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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT As the most serious cyber-attack threats rapidly shift from untargeted toward increasingly targeted methods, it is becoming correspondingly more crucial for organizations to protect the identity and location-privacy of their members against malicious tracking and surveillance. We propose to develop PriFi, an anti-tracking and location-private network access mechanism to protect members of an organization both while on-site (via privacy-protected WiFi networking) and while off-site (via privacy-protected Virtual Private Networking or VPN).					
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


Figure 3: What We Require: Open Warrant-Based Processes for Lawful Electronic Surveillance, Creating a “Privacy Firewall”

Since beginning the PriFi project, we have expanded this work to include an investigation of *contact chaining*, which is also a standard tool of law enforcement and intelligence. The goal is to use the topology of a communication graph (*e.g.*, a phone-call graph, email graph, or social network) to identify associates (or “contacts”) of lawfully targeted users. Agencies can then investigate those associates to determine whether they deserve further attention. It is useful to consider both direct contacts, *i.e.*, users who are neighbors in the communication graph, and extended contacts, *i.e.*, users who are at distance k in the communication graph, for an appropriate constant k . Without mechanisms to limit an investigation’s scope, contact chaining in a mass-communication network can sweep in a huge number of untargeted users.

We present an accountable contact-chaining protocol that bounds the scope of the search, uses encryption to protect untargeted users, and is efficient, with time and communication complexity linear in the size of the output. Experiments show that a three-hop, privacy-preserving graph traversal producing 27,000 ciphertexts can be done in under two minutes.

For a more detailed account, please refer to [10].

5.0 CONCLUSIONS

PriFi is a very promising approach to low-latency, tracking-resistant, local-area networking and could be a critical component of a next-generation communications infrastructure that supports both personal privacy and national security. Preliminary experiments indicate that its performance is good enough to be used in real-life applications, with reasonably high throughput. PriFi’s novel client/relay/server architecture and demanding use of DC-nets are interesting system features.

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J. Weber. **Analysis of Scheduling Algorithms for PriFi.** Thesis: Master in Communication Systems, EPFL, 2017.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

BFT	Byzantine Fault Tolerance
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DC-nets	Dining-Cryptographers Networks
EPFL	Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
UT	University of Texas
VPN	Virtual Private Network