

General of the Army George C. Marshall's Strategic Leadership

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

General of the Army George C. Marshall's Strategic Leadership, by MAJ Melanie S. Kirchhoff, USAR, 51 pages.

Amidst tumultuous international politicking and world war, General of the Army George C. Marshall organized and led Allied forces to victory in World War II. Soldiers, statesmen, and world leaders respected Marshall for his strength of character, political savvy, and strategic prowess. As the Army leans forward into the 21st century in a complex global community, Marshall's strategic leadership still sets a high bar. His personality traits, cognitive approach to leadership, self-development, and achievements validate current doctrine and theories on strategic leadership. Specifically, this monograph examines his words and actions leading up to and through World War II as compared to current Army research on strategic metacompetencies, current Army leadership doctrine, and organizational psychology leadership theories.

Contents

Acknowledgement.....	v
Acronyms	vi
Introduction	1
Army Literature.....	14
Organizational Psychology Leadership Constructs.....	21
Marshall's Strategic Leadership.....	28
Conclusion.....	39
Bibliography.....	43

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Acronyms

ABDA	Australian-British-Dutch-American Command
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
CCC	Civilian Conservation Corps
CCS	Combined Chiefs of Staff
FM	Field Manual
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

Introduction

...what we must do is survey all those gifts of mind and temperament that in combination bear on military activity, taken together constitute the essence of military genius.

—Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

General of the Army George C. Marshall is one of the most highly acclaimed General Officers in the last 100 years. His strategic leadership during World War II (WWII) was unmatched. As his strategic leadership ability is unquestioned, and his military career demonstrated an ability to meet political and military objectives, a comparison of current strategic leadership theories with the personality, characteristics, and leadership approach of Marshall demonstrates that those theories remain relevant, but that one hundred percent consistency is not necessary for excellent strategic leadership to manifest itself. This exploration of Marshall as a strategic leader during WWII will be accomplished through an examination of his thoughts, writings, and actions using primary and secondary sources. This will provide insight into his personality, characteristics, and leadership when compared with current Army publications and doctrine as well as organizational studies of strategic leadership.

Marshall has been the recipient of near universal acclaim. In the words of Mark A. Stoler, author of *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century*, Marshall's "character and accomplishments [as a soldier and statesman] were so exceptional that he is placed in the company only of George Washington when historical parallels and superlatives are used."¹ Colonel Charles Brower from the US Military Academy described him as the "most esteemed 20th century military figure,"² and Lance Morrow rhapsodized that Marshall "saved world democracy

¹ Mark A. Stoler, *George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster Macmillan, 1989), ix.

² Colonel Charles F. Brower, "George C. Marshall: a Study in Character," The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1999, accessed April 6, 2017, <http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/essays-interviews/george-c-marshall-study-character/>.

at the moment of its greatest danger.”³ Unsurpassed leadership qualities, dedication to duty, irrefutable honor, admirable self-control, quiet ambition, and deep humility defined Marshall’s character and equipped him for success at the highest levels of Army command.⁴ But while those qualities are admirable and required for successful strategic leaders, they are not enough to guarantee success in the world of warfare and politics. Marshall demonstrated a number of more nebulous qualities such as the ability to navigate relationships with world powers and civilian authorities. He had the ability to visualize and influence military success that started with politics and soldier training, battlefield resourcing, and ended with rebuilding the destroyed Axis nations. Few other military leaders in US history accomplished so much.⁵ If Marshall is the epitome of excellent military leadership at the highest strategic level, then US Army doctrine should reflect the desirable characteristics, attributes, and behaviors he demonstrated during his management of US forces and multinational coalitions. Additionally, those same qualities should be apparent in current organizational studies of strategic leadership.

US Army leaders have always studied officership and generalship. George Washington, for instance, studied the likes of Frederick the Great.⁶ However, it was not until 1948 that the Army addressed leadership as an individual concept separate from tactical proficiency in leading small units. In 1948, the Army first developed eleven principles of leadership and published them as doctrine in 1951. This was the first appearance of the Army guidance on leadership through the “Be, Know, Do” paradigm. Essentially, leader characteristics, competencies, and activities were

³ Lance Morrow, “George C. Marshall: The Last Great American?” *Smithsonian Magazine* (August 1997), accessed April 6, 2017, http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2014/04/Last_Great_American.pdf. Morrow is a prolific essay and biographical writer. He has written over 50 essays and biographical profiles on war, presidential leadership, and other politically controversial topics.

⁴ Stoler, ix, 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-130.

⁶ J. L. Bell, “Washington’s Five Books” *Journal of the American Revolution* (December 2013), accessed November 6, 2016, <https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/12/washingtons-five-books/>.

organized into the categories of “Be, Know, Do.” For example, “be a person of strong... character” and “be an example of individual values.” The “Know” category included “know yourself” and “know your job.” The “Do” portion gave instructions to “provide” purpose, direction, and guidance.⁷ This doctrine largely focused on tactical leadership, did not address strategic leadership specifically, and did not develop strategic leadership as a concept. By the 1980s, US Army doctrine began to delineate between junior and senior levels of leadership. Several studies identified three possible gaps in senior leader competencies. As Lieutenant Colonel Keith Purvis put it, “senior leaders did not care about creating combat focused command climates, were unable to perform at the executive level required as senior leaders, or did not have the necessary skills to maintain an organizational climate focused on excellence.”⁸ Eventually, this contributed to the creation of doctrine related to operational and executive levels of leadership with a greater emphasis on more complex and indirect leadership.⁹ Additional studies in the 1980s and 1990s led to an update of *FM 22-100: Army Leadership* in 1999 that addressed strategic leadership for the first time as its own subject. This differentiation is critical to understanding Marshall as a strategic leader in today’s nomenclature.

By 2006, leadership doctrine included three levels of leadership: direct (tactical), operational, and strategic. The related Army FM 6-22: *Army Leadership* and the Army Regulation 600-100: *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile*, from 2006 and 2007 respectively, defined leadership, roles, requirements, development, and methods for success at each level.¹⁰ The

⁷ Field Manual 22-100, *Military Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1983), 22-51.

⁸ J. Keith Purvis, “Four Decades and Five Manuals: U.S. Strategic Leadership Doctrine, 1983-2011” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2011), 10. Lieutenant Colonel Purvis gleaned this understanding of the Army conclusions from Walter F. Ulmer’s “The Army’s New Senior Leadership Doctrine,” a 1987 article in *Parameters*.

⁹ Some of the doctrine that addressed this included additions to FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*; FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*; and Army Pamphlet 600-80, *Executive Leadership*. The latter two were published in 1987.

¹⁰ Purvis, 35.

most current doctrine on Army leadership includes the Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22: *Army Leadership* and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22: *Army Leadership*.

These two manuals carried the following themes from previous doctrine:

- Core leader competencies and attributes cover the full range of leader responsibilities
- Relationship to mission command and links to adaptability
- Techniques to improve interpersonal skills through influence
- Counseling, coaching, and mentorship are vital to leader development
- Levels of leadership (direct, organizational, strategic)
- Leader roles

Additionally, they expanded this information on strategic leadership:

- Balancing strategic risk
- Delegation, empowerment, and control
- Strategic judgment and time horizons
- Extending influence to the American people
- Stewardship and leader development¹¹

However, Chapter 11 from ADRP 6-22 describes how strategic leadership differs from the other levels. While the attributes and competencies are the same for all leadership levels, the depth and execution of those characteristics expand at the strategic level. These attributes include character, presence, and intellect. The competencies include leading, developing, and achieving.¹² Each of these attributes and competencies will be used as a lens to evaluate Marshall's strategic leadership.

In addition to Army doctrine, organizational psychology theory also offers insight into successful strategic leaders. As in military leadership, leaders at higher levels in non-military

¹¹ Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011); Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011).

¹² Ibid.

organizations must possess the leadership qualities of lower level leadership as well as those that encourage success at higher echelons. Unfortunately, modern psychology does not differentiate the two in terms similar to the military concepts of tactical and strategic level leadership. However, higher levels of leadership are often described with terms such as “executive” or “organizational leadership” in psychological and business studies.

Basic leadership from a psychological perspective involves psychological frameworks such as the inherent personality of leaders and the cognitive functioning of successful leaders. Five common personality factors coalesce around what is known as “The Big Five.” The five factors include extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness (to experience), and neuroticism. Each factor ranges on a scale of high to low. The name of the factor embodies the high range. For example, extraversion is “an energetic approach toward the social and material world and includes traits such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality.”¹³ Another scholar points out that extraversion levels relate to individuals who seek out social events and interaction, “busy-ness” levels, ambition (albeit individually defined goals), and feelings that life is full of joy and happiness.¹⁴ Not surprisingly, some studies demonstrate that high levels of extraversion, when coupled with other traits, relate to leader success or to identifying future leaders.¹⁵

These personality trait based leadership studies provide a foundation for the leadership characteristics of successful leaders. However, as levels of leadership increase, more cognitive functions become critical to success. These include such activities as reflection, proactive

¹³ John P. Oliver, Richard W. Robins, and Lawrence A. Pervin, eds., *Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research*, 3rd ed. (New York: The Guilford Press, 2010), 114-158.

¹⁴ Daniel Nettle, *Personality: What Makes You the Way You Are* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 31.

¹⁵ Luke McCormack and David Mellor, “The Role of Personality in Leadership: An Application of the Five-Factor Model in the Australian Military,” *Military Psychology* 14, no. 3 (2002): 179-197.

collaboration, and enabling others to excel.¹⁶ Recognizing the complexity and global nature of today's corporate environment, Dr. Mary Uhl-Bien, a professor at Texas Christian University, has developed a framework describing the interactive environment in which this reflection, proactive collaboration, and enabling must take place. A successful strategic leader must manage those not only for himself but for his organization at large.

This monograph will evaluate Marshall's strategic leadership through the lens of military history, current military leadership doctrine, and organizational psychology. The first section will survey Marshall's military career, experiences, and specifically WWII actions and success, highlighting his reputation as a strategic leader. The bulk of the history will come from the well-known biographies by Mark Stoler and Forrest Pogue. However, examples of strategic leadership will be gleaned from other primary sources as well. The second section will cover current Army doctrine and literature on strategic leadership. The third section will describe a small selection of current Organizational Psychology theories and constructs related to strategic leadership, including personality theories (Five Factor Model) and cognitive theories (Uhl-Bien's Complexity Leadership Theory). The fourth section will use Army doctrine and organizational psychology theories as a lens to evaluate George C. Marshall's strategic leadership. For example, the Five Factor Model generally supports high levels of extraversion and conscientiousness and low levels of neuroticism in successful strategic leaders. Each of these traits will be explored as they relate to Marshall by one or more common observable behaviors or statements from history. The same will be done for all Army strategic leader traits and other psychological concepts addressed in sections two and three. In most areas, Marshall appears to meet what the Army and Organizational Psychologists posit about successful strategic and executive leadership traits.

¹⁶ Mary D. Looman, "Reflective Leadership: Strategic Planning from the Heart and Soul," *Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research* 55 (2003): 215-221.

George C. Marshall: History and Success

Prior to WWII, Marshall served in a range of staff positions and fewer command positions. However, he displayed diligence, hard work, and dedication at every turn. His experiences, good and bad, shaped the man who became the Chief of Staff of the Army during WWII.

As his grades and physical fitness were quite average in high school, Marshall despaired of getting accepted to the US Military Academy at West Point, so he applied to the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) with the hope of obtaining one of the few active duty commissions available outside of West Point. He obtained the commission only through the staunch support of the VMI commandant, his father's tireless networking in Washington, and high marks in "moral character and antecedents."¹⁷ In May 1902, he reported to the Philippines, where he commanded a company as a Second Lieutenant. He received promotion to Captain in October 1916, and served twice as an aide de camp for Major Generals Hunter Liggett and James Franklin Bell. The slow promotion to captain had more to do with the size of the officer corps than Marshall's performance.¹⁸ Due to his superiors' faith in him and recognition of his abilities, he held several positions temporarily above his rank in those years.¹⁹ During World War I (WWI), he was instrumental in preparing US forces for the deployment to France under the auspices of his position as aide de camp, first to Major General Bell and then to General John Pershing. Unfortunately, the slow Army promotion system prevented the full use of Marshall's abilities and intellect in spite of his full recognition from Bell and Pershing as a highly competent strategic planner. General Pershing respected Marshall even to the point of allowing him to criticize Pershing's decisions as the American Expeditionary Force Commander.²⁰ In 1919, General

¹⁷ Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General, 1880-1939* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 66. Hereafter referred to as *Education of a General*.

¹⁸ Stoler, 43. General Pershing was another primary example of the difficulty of being promoted in the Army during this time and in the years prior to this time. He was forty-one years old at the time of his promotion to captain.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15-48.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 43.

Pershing recommended him for promotion to Brigadier General, but Congress froze promotions, and Marshall reverted back to his permanent rank of Major.²¹

At the commencement of WWI in 1917, Marshall was working for Major General Bell. Under Bell, he organized and supplied the newly conscripted forces being trained for duty in Europe. Marshall himself called this his most “strenuous, hectic and laborious...experience” during the war.²² After orchestrating the mobilization effort for the Eastern Department of the Army, Marshall transferred to a staff position at the 1st Division under Major General William Sibert (and later Major General Robert Lee Bullard) and, as a 36-year-old Captain, was on the first convoy of US troops that arrived in France. The real purpose behind sending the division was not immediate combat troop augmentation to the Allies, since the division would not be combat ready for months. Rather, it bolstered the Allies’ resolve and morale through a show of solidarity and support. Marshall filled the Chief of Operations position in spite of his low rank, and the Division went to Lorraine for training. Considering his excellence at previous training and preparation positions, Pershing assigned him to set up training areas and support for an additional three divisions arriving shortly thereafter. In July 1917, he returned to the 1st Infantry Division to plan and implement their detailed training for deployment to the front lines. In January 1918, they moved into place and, in May, executed a successful attack on German forces in Cantigny. In addition to his critical role in planning the Cantigny attack, Marshall became Major General Bullard’s “virtual executive” when the latter fell ill during operations. Marshall wore the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, and Bullard recommended him for permanent promotion, but lack of command time prevented the promotion.²³ Bullard further thwarted Marshall’s desire for command by assessing Marshall’s ability to teach and practice staff work as “unequal[ed] in the Army today.” In an effort to utilize those skills at the highest levels, Bullard and

²¹ Stoler, 42.

²² George C. Marshall, *Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 1917-1918* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 1-2.

²³ Stoler, 35-39.

Pershing sent Marshall to Pershing's Army headquarters (GHQ) at Chaumont instead of awarding him a command.²⁴

At GHQ, Marshall worked for Colonel Fox Conner, the "brains of AEF" (American Expeditionary Forces).²⁵ Marshall and Conner were the core planners for the two key offensives of the war: Saint Miheil and Meuse-Argonne. Not only were these large, complicated combined arms actions, they had to be planned simultaneously and executed according to overlapping timelines with shifting forces. The level of secrecy required close coordination with French forces, and monumental logistical challenges heightened the complexity considerably. Since the United States held more than twenty five percent of the Allied line, the Americans did the heavy lifting during the Meuse-Argonne offensive and the operation's success hastened the end of the war on 11 November with the armistice agreement.²⁶

Due to his reputation and connections, Marshall was able to choose his duty assignments after Pershing retired. In 1924, he moved to China and took the position of executive officer for the Fifteenth Regiment in Peking. The regiment of 1,000 soldiers was responsible for maintaining stability in Peking and Tientsin amidst the political and military struggles among several warlords. At one point, a clash among three of the warlords at Tientsin threatened the city and all of its foreign interests. Two of the warlords defeated the third, and armed and hostile forces in and around the city numbered around 100,000 fighting Chinese men. Marshall kept the violence contained through diplomacy rather than firepower and received commendation for "unusual tact, patience, and

²⁴ Larry I. Bland, ed. *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: The Soldierly Spirit December 1880-June 1939* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 1:140-141. Hereafter referred to as *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*.

²⁵ Stoler, 39.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

foresight.”²⁷ After his stint in China, Marshall taught at the War College in Washington, DC for some time and then took the position of Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School at Ft. Benning, Georgia. According to Stoler, he had full reign over the curriculum and training methods, and he revolutionized the way that the Army commanded infantry units and taught tactics. He emphasized simplicity, originality, and improvisation and “banned written lectures, [and] provided either poor maps or no maps” for the student problem sets in order to reproduce the fog and confusion of a real battlefield. He wanted students to be thoughtful, original, and expect the unexpected.²⁸ As Stoler explains,

The result was the ‘spirit of Benning,’ and the virtual creation of the American World War II military character and high command. Simplicity, innovativeness, and mobility would be the hallmarks of the US Army of 1941-45, and the leadership of that army would consist overwhelmingly of “Marshall’s men” from Fort Benning. In all, 200 future generals passed through the school during his years there. 150 as students and 50 as instructors. The latter category, which included names such as Joseph Stilwell and Omar Bradley, Marshall labeled ‘the most brilliant, interesting and thoroughly competent collection of men I have ever been associated with.’²⁹

Before the onset of WWII, Marshall was promoted to colonel and commanded the Eighth Infantry Regiment. His next assignment was a senior instructor position with the “troubled” Illinois National Guard in Chicago. It was an assignment deemed “critical” due to the civilian unrest there, and General Douglas MacArthur personally recommended Marshall for the job, arguing that Marshall had “no superior among infantry colonels.”³⁰ This appeared to Marshall to be a dead-end job, but in part due to his outstanding performance there, he finally received a promotion to Brigadier General in 1936, at the age of 56. Additionally, he proved himself adept at working closely with civic organizations and community leaders. As part of the promotion, Marshall commanded the Fifth

²⁷ Bland, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 1:263-264, 270; Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Education of a General*, 66; Jeffrey S. Tipton “George C. Marshall: The Essential Strategic Leader” (Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, March 30, 2007), 7-8.

²⁸ Stoler, 55-56; Pogue, 66.

²⁹ Stoler, 55-56.

³⁰ Bland, *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 1:398-399; Stoler, 59.

Brigade, 3rd Division in Oregon. Additionally, he supervised the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) elements in his area. The CCC was a federal agency that employed hundreds of thousands of men during the Great Depression to perform conservation tasks in rural areas.³¹

In 1938, Marshall moved to the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Unbeknownst to him, several high-ranking individuals in the War Department, including Deputy Chief of Staff General Stanley D. Embick, planned Marshall's move in order to pave the way to the highest position in the Army: Chief of Staff of the Army.³² At the same time, US political and military leadership watched unfolding European and Asian events with alarm. By September 1939, Marshall had been promoted to Major General and temporarily to a four-star general. On 1 September 1939, he was sworn in as the fifteenth Chief of Staff of the Army. His first day in office coincided with Hitler's advance into Poland, setting the stage for the difficult years to come.³³

With a world war looming, Marshall had his work cut out for him. During the interwar period, Congress had authorized a regular army of only 280,000 men, but the Department of Defense had underfilled the ranks to the tune of 130,000 to 190,000 personnel. Domestic politics of non-intervention and isolationism precluded Marshall from building up the armed forces during his first year as Chief of Staff, but he clearly saw the need to be prepared for additional measures. He consciously orchestrated slow, methodical changes to many antiquated policies and procedures to avoid stirring up political opposition concerning foreign interventions in Europe.³⁴ He approached Congress not with requests for true national defense requirements, but with limited requests to fulfill previously authorized billets and minimum equipment requirements in the case of emergency.³⁵ It

³¹ Stoler, 61.

³² Ibid., 62.

³³ Stoler, 68; Forrest Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942* (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 2.

³⁴ Stoler, 69; Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 5-8.

³⁵ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 10, 16-17.

would not be until the attack on Pearl Harbor that Congress would abandon its isolationism and grant Marshall the badly needed funds and authorizations to fully modernize and equip the Army. In the interim, he made some improvements in troop levels and organizational administration through expert handling of civil-military relations and internal war department politics.³⁶ In fact, shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress had authorized appropriations, a draft, and mobilization of the National Guard equivalent to a standing army of 800,000 men by the end of 1941, just as Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Germany declared war on the United States.³⁷

Although a full analysis of the political and military objectives of WWII are beyond the scope of this monograph, it is critical to understand Marshall's pivotal position in certain areas. He emphasized a unified approach at an international level that had never been before attempted, and he seamlessly managed both the military strategic organizations and domestic and international political requirements. Marshall persuaded the Navy leadership, the US President, and British leadership of the necessity of unified command, and British General Sir Archibald Wavell received command of all Allied forces under the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA) command. In order to foster unified strategic direction, the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) was also formed at Marshall's behest. The armies, navies, and air chiefs of staff of Britain and the United States comprised the CCS for the purpose of planning combined global strategy. They reported directly to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Additionally, the need to better match the British military and advisory leadership structure led to the creation of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).³⁸

Despite the creation of combined and joint organizations at the strategic level, Marshall fought two more years for a truly unified and coordinated war strategy. Finally, in the fall of 1943, his brainchild – nicknamed “Marshall's Memorandum” but formally titled “Operations in Western

³⁶ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 19-34.

³⁷ Stoler, 76.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 91-92.

Europe”— won favor with Allied leaders with a planned launch date of May of 1944. Named “Operation Overlord,” the plan consisted of a cross-channel attack. Roosevelt, Churchill and most other Allied leaders assumed that Marshall would lead the operation.³⁹ However, Marshall had become so “successful and important... in inter-service, civil-military, and Allied coordination that some began to question whether he could transfer to the Overlord command without disastrous consequences for the United States and Allied war effort.”⁴⁰ In the end, Roosevelt selected Dwight D. Eisenhower to lead Operation Overlord because he believed Marshall was too valuable to leave Washington.⁴¹

In its 3 January 1944 edition, *Time* magazine summed up Marshall’s character and success. The magazine declared Marshall “Man of the Year,” giving voice to the common sentiment that Marshall’s achievements were nothing short of monumental. Marshall “created, equipped, and trained the largest army in US history, refused to use this force too early or improperly, recognized the importance of air power, established unity of command, and won adoption of a unified strategy. He had also established an ‘unparalleled’ position with Churchill, Roosevelt, and his CCS colleagues, as well as an extraordinary relationship with the public and Congress.”⁴² Men such as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Prime Minister Churchill referred to Marshall as “the finest soldier ever known” and “the noblest Roman of them all” and “organizer of victory.”⁴³ His immense impact on the ability of the United States to go from a standing army of 250,000 to 8,300,000 men that was effectively deployed in 8 theatres of war and brought the Allied powers from the brink of disaster to

³⁹ Stoler, 93-105.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 108.

⁴² Stoler, 129-130; *Time Magazine*, “U.S. at War: The General,” 43, no. 1 (January 3, 1944), accessed April 6, 2017, <http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,885259,00.html>.

⁴³ Stoler, 129-130; Henry L. Stimson, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 664; Charles M.W. Moran, *Churchill: Taken from the Diaries of Lord Moran: The Struggle for Survival, 1940-1965* (Atlanta, GA: Cherokee Publishing Company, 1976), 292.

military victory over the Axis powers seemed almost superhuman. He was undoubtedly one of the most competent strategic leaders in the history of the United States Army.

Army Literature

As noted earlier, Army leadership doctrine did not include specific guidelines for strategic leadership until the late 1980s publications of FM 22-103 *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels* and Army Pamphlet 600-80 *Executive Leadership*.⁴⁴ However, in 2003, the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked the Strategic Studies Institute to “identify strategic leader skill sets for officers required in the post-September 11th environment.”⁴⁵ Dr. Leonard Wong and a team of coauthors summarized several new ideas about successful strategic and executive leadership in the resulting report. They reviewed academic and military literature for “knowledge, skills, and abilities needed by strategic leaders of the future.”⁴⁶ In addition to reviewing the current literature, they synthesized the lengthy lists of competencies and derived six “metacompetencies” that would be useful for assessment and training purposes. The metacompetencies included identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. Each of the metacompetencies encompasses an assortment of related characteristics, skills, and behaviors. The labels themselves do not transmit the full meanings of each category and should not be considered “complete” without a good understanding of the underlying concepts.⁴⁷

“Identity,” according to Wong et al., is “the ability to gather self-feedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.”⁴⁸ Identity augments and expands

⁴⁴ Purvis, 9.

⁴⁵ Leonard Wong, Stephen Gerras, William Kidd, Robert Pricone, and Richard Swengros, *Strategic Leadership Competencies* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), iii.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, iii.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁸ Jon P. Briscoe and Douglas T. Hall, “Grooming and Picking Leaders Using Competency Frameworks: Do They Work? An Alternative Approach and New Guidelines for Practice,” *Organizational Dynamics* 28, no. 2 (Autumn 1999): 48-49.

on the previously discussed characteristic of “self-awareness.” Identity incorporates the concept of self-awareness as the ability to understand and assess one’s own strengths and weaknesses as they pertain to military operations and make adjustments for personal weaknesses in order to achieve objectives. However, at the strategic level, it is necessary to be capable of not only self-awareness, but also understand one’s identity as an officer, one’s personal values, and the values of the Army. Additionally, one must gain an identity from the accomplishments of subordinates rather than personal feats.⁴⁹

“Mental agility” builds on the concept of adaptability from previous literature. Adaptability is the ability to respond to changes in the environment through identification of new events or information, gaps in capability or knowledge, appropriate learning processes, and effective responses to the changes that bring about successful solutions to a given problem set. At the strategic level, “mental agility” additionally implies tackling complex problem sets with constantly emerging events or effects rather than linear problems with traditional solutions. This requires the ability to gather and process large amounts of information and employ sound and timely judgement about what is relevant. In addition, the concept embodies the ability to understand singular or multiple causes and envision possible courses of action to achieve successful results. Strategic leaders who demonstrate mental agility can also synthesize information, prioritize relevance, and explain events, problems, or systems to others in relatively simple and meaningful prose. Lastly, they know how to incorporate the massive influx of information and resulting synthesis into their organizational processes to ensure their visions are understood and actioned.⁵⁰

“Cross-cultural savvy” refers to not only the ability to work effectively with foreign militaries, but also the capability to understand and work with the full range of diversity that exists in interorganizational, interagency, international, and joint entities. Today’s strategic leader needs to be

⁴⁹ Wong et al., 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 6-7.

able to understand and account for political, geographical, societal, religious, and other differences across the globe. He does not “go native,” but can integrate his nationalistic and Army perspectives effectively when working with organizations with other values or norms.⁵¹

“Interpersonal maturity” goes beyond the interpersonal skills required at lower levels of leadership. Moving beyond face-to-face relationships, strategic leaders must be able to lead through influence in situations where they have no direct authority. In addition, they must be in the business of empowering subordinates and interested parties. Listening and facilitating collaboration underpin the empowering capability. Listening and collaboration can lead to consensus building and effective negotiation within and without the organization. Also related to “interpersonal maturity” is the ability to mold an organization’s culture through effective change management that allows adaptation to emerging trends and systems.⁵²

“World class warrior” is easy to understand. This metacompetency corresponds to a leader’s in-depth understanding of the tactical and operational use of force. However, it also means that he can conceptualize theater, campaign, joint, interagency, and even multinational strategies. It means that he understands how to integrate all elements of national power to achieve strategic objectives. It is imperative that the “world class warrior” is knowledgeable in military history and savvy in the ways history fundamentally influences culture, decisions, and warfare.⁵³

“Professional astuteness” is less intuitive than “world class warrior.” It refers to the leader’s understanding of the Army as a profession and his role not as a member or follower only, but as a leader and developer of the profession. These leaders accomplish the mission and may be personally ambitious, but they put the goals and needs of the institution before their own, setting the institution

⁵¹ Wong et al., 7.

⁵² Ibid., 9.

⁵³ Ibid.

up for long term success. This may require political savvy, the ability to compromise, and serving many constituencies at the same time.⁵⁴

Interestingly, ADRP 6-22, published in 2012, did not use the aforementioned definitions and categories. Instead, the manual based its discussion of leadership attributes and competencies at all levels of the same basic qualities but expounded on how those qualities manifest themselves differently at the strategic level. The basic attributes are character, presence, and intellect. The basic competencies include leads, develops, and achieves. In general, the manual addresses strategic leadership in three ways: 1) the definition of strategic leadership (versus direct or organizational leadership), 2) general guidance on how strategic leaders operate differently from other levels, and 3) how the competencies manifest at the strategic level (attributes are assumed to be the same throughout).⁵⁵

Strategic leadership differs from tactical leadership in that it involves all of the following: the dynamics of problem sets, the complexity and diversity of organizations that influence strategic actions, making decisions and allocating resources, and management of team/staff talent. The complexity of problem sets includes systems that affect the Army from the outside environment to include joint, combined, civilian, international, political, and other organizations. Also, strategic leaders consider tasks associated with congressional hearings, budget constraints, and new technology and organizational systems. As far as decision making, strategic leaders must be able to make decisions on less than complete information and generate support and resources for those decisions. Nevertheless, strategic leaders must be able to manage larger ranges of resources, people, and geopolitical impact than those of other level leaders. Lastly, they are “catalysts for change and

⁵⁴ Wong et al., 10.

⁵⁵ ADRP 6-22.

transformation.”⁵⁶ They focus on the long-term success and health of the organization and have excellent skills in developing their staff and subordinates to do the same.⁵⁷

According to ADRP 6-22, strategic leaders demonstrate several related attributes and skills. They manage political-military relationships and negotiations, as well as civil-military relationships. These include maneuvering the complex systems within and outside of the US government. Additionally, ADRP 6-22 annotates the importance of candor with civil-military authorities and emphasizes the significance of influence of those outside the direct chain of command. Strategic leaders are “high-level thinkers, accomplished warfighters, and geopolitical military experts.”⁵⁸ They understand the current situation, envision the future, and communicate that vision effectively to others. They spearhead necessary change in administration and institutional culture. ADRP 6-22 also emphasizes the need to make good decisions and raise support for those decisions. This requires high levels of interpersonal skills and consensus building.⁵⁹

In ADRP 6-22, the core leader attributes for all leaders are the same: character, presence, and intellect. Character is a quality that encompasses a leader’s ability to make the right moral and ethical choices in difficult situations. ADRP 6-22 lists the core elements of character as personal values consistent with Army Values, empathy, warrior ethos, and discipline.⁶⁰ The Army Values include loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Empathy pertains to a leader’s soldiers, unit families, civilian employees, local populations, and enemy combatants. The warrior ethos requires the leader to put the Army mission first, not accepting defeat, not quitting, and not leaving fallen comrades behind. It also includes the idea of victory and success with honor, which

⁵⁶ ADRP 6-22, 2-5.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 11-1.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 11-1,2.

⁶⁰ “Service Ethos” was left out of the elements list as it pertains specifically to civilian government employees and therefore is not relevant here.

requires good judgment and discipline in regards to using lethal force appropriately. Lastly, discipline refers to self-discipline as well as to orderly and efficient practices in administration and training.⁶¹

The Army concept of “presence” is somewhat intuitive. It refers to the impression of confidence and competence that a leader portrays through his “appearance, demeanor, actions, and words,” including a “commanding presence... [and] professional image of authority.”⁶² It also includes physical fitness, confidence, and resilience. In order to show confidence, a leader must demonstrate composure and control over his own emotions, and resilience implies the ability to recover quickly under stress and high operations tempo.⁶³

There are several concepts included in the idea of “intellect” for the Army leader, including mental agility, sound judgment, innovation, interpersonal tact, and expertise. Sound judgement and innovation are self-explanatory. Mental agility refers to flexibility and adaptability of thought in addressing emerging or ill-structured problems. It implies the ability to evaluate second and third order effects, think critically by examining problems in depth from “multiple points of view,” and isolate the key problem and generate solutions to gain the initiative.⁶⁴ Interpersonal tact specifically includes recognizing diversity and valuing people for the talent they bring to the table. It also requires self-monitoring of emotions and balancing emotional responses in order to motivate or influence subordinates or team members. For example, “intense” emotional responses are appropriate in some circumstances, but only when they promote organizational goals. Lastly, expertise refers to the technical and tactical expertise in Army operations generally and a leader’s job specialty specifically, allowing a leader to care for his soldiers and achieve objectives. In addition to Army knowledge, the

⁶¹ ADRP 6-22, 3-1 to 3-5.

⁶² Ibid., 4-1.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 5-1.

leader must have a good understanding of joint operations, cultural factors that impact operations, and geopolitical knowledge that enhances the ability to work in a multi-national/global context.⁶⁵

ADRP 6-22 enumerates the competencies for Army leaders as leads, develops, and achieves. The manual specifies additional skills or abilities required at the strategic level for these competencies, including the ability to spearhead change, balance current opportunities against future needs, empower junior leaders, and gather experts and staff members with additional skill sets and perspectives. Strategic leaders must lead by providing “vision, motivation, and inspiration.”⁶⁶ This includes the ability to communicate that vision effectively at all levels of command and influence internal and external audiences to support the vision and inherent objectives. These audiences span the spectrum of US government officials, the public, international government entities, and other organizations worldwide. Strategic leaders must understand the need and demonstrate a capability to negotiate effectively within and outside of the Army structure. Finally, they must be able to build consensus among disparate groups of interested parties in order to achieve critical gains or objectives.⁶⁷

“Develops” for the strategic leader is more than self-development and subordinate development. It means setting conditions “for long-term success by developing subordinates who can take the institution to its next level of capability.”⁶⁸ Strategic leaders do this through encouraging a culture of learning, innovation, stewarding resources, and high ethical standards. They prepare themselves with self-assessment, education, and reflection to include education on leadership theory and cultural/geopolitical theories. In the area of subordinate development, strategic leaders do more than coach, counsel, and mentor their direct reports. They actively seek opportunities to teach or

⁶⁵ ADRP 6-22, 5-3,4.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 11-2.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 11-2 to 11-5.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 11-6.

speak to wide audiences at educational facilities to share their higher-level perspective and experience. They also exhibit good judgement in selecting subordinates for personal mentorship. They effectively select those who need only an “intellectual boost” to better understand performing well at higher levels.⁶⁹

The last competency, according to ADRP 6-22, is “achieving.” At the strategic level, achieving encompasses meeting the goals of “Army, joint forces, the nation,” and other large organizations. Successful integration of many diversified organizations and multiple resource factors typifies strategic planning and execution. Strategic leaders must be able to address “technological, leadership, and ethical considerations” associated with battlefield missions involving multiple nations or other actors. They foresee the needs of the future and set priorities for development. They must be able to successfully employ all Department of Defense (i.e. joint and unified action partners) assets as appropriate in order to prevent duplicate efforts and serve as stewards of national resources. Lastly, they must be able to capitalize on the technological advantages the US military holds over every other force in the world, including “force projection, mission command, and the generation of overwhelming combat power.”⁷⁰

Organizational Psychology Leadership Constructs

Organizational Psychology leadership constructs provide another lens to evaluate successful strategic leaders. Two key organizational psychology frameworks will be explored in depth. The first framework explores the personality traits of successful leaders through the five factor personality model. The second framework investigates cognitive processes related to leadership through complex leadership theory.

The five factor model consists of five basic personality traits that are innate in all people: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness. According to the model,

⁶⁹ ADRP 6-22, 11-6 to 11-8.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 11-9 to 11-10.

every person has a value on a scale for each trait ranging from low to high. The affect of the trait is different based on the end of the spectrum (low or high) in which that person falls. Over time, panels of experts have broken down each trait into affects and behaviors that demonstrate the five primary factors in the makeup of an individual personality matrix.⁷¹

The first trait is extraversion. According to John, Robins, and Pervin, professors of psychology at various universities, the definition of extraversion is “an energetic approach toward the social and material world and includes traits such as sociability, activity, assertiveness, and positive emotionality.”⁷² Many other scholars and psychologists use a similar definition. For example, Nettle argues that a high level of extraversion correlates to pursuing social interactions and events, ambition, and feelings that life is abundant with “joy and happiness.” He does qualify ambition as an individually defined set of goals or success because it is not necessarily related to professional success.⁷³ Other affective descriptors for extraversion at the high end of the scale may include: talkative, assertive, active, energetic, outgoing, outspoken, dominant, forceful, enthusiastic, show-off, sociable, spunky, adventurous, noisy, and bossy. At the low end of the scale, the descriptors include: quiet, reserved, shy, silent, withdrawn, and retiring.⁷⁴ These descriptors were based on an observational panel of expert psychologists who achieved a ninety percent agreement rate using 280 subjects. The adjectives correlated closely to the subjects’ self-report on a carefully selected five factor model inventory.⁷⁵ Additionally, Nettle points out that those low on the scale

⁷¹ John, Robins, and Pervin, 114-128.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 120.

⁷³ Nettle, 35.

⁷⁴ John, Robins, and Pervin, 120.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 128.

may choose a simple life with little implicit joy, but they are not necessarily anxious about their lifestyle. They seem to accept a life with little passion as expected and normal.⁷⁶

The second trait is agreeableness. The definition is “a prosocial and communal orientation and includes traits such as altruism, tendermindedness, trust, and modesty.”⁷⁷ Other scholars have used descriptors such as social harmony, cooperativeness, and other-regarding.⁷⁸ Additional accepted characteristics of agreeableness at the high end of the scale include: sympathetic, kind, appreciative, affectionate, soft-hearted, warm, generous, forgiving, and friendly. At the low end of the scale, the adjectives include: fault-finding, cold, quarrelsome, unkind, cruel, and stern.⁷⁹

The third factor is conscientiousness. One short definition of conscientiousness is “socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task and goal directed behavior,” such as following rules, organizing, self-discipline, and prioritizing.⁸⁰ The adjectives used for the high end of this scale include: thorough, planful, efficient, responsible, reliable, and cautious, among others. At the low end of the scale, behaviors may include: careless, disorderly, frivolous, irresponsible, and forgetful.⁸¹

Neuroticism is the model’s fourth trait. The concept is related to emotional stability and even-temperedness (low level) as compared to negative emotions such as anxiety, sadness, tension, and nervousness (high level).⁸² Nettle includes shame and disgust in his exploration of neuroticism.⁸³

⁷⁶ Nettle, 37.

⁷⁷ John, Robins, and Pervin, 120.

⁷⁸ Nettle, 38; Criteria Corp, “Criteria Corp: Pre-employment Testing,” accessed August 5, 2016, http://www.criteriacorp.com/index_alt.php. This website offers a widely-used personality inventory related to the five-factor model.

⁷⁹ John, Robins, and Pervin, 120.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid., 128.

⁸² Ibid., 120.

⁸³ Nettle, 40.

The adjectives used to describe high levels of neuroticism include: moody, worrying, touchy, fearful, high-strung, and self-punishing. Low levels include descriptions such as: stable, calm, and content.⁸⁴ Nettle points out that people who score high in neuroticism will worry more than those with low levels about upcoming events. Moreover, they will interpret events and circumstances in negative or self-blaming ways.⁸⁵

Openness is the last factor in the model. It is defined as “the breadth, depth, originality, and complexity of an individual’s mental and experiential life.”⁸⁶ Other scholars have used creativity (high) as opposed to conventional thinking (low).⁸⁷ The adjectives associated with high levels of openness include: wide-interests, imaginative, original, curious, clever, and resourceful. The other end of the scale includes adjectives such as: commonplace, simple, and shallow.⁸⁸ Individuals with high levels of openness may enjoy a variety of hobbies or experiences that span a breadth of interests, including the arts, travel, cultural experiences, and a wide variety of reading genres.⁸⁹ On the other hand, a low level of openness may manifest itself in people who are satisfied with things that are associated with simple pleasures. Some examples include activities commonly known as “the quiet life,” such as gardening and porch sitting.

The study of leadership through the lens of personality is common as psychologists attempt to answer the age-old question of whether leaders are born or developed, that is, nature versus nurture. On the side of leaders being born, scholars have studied the inherent personality traits of leaders versus non-leaders. Three useful examples of studies on this concept include two articles specifically

⁸⁴ John, Robins, and Pervin, 120.

⁸⁵ Nettle, 41.

⁸⁶ John, Robins, and Pervin, 120.

⁸⁷ Criteria Corp.

⁸⁸ John, Robins, and Pervin, 128.

⁸⁹ Nettle, 43.

on military leaders by Paul Bartone (a retired Colonel and research fellow at the institute for National Strategic Studies); Luke McCormack (a research specialist for Deakin University in Australia); and Meike Bartels (a professor of psychological biology at Vrije University, Amsterdam). The two articles focusing on military leaders used the five factor model as their basis for personality exploration and identification. However, the other article used personality measures that can be translated into similar traits as the five factor model.

The first article is perhaps the most well-known in military circles and is frequently cited in other military leadership studies. Bartone's article examined cognitive and personality predictors of leadership in West Point cadets. He and his co-authors found that West Point Cadets who outperformed their peers in leader behaviors measured high in agreeableness and conscientiousness. They also identified stronger results for conscientiousness and a correlation with extraversion, but not a statically significant one.⁹⁰ The second article also discusses military leaders and the five factor model. McCormack and his coauthor, David Meller, discovered that high conscientiousness, agreeableness, extraversion, and low neuroticism often resulted in high marks for leadership performance in military officers. Additionally, they found a correlation between openness and high academic success.⁹¹ While this is not directly related to leadership behaviors, academic success is often a pre-cursor to acceptance into valuable leadership roles. The third study by Bartels and her coauthors argued that intelligence, dominance, masculinity, and self-monitoring constituted predictors of effective leadership. This study did not use the Five Factor Model, but some of the results are clearly connected. Dominance is often listed as a sub-set of extraversion, and self-monitoring is

⁹⁰ Paul T. Bartone, Scott A. Snook, and Trueman R. Tremble, Jr., "Cognitive and Personality Predictors of Leader Performance in West Point Cadets," *Military Psychology* 14, no. 4 (October 2002): 321-338.

⁹¹ McCormack and Mellor, 179-197.

closely related to certain sub-traits of conscientiousness. Additionally, Bartels positively correlated intelligence with agreeableness and openness.⁹²

This set of studies suggests that leaders must have high levels of conscientiousness, agreeability, extraversion, and openness with values of the former on the highest ends of the scale although some variability in the latter is tolerable. They must also be on the low end of the scale for neuroticism. General of the Army Marshall's personality did not fit into the perfect cookie cutter mold as described by this research, but each trait will be explored in depth in section four.

In the realm of complexity leadership theories, Mary Uhl-Bien and Michael Arena are challenging some of the managerial leadership theories that have guided leadership understanding and development for decades. In fact, they are two of the few scholars who differentiate between "tactical" and "strategic" leadership in the human resources and business world. Thus, their theory, aptly named Complexity Leadership Theory, assesses the kind of leadership necessary to direct and nurture organizations with wide ranging goals, multi-faceted legal and social obligations, and complex inter- and intra-organizational networks with varying levels of hierarchal control. Uhl-Bien and her earlier collaborator argued that globalization and knowledge growth have forced the world of leadership to adapt to new complexities.⁹³

Uhl-Bien and her coauthor's theory dealt with leadership within complex organizations and not about specific leaders or leader development. This perspective addresses leadership at all levels and the very nature of socialized interactions among various agents, including people, departments,

⁹² Meike Bartels, Felice I. van Weegen, Catharina E.M. van Beijsterveldt, Michele Carlier, Tinca J.C. Polderman, Rosa A. Hoekstra, and Dorret I. Boomsma, "The Five Factor Model of Personality and Intelligence: A Twin Study on the Relationship Between the Two Constructs," *Personality and Individual Differences* 53, no. 4 (September 2012): 368; Justin D. Rueb, Holly J. Erskine, and Roseanne J. Foti, "Intelligence, Dominance, Masculinity, and Self-monitoring: Predicting Leadership Emergence in a Military Setting," *Military Psychology* 20, no. 4 (2008): 237.

⁹³ Mary Uhl-Bien, Russ Marion, and Bill McKelvey, "Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting Leadership from the Industrial Age to the Knowledge Era," *Leadership Institute Faculty Publications Paper* 18 (2007): 298-299.

organizations, or specific leaders. She defines leadership as an “emergent, interactive dynamic that is productive of adaptive outcomes.”⁹⁴ In this respect, successful organizations have three types of leadership.

The theory’s three leadership typologies include: administrative, adaptive, and enabling. Administrative leadership is the bureaucratic, hierarchal leadership that many other theories consider the “whole” of leadership. It refers to leaders in the “formal managerial roles who plan and coordinate organizational activities... structure tasks, engage in planning, build vision, acquire resources to achieve goals, manage crises, personal conflicts, and organizational strategy.”⁹⁵

According to the theory, adaptive leadership in an organization is not restricted to a single leader or even group of leaders. It is a “dynamic that produces adaptive outcomes in a social system.” According to Uhl-Bien, this dynamic allows innovation, learning, and change within the organization. However, the key to this dynamic for an individual leader is accommodating the “struggles among agents and groups over conflicting needs, ideas, or preferences; [that] result in movements, alliances of people, ideas, or technologies.”⁹⁶ Additionally, she cautions that successful adaptive leadership must be both significant and impactful and that the leader’s authority and reputation influence the system or organization. The degree to which an idea “grabs” the audience and the ability of an agent to generate support for the idea are also within the realm of influence by the individual leader.⁹⁷ Therefore, a powerful, adaptive leader influences surrounding systems and networks, triggering the acceptance and encouragement of new ideas.

Uhl-Bien’s enabling leadership is directly related to the previous discussion about single agents fostering or catalyzing adaptive leadership behavior within an organization and facilitating the

⁹⁴ Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey, 299.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 306.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 306-307.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 307.

emergence of new ideas. Enabling behavior sometimes overlaps with administrative leadership in that “it may be performed by agents acting in more managerial capacities.” She continues that “enabling leadership manages the entanglement between administrative and adaptive leadership; this includes (1) managing the organizational conditions in which adaptive leadership exists, and (2) helping disseminate innovative products of adaptive leadership upward and through the formal managerial system...”⁹⁸

Another key factor in successful enabling leadership, according to recent research by Uhl-Bien and Michael Arena, is the creation of “adaptive space.” This is a critical point of cross-pollination between Uhl-Bien’s theory and the previous decades of leadership models. The adaptive space is a mental construct of allowing or “embracing” dynamic tension between administrative and adaptive forms of leadership. This “space” generates the collaboration, reflection, and enabling discussed in so many other theories. Those “spaces” can be real-time spaces such as scheduled working groups or meetings. They can also be mental spaces such as attitudes that allow cross-pollination among departments or other self-contained networks.⁹⁹

Marshall’s Strategic Leadership

In order to assess the historical relevance of Marshall’s strategic leadership, three critical time periods in his military life will be examined. The first includes critical events from WWI as well as Marshall’s tour as the Infantry School Assistant Commandant. The second is his assumption of the position of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the early war years, and the last time period focuses on the latter years of WWII.

Marshall’s capstone achievement in WWI was planning the Meuse-Argonne offensive in September 1918. It involved the feat of bringing together various allied commands in an operation

⁹⁸ Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey, 309.

⁹⁹ Michael J. Arena and Mary Uhl-Bien, “Complexity Leadership Theory: Shifting from Human Capital to Social Capital,” *People and Strategy* 39, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 24.

requiring the movement of 820,000 troops (400,000 of whom came directly from another operation in full swing), 3,000 guns, and 900,000 tons of supplies, via only one or two roads headed north in the right direction *at night to preserve secrecy*. Marshall himself said, “It was the most difficult troop movement I ever imagined.”¹⁰⁰ Although he commanded no troops during the actual offensive, Marshall and his staff planned, resourced, and coordinated a host of allied commands in the concentration of troops on the line of departure, and the offensive “began with all forces in place and in total surprise.”¹⁰¹ However, when difficult terrain, German fortifications, and poor tactical planning (of which Marshall was not a part) led to a considerable delay in early progress, General Pershing gave the command of the First Army to General Hunter Liggett who requested Marshall as his operations officer. After that the tide began to turn. As Liggett and Marshall inherited the tactical plans and came in when the fight was desperate and thick, Marshall found himself “planning day by day, though [they] tried to make it cover a week’s progress at least; though it was so very difficult to do with... the constant changes in the battle front due to the necessary withdrawal of French troops and the induction of brand new American units.”¹⁰² One French Corps Chief of Staff commented, ‘I never saw anything like this. It’s change, change, change.’¹⁰³ When the Germans capitulated in November 1918, General Pershing gave Marshall immense credit for the success of the operation due to his planning efforts. The operation constituted the largest operation in WWI.¹⁰⁴ Still under 40 years old and holding the permanent rank of Major, Marshall’s tactical and logistical abilities outstripped those of other officers his age or rank. Additionally, he performed spectacularly in bringing together disparate commands, particularly the French and American forces. He regularly

¹⁰⁰ Larry I. Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall: Interviews and Reminiscences* (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), 222. Hereafter referred to as *Interviews and Reminiscences*.

¹⁰¹ Stoler, 40-41.

¹⁰² Bland, *Interviews and Reminiscences*, 227.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 228.

¹⁰⁴ Pogue, *Education of a General*, 179.

used diplomacy and tactical competence in unifying military efforts across cultural and diplomatic lines. This was true at meetings with General Pershing and French General Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander, as well as in smaller ways such as ensuring French truck drivers transporting American troops were welcome at US Army chow halls and billeting areas.¹⁰⁵ Also of note, Marshall learned to speak French during his time working with French forces in WWI, just as he had learned Chinese when stationed in China.¹⁰⁶ Major General Fox Conner later remarked about future wars: “We will have to fight beside allies, and George Marshall knows more about the techniques of arranging allied commands than any man I know. He is nothing short of a genius.”¹⁰⁷ Marshall also exhibited traits of strong ego, unfailing ambition, and a hot temper, although usually controlled by a cold, professional exterior. Marshall regularly spoke bluntly and forcefully to Pershing when he disagreed with a decision or a policy.

Evaluating the planning and execution of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, one sees strong evidence of Marshall’s potential strategic leader qualities. He demonstrated candor, influence over those over whom he had minimal authority, mastery of joint and combined action, and cross-cultural savvy. He brought together disparate allied commands, assets, and teams and enabled unified action through creating adaptive space between his staff (the experts and creative agents) and the multinational commanders and partners (the administrative agents). Additionally, his exceptional organizational skills demonstrated high levels of conscientiousness and his assertiveness and tireless approach point to high levels of extraversion. Low neuroticism is evident in his positive outlook in spite of overwhelming complications. Openness to experience is difficult to judge in situations where the person is highly engaged through necessity in a single activity such as war planning, and there is no evidence that Marshall afforded himself leisure time during this period. As for

¹⁰⁵ Bland, *Interviews and Reminiscences*, 223, 237-240.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 210, 236-237.

¹⁰⁷ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 192.

agreeableness, the dearth of any indication that his relationships were easy or that he naturally “got along” with those he worked with seems to demonstrate low agreeableness. In fact, his own reminiscences indicate a great deal of professional astuteness about communicating, but little feeling about the actual relationships.¹⁰⁸

Marshall felt passionately about thorough training and development of soldiers and leaders. By the time he took the position as assistant commandant of the infantry school at Ft. Benning in 1927, he had already proven his ability to train cadets, soldiers, and officers through successful stints with the Army Service Schools and Staff College, Massachusetts Volunteer Militia (National Guard), the Pennsylvania National Guard, and the Army War College. He had a deep understanding of the long-term value of properly trained, competent officers as is evident in his restructuring of the infantry school curriculum as well as his recommended changes to the selection of high performers to attend the advanced course and the staff college.¹⁰⁹ Marshall also understood the critical importance of a citizen army embodied in the National Guard. He deepened his understanding of the value of the national guard from his time instructing guardsmen and officers of the guard.¹¹⁰ Neither of these concepts were widely accepted at the time, but Marshall successfully spearheaded a cultural shift in the Army that led to both concepts being adopted by the spring of 1940.¹¹¹ Marshall himself recalled, “We were in a period there where it was rather formative of the new army organization and it was very important that the citizen-soldier aspect be most carefully considered... We made considerable progress in it.”¹¹² When he took the position at the infantry school, he was given “a

¹⁰⁸ Bland, *Interviews and Reminiscences*.

¹⁰⁹ Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 1:325, 334-338.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1:38-45.

¹¹¹ Mark S. Watson, *United States Army in World War II: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1991), 183-187.

¹¹² Bland, *Interviews and Reminiscences*, 251.

virtual free hand with both the curriculum and the teaching methods.”¹¹³ He restructured both by synthesizing his education and experience from Ft. Leavenworth, the National Guard, and WWI. The key lessons were “the need for simplicity in plans and orders, the ability to innovate and deal with the unexpected, and training in warfare of movement.”¹¹⁴ These were heretical notions in 1928.

Stoler puts it this way:

...tremendous effort was required to break the instructors and students out of the old ways of thinking and acting. Marshall thus emphasized originality and improvisation rather than the standard approach. He banned written lectures, often provided poor maps or no maps for his problems and maneuvers so as to duplicate the confusion of a real battlefield, and constantly emphasized thoughtful and original responses to the unexpected.¹¹⁵

Indeed, a textbook, written under his supervision stated, “The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce the same situation twice.”¹¹⁶ Additionally, he believed that teaching should be done by “direct[ing] men by trying to make them see the way to go.”¹¹⁷ Also, Joseph D. Patch, an instructor at the school during Marshall’s tenure, recalled: “...Marshall did more for The Infantry School than anyone who ever served there.”¹¹⁸ Having identified and personally trained outstanding leaders such as Omar Bradley and James Collins, Marshall demonstrated his ability to recognize and inculcate talent in junior leaders. In fact, 200 of the general officers who served in WWII were trained under Marshall’s tenets.¹¹⁹

¹¹³ Stoler, 55; Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 1:319.

¹¹⁴ Stoler, 55.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 49-56.

¹¹⁶ Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 1:334-338, 409-413.

¹¹⁷ Pogue, *Education of a General*, 115-116.

¹¹⁸ Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 1:320.

¹¹⁹ Pogue, *Education of a General*, 248-249.

Marshall became well-known for some other notable characteristics while serving at Ft. Benning. He gained a reputation for his confidence and bearing. He exuded authority. He chose highly qualified staff officers and then granted them autonomy in their work. Omar N. Bradley, a Major at the time, recalled: “During the two years I served him as chief of the weapons section in the Infantry School, he sent for me only once to discuss the work of my section.”¹²⁰ This was typical. Marshall preferred to lead through assent rather than directive leadership, and he gave a great deal of autonomy to his subordinates.¹²¹ However, he did not hesitate to replace an officer who failed an assignment.¹²² He did not tolerate off-color stories or unprofessional behavior by his subordinates even socially, and in support of the law-of-the-land, he stopped drinking alcohol due to prohibition during this time. He was as serious off work as on, and participated in none of the “playboy” behaviors some of his peers enjoyed. Additionally, his beloved wife had died just prior to this assignment, yet he worked through his grief admirably and continued to succeed professionally.¹²³ In spite of some health trouble, he remained physically fit and trim.¹²⁴

At this point in his career, many incipient strategic leadership traits became evident. He clearly demonstrated, both personally and in his teaching philosophy, mental agility, adaptability, the importance of learning processes, the ability to synthesize education and experience, and the ability to communicate vision and orders simply and effectively. Through empowering and mentoring his subordinates, he not only trained an entire generation of technically and tactically proficient general officers, but initiated a self-propagating process of cultural change in the Army concerning officer education and the value of well-trained Guard/Reserve forces. He was staunch in his

¹²⁰ Pogue, *Education of a General*, 1:320.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 248.

¹²² Bland, *Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, 1:320.

¹²³ Stoler, 59-60.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

professionalism, moral qualities, and ethical behavior, and he expected those around him to be just as honorable. His self-discipline, military bearing, and physical fitness were beyond reproach. He proved resilient in difficult personal circumstances. He actively sought ways to share his knowledge and learning from WWI with large audiences by creating opportunities to teach and mentor personally. He certainly enabled his subordinate instructors, and he appeared to have inculcated the basic changes in teaching methods and programs through use of adaptive space between the existing administrative leadership and his personally selected staff and instructors. He demonstrated qualities of extraordinarily high conscientiousness, some indications of middle to high extraversion tendencies, and low levels of neuroticism. He showed an uncanny ability to build and maintain personal and professional relationships, although mission always came first. This indicates possible middle level agreeableness scores, but not high scores. There is little indication that he had high levels of openness to experience. Although he loved his work and took on new responsibilities with gusto, he preferred a quiet personal life. Some of Arena's and Uhl-Bien's principles manifest themselves in this time period of Marshall's life in the combination of excellent administrative leadership of a large organization while initiating massive changes in organizational structure and ideology in spite of conflicting traditions and preferences. His enabling leadership manifested itself in the significant and impactful changes he spearheaded. Additionally, considering that General officers such as Omar Bradley gave credit to Marshall for strongly impacting their professional prowess with his mentorship at the infantry school, he demonstrated enabling leadership and the ability to use outstanding judgement in those whom he mentored personally.¹²⁵

The next period of Marshall's career under examination begins with his elevation to Chief of Staff of the Army. In the end, his reputation for tactical competence, diplomacy, and choosing when

¹²⁵ US Army Center of Military History, "Omar Nelson Bradley: The Centennial," US Army, 2006, accessed March 27, 2017, <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/bradley/bradley.htm>; Michael R. Patterson, "Omar Nelson Bradley: General of the Army," Arlington National Cemetery Website, 2011, accessed March 29, 2017, <http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/omarnels.htm>.

to speak his mind, paved the way for his selection to Chief of Staff of the Army. These traits continued to manifest themselves. For example, he spoke quite bluntly to President Roosevelt on their first meeting together. Yet, his honesty and integrity endeared rather than estranged him to the President just as it had with Pershing.¹²⁶ Another key to his being chosen for the position was his selfless service and modesty. Marshall always put the mission first and never spoke of his own accomplishments although he had an “astute understanding of his strengths and weaknesses.”¹²⁷ It was due to this particular quality that made him the number one choice over the other suitable candidate, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, who promoted himself relentlessly.¹²⁸

Almost immediately upon taking the position, Marshall realized that an antiquated organizational structure interfered with daily operations. He told his deputy chief of staff that “gradually... and without stirring up of people, I wish to eliminate such features... as are continuations of the old days when the Army was a very small affair.”¹²⁹ He recognized that initiating too much change too quickly would cause unwanted discord and defiance within his own office. Marshall worked best through teams of advisors. He diligently encouraged discussion and made it clear that he expected disagreements within the groups and even with himself. He carefully reviewed proposals and requested additional studies when he recognized information gaps. He listened and guided discussion with questions rather than directives. His duty day began early, and he kept a tight and organized schedule. In the afternoons or early evening, he often rode horses to allow himself time to reflect on problems or decisions, and he often read in his off time. He maintained several magazine subscriptions and read history and biographies among other genres. As the war pressures increased, naturally his work hours lengthened and contact with personal friends

¹²⁶ Stoler, 40-43, 65-66.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Stoler, 40-43, 65-66; Pogue, *Education of a General*, 408.

¹²⁹ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 8.

diminished. Close friendships had never come easily to him and his “aloofness and austerity that had long been obvious traits of his personality became more intense.”¹³⁰ He was quite brusque almost to the point of rudeness with subordinates or others who brought him information. He did not have the time or forbearance to tolerate ineptitude, stuttering, or even protocol. His violent temper occasionally broke forth, but an icy fury was just as likely when his wrath was forthcoming. However, subordinates, peers, and even congressmen admired his integrity and self-discipline. He foresaw the desperate need to build the Army into an organization that could enter the war if necessary, and he lobbied untiringly in Congress to approve existing manning and equipping requirements. He gained respect in Congress as an eloquent and fairhanded speaker due to his ability to negotiate, consider budget restraints, prioritize requests, and compromise in order to make gains. Thus, began his tenure as the most powerful military figure of WWII, as an administrator of an arcane organizational structure begging for funding from a reluctant Congress.¹³¹

Reviewing his words and actions in light of Army doctrine, Marshall demonstrated the ability to prioritize relevant information and events, listen and encourage collaboration, build consensus among members of a team, gather experts and information as appropriate, and encourage diversity of opinion. As for the five factors of personality, he demonstrated high levels of conscientiousness, mid to high extraversion, and low neuroticism and openness to experience. However, his agreeableness appears low and was only mitigated by his eloquence, integrity, and desire to achieve success through duty and unity of effort. Once again, this time period shines a bright light on his outstanding administrative leadership abilities, but does not give much insight into his adaptive or enabling leader qualities.

Finally, the examination of Marshall’s leadership during WWII discloses much about his strategic leadership capabilities. Since WWI, warfare had become exponentially more complex.

¹³⁰ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 13.

¹³¹ Pogue, *Ordeal and Hope*, 1-18; Stoler, 68-77.

Mobilizing for war required “a breadth of vision that could encompass the entire globe geographically and every aspect of the nation’s resources conceptually.”¹³² In addition, until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the United States was divided politically on entering the war at all. This left Marshall in the unenviable position of trying to build, train, and equip a force that *could* enter the war without triggering defensive political posturing by those opposed to involvement. Through adaptive space, Marshall navigated the political terrain with a coherent nonpartisan national security narrative. With this as his tagline and through his influence with President Roosevelt and Congress, he achieved the approval of a draft, the expansion of the Army from 200,000 to 1.4 million, the distribution of war materials to potential allies around the world, and the creation of an impressive procurement program for military equipment. Also, he restructured the Army’s promotion system and replaced hundreds of General Officers with more competent men. In addition, he forged essential ties between the Army and the Navy, paving the way for an Anglo/American strategy agreements that included the armies and navies of the United States and Britain. Once the United States entered the war, Marshall’s influence grew through his understanding of the global strategic context. He negotiated conflicting national and international interests and facilitated consensus in strategy among the most powerful men in the world. From the beginning, Marshall called for unified commands to include all services and allied forces in every theater. A unified command at that level was unprecedented, but he won support from all sides.¹³³ However, as conceptual strategic objectives evolved into detailed planning for the defeat of Germany, Marshall’s initial proposals for unified tactical action failed to gain approval in spite of his reputation for tactical skills and his personal relationship with many of the decision makers to include President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill.¹³⁴ However, in early 1943, he

¹³² Stoler, 68.

¹³³ Ibid., 68-100.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 101-108.

“assess[ed] the reasons for his failure [to win the diplomatic support he needed] and reformulate[d] a united front” that met the original intent of attacking Germany directly and achieving victory in Europe, albeit on a later timeline than his original plan.¹³⁵ Having learned some hard lessons about his political adversaries, he navigated new negotiations with more savviness. For example, he compromised on his desired timeline and agreed to actions in the Mediterranean first in order to get Churchill to agree to his unified cross-channel assault afterward. Also, he was able to win Roosevelt over with arguments that if the cross-channel approach did not gain Allied approval, a post-war Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union, would feel that the United States violated its pledge to support the Soviet Union. His arguments were a combination of eloquence, tactical competence, and political maneuvering. In addition, he so successfully articulated his vision to Roosevelt that when he unavoidably missed the initial meeting with Stalin, Roosevelt “sold” the plan without Marshall present. The plan won approval by all parties as Operation Overlord.¹³⁶

By this time, President Roosevelt realized Marshall was an indispensable linchpin in the complex, international network of the Allied forces. The honor of commanding Operation Overlord justifiably belonged to Marshall. Initially, Roosevelt left the decision up to Marshall, but Marshall refused to make the choice. He insisted that the President make the best choice for the country. Roosevelt famously said, “I feel I could not sleep at night with you out of the country,” and he choose Eisenhower to lead the fight overseas.¹³⁷ Mark Stoler, Marshall’s biographer, sums it up well:

...he had done much more than create and manage a war machine. He had carefully selected and supported its commanders, devised the global strategy for its use, and successfully fought for allied acceptance of that strategy. He had also been primarily responsible for the unprecedented inter-service and civil-military coordination in the United States and for the extraordinary Anglo/American coordination from the CCS structure in Washington down to unity of command in each theater... In achieving all of this he had shown exceptional abilities

¹³⁵ Stoler, 101.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 101-106.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 108.

as a diplomat and statesman as well as a soldier and manager and had raised the power and stature of the United States in the world arena to unprecedented levels.¹³⁸

During these trying times, Marshall exhibited critical strategic leadership traits. He performed self-assessment and learned to adapt his approach when necessary when dealing with international dignitaries and other politically powerful men. His mental agility manifested in his ability to learn, respond to change, prioritize relevance, and explain problems to others in meaningful ways. He showed cross-cultural savvy with non-military, international, and joint organizations with a clear understanding of political and geographical differences on a global level. His interpersonal maturity gave him influence with powerful world leaders allowing him to encourage collaboration and build consensus. His ability to negotiate among countries and armed forces with divergent interests was nothing short of miraculous. He demonstrated the skills of a World Class Warrior through his deployment of forces, his deep understanding of strategy and tactics at the theater, campaign, and joint level, and his employment of the instruments of national power. His military professional astuteness brought a global war to a close due to his role as a leader and his previous development of the officer corps and the Army as a warfighting machine. He met virtually every requirement mentioned in the ADRP 6-22, except perhaps empathy. His treatment of others was sometimes curt although respectful; however, duty and mission accomplishment came before feelings, his or those of others. This time period solidifies his personality traits of high conscientiousness, medium to high extraversion, low agreeableness, and low neuroticism. Openness to experience could not be evaluated during this time as his duties left him little time for other interests. His administrative and enabling leadership surfaced often, and he regularly entertained dissenting opinions. He clearly created adaptive space between his staff planners and Congress, allowing plans and ideas to come to fruition and change to take root.

Conclusion

¹³⁸ Ibid., 129.

In summary, Marshall displayed almost every attribute and characteristic of strategic leadership as outlined in the ADRP 6-22, including solving complex problem sets; working within complex systems encompassing joint, combined, civilian, international and other organizations; accomplishing tasks associated with congressional hearings, budget constraints, and new technology and organizational systems; and being a geopolitical military expert capable of envisioning the future and communicating that vision to others. He spearheaded change, balanced current opportunities with future needs, empowered junior leaders and gathered experts with critical skill sets and perspectives. He built consensus among highly disparate individuals and organizations on a global level. He encouraged a culture of learning and innovation. He constantly prepared himself through study and reflection. He excelled at force projection, mission command, and the generation of overwhelming combat power.

Dr. Wong's metacompetencies evidenced themselves in Marshall's actions as well. Marshall demonstrated "identity" through excellent self-awareness, unmatched personal integrity and values, and the humility to gain his identity through the accomplishments of his team rather than personal glory. He showed "mental agility" by gathering and processing large amounts of information and employing sound and timely judgement about what was relevant amidst continually emerging events. "Cross-cultural savvy" was his specialty as he clearly understood the full range of diversity that existed in interorganizational, interagency, international, and joint entities throughout his career. He achieved consensus and collaboration through "interpersonal maturity," demonstrated by his negotiation skills, change management, and adaptation to emerging trends and systems. His status as a "world class warrior" is uncontested and was upheld by his in-depth understanding of tactical and operational use of force as well as his ability to conceptualize theater, campaign, joint, interagency, and even multinational strategies using all elements of national power. The keys to his "professional astuteness" were his political savvy, ability to compromise, and ability to serve multiple

constituencies at the same time. He was personally ambitious, but more importantly put the goals and needs of the Army and the United States before his own.

Marshall also demonstrated administrative, enabling, and adaptive leadership qualities as presented by Dr. Uhl-Bien and coauthors. Marshall demonstrated the kind of leadership necessary to direct and nurture the US Army and the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff in spite of wide-ranging goals, multi-faceted legal and social obligations, and complex inter- and intra-organizational networks with varying levels of hierarchal control. He led the aforementioned complex organizations through Uhl-Bien's "emergent, interactive dynamic that is productive of adaptive outcomes."¹³⁹ He successfully created adaptive space at every level of command, culminating with enabling Allied world leaders to manage the tension of diverse objectives and still collaborate on adaptive and successful strategic action.

Interestingly, Marshall manifested all of the personality trait trends that are associated with the five factor personality model, but not all of the expected characteristics for successful strategic leaders. The "ideal" trend according to the key studies is high agreeableness, high conscientiousness, mid to high extraversion (particularly dominance), mid to high openness to experience, and low neuroticism. Marshall clearly demonstrated high conscientiousness, mid extraversion, and low neuroticism. Openness to experience appeared relatively low, but not at the far end of the scale. However, Marshall also demonstrated low agreeableness although he mitigated that through self-awareness and conscientiousness traits that enabled him to influence others through quiet professionalism and competence rather than gregariousness or personal relationships.

The analysis of additional case studies comparing successful military and executive leaders to known organizational theories may shed light on more detailed trends in adaptive leadership activities and personality traits of executive level leaders. Specifically, future US Army studies should survey the methods by which successful strategic leaders have created adaptive space in their

¹³⁹ Uhl-Bien, Marion, and McKelvey, 299.

organizations or how extraversion and agreeableness impact strategic leadership. There is evidence that self-awareness and reflection can result in compensating activities for successful leaders that do not instinctively thrive in some areas of leadership.¹⁴⁰ This should be explored, recognizing that Marshall was low in agreeableness and perhaps low in openness to experience. In spite of those slight variations from the ideal trends, Marshall set an irrefutable example of a successful strategic leader that is as relevant today as it was half a century ago.

¹⁴⁰ Dionne M. Kress, “A Phenomenological Study Exploring Executive Coaching: Understanding Perceptions of Self-Awareness and Leadership Behavior Changes” (PhD Dissertation, University of Phoenix, Tempe, AZ, 2008), accessed April 6, 2017. <http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3324089>, 105-119; Stephen Gerras and Leonard Wong. “Moving Beyond the MBTI: The Big Five and Leader Development,” *Military Review* 96, no. 2, (March 2016), accessed April 6, 2017, http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160430_art012.pdf, 54-57.

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