

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

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General Studies

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ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY, by Major Sadau Zubairu Azama, 116 pages.

The Boko Haram insurgency first appeared in Maiduguri in Borno State, northeast Nigeria around 2002. The group's objective was to establish an Islamic state and institutionalize Sharia law in Nigeria, particularly the northeast region. Boko Haram activities in the northeast of Nigeria have created a serious security threat to Nigeria and its neighbors in the Lake Chad region. The group engaged in guerrilla warfare using indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and military forces. Despite efforts by the Nigerian government to combat the group, Boko Haram's activities continue to spread across the region. To address the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria, this study looked at Mao's Theory of Revolutionary War as a guide to understand the group. The research analysis revealed that the Boko Haram insurgency has closely adhered to Mao's theory of revolutionary war since its inception. This means that Mao's theory of revolutionary war can be applied to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria in order to find more effective methods than have been used so far by the government of Nigeria to fight Boko Haram. Therefore, this paper recommends the government of Nigeria use efforts to defeat the group focused on; socio economic development, improved intelligence network, training and equipping the army and military collaboration with allies among others.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vi
ACRONYMS.....	viii
ILLUSTRATIONS	ix
TABLES	x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
Background.....	1
Statement of the Problem.....	7
Objective of the Study	8
Significance of the Study.....	8
Primary Question	8
Secondary Question	8
Limitations	9
Definition of Key Terms.....	9
Summary	13
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	14
Introduction.....	14
Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare	14
Phase 1: Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation of Regional Base Areas ...	19
Phase 2: Progressive expansion	20
Phase 3: Decision or Destruction of the Enemy.	21
Concept of Insurgency	22
Concept of Boko Haram	31
Summary	34
CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	35
Purpose of the Research.....	35
Methodology	35
Data and Information Needed to Address the Primary and Secondary Questions	36

Data Collection Method.....	37
Organization of the Research Process	37
Criteria and Metrics to Determine Adherence to Mao's theory of Revolutionary War.....	37
Validity and Limitations	43
Summary	43
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS	45
Politics	45
Intelligence.....	57
Use of Violence	64
Decentralization.	70
Organization, Consolidation and Preservation of Base Area Usually in Isolated and Difficult Terrain.	74
Progressive Expansion.....	76
Decision or Destruction of the Enemy.....	82
Review and Analysis of the Criteria	85
The Nigerian Government Response to the Crisis.....	87
Summary	90
CHAPTER 5 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS	92
Conclusion	92
Recommendations.....	93
Strengthening Border Security.....	97
Training and Equipping the Military	98
Recommendations for Further Study.....	100
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	103

ACRONYMS

AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AQLIM	Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BH	Boko Haram
CJTF	Civilian Joint Task Force
COIN	Counter Insurgency
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IED	Improvise Explosive Devices
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
JTF	Joint Task Force
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force

ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. Map Showing Countries of the Lake Chad Basin Region of Africa.....	6
Figure 2. Map Showing Muslim Dominated States with Sharia law.	7

TABLES

	Page
Table 1. Overall Score – Politics	57
Table 2. Overall Score – Intelligence.....	64
Table 3. Overall Score – Use of Violence	69
Table 4. Overall Score – Decentralization	74
Table 5. Overall Score – Progressive Expansion.....	82
Table 6. Overall Score – Decision or Destruction of the Enemy.....	85
Table 7. Overall Score – Average	86

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Boko Haram insurgency started in 2002 as a domestic Islamic religious group in Maiduguri, Borno State, in northern Nigeria. The insurgent group clearly opposed the Nigerian government and Western influence in the northern part of Nigeria as it sought to introduce Sharia law. Like most insurgent groups, the Boko Haram sect resorted to the use of violence and guerilla tactics against the Nigerian state in an attempt to undermine the government. Unlike other insurgent groups, the Boko Haram wanted to replace government rule and establish a Caliphate within the northern region.

Despite the efforts by the Nigerian government to curtail the insurgent group Boko Haram has transformed into a transnational threat, thereby creating more concern for the international community. Boko Haram currently operates throughout the Republic of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. The group has carried out series of coordinated attacks against citizens, government officials, military forces, and foreigners in order to create fear, gain popularity, or inspire other Islamic extremist groups and individuals. Consequently, the activities of the Boko Haram insurgents have threatened the existence of the sovereign state of Nigeria and its neighbors within the Lake Chad Basin (figure 1).

Background

Nigeria is located in the sub-Sahara West Africa, bordered on the west by the Benin Republic, north by Niger Republic, northeast by the Republic of Chad, Republic of Cameroun to the east, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. The country has a population of approximately 180-million people and over three hundred and fifty ethnic groups, and

four hundred languages.¹ The north is predominantly Muslim while the south is predominantly Christian.

Nigeria was colonized and ruled by Great Britain from 1855-1960. Before Colonial rule, the northern part of the country came under the influence of Islam through the Arab traders and Berbers of North Africa in the eleventh century when Islam first appeared in what was the area of “Kanem Borno” in the northeast of the country.² Portuguese sailors introduced Christianity to the region in 1841, which influenced the southern part of the country.³

In 1914, during the Colonial Era (British rule), the northern and southern part of the country was amalgamated. Subsequently, Nigeria gained independence in 1960 from British Colonial rule. However, people remain divided due to ethnic, regional, religious, and political sentiments. The division resulted in the military coup on 15 January 1966 that threw the country into chaos. Targeted killings of individuals and prominent figures, based on their ethnic affiliations and political background, was the order of the day as the country was in turmoil. Immediately, the Nigerian Civil War broke out as the eastern part of the country attempted to secede. The war lasted for three years from 1967 to 1970.⁴

¹ Trading Economics, “Nigeria Population: 1960-2016,” accessed 30 October 2016, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/population>.

² African Studies Centre Leiden, “Islam in Nigeria,” accessed 2 November 2016, <http://www.ascleiden.nl/content/webdossiers/islam-nigeria>.

³ Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Nigeria: a Country Study*, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing, 1992), 28.

⁴ John de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1972), 17-424.

The country has since witnessed a series of political stalemates, military coups, and saw the rise of ideological and militant groups, such as the Maitatsine sect and militancy in the Niger Delta oil region. The most recent problem has been the emergence of the Boko Haram terrorist group.

29 May 1999 marked a new beginning for Nigeria and Nigerians. With the rebirth of democracy, the people of Nigeria said goodbye to decades of military rule, and saw hope for a better future under a civilian government. Consequently, the international community lifted economic sanctions and other security restrictions imposed on Nigeria. However, hope soon turned into frustration as the people witnessed increased levels of insecurity, militancy, economic problems, and the threat of terrorism following sixteen years of a democratically elected government. In 2002, the dreaded Boko Haram group emerged in the northeast of Nigeria, which brought a new dimension of terrorism into Nigeria as it employed suicide bombings, assassinations, kidnapping, murdering the civilian population, and targeting security forces for political objectives.

Boko Haram, which means, “Western education is forbidden,” is a controversial Nigerian extremist Islamic group that seeks to impose Sharia law in the northern part of Nigeria. The group originated in Maiduguri in Borno State, located in northeast Nigeria, around 2002. It started as a small group founded by Mohammed Yusuf. The group established an Islamic school in Maiduguri from where they operated. The group’s message of Islamic Radicalism drew the attention of prominent Islamic scholars in the region, who challenged Boko Haram’s interpretation of the Quran. Subsequently, the group relocated from Maiduguri in 2004 to a remote village called Kanamma in Yobe

State where they formed a base and named it Afghanistan.⁵ Gradually Boko Haram increased in their numbers as Mohammed Yusuf attracted people who were mostly school dropouts, unemployed, and disgruntled.⁶ The Boko Haram Jihadist group shared a common ideology (jihadist) with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaeda groups operating in the Sahara and Sahel region.⁷

Under the guise of Islam, Boko Haram carried out its radicalization activities without interruption for about seven years. During this period, the group was considered peaceful, as there were no major provocation between it and the Nigerian government. However, the group isolated itself from the Muslim population, who did not share their ideology.⁸ A series of intelligence and security reports were forwarded to the government as Boko Haram gradually became more violent and anti-government. It was learned that the group was arming itself at this stage. In July 2009, Boko Haram clashed with Nigerian security forces, which resulted in the death of some of Boko Haram members in Bauchi State northern Nigeria. This led to the arrest of Mohammed Yusuf, the group's leader, who was later executed by the Nigeria Police Force while in their custody.

⁵ Ezema O. Ogochukwu, *The Socio-Economic Implications of the Boko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria: 2009-2013* (Amorji-Nike, Nigeria: Caritas University, August 2013), 50.

⁶ Anthony Abayomi Adebayo, "Implications of 'Boko Haram' Terrorism on National Development in Nigeria: A Critical Review," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 5, no. 16 (July 2014): 481.

⁷ Stuart Elden, "The Geopolitics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's 'War on Terror'," *The Geographical Journal* 180, no. 4 (December 2014): 414-25.

⁸ Adebayo, 482.

This incident provoked the Boko Haram membership to demand an apology from the Nigerian government, and vowed to take revenge if the government failed to apologize.⁹ Neither the government nor the security forces responded to this threat. On 25 July 2009, Boko Haram made good on its threat as they took up arms against security forces in four northern states, namely Borno, Bauchi, Yobe, and Kano States.¹⁰

Since then, the Jihadist group has continued to perpetrate violence using guerrilla warfare in many parts of Nigeria, especially in northeast Nigeria, where they mostly operate. In spite of the efforts of the Nigerian government and its allies to eradicate the Boko Haram insurgents, the group still poses a grave threat to the sovereignty of Nigeria and its neighbors in the region. In 2014, the group abducted two hundred schoolgirls from Chibok village in the Borno State of Nigeria. The abduction drew the attention of the international community, and provoked worldwide condemnation. The Boko Haram group further pledged allegiance to Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 to consolidate their network and gain more recognition.

⁹ Adebayo, 82.

¹⁰ Adesoji Abimbola, "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria," *Africa Spectrum* 45, no. 2 (2010): 95-108, accessed 15 November 2016, <https://ideas.repec.org/a/gig/afjour/v45y2010i2p95-108.html#author-body>.




Figure 1. Map Showing Countries of the Lake Chad Basin Region of Africa

Source: Rigzone, "Chad Basin," 11 March 2004, accessed 16 November 2016, http://www.rigzone.com/news/image_detail.asp?img_id=446.



Figure 2. Map Showing Muslim Dominated States with Sharia law

Source: Homeland Security Agency, "More Inter-Religious Violence in Nigeria," 21 January 2012, accessed 16 November 2016, <http://www.hlswatch.com/2012/01/21/more-inter-religious-violence-in-nigeria>.

Statement of the Problem

The emergence of the Boko Haram Insurgency in northeast Nigeria has created a security vacuum within the region. The threat of the group to Nigeria, its neighbors and the international community cannot be ignored. The group has engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Nigerian government and its citizens for the last decade. Living conditions in the region have been degraded, life and properties have been destroyed, and an increasing refugee crisis across the region calls for action. Despite efforts by the

Nigerian government and its partners to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the group continues to pose a threat and challenge to the government of Nigeria and its partners. The security situation in the region has deteriorated, and the territorial integrity of Nigeria is being undermined. This research will try to gain an understanding of the concepts behind the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, and how the government can use that understanding to effectively fight the group.

Objective of the Study

The objective of the study is to seek an understanding of the concepts behind the Boko Haram Insurgency, and look at possible ways forward.

Significance of the Study

The research will be significant to the Nigerian government, its partners, and civil societies concerned with the eradication of the Boko Haram insurgency. The study will seek to understand the conceptual basis and activities of Boko Haram, and the correct measures for tackling the Boko Haram menace in Nigeria. It will also be useful to future researchers in the academic field of counter insurgency. Most importantly, the research work will serve as a guide to present and future generations in the field of security.

Primary Question

Does Mao's Revolutionary Warfare theory provide a useful framework for understanding Boko Haram?

Secondary Question

How can the Nigerian government effectively fight the Boko Haram Insurgency?

Limitations

This research focuses on Nigeria, being one of the fifty-four countries in Africa. The research will be limited to the Nigerian government's efforts in combating the Boko Haram insurgency, which poses a threat and problem to the Nigerian government. This research will consult and refer to materials, books, internet, articles, and scholarly writings. However, due to financial constraints, time, and security of materials, the research will not generate new data or use human interviews, which could have added more evidence to the research. Thus, the research will be based on records, events, and access to relevant materials that already exist.

Definition of Key Terms

African Union: The African Union (AU) was established in 2002 from the vestige of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) with the aim to protect the security of the Continent. Although, the AU still struggles to reform its governing bodies, it plays an increasingly high-profile role in peacekeeping.¹¹

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): An Islamic militant group, also sometimes referred to as Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM). It is an Algerian-based Salifist-Jahadist organization, which became affiliated to Osama bin

¹¹ Stephanie Hanson, "The African Union," Council on Foreign Relations, 1 September 2009, accessed 31 November 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/african-union/p11616>.

Laden's Al Qaeda in 2006. The group originated as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.¹²

Al-Qaeda: A global terrorist network founded by Osama bin Laden and other militant groups with a strong base in Afghanistan, although the group has gone underground since the elimination of its leader Osama bin Laden and other prominent members.

Boko Haram Insurgency: The group known by the world as Boko Haram is officially called "Jama'atu Ahlis Suna Lidda' Awati Wal-Jihad," an Arabic phrase meaning, "people committed to the propagation of the prophet's teaching and Jihad." It is an extremist Islamic sect in northeast Nigeria that has created havoc across the country and in the capital, Abuja. Its violent attack on government offices, the United Nations, civilians, and churches threaten the sovereignty of the country. The group actively operates in Republic of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.¹³

Boko Haram: An expression in Hausa language, which means, "Western education is forbidden." Hausa is a major tribe in northern Nigeria and the Republic of Niger.

Caliphate: The position of a Caliph or an area of land ruled by over by a Caliph.¹⁴

¹² Stanford University, "Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," accessed 20 November 2016, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65>.

¹³ Andrew Walker, "What Is Boko Haram?" U.S. Institute of Peace, 30 May 2012, accessed 19 November 2016, <http://www.usip.org/publications/what-Boko-Haram>.

¹⁴ Oxford Living Dictionary, s.v. "Caliphate," accessed 17 November 2016, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/caliphate>.

Counter Insurgency (COIN): “is the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously contain insurgency and address its root causes.”¹⁵

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): The Economic Community of West African States was created by the Treaty of Lagos, in Lagos, Nigeria, on 28 May 1975. The primary purpose of the organization was to promote economic integration, national cooperation, and monetary union for growth and development throughout West Africa. There are currently fifteen countries in the Economic Community of West African States. Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Cape Verde, Guinea Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Sierra Leone, Niger, and The Gambia constitute the members.¹⁶

Insurgency: “Is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. It is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective. Insurgency is not always conducted by a single group with a centralized, military-style command structure, but may involve a complex matrix of different actors with various aims, loosely connected in dynamic and non-hierarchical networks. To be

¹⁵ Department of State et al., *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide* (Washington, DC: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, January 2009), 2, accessed 17 November 2016, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf>.

¹⁶ Alistair Boddy-Evans, “What Is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)?” About Education, 5 April 2016, accessed 31 November 2016, <http://africanhistory.about.com/od/glossary/g/ECOWAS.htm>.

successful, insurgencies require charismatic leadership, supporters, recruits, supplies, safe havens, and funding (often from illicit activities).”¹⁷

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State (IS): A jihadist group, which appeared on the international scene in 2014, when it seized large swathes of territory in Syria and Iraq. The group aim is to establish a state called caliphate across Iraq, Syria and beyond. ISIS is known of carrying out public executions and killing of dozens of people at a time. The group also uses “social media to promote reactionary politics and religious fundamentalism.”¹⁸

Maitatsine: A faction of radical Islamic group that originated in Kano State, northern Nigeria in the late 1970s. Its founder, Mohammed Marwa, was against Western culture and influence in Nigeria, especially in the North. His preaching and practices became increasingly against the Nigerian government, which led to a government crackdown on the group in the early 1980s. As a result, scores of people lost their lives, including Muhammed, the group leader, and the Maitatsine group was put to rest.¹⁹

Terrorism: The use of violent acts to frighten the people in area as a way of trying to achieve a political, ideological, economic, or religious goal. The unlawful use of

¹⁷ Department of State et al., *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, 2.

¹⁸ Cable News Network (CNN), “ISIS Fast Facts,” 1 November 2016, accessed 24 December 2016, www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.html.

¹⁹ John Ford, “The Origins of Boko Haram,” *The National Interest*, 6 June 2014, accessed 17 November 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-origins-boko-haram-10609>.

violence and intimidation especially against innocent civilians by and individual or a group of organized individuals, in the pursuit of political, religious, ideological aims.²⁰

Summary

The research is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 talks about the general background to the study, statement of the research problem, research questions, objectives of the study, and definition of concepts. Chapter 2 deals with the literature review and theoretical framework. Chapter 3 looks at the research methodology. Chapter 4 deals with data presentation and analysis. Finally, chapter 5 contains the summary, conclusion, and recommendations.

²⁰ Merriam-Webster, s.v. "Terrorism," accessed 17 November 2016, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/terrorism>.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Today, the world has witnessed an unprecedented rise in the activities of Islamic extremist groups across the continent. Boko Haram, like other extremist groups, has engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Nigerian government and people. The sect, which started as a domestic religious group, has rapidly grown into an organized insurgent group, threatening the establishment of the Nigerian state and its neighbors in the Lake Chad Basin. The activities of the group have claimed many lives of innocent civilians, damaged properties, and created tension within Nigeria. The devastated effect of the Boko Haram insurgency on the population has generated mixed feelings, concerns, and triggered international condemnation.

Despite efforts by the Nigerian government to subdue the sect, it continues to pose threats and commit all forms of atrocity against innocent civilians and all aspects of life. More so, the rapid expansion of the group into neighboring Chad, Niger, and Cameroon Republic threatens the peace and stability of the entire region. Hence, this research paper seeks to take into account Mao's model of Revolutionary Warfare, books, articles, and other scholarly writings as a framework in understanding the Boko Haram insurgency in order to defeat the group.

Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare

According to Mao Tse-tung, political power comes out of the barrel of a gun. Mao Tse-tung came from Hunan Province in central China. His father was an industrious

farmer, and a strict disciplinarian. He was among the privileged Chinese minority to have enjoyed educational opportunities with the support of his father. His primary and secondary schooling was uninterrupted. Because of his quest for the key to the future of China, he was more interested in the studies of history and political science.²¹ His effort was without success as he lost faith in both democratic liberalism and parliamentary socialism, which he believed was unsuitable for China.

Mao knew that China was due for change, but history would not give it the opportunity of “gradual political, social, and economic change, of a relatively painless and orderly evolution.”²² He realized that, China had to make a radical move for change and urgently, but he had no clue how to go about it. In 1917, Mao was employed as an assistant in the Peking University library. This provided him the opportunity to align himself with Marxist study groups set up by Li Ta-chao and Ch’en Tu-hsiu, where he discovered Lenin, read his essays, and began to study Marx and Engels. “By 1920, Mao was a convinced Communist and a man who had discovered his mission: to create a new China according to the doctrine of Marx and Lenin.”²³

Mao joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 when it was established in Shanghai. As at this time, China was not a recognize nation in the world order. However, the political and economic situation in China was a mess. “About 400 million peasants lived from day to day at subsistence level. While tens of millions of peasant families

²¹ Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Champaign-Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 12.

²² *Ibid.*, 13.

²³ *Ibid.*

owned no land at all. Other millions cultivated tiny holdings from which they scraped out just enough food to sustain life.”²⁴ The peasants suffered in the hands of greedy soldiers and bandits; they were afflicted by diseases, droughts, floods, and epidemics, many slowly starved, and died of diseases. Communities were subjected to hard conditions in which there were no existing public services, doctors, schools, running water, electricity, paved streets, or sewage disposal.²⁵ The people were relegated to the background; they lived in constant fear of army press gangs and provincial officials, who forced them out to work on military roads and dikes throughout the seasons. These were the features of the feudal China, which soon would erupt in flames. External forces had for almost a century contributed to the pandemonium of China. Mao once described the China he knew in his youth as “semi colonial and feudal.”²⁶

In 1926, Mao returned to Hunan to stir up the peasants for land reform; it was termed as almost a one-man show. The fundamental problem in China then was the unbalanced relationship between the gentry landowners and peasant farmers. Land reform and redistribution was seen as the only means of solving the peasants’ problems. However, the Nationalists did not welcome this idea because they wanted to keep the support of the gentry, which were, historically, the stabilizing element in Chinese society.

²⁴ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 13.

²⁵ Ibid., 14.

²⁶ Ibid.

However, in Mao's view, there could be no meaningful revolution until the power of this class was completely removed.²⁷

While Mao embarked on this unpopular move against the landed gentry in Hunan, the Kuomintang revolutionary armies were already advancing north from Canton to Wuhan on the Yangtze, where the Nationalist Government was established in December 1926. These armies combined a number of Communist components; but as soon as the vanguard divisions of Chiang's army reached the outskirts of Shanghai in March 1927, the celebration of the revolutionaries was almost over.²⁸ "In April, Chiang's secret police captured and executed the radical labor leaders in Shanghai, and began to purge the army of its Communist components."²⁹

The left wing administration in Wuhan later dissolved. The Communists walked out while the Soviet mentors headed for home. The Communists also had their own troubles during this period. The movement was on the brink of annihilation. Those who escaped Chiang's secret police fled to the south and regrouped at Ching Kang Shan, a rugged area along the Fukien-Kiangsi borders. As various groups wandered into the mountain stronghold, Mao and Chu Teh, who had arrived in April 1928, began to raise an army.³⁰ Several local bandit chieftains were convinced to join the movement and were later used to carry out propaganda activities within the region. Progressively, the

²⁷ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 15.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid., 16.

Communists expanded their territory and commenced operation against provincial troops who were supposed to subdue them. In the early 1930s, a directive was given by the Central Committee of the Party, which required the Communist armies to go on the offensive against cities held by the Nationalists. However, the attempt was unsuccessful, and the Communists were defeated at Changsha in September.³¹

Following its defeat, Mao and Chu-Tech, who were now leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, decided to change tactics by neglecting the line laid down by Moscow in favor of one of Mao's own devising. The decision divided the Party wide open because questions were raised on the effectiveness of the revolution: Should it be centered on the industrial proletariat or was it to be based on the peasant?³² Mao had confidence in the peasants compared to the Chinese urban proletariats, who were few in number and uninterested in revolution. Mao's ideas were productive, and the Chinese Communist Party later implemented his decisions. In 1930, the Generalissimo (Chiang) declared war on the communist in an attempt to suppress what he called the Bandit. However, the campaign uncovered how weak the Nationalists were, as government troops ran away or surrendered to the Communists in their hundreds.³³

Consequently, Chiang reluctantly accepted the strategies of his German advisers, and commit well equipped, trained, and loyal troop against the Communist. For the first time the Communist were isolated from the peasants and almost wiped out by the

³¹ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 16.

³² Ibid., 17.

³³ Ibid.

Nationalist. Communist morale was completely damaged as a result. It was in this context that the bold decision to shift the base to Shensi Province was taken.³⁴ “Later, after the base was shifted to Yen-an, Mao had time to reflect on his experiences and to derive from them the theory and doctrine of revolutionary guerrilla war, which he embodied in *Yu Chi Chum*.”³⁵ Considering his experience, Mao came up with a three-phase theory a revolutionary movement must undertake for it to be successful:

Phase 1: Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation of Regional Base Areas

Organization, consolidation, and preservation of regional base areas are usually in difficult and isolated terrain. At the initial phase of Revolutionary war, recruitment begins in remote rural areas where government presence is minimal, here volunteers are trained and indoctrinated, and from here, agitators and propagandists set out individually or in groups to the environs in order to convince the people, and to solicit for their support. Over time, the group becomes trusted by the peasants, who sympathize with them, and are willing to supply food, recruits, and information to the revolutionist.³⁶ The government on the other hand will always make effort to fish out or apprehend the revolutionary organization. But it is more difficult for the government to succeed because, in remote areas, the peasant population is small, so it is harder for the

³⁴ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 18.

³⁵ Ibid., 19.

³⁶ Ibid., 20.

government to penetrate them or gather intelligence. The pattern of this operation is conspiratorial, underground, methodical, and progressive.³⁷

Phase 2: Progressive expansion

Phase 2 is the “progressive expansion.” The transition to phase II involves direct action, guerrilla warfare and arms struggles. Guerrillas engaged in acts of sabotage and terrorism in order to achieve their objectives. Attacks are carefully planned and the group takes advantage on vulnerable military and police target, weak columns are ambushed as well. The guerrilla carried out these operations primarily to acquire arms, ammunition, and other essential material that will further their movement. They also conducted such attack to create fear and cause panic in the rank of government forces by their action. They kidnap and carry out executions of prominent individuals just to create attention and prove to the people that they are capable of reaching the enemy. As the guerrilla forces expands their network, they attempt to organize their movement in political settings, with indoctrination of the inhabitants of neighboring districts soon to be absorbed into the expanding “liberated” area. One of the primary objectives during the first phases is to persuade as many people as possible to commit themselves to the movement, so that it gradually acquires the quality of “mass.”³⁸

³⁷ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 21.

³⁸ Ibid.

Phase 3: Decision or Destruction of the Enemy.

Decision or Destruction of the Enemy. It is during this phase that a substantial number of the active guerrilla force completes its transformation into a conventional formation capable of confronting the government troops in conventional combat. The revolutionists may enter into negotiations. Normally the revolutionists do not initiate such negotiations; they rarely compromise, except for a strategic advantage. Negotiations are accepted for deceptive measures, either to gain military, political, social, or economic positions. Only on few occasions, concessions are met from the revolutionary side, whose goal is only to make conditions that will preserve its movement and guarantee the expansion of a “victorious situation.”³⁹

Mao also emphasized on the importance of “intelligence” in planning guerrilla operations. Guerrillas look for lapses from the government troops and capitalize on them. They ensure that the disposition, supply route, and morale of government troops and commanders are constantly observed and taken advantage of when the need arise. Guerrillas also look to their intelligence community for answers to these and dozens more detailed questions. Guerrilla intelligence nets are closely organized and persistent.⁴⁰ They deny all information of themselves to government troops, who are engulfed in an impenetrable fog. Guerrillas often avoid combat in unfavorable conditions, except when the chance of victory presents itself.⁴¹ Mao once stated, not completely foolishly, that

³⁹ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 22.

⁴¹ Ibid., 23.

guerrillas must be expert at running away since they do it so often. They avoid static dispositions because their efforts are to constantly keep the situation as fluid as possible, and to strike where and when the government forces least expects them. Only by this method, can they retain the initiative and be guaranteed of freedom of action.⁴²

Concept of Insurgency

Normally, insurgent groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, and similar networks fall into the category of “irregular warfare,” because they lack the organization of a revolution, even though it has the same aims. Insurgents usually take advantage of remote areas, where they build momentum and gain local support in order to operate effectively. An insurgency may take the form of ethnic or religious identity related to political or economic struggle. Insurgents tend to use guerrilla tactics such as bombing, ambushing, kidnapping, killings, and assassination in order to create fear or gain recognition.⁴³

The U.S Government Counterinsurgency Guide defines insurgency as the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. It is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities to be effective.⁴⁴ Insurgents are a locally motivated group whose movement is primarily political, both the

⁴² Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 24.

⁴³ Merriam-Webster, s.v. “Insurgency,” accessed 2 December 2016, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/insurgency>.

⁴⁴ Department of State et al., *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, 2.

insurgent and government use armed force to pursue their political, economic and influence activities.

While insurgency may involve other actors with different interests, a single national group, as seen in the case of Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, does not always conduct it; they are loosely connected in dynamic and non-hierarchical networks.⁴⁵ The insurgencies need a charismatic leadership, supporters, and funding (mostly from illegal activities) in order to operate successfully. Depending on the situation, insurgent group may receive local or foreign support from state or non-state actors based on their interests. It is also important that the regime understands the insurgents' sources of inspiration, support, and fundamental grievances in order to conduct a successful counterinsurgency operation.⁴⁶

According to Dr Thomas A. Marks, the works of Mao Tse-tung are unavoidable in any discussion of insurgency. Hence, it is essential to understand Mao's approach to irregular warfare in order to gain advantage over insurgent groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram, or similar movements.⁴⁷ Apparently, state actors need to study the characteristics and features of insurgents in order to defeat them. It would be wrong to focus only on the military aspects of insurgencies. Mao's approach to guerrilla warfare indicates the

⁴⁵ Department of State et al., *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, 2.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Thomas Marks, "Mao Tse-Tung and the Search for 21st Century Counterinsurgency," *CTC Sentinel* 2, no. 10 (October 2009): 17-20, accessed 3 December 2016, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/mao-tse-tung-and-the-search-for-21st-century-counterinsurgency>.

fundamental goal of all insurgent movements is strategically political, and directed operationally through multiple lines of struggle, only one of which was violence.⁴⁸

As insurgents grow stronger, the neutralization of the military becomes their objective with the aim to achieve strategic stalemate. However, he acknowledged that violence is critical to insurgencies, but it is not the most important element. The “cause of the struggle is the most important element. Violence is an enabler for “the cause” to advance.⁴⁹ The scholar listed five questions a counterinsurgent effort must ask of any irregular challenge:

1. What is the political content of the movement?
2. Who are its domestic allies?
3. How is it using violence?
4. How is it using non-violence?
5. What is it doing internationally?

The writer was of the opinion that insurgent groups may be different in their lines of effort. “Nevertheless, Mao has provided an approach which, when turned inside out, allows insight into any insurgent project.”⁵⁰

Dr. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen blamed the current expansion of insurgents’ activities across the world on various factors, which includes globalization, failed economic development, widespread hatred, presence of weak regimes,

⁴⁸ Marks, “Mao Tse-Tung.”

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

transnational organized crime, and arms proliferation among others. They assert that the 21st century counterinsurgency operation presents a new challenge to strategies, operational concept, and doctrine. They identified two categories of insurgency, namely “national” and “liberation.” National insurgency involves the insurgents and a national government, which has at least some degree of legitimacy and support.”⁵¹

National insurgency may occur as a result of political, ethnic, or religious bias. National insurgencies are triangular because other actors may actively participate or provide support to any of the party, but the conflict is obviously between the insurgents and the government.⁵² For liberation insurgencies, the insurgents are engaged with a foreign power that is seen as an outsider (even though they might not actually be) by virtue of race, ethnicity, or culture. The goal of the insurgents is to liberate their nation from foreign occupation.

It is difficult to eliminate this category of insurgency as seen in the apartheid regime in South Africa and the Palestinian insurgency.⁵³ According to the writers, insurgencies vary across time and region, but most follow a common life cycle. Despite the fact that most governments have discovered ways to counter Maoist People’s War,

⁵¹ Steven Metz and Remond A. Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 1-2.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid., 3.

the factors that motivate insurgents, such as repression, frustration, anger, deprivation, and an inability to ameliorate these through legitimate political means, persist.⁵⁴

David Galula, in *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, described insurgency as a prolonged struggle conducted systematically, in order to achieve specific intermediate goals leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.⁵⁵ The action of insurgents is politically driven he observed. In conventional war, either of the actors can initiate conflict, unlike revolutionary warfare where an insurgent, alone, can initiate conflict even though he may not necessarily be the one to first use force. This gives the insurgent the strategic advantage to choose the time or place to strike. Counterinsurgency is a difficult operation to conduct, especially in countries where political rivalry is tolerated. Unless the insurgent develops to a level capable of confronting the government using subversion or open violence, he represents nothing, but an indefinite or likely danger to the counterinsurgent, and do not offer a concrete target that would justify a large effort.⁵⁶

At the beginning of conflict, the regime tends to have overwhelming superiority in tangible assets against the insurgent. This is due to its control over all instruments of national power and international recognition. Meanwhile the insurgent lacks this asset. However, the situation is reversed in the field of intangibles. “The insurgent has a

⁵⁴ Metz and Millen, *Insurgency*, 4.

⁵⁵ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practices* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), 3, accessed 6 December 2016, <http://louisville.edu/armyrotc/files/Galula%20David%20-%20Counterinsurgency%20Warfare.pdf>.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

formidable asset the-ideological power of a cause on which to base his action.”⁵⁷ The insurgent will always aim at changing his intangible assets into concrete ones. As the government focuses on defeating the insurgent, the insurgent will continue to advance in his course or fail.⁵⁸

Anthony B. Aguilar asserts that the spread of insurgencies all over the world amongst failing centers of nation state authority, account for over 75 percent of militarized disputes since 1945.⁵⁹ Nearly every country, race, or religion is directly or indirectly affected by intrastate conflict today. He suggested, “Unified Action partners need an integrated system based framework to analyze insurgency from the onset to outcome.”⁶⁰ Their motivation, root cause, how they organize, and method of operation must be considered. Demonstrated by history, it has been observed that military actions alone do not create the desired end state for favorable conflict resolution.⁶¹

Insurgencies occurred in different form according to the writer. They can be referred to as revolutionary, reformist, separatist, resistance, and commercialist; and they are politically based, militarily organized, or urban-cellular networks.⁶² The writer

⁵⁷ Galula, *Counterinsurgency*, 6.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁵⁹ Anthony B. Aguilar, “On Insurgency” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2014), 2, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWEG/AY_2014/Aguilar,%20A%202014.pdf.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Aguilar, “On Insurgency,” 2.

posited that insurgencies are best understood by concentrating on the multilevel complexity, spiraling emergent properties, fundamental stories, histories, and political language, rather than predetermined goal or typology.⁶³

Bruscino Thomas says insurgencies are not a modern-day phenomenon. In the past, smaller groups have engaged in guerrilla style warfare against established power. During the American War of Independence, some forms of insurgent warfare took place, especially in the Southern colonies.⁶⁴ Insurgent warfare (guerrilla warfare) has been employed by most insurgent groups during conflict in order to achieve their political goal. However, insurgencies have come to be more predominant in the 20th century, repeatedly as part of efforts to eject Western powers from their colonial territories. Western powers were key architect in the creation of the modern system of nation-state, and therefore, tend to respect that system of international boundaries. The current struggle against fundamentalist Muslim insurgents indicates that international borders do not confine the enemy.⁶⁵

Despite their devotion to ideology, the extremists understand and use the international system; notwithstanding, their dismissal of nations and states for their version of promoting Jihad, they gratefully hide behind the veil of state boundaries.⁶⁶

⁶³ Ibid., 3.

⁶⁴ Thomas A. Bruscino, Jr., *Out of Bounds: Transnational Sanctuary in Irregular Warfare* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 6, accessed 10 December 2016, <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/bruscino.pdf>.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 1.

⁶⁶ Bruscino, *Out of Bounds*, 109.

Some states contend against the insurgents, but are unable of completely bringing to an end the use of their boundaries. Others favor the insurgents for reasons stretching from regional power politics to sympathy for insurgent ideology to hostility to the United States and its allies, either directly supporting the radicals or knowingly allowing them to make use of their lands. Therefore, international borders, and the transnational sanctuaries and supply lines that they protect, have become a crucial issue in the global effort to eradicate such groups.⁶⁷

Byman Daniel writes, “Insurgents engage in a range of activities, most notable guerrilla warfare, but also political mobilization and attendant efforts to attract support from abroad.”⁶⁸ External support for insurgent groups by some state actors remains an essential source of strength for many groups after World War II. External government support assists the insurgent to improve his military strength, recruitment efforts, diplomatic influence, and other requirements for success.⁶⁹ Other than the state actors, insurgent groups also benefit more from non-state actors, such as those in the diaspora, refugees, individuals, and similar networks who play a vital role in sustaining several foremost insurgencies. “For instance, the Palestinian, Irish, Tamil, and Kurdish diaspora

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Daniel Byman et al., *Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 5, accessed 19 December 2016, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR1405.pdf.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 2.

have helped foster strong insurgencies that have weathered concerted attacks of dedicated states.”⁷⁰

External support received by an insurgency from state or non-state actors can prolong the war, intensify the scale and lethality of its fight, and may even change a civil conflict into a global war. The effects of external support can be both positive and negative, or unpredictable. Even though concrete overthrow of an enemy government is comparatively uncommon, the assistance provided to an insurgency can regularly produce a number of less determined benefits, such as weakening an antagonistic government and strengthening a rival group’s bid for control or simply representing support for tribal kin.⁷¹

More so, external support can create tension, provoke foreign intervention, and escalate partial friction into full-size conflict. Such intensification can produce greater instability within the region. The writer stresses that external support receives relatively little attention today. Byman, therefore, endeavors to fill some conceptual and intellectual gaps by surveying the current status of external support for insurgent movements and assessing its impact and implications, to aid intelligence experts to recognize the factors that affect the conduct of insurgencies, and better predict their success or failure.⁷²

⁷⁰ Byman et al., *Trends*, 2-3.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid., 5.

Concept of Boko Haram

Oluwatosin Babalola, in *Combating Extremism and Insurgency in Nigeria*, refers to the Boko Haram sect as the “most recent extremist group in Nigeria,” which continues to commit a lot of violence atrocity against soft targets.⁷³ Despite Nigerian government efforts to combat the sect, it continues to prove resistance as he claimed that the government lacked the solution in dealing with the challenge of violent extremism.⁷⁴ Several attempts by extremist groups to forcefully impose religious ideology in northern Nigeria seem to threaten the peaceful co-existence of the country, a country with diverse religious beliefs.⁷⁵ The writer notes that the colonial legacy, among other factors such as socio-economic conditions, corruption, and weak political institutions of government, contributed to the increase in violent extremism in the country, especially northern Nigeria.⁷⁶ However, he suggested the government should consider the use of military force as a last resort, after first exploring other traditional approaches to conflict resolution.

Dr. Muhammad F. Othman described insurgencies as being “old as civilization but became most prominent after the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center in

⁷³ Oluwatosin Babalola, *Combating Violence Extremism and Insurgency in Nigeria* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office), 4-5, accessed 7 December 2016, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/Collaboration/universities/Boko-Haram-Scourge.pdf>.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 6.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 7.

the United States by Al-Qaeda.”⁷⁷ He notes that the anti-Western ideology of Boko Haram has earned the group recognition and concern about its potential relationship with other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Al-Shabab.⁷⁸ Boko Haram, which started as a domestic sect in the northeast Nigeria, has spread across the regions of the Chad Basin. Boko Haram activities have a negative impact on the economy of Nigeria like other terrorist activities across the globe.⁷⁹ The continued attacks on government installations and organizations, and bank robberies have chased away investors, both local and foreign. Additionally, military allocation has taken priority over other sectors of government, which is detrimental to national development and growth.⁸⁰ Othman opts for a tough government approach in combating Boko Haram in order to create a conducive atmosphere for business activities, which directly improves the conditions of the people.

Adesoji Abimbola, in *The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria*, notes “The Boko Haram uprising was not the first forceful attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular Nigerian society.” The recurrence of religious conflict was traced back to the Maitatsine sect in 1980, an Islamic group that attempts to undermine the Nigerian state and forcefully introduced a religious ideology. Government

⁷⁷ Mohammad F. Othman, “An Analysis of the Impact of Boko Haram Insurgents on Business Entrepreneurship Environment in Nigeria,” *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 4, no. 3 (November 2015): 37.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 38.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 41.

crackdown on the groups resulted in widespread resistance by its members, which led to the death of scores, and damage to properties in several northern parts of the country. However, the Boko Haram uprising was distinctive in that it not only set a pattern, but also reinforced Islamic conservative efforts to impose religious ideology throughout regions of Nigeria. She attributed the uprising of the Boko Haram insurgency to the religious sensitivity of Nigerians, the prevailing economic situation in the country, party politics, and inconsistency of some vocal Islamic leaders. The group is suspected to have been inspired by the Taliban of Afghanistan.⁸¹

Israel Adoba, who wrote *Domestic Terrorism and National Security in Nigeria*, emphasized, “Northern Nigeria has been a hotbed of religious uprising, most often between the dominant Muslims and minority Christians in the region. Islam has become heterogeneous with the springing up of many Islamic sects. These sects are opposed to the local Nigerian Islamic teachings of the Sufi brotherhood and are gradually alienating themselves from the main Islamic body.”⁸² The Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s was a good example of the emerging trend of domestic terrorism in Nigeria. However, the emergence of Boko Haram and their operation is a departure from the religious uprising in northern Nigeria, as observed in the dimension of violence carried out by the sect that has never been witnessed before in the country. These activities have resulted in the death of scores of people and damage to property. Adoba attributed the causes of this spate of

⁸¹ Adesoji. “The Boko Haram Uprising,” 95-108.

⁸² Israel Adoba, “Domestic Terrorism and National Security in Nigeria: A Critical Analysis of Hostage Taking and Kidnapping,” Academia, 2016, accessed 9 December 2016, 26-28, https://www.academia.edu/9192626/Domestic_Terrorism_and_National_Security_in_Nigeria_A_Critical_Analysis_of_Hostage-Taking_and_Kidnapping, 26-28.

violence to economic imbalance, psychology, political differences, and grievances among certain groups of people in the country.⁸³

Summary

The above review of literature discusses the concept of insurgency in relation to Mao's Revolutionary War model. Scholarly views were also examined and deliberated upon for a clear understanding of the root causes of insurgency and its effect on the society. Furthermore, experts' views on the dreaded Boko Haram insurgency, its links with other insurgent organization, and their method of operation were looked at as the focal point of this research paper. The review also discussed the origin and foundation of the Boko Haram crisis in the northern part of Nigeria, as well as the Nigerian government's response to the insurgents.

⁸³ Adoba, "Domestic Terrorism," 19.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology provides an understanding of the framework of this study. This research paper concentrates on descriptive content analysis of primary and secondary information to examine the ongoing Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. This chapter will discuss the research methodology designed to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The research is significant to the Nigerian government, its partners, and civil societies concerned with the eradication of the Boko Haram insurgency. The study will seek to understand the conceptual basis that lies behind the activities of Boko Haram.

Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this study is to seek an understanding of the concepts behind the Boko Haram Insurgency, and look at possible ways the Nigerian government can effectively fight the Boko Haram insurgency. The primary research question is: Does Mao's Revolutionary Warfare theory provide a useful framework for understanding Boko Haram? The secondary research question is: How can the Nigerian government effectively fight the Boko Haram insurgency based on Mao's Revolutionary Warfare theory?

Methodology

The methodology used for this study is a qualitative method of research aimed at assessing the case study using Mao's theory of revolutionary war as a tool for analyzing the Boko Haram insurgency and its mode of operation. Boko Haram insurgents have

engaged the Nigerian government and security forces using various means and tactics in order to get to their objectives. The research will look at both primary and secondary sources of information to critically analyze the Boko Haram insurgency and their organizations.

The hypothesis of this research will argue that Mao's theory of revolutionary war provides a valid framework for understanding the ongoing Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The null hypothesis is that Mao's theory of revolutionary war does not provide a valid framework for understanding the ongoing Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The Dependent Variable is the Degree of Adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram.

This thesis will attempt to disprove (reject) the null hypothesis by demonstrating that Mao's theory of revolutionary war can be applied to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. Using Mao's theory of revolutionary war as a guide, the study reviews Boko Haram's strategy, activities, and motives since its inception. This allows a comparative analysis that can clearly establish whether Mao's theory of revolutionary war fits the reported evidence regarding Boko Haram.

To address the secondary research question, Mao's theory of revolutionary war will be compared to the activities that have been taken thus far to combat Boko Haram. This should identify any areas that have been ignored and can be acted upon.

Data and Information Needed to Address the Primary and Secondary Questions

To address the primary and secondary research question, a clear understanding of Mao's Theory of Revolutionary War and its component criteria must be developed to

provide a clear and testable framework for analysis of the Boko Haram insurgency. A detailed chronological list of Boko Haram activities, operations, messages, and responses to attempts to counter the group are required. To address the secondary research question a detailed chronological list of the activities that have been taken thus far to combat Boko Haram is required.

Data Collection Method

Data was collected from scholarly writings, books, journal articles, media reports, reports from US Department of Justice, Nigerian government officials, UN reports, and unpublished materials to contribute to the work.

Organization of the Research Process

The research process will consist of three main phases. The collection and selection of data and information will be developed in the first phase. The second phase will establish methods, criteria, and metrics of comparison between Mao's theory of revolutionary war and Boko Haram. In the final phase, collected data and information will be compared and analyzed in order to formulate a clear and concise conclusion.

Criteria and Metrics to Determine Adherence to Mao's theory of Revolutionary War

All of the following criteria provide a category that can be used to determine whether the Boko Haram insurgency adheres to Mao's theory of revolutionary war. Each criteria has one or more metrics that will allow measurement of the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war (Dependent Variable). Each of these metrics will be examined using the available data to determine the degree of adherence to Mao's theory.

The degree of adherence will be reported using a simple scale of: no adherence = 0, limited adherence = 1, partial adherence = 2, and complete adherence = 3. The score for all metrics within a criterion will be averaged to provide a single score for each criteria. These scores then will indicate the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war (Dependent Variable) by criteria.

Politics. Politics is defined for this thesis as: Activities targeted towards influencing the policies of a government or actions carried out by groups in order to get and keep power in a government.⁸⁴ Insurgency is primarily a political struggle, in which groups use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities.⁸⁵ Clausewitz notes, "War is mere continuation of Politics by other means."⁸⁶ Guerrilla leaders ensure that their fighters are politically inclined and fully aware of the issues at stake. Politics forms part of their doctrine and teaching, key leaders placed emphasis in organization, instruction, agitation, and propaganda work aimed at winning over the people.⁸⁷ The metrics used to measure Politics as criteria to determine adherence to Mao's theory of Revolutionary War are: 1) doctrine and teaching, 2) organization, 3) instruction, 4) agitation and propaganda work. Each of these metrics will be examined using the available data to determine the degree of adherence to Mao's theory.

⁸⁴ Merriam-Webster, s.v. "Politics," accessed 10 December 2016, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/politics>.

⁸⁵ Department of State et al., *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, 2.

⁸⁶ "War is a mere continuation of Politics by (with) other means." Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

⁸⁷ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 8.

Intelligence. Intelligence is defined for this thesis as: Information collected from multiple sources by multiple means to assist in planning guerrilla operations. Mao emphasized the significance of intelligence in planning guerrilla operations. Mao said that intelligence is; “The decisive factor in planning guerrilla operations.”⁸⁸ Guerrillas look for gaps from the observations of regular army and capitalize on them. Using the knowledge of the terrain, guerrillas carefully study the government troops, their disposition, routine activities, supply route, and confidence of government troops. They are cautious of the capabilities of government troops whether they are tough/soft, efficient, well disciplined, or poorly trained. Guerrilla intelligence networks are closely organized and determined. In a guerrilla-controlled territory, every person is an agent irrespective of age, sex, or position.⁸⁹ Guerrillas gather all conceivable information about the enemy, they are able to use it to their advantage and the enemy’s disadvantage. Because of the superior knowledge of terrain, guerrillas avoid risk, and only operate when the opportunities present itself.⁹⁰ The metrics used to measure Intelligence as criteria to determine adherence to Mao’s theory of Revolutionary War are: (1) knowledge of the terrain, (2) study of government troops, 3) organization, and 4) use of civilians.

Use of Violence. Use of violence is defined for this thesis as: The resort to the use of force to intimidate people, or cause damage to property for personal goal or political

⁸⁸ Ibid., 22.

⁸⁹ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 23.

means.⁹¹ Dr Thomas A. Marks perceives violence as one of the multiple lines of struggle through which an insurgent movement is directed operationally. Violence is critical to guerrillas, as they grow stronger; the neutralization of the military becomes their objective with the aim to achieve strategic stalemate. Violence is an enabler for “the cause” to advance.⁹² Use of violence is strategic and synonymous to most struggles; it is used for propaganda and spread of fear and terror among people and across the regions. The metrics used to measure use of violence as criteria to determine adherence to Mao’s theory of revolutionary war are: 1) strategic violence, 2) used for propaganda, 3) used to spread fear and terror.

Decentralization. Decentralization is defined for this thesis as: A method use by guerrillas to keep their operation as fluid as possible in order to mislead the enemy. Guerrillas operate in small units that can be easily overrun by a regular force. However, operating in smaller groups affords guerrillas speed, and the ability to easily penetrate into the exposed rear of the enemy. That is, the enemy’s rear becomes the guerrillas’ front. Mao, in his principle of “unity of opposite,” comprehended that within strength lies weakness, and within weakness, strength. Mao once mentioned that guerrillas must avoid static disposition in order to retain the initiative and be assure of freedom of action. Their aim is to keep the situation unstable, and engage the enemy where they least expected. Whereas, in conventional military tactics, dispersion of forces calls for failure or

⁹¹ Merriam-Webster, s.v. “Violence,” accessed 17 November 2016, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/violence>.

⁹² Marks, “Mao Tse-tung,” 17-19.

disaster.⁹³ The metrics used to measure Decentralization as criteria to determine adherence to Mao's theory of Revolutionary War are: 1) avoiding static disposition; 2) actions taken to retain the initiative; and 3) engage the enemy where least expected.

Organization, Consolidation and Preservation of Base Area in Usually Isolated and Difficult Terrain. This is a key feature of Mao's theory of revolutionary war after the defeat of the urban-based communist party in September 1930.⁹⁴ Mao decided to shift from the party's ideas of Marxist revolution, which was centered on winning over the workers (proletariat) in urban areas, to build the struggle on peasants in remote locations.⁹⁵ Guerrillas usually take advantage of remote areas where government presence is minimal or absent to establish a base. Here fighters are trained and indoctrinated. Before the government could realize, they would have persuaded and convinced the inhabitants of the locality to join or support their movement. In remote areas, it becomes very easy for the guerrilla movement to spring up because of the support they enjoyed from the locals who are mostly peasants, illiterates, and those who are upset with the system.⁹⁶ The metric used to measure this as a criteria to determine adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war is whether Boko Haram has organized, consolidated, and preserved a base area in an isolated area.

⁹³ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 24-25.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 16.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 17.

⁹⁶ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 20.

Progressive Expansion. Progressive expansion is defined for this thesis as the spreading out of the guerrilla's movement and creating awareness. At this stage, the guerrillas' primary aim is to expand their control of the region by persuading many people to involve themselves in the struggle, so that they can progressively attain the quality of "*mass*." In addition, guerrillas engaged in acts of sabotage and terrorism in order to achieve their objectives. Attacks are carefully planned and the group takes advantage of vulnerable military and police targets; weak columns are ambushed as well. The guerrillas carried out these operations primarily to acquire arms, ammunition, and other essential material that will further their movement.⁹⁷ The metrics used to measure progressive expansion as criteria to determine adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war are: 1) attacks on vulnerable military and police targets, 2) expanding control of territory, 3) increased recruitment, 4) expanding material inventory.

Decision or Destruction of the Enemy. Decision or Destruction of the enemy is defined for this thesis as: The confrontational phase in which a substantial number of the active guerrilla force completes its transformation into a conventional formation capable of confronting the government troops in conventional combat. The revolutionists may enter into negotiations. Normally the revolutionists do not initiate such negotiations; they rarely compromise, except for a strategic advantage. Negotiations are accepted for deceptive measures, either to gain military, political, social, or economic positions. Only on a few occasions, concessions are met from the revolutionary side, whose goal is only to make conditions that will preserve its movement and guarantee the expansion of a

⁹⁷ Ibid., 21.

“victorious situation.”⁹⁸ The metrics used to measure Decision or Destruction of the enemy as criteria to determine adherence to Mao’s theory of revolutionary war are: 1) guerrilla force converts into conventional formations 2) Negotiations for deceptive measures.

Validity and Limitations

The validity of this case study is tied to the theoretical model used to analyze the data. This thesis accepts Mao’s theory of revolutionary war as a valid basis for inquiry into the nature of insurgencies. This study is limited in that it explores only one ongoing case of a current insurgency as its topic of study. Applicability of the conclusions beyond the current case cannot be demonstrated without further research.

Summary

The emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria has created a security vacuum within the region. The threat to Nigeria, its neighbors and the international community cannot be ignored. The group has engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Nigerian government and its citizens for the last decade. Despite efforts by the Nigerian government and its partners to combat the Boko Haram insurgency, the group continues to pose threats and challenges to the government of Nigeria and its partners.

This study uses Mao’s theory of revolutionary war as a tool for analyzing the Boko Haram insurgency. By comparing the component criteria of Mao’s theory to the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency in chapter 4 this study will attempt to determine

⁹⁸ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22.

if the insurgency conforms to the theory or not. Then comparing the efforts to counter the Boko Haram insurgency to Mao's theory of revolutionary war should provide insights that may allow the Nigerian government to more effectively fight the Boko Haram insurgency. This analysis should allow for results and recommendations to be presented in chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. In doing so, this chapter will use the variables identified in the previous chapter to analyze the Boko Haram activities in relation to Mao's revolutionary theory and principles of guerrilla warfare. This chapter also seeks to answer the research question: Does Mao's revolutionary war theory provide a useful understanding of the Boko Haram? Additionally, the research analysis will consider the Nigerian government's approach towards combating the insurgent group with a view to making recommendations in chapter 5. These recommendations will attempt to answer the secondary research question, how can the Nigerian government effectively fight the Boko Haram insurgency based on Mao's Revolutionary Warfare theory?

The following criteria allow for measurement of the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war (Dependent Variable).

Politics

In most cases, a revolutionary guerrilla movement usually occurs in situations whereby the people feel marginalized by their own government, which fails to provide basic needs of life that will meet the aspirations of the great majority of its people, or part of its population.⁹⁹ Under these conditions, it is most likely a political movement, organization, or revolutionary party will take advantage of the people's woes to create a

⁹⁹ Mao Tse-tung. University of Illinois Press, 5.

grassroots uprising. In many societies today, the people are divided into two classes, the rich and poor. Usually, aggrieved youth, mostly from poor backgrounds, oppose government policies perceived as unfavorable to the people, who demand change. These problems lead to a political movement using violence as an instrument or, alternatively, peaceful demonstrations targeted at replacing the government or its institutions seen as corrupt and illegitimate by a particular segment of the population.¹⁰⁰ Mao placed emphasis on the political aspect of the guerrilla movement, which is vital to the struggle. He once remarked that guerrillas are politically motivated and conscious of the issues at stake, even before they are trained to fight.¹⁰¹

The reason behind the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria is strategical political, in that the insurgents are attempting to replace the Nigerian state with an Islamic state governed by Sharia law, especially in the northern Muslim dominated region. Sharia law is an Islamic law based on the Quran, which regulates both public and private conduct.¹⁰² Boko Haram believes a strict Islamic state under Sharia law would address the problems of corruption, bad governance, and Western influence, which does not meet the desires of the Muslim population.¹⁰³ Before the annexation of Nigeria by Great Britain in 1885, the

¹⁰⁰ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 5-6.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 8.

¹⁰² *Merriam-Webster* (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, n.d.), s.v. "Sharia Law," accessed 17 November 2016, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sharia%20law>.

¹⁰³ International Crisis Group, "Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II) Africa Report No. 216: The Boko Haram Insurgency," 9 April 2014, accessed 10 February 2017, <https://www.ecoi.net/>

Nigerian people were organized as independent states based on ethnic and religious identity. Noticeably among them were the Kanem-Borno in the Northeast, Hausa-Fulani in the Northwest, Yoruba in the Southwest, and Igbo in the Southeast.¹⁰⁴ During the colonial period, Sharia law was commonly practiced among the northern Muslim population because of the influence of Islam in the region.¹⁰⁵

Sharia law, practiced in northern Nigeria, can be traced back to the late eighteenth century, when Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio, an Islamic scholar, and his followers mostly from the Hausa-Fulani tribe became passionate supporters of strict Islamic compliance across the region. From 1804-1808, Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio and his followers led a successful holy war (jihad) against Muslim rulers of the Hausa's Dynasty because of their failure to adhere to strict Islamic practices. In 1809, Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio established an Islamic Caliphate in Sokoto district, from where most the northern regions of Nigeria were governed throughout most of the nineteenth century. The Islamic Caliphate was structured as a loose confederation of emirates that were tied to the central authority of the Caliph (spiritual leader), and based on strict Islamic law. Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio died in 1817, after which his son, Mohammed Bello, succeeded him. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Caliphate had expanded its territory to thirty emirates and the capital district of Sokoto. Usman Dan Fodio's jihadist movement became one of the

file_upload/1226_1396951718_216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf.

¹⁰⁴ Toyin Falola and Matthew M. Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 6.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 32.

largest empires in Africa before British colonial interference. His movement provided the motivation for a series of holy wars conducted beyond the borders of Nigeria.¹⁰⁶

Muslims account for about 50 percent of the Nigerian population; Christians, 40 percent; while 10 percent are believed to be traditional worshipers.¹⁰⁷ By 1903, the British already occupied the southern and northern regions of Nigeria by the use of military force. The Sokoto Caliphate was eventually conquered by the British, and its rulers deposed. Subsequently, the deposed Fulani emirs were given conditions in order to be reinstalled, and served under the British by indirect rule of the indigenous people. The British indirect policy rule provides a dual system of law that existed between the Colonial masters and the locals. For instance, in the northern region, Sharia Islamic law court continued to handle local issues concerning the Muslim populations.¹⁰⁸

In 1960, Nigeria got its independence from Britain. The Nigerian founding fathers settled on a federal system of government that represents every sector of the country. This was an attempt to address the diverse and complex nature of the people. Under this system, the federal, state, and local governments were established. The state government has the power to enact law, and maintains some level of autonomy. However, the state government remains subordinate to the federal government, and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria takes precedence over all laws of the land.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ Chapin Metz, 21.

¹⁰⁷ Falola and Heaton, 4.

¹⁰⁸ Chapin Metz, 31-32.

¹⁰⁹ Falola and Heaton, 7-8.

However, agitation for Sharia law, and a series of attempts by some political leaders, mostly from the North, to identify the Nigerian state with other Islamic organizations, has created tension and division among the people. The status of Sharia law in the Nigeria's legal system has remain an unresolved issue between Christians and Muslims for decades. In the year 2000, twelve northern states, led by their governors, implemented Sharia law code in their respective states.¹¹⁰ These actions resulted in several protests across the states and country by Christians, who felt sidelined.

Boko Haram emerged in 2002 in the wake of Sharia declaration by governors of twelve states of the northern regions of Nigeria. The insurgent's aim was to reinforce the implementation of Sharia law across the country and the establishment of an Islamic state.¹¹¹ Boko Haram's approach to the struggle for an Islamic state took on a different dimension from other Islamic fundamentalist groups that Nigeria has witnessed in the past. Since its emergence, the insurgent group has employed all forms of guerrilla tactics and violence to unleash mayhem against the state and people in an attempt to replace the Nigerian institutions, which they perceived as corrupt and Western inclined.¹¹² Boko Haram took advantage of the prevailing situation to mobilize support, and recruited fighters to carry out a revolutionary Jihadist movement against the Nigerian state.

¹¹⁰ Chukwuma O. Ani, "Combating Terrorism: A Case Study of Nigeria Against Boko Haram Terrorist Group" (master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2014), 4-5.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 32.

¹¹² U.S Department of Justice, "Nigeria: Boko Haram (LL File No. 2014-010945)," 2-3, Accessed 10 February 2017.
<https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/07/28/2014-010945%20NG%20Rp7.pdf>.

The metrics used to measure politics as criteria to determine adherence to Mao's theory of Revolutionary War are: 1) doctrine and teaching, 2) organization, 3) instruction, 4) agitation and propaganda work. Each of these metrics will be examined using the available data to determine the degree of adherence to Mao's theory. The degree of adherence will be reported using a simple scale of: no adherence = 0, limited adherence = 1, partial adherence = 2, and complete adherence = 3.

Doctrine and Teaching. Most nation states and their armies tend to keep their soldiers away from politics. However, guerrillas do exactly the opposite. Key leaders in a revolutionary movement go to a great length to ensure their men are politically educated and motivated in fighting their cause. The guerrilla fighter is politically indoctrinated, even before he is taught to shoot accurately. Doctrine and teaching of followers is one of the most important features of a guerrilla movement. Guerrilla leaders invest more time in organization, agitation, and propaganda activities than they do fighting. According to Mao, guerrilla leaders must patiently explain, persuade, and convince their men in order to stir the political atmosphere.¹¹³

Boko Haram was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri. Yusuf was a charismatic Islamic cleric, who led the youth wing (Islamic Youth Vanguard) of Ahl-Sunnah, a Salafi group in the 1990s. In 2002, Yusuf established an Islamic complex in Maiduguri, where he started teaching and agitating for the implementation of Sharia law across the northern region. His "big idea" was to establish an Islamic state where strict Sharia law is fully implemented. Yusuf became popular because of his radical ideas

¹¹³ Mao Tse-tung. University of Illinois Press, 8.

and agitation for strict Sharia compliance. He spent most of his time teaching, educating, and preparing his followers on the cause (strict Sharia compliance).¹¹⁴

Mohammed Yusuf was able to promote ant-Western feelings through his method of teachings, and thousands of followers were recruited. He led his followers to believe that Western education was the cause of their suffering, and corrupt government lacked the interest of the masses. Most of his followers were from poor backgrounds, school dropouts, and aggrieved, unemployed youth. However, some members joined the group based on religious conviction and support for strict Sharia compliance.¹¹⁵ Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Organization. Guerrillas' organizations begin in the various forms:

From the masses of the people, from regular army units temporarily detailed for the purpose, from regular army units permanently detailed, from the combination of a regular army unit and a unit recruited from the people, from the local militia, from deserters from the ranks of the enemy, and from former bandits and bandit groups.¹¹⁶

The Boko Haram insurgency can be described as the fundamental type, in which the guerrilla units are formed from the ranks of the masses of the people. The national army will always attempt to oppress or use excessive force to terminate the movement, but the leader of the movement will normally call his people to resist every form of oppression by the government, which would further lead to escalation. Subsequently, an armed

¹¹⁴ Walker, 1-15.

¹¹⁵ Babalola, Combating Violence, 15.

¹¹⁶ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 71-72.

group is formed, which takes up arms against the government and, thus, a guerrilla unit begins. Normally, the responsibility of the leadership of the guerrillas typically rests upon the shoulder of young student, teachers, professional men, or those without fixed professions, who are willing to risk everything and shed the last drop of their blood for the sake of the movement.¹¹⁷

Irrespective of the type of guerrilla movement, guerrilla organizations are tied to specific geographical areas. These regions may have several counties that are occupied by the guerrillas. The military unit of the guerrillas are divided into companies or battalions in their control areas, and are assigned responsibility according to designated area. In the guerrilla-held region, a military commander and political commissioner are appointed. The military or command headquarters control the various branches of the organization. Under the military wing, the headquarter staffs are controlled by the chief of staff, who answers to the overall commander. Meanwhile, political chairman oversees propaganda from the political headquarters. Depending on the geographical location, guerrilla expansion, and local enemy situation, the guerrilla areas are subdivided into smaller districts within its region.¹¹⁸

The Boko Haram insurgency is a homegrown movement that emerged from the people. Its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, formed the group based on radical Islamic ideas, which preaches against government corruption and agitates for Sharia law. Yusuf and his followers' inability to achieve these set goals resulted in frustration, and a subsequent call

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 71-72.

¹¹⁸ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 77.

for an authentic Islamic revolution.¹¹⁹ After government crackdown on the group in 2009 that led to the death of its leader and some members, the group went underground for about a year. During this period, Boko Haram transformed into a guerrilla movement with a new leader, Abubakar Shakau, who was Yusuf's deputy.¹²⁰

Boko Haram's organization is composed of the thirty-member, Shura Councils, with each member in charge of a cell. Each cell is designated a geographic area of responsibility. The organization is said to be commanded by an amir ul-aam (commander in chief), who oversees the Shura Council. In smaller districts where the group operates, a local amir is appointed to oversee the group. Besides a commander, who oversees and coordinates armed operations, the amir is assisted by a nabin (deputy), who is, in turn, assisted by a mu'askar. The Mu'askar conveys the instructions from the commander and the deputy to the foot soldiers. Cities and large towns are divided into sectors, which is administered by sub-armir for operational and administrative purpose. Decisions are made by the Council, whose members maintain contact only through limited use of mobile phones.¹²¹ The degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is therefore rated 3; complete adherence.

Instruction. Boko Haram is a branch of an Islamists Jihadist Salafi group whose teachings and practices are deeply rooted from the Qur'an and the traditions of the

¹¹⁹ International Crisis Group, 7.

¹²⁰ U.S Department of Justice, 3.

¹²¹ International Crisis Group, 18.

Prophet Mohammed.¹²² The aim of the Salafist is to promote conservative ideas of Islam based on Sharia, and the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf the founder of the Boko Haram group established an Islamic complex that comprised a Mosque and an Islamic school in Maiduguri town of Borno state. This complex became the breeding ground for the Islamic revolutionary movement as many ascribed to the teachings of Mohammed.¹²³ They built on this in the years in Maiduguri, providing guidance and instructions in accordance with the Salafist teachings of the Qur'an. Yusuf's teachings and recordings expanded into neighboring states, including Kano, Yobe, Bauchi, Niger, Adamawa, and Gombe of the northeast Nigeria. The complex was later relocated to Yusuf's hometown of Kanama Yobe state where the group eventually transformed to a fundamentalist revolutionary movement. After government crackdown on the group in 2009, it is not clear if they still maintained or ran the Islamic school in their base camp or somewhere else. However, this was one of the strategies used by its leaders to create anti-Western feelings among the people in order to discredit the Nigerian government, and call for a Sharia state.¹²⁴ Therefore the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 2; partial adherence.

¹²² Ibid., 7-8.

¹²³ James A. Falode, "The Nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram War, 2010-2015: A Strategic Analysis," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 1 (2016), accessed 14 February 2017, <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/488/html>.

¹²⁴ Daniel E. Agbiboa, "The Social Dynamics of Nigeria's Boko Haram Insurgency," Center for Effective Global Action, accessed 14 February 2017, http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/110_-_Agbiboa_-_ABCA.pdf.

Agitation and Propaganda Work. This is an important aspect of a revolutionary movement, where its leaders take advantage of a given situation or capitalize on the government's inability to provide basic needs to arouse peoples' emotions and mobilize them for a particular cause. Any country where the government regularly fails in its duty to provide at least a decent standard of life for the majority of its citizens or where a powerful minority controls the resources of the country is prone to an uprising by a unit or branch of the population. In such a condition, the aspiration for a change or replacement of government is inevitable. If there is a leader or group capable of providing leadership, doctrine, and organization, the only ingredients needed are violence, propaganda, and agitation.¹²⁵ Based on this, "Mao was convinced that an aroused, indoctrinated, and guided peasantry could make the revolution China needed to take its rightful place in the world."¹²⁶

Boko Haram commenced its agitation and propaganda work in 2002 when the group set up an Islamic Complex in Maiduguri of Borno state. The group was popularly known for their agitation of implementing Sharia law throughout the northern region of Nigeria. In its early stages, the group attempted to replicate a state-like organization, operating parallel to the federal institution. Its propaganda included providing welfare handouts to the poor, job training, and community policing (moral police).¹²⁷ According to Mao, a revolutionary movement is never limited to military actions alone because its

¹²⁵ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 5-6.

¹²⁶ Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 2nd ed., ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1978), 34.

¹²⁷ U.S Department of Justice, 1-3.

goal is to abolish an existing society and its institutions, and replace them with a new order. Every revolutionary movement is a struggle in which the fundamental parts, in varying importance, are political, economic, military, social, and psychological.¹²⁸

However, in 2009, the group turned violent following the judicial execution of some of its members and leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Since then, Boko Haram has carried out numerous attacks on government institutions, buildings, and murder of security forces to prove to the people they can be everywhere and are capable of reaching their enemies. In 26 August 2011, the insurgents bombed the United Nations building in Abuja, the federal capital of Nigeria, as a means of propaganda, and further proved they are a force to reckon with to the world.¹²⁹ Additionally, Boko Haram assassinated government officials, chiefs, and local Islamic figures to put fear in the heart of the people, and demonstrate the government's weaknesses and inability to provide security for its people. Since its inception, Boko Haram has conducted propaganda using social media on numerous occasions.¹³⁰ Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence. In view of the forgoing, the overall score for this criteria is as shown below. The average score of 2.75 is close to complete adherence to Mao's theory for the criteria of Politics.

¹²⁸ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 7.

¹²⁹ House Committee on Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, 112th Cong., 1st sess., 2011, H. Rep., 1-40.

¹³⁰ Walker, 5.

Table 1. Overall Score – Politics	
Doctrine and teaching	3
Organization	3
Instruction	2
Agitation and propaganda work	3
Total	11
Average Score	$3 + 3 + 2 + 3 = 11$ $11 \div 4 = 2.75$

Source: Created by Author.

Intelligence

According to Mao's doctrine, guerrilla warfare is heavily dependent on intelligence, which is a decisive factor in planning operations. Guerrillas make a detailed study of the enemy before conducting an attack. They exploit the enemy's weaknesses to their advantage. For instance, guerrillas seek out information about the enemy's strength, state of equipment, deployment, movement and supply route, troop discipline, level of commitment and training, and boldness of its leader. All these are considered before they strike. Guerrilla intelligence nets are strongly coordinated with everyone acting as an agent in the guerrilla-controlled area. Men and women, both old and young, are potential agents. Guerrillas operate under conditions of their own choice and time because of superior information and knowledge of terrain they enjoined.¹³¹

Boko Haram has kept its operation fluid, making it difficult for Nigerian security forces to understand its intention. The exact details of Boko Haram "operations, size, and

¹³¹ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22-23.

structure remain a mystery, and a solution to defeating them remains elusive.”¹³² The insurgents have exhibited superior knowledge in their understanding of terrain, and use of information to outsmart security forces on numerous occasion. They employ services of local inhabitants, who provide them with accurate intelligence about government forces. The group also enjoys the support of sympathizers, who are not necessary taking part in the struggle, but provide information for the insurgents because they have had lost faith in the government.

The metrics used to measure Intelligence as criteria to determine adherence to Mao’s theory of Revolutionary War are: 1) knowledge of the terrain, 2) study of government troops, 3) organization, and 4) use of civilians. The degree of adherence will be reported using a simple scale of: no adherence = 0, limited adherence = 1, partial adherence = 2, and complete adherence = 3.

Knowledge of the Terrain. Boko Haram is a homegrown insurgence movement, which comprises members from the same ethnic and geographical background. Its members are mostly from the Kanuri and Hausa tribes, and located within the northeast region of Nigeria. However, other elements within the Lake Chad region, who later joined the movement, are members from neighboring countries (Niger, Chad, and Cameroon Republic). Most of its member are from the same culture and religious faith. The group has frequently demonstrated knowledge of the terrain in which they operate. They study security forces movement, relocate their bases at will, and conceal most of their activities from security forces. The Boko Haram relocation from its base from

¹³² House Committee, *Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland*, 3.

Maiduguri to Kanema, a remote village far from government presence, was a good example of knowledge of the terrain in which they operate.

Another example was the abduction of over two hundred schoolgirls, in 2014, from a community called Chibok in Borno state by Boko Haram members.¹³³ Three years later, the abducted girls have not been traced or rescued by the government. Because of the knowledge of the terrain, Boko Haram has been able to deny security forces the ability to locate or rescue the Chibok girls. Additionally, Boko Haram has been able to dominate its areas of operation, establish bases, and shift within Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and the Republic of Cameroon unopposed. The group has employed the services of local inhabitants, who also provide support and information to the group, further enhancing their knowledge of terrain.

“As a corollary, guerrillas deny all vital information of themselves to the enemy, who is enveloped in an impenetrable fog.”¹³⁴ They take advantage of knowledge of terrain to gain initiative and operate on the ground of their own choosing. They attack weakness and withdraw when conditions are not promising. Guerrillas are expert at running away from major confrontation because their aim is to exhaust security forces and prolong the struggle.¹³⁵ Unlike government troops, guerrillas effectively engage locals and recruits from inhabitant of their geographical location (community) with knowledge of the terrain and can easily spot any unusual movement in their controlled

¹³³ Falode, 48.

¹³⁴ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 23.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 23.

area. Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Study of Government Troops. This is another key advantage the group has over Nigerian security forces: Boko Haram has sympathizers, informants, and supporters in and around Nigeria. They go to great lengths to acquire information about military forces, planting members within the government institutions to provide them with important information on government activities and security forces operations. It is believed that the group has agents operating within the Nigerian security forces to provide detailed military operations information. The group has countered Nigerian military operations by avoiding major battle, conducting surprise attacks on military bases, ambushing military convoys and supply depots to mention but a few. In 2014, the then-president of Nigeria stated in a public broadcast, that Boko Haram members have infiltrated his government.¹³⁶

The group has also employed devices to collect information on government troops, such as includes electronic devices, social media, hacking, and use of local inhabitants. The rate at which Boko Haram carried out coordinated attacks against government troops, locations, and facilities is alarming. This indicates the amount of surveillance activities conducted against government troops and their operations. A statement, credited to a former Chief of Staff and Minister of Defense of Nigeria, claimed "Intelligence capabilities of Islamic group Boko Haram are 100 percent better than those

¹³⁶ Walker, 7.

of the Nigerian security forces.”¹³⁷ He observed that insurgents relied on surveillance and intelligence collection in their dealings.

In a guerrilla controlled area, study of government troops is a decisive factor in planning their operations. Therefore, Mao points out questions guerrillas must asked about government troops in order to be successful in their operations. Such questions must include the enemy’s locations, strengths, state of equipment, morale, supply routes, and combat readiness. The guerrillas also seek to understand whether the commanders of government troops are intelligent, bold, imaginative, or otherwise. Guerrillas consider whether government troops are well or poorly trained, tough, efficient, and well discipline. Guerrillas expect members of their intelligence to provide answers to the underlying questions as they look for weaknesses to exploit.¹³⁸ Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao’s theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Organization. Boko Haram has no specific order of intelligence structure; however, insurgents have applied both traditional and modern technology in organizing a well-coordinated intelligence network. Every member of Boko Haram provides information for the group at all levels. Its members have infiltrated so many organizations, government institutions and all occupations, acting as undercover agents, providing useful information to the group about every move made by the government.

¹³⁷ Ian Allen, “Boko Haram Spy Network Is Better than Nigerian State’s, Says Ex-Army Chief,” IntelNews, 4 November 2015, accessed 30 March 2017, <https://intelnews.org/2015/11/04/01-1805/>.

¹³⁸ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22.

The group also uses local inhabitants and supporters to get information and keep abreast of local situations. Additionally, the insurgents heavily depend on mobile networks to coordinate their operations and maintain contact.

Guerrillas run a close intelligence network capable of providing detailed and timely information for movements. In a guerrilla-dominated terrain, members are required to provide information that helps their planning activities. Irrespective of sex, age, or rank, everyone in a guerrilla movement must be seen as an agent (storekeepers, schoolteachers, clerics, boys driving ox carts, girls attending to goats). The insurgents mount constant pressure on inhabitants to provide all conceivable information about the government forces. This is an important aspect of most guerrilla struggles because information is decisive for the survival of every guerrilla struggle. Government troops are misled and kept in the dark as many unseen eyes monitor troop's movement throughout the guerrilla-dominated areas.¹³⁹ Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Use of Civilians. It is difficult for a revolutionary movement to succeed without the involvement of the civilian population. Mao, having worked with the peasant farmers, believed that well-motivated and indoctrinated peasant farmers with the necessary leadership, could accomplish the revolution China had longed for to take its rightful place in the world. He was able to take advantage of the situation to mobilize the masses, who provided the necessary support needed by the group, to take on the Japanese Imperialists.

¹³⁹ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22-23.

Mao trusted the civilian population and built his struggle around them.¹⁴⁰ Guerrillas employ civilians in various capacities and roles as they engaged government forces, irrespective of age, sex, or status. Leaders of guerrilla movements mount pressure across the ranks (i.e., old men, women, boys, girls, farm laborers, storekeepers, schoolteachers, scavengers) to produce all conceivable information about the enemy.¹⁴¹ This is a well-known tactic that guerrillas adopt in order to remain well informed.

Boko Haram does not operate in an empty space; rather it operates in conjunction with the civilian population. The Boko Haram movement inspired many people, not only because of the religious point of view, but also because of the long term neglect of the people by the government. As no guerrilla movement can be successful without the support of the civilian population, Boko Haram has greatly employed the use of civilians to coordinate and carried out its propaganda within the northern region of Nigeria. Before the group resorts to the use of violence, the late Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, attracted many civilians through his method of teachings and criticisms against the government for its inability to provide good leadership for the people. As such, the group mobilizes and indoctrinates supporters where able, most of whom are civilians, to serve in various capacities, most notably the local police.¹⁴² After the bloody clash with government operatives in 2009, Boko Haram still enjoys the support of civilians, who run many errands for Boko Haram, and provide all forms of support. They serve as agents,

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 34.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 22-23.

¹⁴² U.S Department of Justice, 3.

and provide vital information for the group. In many instances, the security forces have conducted raids on civilian accommodations in order to arrest persons believed to be aiding Boko Haram. The group also maintains links with civilians in high places, such as politicians, government officials, and the security agents, who are suspected to be sympathizers. It is difficult to separate the insurgents from the civilians who aid the group. Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by the Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence. In view of the foregoing, the overall score for this criteria is as shown below. The average score of 3 is complete adherence to Mao's theory for the criteria of Intelligence.

Table 2. Overall Score – Intelligence	
Knowledge of the terrain	3
Study of government troops	3
Organization	3
Use of civilians	3
Total	12
Average Score	$3+3+3+3=12$ $12\div4=3$

Source: Created by Author.

Use of Violence

Violence is one of the multiple means of struggle employed by insurgents in order to achieve a strategic objective. Violence is critical to every guerrilla movement; Mao

once noted, political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.¹⁴³ Boko Haram, which started as a domestic Islamic group, resorted to use of violence in 2009 after a bitter clash with government security forces. They used violence to spread fear and propaganda across Nigeria in order to express their grief, and push for a Sharia state, a strategy the group has based its movement upon since the outbreak of hostilities.

The metrics used to measure use of violence as criteria to determine adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war are: (1) strategic violence; (2) violence used for propaganda; and (3) violence used to spread fear and terror. The degree of adherence will be reported using a simple scale of: no adherence = 0, limited adherence = 1, partial adherence = 2, and complete adherence = 3.

Strategic Violence. Mao's principles of "unity of opposites" clearly explains the tactical advantages that guerrillas employ in turning their weaknesses into strengths and the enemy's strengths into a weakness. They attack weakness and avoid strength, using the enemy as their source of logistical supplies as they ambush and attack enemy supply lines and locations to acquire arms and equipment. Mao once remarked, "We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as of Hanyang, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy's own transport corps."¹⁴⁴ Guerrillas also engage government forces and its institutions in order to prove that the government is illegitimate or incapable of providing security for the vast majority of its people, and creating the impression that guerrillas are everywhere.

¹⁴³ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 12.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 24-25.

Boko Haram has engaged in strategic violence directed mostly towards government security forces, civilian populations, institutions, and Western interests. In September 2010, Boko Haram attacked the Maiduguri Prison, releasing seven hundred prisoners, including its own members. Another strategic attack by the insurgents was the bombing of the Nigerian police headquarters at Abuja, the federal capital territory, in June 2011. Two months later (26 August 2011), the insurgents masterminded the bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, killing 26 people.¹⁴⁵ This was also an attempt to express their hatred for Western influences in Nigeria. On 2 December 2013, several Boko Haram fighters, dressed in military uniforms and equipped with rocket launchers, infiltrated Maiduguri, and attacked the army barracks and air force base, leaving several buildings and five aircraft destroyed. A similar incident occurred in Bama in Borno state, on 20 December 2013, when the insurgents attacked a military barracks killing members of the security forces.¹⁴⁶

Other noticeable strategic violence perpetrated by the insurgent includes the attack on the Kanama police station in December 2003; looting arms and burning down a police station in a coordinated attack in 2004; an invasion of the Bama and Gwoza police stations, killing scores of policemen, including a deputy police commissioner, and carting away arms and ammunition.¹⁴⁷ In March 2014, a coordinated attack was staged on Giwa army barracks in Maiduguri, freeing more than one thousand fighters and detainees by

¹⁴⁵ House Committee, *Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland*, 8.

¹⁴⁶ International Crisis Group, 18.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 10.

Boko Haram.¹⁴⁸ Boko Haram also resorted in killing prominent figure, clerics, and chiefs who presented a threat to their organization. In 2011, the group assassinated a gubernatorial candidate and a political party's chairman in Maiduguri, a month before a general election. Prominent chiefs and Muslim clerics were also assassinated during this period for criticizing the group, or being suspected of passing information to government troops.¹⁴⁹ These attacks are deliberate attempts by the insurgents to undermine the Nigerian government, destabilize the country, and eventually overthrow it. Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Violence used for Propaganda. Violence is one of the line of efforts and a key strategy used by most insurgent movements for propaganda. Boko Haram has engaged in violent propaganda in order to propagate its ideology, reach wider audience, and attract similar radical groups beyond the Nigeria border. Guerrillas need to be experts in propaganda media; they do everything possible to spread their ideology, create fear, and disrepute the government and its security operators. Boko Haram has employed propaganda strategies throughout its operations. The group has effectively engaged the internet, YouTube, cable news, and other social networks in showcasing clips of its successful attacks on military targets, prison breaks, attacks on police stations and government installations.¹⁵⁰ Boko Haram continues to conduct propaganda activities in

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 35.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 14.

¹⁵⁰ Falode, 44.

order to spread fear, and prove they are everywhere and capable of taking on selected targets. The abducted schoolgirls from Chibok community were repeatedly displayed on social media, YouTube, and cable news by Boko Haram in order to achieve its propaganda goals.¹⁵¹ Hence, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by the Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Violence used to Spread Fear and Terror. The fastest way to spread fear and terror is the use of violence. Guerrillas employ violence in order to prove to the people that they can always reach the enemy as well as anyone contrary to the movement. Violence helped Boko Haram to spread fear among the Nigerian security forces, government officials, civilian population, and the international community. Boko Haram attacked and set thousands of homes ablaze, causing panic and fear among communities, forcing people to abandoned their homes and property for safety. The insurgent also engaged in terror attacks using suicide bombs on targeted personnel and installations.

The group conducted assassination of prominent chiefs and Islamic scholars critical of their movement. This act left other prominent Islamic scholars, government officials, and key figures silent out of fear for their lives.¹⁵² On several occasion, the group has indiscriminately attacked worshippers, both Christians and Muslims, to scare them away from their places of worship by depriving the people freedom of religion.¹⁵³ In 2016, the insurgents threatened to assassinate a prominent Islamic emir in Kano for his

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 48.

¹⁵² International Crisis Group, 14.

¹⁵³ Ibid., 16-17.

opposition to the group after its attack on a mosque in Kano. Boko Haram actions have left the Nigerian populace with no option other than to seek safe zones. During a semester lecture for students of Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, on 24 March 2016, the Minister of Interior of Nigeria, Lieutenant General (Retired) Abdulrahman Bello Danbazau, stated that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has conducted about 180 attacks, which have resulted in the death of 4,780 people in the northeastern region between 1 February to 25 December 2015. He noted that such terror attacks were intended to cause loss of life, destruction of facilities, to create public panic and fear among the people.¹⁵⁴ Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence. In view of the forgoing, the overall score for this criteria is as shown below. The average score of 3 is in complete adherence to Mao's theory for the criteria of Use of Violence.

Table 3. Overall Score – Use of Violence	
Strategic violence	3
Used for propaganda	3
Used to spread terror	3
Total	9
Average Score	$3+3+3=9$ $9\div3=3$

Source: Created by Author.

¹⁵⁴ Abdulrahman Bello Danbazau, "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria" (lecture, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Accra, Ghana, 24 March 2016).

Decentralization

Guerrilla operations are fundamentally decentralized over a wide area (region). The guerrillas are encouraged to expand their area of operations because it gives them the opportunity to stretch security forces and take advantage of the local terrain to inflict casualties on government forces. They employ strength against weakness and weakness against strength; because guerrillas lack a well-organized structure and technical capabilities, decentralization becomes necessary. Each regional commander is expected to dominate the local surroundings and take advantage of local conditions in order to outsmart the enemy. In this situation, the guerrilla turns every disadvantage to his advantage and disadvantage to the enemy. Decentralization is forced upon guerrillas because of their vulnerability. However, it provides them with many opportunities, especially if local leaders are resourceful and courageous. The enemy becomes the source of guerrillas' logistics and replenishment of equipment, ammunition, and weapons.¹⁵⁵

The metrics used to measure decentralization as criteria to determine adherence to Mao's theory of Revolutionary War are: 1) avoiding static disposition; 2) actions taken to retain the initiative; and 3) engage the enemy where least expected. The degree of adherence will be reported using a simple scale of: no adherence = 0, limited adherence = 1, partial adherence = 2, and complete adherence = 3.

Engage the Enemy Where Least Expected. Boko Haram operations are highly decentralized, and conducted over a wide region. The group has a disjointed command structure that operates in cells, each cell designated a geographical region under its

¹⁵⁵ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 24.

control. A commander is assigned a region, and, in turn, receives instructions from the central command. Apart from its foot soldiers, who engage openly in violent struggle, the group enjoys a wide-range support from large number of local sympathizers within its controlled areas, who provide them with important information.¹⁵⁶ Boko Haram has taken advantage of its dispersed nature to keep the operational situation unstable. Because it operates in smaller cells, it moves quickly to ambush security forces and supply depots and withdraws back into the jungle, it presents no opportunity target for the military to exploit. It operates in the rear locations of security forces, which enables it to engage troops where least expected, using diversionary tactics. An example was the December 2013 attack on the Nigerian air force base and military barracks when the group dressed in military uniform and infiltrated Maiduguri city to strike these targets.¹⁵⁷ This makes Boko Haram dangerous and unpredictable. Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by the Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Avoiding Static Disposition. In guerrilla warfare, dispersion of forces is a tactic adopted by guerrillas to seize the initiative, protect limited combat power by avoiding and make them static dispositions, and create the impression that the guerrillas are everywhere. Guerrillas use this tactic to confuse conventional forces, eroding their morale, and making conventional forces appear less legitimate against this sort of threat. They may not have the luxury of heavy infantry support weapons, but it allows guerrillas

¹⁵⁶ U.S Department of Justice, 4-5.

¹⁵⁷ International Crisis Group, 18.

to travel light and fast. They attack when conventional troops least expect, and divert troops' attention away from their main objective. These tactics are undesirable for conventional forces, which emphasize quick victory, use of massive firepower, and need for concentration of forces. Mao noted that, in conventional tactics, dispersion of forces attracts annihilation, while in guerrilla war, it is an essential tactic employed to confuse the enemy and create the impression that the guerrillas are ubiquitous.¹⁵⁸

“Avoiding static disposition” has been a key tactic for the Boko Haram since the group resorted to hostilities. After the clash with Nigerian security forces in 2009, the insurgent group broke into cells and dispersed over a wide region in the northeast of Nigeria. They have utilized this tactic to their advantage, which provides no front for military forces to attack or bear its massive firepower. The Nigerian military operations in the northeast are faced with one of the most complex insurgencies in the country's history. Boko Haram was particularly effective against security forces using guerrilla tactics of being everywhere and nowhere (dispersion of forces). They split their forces into smaller bands, which continued to infiltrate military units, and avoided combat when the battlefield situation was not in their favor. Boko Haram has kept its operations as fluid as possible constantly moving within Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon to avoid static disposition, hitting government forces where they least expect. This tactic proved effective because it denied conventional forces the ability to employ massive firepower against a dispersed group. Mao once acknowledged, “Guerrillas must be expert in

¹⁵⁸ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 23-25.

running away since they do it so often.”¹⁵⁹ Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao’s theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Actions Taken to Retain the Initiative. Boko Haram conducts coordinated attacks on military convoys, supply, and locations to retain the initiative and maintain freedom of action. In September 2004, a radical faction of the group attacked a police training college in Gwoza close to the Cameroon border, carting away arms across the border.¹⁶⁰ In the same vein, the group attacked military barracks in Maiduguri on 14 March 2014, releasing over a thousand detainees and fighters.¹⁶¹ Similarly, the group conducted a coordinated attack on the military barracks in Bama Borno state in 2013; and an attacked a Nigerian air force base the same month, destroying facilities and five aircraft in order to deny the military air superiority and freedom of actions.¹⁶² The released members always return to the ranks to continue fighting. The group carried out “hundreds” of ambushes against military convoys and attacks on military locations, using the knowledge of terrain to gain the advantage and seize the initiative. Additionally, Boko Haram members and sympathizers are believed to have infiltrated the government and security forces, thereby gaining access to classified information. The degree of adherence to Mao’s theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is therefore rated 3;

¹⁵⁹ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 24.

¹⁶⁰ International Crisis Group, 10.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 35.

¹⁶² Ibid., 18.

complete adherence. In view of the forgoing, the overall score for this criteria is as shown below. The average score of 3 is complete adherence to Mao's theory for the criteria of Decentralization.

Table 4. Overall Score – Decentralization	
Engage the enemy where he least expected	3
Avoid static disposition	3
Actions taken to retain the initiative	3
Total	9
Average Score	$3+3+3=9$ $9\div3=3$

Source: Created by Author.

Organization, Consolidation and Preservation
of Base Area Usually in Isolated
and Difficult Terrain

Mao's most important governing principle of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy.¹⁶³ Guerrilla organizations usually take advantage of remote areas where government presence is minimal to start the groundwork of their movement, recruit local inhabitants, and carry out its propaganda. This is one of the key aspects of Mao's theory of revolutionary war, which the primary effort was to center the struggle on winning over the peasants farmers, located in remote areas, instead of the urban proletariat in urban areas.¹⁶⁴ Guerrillas take advantage of remote areas, especially where

¹⁶³ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 26.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 17.

government presence is negligible, to establish a base and recruit fighters. Governments tend to respond late, by which time the guerrillas have influenced the surrounding inhabitants to participate in their struggle. Remote areas are necessary, but prone to guerrilla movements and uprisings because the locals are mostly poor and aggrieved members of the society.¹⁶⁵

The metric used to measure this as a criterion to determine adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war is whether Boko Haram has organized, consolidated, and preserved a base area in an isolated area. The degree of adherence will be reported using a simple scale of: no adherence = 0, limited adherence = 1, partial adherence = 2, and complete adherence = 3.

The Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, started his propaganda work and agitation in Maiduguri in 2002. He established a religious complex that comprised a school and a mosque, where members were indoctrinated. Yusuf attracted huge number of followers, mostly unemployed youths from poor backgrounds because of his teachings and criticism of government corruption. He stressed the need for people to return to the Islamic way of life as prescribed by Sharia. Between 2002 and 2009, his movement expanded into other northern states including Bauchi, Yobe, Katsina, Kano, Niger, and Gombe. In 2004, Yusuf and his followers realized that Maiduguri was unsustainable for the group's propaganda, due to government presence and opposition from other Islamic scholars. They withdrew from the city, and relocated the complex to a remote village

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 20.

called Kanamma in Yobe state near the Nigeria-Niger border. This was an attempt to preserve the group from the eyes of the public and stay away from the government.¹⁶⁶

In Kanamma, where government presence was minimal, Boko Haram expanded its base and enjoyed local support. The base was nicknamed *Afghanistan* as the group engaged in militant activities, training, and indoctrination.¹⁶⁷ Mohammed Yusuf called on other Muslims to shun the corrupt government establishment, and return to a life under true Islamic law with the aim of making a perfect society. His teachings appealed to youths, who were already disgruntled members of society because of bad governance and religious sentiment, thereby increasing the number of followers and subsequent expansion of the group. According to observers, Boko Haram established a state-like structure with a cabinet and its own religious police, and with a large farm within the surrounding area. Its propaganda convinced more people to come under its roof by offering shelter and other forms of support to the people.¹⁶⁸ The degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this criteria is rated 3; complete adherence.

Progressive Expansion

The objective of guerrillas at this stage is to expand its control over a wide region and spread its propaganda to reach a wider audience. The inhabitants of the guerrilla-controlled area are persuaded to join the movement and fight a common enemy. The aim

¹⁶⁶ Falode, 43

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 43

¹⁶⁸ Walker, 3.

is to attain the quality of “*mass*” that is required for the struggle to take the form of a revolutionary movement. The guerrillas resort to acts of sabotage and terrorism in order to achieve their objectives. Mostly attacks are carefully planned, and the group takes advantage of vulnerable military and police targets, and weak columns are ambushed as well. The guerrillas carry out these operations primarily to acquire arms, ammunition, and other essential material to further their movement.¹⁶⁹

The metrics used to measure progressive expansion as criteria to determine adherence to Mao’s theory of revolutionary war are: 1) attacks on vulnerable military and police targets, 2) expanding control of territory, 3) increased recruitment, and 4) expanding material inventory. The degree of adherence will be reported using a simple scale of: no adherence = 0, limited adherence = 1, partial adherence = 2, and complete adherence = 3.

Attacks on Vulnerable Military and Police Targets. In December 2003, the group attacked a police station in Yobe state following a dispute regarding fishing rights at a local dam. They looted the police armory and burnt down the station, including other government buildings. In a coordinated attack, a smaller group of its members proceeded to a neighboring police station, where they carted away additional arms, and set the local government secretariat ablaze. In 2004, the group also launched a coordinated attack in Bama and Gwoza of Borno state, near Cameroon border, killing scores of police, including an assistant police commissioner. The Nigerian army was not left out from the

¹⁶⁹ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 21.

rage of the dreaded Boko Haram as several military facilities and outpost were attacked during this same period.¹⁷⁰

After the 2009 government crackdown on the group, it conducted a full-scale armed confrontation with the government and its security forces. In 2010, the group carried out a coordinated attack on New Year's Eve against a military barracks in Damaturu town of Yobe state. In 2011, Boko Haram bombed a military checkpoint in Maiduguri resulting ten dead and thirty wounded. In January 2013, the group attacked a military convoy carrying troops earmarked for a military intervention force in Mali.¹⁷¹ In 2013, the group, dressed in military uniform, infiltrated Maiduguri, and attacked the air force base, destroying five aircraft and base facilities. It also carried out a planned attack on a military barracks in Bama, killing scores.¹⁷² Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Expanding Control of Territory. The Boko Haram movement that started in Maiduguri in 2002 has attracted many unemployed youths and members of the Muslim population, mostly from a poor background, to join the movement. Yusuf made gains because of the government's inability to meet the needs of the northern population. Between 2002 and 2009, the group expanded its control and operation across several northern states, which includes Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Gombe, Borno, Yobe, Adamawa,

¹⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, 10.

¹⁷¹ Babalola, *Combating Violence*, 20-21.

¹⁷² International Crisis Group, 18.

Bauchi, Katsina, and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. In Kanamma, where the group had its stronghold, it established a state-like structure and a governing body (cabinet). The group had a religious local police, who maintained law and order within their surroundings.¹⁷³ In 2013, the Boko Haram, in a military fashion, engaged the Nigerian army in a battle, and took control of large area of land (over fifteen local government councils in Borno and Adamawa state), hosted its flag, and declared an Islamic state. The Boko Haram gains compelled the then-president to declare a state of emergency within the region, beefed up military forces, and conducted a major offensive to reclaim the land, and push back the militants.¹⁷⁴ Boko Haram eventually extended its control area beyond the Nigerian border into Niger, Chad, and the Cameroon Republic. Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by the Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Increased Recruitment. Most revolutionary movements enjoy the support of the local population who, in turn, provide the source of recruitment for the movement, especially where the government fails to provide the basic necessary needs for part of its population. Mao knew he could take advantage of this situation, to inspire and indoctrinate the people (peasantry), who live at subsistence-level with nothing to lose to make a change.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Walker, 3.

¹⁷⁴ International Crisis Group, 17.

¹⁷⁵ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 5.

The vast majority of the people that Mohammed Yusuf recruited are unemployed youth, street boys and disgruntled elements from the northeast region who believe they have been marginalized by the government over a long period. Many recruits found Yusuf's teachings and agitations appealing, and believed a strict Islamic state governed by Sharia would provide an ideal society devoid of corruption and bad governance.¹⁷⁶ The majority of the Boko Haram's fighters are volunteers who decided to join the group based on their personal conviction. Students from tertiary institutions and universities in Borno and Yobe state abandoned their studies to join the Boko Haram movement.¹⁷⁷

However, over a period of protracted struggle against the Nigerian government and military forces, "Boko Haram reportedly has resorted to forced conscription and recruiting criminals and thugs."¹⁷⁸ The group is also linked to financial organizations abroad that fund its efforts to recruit fighters and support its activities.¹⁷⁹ The group now draws fighters from Niger, Chad, and the Cameroon Republic. Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by the Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence.

Expanding Material Inventory. Usually, guerrilla movements that originated with the people are faced with equipment problems at its initial stage. Members of the guerrilla forces are likely to start with light weapons such as pistols, semi-automatic

¹⁷⁶ Babalola, 15-16.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., 18.

¹⁷⁸ International Crisis Group, 17.

¹⁷⁹ Babalola, 17.

rifles, bird guns, spears, machetes and other tools to conduct their operations and self-defense. However, this problem is solved as the guerrillas engage security forces in battles, ambush transport companies, and attack enemy locations, acquiring arms and materiel from the captured enemy. According to Mao, for every successful attack, guerrillas will capture the enemy's transport. "Guerrillas must not depend too much on an armory. The enemy is their principal source of supply."¹⁸⁰

Like every other grassroots movement, Boko Haram started with local weapons, knives, cutlasses, and homemade tools. On several occasion, they conducted attacks against vulnerable police stations, both military and police checkpoints, to loot arms. The group gradually built its armory when it relocated to Kanamma, close to the Niger border, as it engaged the Nigerian police force and other security outfit in hostilities. After the 2009 crackdown, Boko Haram members engaged in guerrilla tactics of hit and run to capture arms and harass security forces. This was a deliberate move by Boko Haram to strengthen the movement as they formed their own government. The group ambushed military convoys, especially transport companies, and carted away supplies and equipment meant for troops at the frontline. Using the enemy as a source of supplies benefited Boko Haram as most of its weapon and equipment were captured from Nigerian security forces. Boko Haram is currently equipped with "AK-47 rifles, grenades, rocket propelled grenades, automatic rifles, surface-to air-missiles, vehicle mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, T-55 tanks, Panhard ERC-90 'Sagaie,'

¹⁸⁰ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 82-83.

and explosive such as Semtex.”¹⁸¹ Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao’s theory of revolutionary war exhibited by the Boko Haram insurgency under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence. In view of the forgoing, the overall score for this criteria is as shown below. The average score of 3 is complete adherence to Mao’s theory for the criteria of Progressive Expansion.

Table 5. Overall Score – Progressive Expansion	
Attack on vulnerable military and police targets	3
Expanding control of territory	3
Increased recruitment	3
Expanding material inventory	3
Total	12
Average Score	$3+3+3+3=12$ $12\div4=3$

Source: Created by Author.

Decision or Destruction of the Enemy

At this stage, the guerrilla fighters develop into a conventional formation, able to confront government troop in armed combat. The group targets military objectives in order to acquire more weapon for the sustainment of its campaign against government forces and the state. The insurgent makes an effort to inspire local support and recruit local inhabitants. The captured weapons and ammunition are made available for supporters willing to take up arms against the government for a common purpose. The government will likely call for negotiation as the situation escalates. Guerrillas rarely

¹⁸¹ Falode, 43-44.

compromise at this level; however, they may accept government moves towards negotiation in a deceptive measure to gain military, political, social, or economic positions. Compromises are made only on few occasions from the revolutionary side, whose objective is only to make conditions that will preserve its movement.¹⁸²

The metrics used to measure decision or destruction of the enemy as criteria to determine adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war are: 1) guerrilla force converts into conventional formations, and 2) negotiations for deceptive measures. The degree of adherence will be reported using a simple scale of: no adherence = 0, limited adherence = 1, partial adherence = 2, and complete adherence = 3.

Guerrilla Force Converts into Conventional Formations. In 2013, the Boko Haram took a different approach from the hit and run guerrilla tactics when the group openly confronted the Nigerian army in a conventional military fashion. A substantial number of its active guerrilla force appeared in full military regalia advancing with tanks, armored vehicles, and light vehicles. They also employed rocket launchers, mortar tubes and bombs, missiles, vehicle-mounted machine guns with anti-aircraft visors, anti-aircraft guns, and general-purpose machine guns against military locations and targets. Boko Haram were able to achieve great success over the Nigerian military as they captured large areas of land in the northeast, hoisted their flags, and declared Gwoza the headquarters of its caliphate. Boko Haram pushed the Nigerian army and other security forces close to Maiduguri and Yola in Adamawa, and took control of more than fifteen local government councils within a short period. However, they could not sustain their

¹⁸² Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22.

gains, and were overpowered by the Nigerian army, which pushed the guerrillas back and recaptured lost ground. The insurgents failed to do their groundwork properly, in their hurry to transform into an established Islamic state with a conventional army. This dream did not come true as the government declared a state of emergency and deployed additional troops to the region. Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by the Boko Haram under this metric is rated 2; partial adherence.

Negotiations for Deceptive Measures. The Nigerian government engaged the Boko Haram key leaders and representatives in order to seek common ground to come to an agreement. However, no effort made by the government yielded any positive result. In the wake of 2013, Boko Haram staged a major offensive against the military forces gaining control of more area of land and escalating violence in the region; the Nigerian government was compelled to negotiate with the group in order to come to a compromise. Mohammed Marwa, who claimed to speak for the group, announced a ceasefire in January 2013. Boko Haram took advantage of the ongoing negotiation to call for a ceasefire, but the insurgents were busy replenishing and consolidating their gains during this period. After six months, the group resumed the offensive, dismissing any claim of ceasefire and ongoing negotiation with the government. Eventually, the group lost the momentum and was pushed back by the military.¹⁸³

Boko Haram engaged the Nigerian government on several occasion in an attempt to negotiate and make peace, but the group continues to manipulate the government and

¹⁸³ International Crisis Group, 21.

contradict itself on issues and their objectives. This has kept the situation in an unresolved state, and violence continues throughout the region. Therefore, the degree of adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram under this metric is rated 3; complete adherence. In view of the forgoing, the overall score for this criteria is as shown below. The average score of 2.5 is partial adherence to Mao's theory for the criteria of Decision or Destruction of the Enemy.

Table 6. Overall Score – Decision or Destruction of the Enemy	
Guerrilla force converts into conventional formations	2
Negotiation for deceptive measure	3
Total	5
Average Score	$2+3=5$ $5\div 2=2.5$

Source: Created by Author.

Review and Analysis of the Criteria

The following analysis of the criteria shows the degree of adherence to Mao's Revolutionary Warfare theory exhibited by the Boko Haram insurgency in its efforts to overthrow the Nigerian government:

Table 7. Overall Score – Average	
Politics	Close to complete adherence
Intelligence	Complete adherence
Use of Violence	Complete adherence
Decentralization	Complete adherence
Organization, Consolidation and Preservation of Base area usually in Isolated and Difficult Terrain	Complete adherence
Progressive expansion	Complete adherence
Decision/Destruction of the enemy	Partial adherence

Source: Created by Author.

The hypothesis of this research was that Mao's theory of revolutionary war provides a valid framework for understanding the ongoing Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The null hypothesis was that Mao's theory of revolutionary war does not provide a valid framework for understanding the ongoing Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. The Dependent Variable is the Degree of Adherence to Mao's theory of revolutionary war exhibited by Boko Haram.

Using Mao's theory of revolutionary war as a guide, the study above reviewed Boko Haram's strategy, activities, and motives since its inception. This resulted in a comparative analysis that clearly established that the Boko Haram insurgency almost completely adheres to Mao's theory of revolutionary war. All the criteria of the independent variable fits with the reported evidence regarding Boko Haram. Based on this analysis, this paper can reject the null hypothesis. It is now clear that Mao's theory of revolutionary war can be applied to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria.

The Nigerian Government Response to the Crisis

The secondary research question of this paper is how can the Nigerian government effectively fight the Boko Haram insurgency based on Mao's Revolutionary Warfare theory? To answer this question, with recommendations in chapter 5, the actions of the Nigerian government to date must be reviewed to determine suitable areas for recommendations based on countering Boko Haram's use of Mao's theory.

The Nigerian government has made several efforts to bring the northeast region under control since the outbreak of hostilities in 2009. However, the Boko Haram insurgency took a different dimension from the forms of violence and religious uprising witnessed in Nigeria in the past. Traditionally, the government employs the use of its military force to handle such issues, especially when the crisis cannot be curtailed by the police force. The use of brutal military force to crack down on Boko Haram members not only escalated the situation, but drew support for them. Many sympathizers and family members, who did not formerly participate in the movement, were left with no option than to join or provide support for the group.

The Nigerian government deployed over ten thousand soldiers to the northeast to fight against the Boko Haram insurgency to maintain peace in the region. A Joint Task Force (JTF) comprised of army units, police, and the Department of State Security were established in Maiduguri to combat the group in early 2011. Additional troops of about two thousand men were deployed to the region in 2013 as part of the JTF team to combat Boko Haram and protect the civilian population. The government also made efforts to concentrate available military resources such as tanks, jet fighters, and helicopter fighters to the region. In May 2013, the then-President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of

emergency in the region. In August 2013, an armored division (7th AD) was established to protect the area of Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno state. The division was also tasked with the responsibility of securing the border between Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.¹⁸⁴

As part of the government effort, a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) was also established in June 2013 from local hunters and youths of the local inhabitants to provide local policing, and operate alongside government security forces. The formation of the local militia (CJTF) not only enhanced the protection of civilians, but also closed the security gap in the vast region. They provided the military with useful information on insurgent hideouts and their supporters. The CJTF have also been deployed at various checkpoints and outlets to spot and frustrate Boko Haram activities. Even though the CJTF have not received any formal military training, their involvement in the ongoing fight against Boko Haram has closed many security gaps. However, the CJTF has its shortcomings in terms of use of abuses and intimidation of civilians.¹⁸⁵

The government has rallied for support and cooperation from the Economic Community of West Africa States, Africa Union, and international community. Subsequently, the multinational joint task force (MNJTF) was established with its headquarters at Ndjamen, Chad, to combat Boko Haram. The MNJTF is comprised of troops from Nigeria, Niger, Benin Republic, and Cameroon. The formation of the MNJTF has proven significant and instrumental to the military campaign in the Lake

¹⁸⁴ International Crisis Group, 34-35.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 34-35.

Chad region. The members of the MNJTF has, on several occasions, has dislodged Boko Haram inside Nigeria from their hideout near the border, serving as barrier to Boko Haram's activities and operations across the border.¹⁸⁶

The Nigerian government and its officials have made tremendous efforts to negotiate with the Boko Haram insurgency to achieve lasting peace in the region, but the group has turned down several opportunities by the government. In September 2011, a team led by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo held a meeting with Boko Haram representatives. The group demanded an end to arrest and killing of its member, release of arrested members, compensation for families killed by security officials, and a call for the prosecution of security forces involved in the extrajudicial killing of Boko Haram leaders and members. The meeting was unsuccessful when the government would not respond to these demands. In September 2013, the government also took a bold step by setting up a 26- member amnesty committee with the mandate of communicating with Boko Haram to convince the group to lay down arms within three months. The committee's report indicated the insurgent members responded positively and agreed to dialogue options.¹⁸⁷ However, some members of the group denied the government's claim. Boko Haram expressed lack of trust in the Nigerian government in the past after it arrested Boko Haram members who came to negotiate. The group claimed that government have not been faithful in its word and would not enter into agreement with it,

¹⁸⁶ Falode, 45.

¹⁸⁷ International Crisis Group, 33-34.

while members of its more radical branch claimed it was un-Islamic to enter into negotiation with unbelievers (i.e., the government).

The Nigerian government has consistently applied the various tools earlier mentioned to bring peace to the northeast region, but the Boko Haram insurgency continues to pose a security challenge to Nigeria and its neighbors within the Lake Chad region. Owing to the recent military offensive in December 2016, which successfully dislodged and sacked the group from its strong hold of Sambisa forest, the president was prompt to declare that Boko Haram was now defeated. This did not stop the group from attacking military forces and civilians in the region. Even though the Boko Haram has been subdued from carrying out any major offensive or conduct a conventional warfare, the group remains a major threat to Nigeria and its allies.¹⁸⁸

Summary

Boko Haram insurgency is a politically motivated movement with a religious overtone. The group's primary idea is to establish Sharia law and an Islamic caliphate across Nigeria, particularly the northern region. The group turned violent in 2009 after a government crackdown, which led to the death of its leader and scores of members. Boko Haram has engaged the Nigerian government and security forces in a bloody war for almost a decade, using all forms of guerrilla tactics to their advantage. The group inspired youths from the Muslim community to willingly fight for the cause for which they stand. The group took advantage of the prevailing situation to incite violence and promote a revolutionary movement against the Nigerian government. The late Mohammed Yusuf

¹⁸⁸ Falode, 45.

was able to capitalize on government weaknesses, as he attracts unemployed youths, mostly from poor backgrounds and disgruntled. The group also enjoyed a wide range of support from the Muslim community because Yusuf created anti-Western feelings among them.

From the analysis, it is apparent that agitation for a Sharia law state within the northern part of Nigeria has been the major idea and objectives of the Boko Haram. In the wake of 2002, twelve northern state governors declared Sharia law in their respective states that created misunderstanding and fear of domination by groups who do not necessary share their ideas. Boko Haram reinforced ideas of implementing Sharia law across the board to form a popular movement, calling on all Muslims to shun the corrupt government and turn towards an Islamic, ideal state. Eventually, Boko Haram succeeded in provoking the Nigerian government, which overreacted by use of excessive force to crack down on the group and its supporters. This was a major achievement for the Boko Haram as it turned the masses against the government, seen as an oppressor.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Conclusion

The activities of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria have presented a series of security challenges to the government and people of Nigeria, particularly the northeast region where the group fully operates. The previous chapter provided analysis of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria in relation to Mao's revolutionary theory and principles of guerrilla warfare. The comparative analysis in the previous chapter clearly established that the Boko Haram insurgency almost completely adheres to Mao's theory of revolutionary war. All the criteria of the independent variables fit with the reported evidence regarding Boko Haram. This means that Mao's theory of revolutionary war can be applied to the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria in order to find more effective methods than have been used so far by the government of Nigeria to fight Boko Haram.

Boko Haram has taken advantage of the vacuum created by the weak system of government to promote a religious political movement in the northern region of Nigeria. Most insurgent activities are common within a marginalized society where the majority of the people are aggrieved, and government support is low. Insurgent groups capitalized on these issues to provoke a popular movement against the government and its institutions. In such conditions, it becomes unavoidable for groups not to emerge and challenge government authority as witnessed in the case of Boko Haram and other militant groups around the world.

The activities of Boko Haram have not only negatively affected the people, but has slowed down commercial activities in the region, development, job creation and

opportunity, education, and interaction with the outside world. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced from their homes and many killed as a result. Additionally, the group has equally threatened the existence of Nigeria and its neighbors in the Lake Chad region. The Nigerian government efforts to combat the group and restore law and order in the region have proven counterproductive for almost a decade. Consequently, it is essential for the government to take every step necessary to defeat and deter the growing threat of the Boko Haram insurgency in order to restore peace and the livelihood of the people in the region. The method to do that is to use the criteria reviewed in chapter 4 regarding Mao's theory of revolutionary war, and design countermeasures to frustrate Boko Haram's use of those criteria. The secondary research question of this paper, how can the Nigerian government effectively fight the Boko Haram insurgency based on Mao's Revolutionary Warfare theory, is answered by the following recommendations.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis of this research, it is clear that Boko Haram members consistently engaged in guerrilla warfare against the government of Nigeria, the security forces, and the people since its inception. Using Mao's theory of revolutionary war, they employ all of the component criteria such as Politics (doctrine and teaching, organization, instruction, agitation and propaganda); Intelligence (knowledge of the terrain, study of government troops, organization, use of civilians); Use of Violence (strategic violence, used for propaganda, used to spread fear and terror); Decentralization (avoiding static disposition, actions taken to retain the initiative, engage the enemy where least expected); Organization, Consolidation and Preservation of Base Area in Usually Isolated and

Difficult Terrain, Progressive Expansion (attacks on vulnerable military and police targets, expanding control of territory, increased recruitment, expanding material inventory); and Decision or Destruction of the Enemy (guerrilla force converts into conventional formations, negotiations for deceptive measures) in order to influence the population and ridicule the government in power. The group's activities have also caused huge devastation among the civilian population in the region, and lack of confidence in governance. Therefore, it is necessary for the Nigerian government to carefully examine the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency and consider the following recommendations. These recommendations are designed to be countermeasures that would frustrate Boko Haram's current successful use of Mao's theory of revolutionary war.

Socio Economic Development

The Boko Haram insurgency is a politically motivated movement with religious views. The group took advantage of government weaknesses to promote resentments among the poor population to rally for popular support for the cause of Sharia Islamic state, which they believed would address the ills of society and bad governance.¹⁸⁹ From the research analysis, it is obvious that Boko Haram uses Politics (doctrine and teaching, organization, instruction, agitation and propaganda) from Mao's theory of revolutionary war to generate support. Revolutionary guerrilla movements often take place in backward societies where the people feel marginalized by their own government, which fails to

¹⁸⁹ International Crisis Group, 9.

provide basic needs of life for its people.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, the insurgency uses this as a propaganda instrument to rally popular support and oppose legitimate authority.

Today, the majority of the people living in Nigeria, especially in the northeast region, have been subjected to abject poverty since the country returned to democracy. Nigeria's National Bureau of Statistics report of 2012 indicated that about 100 million Nigerians live on less than one dollar a day.¹⁹¹ According to the United Nations Population Fund report of 2012, Nigeria has a growing population estimated at 168.8 million, over 60 percent are youth under the age of twenty-four, with about 112 million living below the poverty line.¹⁹² Any society under these conditions is a virtual time bomb because the majority of the people are aggrieved and dissatisfied with authority. The situation is waiting for the slightest opportunity to erupt into a violent, sectarian movement, which could result in a call for a change of government.

In response to Boko Haram's use of these circumstances, the government could address the social-economic problems of the country by implementing policies and programs to address the peoples' suffering. Through infrastructural development, investment in human capital, and trade promotion, the government could reduce the poverty rate in the country and as well as unemployment. Government could also take advantage of the growing youth population to create job acquisition programs, and invest

¹⁹⁰ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 5.

¹⁹¹ Babalola, 26.

¹⁹² United Nations Development Programme, "National Human Development Report 2016," 21-22, accessed 1 April 2017, <http://www.ng.undp.org/content/Nigeria/en/home/library/poverty/national-human-development-report-2016-html>.

in industrial projects, which would be beneficial to the youth and the government in the end. The government must also embark on projects and implement policies to address the grievances of the general population in the region. This will further reduce the tension in the region and create an atmosphere where youth would no longer engage in violence. These recommendations would frustrate Boko Haram's use of Politics as a category from Mao's theory of revolutionary war to generate support.

Intelligence is another key element in counterinsurgency operations. Based on the research analysis, Boko Haram uses Intelligence (knowledge of the terrain, study of government troops, organization, use of civilians) from Mao's theory of revolutionary war to gain tactical advantage. Insurgents employ the services of the local inhabitants, who provide information about the enemy to the insurgents. Irrespective of age or sex, everyone in a guerrilla stronghold acts as an agent—men, women, children, and girls.¹⁹³ A population that is aggrieved and lacking confidence in its government will hardly provide key information to the government to succeed in counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, it is important for government to engage in projects that will build trust and win the hearts and minds of the people in order to build a strong intelligence network. The government must do everything possible to undermine the support of the Boko Haram and reassure the population that it is committed to the welfare and wellbeing of the people. The support of local inhabitants will not only assist government in monitoring the Boko Haram activities, but will deny freedom of operation to the insurgents. Furthermore, a well-coordinated intelligence network would help in tracking all border-

¹⁹³ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22-23.

crossing activities and frustrate the movement of illegal arms and ammunition. It will also reduce the spate of suicide bombing in the region, as individuals would be willing to work and provide timely information to the government. These recommendations would frustrate Boko Haram's use of Intelligence as a category from Mao's theory of revolutionary war to gain tactical advantage.

Strengthening Border Security

Boko Haram uses Intelligence (knowledge of the terrain) and Organization, Consolidation and Preservation of Base Area in Usually Isolated and Difficult Terrain, from Mao's theory of revolutionary war to create safe areas as a base of support. This is one of the key aspects of Mao's theory of revolutionary war, in which the primary effort was to center the struggle on winning over the peasants farmers, located in remote areas, instead of people in urban areas. Boko Haram fighters are local inhabitants who have demonstrated superior knowledge of terrain in the conduct of their operations. Most of its members are indigenous groups from Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Nigeria. Because of their knowledge of the terrain, the group has been able to exploit the porous borders of the countries of the Lake Chad region to carry out illegal activities such as arms smuggling, kidnapping and abduction, human trafficking, and sex slavery. The porous nature of the borders provides a safe haven for insurgency activities, as Boko Haram freely operates within these borders. More so, the activities of the group and other illegal networks in the region have greatly undermined security.

Therefore, it is important for the Nigerian government to implement adequate security measures along its border area in order to deny the Boko Haram and other illegal networks freedom of operation and safe havens. In addition, the government needs to

incorporate neighboring Niger, Chad, and the Cameroon in its efforts to secure this border. Effective manning of the borders will require the government to provide security forces with sophisticated technology such as surveillance equipment, communication equipment, searching equipment, and operational vehicles. It also requires the revamping of border posts located along borderlines and vulnerable points for effective security to frustrate movement of illegal arms. Border security patrols could be enhanced by conducting local joint patrols with security forces from the Lake Chad region. This will provide the synergy and concentration against the Boko Haram insurgents. Therefore, the Nigerian government needs to adequately address the security gaps in the border area, and provide the necessary means to control movements, and check the activities of the Boko Haram. These recommendations would frustrate Boko Haram's use of Intelligence and Organization, Consolidation, and Preservation of Base Area in Usually Isolated and Difficult Terrain as categories from Mao's theory of revolutionary war to create safe areas as a base of support.

Training and Equipping the Military

Boko Haram uses; Use of Violence (strategic violence, used for propaganda, to spread fear and terror); Decentralization (avoiding static disposition, actions taken to retain the initiative, engage the enemy where least expected); Progressive Expansion (attacks on vulnerable military and police targets, expanding control of territory, increased recruitment, expanding material inventory); and Decision or Destruction of the Enemy (guerrilla force converts into conventional formations) from Mao's theory of revolutionary war to attack government forces.

In a guerrilla-controlled area, study of government troops is a decisive factor in planning guerrilla operations. According to Mao, guerrillas ask questions about government troops, such as strengths, state of equipment, enemy's morale, and combat readiness. The guerrillas also seek to understand whether the commanders of government troops are intelligent, bold, imaginative, or otherwise. Guerrillas consider whether government troops are well or poorly trained, tough, efficient, and well disciplined. Guerrillas expect members of their intelligence network to provide answers to the underlying questions as they look for weaknesses to exploit.¹⁹⁴

It appears that, most conventional armies in the world today are faced with the threat of irregular warfare, but few understand guerrilla tactics and the methods to combat them. However, the Nigerian government could improve its military capability by looking beyond the conventional way of doing things. This implies that troops committed in the fight against insurgency should be given special training on counterinsurgency operations in order to overcome the challenges posed by irregular warfare. Fighting in a complex operational environment, where the insurgents have the technical ability to make homemade bombs, improvise explosive devices (IEDs), and use them against military and civilian targets, requires a technically equipped and trained military to operate in this situation. It is pertinent that the government invest in acquiring modern equipment, weapons, and training facilities to enable troops to prepare and effectively operate in such an environment.

¹⁹⁴ Mao Tse-tung, University of Illinois Press, 22.

The fight against insurgency and terrorist networks cannot be seen as one man's business because of its implications home and abroad. The Nigerian government in its effort to combat the Boko Haram insurgency must not leave any option off the table. Military operations must be harmonized with neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon in order to achieve better results. This harmonization includes timely sharing of information, training exchange, and joint training among troops in the Lake Chad region. This would not only improve the troop's operational ability, but would enhance understanding of the regional operational environment and doctrine of neighboring countries. Building partner capacities could be taken into consideration by the government in order to complement one another in terms of logistics, training support, weapons, and intelligence. The Nigerian government also needs to seek international military support and cooperation from its allies to further prepare its military, and complement its effort in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency. The establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force with its headquarters at Ndjamen, Chad, is one among several measures needed in order to promote military cooperation, build partner capacity, and engage in joint operation. These are some of the methods required to overwhelm and subdue insurgency by the government. These recommendations would frustrate Boko Haram's use of Violence, Decentralization, Progressive Expansion, and Decision or Destruction of the Enemy from Mao's theory of revolutionary war to attack government forces.

Recommendations for Further Study

This research attempts to understand the Boko Haram insurgency using Mao's Revolutionary warfare theory as a framework. This study is limited in that it explores

only one ongoing case of a current insurgency as its topic of study. Applicability of the conclusions beyond the current case cannot be demonstrated without further research using other cases to compare the results.

The analysis of the research shows how the Boko Haram insurgency consistently engaged in all forms of guerrilla tactics and terrorist acts against the Nigerian government, security forces, and law-abiding citizens since its inception in 2009. The research holds that a profound knowledge of the Boko Haram insurgency and its modes of operation will not only help the Nigerian government in the ongoing counterinsurgency operations, but could address some of the fundamental security issues that bring instability. Insurgent groups may differ in their causes and objectives, however, their tactics and engagement is common from one region to another. In view of this, Mao's Revolutionary warfare theory as analyzed by this study could be applied not only in Nigeria, but also in other parts of the world faced with the increased threat of a militant group if further research demonstrates the validity of this approach.

Therefore, the need for further study to ascertain the activities of the Boko Haram and other fundamental groups becomes necessary in order to seek lasting solution to the growing threat and to avert future occurrences of these forms of movement and support. Further study is required in the following areas:

The relationship between corruption and insurgency. According to the former U.S secretary of State John Kerry during his visit to Nigeria, most militant movements use corruption as a major reason why they challenge government authority.

Another area of study is the effect of unemployment on insurgency. Like every other group, the majority of Boko Haram fighters are unemployed youth. Therefore, areas

with high unemployment serves as a recruitment ground for all form of criminal activities, produces wide spread resentments and creates movements among the disgruntled population.

Finally, more attention from senior military leaders should be given to military capabilities and training to counter the growing threat of guerrilla tactics as it is important to understand the enemy's doctrine, and war fighting functions in order to defeat him.

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