

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM:
INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS AT THE
U.S. ARMY DIVISION LEVEL

by

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B.S., United States Military Academy, 1954
M.B.A., Florida State University, 1963

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1969

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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ABSTRACT

In this study the research problem was to identify specific psychological operations (PSYOP) feedback indicators of effectiveness applicable at the U.S. Army division level in the Vietnam-type conflict.

The purpose of the study was to contribute towards filling what was believed to be a gap in the existing guidance and doctrine available to PSYOP personnel in the field at the tactical unit level. The scope of the study was limited to U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam during the period 1965-69 operating within the political, economic, and military constraints characterized by that time-frame.

This study was conducted following the principles and techniques of systems analysis combined with case studies, surveys, and documentary research. Primary and secondary reference material and data were gathered from essentially two general areas: (1) case studies of the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam, and (2) a survey of selected student officers in the 1968-69 class of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The latter group was selected on the basis of having had combat experience associated with U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam. From these two general batches of data, thirty-seven different PSYOP indicators of effectiveness were identified.

Upon identification of the PSYOP indicators resulting from the division case studies and the CGSC survey, the indicators were arranged and collated according to central tendencies or mutual patterns of support. It was found that the specific indicators could be grouped into six general categories of PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness.

Of the six general categories of indicators, statistical data concerning the numbers and frequencies of defectors coming over from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army to the allied forces under the Vietnamese Government "Chieu Hoi" or amnesty program was found to be the most widely utilized indicator at the division level. Following Chieu Hoi statistics, the next most generally mentioned category of indicators was intelligence gained through interrogation of various groups from the Vietnamese populace. These groups included Hoi Chanhs (ralliers), Vietnamese personnel participating in the Volunteer Informant Program, prisoners of war, detainees, and others.

The other major categories of PSYOP indicators of effectiveness that were identified included the following: (1) intelligence from captured enemy documents and intercepted messages, (2) direct observations by PSYOP teams, U.S. troops, province/district advisors, and Vietnamese Government officials, (3) enemy counteractions (indirect

indicators), and (4) a wide variety of miscellaneous indicators.

Sufficient numbers of indicators were identified, collated, compared, and tested against stated parameters and existing doctrine, to provide commanders and staff officers with various options for evaluating PSYOP effort. It was determined that these indicators can be presented to some degree in quantitative or statistical format. The indicators, when combined with experience factors and subjective judgment, provide a means for reporting PSYOP effectiveness and results to the division commander, key staff officers, important official visitors, and to higher headquarters.

This study also suggested related areas within psychological operations that should prove fruitful for additional research. These include research projects such as: (1) in-depth PSYOP case studies of each U.S. Army division in Vietnam conducted by on-site investigative teams, (2) an expansion of the scope of the PSYOP survey among future classes at the Command and General Staff College, and (3) controlled PSYOP experiments at the tactical level in Vietnam.

It was concluded that the primary value of this research project was the identification, analysis, and collection into a single document various specific

indicators of PSYOP effectiveness. At the tactical level these indicators can provide immediate points of departure for PSYOP staff officers in evaluating the effectiveness of their efforts. This value was considered especially significant in view of the rapid job turnover in Vietnam resulting from the short tour, unexpected curtailments, casualties, frequent job rotation, temporary absences, and other exigencies of the Vietnam combat situation. It was also concluded that the indicators identified in this study can suggest additional indicators for development by imaginative PSYOP officers that may be better suited to a particular local situation. The final conclusion of the study was that a variety of PSYOP effectiveness indicators are available, which can serve as additional resource management tools for division commanders in operations designed to influence behavior of target audiences on the tactical battlefield.

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CHAPTER I

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THE TECHNIQUES OF INVESTIGATION

The purpose of this study was to identify and to collect data concerning techniques to facilitate the evaluation of effectiveness of the psychological operations (PSYOP) effort of the U.S. Army tactical divisions in Vietnam. The specific research problem was to identify or develop feedback indicators of effectiveness that may be utilized at the division level in Vietnam.

I. NEED

In discussions with staff officers and commanders who have been closely involved with PSYOP in Vietnam, it appeared that there was a tendency among commanders to look for quick and dramatic results from the PSYOP effort in the tactical divisions. The functions of some of the assistant chiefs of staff such as the G1 (Personnel), the G2 (Intelligence), G3 (Operations), and the G4 (Logistics) seemed to facilitate presentation of results in quantitative form. The personnel officer could report casualties in numbers of people; the intelligence officer could cite or estimate the strength of the enemy forces in terms of numbers of people; the operations officer could report the number of dead enemy

bodies killed by his forces on the battlefield; and the logistics officer could report supply requirements in terms of tons of equipment. The G5 (Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations) could report numbers of refugees that exist in a certain area, but faced more of a challenge in reporting with any degree of accuracy the number of people whose behavior had been influenced by U.S. PSYOP efforts. It seems that PSYOP staff officers often grope and flounder about in search of some acceptable means of presenting to their commanders the actual results of the PSYOP effort on the battlefield. Charts, graphs, and reports containing statistical data seem to be the popular means in the modern army for presenting results. In dealing with a behavioral science like psychology, which involves intangible factors such as attitudes and thoughts in the minds of diverse groups of people, there seems to be a challenge and a real need to develop a workable evaluation system.

The PSYOP missions and functions imposed upon the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam appear to be complicated by a relatively high degree of personnel turbulence, or job turnover, compared with the normal peacetime army situation. This personnel turbulence is caused by a variety of factors. First, the normal tour length in Vietnam is only one year, during which time an officer can usually expect to be assigned in more than one primary duty position. The turnover rate

is often accelerated by tour curtailments, wherein the incumbent returns to the continental United States before the end of his normal tour in order to attend a military service school or because he has suffered serious injuries or wounds. Other processes of personnel management, or the lack thereof, can contribute to the rapid turnover of personnel in PSYOP duty positions, such as the infusion of officers from one division to another to avoid "rotational humps" in certain months of the year. Other factors, such as personal preferences of individuals for a different assignment and personality clashes within an organization, can also contribute to rapid job turnover. This type personnel turbulence can bring officers into the PSYOP field who are new to the discipline, who realize that they may be in the PSYOP job only a relatively brief period of time, and who are searching for quick and expedient solutions to the demanding reporting requirements at hand. The answers to the problems of a soft science dealing with the degree of influence obtained over the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the people in a target audience do not seem to be readily available. For these reasons, it appears that there is a valid requirement for research to provide some specific answers and techniques for satisfying demands of commanders and higher headquarters concerning results of tactical level PSYOP in a Vietnam type military conflict.

In attempting to report results in a quantifiable form, the staff officer or analyst often faces severe difficulties or limitations. Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Comptroller, Department of Defense, has addressed this problem in the following terms:

Of course, there are many things that simply cannot be calculated; for example, the reliability of an ally, or the psychological and political consequences of a military operation. And,¹ these non-quantitative factors may dominate the problem.

Another military writer, Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Hobbs, an Olmstead Scholar, who has served a military tour in Vietnam in positions ranging from battalion advisor to Aide-de-Camp for the Deputy Commander, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (DEPCOMUSMACV), has expressed the shortcomings of battlefield statistics in the following manner:

. . . We must be careful of statistics. They tell only what you permit them to tell you, and only about things which can be measured.

There is more to war than comparing casualty figures, equipment seized or lost, and ground conquered or relinquished. What is ultimately important is the political impact of military actions. . . .

.

¹United States Army Command and General Staff College, Readings in Command Management Analytical Methods, Reference Book 20-5, Volume II (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1968), p. 2-3.

The trouble is in our American impatience and desire to get the job done now and in a big way. We demand results.

There may have been important results. The trouble is that we do not see them and may not until months or years later--or never.²

Original source material was obtained relatively early in this study that tended to substantiate the need for additional research into the problem area of evaluating effectiveness at the tactical division level within the U.S. Army. Letters received from Army officers in Vietnam, closely associated with PSYOP, pointed out this need.

Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Robinson, then Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Americal Division, wrote that the PSYOP program of that division was made up of five major campaigns: (1) Chieu Hoi (program designed to induce members of the insurgency to defect or rally to the side of the allied forces), (2) Volunteer Informant Program, (3) Anti-Viet Cong, (4) Anti-North Vietnamese Army, and (5) Pro-Government of Vietnam. The requirement for additional research and solutions in the PSYOP areas mentioned is pointed up by the following comments made by Colonel Robinson:

In the case of the first two campaigns listed the feedback indicators are concrete and measurable.

²Richard W. Hobbs, "All the Answers Are Not in the Statistics," Army, XVIII (March, 1968), 77.

.....

Indicators of the effectiveness of such campaigns as Anti-VC, Anti-NVA, and Pro-GVN are difficult to perceive. In assessing such campaigns the variety of factors involved makes it extremely difficult to determine the part played by PSYOP.³

The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), a research and development agency co-located with Headquarters U.S. Army Vietnam, was involved during the first five months of 1969 in an extensive PSYOP research project oriented towards the PSYOP activities of the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam. It appears significant that effectiveness was not a prime object of that study. According to the ACTIV project officer,

Effectiveness is not a prime objective of our study. DA [Department of the Army] ruled that out as an objective because experience has shown that indicators are very difficult to establish and much research will be required in order to find any definite correlation between such things as Chieu Hoi rates, intelligence tip-offs, etc., and the effort expended in an area.⁴

Captain Gary A. Olsen, PSYOP Officer, 101st Airborne Division during the period 1968-69, alluded indirectly to the need for a means of indicating the effectiveness of PSYOP efforts in his response to an open-end questionnaire

³Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from Norman L. Robinson, January 5, 1969.

⁴Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from James C. Lawson, February 14, 1969.

sent out by this investigator. Captain Olsen mentioned that it is very difficult to determine what goes on in another person's mind. Captain Olsen suggested that although there may not be any overt evidence readily available that might show that an enemy soldier has been influenced by U.S. Army PSYOP, there is still the possibility that PSYOP efforts may have had some influence over the morale, attitudes, or future behavior of the soldier in question. He indicated that the degree of the PSYOP effectiveness in such cases cannot, within the present state of the art, be determined.⁵ Captain Olsen's comments seem to be typical of those received from officers closely involved with the PSYOP effort in the U.S. divisions in Vietnam, and tend to reflect the need for continuing research in this problem area.

Statements made by those at the opposite end of the PSYOP spectrum, the critics of the PSYOP policies being employed in Vietnam by U.S. Army units, also tend to reinforce the need for research on measuring PSYOP effectiveness vis-a-vis the need for improving the PSYOP effort. Colonel Paul F. Braim, a U.S. Army officer attending the Canadian National Defence College in 1968-69, a veteran of two tours of duty in Vietnam, has written as follows:

⁵Personal Correspondence of the Author, inclosure with letter from James E. Fiscus, January 12, 1969.

I believe that we do an abominable job in psychological operations, both in the field and on the home front. . . . The war in Vietnam is a good case in point. We have won that war in every way except propaganda. We have failed to convince a sizeable number of the enemy that our way is better, even though the Chien Hoi figures do appear impressive.

.

I believe that we have failed in our propaganda efforts for two reasons: (1) We are rather obtuse in the creation of propaganda. We consider it, perhaps subconsciously, un-American to attempt to put something over on other people. And, more than that, I believe we lack the sophistication necessary to understand the target audience sufficiently to prepare propaganda for foreigners. (2) We are involved in another war--the press and information media of much of the world is at war with the Establishment, as represented by the United States.⁶

Although Colonel Braim's statements reflect only his personal opinions, the fact that he has made them, coupled with his own extensive background and experience in the PSYOP and civic action fields, serves to reinforce arguments that continued PSYOP research is necessary in order to develop new solutions to the existing problems.

II. HYPOTHESIS

The primary hypothesis in this study was that specific PSYOP feedback indicators can be identified or locally developed that may be utilized by division commanders and

⁶Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from Paul F. Braim, March 27, 1969.

G5/S5 staffs in evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP programs in the current Vietnam conflict or in similar conflicts. The procedure by which this hypothesis was analyzed will be explained in detail in the section of this chapter concerning "Techniques of Investigation."

III. DEFINITIONS

The definitions of technical terms used in this study are those set forth in Army Regulation 320-5, Dictionary of United States Army Terms, current field manuals, and other official U.S. Government publications. The definition of PSYOP used in this study is as stated by the Department of the Army:

The planned use of propaganda and other measures to influence the opinions, emotions, attitude, and behavior of hostile, neutral, or friendly groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.⁷

IV. DELIMITATIONS

This study has been limited to U.S. Army divisions that have been actively engaged in PSYOP in Vietnam since the troop build-up began in 1965 through the first half of the current year, 1969. Specifically, the divisions treated

⁷United States Department of the Army, Psychological Operations U.S. Army Doctrine, Field Manual 33-1 (Washington: Office of the Adjutant General, 1968), p. 1-1.

are: 1st Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile), 4th Infantry Division, 9th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division, and the Americal Division. The relative locations of these divisions as of March, 1969, are depicted on the map in Figure 1.

The target audience treated in this study was limited to the Viet Cong guerrillas, North Vietnamese Army forces, and the Vietnamese civilian populace (to include the various montagnard ethnic groups) within the geographical confines of the Republic of Vietnam.

Another parameter involved is the level of conflict, which, for this study, is the level of insurgency that has existed in Vietnam during the period 1965-1969.

The final parameter of this study is that of economy. All options that offer solutions to the problem central to this thesis must be economical in terms of either time, money, manpower, or effort.

V. TECHNIQUES OF INVESTIGATION

The methodology followed in this study has included historical, documentary, and descriptive research, survey questionnaires, and case studies. The primary approach was one of systems analysis as depicted graphically by the research model shown in Figure 2. The general concept of the study was to assemble two batches of data, one batch




Figure 1. Republic of Vietnam showing United States Army division locations.




Figure 2. Systems analysis model--graphic portrayal of research process, experimental design, analysis, consideration of hypothesis, and major conclusions.

consisting of case studies of the majority of U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam during the 1965-69 time frame, and the other batch consisting of a survey of a selected group of student officers in attendance at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College during the 1968-69 academic year. The officers participating were a group from Division C, selected on the basis of having had experience in Vietnam with U.S. Army divisions. From the two primary batches of data (i.e., the case study batch and the student survey batch) thirty-seven specific PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness were identified or suggested. These feedback indicators were then arranged and evaluated according to central tendencies or patterns of support. The next step in the research was to test the hypothesis by subjecting the feedback indicators to an analysis in which central patterns, current doctrine, supporting arguments, opposing arguments, and the specified parameters of the study were compared and collated. By this process of reasoning and analysis, the hypothesis was evaluated and the appropriate conclusions formulated.

VI. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

A review of the literature on PSYOP indicated that considerable research has been done in the general subject area, but it appeared that most of this research had been

oriented at the national or strategic level of interest. The PSYOP literature most widely encountered was concerned primarily with country policy, doctrine, and general methods of implementation. Data concerning specific techniques of evaluating PSYOP effectiveness at the tactical, or division level, was not readily available to this investigator in the published literature. Of the published information concerning specific PSYOP techniques that was available, most was found in recent issues of unit newspapers published by the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam. Some published information was not available to this study because of security classifications; however, it is believed that this restriction had little adverse effect upon this study due to an abundance of data available from unclassified primary and secondary sources.

As a point of departure in reviewing the literature, letters requesting assistance were sent to various individuals and agencies in the continental United States and in Vietnam. These agencies included the seven U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Army Concept Team in Vietnam, the United States Embassy in Saigon, the Department of Defense Documentation Center, the United States Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and other individuals and agencies.

Five of the seven divisions in Vietnam responded to the requests by contributing input materials, including the sample Viet Cong and United States leaflets that are reproduced in Appendix C and Appendix D. Letters from the higher level agencies tended to support the need for the study and in most cases provided leads which were followed up and which resulted in the receipt of additional input data. The bulk of the data received from the higher level agencies was broad and general in scope and was useful primarily as background or overview information.

A reply from the Psychological Operations Department of the United States Army Special Warfare School reported, "Regretfully, we are unable to help you with the material you require. However, it is possible that the following addressees may be able to assist you."⁸ The leads provided included the Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Saigon and the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J3, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

A follow-up letter was then sent to the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Field Operations, and produced the following response:

. . . Regret that since our work here is at the national level of psychological operation it is not

⁸Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from D. W. Affleck, February 10, 1969.

possible for me to provide you with the data you wish. However, I have forwarded your request to the Psychological Operation Division of J3, MACV, with a request that they render you any assistance possible. Their activity includes the field of military psychological operation which includes the tactical application of the PSYOP themes and guidances which are in use in Vietnam. I have asked the Chief of the MACPD /Military Assistance Command, PSYOP Division to reply directly to you on this matter.

Approximately one week after receipt of the above letter, an answer was received from MACPD, over the signature of Colonel Reginald J. Hinton, Chief, PSYOP Division. Colonel Hinton inclosed two documents dealing with related PSYOP research, one of which had been previously classified for security reasons. Colonel Hinton wrote as follows:

I have taken steps to declassify a document developed in the PSYOP Directorate prior to my assignment which appears to be very close to your thesis topic. It represents a comprehensive attempt to isolate all factors or indicators of effectiveness of PSYOP and contains sufficient background material to thoroughly explain the methodology or approach used. The method is still useful although the information on which it is based is somewhat dated.¹⁰

By following through on this series of consecutive leads, the investigator was able to obtain two additional documents that were pertinent to the study. The declassification process that was used by Colonel Hinton illustrates

⁹Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from William E. Linn, March 4, 1969.

¹⁰Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from Reginald J. Hinton, March 15, 1969.

that although security classifications may complicate the PSYOP research process to some degree, the desired data may be forthcoming to qualified researchers and students through declassification of the entire document in question or by a simple process of separating the classified information (which in this case was only a relatively small portion of the document) from the unclassified information. It was also noted that although some PSYOP data is contained in classified operational reports and thus not readily available to the general academic and military public, this need not be considered a significant bar to research endeavors. It was found that there is an abundance of PSYOP data available from non-classified primary sources such as staff studies, letters, interviews with Vietnam returnees, and workbook entries. These primary sources, supplemented by the many secondary sources available in the literature, provide the researcher with a wide spectrum of PSYOP information with which to work.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

"The most important demand upon a weapon system is effectiveness. This is no less true for PSYOP systems than for combat weapons."¹

I. NATIONAL STRATEGY

It has been observed that national objectives in times of recent military conflict have changed from all-out military victory, as in World War II, to limited military objectives, as in the Korean Conflict, and finally to a policy wherein an overall military victory has been ruled out, as is the case in Vietnam. And, as this emphasis or main thrust has swung from total military victory to something less than a military victory, it has been noted that more and more attention is being given to psychological warfare. This point has been expressed by Dr. Reuben S. Nathan, noted authority, consultant, lecturer, and writer on the subject of psychological operations. Dr. Nathan has written:

Political and psychological warfare have been the stepchild of U.S. statecraft for too many years. . . .

¹Office of the Psychological Operations Directorate, Vietnam, PSYOP Effort and Effectiveness: An Objective Look (Vietnam: Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, October, 1967), p. 1.

Fortunately, the effort in Vietnam demonstrates that the United States is changing her attitude. . . .

.

The fact is that the United States has, in Vietnam, at last begun to appreciate the usefulness of tactical psychological operations, but has not as yet recognized their correct place and their true potential.²

II. CRITICISM

Critics of the U.S. effort in political warfare and psychological warfare have made the PSYOP challenge stand out rather clearly. The Honorable Thomas J. Dodd, United States Senator from Connecticut, stated in a speech in the U.S. Senate on February 23, 1965, that the prime goal of political warfare is to win men's minds.³ Senator Dodd spoke out on the problem of effectiveness in political warfare in the following terms:

. . . In the field of political warfare, where the communists have scored their most spectacular triumphs, our own effort has been limited, and halting, and amateurish, and, in fact, sadly ineffective.

.

²Reuben S. Nathan, "Psychological Warfare: Key to Success in Vietnam," Military Review, XLVIII (April, 1968), 27.

³"Vietnam and the New Isolationism," Congressional Record, Speech of Hon. Thomas J. Dodd, of Connecticut, in the Senate of the United States, February 23, 1965 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 28.

An effective political warfare program requires three major ingredients: first, a handful of basic slogans which capsulize popular desires and which are capable of striking responsive chords in the hearts of the people; second, a propaganda apparatus capable of conveying this program both to those on the Government side and those on the side of the insurgents; third, specially trained cadre to direct the effort.⁴

Another pessimistic view of the PSYOP situation in the early days of the U.S. troop build-up was expressed by Marguerite Higgins, a noted war correspondent who covered both the Korean Conflict and the early phases of the Vietnam Conflict. Miss Higgins stressed the role of psychology and the necessity of a complete understanding of the people who make up the target audience.

The principal way that America can reshape countries that are friends (an aim of highly dubious value) is by example and by persuasion in those cases where we are confident we understand the culture, psychology, history, and values of a people. Vietnam was never one of those cases, and that explains why American pressure there was often exerted at the wrong times, at the wrong places, and for the wrong purposes.⁵

Hugh Mulligan, William Lederer, Jonathan Schell, Bernard Fall, and other Vietnam authors have cited what they believe to be a basic lack of understanding between the Americans and the Vietnamese. The conflicting attitudes or contrasting attitudes provide a delicate relationship within

⁴Ibid.

⁵Marguerite Higgins, Our Vietnam Nightmare (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 303.

which the U.S. PSYOP effort must function. According to Mulligan, even the members of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces personnel resent the overwhelming presence of the U.S. military forces and the manner in which they impact upon the normal way of life in Vietnam. This paradox is expressed by Mulligan as follows:

. . . [The Vietnamese soldier] sees the American dollar driving prices sky-high in the cities, despite American attempts to control inflation by paying the troops in military scrip. He is envious of the better food and housing provided for American soldiers, and deeply resentful that post exchange privileges have been extended to Korean and Philippine troops but not to the ARVN [Army Republic of Vietnam]. He is incensed at American officers clubs and messes that exclude Vietnamese officers, hates passing through an American M.P. control gate within his own country, and, now that Americans have taken over more and more of the strategy, smolders at taking orders from men whom he rightfully regards as foreigners.⁶

III. CORRECTIVE MEASURES

These rather gloomy vignettes of the attitudes and feelings of the Vietnamese people may raise the question of why and where the United States has gone astray in the PSYOP effort. With the cost of the Vietnam war running into the billions of dollars each year, it is believed that the American taxpayers and the U.S. military planners are entitled to know the return on their investment. From daily

⁶ Hugh A. Mulligan, No Place to Die: The Agony of Viet Nam (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 101.

press accounts it is evident that steps are being taken to measure the results of all aspects of the Vietnam operation. Tactical engagements are evaluated in terms of relative casualties, air strikes are evaluated in terms of enemy troops killed, bunkers destroyed, secondary explosions, and other observations that are readily quantifiable. The pacification program has been assessed on a continuing basis through the Hamlet Evaluation System. In the research for this study it was determined that considerable effort and emphasis is also being placed on developing means of evaluating PSYOP effectiveness. The extent to which these evaluation systems are applicable at the U.S. Army division level has been considered in detail in subsequent chapters of this report.

A PSYOP research plan was developed for Vietnam in the latter part of 1967 by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The purpose of this plan was to ". . . govern the direction of PSYOP research in Vietnam."⁷

IV. EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS

The MACV plan addressed the general problem of evaluating PSYOP effectiveness and has identified some of the

⁷Office of the Psychological Operations Directorate, Vietnam, PSYOP Research Plan--Vietnam (Vietnam: Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, December, 1967), p. 1.

U.S. agencies in Vietnam that are charged with functions that include formal PSYOP research. Some extracts from this study that serve to place the problem in perspective follow:

Basic to any phase of PSYOP is the need for the evaluation of effects. Without methods for assessment, there can be no systematic improvement of the effort, no empirical base for new developments. PSYOP research is also dependent upon an assessment base which is both reliable and valid. Requirements demand the development of adequate criteria and acceptable measures of both PSYOP effort and results. Additionally, effect evaluation is needed in an operational sense--to indicate the progress of the PSYOP activity as it contributes to the overall effort in Vietnam. Thus, what is the most important research endeavor is the development of an intensive evaluation program. It is also the most difficult of the tasks in a social science research program.⁸

U.S. agencies that are involved in PSYOP research, analysis, and/or PSYOP evaluation in Vietnam that are listed in the plan include: (1) The Military Assistance Command Psychological Operation Division Research and Analysis Branch, (2) the Military Assistance Command Civil Operations Revolutionary Support Research and Analysis Division, (3) the 4th PSYOP Group Audience Analysis Section, (4) the Joint United States Public Affairs Office, (5) the Advanced Research Projects Agency, (6) the Deputy Science Advisor to Military Assistance Command Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support, (7) the Combat Intelligence Center Vietnam, J-2, Strategic Research and Analysis Branch, and (8) the Operations Research/Systems Analysis Office of the

⁸Ibid., pp. 12-13.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.⁹

It was noted that although the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, (MACV) PSYOP plan was elaborate and involved considerable agencies and resources, there was no evidence to indicate that the specific problem of identifying indicators of PSYOP effectiveness at the U.S. Army division level was addressed.

A PSYOP research proposal developed by the Advanced Research Projects Agency during the year 1968-1969, summarized the current state of the art:

At the present time, although psychological operations have been conducted in Vietnam for several years, the primary foundation for the total PSYOP effort has been forced to depend upon the previous experience of personnel in other areas, and upon "intuitive" approaches that appear to have merit for logical reasons. Very little effort has been given to the creation of an overall theoretical model for PSYOP, or the provision of an empirical base for the conduct of specific programs.

.....
 . . . There is reason to believe that the effect of PSYOP programs can be measured and that the nature of the PSYOP programs found to be effective can be specified as well as the conditions and circumstances in which they were effective.¹⁰

In October, 1967, MACV published a report, PSYOP Effort and Effectiveness: An Objective Look, that purports

⁹Ibid., pp. 15-17.

¹⁰Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense, Vietnam, "Proposal: Research on Effectiveness of PSYOPS," pp. 1-2.

to be ". . . the initial attempt to quantify PSYOP effort and effectiveness and display the results in a meaningful manner."¹¹ The MACV study was directed at overall PSYOP activities throughout Vietnam by all U.S. and Vietnamese military and civilian governmental agencies. Additionally, it was stated in the preface of the report that this was merely a point of departure for further studies and that ". . . comments, ideas, and sources of additional data are solicited from the reader."¹² The action officer for this particular report was Major Angelo L. Fortuna. It may be significant to note also that Major Fortuna is a member of the U.S. Air Force rather than the U.S. Army, and his assignment was at the national level in Vietnam rather than at the tactical level.¹³

In his introduction, Major Fortuna reiterates the need for research into PSYOP effectiveness:

The need for measures of PSYOP effectiveness has long been an urgent one. This urgency has found expression in the substitution of "effort" for "effectiveness." Briefings concerning PSYOP activities have been punctuated with quantities of leaflets, loudspeaker hours, and air sorties. These presentations satisfied neither the briefer nor those being briefed, but the complexity of the problem generally vetoed any statement of dissatisfaction until recently.¹⁴

¹¹Office of the Psychological Operations Directorate, Vietnam, op. cit., preface.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 1.

Major Fortuna's report shows methods of displaying PSYOP feedback indicators in chart and graph form. Overall, Major Fortuna's report seems to be written in easy-to-read language; still, there are many technical terms and phrases scattered through the report such as "index computed upon a sliding base, single criterion problem, profile analysis, Vincentizing curves, and inferential meaning."¹⁵ The extent to which these words would be fully comprehended at the tactical unit level in the field by non-specialist personnel is a matter of conjecture.

In Major Fortuna's forty-one page report, besides showing methods of displaying indicators of PSYOP effectiveness, he also identified seven indicators, five of which were among the approximately twenty-five identified by this investigator at the U.S. Army division level in Vietnam. In his narrative summary, Major Fortuna stated:

The search for indicators of effectiveness has been engaged. The initial run includes Hoi Chanh /Vietnamese term referring to a person who defects from the insurgent side and rallies to the Republic of Vietnam side/, weapons per rallier, population security, contacts per operation (RVNAF), VC incidents, military accessions, and prisoner of war rates. . . .¹⁶

Of these indicators identified by Major Fortuna, contacts per operation (RVNAF) and military accessions apply primarily to the Vietnamese Government PSYOP activities and

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 3-4.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 27.

have not been identified by this investigator at the U.S. tactical division level.

Major Fortuna concluded his summary with the following comments:

. . . It is hoped that this start will elicit responses from the field that will permit quantification of other indicators. The lesson to be learned is to consider the measures necessary to evaluate effectiveness during the planning of an operation. Then data may be collected as needed, not derived in an ex post facto manner.¹⁷

V. DOCTRINE

The next step in considering the background against which PSYOP activities take place in Vietnam is to examine the current doctrine. This doctrine provides the broad conceptual framework which serves as a point of departure and sets forth the general operating principles. The source of U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine is the Department of the Army Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations U.S. Army Doctrine. This investigator has not found any Department of the Army PSYOP doctrine more recent than this official field manual on the subject, which was published in June 1968.¹⁸ In this publication, the stated mission of U.S. Army

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ United States Department of the Army, Psychological Operations U.S. Army Doctrine, Field Manual 33-1 (Washington: Office of the Adjutant General, 1968), p. 1-1.

PSYOP ". . . is to assist the commander in the conduct of operations by influencing attitudes and behavior."¹⁹

According to the doctrine,

. . . Tactical PSYOP are directed at hostile military or paramilitary forces to reduce their combat effectiveness, and at civilians to prevent interference with tactical operations, reduce noncombatant casualties, and elicit support for friendly forces. Tactical PSYOP support the tactical plan and are based on achieving short-range objectives.²⁰

With regard to the evaluation of PSYOP effectiveness, the PSYOP doctrine is as follows:

PSYOP are continuously evaluated for errors, weaknesses, or changes which require adjustment or improvement. PSYOP effectiveness is difficult to measure, especially among hostile audiences. The quantity of propaganda output is a measure of PSYOP effort rather than PSYOP effectiveness.²¹

The evaluation doctrine states that PSYOP activities should be pretested when possible and should be assessed by obtaining feedback data. The feedback is further divided into two categories of indicators, direct indicators and indirect indicators. The direct indicators include responsive actions taken by the target audience, reports gathered from defectors, prisoners, agents, or other people exposed to the PSYOP program, comments by observers, and captured documents or intercepted messages.²² Indirect indicators are defined in the doctrine as:

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Ibid., p. 1-4.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid.

. . . Acts which indicate enemy countermeasures such as hostile action, counterpropaganda, and restrictive measures. Indirect indicators include--

- (a) Troop movements.
- (b) Combat actions.
- (c) Atrocities.
- (d) Propaganda employed to counter friendly PSYOP.
- (e) Censorship.
- (f) Jamming.
- (g) Restrictions on possession of radio and television receivers, printed matter, and items distributed for propaganda purposes.²³

Appendix C contains examples of Viet Cong propaganda leaflets that have been employed to counter friendly PSYOP such as the leaflets used by U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam. These Viet Cong leaflets were collected by the investigator from the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), and the 4th Infantry Division. The U.S. Army leaflets, samples of which are shown in Appendix D, follow generally the same themes throughout all of the seven division areas, with the exception of the Volunteer Informant Leaflet shown in Appendix D. The Volunteer Informant Program theme is a standard theme throughout Vietnam; however, this Volunteer Informant Leaflet (Appendix D) is directed against a particular target audience, the montagnards (hill tribes people), of the 4th Infantry Division Area of Operations in the Vietnam central highlands. Since there is a significant amount of illiteracy among the montagnard

²³Ibid., p. 1-5.

population, the Volunteer Informant Program story is told in picture form as well as in the written form of the local dialect. It was noted that the Viet Cong are also selective in their target audiences, as illustrated by the series of Viet Cong leaflets in Appendix C that are directed against the negro population of the U.S. Army divisions in the combat areas.²⁴

Another Department of the Army field manual provides "... detailed psychological operations and techniques for psychological operations commanders and staff officers."²⁵ This official publication discusses PSYOP effectiveness in terms of media analysis. Stated in this manual is the following:

The impact of a propaganda effort may be determined by obtaining four general forms of evidence: responsive action, participant reports, observer commentaries, and indirect indicators.²⁶

This investigator has found nothing further in the area of PSYOP doctrine pertaining to evaluation and effectiveness than that cited in Field Manual 33-1 and Field Manual

²⁴Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter and inclosures from James E. Fiscus, January 12, 1969.

²⁵United States Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, Field Manual 33-5 (Washington: Office of the Adjutant General, 1966), p. 3.

²⁶Ibid., p. 109.

33-5. Nothing was found in the doctrine that was specifically tailored to the situation confronting PSYOP staff officers in the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam at the present time.

VI. GUIDANCE

To assist PSYOP personnel in the field in Vietnam in the adaptation of official doctrine to their particular situations, MACV published a handbook of information on the subject in April of 1968.²⁷ This PSYOP Guide was sent to the field users with a cover letter signed by General Westmoreland, who was the U.S. Commander in Vietnam at that time. In the cover letter, General Westmoreland stated that the handbook establishes the broad concepts and the specifics for effective PSYOP.²⁸ With respect to specific indicators of effectiveness at the U.S. division level, it was found by this investigator that the PSYOP Guide, while being a helpful reference document towards integrating the overall PSYOP effort, did not reveal any specific indicators that were not identified in the case studies made of selected U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam (Chapter III) and

²⁷United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, PSYOP Guide (Vietnam: Headquarters, United States Military Assistance Command, April, 1968), cover letter.

²⁸Ibid.

in the sample survey conducted among recent Vietnam returnees in the 1968-69 class of the U.S. Command and General Staff College (Chapter . . .). It was found that the latter two analyses yielded more than twice the number of specific indicators of effectiveness (applicable at the division level) than were listed by the PSYOP Guide.

VII. ORGANIZATION

According to published PSYOP doctrine, as outlined in Field Manual 33-1, the staff responsibility for PSYOP is charged to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, of a general staff, or to the Assistant Chief of Staff, J3, of a joint staff. The doctrine is stated as follows:

The Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (J3), has overall staff responsibility for PSYOP activities of the command to include allocation of resources. The nature of the PSYOP role in stability operations usually requires an increase in PSYOP staff personnel.²⁹

It appears that with regard to staff organization for PSYOP, the published doctrine has been overtaken by events in Vietnam. From the correspondence exchanged between the investigator and representatives of the G5 sections of the various U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam, from informal conversations with officer contemporaries recently returned from Vietnam tours of duty, from perusals of the various

²⁹United States Department of the Army, op. cit., p. 6-4.

U.S. division unit newspapers, and from personal observation during a tour as Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 1st Infantry Division (February 1967 - July 1968), it is evident that the organizational doctrine quoted in Field Manual 33-1 is not being followed in Vietnam at the division level. In the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam, the staff responsibility for PSYOP rests with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5. [This investigator found no evidence to refute this observation and assertion. Further, no evidence was found to indicate that this organizational deviation from doctrine has not existed for at least the majority of time that the U.S. Army divisions have been deployed in Vietnam. In this sense, it may be inferred that PSYOP doctrine is being developed in Vietnam.] If PSYOP doctrine is, in fact, being developed in Vietnam by the operators in the field and elsewhere, then the need for this study at this time may be more apparent to the reader, and the stage has been set for reporting the results that follow in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER III

CASE STUDIES OF U.S. ARMY DIVISIONS IN VIETNAM

In making case studies of the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam, this investigator gathered primary source material on the PSYOP activities of the divisions by direct communication through the mails. The point of contact with each division was the Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, or his representative. The objective was to elicit information from all seven divisions. It was realized that because of the exigencies of combat and the high priority demands upon the time and energies of the G5 personnel in Vietnam, the proportion of responses to requests could be expected to be relatively low; however, G5 personnel in five of the seven divisions responded and provided data of value to this study.

To facilitate optimum response, it was decided to write a personal letter to each division G5 by name, using the style letter shown in Appendix B. The names of each division G5 were provided to the investigator by Lieutenant Colonel William J. Connolly, a staff division chief assigned to Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam.

To further facilitate response, the technique of inclosing a postage-paid, self-addressed return envelope was used. Most of the letters to the divisions were mailed out

in the latter part of December, 1968, and by the end of January answers had been received from the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 4th Infantry Division, 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), and the Americal Division. Correspondence had already been exchanged during September, 1968, with members of the G5 Section of the 1st Infantry Division. Replies were not received from either the 9th Infantry Division or the 25th Infantry Division; however, some data was available concerning the PSYOP programs of these two divisions from notes made as a result of personal visits to the headquarters of each of these divisions during April, 1968, by the investigator, telephone conversations in Vietnam with the division G5 personnel the same month, and from secondary source material assembled by the investigator at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. The case studies on the other divisions were also supplemented by other secondary source material such as unit newspapers, unit magazines, and books that have been written about the war in Vietnam.

I. 1st INFANTRY DIVISION

In the 1st Infantry Division a total of seventeen PSYOP feedback indicators of effectiveness were identified. These indicators ranged from quantifiable direct indicators, such as the number of hoi chanh (returnees to Government of

Vietnam control from VC/NVA ranks) per month in the division area of operations, to subjective indirect indicators, such as conversations with the division Vietnamese Army Liaison Officer and attached Vietnamese Army interpreters.

The indicator given the greatest significance during 1968 was the Chieu Hoi (Vietnamese Government Open Arms Program) rate.¹ The rate was figured on number of ralliers per month in the division area of operations. The Chieu Hoi data was updated on a daily basis from feeder reports submitted to the division headquarters from subordinate brigades, province Chieu Hoi centers, and from nearby Vietnamese Government officials. The division commander and staff officers were briefed on the Chieu Hoi rate every Thursday evening by a representative of the Division G5. This indicator was considered to be significant because the main thrust of the division PSYOP effort was oriented towards causing members of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units to rally to the side of the free world forces.

A related indicator used by the 1st Infantry Division was information obtained by debriefing the individuals who had rallied in the division area. In a special briefing presented to the Assistant Division Commander, then

¹Robert P. Morris, G5 Workbook (Lai Khe, Vietnam, March 1-June 19, 1968), p. 93.

Brigadier General Orwin C. Talbott, by the Division G5 on June 19, 1969, the recent rally rates and debriefing results were discussed. The number of individuals who had rallied in March, 1968, was eighteen; the number who rallied in April, 1968, was thirty-two; the number who rallied in May was thirty-nine; and the number who had rallied during the period June 1-19, 1968, was thirty-nine.² Of thirty-nine ralliers in June, two of them had stated in debriefing sessions that PSYOP helicopter broadcasts in their vicinity had been a factor in their decisions to rally.³

Also related to the Chieu Hoi rate was the "mass rally rate," in which multiple ralliers from the same enemy organization defected to the allied side together. An example of this indicator was cited by the Division PSYOP Officer in a letter to this investigator in September, 1968. According to the letter, a ninety-five man group rallied en masse in the vicinity of An Loc, about seventy miles north of Saigon.⁴ This particular group was composed of Khmer montagnard people who had become disenchanted with their affiliation with the Viet Cong, had been subjected to extensive PSYOP rally appeals broadcast from aircraft, and who

²Ibid., p. 137.

³Ibid.

⁴Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from M. L. Cunningham, September 10, 1968.

finally decided to rally.

Two other statistical PSYOP indicators used by the division that are related to the Chieu Hoi Program are:

Kit Carson
 (1) the rate of ralliers per month who turn themselves over to U.S. units rather than to Vietnamese officials,⁵ and (2) the number of ralliers who volunteer to serve with the division in the "Kit Carson Scout Program."⁶ The Kit Carson Scout data is considered significant from a PSYOP viewpoint because the participation in the program reflects not only defection from the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army ranks, but reflects complete reversal of loyalties to the point where the rallier takes up arms against his former comrades in an active and hazardous manner.

According to PSYOP doctrine, as cited in the previous chapter, one of the functions of tactical PSYOP is to reduce interference by civilians with tactical operations. The extent to which PSYOP accomplishes this function is judged by the next indicator used by the division, which is "direct observation." Typical situations in which this indicator has been used are cordon and search operations and situations where a major battle is about to take place in a built-up area populated heavily with Vietnamese civilians. In the cordon and search operations, two taped or live

⁵Morris, R.P., op. cit., p. 137.

⁶Ibid., p. 123.

messages are broadcast from a PSYOP helicopter to the village people within the cordon advising them that the hamlet or village is surrounded and to avoid trying to escape because of the danger of being mistaken for one of the enemy and possibly being shot. A second message is then broadcast instructing the populace to assemble at a certain prominent location within the hamlet or village.⁷ The extent to which the people follow the instructions broadcast from the PSYOP helicopter can usually be observed directly from the helicopter by the PSYOP personnel.

The direct observation technique was used extensively throughout the first two weeks of the "Tet Offensive of 1968" in the 1st Division area. In the Battle of An My, twenty miles north of Saigon, during the period February 1-2, 1968, an estimated two battalions of the Viet Cong 273d Regiment were occupying the village of An My, which had a reported population of 1,768 people.⁸

The following account of the battle was given in the division historical magazine:

⁷United States Department of the Army, Letter of Instruction on Cordon and Search Operations, Letter of Instruction 11-68 (Lai Khe, Vietnam: Headquarters, First Infantry Division, June 13, 1968), p. D-1-1. (Mimeographed.)

⁸Major William E. Daniel, Jr., "Battle of An My," Danger Forward: The Magazine of the Big Red One, Vietnam, II (September, 1968), 25.

General Thuan (ARVN III Corps Commander) granted province clearance for artillery to fire into An My and General Eschenburg /Acting Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division, at that time/ gave the final U.S. okay. A psychological operations mission then flew over the village from 1320 to 1410 hours warning civilians to evacuate the village. Artillery fire commenced immediately after the announcement.⁹

The exodus of the people moving out of the village towards the prescribed assembly area was observed directly by the PSYOP personnel in the loudspeaker helicopter. This was one indication of effectiveness obtained by direct observation from the air. Another direct observation was from U.S. troops on the ground, who noted that 372 Viet Cong soldiers were killed in the battle, but only 13 civilians were killed.¹⁰

A variation of the direct observation indicator by U.S. Troops on the ground is used to check the technical effectiveness or the operational capability of the electronic broadcast equipment aboard PSYOP helicopters. For example, in a cordon and search operation, the "seal message" is often broadcast in English as well as in the local language. If this English language message is audible and intelligible to the U.S. troops on the ground in the vicinity, then it is assumed that the electronic gear is functioning properly and that the target audience is receiving the message in an understandable manner, which is a key

⁹Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 28.

element of effectiveness.¹¹

Another important effectiveness indicator used by the division is feedback information from prisoners of war. A memo entry in the G5 Workbook for June 17, 1968, indicates that three prisoners of war ". . . surrendered as result of loudspeaker broadcasts at [map grid coordinates] XT 8507 . . ." on or about that date.¹²

The division participates in a combination intelligence and PSYOP program known as the Volunteer Informant Program. Under this program Vietnamese civilians are encouraged to volunteer information about the enemy, locations of weapons caches, locations of mines and booby traps, and to turn in weapons and ammunition. In return for these voluntary services the people may be compensated with money, rice, or other commodities. The program is supported with leaflets, posters, aerial loudspeaker broadcasts, and by "armed propaganda teams" using "face-to-face" communications techniques in the populated areas. The armed propaganda teams are composed primarily of Hoi Chanh personnel, Kit Carson Scouts, or other former members of the Viet Cong side. The results of these efforts are indicated by the

¹¹United States Department of the Army, op. cit., p. D-2-1.

¹²Morris, R.P., op. cit., p. 126.

amount of informant tips received, weapons turned in, and other similar services rendered to the allied forces by the people in the target audience.

The success of the armed propaganda teams working with the 2nd Bridage of the 1st Infantry Division was summarized in an article on the front page of the division newspaper as follows:

. . . By talking with the people in the privacy of their homes, the men were able to pick up bits and pieces of information that were valuable for intelligence purposes. In many cases, the information collected from the APT's [Armed Propaganda Teams] was vital to the success of programs to root out the VC infrastructure.¹³

Captured enemy documents are used as indicators of PSYOP effectiveness because they sometimes contain specific information concerning enemy reaction to PSYOP broadcasts and leaflet drops. This fact has been confirmed in conversations between the investigator and Lieutenant Colonel William G. Benedict, who was the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, 1st Infantry Division, 1967-1968.

Two additional indicators of effectiveness that originate outside the division, but relate to the division PSYOP effort, are: (1) the monthly reports of province senior advisors, and (2) periodic civilian attitude reports

¹³News item in the American Traveler (Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Vietnam), January 20, 1969.

from the province advisory staff.¹⁴ The province advisors often report PSYOP feedback information that they may have received through their Vietnamese counterparts. The attitude reports are based on surveys of a sample of the populace in a given province and reflect Vietnamese views vis-a-vis the U.S. forces, the Government of Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and other topics of a PSYOP significance.

The 1st Infantry Division frequently conducts medical civic action projects (MEDCAPS) in hamlets located in VC dominated territory and elsewhere. These short range, high impact projects are designed to foster goodwill towards the allied forces and the Government of Vietnam (GVN). An article in the division newspaper featured a medical technician, Specialist Five Jack La Rocca, who was conducting medical aid sessions in the hamlet of Chanh Luu, about twenty-five miles north of Saigon. According to the newspaper article, Specialist La Rocca ". . . normally sees more than 100 patients daily."¹⁵ The number of MEDCAP patients treated per month is considered to be a direct PSYOP indicator. A variation of this indicator is the number of dental civic action project (DENTCAP) patients treated per

¹⁴Morris, R.P., op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁵News item in the American Traveler (Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Vietnam), January 13, 1969.

month; however, the figures are usually consolidated into a single MEDCAP figure that includes both the medical and the dental patients.

Another direct PSYOP indicator is the attendance rate at division-sponsored movies provided for the benefit of local audiences. These movies are publicized by PSYOP media and the attendance at the movies is considered to be "responsive action" on the part of the target audience; hence, this data qualifies as a direct PSYOP indicator under the criteria set forth in the official field manual on PSYOP doctrine. Another article from the division newspaper explains the concept and rationale of the film-showings as follows:

Hundreds of upturned faces smile in the reflection of the cartoon on the parking lot screen. The team members of the 6th Psychological Operation Battalion (attached to 1st Infantry Division) are making one of their weekly visits to An Loc.

The team, operating out of Quan Loi, visits 20 villages per month, showing films obtained from the Vietnamese Information Service. The films--there are more than 100 different titles available--entertain while showing the ways in which the Republic of Vietnam government benefits its citizens.

.....

Evidently the program has been successful. So successful in fact, that the Viet Cong are reported to have started training drama teams to counteract the movies.¹⁶

In spite of the report in the final paragraph of the

¹⁶Ibid.

preceding newspaper article, no hard evidence was obtained to verify that the Viet Cong were training drama teams to "counteract the movies." If this report were a fact, then this would be an example of an indirect PSYOP indicator or an enemy counteraction to friendly PSYOP activity.

Another PSYOP effectiveness indicator is the monthly "Hamlet Evaluation System" report which shows the percentages of hamlets that are considered to be pacified in degrees ranging from unsecured to secured. This evaluation system is a country-wide program that is conducted at the national level. The portion of the monthly report that is considered most significant from the division point of view is that section which rates the hamlets in the division area of operations.¹⁷

The final PSYOP indicator revealed by the data on the 1st Infantry Division is an indirect indicator. This indicator concerns specific VC/NVA PSYOP actions directed against the division PSYOP efforts. Examples of this type enemy PSYOP activity include the use of leaflets, such as the ones shown in Appendix C of this study, and incidents such as placing brush and abati roadblocks across the main roads in an area. This latter technique has been employed extensively during the first six months of 1968 on the roads

¹⁷Morris, R.P., op. cit., p. 91.

between the hamlet of Chanh Luu and the province capital of Phu Cuong in Binh Duong Province. The brush roadblocks did not present any serious obstacle to movement (except for occasional booby traps set within them), but served as a psychological sign to indicate that the area was not, in fact, controlled by the Government of Vietnam nor secured totally by the allied forces; the Viet Cong forces still had influence over the area. The incidents apparently aimed also at countering a specific 1st Division PSYOP leaflet and broadcast theme that informs the local people of the road-opening exercises that have been successfully completed in the area, particularly along National Highway 13, which runs from Saigon to Phu Cuong to Lai Khe and on north to the Cambodian border. These counter-actions by the VC have been re-countered by tape-recorded messages telling the people to remove the roadblocks. No data is available on the final or present outcome of this PSYOP versus PSYOP battle over the brush roadblocks in the Chanh Luu area.¹⁸

In summary, the 1st Division case study has produced a total of seventeen different PSYOP indicators of effectiveness that are or have been used by the division in evaluating the results of its PSYOP effort.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 71.

II. 1st CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBILE)

The data examined concerning the 1st Cavalry Division yielded eight major PSROP indicators of effectiveness. Of these eight indicators, six were the same or were variations of indicators that were also identified in the 1st Infantry Division case study.

Of the two new indicators developed, the first one was "voluntary surrender broadcasts" or "quick reaction messages" broadcast by ralliers to their VC or NVA units. An example of a situation that portrays this type indicator was the Battle of Vinh Thanh in the central highlands of Vietnam in May, 1966. General S. L. A. Marshall described the episode as follows:

. . . At 1253 hours on 29 May the first rallier came into the hands of the 1st Cavalry Division. . . . The rallier was most anxious to talk. The rallier had walked in from a two platoon-sized force that was only about one kilometer away. According to the Hoi Chanh, "all members of his force were feeling mighty low and in a mood to surrender, so great a beating had they taken from shot, shell and malaria." The rallier volunteered to fly over his unit's position in an aircraft to make a broadcast appealing to his compatriots to also surrender.¹⁹

The other new indicator developed from the 1st Cavalry Division study consisted of incidents in which the

¹⁹S. L. A. Marshall, Battles in the Monsoon: Campaigning in the Central Highlands, South Vietnam, Summer 1966 (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 201-202.

enemy fired upon PSYOP helicopters broadcasting messages. The validity of this indicator may be subject to question since the helicopter would probably be considered a lucrative target, with or without the PSYOP broadcast capability. A supporting argument for this type action as an indicator would be the rationale that certain isolated groups of insurgent forces might be reluctant to fire upon helicopters for fear of drawing heavy suppressive fires from tactical airstrikes, helicopter gun ships, and conventional artillery. This type incident was related in a recent copy of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam newspaper in the following manner:

Anyone caught /VC or NVA personnel reading allied forces PSYOP leaflets/ is subject to punishment. Because of this we rely upon our heliborne 1,000 watt loudspeaker heavily. After all, they can't stop them from listening. On the other hand, the leaders do try to stop the troops from hearing. As the chopper circles, 1,000 feet overhead, in a slow bank, the leaders frequently fire their weapons at it. A primary reason is to stop the troops from hearing the broadcast--if they happen to hit the craft in the process, well and good.²⁰

As with the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division utilizes captured enemy documents as PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. This indicator is illustrated by another newspaper account pertaining to the 1st Cavalry Division:

²⁰News item in The Observer (Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), February 21, 1969.

Another theme currently being employed against the enemy is the Paris talks. "The enemy is not well informed about the peace talks," said Major Carter [1st Cavalry Division PSYOP Officer].

"According to various documents we have captured, Hanoi has issued instruction that the peace talks are not to be discussed with the troops. It could cause their men to not fight as hard and sort of 'drag their feet' in the war effort."²¹

The remaining five indicators were explained in a letter received from a former Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, of the 1st Cavalry Division, Lieutenant Colonel James R. Bambery. Following is an excerpt from his letter:

Inclosed you will find the feedback indicators used to evaluate our PSYOP program. I am sure you will find nothing startling or new about any of them. The number of HOI CHANS [sic] and rewards payment of course are tangible and therefore get the biggest play. We use charts which depicted these statistics and the CG is by and large satisfied with these indicators. It is my personal opinion, however, that the real success of PSYOP's [sic] is more subtle and therefore IPW [Interrogation Prisoner of War] reports give a better indication of campaign effectiveness. This latter approach does not lend itself to statistical analysis and thus does not receive its share of command attention. If the G5 neglects this area (IPW reports) he is likely to misjudge his efforts.

The Cav has a very active PSYOP program and has achieved some success. Before leaving northern I Corps we had the feeling real progress was being made. The move to III Corps and our mission of screening 190 KM of Cambodian border has caused us to start over again. In many ways we are operating in virgin territory and it is likely to be some time before we see the results of our labor.²²

²¹ Ibid.

²² Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from James R. Bambery, January 20, 1969.

The three indicators mentioned by Colonel Bambery in the body of his letter above were: (1) Chieu Hoi statistics, (2) reward payments, and (3) IPW reports. In an inclosure to his letter, Colonel Bambery mentioned that the reward payments indicator was further subdivided into four categories. These sub-categories were: (1) munitions turned in, (2) weapons turned in, (3) military equipment turned in, and (4) information furnished on members of the VC infrastructure. In the inclosure, Colonel Bambery also mentioned a final indicator, "Interrogation of Returnees."²³

Colonel Bambery raised some doubts concerning the validity of this latter indicator--interrogation of returnees. He states:

Interrogation of returnees reveals that virtually all have been exposed to some PSYOP media. Almost without fail they state that PSYOP information helped influence them in their decision to return to the GVN /Government of Vietnam/. This is generally accepted as being true, however, there is a nagging question in my mind that these admissions may be a manifestation of the oriental desire to please. This wish to please would be particularly strong when returning to the GVN. What I am saying is the indicator may not be as good as we think.²⁴

The last of the 1st Cavalry Division indicators identified was the "VC/NVA action to counter friendly PSYOP." This indicator was alluded to in the preceding account of "enemy firing on U.S. PSYOP helicopters." The

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

Viet Cong leaflets from the 1st Cavalry Division area, in Appendix C. which were also inclosed in the letter from Colonel Bambery, are examples of this type PSYOP indicator.²⁵

III. 4th INFANTRY DIVISION

Fifteen indicators of PSYOP effectiveness were identified in the 4th Infantry Division. Seven of the fifteen indicators were not mentioned in the studies of the 1st Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions.

Of the seven new indicators, one was "results per dollar cost," and the other was "results per manpower unit." Both indicators were explained in detail through a staff study written by the then incumbent Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 4th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Apt, in February, 1968. In his staff study, Colonel Apt found the average monthly cost of the 4th Infantry Division PSYOP program to be \$19,420 and 11.5 or 12 manpower spaces. To complete the ratios, results were quantified in terms of Hoi Chanhs who had rallied in a given time period and the number of items of intelligence value reported to the division during a given time period. Using this technique, Colonel Apt arrived at the following conclusions:

²⁵Ibid.

The immediate tactical benefits, in terms of American lives saved and enemy plans disrupted, from just two of the Hoi Chanhs (VU HUNG and LE VINH CAN), represented an extremely high return on the entire dollar and man hour investment in the PSYOP for the year.

The real worth of PSYOP against enemy soldiers lies in the progressive erosion of their will and morale. This takes place over a period of time during which, hardships, sickness, and attacks depress morale. Psychological operations serve to crystalize dissatisfaction in various soldiers at various times. Sometimes circumstances are such that a Hoi Chanh results. Most of the time the result is diminished efficiency at work or in the attack. This cannot be measured in easy to handle numbers.²⁶

Weather conditions were also cited in the 4th Infantry Division as a subjective indicator. The damp, soggy conditions brought about during the wet monsoon season work against PSYOP effectiveness by limiting loudspeaker ranges and by reducing the legibility of paper leaflets lying on the ground in the jungle. On the other hand, the rainy monsoon season works for PSYOP effectiveness by creating less desirable living conditions for the VC/NVA forces and thus possibly making the target audiences more susceptible to allied PSYOP efforts.²⁷

Another subjective indicator of PSYOP effectiveness that was cited in the 4th Division was "status of enemy

²⁶Robert Apt, "Staff Study: The Effectiveness of Psychological Operations Conducted by the 4th Infantry Division" (Vietnam, February 25, 1968).

²⁷Henry G. Evans, Jr., "Staff Study: PSYOPS Study" (Vietnam, July 5, 1968).

medical care." This indicator was of interest because poor medical care could indicate lower morale. Another reason for this indicator being of interest was that a condition of poor medical care would tend to enhance the credibility of U.S. PSYOP themes which exploit the suffering and sickness within VC/NVA ranks, hardships of life in the jungle, and inadequate care and preventive measures against malaria and other tropical diseases. Information to develop this type effectiveness indicator was usually obtained from ralliers in the 4th Division area.²⁸

Similar to the reports received concerning the status of enemy medical care, was another closely related subjective indicator. This indicator consisted of interrogations which directly reported upon the state of morale within the enemy ranks.²⁹ Again, this indicator was considered significant because it has a bearing directly upon one of the PSYOP objectives, namely to "lower morale and combat efficiency."³⁰

The 4th Infantry Division also disseminates a special type of PSYOP leaflet over the VC/NVA areas which is actually a two to four page newspaper, described in a 4th

²⁸Apt, op. cit.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰United States Department of the Army, Psychological Operations U.S. Army Magazine, Field Manual 33-1 (Washington: Office of the Adjutant General, 1968), p. 7-4.

Division staff study as follows:

Binh Minh /First Light/ is a newspaper type propaganda leaflet directed at NVA/VC target audiences. Its purpose is to disseminate credible news of the war and related news. Interviews with Hoi Chanhs reveals wide acceptance by the enemy target audience. The newspaper has been expanded in size and content. It is felt that it is an effective media. Many of the new articles in Binh Minh give factual reports of hardships suffered and stringent control within enemy units. Binh Minh does not attack the target audience by means of overt propaganda because it publishes timely stories and reports and undermines information given to enemy troops by their political cadre. It is felt that this form of propaganda complements the overt loudspeaker and leaflet media.³¹

Copies of Binh Minh with English translations were sent to this investigator by Major James E. Fiscus, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 4th Infantry Division, in a letter dated January 12, 1969. Major Fiscus annotated one of the copies of Binh Minh with a comment, which suggests another PSYOP effectiveness indicator, unique to the 4th Division. Major Fiscus wrote that it was interesting to note that of eleven North Vietnamese Army soldiers killed in a single action during December, 1968, all eleven of the soldiers had either a picture or a poem from Binh Minh on their bodies.³² The PSYOP indicator in this situation was "Binh Minh clippings found on bodies of VC/NVA troops."

³¹ Evans, op. cit.

³² Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter with inclosures from James E. Fiscus, January 12, 1969.

A sample of a Binh Minh newspaper clipping is shown in Appendix D.

Another different indicator that was developed through the 4th Division study was "JUSPAO analyses of VC propaganda."³³ This indicator is subjective and is based upon a series of periodic field memorandums published by the Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Saigon. This indirect indicator of PSYOP effectiveness is unique in that it is based on material developed at the national level from which information can be extracted that pertains to the local division area of operations.

As in the case of the 1st Infantry and the 1st Cavalry Divisions, the 4th Infantry Division also utilizes the indicator, "VC/NVA action to counter friendly PSYOP." Three examples of VC PSYOP leaflets used against the 4th Infantry Division are shown in Appendix C; these leaflets were analyzed by the 4th Division PSYOP personnel as indirect indicators of effectiveness.³⁴

Other PSYOP indicators identified in the 4th Division study are the same as or very similar to those previously mentioned as being used in other divisions. These remaining indicators are: (1) quantitative measurement of Hoi Chanh,³⁵ (2) prisoners of war captured with U.S. leaflets

³³Ibid.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Apt, op. cit.

in possession,³⁶ (3) debriefing of Hoi Chanh personnel,³⁷ (4) Volunteer Informant Program,³⁸ (5) face-to-face interviews with local people,³⁹ (6) general acceptance of allied forces by the people following PSYOP activities,⁴⁰ and (7) attendance at PSYOP film and slide shows.⁴¹

IV. 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION (AIRMObILE)

The study of the 101st Airborne Division revealed seven PSYOP indicators of effectiveness, of which three had not been mentioned previously in this research project. The Division PSYOP Officer, Major Charles R. Kelly, provided most of the data for this portion of the study in a letter to this investigator.⁴² Additional data came from other sources.

Probably the most unusual example of PSYOP effectiveness in the 101st Division was the incident in which PSYOP was used successfully to aid in the repatriation of forty Vietnamese Government troops who were being held captive by the Viet Cong in a prison compound. The 101st Division "Tiger Force," an all-volunteer long range reconnaissance

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Fiscus, op. cit.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Evans, op. cit.

⁴²Charles R. Kelly, Comments on open-end questionnaire, January 7, 1969.

unit, led by Captain Tom Agerton, made a raid on the enemy POW camp in September of 1966. In the confusion of the raid, a number of the prisoners scattered into the surrounding jungle. PSYOP played a role in rounding up the scattered prisoners. The last five prisoners came in ". . . only after the voice coming from the airborne loud-speaker had convinced them that the Americans were there to help them, not to harm them."⁴³

The foremost PSYOP indicator used by the 101st Division appeared to be the number of Hoi Chanh per month within the division area of operations. The heavy reliance placed upon this indicator is illustrated by the following news release:

Screaming Eagles [nickname for the 101st Airborne Division] set another Hoi Chanh record for the I Corps Tactical Zone when 251 previous enemy soldiers rallied to the South Vietnam Government during October [1968]. The figure bettered the Division's September record of 231, and brought the total for the last two months to 482. The success of the Chieu Hoi program has been attributed to the policies of the Division Commander, Major General Melvin Zais, who has incorporated psychological operations into all phases of Screaming Eagle combat operations.⁴⁴

The other PSYOP indicators used by the 101st Division included: (1) interviews with Hoi Chanh, (2) intelligence

⁴³ Albert N. Garland (ed.), Infantry in Vietnam (Fort Benning, Georgia: Infantry Magazine, 1967), p. 67.

⁴⁴ News item in The Screaming Eagle (Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, Vietnam), November 25, 1968.

agent reports, (3) verbal surveys conducted by armed propaganda teams in local hamlets, (4) monitoring tactical operations of target groups, and (5) analysis of enemy propaganda messages directed towards the allied forces.⁴⁵

The three indicators which had not been mentioned previously in this study were: (1) the repatriated prisoners response to PSYOP, (2) the verbal surveys conducted by the armed propaganda teams, and (3) the monitoring of the tactical operations of target groups.

V. AMERICAL DIVISION

In the Americal Division a total of nine PSYOP indicators of effectiveness are utilized. These indicators were identified in a letter from the Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Lieutenant Colonel Norman L. Robinson, dated January 5, 1969. The nine indicators used by the Americal Division are common to the other divisions previously discussed. Extracts of Colonel Robinson's letter follow:

Of all our media there is little doubt that face-to-face PSYOP is the most effective. . . .

.

The number of Hoi Chanh rallying to the GVN is the best indicator of the success of the campaign. By interrogating the Hoi Chanh we gain our most concrete evaluation of the relative effectiveness of our

⁴⁵ Kelly, op. cit.

different propaganda media and delivery techniques.

Volunteer Informant Program. The success of this campaign can be measured directly by the number of informants and the amount of munitions, weapons, and information received by the unit.

An indication of the effectiveness of our PSYOP campaign is also gained by interrogation of POW's and detainees. The most effective propaganda delivered by loudspeaker is worthless if the message is unintelligible to the target audience. Interrogation of POW and detainees provides information as to the coverage and reception of our messages. . . .⁴⁶

The nine Americal Division PSYOP indicators were:

(1) number of ralliers under the Chieu Hoi Program, (2) interrogation of Hoi Chanh personnel, (3) number of participants under the Volunteer Informant Program, (4) amount of munitions turned in, (5) number of weapons turned in, (6) information received under the Volunteer Informant Program, (7) interrogation of POW, (8) interrogation of detainees, and (9) results of face-to-face PSYOP.⁴⁷

VI. 9th INFANTRY DIVISION

No letter response was received by this investigator from the 9th Infantry Division; however, some data was available from other sources, and six PSYOP indicators were identified. These indicators generally follow the pattern

⁴⁶Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from Norman L. Robinson, January 5, 1969.

⁴⁷Ibid.

of those mentioned most frequently in the studies of the other U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam.

The first indicator identified was "number of ralliers in division area."⁴⁸ Closely related to the number of ralliers statistical indicator was "participation in the Kit Carson Scout Program." Following is a quotation from a recent article on the subject of 9th Division operations, which shows how this indicator is utilized:

All of the scouts rallied voluntarily to the South Vietnamese Government under the Chieu Hoi amnesty program and then further volunteered for duty as scouts with United States forces.

Six months ago the Division had only 32 such scouts. Now there are over 150, and the Division plans to add another 50 in the near future.⁴⁹

Another PSYOP indicator used by the 9th Division is "evaluation of enemy PSYOP efforts." Near the end of 1968, the Viet Cong forces mounted a PSYOP surrender appeal directed against troops of the 9th Division's 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. The surrender appeal was broadcast over a ground loudspeaker located in a treeline about 200 meters away from the U.S. troops. The U.S. troops answered the appeal by raking the area with gunfire. The next morning two blood trails and an abandoned portable loudspeaker were

⁴⁸ Dave Furse, "Kit Carson Scouts in Action," Army Digest, XXIII (September, 1968), 46-47.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

found by the U.S. troops in a sweep of the area.⁵⁰

Other PSYOP indicators of effectiveness known to be used by the 9th Infantry Division include: (1) participation of Vietnamese in the MEDCAP program,⁵¹ (2) participation and information received through the Volunteer Informant Program,⁵² and (3) interrogation prisoner of war reports.⁵³

It is believed that the 9th Division utilizes many more indicators than the ones mentioned thus far in this study, but no documentation on additional indicators was available in this portion of the research. Some additional 9th Division indicators were identified in the questionnaire survey administered to Command and General Staff College students, but these will be discussed in the next chapter.

VII. 25th INFANTRY DIVISION

The data available on the 25th Infantry Division revealed seven PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. All seven of these indicators have also been identified in the modus operandi of other divisions in Vietnam. Although there may be other indicators used by the 25th Division, the following

⁵⁰News item in The Old Reliable (Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division, Vietnam), January 1, 1969.

⁵¹Morris, R.P., op. cit., p. 89.

⁵²Ibid., p. 111.

⁵³Ibid.

are the indicators that were presented to the investigator in a briefing at the division headquarters at Cu Chi, Vietnam, on April 8, 1968. These indicators were subsequently documented in a written trip report. The indicators were: (1) MEDCAP participation in division area, (2) Hamlet Evaluation System data, (3) interrogation prisoner of war reports, (4) Hoi Chanh statistics and reports, (5) province attitude reports, (6) direct observations, and (7) results obtained from the Volunteer Informant Program.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Robert P. Morris, "Memorandum to Chief of Staff; Subject: G5 Visit to 25th Infantry Division," Trip Report (Lai Khe, Vietnam, April 9, 1968).

CHAPTER IV


CGSC SURVEY

As mentioned in the methodology portion of Chapter I, the approach to the problem in this research study was the consideration of two major batches of data--division case studies and a survey of Command and General Staff College (CGSC) students. This chapter treats the findings derived from the latter batch of data.

I. SELECTING THE SAMPLE

The 1968-69 class of student officers attending the United States Army Command and General Staff College Regular Course is organized as shown in Figure 3. By inspection of a class roster or by observation it may be seen that each of the four lettered divisions within the class consists of approximately the same proportion of officers by grade and by branch of the Army. In brief, each lettered academic division within the class represents a homogeneous cross section by grade and branch. Each division is further subdivided into five or six academic sections, which are identified by designated numbers. The academic sections are homogeneous representations of the respective divisions and of the class as a whole.

Division C of the CGSC class was chosen as the



Total number of officers in Division C whose class qualification records indicate experience with U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam 41 officers

Number of above qualified officers in Division C responding to survey questionnaire 20 officers

Percentage of qualified officers in Division C surveyed in this study (approximately) 50 per cent

Figure 3. CGSC survey of Student Division C.

portion of the CGSC population to be sampled primarily because the investigator was a member of that division and thereby attended classes on the same schedule as the members of the sample (the other class divisions attended classes on different schedules), and because the close physical proximity of the students of that division would facilitate distribution and collection of the questionnaires. (A copy of the questionnaire used is shown in Appendix A of this study.)

Initially, the investigator had decided to use the interview technique; however, it was found that because of the demands upon the time of the various students during break periods and during off-duty hours to accomplish other administrative and academic tasks, that the questionnaire technique would be more feasible. By using questionnaires, each respondent had the opportunity to make replies at a time of his own convenience and was afforded more time to consider the questions and the responses.

A biographical card file maintained in each CGSC academic section classroom contained data about the previous assignments of each member of the section. This card file was used to identify those students in each section known to have been associated with U.S. Army divisions on tours of duty in the Republic of Vietnam. The fact that approximately the same number of students was so identified in each

of the six sections within Division C further substantiated the premise that the sections represented a homogeneous cross section of the entire CGSC class. It is possible that there may have been more student officers in each section who had been associated with U.S. Army divisions during their Vietnam tours of duty, but the biographical card file did not identify more personnel in this category than was indicated in Figure 3, page 64.

In all of Division C (Academic Sections 13-18), 41 students were identified whose biographical cards indicated experience with U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam. Of this number, questionnaires were sent to 24 officers. A total of 20 officers executed and returned the questionnaires; this represented a response of 83 per cent. Of the 20 student officers who returned questionnaires, 18 officers identified PSYOP indicators of effectiveness.

II. FINDINGS

There were eight PSYOP indicators of effectiveness mentioned by multiple respondents. The indicators most frequently cited by the respondents and the percentages of same are shown in Figure 4. The frequency of identifications of the eight indicators mentioned by multiple respondents ranged from 10 to 35 per cent of the total responses. The percentages were calculated on the basis




Figure 4. PSYOP feedback indicators identified by multiple respondents.

of the total of 20 respondents who contributed to the survey.

Of the eight indicators mentioned by multiple respondents, all but two indicators had been developed in the case studies of the divisions in the preceding chapter. The two new indicators were the following: (1) number of desertions in enemy ranks reported per period of time, and (2) the number of prisoners captured per period of time.

The data on enemy desertions was gathered by the divisions from various sources, such as intelligence agents, captured enemy documents, Hoi Chanh interviews, and prisoner of war interrogations. The number of prisoners captured was considered to be a related, but separate, PSYOP indicator from the number of enemy personnel rallying to the allied forces under the provisions of the Chieu Hoi Program.

There were fourteen other PSYOP indicators mentioned by respondents only a single time. These indicators are shown in Figure 5. These additional indicators covered a relatively wide range and included six indicators that had not been mentioned previously in the study. The six new indicators were: (1) attitudes and behavior of Vietnamese civilian laborers employed on U.S. base camps, (2) frequency of enemy rocket/mortar attacks against division base camps, (3) number of "high impact" Vietnamese patients treated successfully by division surgeons (medical conditions

Additional PSYOP Indicators

1. Attitude of local civilian laborers employed on U.S. division base camps.
2. PSYOP loudspeaker/leaflet helicopters drawing fire from enemy forces.
3. Prisoners of War turning in weapons to allied forces.
4. Direct observation of target group behavior by U.S. PSYOP teams.
5. Captured enemy documents alluding to effectiveness of U.S. PSYOP in division area of operations.
6. Reports from Regional Forces/Popular Forces (RF/PF) personnel having indirect contact with Viet Cong.
7. Frequency of VC/NVA rocket/mortar attacks against U.S. division base camps.
8. Number of Vietnamese voluntarily participating in MEDCAP/DENTCAP Operations in division area of operations.
9. Number of "high impact" Vietnamese nationals treated by division surgeons.
10. Participation by indigenous personnel in the inpatient hospital care program at division base camps.
11. Frequency of VC incidents against division medical teams.
12. Reports from MACV Advisor Teams.
13. Mass surrender/defection rates.
14. In-depth interviews with local populace.

Figure 5. PSYOP feedback indicators identified by single respondent.

remedied in a dramatic manner with resultant favorable psychological impact, such as correction of cleft palates, removal of cataracts, quick cures of advanced pneumonia with massive doses of antibiotics, correction of crossed-eye conditions, and treatment of remedial blindness), (4) number of Vietnamese patients voluntarily participating in the in-patient hospital care program at the division headquarters base camp, (5) frequency of enemy incidents directed against U.S. division medical personnel operating among the Vietnamese local populace in enemy-dominated or contested areas, and (6) data obtained through in-depth conversations by specially trained U.S. division personnel.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

In the two previous chapters, this report was concerned with the examination of data available from the division case studies and the CGSC survey. From these two groupings of data, approximately thirty-five feedback indicators of PSYOP were identified. In this chapter, key points in the analysis of these indicators are reported, to include central tendencies and patterns of support, relative merits of the major indicators, and testing of the hypothesis.

I. CENTRAL PATTERNS

It was found that the indicators that were identified and developed in this study could be arranged into six general categories. These categories were: (1) Chieu Hoi statistics, (2) intelligence from interrogations, (3) intelligence from captured documents and intercepted messages, (4) observations, (5) enemy counter actions, and (6) miscellaneous. Of these general categories, there was sufficient data to justify further division of three of the general categories into specific subdivisions.

The "interrogations" group was further divided into interrogations of: (1) prisoners of war, (2) detainees,

(3) members of the local populace on a voluntary basis --Volunteer Informant Program, (4) Hoi Chanhs, and (5) intelligence agents.

The "observations" group was subdivided into observations by: (1) U.S. PSYOP teams--in the air or on the ground, (2) U.S. troops on tactical operations, (3) province advisory team personnel, and (4) Vietnamese officials at the province and district level within the tactical division area of operations.

The "enemy counter actions" group was subdivided into: (1) enemy broadcasts--both by radio and by local ground mounted loudspeaker systems, (2) leaflets distributed in and around U.S. division areas, (3) enemy roadblocks and tactical operations in the U.S. division areas, and (4) enemy restrictions placed upon their own troops against reading or listening to U.S. propaganda messages and literature.

All of these indicators are shown, by major groupings, in Figure 6, in which the various indicators from the division case studies and the CGSC survey have been synthesized into a single figure. From an examination of this figure, it can be seen that these groupings do reflect the general tendencies. The "Chieu Hoi statistics" and the "interrogations" categories were the most frequently identified indicators, followed closely by the "enemy counter

INDICATORS	DIVISIONS					CGSC
	1st Inf	1st Cav	4th Inf	101st Abn	Amer- ical	
1. Chieu Hoi statistics	X	X	X	X	X	X
2. Intelligence from interrogations						
a. PW's	X	X	X		X	X
b. Detainees	X				X	
c. Populace (VIP)	X	X	X	X	X	X
d. Hoi Chanhs	X	X	X	X	X	X
e. Agents	X			X	X	
3. Intelligence from captured documents and intercepted messages	X	X	X			X
4. Observations by						
a. PSYOP teams	X	X		X		
b. U.S. troops	X		X			
c. Province advisors	X					
d. GVN officials	X				X	X
5. Enemy counter actions						
a. Broadcasts			X	X		
b. Leaflets	X	X	X	X		X
c. Roadblocks and enemy operations	X			X		
d. Restrictions on own forces	X	X				
6. Miscellaneous	X	X	X	X		X

Figure 6. Central patterns--Division case studies and CGSC survey.

actions (leaflets)" and "miscellaneous" categories.

It was also noted that there was a definite mutual pattern of support between the general indicators developed within the division case studies and by the CCSC survey. This pattern of support existed within all six of the major categories of PSYOP indicators.

II. EVALUATION OF INDICATORS

It was found that "Chieu Hoi statistics" were universally used by the U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam as an indicator of PSYOP effectiveness. This indicator lends itself to this purpose particularly well because the data involved can be readily presented in a quantitative form on a briefing chart or in a report to higher headquarters or to other interested agencies. A weakness of this indicator is that misleading statistics can be easily developed unless a careful, accurate, and honest reporting system is used. In situations where more than one U.S. division is operating within a given Vietnamese province, it is possible that each division could report the same province Chieu Hoi center returnees solely within its own totals for a particular month, rather than pro-rating the numbers or using some other system that would approximate the truth. Another weakness of the Chieu Hoi statistic is that in the enthusiasm for meeting quotas or exceeding the results of a

previous reporting period, the staff officers concerned may simply accept each feeder report without question and simply add the new numbers to the old. This type accounting can lead to duplication of data and inaccurate reporting of the totals, for a given Hoi Chanh might be reported by a subordinate unit as one rallier on a particular day to that unit, later this same rallier might be reported again as a new acquisition by the local province Chieu Hoi center. Therefore, it can be seen that a careful and valid accounting system is necessary if the Chieu Hoi data is to be meaningful, and great care must be taken to identify specific Hoi Chanh by name and by other specific identification means in order to preclude fallacious or ambiguous reporting.

The "interrogations" PSYOP feedback indicators provide quantitative and subjective information for the PSYOP analyst. The division case studies and the CGSC survey reflected wide use in Vietnam of interrogations, particularly interrogations of people under the "Volunteer Informant Program" and interrogations of Hoi Chanh personnel. The numbers of individuals interrogated successfully can be quantified. The amount of munitions, the number of weapons turned in, the number of mine and booby trap locations, and the number of intelligence tips of value received can be quantified and used as a numerical yardstick of effectiveness

in a relative manner. But, as was pointed out by Colonel Bambery, former G5 of the 1st Cavalry Division, in his letter to this investigator, there is an inherent "desire to please" that characterizes people within the oriental races, and this desire to say what the questioner would like to hear is a factor that must be taken into account when making subjective evaluations of PSYOP feedback information obtained through interrogations.¹

With respect to participants in the Volunteer Informant Program and individuals acting as regular intelligence agents, there is the element of "payment for services rendered" involved in the interrogations. The informants (the informants who are being paid for their information) have a product to sell and it would be natural to assume that such informers would be eager to please their benefactors in the hope of making even more money. When the primary motivational factor becomes money, then it seems that the indicators of PSYOP effectiveness thus produced must not be accepted purely at face value. These indicators must be evaluated in a careful manner or there is the possibility that information provided may be somewhat less than accurate, less than objective, and less than completely reliable. Even if the intent of the informer is sincere,

¹Personal Correspondence of the Author, letter from James R. Bambery, January 20, 1969.

the information may be of doubtful veracity because of the qualities of the various sources along the reporting line.

Another disadvantage of interrogations as a source of indicators is that in many cases the information must be obtained through the use of either Vietnamese or U.S. interpreters. Therefore, the quality of the information obtained through interrogations must be tempered and assessed in terms of the qualifications and reliability of the person who interprets and translates the thoughts from one language to another. Colonel Wolfred K. White, in his article in Military Review, "Interpreter--or Filter?" has examined this problem and has cited the pitfalls inherent in the use of interpreters in the less developed countries of the world. Colonel White has explained the situation in the following terms:

Nothing can replace the person-to-person exchange of ideas in a language common to both individuals. At best, the interpreter is a substitute for no communication at all.

The interpreter's lot is not a happy one. His task is demanding, his responsibilities are great, and too frequently his reward is scant. The interpreter's abilities are determined by a number of factors including:

Detailed knowledge of the formal aspects of the languages in which he is working.

Command of the idiomatic expressions in each language.

Technical vocabularies applicable to the interpretive situation.

Ability to convey accurately the tone, spirit, and nuance of each speaker.

Native intelligence.

It is infrequent that the military advisor is fortunate enough to acquire an interpreter possessing all of these qualities in adequate measure. In most instances, he is forced to settle for less--much less.

.....

One of the most frequently expressed complaints of the advisor concerning his interpreter is the real or imagined reluctance on the part of the interpreter to convey criticism, bad tidings, or censure.²

Although Colonel White's remarks are directed specifically at situations involving advisor-counterpart relationships, it seems that the thesis he presents would apply equally to interrogations of prisoners, detainees, volunteer informants, or any conversation or communication between U.S. personnel in tactical units and members of the indigenous cultures.

The obvious alternative to the problem of unreliable interpreters might be to dispense with native interpreters entirely and to conduct interrogations using only highly qualified U.S. personnel who are fluent to the highest degree in the local dialects. But, people with the requisite language skills are in short supply within our armed forces, in spite of efforts to train personnel in the

²Wolfred K. White, "Interpreter--or Filter?" Military Review, XLVIII (February, 1968), 80.

service schools. Colonel White has summarized this paradox as follows:

. . . At a time in our history when we have the greatest requirement for citizens capable of speaking a wide variety of foreign languages, we are discovering the difficulty of developing rapidly these required skills.

.

Undoubtedly, the lack of U.S. advisors adequately trained in the language of the host country has frequently caused misunderstanding, impeded progress, and complicated the task of aiding emerging nations.³

Captured documents and intercepted messages are another indicator of PSYOP effectiveness that has been used by U.S. tactical divisions in Vietnam. This indicator has also been cited in the CGSC survey. The number of documents and messages processed that allude to PSYOP effectiveness can be quantified; however, it seems that the same disadvantages that have been mentioned concerning the evaluation of information through interpreters can be equally applied to the evaluation of captured documents and messages. Whether the translator is a native of Vietnam or whether he is a U.S. native, there is the pitfall of "filtering" or of unintentional misrepresentation of the facts or data contained in the documents or messages processed. If a division has a highly developed intelligence capability, then it would seem that the problems encountered with

³Ibid., p. 79.

interrogations and translations would be greatly ameliorated and the two indicators, "interrogations" and "captured documents and intercepted messages" would become significantly more valid.

The "enemy counter actions" indicator seems to have gained general acceptance in Vietnam. Enemy leaflets were mentioned most frequently as the medium of action. Since the leaflets directed against the U.S. troops are written or printed in the English language, the interpreter/translator problem is of no consequence. However, the value of this indicator would probably depend upon the availability of adequately trained personnel within the division resources who could properly evaluate the meaning and exact underlying significance of the messages and broadcasts, vis-a-vis judging the effectiveness of the corresponding U.S. PSYOP activity that may have had a direct or indirect bearing upon the enemy side producing a particular counter action.

The "observations" indicator of PSYOP effectiveness was the one mentioned less frequently than any of the other indicators. This situation may be due to the fact that PSYOP personnel and other U.S. and GVN personnel are so close to many activities that have PSYOP significance that the observations of the effects are missed in spite of the close proximity. Another way of expressing this thought

is by reference to the saying, that often one "can't see the forest for the trees."

Direct observation is a technique that avoids the pitfalls inherent in the use of interpreters, translators, and third-party persons involved in intelligence networks. It is believed that this indicator has merit in that results should be forthcoming with relatively little on-the-job training or experience. An enlisted specialist aboard a PSYOP helicopter should be able, it would seem, to observe directly whether or not the populace of a local village is moving to a designated assembly point as may have been directed in a previously broadcast message from the PSYOP helicopter loudspeaker system. It appears that U.S. troops, officers and enlisted personnel on the ground, should certainly provide feedback information concerning the quality of English language "test" messages broadcast to check whether the electronic communications equipment is functioning in an audible and intelligible manner or not. Certainly, it would seem, the local U.S. advisor teams at the province and district level, who are in daily contact with the local people, could provide observations concerning behavior of the local populace. The corresponding GVN officials could provide information concerning behavior and attitudes through channels and directly to U.S. division PSYOP or G2 personnel. It may be that because the PSYOP

function is relatively new to many U.S. division staff officers that the possibilities of direct observation as an indicator of PSYOP effectiveness have not yet been fully explored.

The "miscellaneous" category of PSYOP effectiveness indicators seems to have merit because the indicators reflect the imagination and development of many different individuals and organizations. The apparent disadvantage of the indicators in this category is that most of them are not generally known to the operators in the field. The fact is that these miscellaneous indicators have been identified by individuals and organizations that have been professionally associated with U.S. divisions in Vietnam. Collectively these indicators reflect a relatively large amount of thought and experience.

As with any other indicators or yardsticks used by any sort of analyst, unless the indicators are employed with care and a certain degree of subjective judgment, their usefulness to a commander at the tactical level of operations can be lost. Judiciously utilized, these indicators have served as useful tools in the management of PSYOP and tactical resources in the Vietnam environment.

III. TEST OF THE HYPOTHESIS

The primary hypothesis tested in this study was that

specific PSYOP feedback indicators can be identified or locally developed, that may be utilized by division commanders and G5/S5 staffs in evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP programs in the current Vietnam conflict or in similar conflicts.

In the research model for this study, Figure 2, page 12, it was shown that the hypothesis was to be analyzed by subjecting the trial PSYOP indicators to a critical comparison within a framework consisting of stated parameters, official doctrine, and central patterns of experience.

It has already been shown in the first section of this chapter that the trial PSYOP indicators derived from the case studies and the CGSC survey have established mutual patterns of support and that within these two batches of research data there were definite central tendencies. These central patterns are summarized in Figure 6, page 73.

The stated parameters that were set forth in Chapter I of this report were: (1) U.S. Army divisions in Vietnam, (2) target audience of Viet Cong forces, North Vietnamese Army forces, and the Vietnamese civilian populace to include minority ethnic groups, (3) time frame of 1965 through 1969, (4) level of conflict equal to that which has existed in Vietnam during the stated time frame, and (5) economy, in terms of either time, money, manpower, or overall effort required.

It is believed that the trial indicators developed in this study have met the stated parameters. This inference is supported by the fact that the research design of this study precluded the selection of indicators which had not been developed or used under the conditions defined by the stated parameters. In other words, theoretical or purely laboratory-type indicators were not retained for analysis in this study. Only those indicators were retained for collation and analysis that did meet the constraints of the parameters prescribed initially by the investigator.

With respect to official doctrine, reference is made to Department of the Army Field Manual 33-5, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, which augments the basic U.S. Army PSYOP doctrine.⁴ In this manual, which reflects doctrine, the following statement concerning PSYOP effects analysis appears:

The impact of a propaganda effort may be determined by obtaining four general forms of evidence: responsive action, participant reports, observer commentaries, and indirect indicators.⁵

By referring back to the findings of PSYOP indicators shown in Figure 4 on page 67, Figure 5 on page 69, and

⁴United States Department of the Army, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, Field Manual 33-5 (Washington: Office of the Adjutant General, 1966), p. 3.

⁵Ibid., p. 109.

Figure 6 on page 73, it can be seen that all of the specific PSYOP indicators identified in this study do fit into at least one of the "four general forms of evidence" for PSYOP effects analysis as described in the doctrinal reference cited above.

In weighing the relative advantages and disadvantages of the specific PSYOP indicators that have been developed, it can be seen that although most of the indicators do have some limitations, the indicators when considered from an overall viewpoint, and when quantitative aspects are combined with the appropriate subjective judgments of qualified personnel, the indicators can and do serve a useful place in PSYOP. There was no evidence available to this investigator that would refute the overall validity of any of the indicators identified.

The evidence thus far presented in this study tends to support the primary hypothesis. The central tendencies established support the hypothesis. The stated parameters and the official doctrine support the hypothesis. And, finally, the preponderance of subjective argument has tended to support the hypothesis of this study as originally stated.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The major conclusion of this study is that numerous specific feedback indicators of PSYOP effectiveness do exist that are applicable at the U.S. Army division level in Vietnam. Six major categories of PSYOP indicators have been confirmed, with thirty-seven specific PSYOP indicators identified in all.

It is also concluded that the indicators that have been identified with respect to the Vietnam conflict would be an initial basis for PSYOP evaluation with respect to any similar type limited warfare in the future.

Of the categories identified, it is believed that a major contribution to the field of PSYOP is the identification of the approximately one dozen indicators in the "miscellaneous" category. These indicators should be of particular value to PSYOP staff officers in search of new techniques for evaluation of the effectiveness of their own PSYOP programs. If nothing else, these miscellaneous indicators should contribute to the stimulation of new ideas on the part of PSYOP personnel who are already experienced in the PSYOP field and who might be interested in developing additional indicators of effectiveness based upon the particular situation that exists within their areas of

operations.

It is also concluded that the findings of this study would be useful to PSYOP staff officers at the U.S. Army division level who are new to the PSYOP discipline, but find themselves suddenly assigned to perform PSYOP duties on a G5 or S5 staff in Vietnam or elsewhere.

Although the literature seems to offer conflicting information concerning whether PSYOP can be quantified, it is another conclusion of this investigator that PSYOP indicators can be quantified and can be adapted to graphic presentation on charts and graphs. It is concluded that the quantitative indicators, to be of greatest value to a commander, should be combined with subjective judgments of qualified PSYOP personnel and should be based upon accurate and valid information.

A further conclusion of this study is that the PSYOP modus operandi at the U.S. Army division level in Vietnam is ahead of doctrine to a certain extent. This fact is evident primarily in two areas: (1) in Vietnam at the U.S. Army division level, the PSYOP function is assigned as a staff responsibility of the G5 rather than the G3, and (2) many of the specific PSYOP indicators developed in this study were not listed in the doctrinal literature even though such indicators were found to be in consonance with the general principles of PSYOP doctrine.

It was also found in this study that although PSYOP indicators may follow similar broad patterns in the different divisions studied, there were numerous variations of the same general type of indicator from division to division. This observation has suggested that PSYOP indicators are a flexible management tool, and that employed with imagination, can be adapted to almost any local tactical situation.

One of the final conclusions of this study is that valuable additional information could be obtained concerning PSYOP indicators of effectiveness by continued research. Specifically, there are three areas for additional research that have been suggested by this study as being potentially fruitful areas for related or additional research. These research areas, which were beyond the scope or time available for this study, include the following: (1) provision for an on-site investigation of PSYOP effectiveness indicators at the division level in Vietnam by a team of researchers who would visit each of the seven U.S. Army divisions to collect data first hand, (2) an expansion of the CGSC PSYOP survey to include a larger sample or to include samples in each of the four major academic divisions within the CGSC class, and (3) controlled PSYOP effectiveness experiments to be conducted at the division level in Vietnam, wherein a specific technique would be varied in one division while other controllable factors would be held

constant to determine the correlation between specific efforts and indicators of effectiveness, to develop experience factors for predicting time-lag for effectiveness feedback to occur, and to record any other meaningful relationships that might be observed.

In summary, this study has shown that numerous indicators of PSYOP effectiveness at the U.S. Army division level in Vietnam do exist, can be varied to adapt to local conditions, and can be developed by PSYOP personnel in the field utilizing imagination and ingenuity. The results of this study can be of particular benefit to those persons who find themselves assigned on rather short notice to key PSYOP staff officer positions in a division. The findings of this study can serve as a point of departure in aiding new personnel in their efforts to be productive and to assist commanders in utilizing their PSYOP weapons system wisely and economically. It is believed that the art of PSYOP has been enhanced by the identification of new specific PSYOP indicators of effectiveness. These new indicators in turn afford the commander more options from which to choose as he pursues his new targets--the "hearts and minds" of people in the psychological and political struggles of the future tactical arena.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A. Sample questionnaire.

Interview Form

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FEEDBACK

1. NAME:
2. TACTICAL UNIT:
3. DUTY POSITION:
4. DATES OF DUTY:
5. RELATIONSHIP OF DUTY TO PSYOP:
6. FEEDBACK INDICATORS UTILIZED/OBSERVED:
 - a.
 - b.
 - c.
 - d.
 - e.
 - f.
7. PROBLEMS NOTED:
8. LESSONS LEARNED:
9. COMMENTS CONCERNING PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS:
10. MISCELLANEOUS COMMENTS (Knowledge of other local authorities or sources, etc.):

(Initials and date of interview)

Appendix B. Type letter sent to each U.S. Army Division
Assistant Chief of Staff G5 in Vietnam.

LTC Robert P. Morris 070872
5 Burnham Court
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
27 December 1968

LTC Roderick D. Renick, Jr.
Assistant Chief of Staff G5
4th Infantry Division
APO San Francisco 96262

Dear Colonel Renick,

Having spent two tours in Vietnam, one with MACV (1964-65), and one with USARV (1967-68), I have become deeply interested in the role played by psychological operations in our tactical units in Vietnam.

At the present time I am involved in research for a thesis on PSYOP here at CGSC. My specific research problem is to identify feedback indicators for use in evaluating the effectiveness of our PSYOP effort at the division level in Vietnam. In other words, how does the G5 report his progress periodically in the PSYOP area to his CG, visiting VIP's, and to higher headquarters?

In this regard, and if your time permits, would you please jot down on the attached sheet the primary PSYOP feedback indicators, if any, that are used by the 4th Infantry Division in assessing the results or effectiveness of your PSYOP programs?

I know that your time is at a premium, particularly as a division G5 in Vietnam; therefore, any thoughts or material that you may care to contribute to this project will be greatly appreciated. For your convenience, a self-addressed envelope is inclosed for your reply.

Many thanks for your help and best wishes for the new year.

Sincerely,

ROBERT P. MORRIS
Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry

Appendix B (continued)

P.S. If you happen to have any extra clippings, VC leaflets, PSYOP literature, notes, or other related documents to spare, I would appreciate it very much if you would drop them into the envelope also. Please let me know if I can do anything for you back here at Bell Hall.

Inclosure: Questionnaire

Appendix C. Viet Cong leaflets.

AFRO AMERICANS!

OVER the past two months, more than a million of Black men in your homeland, armed with weapons, have risen up against U.S. racial administration's terrorism and cruel suppression. This movement of struggle has been becoming ever more fiercer and wider, prevailing throughout over 90 cities and provincial towns in 28 states of U.S.A. Detroit of Michigan was especially considered the theatre of combat. Being afraid of this resolute and powerful struggle, the U.S. racial capitalist authorities sent ten of thousand policemen and soldiers to Detroit, tanks and helicopters were applied to suppress it. Blood is shedding, the Black casualties were about one hundred killed and wounded, thousands arrested. But the endless shots were heard and their struggle for the rights of **EQUALITY** and **FREEDOM** kept on going stronger all over U.S.A.

YOU, BLACK MEN, HAVE BEEN DECEPTIVELY SENT TO SOUTH VIET-NAM, HOW DO YOU THINK ABOUT YOUR AFRO AMERICAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE AT HOME?

Our Vietnamese people have been struggling for our **INDEPENDENCE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY**, for **EQUALITY** and friendship among nations all over the world.

Your Afro American people are also struggling for the rights to live, **FREEDOM** and **EQUALITY**. More than 22 millions of yours have been daily oppressed, exploited, paid no respect to and whipped by U.S. racial capitalist authorities. They are now rising up, with arms in their hands against the U.S. racialists.

AFRO AMERICANS !

It is U.S. imperialists who have been killing, oppressing your people, are your real enemies.

Join with Afro American people in :

- **Protesting against Johnson administration, its racial clique and its suppression of the Black's struggle for **EQUALITY** and **FREEDOM**.**
- **Opposing the U.S. dirty war of aggression in South Vietnam, refusing to go to the battlefield, giving no help to them in killing your friendly South Vietnamese.**
- **Demanding Immediately your home return, contributing your share to your people's struggle.**
- **Crossing over to the S.V.N.N.F.L.'S side, your home return will be helped by all means available as in the case of S.SGT Claude Mc Clure RA 14703075.**

*These are your real necessities and sensible acts to support your people's struggle for **EQUALITY** and **FREEDOM** all over U.S.A.*

Appendix C (continued)

AFRO-AMERICANS!

Your leader, Martin Luther King was assassinated.

Who has killed him?

Where is Luther King's and all of Afro-Americans' enemy?

Their enemy is not in Vietnam but in the very U.S.A.

Join in your compatriots' common struggle.

U.S go home! and settle their problems of civil rights and living.

OPPOSE THE WAR AND DEMAND YOUR HOME REPATRIATION.

LET THE VIETNAMESE SETTLE THEMSELVES THEIR OWN AFFAIRS.

Appendix C (continued)

U.S. BLACKMEN!

What do you see?

You are forced:

- To move forward to the front
- To last retreat
- To station at the outside perimeter.

The U.S. blackmen's killed and wounded rate are now higher than that of the white!

It is clear that you have been pushed to deadly dangerous places to serve as cannon-fodder for U.S. imperialists and racist authorities.


The Vietnamese people are not your enemies. It is just those who despise and force you to take part in their aggressive war against our people who are your enemies.

U.S. BLACKMEN!

- OPPOSE THE U.S. AGGRESSIVE WAR
IN SVN.
- DEMAND YOUR REPATRIATION.
- SOUTH VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS MUST
BE SETTLED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
THEMSELVES.

NOTE: Take this « Special fair treatment bill » and keep it with you.

Appendix C (continued)



What for?

For Herbert Fuller of New York
(with 10 million invested in a sugar
mill at Tuy Hoa, South Vietnam)

the answer is simple:

"I'm in it for the money," he says.

Gloating over your corpse, he adds:

"Once you've cleared the land, we'll
get back our investment in two
years."

Whose land? The Vietnamese aren't
about to give up land and liberty for
Herbert Fuller's vicious daydream.

They fight hard and well because their
cause is just.

WHAT'S IN IT FOR YOU?
IS THERE A COFFIN IN YOUR
CRYSTAL BALL ???

South Vietnam N.F.L.

Viet Cong Leaflets from 1st Air Cavalry
Division (Airmobile) Area

Appendix C (continued)

"The Whole Thing Was A Lie"

So said M/Sgt. Donald Duncan, a Vietnam Veteran Green Beret who is now working against this "illegal, immoral and unjust war" of Johnson.

If you want to know the truth about this war you hate to fight:

— Listen to Liberation Radio, the voice of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation. Special English transmission for American Servicemen in South Vietnam, every Saturday from: 20.15 to 20.30 (Indo-China time) or 21.15 to 21.30 (Saigon time).


— Listen to Hanoi Radio "The Voice of Vietnam" Special Broadcasts to American Servicemen in South Vietnam every day:

Hanoi time	Saigon time
From 06.00 to 06.30	From 07.00 to 07.30
Metre bands: 25, 31, 240	
Frequencies: 11.840, 9.840, 1.240 Kc/S	
From 20.00 to 20.30	From 21.00 to 21.30
Metre bands: 25, 31, 240	
Frequencies: 11.760, 9.760, 1.240 Kc/S	

THE SOUTH VIETNAM NATIONAL
FRONT FOR LIBERATION

Appendix C (continued)

Policy toward US and Satellite POWs IN SOUTH VIETNAM



Base on the humanitarian and lenient policy of the SVN-NFL, the High Command of the SVN-LA has stipulated the following points:

1. The US and other Satellite officers and men who lay down their arms at the battlefield will not be killed and will be transferred to safe places.

2. POWs will be well-treated — will not be tortured or insulted and will be given medical care in case of sickness.

3. All their personal belongings such as: money, gold-watches, pens and other private souvenir will not be deprived

4. POWs are allowed to communicate news and write to their families and friends.

5. The wounded left in the battlefield will be bandaged and cured if possible by the LA medical-men.

6. The dead left in the battlefield will be given proper funeral and their graves taken care of.

The High Command of the
SVNLA

Appendix C (continued)

HANG ON TO YOUR HEAD

GI's in Vietnam now number over 400,000
 GI's killed, maimed, or missing — more
 than 131,000.

Lots of soldiers —
 Lots of money —
 Lots of hardware —
 Lots of coffins !

THE 64 BILLION DOLLAR QUESTION IS...

Boeing Aircraft, Lockheed Aircraft, General Electric, General Motors, Dupont, are hauling it in while GI's are being hauled out.

WHY DIE FOR THEIR PIE ?

Better make it out — before you're pushing up daisies, too.

GO HOME — ALIVE !

South Vietnam N.F.L. — 2-1967

HIS WIDOW GRIEVES. FOR WHAT ?

For an American policy that sent her man, and continues to send more men, half-way round the world to wage a war that is loathed and condemned at home and abroad and that is bringing but huge profits to US war mongers.

The G.I. casualty toll in Vietnam is higher and higher.

NOW IT IS THE TIME TO STOP THIS « ILLEGAL, IMMORAL, UNJUST AND UNNECESSARY » JOHNSON'S WAR IN VIETNAM.

It is now clear to everyone that American troops do not belong in Vietnam. Vietnamese's internal affairs must be settled by the Vietnamese themselves.

TELL PRESIDENT JOHNSON:

« WE WANT TO BE BROUGHT HOME NOW — ALIVE ! »

« Withdraw US. Troops from South Vietnam and let the Vietnamese settle their own affairs themselves ! »

The South Vietnam Liberation Army

Appendix C (continued)

WHY?

Are you going 10,000 miles from home to live a helluva life and to die on this land?

This country is not yours.

We do no harm to your homeland.

Why have you come here to kill our men and women, and destroy our homeland?

We have fought for 20 years and we'll continue to fight until final victory — even if necessary for another 20 years — on our native soil, to defend our country our homes. This is only what your forefathers did about 200 years ago.

And you? What are you fighting for?

Don't let yourselves be fooled by such lies as «to defend freedom and democracy», «to help on request of the South

Vietnamese government»! The presence of hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops wantonly firing and killing in this little country, massive bombings destroying whole areas, the use of most atrocious weapons like napalm bombs, phosphorous shells, poison gas..., in themselves trample on the loftiest ideals of the American Revolution and besmear the honor of the American people. As for the so-called South-Vietnamese government, said Sen. W. Morse: «that government is just what we have rigged up».

Are you resigned to playing the same role as those nazi soldiers who blindly obeyed Hitler's orders and committed crimes, or will you rise up and act according to your conscience, against this immoral U S war, to be worthy of Washington, Lincoln, Jefferson...?

Do refuse to fight!

Demand your repatriation!

Get out of South Vietnam before it is too late!

Appendix C (continued)

YANKS COME HOME!

That's what they're crying in the States
They're right There's no reason for you
to be away from home.

Yanks, go home!

That's what they're should all over
South Vietnam. They're right. There's
no reason for you to be here where
nobody except a few crooks who betray
their own people want you.

Yanks, come home!

Yanks, go home!

In the States or in South Vietnam the
people calling to you only want to make
sure that no more American soldiers
die here. That's what they want?

Isn't it what you want?

No matter what you're told you're not
fighting for the American people or the
Vietnamese, why should you killed in
Johnson and McNamara's war? You
won't get rich from procurement orders
for war materials. And your families
and friends are missing you all time.


Yanks, come home! go home!

Support the present movement of the
American people to demand the ending
of Johnson's war in Vietnam and repa-
triation of American GIs.

The SVNLA

Appendix D. United States leaflets.

CHIÊU HỜI



Hội chánh viên được hoàn toàn tự do xây dựng cuộc sống mới hạnh phúc với người thân yêu của mình.

Trong mọi trường hợp người tình nguyện trở về ĐỀU ĐƯỢC ĐÓN TIẾP NÔNG HẬU theo chánh sách Chiêu Hời.

SP-2079

Bạn có thể dùng truyền đơn này như một giấy thông hành. Không có thông hành hay truyền đơn bạn vẫn được đón tiếp nông hậu.

Appendix D (continued)

Majority of people have been living under the protecting of GVN and have a happy life.

The country have been in process of development and situation was stabilized, so the citizen's life is more and more well-off.

The Government is always willing to welcome to whom decided return to GVN and will have a part in establishing national solidarity.

YOU CAN USE THIS LEAFLET AS A SAFE CONDUCT PASS TO RETURN TO THE GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH YOU DO NOT HAVE A LEAFLET OR A SAFE CONDUCT PASS YOU ARE STILL WARMLY- WELCOMED ALSO.

Appendix D (continued)

TOLƠI LÃI POTHẢO MRÃO-MRANG:**GÓYUT-GÓYÃO KIANG KHẮP !**

Có mõi sem duah tóidj đjru móng bing gih! Bing tở han gah Kódu
laih anũn bing tởhan VC sem jẻlan kiang sua mã lon ẻar bing gih.
Bing gómỏi kiang đjru bing gih hẻmẻo tẻidj rẻnuk-rẻnua laih anũn
đjru bing gih anẻng tẻidj pẻkẻ-pẻjẻng gẻiẻi lẻa ẻar gih pẻ.

Kiang pẻpủh-pẻduẻi hẻi khul bing kẻtủ-jua sua ẻar anũn. gómỏi
kiang tẻidj đjru móng bing gih, anũn jẻng bing gómỏi kiang sem thẻo
tẻidj mẻo-mẻang anẻi kẻdẻng bing VC đẻ laih anũn hẻm gẻu ba
hẻu khul tẻhan gẻu.

Tủi anũn gómỏi-rẻẻẻo kẻ bing gih bẻi lẻi pẻmẻo tẻẻah bẻh bing
Vẻ đẻr mẻi bẻẻah hẻget boh pẻẻh jẻ anẻi kẻdẻng bing tẻhan Yuan
bẻẻah Amerikai đẻ. Bẻi bing gih lẻi pẻthẻo anẻi bing VC pẻdẻp

lui phao-kẻtuang. Arang amra bẻi gẻnam bẻi
tẻidj mẻo-mẻang ba nao bẻẻah pẻam-pẻẻi kẻ
laih anũn hẻm hẻng gẻnam blah-wẻng gẻu. A.
TUT-RUẢH ĐỄ HẻGET PHAO-KẻTUANG, E
BOH MIN Ờ ! Bẻi bing gih rang anẻm bẻ
gih ờ.

Bing tẻhan Tac-Rẻngiẻo Amerikai mẻa mã đẻ
hẻt-hẻi anũn laih anũn bing gẻu amra blah
bing gih lẻi pẻthẻo hẻng gẻyut-gẻyẻo. aẻẻi
anẻi anẻi ờ, bẻi ma đẻm anẻi hẻmẻo boh pẻ
bing gih đjru gómỏi lẻi pẻthẻo tẻidj mẻo-mẻa
Rẻh ayat amra thẻẻ laih anũn tẻidj blah-wẻ
Lu tẻidj hẻgẻp mẻnủh laih anũn at tẻidj hẻ
mẻng tẻidj hẻi, tẻidj đẻi. ANẻM Đẻ KẢH
LẻI PẻTHẻO ĐỄ TẻLỎI MẻO-MẻANG Kẻ
BẻẻAH TẻHAN AMERIKAI TẻN MẻTẻ



Appendix D (continued)

Dear Friends,

We seek your assistance! The soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong seek to conquer your country. We want to help you remain free and to assist you in the development of your country.

In order to drive out these aggressors, we need your help in that we welcome any information of the location and movement of enemy soldiers. We ask that you report where they plant mines or explosive traps to the nearest GVN or US soldier. Report the location of enemy weapons.


A reward will be paid to you for any information which leads to the finding and destruction of these troops and dangerous items.

DO NOT GO NEAR OR TOUCH ANY WEAPONS OR EXPLOSIVES OR MINES! Try to avoid being seen by the enemy. Allied personnel will remove the dangerous explosives and will engage the enemy. Warn your friends to stay away from these areas especially where there are mines or explosives.

If you assist us with this information, the enemy will be defeated and this war will end sooner. Many lives including yours will be saved.

DO NOT DELAY! REPORT ALL INFORMATION TO THE US OR GVN IMMEDIATELY!

Appendix D (continued)



SAFE-CONDUCT PASS TO BE HONORED BY ALL VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ALLIED FORCES

MANG TÂM GIẤY THÔNG HÀNH
này về cộng tác với Chánh Phủ
Quốc Gia các bạn sẽ được :

- Đón tiếp tử tế
- Bảo đảm an ninh
- Đãi ngộ tương xứng

NGUYỄN VĂN THIỆU
Tổng Thống Việt Nam Cộng Hoà



TÀI GIẤY THÔNG HÀNH NÀY CÓ GIÁ TRỊ VỚI TẤT CẢ CƠ QUAN
QUẢN CHÍNH VIỆT-NAM CỘNG-HÒA VÀ LỰC-LƯỢNG ĐỒNG-MINH.

Appendix D (continued)

Use this Safe Conduct Pass and return to the National Government. You will be:

*Kindly welcomed

*Guaranteed security

*Well treated

Nguyen Van Thieu

Translation
United States Leaflet
Safe Conduct Pass

Appendix D (continued)



Rõ ràng đây một cuộc chiến tranh CHỐNG NHÂN DÂN

CHỦ TRƯỞNG BẦN CÙNG HÓA NHÂN DÂN ĐÔ THỊ

Người dân Đô Thành và các Tỉnh lỵ ngẹn ngào trước những cảnh tàn phá, giết chóc do Việt Cộng gây ra trong trận tấn công đợt hai của chúng vừa qua. Cộng Sản vẫn thường rêu rao là chúng tranh đấu cho nhân dân nhưng đây rõ ràng là một cuộc chiến đấu chống lại nhân dân, làm cho nhân dân kinh sợ, ghê tởm. Tóm lại họ dùng mọi thủ đoạn để thực hiện tham vọng thống trị của họ.

2637



**TRỞ VỀ CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC
ĐÓN TIẾP NÔNG HẬU THEO
CHÁNH SÁCH CHIÊU HỜI**




Appendix D (continued)

Picture caption: This is really a war against the people.

People in the Capital and Provinces were deeply disappointed witnessing the destruction and killing done by the VC in their second offensive. The Communists have often propagandized that they are fighting for the welfare of the people but alas, what happened was a war against the people and the people feared it, hated it. In fact, the Communists say it one way and act in another and always try to realize what they have planned even through the most wicked maneuvers.

Return. You will be welcomed Chieu Hoi.


Appendix D (continued)

ATTENTION

I REPRESENT THE VILLAGE OF _____
 WE HAVE SICKNESS IN THE VILLAGE AND NEED MEDICAL
 ASSISTANCE. PLEASE TAKE ME TO THE _____
 CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER.

XIN-LƯU-Ý

TÔI THAY MẶT CHO DÂN LÃNG _____
 LÃNG TÔI CÓ NHIỀU NGƯỜI ĐAU ỐM (ĐỆNH)-VÀ RẤT CẦN ĐẾN
 SỰ SẴN SÓC VỀ Y-TẾ.
 XIN LÃM ƠN DẪN TÔI ĐẾN _____
 SỞ-QUAN DÂN-SỰ-VỤ.



Appendix D (continued)

CHÍNH PHỦ CAM KẾT MỖI HỘI CHÁNH VIÊN SẼ ĐƯỢC:

- ① Đối xử đúng đắn
- ② Hướng quyền công dân
- ③ Sản sóc thuốc men tại Trung tâm Chiêu hồi
- ④ Đoàn tụ với gia đình
- ⑤ 30\$ tiền ăn cho mỗi hội chánh viên, vợ hội chánh viên và con lớn. Con nhỏ của hội chánh viên được 15\$ mỗi ngày
- ⑥ Hằng tháng 200\$ tiền tiêu vặt, 100\$ cho mỗi người trong gia đình cư trú tại Trung tâm Chiêu Hồi
- ⑦ Tiền thưởng về vũ khí mang về (từ 500\$ đến 75.000\$)
- ⑧ Hai bộ quần áo mới hoặc tiền mặt 1000\$
- ⑨ Tiền hoàn hương cho gia đình 1000\$
- ⑩ Giúp đỡ kiếm công ăn việc làm
- ⑪ Những hội chánh viên định cư trong những ấp chiêu hồi sẽ được cấp xi-măng, mái và 10.000\$ tiền mặt để xây nhà, 2000\$ để sắm các vật dụng trong nhà và sáu tháng gạo.



Thiếu Tướng
NGUYỄN-BẢO-TRỊ

United States Leaflet
Chieu Hoi Information Leaflet

Appendix D (continued)

THE GOVERNMENT HAS PROMISED TO EVERY RETURNEE:

1. Good treatment
2. To enjoy citizenship
3. Medical treatment in the Chieu Hoi Center
4. Reunion with family
5. 30\$VN daily food, for each returnee, his wife and older children, 15\$VN for younger children
6. 200\$VN for monthly pocket-money
7. Reward for weapons, from 500\$VN to 75,000\$VN
8. 2 suits of new clothing or 1,000\$VN for cash
9. Help to find a good job
10. 1,000\$VN per family for resettlement
11. Those who settle in the Chieu Hoi hamlet will receive 10,000\$VN to build a new house, plus free cement, and roofing, 2,000\$VN to buy furniture, and six months rice subsistence.

GENERAL INFORMATION OF CHIEU HOI

MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN BAO TRI

Translation
United States Leaflet
Chieu Hoi Information Leaflet

Appendix D (continued)

FIRST LIGHT

SOUTH VIETNAM WINNING BATTLE OF EDUCATION

Stars and Stripes

23 November 1968

In the field of education, dramatic gains have been made despite the war, according to statistics reported at a recent meeting of Vietnamese and American educators at Ohio University. The university has been providing educational assistance in South Vietnam since 1962.

Dr. D. P. Jones, Acting Chief of the Educational Division for Vietnam of the U.S. Agency of International Development, summarized the situation:

Whereas only 450,000 elementary youngsters were in school in 1956, there are two million today. (South Vietnam has a population of 16.5 million.)

Since 1962, when substantial government support of education got underway, over 10,000 classrooms have been built.

In the same five years, 12,000 new teachers have been given sufficient training to enable them to teach in elementary schools. Most of them have gone into hamlets that previously had no public educational facilities.

Along with the crash teacher training program, five normal colleges have been developed since 1963 to give two years of teacher training beyond high school. These colleges graduated 1,200 teachers this year, will graduate 1,500 in 1969 and 2,000 in 1970.

A Vietnamese publishing effort has produced 14 million paperback textbooks, written for Vietnamese children in Vietnamese. Before this, no textbooks were available.

At the present rate of providing schools and teachers, 85% of South Vietnam's children will be in elementary schools by 1970. In 1963, only 17% attended school.

Translation
United States Leaflet
Portion of Vietnamese Language Newsheet

Appendix E. Sample tape recorded message--appeal for ralliers (Chieu Hoi Program)--broadcast from airborne loudspeakers by 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) PSYOP personnel.

"Attention members of V-21 Regiment! You cannot win! You were severely beaten when you attacked the ARVN base camp, located west of the Saigon River in Tay Ninh Province. You suffered more than 289 casualties while the ARVN suffered small losses. You fought well, but against a better and stronger force you didn't have a chance. Now many of you are wounded and dying. Do you want to be buried in an unmarked grave? You have two choices: die where you are or rally to the GVN. If you rally you will be given medicine and be treated well. Rally now. Hide your weapon and rally during daylight hours to any ARVN or Allied soldier or GVN official."

Appendix F. Message from the Commander, United States
 Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, to U.S.
 Servicemen in Vietnam

REMEMBER —

CHIEU HOI PAYS DIVIDENDS



UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER

The Chieu Hoi Program pays dividends to you, the fighting man. It provides intelligence, and it saves lives. It is my desire that every serviceman in Vietnam assist this program whenever he can. Your support of this program will help materially in the defeat of the enemy on the battlefield.

Creighton W. Abrams
 CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS
 General, United States Army
 Commanding

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