the LRA and are the first signs of the terrorist organization's ultimate dissolution.⁵⁰

As of March 2017, the dissolving LRA organization was viewed as a diminishing threat with no significant US interest to warrant continued DoD involvement.⁵¹ Operation Observant Compass' largest supporter in Congress, Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK), noted the diminished threat and acknowledged the potential for smaller troop levels in the future.⁵² Then President-elect Donald Trump's transition team released a statement which read, "The LRA has never attacked US interests, why do we care? I hear that even the Ugandans are looking to stop searching for him since they no longer view him as a threat, so why do we?"⁵³ The ultimate fate of Operation Observant Compass remains a mystery but the past six years of involvement still provide valuable insight on the convergence trend.

Analysis

The campaign against Joseph Kony and the LRA is a notable departure from the convergence trend. Two factors curiously accompany the absence of covert action within the campaign. The first is the absence

⁴⁷ Bishop, "EXCLUSIVE."

⁴⁸ "National Counterterrorism Center | Groups"; Bishop, "EXCLUSIVE."

⁴⁹ "LRA Crisis Tracker," accessed April 17, 2017, <https://www.lracrisistracker.com/>.

⁵⁰ Trevithick, "The Hunt for Kony"; "LRA Crisis Tracker."

⁵¹ Zack Baddorf and Eric Schmitt, "Hunt for Joseph Kony, No Longer Seen as a Threat, May Shrink - NYTimes.Com," accessed March 23, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/world/africa/joseph-kony-congo-africa.html?nytmobile=0>.

⁵² Baddorf and Schmitt, "Hunt for Joseph Kony, No Longer Seen as a Threat, May Shrink - NYTimes.Com."

⁵³ Baddorf and Schmitt, "Hunt for Joseph Kony, No Longer Seen as a Threat, May Shrink - NYTimes.Com."

of any real political sanctuary for Kony and his followers. The LRA did enjoy sanctuary for a period within Sudan until 2001.⁵⁴ The Sudanese had even supported the LRA with weapons and intelligence earlier in the terrorist organization's history.⁵⁵ The Sudanese support for Kony changed when its government agreed to allow Ugandan troops within its borders.⁵⁶ This agreement was vital to the UPDF's Operation Lightning Thunder which displaced some LRA members from their Sudanese sanctuaries. The LRA is primarily on its own now that their physical sanctuary, weapons, and intelligence flow from Sudan have dried up.

In addition to the lack of sanctuary, another curious factor is the limited degree of public support and vital US interests for actions against the LRA. There are no polls to accurately gauge public interest in the LRA, which is telling in its own right. Public interest in the humanitarian crisis may have soared after a YouTube video went viral in 2012 with over 100 million views, but waned once the public moved on to the next humanitarian fad.⁵⁷ A Google Trends examination of the #stopKony hashtag revealed peak popularity occurred after the YouTube video but had decreased by 75% in 2016 and has not surfaced as of March 2017.⁵⁸ The rare direction from Congress to the Obama Administration to develop a strategy against Kony is another interesting example of limited political will, this time from the executive branch. The legislation to capture or kill Kony resulted from the grassroots lobbying efforts of NGOs in Washington D.C., as opposed to nation-wide interest. Congress directed the Administration develop a strategy against Kony and the LRA in an

⁵⁴ Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," 47.

⁵⁵ Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," 47.

⁵⁶ Feldman, "Why Uganda Has Failed to Defeat the Lord's Resistance Army," 47.

⁵⁷ Invisible Children, *KONY 2012*, 2012,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y4MnpzG5Sqc>; Joshua Keating and Elliot Hannon, "The Less You Know," *Slate*, May 20, 2014,

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_world_/2014/05/20/the_depressing_reason_why_hashtag_campaigns_like_stopkony_and_bringbackourgirls.html.

⁵⁸ "Google Trends," *Google Trends*, accessed April 19, 2017, /trends/explore.

astonishing reversal of recent precedent on the use of force. Over much of the past decade-and-a-half, the executive branch has acted unilaterally or has sought Congressional approval in matters of defense. Some journalists, however, have questioned whether the degree of the US response is commensurate with the US interests in the area if there any at all.⁵⁹ Both military leaders and politicians have publicly stated that the LRA poses no threat to core US interests and detracts from other more salient security-related issues.⁶⁰ The limited strategic interest along with the fickle support is noteworthy when considered alongside the absence of covert action.

The minimal public support and US strategic interest, along with the absence of sanctuary for the LRA, are interesting considering the lack of convergence. Limited interest is not surprising considering the politico-military context and the fickle nature of US support for humanitarian crises. While the decapitation strategy to capture or kill Kony has not yet succeeded, the means and ways used by the Obama Administration is telling for those exploring the convergence trend. A response consisting almost wholly of Title 10, DoD forces, to the security-related objectives to a conflict which lacks serious political sanctuary challenges and waning public support holds key insights for the overall analysis of convergence in the Gray Zone.

⁵⁹ Arieff and Ploch, "The Lord's Resistance Army," 3.

⁶⁰ "United States Committee on Armed Services," accessed April 17, 2017, <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/17-03-09-united-states-central-command-and-united-states-africa-command>; Bishop, "EXCLUSIVE."

Conclusion

Traditional Military Activities become a liability with risky foreign policy choices. Covert action has become the easy button to avoid political backlash.

Anonymous Professional Staff Member

Convergence within the Gray Zone is often discussed in the same breath as legislative or authorities-based restrictions. This thesis has reached a different conclusion: convergence and divergence within the Gray Zone have less to do with contemporary legislative matters than an improved understanding of insights from classical military theory. This conclusion is apparent when one closely examines the relationship between public support and political will. Contrary to popular belief, a scholarly analysis reveals legislation enables USSOCOM to conduct a wide range of Gray Zone activities. Therefore, legislation is not a restriction as expected, but is perhaps better explained through military theory. Each case study, summed in Table 1, reveals convergence and divergence as a product of public support and political will. Convergence and divergence also link to covert and overt effectiveness. As a result, the analysis reveals that convergence within the Gray Zone has more to do with insights about the value of the political object in supporting and sustaining political will, and keeping the Clausewitzian Trinity in balance, rather than expansion of legislation or authorities.

The first reason why legislation has minimal impact on convergence in the Gray Zone is the latitude provided by TMA. As Andru Wall points out, many functions described as covert action could and should fall under TMA.¹ For example, RPA strike operations in Pakistan could be executed under TMA provisions by USSOCOM under the 2001 AUMF, yet they are not. The raid against Bin Laden in Abbottabad also

¹ Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate,” 86.

could have been a wholly USSOCOM operation under the same TMA provisions offered by the AUMF, and again it was not. Finally, the STEP could have been an unacknowledged program under the same TMA exception thanks to the same 2001 AUMF, and yet it again was not. If the Title 10 and 50 legislative split does direct the convergence of military and intelligence activities, what does?

Public support and political will drive convergence and divergence within the Gray Zone. The case studies—summed in Table 1—reinforce the theoretical model in Chapter 3. Each case study links public support to political will, which consists of static ends, dynamic means and ways, and stubborn risks. The adjustment of means and ways—to match political will to popular support—ultimately drive the existence of convergence or divergence. This adjustment of means and ways to produce convergence took center stage during the UW campaign to overthrow the Taliban.

Table 1: Consolidated Case Studies, Convergence, and Influencers.

		Taliban Overthrow	STEP	AQSL			C-LRA
Public Support	Polling	High	Medium	High	Medium	High	Low
Political Will	Ends	Remove Taliban Government	Deny ISIL Safe Haven and Build Partner Capacity	Deny, Disrupt, Defeat AQ	Deny, Disrupt, Defeat AQ	Deny, Disrupt, Defeat AQ	Protect Civilians
	Means and Ways Covert Capacity	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	Sufficient	Insufficient	N/A
	Risks Sanctuary	None	Indirect Russian sponsorship	Pakistani failure to seal border	FATA sovereignty	Abbottabad sovereignty	None
	Convergence or Divergence	Convergence	Divergence	Convergence	Divergence	Convergence	Divergence
	USSOCOM Success	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No

Source: Author's Original Work

Toppling the Taliban was a prime example of public support and political will laying the groundwork for unprecedented convergence. The nearly unanimous public sentiment favoring action against the Taliban gave way to an expansive AUMF allowing the President to take significant latitude with ends, means, and ways. The President's stated goal of retribution against al-Qaeda and their Taliban sponsors paired well with

popular support from the American people. Furthermore, the President coupled capabilities inherent to covert action and capacity inherent to DoD SOF to conduct a convergent UW campaign. The convergent campaign thrived after Pakistan removed its support of the Taliban regime, following the attacks on September 11, 2001. This confluence of popular support, combined means and ways, and the absence of sanctuary allowed for a truly convergent UW campaign that produced shocking success. If the UW campaign in Afghanistan was the poster child for convergence and success, then the UW campaign 13 years later in Syria was almost the exact opposite.

The STEP, designed to dislodge ISIL from Syria, was a textbook case of public support and political will fomenting divergence. The American public abhorred ISIL, but a majority opposed a training and equipping program of Syrian fighters to fight ISIL. The limited domestic support combined with another problem of an indirect political sanctuary. The Russian influence in Syria forced the Obama Administration to limit the overt STEP to a minuscule number of recruits. Conversely, press accounts suggest that a covert program stood up to accomplish similar objectives as STEP, without openly antagonizing Syria and its Russian sponsor. The disparate covert and overt means—due to low public support and the presence of political sanctuary risk—paralleled one another throughout the campaign. The low recruitment numbers and dismal battlefield success of the NSF was a key marker of STEP's divergence. The lack of popular support, disparate means and ways resulting in two separate UW campaigns, and a high political sanctuary risk produced textbook divergence. The overt STEP campaign, thanks to the weight of divergence, ultimately failed to produce meaningful success.

CT campaigns experienced similar convergence and divergence issues but for slightly different reasons. Convergence waxed and waned, for example, during the 10-year campaign against AQSL. Public support

was strong at the beginning of the campaign, means and ways combined into one effort, and the Taliban sanctuary that AQSL enjoyed was gone, which all produced convergence. This convergence resulted in Mohammed Atef's death but not Bin Laden's capture in Tora Bora. The failure to capture or kill Bin Laden in Tora Bora primarily resides with the Pakistani's failure to seal the border with Afghanistan—an indirect form of sanctuary. Divergence began once AQSL sought refuge in Pakistani cities and the FATA. This divergence should not surprise since public support began to wane and the FATA provided indirect political sanctuary risks to political will. A covert CT program led by the CIA began in Pakistan while USSOCOM's overt CT campaign continued in Afghanistan. The overt CT campaign consistently failed to achieve success against AQSL while the terrorist organization remained in Pakistani cities and the FATA. This lack of overt CT success due to divergence changed, however, in the 2011 raid to capture Bin Laden. Due to a gap in capacity, the CIA merged its covert operations with DoD CT forces in the form of true convergence, if only temporarily. This convergence derived from high public support for retribution against the most wanted man in the world and some sanctuary. Once again, convergence ebbed and flowed through the AQSL campaign along with public support and political will. In cases of convergence—the strike against Atef and Abbottabad raid—USSOCOM's activities in the Gray Zone were successful. In cases of divergence—Operations Winter Strike and Valiant Pursuit—USSOCOM's activities in the Gray Zone were unsuccessful. The ebb and flow of convergence seen in the campaign against AQSL ended with the counter LRA efforts.

The CT campaign to kill or capture Joseph Kony and resolve the LRA-inspired humanitarian crisis was a clear case of divergence. In this case, aside from a sharp spike in social media-inspired public support, there was reduced American political will in spite of no sanctuary risks. The grassroots NGO activism in Washington D.C. and short-lived

YouTube sensationalism were not enough to sustain any serious political will. Kony's Sudanese-backed sanctuary ended in 2001. Finally, as both military and politicians have commented, the LRA does not fit within any vital or core US interests. Not surprisingly, the CT campaign has been an entirely overtly military operation that has not involved any discernible efforts from the CIA and or achieved its original objective.

So, what directs the convergence of military and intelligence activities in the Gray Zone? The drivers of public support and political will determine the level and success of convergence. Public support—indicated by modern day polling data and election cycles—provides a signal from the people to the government. That signal is received by the government and combines with an analysis of ends, means, ways, and political sanctuary risk to achieve a degree of political will. Through case study analysis, political will drives the convergence and divergence trends and not the limitations of legislative authorities. This revelation from the preceding study leads to two additional observations.

The next observation is the role of political sanctuary in calculations of political will. Irregular opponents naturally seek to offset a greater power's capabilities to maximize their survival. This offset is a reflection by irregulars to minimize their exposure to superior government resources and combat power. Irregulars limit their exposure through sanctuary. Sanctuary has traditionally conjured up notions of geographic safe havens, largely across a border in a neighboring state. States fighting against irregulars may commit resources but are unwilling or unable to violate another state's sovereignty to neutralize their irregular opponents. An incapable or unwilling state, sponsored by a greater power, exacerbates the issue of sovereignty and can lead to greater divergence as Chapter 6 suggests. Sanctuary also extends beyond borders and can align itself with identity politics. For example, certain ethnicities, ideologies, or social backgrounds may receive direct or indirect external support from outside countries. Kony's Acholi-related

support from Sudan in the late 1990s, while he was in the Ugandan jungle and discussed in Chapter 7, is an example of a sanctuary by outside powers along ethnic lines. One may expect Russia in the future to offer similar lines of support to the Russian population in the Baltic States such as Latvia and Estonia. Virtual support by greater powers to irregular belligerents through cyberspace also offers alternatives to traditional support and sanctuary. Information operations in cyberspace, for example, have the potential to provide irregulars with greater access to intelligence and resources like Bitcoin. In the end, the notion of sanctuary has evolved from a strictly geographic consideration to a multi-domain concept and bears further study.

A final observation is the effect irregular belligerents' actions have upon the state's trinity. AQSL's use of sanctuary in the FATA and continued terrorist attacks are examples of how the tension between popular support and political will influences convergence and divergence. Recognizing diminishing or weak popular support may lead to more effective US strategy and decision making. American leaders, should recognize that some modest ends are not worth the means given the risks and the limited popular support. This recognition recalls Edward Luttwak's warning against interventions in civil wars and other humanitarian crises.² The LRA case study is emblematic of a situation in which enormous popular support initially led to poor strategic judgment in terms of commitment of resources. The subsequent commitment of divergent resources from the onset, however, signaled that the Administration rightly forecasted that the public's passion for the object, based largely on social media, would fade over time. In effect, the relationship between erratic popular support and political will reaffirms the role of strategic vision on the part of National Command Authorities

² Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, Rev. and enl. ed (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 60–63.

and the defense community. This observation, along with the two others, yields two important recommendations for action officers and professional staff members.

The first recommendation concerns action officers within USSOCOM. While SOF may have capability and capacity for certain missions, USSOCOM may not be the most suitable organization to due to public expectations and the level of political support. As a result, one must note that the option for covert action rather than USSOCOM's TMA is likely not due to legislation, though that excuse may be invoked to mask other intentions. The choice to employ other organizations likely stems from fickle public support and potentially high sanctuary risks, which provide policy makers an element of deniability in the event of blowback. The second recommendation concerns Congressional staffers. Staffers must understand that SOF capability and capacity cannot overcome limitations in public support, sanctuary, and strategic interest. As former USSOCOM Commander, GEN Peter Schoomaker, advised, "One must never confuse enthusiasm with capability."³ In the end, both action officers and staffers would be better served understanding the implications of military theory than seeking to blame perceived legislative restrictions to the convergence of military and intelligence activities.

³ "April 10, 2007 - Gen. Peter Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, Change of Responsibility to Gene," *Www.Army.Mil*, accessed April 21, 2017, http://www.army.mil/article/2613/April_10_2007__Gen__Peter_Schoomaker__Chief_of_Staff_of_the_Army__Change_of_Responsibility_to_Gene.

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