

SWISS ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL LEADER DEVELOPMENT:
A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

SWISS ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL LEADER DEVELOPMENT:
A QUALITATIVE CASE STUDY, by LTC (GS) Marco Mudry, 104 pages.

Since 1995 the Swiss Armed Forces have implemented two major reforms which caused several negative aftermaths in the leader training and education. The next reform *WEA* Weiterentwicklung der Armee (continued development of the Armed Forces) will try to fill the current gaps in the application of mission command philosophy. The purpose of this study is to research how does the planned changes under *WEA* prepare Swiss Armed Forces organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy. Using the US Army's Leader Development Model and the US Army Leadership Requirements Model as a lens the research explores the leader education in the Swiss Armed Forces. Therefore, the study recommends to pay more attention in how to lead the *WEA* implementation and execution. Furthermore, the self-development domain as an essential part of the leader development, can be improved by inspiring and developing lifelong learner and creating a comprehensive longterm self-development plan.

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ACRONYMS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
AFC	Armed Forces College
COF	Career Officer
CT	Collective Training
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
FBT	Functional Basic Training
GS	General Staff
IBT	Individual Basic Training
LDM	Army Leader Development Model
LDP	Leader Development Process
LRM	Leadership Requirements Model
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
MAJ	Major
MOF	Militia Officer
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
RS	Recruit School
SAF	Swiss Armed Forces
SPR	Security policy report
WEA	<i>Weiterentwicklung der Armee</i> , Continued Development of the Armed Forces (latest reform of the Swiss Armed Forces)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

Leadership has the potential to become your organization's most valuable resource. Everything new that happens or does not happen in your organization – including any response to change – depends on the quality of your leaders. The success or failure of a company's vision, products, programs, systems, and processes all depend on leaders' setting the atmosphere, tone, and example for the entire organization. The good news is that you don't need to mine the depths of the earth for great leaders. You can develop the leaders you have.¹

— Gene Klann, *Building Character*

The leaders' quality is the most important factor to ensure long term success in the modern complex and dynamic operational environment. Major General (R) Perry M. Smith writes, "Leaders count. People at the top can and should make the difference."² Therefore, the leader development and education represents a critical aspect to any military organization, and should receive the necessary attention, priority and resources. For this reason, one pillar of the WEA (Weiterentwicklung der Armee) is the improvement of leader education and training within the SAF (Swiss Armed Forces).³

¹ Gene Klann, *Building Character: Strengthening the Heart of Good Leadership* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2007), 4.

² Perry Smith and Jeffrey W. Foley, *Rules and Tools for Leaders: From Developing your Own Skills to Running Organizations of any Size, Practical Advice for Leaders at all Levels*, 4th ed (New York: Penguin Group, 2013), xiv.

³ Swiss Armed Forces, 81.076.d, *Weiterentwicklung der Armee: unsere Schweizer Armee von Morgen* (Bern: BBL, June 2016), 17-18, accessed February 1, 2017, <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/content/vbs-internet/de/die-schweizer-armee/die-weiterentwicklung-der-armee.download/vbs-internet/de/publications/verteidigung/weiterentwicklungderarmee/Brochure-WEA-d.pdf>.

The intent is to mitigate the negative incidents caused in the leader development and training domain by the last two major reforms. For example, several serious shortfalls in the manning of COF (career officers) and militia officers, the lack of practical experience of young leaders, the decreased interest and motivation to serve as a leader⁴, reduces the significance of the SAF as *Kaderschmiede der Nation*⁵ [national source and school for leaders. Translated by author].

Background, the nature of the problem

The Swiss Armed Forces have undergone several major reforms during the last twenty-two years due principally to new threats in the security context, constraints of the economy and civil society, development in tactical-technical domain, and budget reductions. The continued evolution and accelerating changes overstretched the acceptance and the integration capabilities of the militia based organization. As a result, shortfalls in personnel domain, manning, and leadership education and training, reduced the interest in the once nationwide recognized military leadership experience.⁶ A survey among civilian Swiss Chief Executive Officers conducted in 2004, six months after *Armee XXI* implementation, confirmed this trend to emphasize the drawbacks of military leadership education as the absence from the civil job rather than the acquired skills and

⁴ Federal Council, *Armeebericht 2010* (October 1, 2010), 8886-8887, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2010/8871.pdf>.

⁵ Mélanie Rietmann, and Eckhard Baschek, “Militärausbildung: Lieber eine zivile Schulung,” *Handelszeitung* (Zürich), July 6, 2004, accessed January 2, 2017, <http://www.handelszeitung.ch/unternehmen/militaerausbildung-lieber-eine-zivile-schulung>, 3.

⁶ Federal Council, *Armeebericht 2010*, 8877-8883.

experiences.⁷ WEA aims to invert this trend and comprehensively improve the leader's education and training.⁸

As the Swiss Armed Forces prepare for WEA implementation there is a concern about the new role of COFs and NCO (noncommissioned officers). Lieutenant General Daniel Baumgartner, Land Forces Commander, express it after more than forty troop visits between April and August 2016 during a meeting held in September 2016 with the school commanders.

Ich habe hochstehende Arbeitsausführung und motiviertes Personal gesehen, aber auch festgestellt, dass das Ausbildungssystem nicht einwandfrei funktioniert. Mit einem System, in dem den Milizangehörigen keine volle Verantwortung zuteil kommt, können wir nicht erfolgreich sein. Wir müssen die Milizkader unterstützen und fördern, damit sie wieder selbständig arbeiten können. Das heisst, ihnen einen Auftrag geben, die Verantwortung und die Kompetenz übergeben oder einfach: führen nach Auftragstaktik. Die Miliz ist unsere Daseinsberechtigung. [I saw a high level of commitment and motivated people during task execution. I also realized that the current training system does not works faultless. We can't be successful in a system, in which the militia leaders can't assume full responsibility. We need to support and develop militia leaders able to exercise disciplined initiative. It means give them a task, the correlated responsibility and competence. In other words: leading by *Auftragstaktik*. The militia is our legitimacy to exist. Translated by author].⁹

The Land Forces Commander underlined the necessity and importance of career officers leading along the principles of *Auftragstaktik* or Mission command to provide militia leaders freedom of action. Operating under those principles, officers must be

⁷ Rietmann, "Militärausbildung," 1-3.

⁸ SAF, *Weiterentwicklung der Armee*, 17-18.

⁹ Letizia Paladino, "Gute Arbeit in einem schlechten System: die Rolle der Berufsmilitärs muss sich ändern," Land Forces Communication, September 5, 2016, accessed December 12, 2016, <https://intranet.vtg.admin.ch/de/gruppe-verteidigung/organization/heer.detail.news.html>.

adaptive and flexible and allowed to work through their own initiative. They must have the leadership abilities necessary to operate under mission command in a complex operating environment. U.S. forces have been operating under this concept for (some period of time) and the officer education system prepares US ARMY officers at the organizational level to operate in a complex environment under the philosophy of mission command.

A potential gap exists between the *Armee XXI* and *WEA* producing officers prepared to operate under mission command philosophy. By closing the gap, the SAF could better prepare officers to operate in a mission command type environment and improve the organizational climate.

Problem statement

The SAF officers must be better prepared to operate under mission command philosophy. The current leader development process does not enable officers to operate in that manner. Therefore *WEA* must be implemented in order to eliminate the identified gap.

Primary research question

How does the planned changes under *WEA* prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy?

Secondary research questions

The two secondary research questions help to answers the primary research question in a step-by-step procedure:

1. What is the process of educating organizational level leaders in the SAF?
2. What leadership attributes and competencies are necessary for successful organizational level leaders within the SAF?

Assumptions

First assumption: the *WEA* will be implemented as planned along the defined approach and without relevant changes in the assumed planning guidance, conditions, and resourcing.

Second Assumption: the US Army is considered a benchmark and model for reference in the domain of leader development processes and mission command.

Third assumption: the need of more adaptive and effective leaders in the SAF will increase due to the complex, rapidly changing security environment. This assumption is based on the following statement: “Increasingly, many non-state players are able to influence Switzerland’s internal and external security. . . . In this environment, threats and dangers can often develop rapidly and surprisingly. They are becoming more unpredictable and the response times for decision-makers are shrinking.”¹⁰ Effective leader development combined with an effective training program represent the cornerstone of operational success.¹¹

¹⁰ Federal Intelligence Service FIS, *Switzerland’s security: Situation Report 2016* (Bern: BBL, March 2016), 5.

¹¹ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 1-1.

Definition of terms

Army Leader. An Army leader is anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.¹²

Army Leader Development Model (LDM). How the US Army develops competent and confident military and Army civilian leaders through training, education, and experience gained in schools, while assigned to organizations, and through the individual's own program of self-development. These three mutually supporting training domains. Leader development is a continuous and progressive process, spanning a leader's entire career.¹³

Armee 61 [Armed Forces 61]. Designation of the SAF between 1961 and 1994.¹⁴

Armee 95 [Armed Forces 95]. Designation of the SAF between 1995 and 2003.¹⁵

Armee XXI [Armed Forces XXI]. Designation of the SAF since 2004.¹⁶

¹² Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 1.

¹³ Department of the Army, ADRP 7-0, 1-2.

¹⁴ Hans-Jakob Reichen, "Swiss Armed Forces Reform: Doctrinal and Organizational Challenges" (Master's Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2016), 19.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

DOTMLPF. Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities [the force development domains].¹⁷

Leadership (SAF). Führen heisst: das Handeln der Unterstellten auf das Erreichen eines Ziels ausrichten. Die Leistung eines Verbandes entsteht aus dem planvollen Zusammenwirken der einzelnen. Führen im Militär heisst deshalb insbesondere: den einzelnen dazu bringen, seine ganze Kraft für die gemeinsame Erfüllung des Auftrags einzusetzen, im Ernstfall auch unter Einsatz des Lebens. [Leadership means directing the subordinate's action to achieve a goal. The unit's collective performance is generated from the planned cooperation from each of its member. Military Leadership means in particular: influence a person to engage all of his/her energy to accomplish the collective task. In extreme situations with the sacrifice of her/his life. Translated by the author]¹⁸

Leadership (US ARMY). *Leadership* is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.¹⁹

Leadership Requirements Model (LRM). The Leadership Requirements Model conveys the expectations of leaders within the US Army. A common model of leadership shows how different types of leaders work together and is useful for aligning leader development activities and personnel management practices and systems. One portion of

¹⁷ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1-02, *Terms and Military Symbols* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2015), 2-9.

¹⁸ Swiss Armed Forces, Reglement 51.002d, *Dienstreglement (DR 04)*, January 1, 2004 (Status as of January 1, 2015), 5.

¹⁹ Department of the Army, ADP 6-22, 3.

the LRM consists of attributes indicating what leaders should be and should know and the second is a set of competencies that the US Army requires leaders to do. The single model organizes the disparate requirements and expectations of leaders at all levels of leadership.²⁰

Organizational level leadership. “Organizational leaders influence several hundred to several thousand people. They do this indirectly, generally through more levels of subordinates and staffs than do direct leaders. The additional levels of subordinates can make it more difficult for them to see and judge immediate results. Organizational leaders have staffs to help them lead their people and manage their organizations’ resources. They establish policies and the organizational climate that support their subordinate leaders.”²¹

Security Policy Report (SPR). “The SPR is a strategic document published by the Federal Council that describes threats and dangers, strategy, and tasks of the different instruments of security policy.”²²

Weiterentwicklung der Armee (WEA). “WEA is the Armed Forces reform initiated by the SPR 2010. Literally *Weiterentwicklung der Armee* can be translated as the continued development of the Armed Forces.”²³

²⁰ Ibid., 5.

²¹ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 2-5.

²² Reichen, “ “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 20.

²³ Ibid.

Limitations

First, the SAF educates all the organizational level leaders, both militia and COF, at the AFC (Armed Forces College). Consequently, the unity of effort and the synchronization between the services and branches is guaranteed in this domain. The research focus on SAF organizational level leader's development process, but using the US Army LDM as a lens. However, these two organizations present major differences per the DOTMLPF-Factors (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities), there are several characteristics which good leaders need to possess, independently if they are working in the US Army or SAF.

Second, the *WEA* will officially start at January 1, 2018 but several measures in the DOTMLPF domains have already been applied since 2016 after the political approval of the reform. In the last days of February 2017 most of the senior leader level positions were assigned and communicated to the officers who will fill those positions. Having the personnel configuration defined, the implementation of the *WEA* will be prepared and in some domains implemented before 2018. This research cannot consider any future documents and/or regulations published after March 2017.

Scope and delimitations

The study will assess how the planned changes under *WEA* prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy. The focus of this study is the development of organizational level leaders. The changes in the leader development process encompassed in *WEA* are primarily focused on the development of direct level leadership. This is an important consideration because it takes many years to

develop organizational-level leaders capable of operating under mission command philosophy.

The thesis will consider as organizational level leaders SAF career officers who successfully attended the General Staff education (MAJ (GS) and LTC (GS)). These categories of officers match with “middle level leaders” level leaders and engagement groups “COF E2 / E3” as showed in Figure 1, Defense leadership level and engagement groups. Figure 2, Army leadership levels, shows the US Army organizational level leader.

Despite the limited number of Swiss officers meeting these criteria, the research will make more sense from a qualitative point of view and level of education and training. Furthermore, this research will use the US Army LRM (Army Leadership Requirements Model) and the LDM (Army Leader Development Model) as a lens, even though the study focuses on the SAF.




Figure 1. SAF Leaders level and engagement groups

Source: Adapted by author from Swiss Armed Forces Staff, *Konzept Kaderentwicklung Verteidigung* [Defense leader development concept, translated by author] (Bern: Swiss Armed Forces Staff, December 23, 2014), 8.




Figure 2. Army leadership levels

Source: Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 2-4.

Significance of the study

With reform *Armee XXI* the training domain aims to achieve operational readiness. The factors used to measure its quality are comparison with international standards, the credibility in the troops and in the population. The militia officers are in charge primarily for operation planning and leading units/staffs.²⁴ Consequently, the

²⁴ Federal Council, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die über die Konzeption der Armee XXI: Armeeleitbild XXI* (Bern, BE: Federal Council, October 24, 2001), 1020-1021, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2002/967.pdf>.

required time to educate a leader was reduced in order to increase the acceptance of the economy and civil society. In other words, militia officers are assigned to commanders and others leading functions²⁵ and career officer's main effort is on the training domain. As a result, the aftermath of all the implemented changes cause a generations of militia officers without the necessary practical experience and decreased motivation. In addition, four years after the start of *Armee XXI* staffing of militia officer's positions was still unsatisfactory with about 20 percent of vacancies in the period between December 2008 and December 2009.²⁶

Furthermore, career officers and NCO balanced this lack of experience and manning with detailed directions, reduced freedom of maneuver and increased engagement in order to support the militia officers and achieve the required readiness. Despite the introduction of a new category of military personnel, the contract serviceman, as support for the career officers and NCO in the training domain, the situation got worse.²⁷

Therefore, the SPR 2010 recognized the lack in this domain and underlined the importance of the leader development and education improvement to ensure a mission command culture. For this reason, one of the four pillars of the *WEA* are leader education and training enhancement.²⁸ However, in the transition phase between the current *Armee*

²⁵ Ibid., 978.

²⁶ Federal Council, *Armeebericht 2010*, 8886.

²⁷ Ibid., 8889-8890.

²⁸ Daniel Baumgartner, "Ausbildungskonzeption der Zukunft," *Military Power Revue of the Swiss Armed Forces*, no. 2 (November 2016): 38.

XXI and the complete implementation of the *WEA* there are several significant changes and challenges along DOTMLPF, which can influence the success.

How the results of this research could be used to improve the use of mission command philosophy under the *WEA*? This study explores LDP within SAF organizational level leaders using the US Army LDM and LRM as a lens. Therefore, the potential gap between these two-different processes can be identified and closed. Also, the SAF could be better prepared to operate in a mission command type environment and improve the operating climate during the implementation and execution of the *WEA*.

Summary and conclusion

Chapter 1 describes first the relevance of leadership and leader development as the potential most valuable resource to ensure the success in an organization. Then the research explains the background and nature of the problem. In brief: the current LDP does not prepare the SAF officers to operate under mission command philosophy. The core of this chapter is built around the primary research question. Moreover, the purpose of this research is to examine how does the planned change under *WEA* prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy. The secondary research questions represent the intermediate goals, which help to answer the primary question. These intermediate steps are the processes to educate an organizational level leader, and develop or improve the required attributes and competencies.

The researcher used the US Army as a role model and limited the analysis to the organizational level leader of the SAF. Therefore, to ensure a consistent exploration, this paper focuses on Swiss COF with general staff education. As a result, by answering the

research questions the thesis offers possible recommendations to enhance the LDP during the preparation and execution of the *WEA*.

Writing about the importance of this leader development, the former U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General (R) Martin E. Dempsey, “I am convinced that learning and leadership are the core of our profession. Military Service must continue to be our Nation’s preeminent leadership experience. We will continue to reform and leverage the Professional Military Education enterprise to advance our profession. It is more important than ever to get the most from the potential and performance of every Service member.”²⁹

²⁹ Department of Defense, *Joint Education: White Paper* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 16, 2012), accessed January 17, 2017. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/white_papers/cjcs_wp_education.pdf.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to research how the planned changes under *WEA* will prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy.

This chapter, divided in three distinct parts, reviews the LDP through examining the LDM, the LRM, and mission command philosophy within the SAF first, then within the US Army for organizational level leaders. In the third part, the study describes what other relevant authors think about mission command philosophy and leader development process.

First, the author presents an overview of the SAF by describing briefly the Swiss militia system, and the main aspects of *Armee 61*, *Armee 95*, *Armee XXI*. Then, this part reviews the organizational level LDP within the SAF as planned under *WEA*.

Furthermore, the author describes the Swiss competencies model and how this is applied across the different levels and domains. The study also presents the *Auftragstaktik* or mission command philosophy within the SAF.

The second portion is a review of the LDM within the institutional, operational, and self-development domains, and the LRM in the US Army specifically focused on the organizational-level leader. Then, the author describes mission command philosophy.

Third, a review of relevant aspects of the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) at Fort Leavenworth, covers additional approaches of how to apply the art of command. In addition, the author describes other significant authors' opinions about mission command philosophy and leader development process.

Swiss Armed Forces

From Armee 61 to Armee XXI

The purpose of this section is to provide information about the evolution of the SAF from reforms which occurred over the course of more than twenty years. The reviews of *Armee 61*, *Armee 95*, and *Armee XXI* describes only main aspects of each reform related to development of the officer corps with enough detail to allow the reader to achieve a better understanding of the planned changes under *WEA*.

Militia System

The militia system is a pillar of Swiss identity that organizes public life requiring apt citizens to assume unpaid public functions.³⁰ “In Switzerland, this applies to politics and firefighting at the local level, legislative activities at the cantonal and national level, as well as activities in private associations. The Swiss military has been organized as a militia system since the Middle-Ages.”³¹ The Swiss constitution requires the Armed Forces to be organized as a militia.³² “The Swiss militia system has evolved over the years, but the basic concept remains the same. Conscription applies to all male Swiss citizens.”³³ Military service is voluntary for Swiss women.

³⁰ Andreas Kley, “Milizsystem,” *Historische Lexikon der Schweiz*, last modified November 10, 2009, accessed March 1, 2017, <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D43694.php>.

³¹ Reichen, ““Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 11.

³² *Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation*, April 18, 1999 (status as of January 1, 2016), 14, accessed February 18, 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/201601010000/101.pdf>.

³³ Reichen, ““Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 11.

Overview from *Armee 61* to *WEA*

Table 1. SAF between <i>Armee 61</i> and <i>WEA</i>				
Armed Forces designation	<i>Armee 61</i>	<i>Armee 95</i>	<i>Armee XXI</i>	<i>WEA</i>
Duration	1961-1994	1995-2003	Since 2004	From 2018
Militia personnel (according to law)	625,000	400,000	200,000 total 120,000 active 80,000 reserve	100,000
Militia personnel (reality)	781,500	426,000	232,000	-
Officers (by law)	45,000	35,000	20,000	
Age of service for ^a				
- Soldiers	- 50	- 42	- 34	- 34
- Lieutenants	- 55	- 42	- 36	- 40
- Captains	- 55	- 42/52	- 42	- 42
- Majors and above	- 55	- 52	- 50	- 50
Length of basic training	17 weeks	15 weeks	21 weeks	18 weeks
Refresher courses	Annual	Biennial	Annual	Annual
Frequency/Quantity ^b	8 ^b	10 ^b	7 ^b	6 ^b
Battalions (quantity)	742	592	179	181
Military expenditure	5.635 Billion Fr.	5.493 Billion Fr.	4.357 Billion Fr.	5.0 Billion Fr.
% GDP	1.7%	1.5%	1.0%	0.8%
Military expenditure as % of central government expenditure	17.8%	13.6%	8.7%	-
Day of militia service per year	11,993,277 (1990)	7,162,508 (1995)	6,019,542 (2005)	5,000,000 (planned)

Source: Table adapted by author from Federal Council, *Armeebericht 2010*, October 1, 2010, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2010/8871.pdf>, 8879-8881.

Notes a) The age of retirement from the military service categorized by grades, b) Quantity of annual refresher course periods each lasting 19 days for soldiers (3 weeks), and 26 days (4 weeks) for leaders.

Table 1. SAF between *Armee 61* and *WEA* gives a good overview about key numbers of the Armed Forces from 1961 to *WEA*. During more than twenty years of reforms the global trend is a diminution in almost all domains and factors presented.

Moreover, the service time of militia personnel, which is a cornerstone of the militia system, is one of the main cost factors. For example, each service day generates costs in several fields like lodging, food, ammunition, medical, fuel, maintenance, and income compensation allowance. In addition, the number of days of service each year and the “retirement” age for each rank, have direct impact on the militia personnel, their life and their employers. The strength of the Armed Forces was decreased by reducing the “retirement” age from military service.³⁴ For example soldiers in the *Armee 61* were integrated in a unit and served in a refresher course till the age of fifty. In the *Armee XXI* soldiers finish their service time at the age of thirty-four. Upon retirement soldiers return their personal military equipment and weapon to the SAF. For platoon leaders and unit commanders the age of retirement dropped from fifty-five in the *Armee 61* to thirty-six respectively forty-two in the current system. The reduction of one year service group decreases the SAF strength of about 20,000 soldiers.

Armee 61

Main aspects

Armee 61 is the name for the SAF used during the Cold War between 1962-1994. The main idea of the Combined Defense doctrine was “to canalize the enemy with multiple defense zones echeloned in depth using the country's advantageous terrain, then destroy enemy penetration by mechanized counterattacks.”³⁵ This concept was too unilateral and rigid to execute at the operational-tactical level because the plan

³⁴ Reichen, “ “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 77-78.

³⁵ Federal Council, *Armeebericht 2010*, 8877.

anticipated only one course of action, an enemy attacking through the Swiss plateau. The SAF conducted subsidiary security operations to support civil authorities (embassy, international conferences, airport), and disaster relief in Switzerland and abroad during this period. In addition, the Armed Forces conducted peace supporting operations in Korea and other war zones. During that thirty-year period, the military leaders implemented several changes which led to some improvements.³⁶

LDP/Role of COF

During the Cold War, the four Army Corps and militia officers were responsible for training and leading military units.³⁷

Career officers were designated as instructors and were mainly employed in basic training, officer schools, or in General Staff functions. Until the rank of general, all career officers also had a parallel militia function. Career officers received the same training as their militia peers and gathered most of their knowledge through exercises. Once they became career officers, they received a yearlong education. Continuing education was provided throughout their career; however, it focused mostly on tactical, educational and administrative issues. The SAF sent career officers abroad to professional military education institutions in order to complete their operational and strategic level education.³⁸

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Simon Küchler, “Die überlegene Stärke der Miliz,” in *Erinnerung an die Armee* 61, ed. Franz Betschon and Louis Geiger (Frauenfeld: Verlag Huber, 2009), 114.

³⁸ Reichen, ““Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 32-33.

In the 1970s only 75 percent of the career officer's positions were staffed.³⁹
“Recruiting sufficient career officers has always been a challenge for the SAF.”⁴⁰

Armee 95

Main aspects

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the new strategic context, the government published SPR 90 in October 1990, which described the required changes to all security instruments, not only to the Armed Forces. The strategy was to “promote peace by cooperation and mutual aide, prevent war through the capability to defend the country, contribute to the safeguard of vital needs, and maintain an adequate preparation.”⁴¹ The 1990 SPR underlined the importance of reducing the impact of military life on militia personnel.⁴²

Two years later in 1992 the master plan *Armee 95* defined the main aspects of the future Armed Forces. The defense doctrine was designated *dynamische Raumverteidigung* [Dynamic Defense]. Moreover, “the reform downsized the Armed

³⁹ Michael M. Olsansky and Dominique Moccand, “Treten an Ort? Die schweizerische Instruktionsproblematik aus historischer Perspektive,” *Military Power Review of the Swiss Armed Forces*, no. 1/2015 (May 2015): 69, accessed February 3, 2017, <http://www.vtg.admin.ch/content/vtg-internet/en/media/publikationen/military-power-revue.download/vtg-internet/en/publications1/verwaltung/organisation/astab/mpr/mpr15-1.pdf>.

⁴⁰ Reichen, ““Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 33.

⁴¹ Federal Council, *Rapport du Conseil fédéral sur la politique de sécurité de la Suisse* (Feuille Fédérale, October 1, 1990), 795 [translated by Reichen, “SAF Reform,” 36].

⁴² Federal Council, *Rapport sur la politique de sécurité de la Suisse*, 1990, 830, [translated by Reichen, ““Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 38].

Forces from 600,000 to 400,000 personnel by dropping the age of service from 50 to 42. The available forces were organized into three regular corps, one mountain corps, and the corps of flying and air defense troops, the armed forces staff and other armed forces troops as shown in Figure 3, Structure *Armee 95*.




Figure 3. Organization under *Armee 95*

Source: Federal Council, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee in den neunziger Jahren: Armeeleitbild 95* (Bern, BE: Federal Council, January 27, 1992), 940-41, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.do?id=10052134>.

Training and service model

“The number of service days were furthermore diminished by reducing the length of basic training from 17 to 15 weeks.”⁴³ As depicted in Figure 4, Basic service model for

⁴³ Reichen, ““Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 38.

soldiers in *Armee 95*, the refresher courses' frequency was biennial instead annual. As a result, the readiness and training levels decreased, and achieved an unsatisfactory level.




Figure 4. Basic service model for soldiers in *Armee 95*

Source: Adapted by the author from Federal Council, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee in den neunziger Jahren: Armeeleitbild 95* (Bern, BE: Federal Council, January 27, 1992), 963, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.do?id=10052134>.




Figure 5. Leader development process from soldier to platoon leader in *Armee 95*

Source: Created by author.

The leader development process from soldier to platoon leader under *Armee 95* was almost the same as under *Armee 61*. At the end of the recruit school, the selected soldiers went to the squad leader school. After six weeks of education, squad leaders oversaw their squads during twelve weeks of practical training in the recruit school which followed the squad leader school. In the same way, the selected squad leaders attended a seventeen-week long course at the officer's school. The main efforts during officer education was leadership and developing trainer skills. Following graduation to lieutenant, the new officers took charge of their platoon for an entire recruit school.⁴⁴ To sum up, the whole education and training time necessary to be a trained platoon leader as depicted in Figure 5, Leader development process from soldier to platoon leader in *Armee 95*, is sixty-six weeks. A completely trained platoon leader was then integrated in a new company and was responsible for his platoon during the yearly refresher courses.

A platoon leader in his third refresher course could apply to be selected to become a company commander. The leadership education within the SAF during this period prepared the leader for a particular role through a combination of instruction types and courses: basic education (school), technical course (specific to the branch of function) and practical training. The three-week-long captain career course was conducted decentralized within the division, with the practical service/training conducted under the

⁴⁴ Federal Council, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee in den neunziger Jahren: Armeeleitbild 95* (Bern, BE: Federal Council, January 27, 1992), 965-969, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.amsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.do?id=10052134>.

oversight of the training command. The education and training for leaders above company commander was concentrated at the Training Center for higher leadership.⁴⁵

Operations

The number of engagements in subsidiary security operations to support civil authorities increased from 1999. Indeed, “the Federal Council tasked the Armed Forces to protect embassies and consulates in Bern, Geneva, and Zürich.”⁴⁶ In addition, the Armed Forces performed other relevant operations to ensure security during the annual World Economic Forum in Davos and the G8 international conference in Evian in cooperation with France during 2008, the SAF engaged more than 5000 soldiers in this combined joint operation next to the Swiss border.⁴⁷ The deployment of a reinforced armed company to Kosovo since 1999 shows the increased effort in peace support operations. The SAF sent other small contingents to support different UN or OSCE missions to Bosnia, Western Sahara, Namibia.⁴⁸ “These international contingents were composed of

⁴⁵ Federal Council, *Armeeleitbild 95*, 969-970.

⁴⁶ Reichen, “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 42-43.

⁴⁷ Robert Riedo, “Schutz der G8-Konferenz von Evian,” *Allgemeineschweizerische Militärzeitschrift*, no. 7-8 (2003): 14-15, accessed March 1, 2017, <http://www.e-periodica.ch/digbib/view?pid=asm-004:2003:169#420>.

⁴⁸ Bruno Lezzi, “Der Kampf für Blauhelme im Rückblick: Neutralitätsparole gegen modernere Sicherheitspolitik,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zürich), August 6, 2013, accessed March 5, 2017, <https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/neutralitaetsparole-gegen-modernere-sicherheitspolitik-1.18128119>.

volunteer soldiers, who had been recruited, organized and trained by the SAF International Command (SWISSINT).”⁴⁹

COFs

The COF’s role during *Armee 95* was mainly focused on training militia officers. The time for self-development and, in general, for education purposes was reduced. There was not a culture of critical and creative discussion within the COF’ corps. Major General Bachofner wrote about this situation already in 1989.⁵⁰ From 1993 the Military Command School improved the education to become a COF in the academics domain with a three-year-long comprehensive course.⁵¹

Armee XXI

Main aspects

“The 1999 SPR proposed a radically new strategy, security through cooperation, and built the political foundation for the reform *Armee XXI*. The new strategy was a consequence of major changes in the operational environment and organizational struggles with the *Armee 95* reform.”⁵² The strategy security through cooperation recognized the impossibility to face the new threats autonomously with the limited

⁴⁹ Reichen, “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 43.

⁵⁰ Hans Bachofner, “Armee im Wandel,” *Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift*, no. 10 (1989): 635-636, accessed March 5, 2017, <http://www.e-periodica.ch/digbib/view?pid=asm-004:1989:155::776#776>.

⁵¹ Hansruedi Ostertag, “Armee im Wandel,” *Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift*, no. 2 (1995): 3-6, accessed March 5, 2017, <http://www.e-periodica.ch/digbib/view?pid=asm-004:1995:161#65>.

⁵² Reichen, “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 44.

resources. This new approach was not only at the international level but also within the Swiss Confederation with others security organizations at federal, cantonal, and regional level.⁵³ The organization of the SAF under *Armee XXI* changed in a significant way:

The General Staff, the four Army Corps and the Air Force organization was discarded. Armee XXI was composed of two services, Army and Air Force, led by the joint staff (*Führungsstab*) and supported by a logistics organization and a command support organization. The joint staff was a new command, manned primarily by professional personnel (career officers and Armed Forces civilians), who had to assume numerous functions ranging from the planning and executing of joint operations, evaluating the feasibility of operations in support of civilian authorities, integrating and coordinating the operations of the Army and the Air Force, training brigade and territorial region staffs to the joint training of the Army and Air Force staffs.⁵⁴




Figure 6. Organization under *Armee XXI*

Source: Adapted by the author from Federal Council, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee XXI: Armeeleitbild XXI* (Bern, BE: Federal Council, October 24, 2001), 1011, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2002/967.pdf>.

⁵³ Federal Council, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz: SIPOL B 2000* (Bern, BE: Federal Council, June 7, 1999), 39, accessed January 14, 2017. <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/1999/7657.pdf>.

⁵⁴ Reichen, “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 50.

Training and service model

“The model of training was also radically changed compared to that in the *Armee 61* and *Armee 95*. The *Armee XXI* master plan proposed the following: an increase of basic training length from 15 to 21 weeks; the transfer of training responsibility to career officers; the utilization of contract soldiers to conduct initial training; the return of annual refresher courses.”⁵⁵ By reducing the age of service from 42 to 34 the SAF strength downsized from 400,000 to 200,000 soldiers divided in 120,000 active and 80,000 reserve as shows Figure 7, Basic service model for soldiers in *Armee XXI*.




Figure 7. Basic service model for soldiers in *Armee XXI*

Source: Adapted by the author from Federal Council, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee XXI: Armeeleitbild XXI* (Bern, BE: Federal Council, October 24, 2001), 1035, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2002/967.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Reichen, “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 51.

LDP

The leader development model changed radically under *Armee XXI*. By reducing the time to become a trained platoon leader to fifty-three weeks, the *Armee XXI* tried to increase the attractiveness for a leadership education and the acceptance from the civilian society. Under the new system, leaders don't go through all the level of education before being in charge of a platoon. Within the first seven weeks of basic individual training, the unit COF is in charge to select the future leaders already divided in the different categories (squad leader, sergeant major, officers).

After twenty-two weeks of education and practical training, squad leaders oversaw their squads during the collective training for eight weeks. In a similar way, the selected future officers attended a nine-week long squad leader school, followed by a joint centralized education. Future officers then attend a practical training usually as deputy platoon leader during thirteen weeks. The main efforts during officer education is developing leadership skills. Following graduation to lieutenant, the new officers take charge of their platoon for an eight-week collective training.




Figure 8. Leader development model under *Armee XXI*

Source: Adapted by the author from Federal Council, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Konzeption der Armee XXI: Armeeleitbild XXI* (Bern, BE: Federal Council, October 24, 2001), 1025, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2002/967.pdf>.

The staffing of the militia officers is unsatisfactory at two different levels. First, instead of 1,240 yearly required platoon leaders for the units, the leader development system prepared about 1,000 lieutenants yearly. Second, the vacancies in the battalion staffs increased continually, because of missing interest among the platoon leaders to continue to serve in these functions. From the yearly required 450 staff officers only about 300 were selected and educated. The Federal Council recognized in the 2008 published SAF assessment three main reason for this unsatisfying personnel situation. The reduced number of persons attending the recruit school decreased and consequently the number of potential leaders. The augmented pressure in personal and working life

impacted the readiness of possible candidates to serve as leader in uniform. The coordination difficulties between professional development and the military basic training grow with the introduction of the new academic calendar known as Bologna-system. A student who decides to advance as officer lose one academic year at the university.⁵⁶

COFs

The *Armee XXI* changed the career officer's job profile. The augmented requirements and the massively increased work load created a general dissatisfaction in the military career personnel. Conducting three RS start per year instead of two as before in the *Armee 95* the signs of fatigue increased among the officers.⁵⁷ Consequently, the resignations among COF/ career NCO achieved a peak in 2006 with 38 persons. Because of the long educational time to become COF, it was not possible to appropriately replace the missing personnel quick. "In 2002, the Military Command School transformed into the Military Academy and was recognized to award bachelor's degrees. Furthermore, career officers were eligible to participate in different NATO training courses."⁵⁸

Operations

Table 2 presents the number of man days accomplished by militia and career military personnel in operations since the start of *Armee XXI*. The last row contains the total amount of service days which militia personnel accomplished in

⁵⁶ Federal Council, *Überprüfung der Zielsetzungen der Armee* (Bern: BBL, February 13, 2008), 2449-2450, accessed January 14, 2017, <https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/federal-gazette/2008/2413.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Federal Council, *Überprüfung der Zielsetzungen*, 2453.

⁵⁸ Reichen, "Swiss Armed Forces Reform," 51.

a given year in training or operations. The operations are split in subsidiary security, disaster relief, peace support, and general support operations. Subsidiary security operations encompass support to police or border guards for the protection of foreign diplomatic representations in Switzerland, Swiss embassies abroad, international conferences or events, and the border. Disaster relief operations occur in Switzerland or abroad. Peace support operations include the engagement of units and individuals. General operations encompass non-security support (manpower, construction, transport, communications) to major civilian events such as international ski races or national cultural events and military representation duties in the event of international visits.

Since 2004, the SAF have conducted multiple subsidiary security operations. However, over 80 percent of the personnel committed to subsidiary security operations were engaged in the same operations over the 12 years: the daily protection of diplomatic representations, support of border guards, on board flight protection, and the yearly protection of the World Economic Forum. The other operations consisted of the protection of five international conferences and the 2008 European soccer championship. The daily protection of embassies has been accomplished for over ten years.⁵⁹

Since 2004, the SAF have conducted multiple peace support operations. Over the past 12 years, more than 82 percent of the personnel committed to peace support operations were engaged in operations within Kosovo and Bosnia, which are also the only two operations with a contingent. The Swiss Armed Forces contributed individual officers and demining specialists to a dozen missions.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Ibid., 56-57.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

	Table 2. Engagement of the Swiss Armed Forces in man days (thousands)											
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Subsidiary security	282	324	340	294	423	272	190	131	122	95	122	76
Disaster relief	0.4	17	0.07	1.6	0	0.4	0.6	3.8	0.05	0.02	0	1.5
Peace support	93	98	101	100	100	96	97	97	103	103	102	106
General support	24	58	17	22	18	20	28	24	22	30	26	23
Total service days	N/A	6020	6311	6566	6367	6376	6392	6238	6311	6052	5841	5793

Source: Hans-Jakob Reichen, “Swiss Armed Forces Reform: Doctrinal and Organizational Challenges” (Master’s Thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2016), 56.

WEA

Main aspects

The main purpose of the WEA aims to improve the SAF in the following four pillars: achieve a more flexible operational readiness, improve leaders’ training and education, increase the equipment level in the units, and enhance the regional ties to the civilian authorities, and population.⁶¹ The strength reduction to 100,000 soldiers and a better use of the limited resource will cause an important organizational change for the two services.

⁶¹ Swiss Armed Forces, 81.076d, *Weiterentwicklung der Armee: unsere Schweizer Armee von Morgen* (Bern: BBL, June 1, 2016), 24-25, accessed February 1, 2017. <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/content/vbs-internet/de/die-schweizer-armee/die-weiterentwicklung-der-armee.download/vbs-internet/de/publications/verteidigung/weiterentwicklungderarmee/Brochure-WEA-d.pdf>.




Figure 9. Organization WEA

Source: Adapted by the author from Swiss Armed Forces, 81.076d, *Weiterentwicklung der Armee: unsere Schweizer Armee von Morgen* (Bern: BBL, June 1, 2016), 14, accessed February 1, 2017. <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/content/vbs-internet/de/die-schweizer-armee/die-weiterentwicklung-der-armee.download/vbs-internet/de/publications/verteidigung/weiterentwicklungderarmee/Brochure-WEA-d.pdf>.

The organization planned for the WEA represent a significant change for the direct subordinates of the Chief of the Armed Forces. The Land Forces and the Air Forces will be integrated in the operations command and training command. The AFC will be also a prominent part of the Training Command together with the training brigades. Having all the training organizations under the same command improve the synchronization and unity of effort across the entire SAF for the training and education of soldiers and leaders.

Training and service model




Figure 10. Basic service model for soldiers in *WEA*

Source: Created by the author.

The training model for the soldier will be adapted by reducing the RS from 21 to 18 weeks and the refresher courses limited to 6 by maintaining the age of service at 34 years. The total number of service days was increased for platoon leaders from 600 in the *Armee XXI* to 680 to improve the leader education and training.




Figure 11. Leader development process WEA

Source: Adapted by the author from Swiss Armed Forces, 81.076d, Weiterentwicklung der Armee: unsere Schweizer Armee von Morgen (Bern: BBL, June 1, 2016), 17-18, accessed February 1, 2017. <http://www.vbs.admin.ch/content/vbs-internet/de/die-schweizer-armee/die-weiterentwicklung-der-armee.download/vbs-internet/de/publications/verteidigung/weiterentwicklungderarmee/Brochure-WEA-d.pdf>.

The increased service days for platoon leaders will allow to radically change the leader development process. The time necessary to become platoon leader will grow from 53 weeks in the *Armee XXI* to 64 weeks. All the future leaders will serve for a complete RS before being selected for the squad leader school. After successfully complete this first leadership education, the future officers will get through a 7 weeks practical training as squad leader performed during a following RS. The selected future officers, will then complete a 15 weeks-long officer's school and promoted to lieutenant at its end. The new officers will oversee the training and education as a platoon leader during a complete RS.

This leader development model WEA allows the officers to gain the necessary experience to be well prepared to lead a platoon from the individual basic training, through the functional basic training and finally for the most challenging collective training.

COFs

Figure 12, Leader development process for COFs under WEA offers a good overview how the optimized process will win, select, and prepare the future COF. An appropriate balance between experience, training, education will enable to improve the current unsatisfactory situation.




Figure 12. Leader development process for COF under WEA

Source: Adapted by the author from Swiss Armed Forces, 81.132d, *Meine Karriere in Uniform: Berufsoffizier oder Berufsunteroffizier bei der Schweizer Armee* (Bern: BBL, 2015), 5-9.

The source to win future COF are the militia officers serving during the RS or the refresher courses as platoon leader (lieutenant, first lieutenant) or company commander (captain). The different branch training brigades select the COF aspirants from the interested COF. The time before the selection 2 provides the aspirants the necessary experience at company level. The centralized selection 2 consists in a sport exam, language competencies exam, and a three-day-long Assessment Center (ACABO). COF aspirant increase their experience within a RS unit career team during 6 months.⁶² The COF aspirant will then complete the Military Academy at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology along one of the three curricula. Aspirant with a bachelor-degree can attend the 18 months long *Diplom Lehrgang*. The *Bachelor Lerhgang* offers the participant the opportunity to a bachelor-degree. Graduated COF can serve as career company commander or unit COF for at least four years.

To staff the COF positions under WEA it will be necessary to educate 38 COF. According to the recent experience and planning each year the SAF needs about 130 COF interested who get through the leader development model.

Auftragstaktik/Mission Command and LRM

Auftragstaktik/mission command

Dienstreglement DR 04 is one of the most important regulations in the SAF because is valid for all the soldiers and leaders independently of the level or function and it's distributed to every military person. According to *Dienstreglement DR 04*

⁶² Swiss Armed Forces, 81.132d, *Meine Karriere in Uniform: Berufsoffizier oder Berufsunteroffizier bei der Schweizer Armee* (Bern: BBL, 2015), 5-9.

“Leadership means directing the subordinate’s action to achieve a goal. The unit’s collective performance is generated from the planned cooperation from each of its member. Military Leadership means in particular: influence a person to engage all of his/her energy to accomplish the collective task. In extreme situations with the sacrifice of her/his life.”⁶³ *Dienstreglement DR 04*, and *Führung und Stabsorganisation der Armee*⁶⁴ [Leadership and Staff organization in the SAF] offers important leadership principles similar to the Mission command philosophy. Both regulations highlight the importance of *Auftragstaktik* (Mission command) and the mutual trust between leaders and followers to accomplish the received mission. Leaders should be able to adapt to the changing environment and solve problems through teamwork, initiative, leading by example, communicating a clear commander’s intent.

The necessity to enhance the leadership education and training described in SPR 2010, was implemented in the *WEA* project as one of the four pillars. Consequently, the implementation of the adapted leadership requirements model and the leadership development program represent an incredible opportunity to improve the leadership education. In this context, the Military Academy (at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology), which is responsible for the leadership education of COFs at all levels, will play a central role in the application of these adapted models and regulations.

⁶³ Swiss Armed Forces, Reglement 51.002 d, *Dienstreglement (DR 04)* (Bern: BBL, January 1, 2004) (Status as of January 1, 2015), 5-7.

⁶⁴ Swiss Armed Forces, Reglement 50.040 d, *Führung und Stabsorganisation der Armee 17 (FSO 17)* (Bern: BBL, July 1, 2014).

In addition, the leadership and communication faculty, not only educates the organizational level leaders but also conducts seminars on specific topics. One of these events in 2015 focused on leadership in complex operational environments and extreme situations in the military and in the civil society.

The Competency Model of the Swiss Federal Administration

The Management Competency Model of the Swiss Federal Administration serves as a basis and working tool to assist Management and Human Resources in their work. The term competency refers to the knowledge, capacities, proficiencies, and experience that individuals have at their command.⁶⁵ The different areas of the competency model:

⁶⁵ Federal Office of Personnel FOPER, 614.150e, *Overview Competency Model of the Swiss Federal Administration* (Bern: BBL, May 1, 2013), 1, accessed January 14, 2017, <http://intranet.infopers.admin.ch/personal/01726/01732/index.html?lang=de&amtid=2>.



Figure 13. The Competency Model of the Swiss Federal Administration

Source: Adapted by the author from Federal Office of Personnel FOPER, 614.150e, *Competency Model of the Swiss Federal Administration: At a Glance* (Bern: BBL, May 1, 2013), 2-8, accessed January 14, 2017, <http://intranet.infopers.admin.ch/personal/01726/01732/index.html?lang=de&amtid=2>.




Figure 14. The Competency Model areas

Source: Adapted by the author from Federal Office of Personnel FOPER, 614.150e, *Competency Model of the Swiss Federal Administration: At a Glance* (Bern: BBL, May 1, 2013),2-8 , accessed January 14, 2017, <http://intranet.infopers.admin.ch/personal/01726/01732/index.html?lang=de&amtid=2>.

SAF competencies model

The SAF use a competency model adapted from the one provided from the Federal Office of Personnel (FOPER). The AFC summarize theses competencies in a Leadership triangle composed by the social competencies, the professional competencies, and the methodology competencies. Appendix A offers a detailed view of these competencies.



Figure 15. Triangle of leadership competencies

Source: Adapted by author from Swiss Armed Forces, 5.2015d, *Ausbildung der höheren Armeekader: Mehrwert für die Wirtschaft* (Bern: BBL, May 1, 2015), 4, accessed January 14, 2017, http://www.vtg.admin.ch/de/organisation/hka.detail.publication.html/vtg-internet/de/publications/verwaltung/organisation/hka/150501_Brochuere_Ausb_hoehere_Armeekader_d.pdf.html.

US Army

Mission command (philosophy)

“Leadership is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”⁶⁶

The Army’s guidance on mission command describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, understand the environment, make decisions, direct actions by combining the art of command and the science of control. Mission command philosophy is the “exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”⁶⁷ The mission command philosophy is guided by six principles, which are crucial to success in each military operation.




Figure 16. Principles of mission command

Source: Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-00, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 17, 2012), 1-4

⁶⁶ Department of the Army, ADP 6-22, 1.

⁶⁷ Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 17, 2012), 1-4.

Army Leader Development Model (LDM)

Leader development is a continuous and progressive process, spanning a leader's entire career. Leader development comprises training, education, and experience gained in schools, while assigned to organizations, and through the individual's own program of self-development. With limited time in the schoolhouse, the majority of leader development occurs in operational assignments and through self-development.⁶⁸

The three domains mutually support the development of competent US Army leaders. The role of the commander is to create a learning environment, assigns challenging assignment to his/her subordinates, provide feedback about their individual strengths and weaknesses. Leaders encourage the individual self-development allocating the necessary time for their subordinates. The Meaning-Making cycle helps the leader development process by enhancing the lessons of experience along observation, feedback, dialogue, reflection, and adjustment.

⁶⁸ Department of the Army, ADRP 7-0, 1-2.

The **institutional training domain** is the Army's institutional training and education system, which primarily includes training base centers and schools that provide initial training and subsequent professional military education for Soldiers, military leaders, and Army civilians. This domain includes the centers of excellence and schools, both inside and outside the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.

The **operational training domain** is the training activities organizations undertake while at home station, at maneuver combat training centers, during joint exercises, at mobilization centers, and while operationally deployed. This domain equates to assignments in the operational Army and the generating force.

The **self-development training domain** is planned, goal-oriented learning that reinforces and expands the depth and breadth of an individual's knowledge base, self-awareness, and situational awareness; complements institutional and operational learning; enhances professional competence; and meets personal objectives. Within this domain, Army leaders expect Soldiers and Army civilians to fill in their skills, knowledge, and behavior gaps from institutional training and operational assignments.

Figure 17. The three domains of LDM

Source: Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-3.




Figure 18. US Army Leader Development Model (LDM)

Source: Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 1-2.

US Army Leadership Requirements Model (LRM)




Figure 19. US Army Leadership Requirements Model (LRM)

Source: Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2012), 2-5.

“The requirements are for leaders at all levels and are common to all cohorts. The model informs leaders of the enduring capabilities needed regardless of the level of leadership, mission, or assignment.”⁶⁹ Which conveys the expectations that the Army wants leaders to meet. The sets of expectations are divided in the attributes (character, presence, intellect) and the core competencies that the Army requires leaders to do (leads, develops, achieves). All these elements are necessary to become a competent,

⁶⁹ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, 1-4-5.

multiskilled and agile leader. Mutual trust between leaders and followers is necessary to ensure a consistent and effective leader development process. “Attributes describe how an individual behaves and learns within an environment.”⁷⁰ A balanced combination from the three LDM-domains self-development, institutional education and training enable an effective development of the leader competencies. Improving these competencies is a lifelong process. Moving to the organizational level leader, a person enhance and refine the competencies acquired as direct level leader.

Other points of view on mission command and Leader Development

CGSOC Leadership

The US Army CGSOC Common Core course L100 “developing organizations and leaders” complements and expands the doctrine in ADRP 6-22 with military and civilian case studies to illustrate the most relevant leadership theories. Leadership development in CGSOC focuses on professional growth as an organizational level leader. The curriculum centers on the transition from direct level leadership to organizational level leadership. One of the goals of L100 is to develop adaptive organizational leaders who successfully deal with the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty associated with future operational environments.

The new role of the leader: a gardener

Former senior military leaders, like retired General Stanley McChrystal, and other relevant leadership authors confirm in their books the requirements of the LRM and the

⁷⁰ Department of the Army, ADRP 6-22, 1-4-5.

practical application of Mission command philosophy. In short, the ability to react quickly and adapt to a complex operational environment is critical and “requires new ways to communicate and work together.”⁷¹

Innovation and problem solving become the products of teamwork, not a single architect. Doing this requires increasing transparency to ensure common understanding and awareness. It also often involves changing the physical space and personal behaviors to establish trust and foster collaboration. This can develop the ability to share context so that the teams can decentralize and empower individuals to act. Decision are pushed downward, allowing the members to act quickly. This new approach also requires changing the traditional conception of the leader. The role of the leader becomes creating the broader environment instead of command-and-control micromanaging.⁷²

General McChrystal describes the new role of the leader like a humble gardener who shapes the ecosystem. This transition from chess-master-type leader focused on moving the pieces requires a considerable mental effort.⁷³

Gene Klann describes the importance of being an effective leader. “True effectiveness means using leadership influence to unite the organization’s effort toward and past any single bottom-line moment. It means achieving goals and objectives in such a way that team is still intact, morale is high, and people are lined up to get on the team.”⁷⁴ He uses General H. Norman Schwarzkopf as an excellent example of an effective leader. “Leadership character is defined as behaviors that have a positive

⁷¹ Stanley McChrystal, Tatum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris Fussell, *Team of Teams: New rules of engagement for a complex world* (New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2015), iv.

⁷² Ibid., ix.

⁷³ Ibid., 225-226.

⁷⁴ Klann, *Building Character*, 6.

influence on others.”⁷⁵ “Great leaders move us. They ignite our passion and inspire the best in us. When we try to explain why they are so effective, we speak of strategy, vision, or powerful ideas. But the reality is much more primal: Great leadership works through the emotions. No matter what leaders set out to do – whether it’s creating strategy or mobilizing teams to action – their success depends on *how* they do it.”⁷⁶

Summary and conclusions

In the first section of the chapter the author presented an overview of the SAF through the different reforms from *Armee 61*, *Armee 95*, *Armee XXI*, and the planned *WEA* focusing principally on the LDM. A brief description on *Auftragstaktik*/mission command, and LRM in the SAF concluded this first section. The second section presented the US Army LDM with its three domains institutional, self-development, and operational. The US Army LRM completes this second part with an explanation about the attributes and the competencies required for a leader. In the third section, the study describes what other authors think about mission command philosophy and the role of the leader in our dynamic complex world.

⁷⁵ Klann, *Building Character*, 7.

⁷⁶ Daniel Goleman, Richard Boyatzis, and Annie McKee, *Primal Leadership: Unleashing the Power of Emotional Intelligence* (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press, 2013), 3.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to research how the planned changes under WEA prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy. This chapter, divided in five distinct parts, describes the chosen research methodology, explain why the qualitative case study is appropriate to conduct the investigation, and answer the research questions. In the third and fourth sections, the paper describes how the author collected, respectively analyzed the data. The last part focuses on the procedures the researcher used to ensure the validity of his approach.

Qualitative case study

This research study uses a qualitative methodology by performing a qualitative case study on the organizational level leader's development process within the SAF. "The following four characteristic are identified by most as key to understanding the nature of qualitative research: the focus is on process, understanding, and meaning; the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis; the process is inductive; and the product is richly descriptive."⁷⁷ The LDP within the SAF in the current transition phase from *Armee XXI* to *WEA* corresponds accurately to Merriam's qualitative research description. Because the *WEA* implementation is a complex process, the understanding of the primary and secondary effects on all DOTMLPF-domains and other factors plays a

⁷⁷ Sharan B. Merriam, and Elizabeth J. Tisdell, *Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Implementation* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2016), 15.

relevant role. Exploring how the mission command philosophy is applied in the current and future system requires comprehension and description than a numerical analysis. Therefore a quantitative research is not an effective approach, because it uses numbers as data to answer questions focused on how much or how many by using statistical techniques.⁷⁸

Merriam, defines a case study as “an in-depth description and analysis of a bounded system.”⁷⁹ Among the six different qualitative types of research, the case study offers the most effective way to address the current inquiry. The scope of this paper is specific and the object of the study delimited to organizational level leaders within the SAF and their preparation to operate under mission command philosophy. Moreover, the LDP is tied to the DOTMLPF-factors and other contextual factors. Exploring the changes between the LDP in the *Armee XXI* and in the *WEA*, the variables describing these phenomenon cannot be separate from their context.

Research questions

How does the planned changes under *WEA* prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy?

Two secondary research questions will help to answer the primary question study:

1. What is the process of educating organizational level leaders in the SAF?
2. What leadership attributes and competencies are necessary for successful organizational level leaders within the SAF?

⁷⁸ Merriam, *Qualitative Research*, 5-6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 37.

Data collection

The primary method of data collection for this work are existing officials documents and materials. Swiss government documents produced by the Federal Council like SPR, *Armeebericht*, *Armee XXI*, and *WEA* concepts deliver an accurate source for a comprehensive approach on the SAF. Before the Federal Assembly approved it, the approval process go through a wide consultation. Security domain stakeholders, the other six federal departments, political parties, and other organizations have the opportunity to make representations. Selected periodicals, journal articles, magazine are also a good source to further explore aspects of the leader development process in general or specific to militia officers, GS officers, or COF. The selected documents describes these topics mainly on *Armee XXI* and *WEA*. All significant SAF regulations presenting *Auftragstaktik*, and leadership principles are selected as evidence for this study.

The selected US government documents describe the LDM, the LRM, mission command philosophy, and other leadership related topics. Department of Command and Leadership at the US Army Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth teaches during the courses L100 “Developing Organizations and Leaders” and L200 “Art of Command” several model and frames of references specific for organizational level leaders education. All these readings describes how to develop adaptive and innovative organizational leaders who successfully address the complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty related to operational environments. Another source of evidence are books which describes effective great leader who use mission command philosophy.

Data analysis

The author analyzes the collected data in three different steps. First, using the US Army LDM as a frame, the author compares the current *Armee XXI* and the future *WEA* SAF LDP. A particular attention is placed on the balance and combination between training, experience and education in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. The research also explore how the current and future leader development model within the SAF ties to the mission command philosophy. The thesis provides also an analysis how in the specific domains the SAF shape the leaders' character and improve their competencies. Second, the author investigates the SAF LRM using the US Army LRM as a lens looking for potential gaps which can affect the application of mission command philosophy within the SAF. The paper also provide a brief look in the way the LRM are adapted for GS officers candidate and COF. In conclusion, the thesis consolidates findings from the two previous steps to answer the primary research question.

Validity

The author incorporates several validity strategies to ensure the credibility and reliability of findings.⁸⁰ “The study present negative and discrepant information that runs counter to the themes.”⁸¹ By presenting different and contradictory evidences the study becomes more realistic. The researcher clarify his bias linked to the inquiry with a honest

⁸⁰ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches* (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2014), 201.

⁸¹ Ibid., 202.

and open reflection about his provenience from the cultural Italian speaking minority. Being a Swiss COF since 2000, GS officer for eight years, and having moved the first steps as a private in 1994 under *Armee 61*, the author recognized how his background can shape the finding's interpretation. At the same time, having accumulated so many experiences in the field across the SAF from *Armee 61* through *Armee XXI*, "the researcher develop an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon."⁸²

Summary

This research study uses a qualitative methodology by performing a case study on the organizational level leader's development process in the SAF. The framework used to look at the Swiss-system is the US Army LDM and LRM. Chapter 3 describes the selected research design and explains the reason for this choice. Then next parts offers the reader an overview of the data collection and analysis. The last section focuses on the validity strategy adopted to guarantee the credibility of this work.

⁸² Creswell, *Research Design*, 202.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to research how the planned changes under *WEA* prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy. This chapter, is divide in three sections. The first section, provides an analysis of the LDP in the SAF between the current system and the future one. The US Army LDM offers a lens to evaluate how the planned changes in *WEA* will improve the leaders training, education, and experience across the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. The the researcher analyzed how the changes in the leader development process will affect mission command philosophy in the future model. Section two describes the investigation of the SAF LRM using US Army LRM as a frame looking for potential gaps that can influence the application of mission command philosophy. The last section consolidates the findings from the preceeding sections in order to answer the primary research question.

SAF LDP from *Armee XXI* to *WEA*

The purpose of this section is to answer the secondary research question: what is the process of educating organizational level leaders in the SAF? The analysis addresses the current model and then the planned process for the *WEA*. Using the LDM as a lens to analyze the LDP in the SAF it is important to define which part of the LDP is conducted in the operational and which portion is conducted within the institutional domain in the SAF. According to the definitions as in Figure 17, The three domains of LDM, the

education from private to platoon leader within *Armee XXI* and *WEA* are considered a part of the institutional domain. The LPD for COF is also under the same domain. The approved organization under *WEA* reinforces this way to group, because all these LDP are performed under the Training Command, respectively in the training brigades or in the AFC. The service time during the refresher courses is a part of the operational domain. In fact, the units performing refresher courses and conducting the operations are under the Operations Command under *WEA* organization.

LDP in *Armee XXI*

Armee XXI changed the training and service model significantly with several positive impacts in the SAF. At the same time, second and third order effects created shortfalls in education and manning and quality of leader development. Manning shortfalls in new officer assessments were around 19 percent. The staff officer requirement was short by 33 percent. These two manning shortfalls contributed to the lack of experience within the SAF and reduced the education and quality of the officer corps.⁸³

Institutional domain

One of the most significant changes in the LDP is the time reduction to become a trained platoon leader of 13 weeks compared to the previous system under *Armee 95*. Despite the massively reduced time to become an officer, the interest to embrace an officer's education did not increase as expected.⁸⁴ The necessary changes to reduce the

⁸³ Federal Council, *Zielsetzungen der Armee*, 2449-2450.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

officer's education time, created an imbalance between the increased education and decreased practical training component. This was in contrast to the education employed in *Armee 61* and *Armee 95*, where each leader went through a balanced combination of education at a specific level followed by practical training at the same level as depicted in Figure 5, LDP from soldier to platoon leader in *Armee 95*.

Comparing the former LDP with the current one using the lens of experience, it exposes the negative aspects of the new method of preparing officers for service. In the previous systems under *Armee 61* and *Armee 95*, a trained officer went through three complete recruit schools (RS) as soldier, squad leader, and platoon leader. Across these three RS he/she was in charge for all the phases from IBT (individual basic training), FBT (functional basic training), to CT (collective training). In contrast, the *Armee XXI* officers are responsible for planning and conducting the eight weeks CT. This is the officer's first complete experience as a professional officer. They have never seen or experienced this important sequence prior to this event.

Another aspect to consider is the frequent change of responsibility along the LPD. The first seven weeks in the RS, contract soldiers hold the positions of company commander and platoon leaders. These contracted officers plan and execute the missions and training. During the 37 weeks of training the trainee undergoes a minimum of three changes in organization and leadership. Finally, after being promoted to lieutenant, the new officer is responsible for the final eight weeks CT in an entirely different recruit school while accepting new responsibilities as a platoon leader.

What is the impact of all these aspects on the application of mission command philosophy for the different functions? It is a great challenge to consistently create a

positive climate and culture to apply the mission command principles for all the involved persons. Contract soldiers lead the units and its platoons during 13 weeks from IBT to FBT. At this point, and after one week of onsite preparation, militia company commanders and platoon leaders take responsibility over their formations for the final eight weeks of CT. These new leaders face the demanding challenge of building a cohesive team through mutual trust in the eight weeks of CT after a team was forged by different leaders during the first thirteen weeks of training.

The unit COF as organizational level leaders, face similar challenges with the current LDP system. Applying mission command philosophy under these conditions is almost impossible. Indeed, for inexperienced platoon leaders it is difficult to exercise disciplined initiative, and accept prudent risks, by receiving mission orders without providing excessive detailed directions. The lack of time and familiarity with basic leadership skills also hampers the effectiveness of the platoon leaders during the demanding time of CT. Because the militia company commanders are also inexperienced during the CT, the COF's requirements and the augmented work load create dissatisfaction and increased resignations as mentioned in chapter 2.⁸⁵

Operational domain

Following the fifty three weeks of education and training, the platoon leaders are integrated in a unit for the yearly refresher course until the officers reach the age of thirty-six. The frequency of the refresher courses improved the quality of the training when compared to *Armee 95*. On the other hand, the lack of experience of the newly

⁸⁵ Federal Council, *Überprüfung der Zielsetzungen*, 2453.

integrated platoon leaders limit the level of performance during the CT and the operational effectiveness is decreased. Because the new leaders are not used to operating under mission command philosophy during the institutional phase, they generally expect to receive detailed directions from their superiors, which is not forthcoming. In contrast, the frequent operations in support to civilian authorities requires a high level of initiative, flexibility and use of mission orders to accomplish the mission. So the education, including the refresher courses, does not adequately prepare the officers for what turns out to be the primary mission, defense support to civilian authorities.

Moreover, the platoon leader educated under *Armee XXI*, has less experience in training their squad leaders and troops, thus limiting the use of mission command across the organization. In contrast to *Armee 95* and *Armee 61*, contract soldiers train the soldier during the IBT and FBT. Therefore, contract servicemen and COF exercising their militia function during refresher courses have augmented requirements and try to compensate these experience deficits of militia officers. In addition to these problems which limit effectiveness, the age of retirement from militia service for platoon leaders was reduced from 42 to 36 years in the current system. This change removes the more experienced platoon leaders who have learned to create shared understanding and have the ability to provide motivation and inspiration from the unit. Just as these leaders are able to set a positive working environment many of them conclude their militia service as a deputy company commander. Many officers have made these increases in command ability and use of mission command philosophy on their own. This leads to the next important domain of leader development, self-development.

Self-development domain

Several factors limit the self-development domain for COF and organizational level leaders under *Armee XXI*. First, there are currently three RS starts yearly each lasting twenty-one weeks instead of two lasting fifteen weeks as in *Armee 95*. This change massively reduced the time available for any discretionary or non-mandatory periods of development.⁸⁶ Second, the increased workload, the increased requirements, and the consequent resignations's are other indicators of a climate where it is not easily possible to improve through self-development while operating.

Contract officers are affected in a similar manner. Contract officers are used as platoon leaders or company commanders during three RS starts each year. This limits and eliminates the possibility of conducting self-development activities for contract officers reducing the potential of becoming COF. These are officers who initially completed their institutional training with the intent to become COF or work for the SAF as contract serviceman for a limited time [maximal 5 years]. During this time they are usually integrated in a unit career team and engaged primarily as a platoon leader, deputy company commander, or commander during a RS IBT and FBT. The officers interested in COF prepare and attend the physical examination, language examination, and three day-long assessment center for candidate COF.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Federal Council, *Überprüfung der Zielsetzungen*, 2453.

⁸⁷ Swiss Armed Forces, 90.093d, *Weisungen über die Eignungsüberprüfung und die beruflichen Rahmenbedingungen für angehende Berufsoffiziere und Berufsunteroffiziere (Weisungen ERB)* (Bern: BBL, February 1, 2014), 1.

Looking at the institutional domain for ongoing officers, *Armee XXI* introduced the leadership education for direct level militia leaders. This program aligned with the guidance of the *Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Führungsausbildung* [Swiss leadership association] and offers the theoretical and practical education for personal, social, professional, and methodology competencies. Depending on the future function a candidate leader attends an educational activity in the following domains: self-awareness, personal working technique, communication and information, conflict management, leading a group. A future platoon leader attends all these modules. This modular concept offers the possibility to complete civil recognized degrees after the end of the education as an officer.⁸⁸

With the general technological enhancement across civilian society, the SAF developed the learning management system which provides access to tools and education to complete certain self-development skills. A web-based secured platform which offers access to regulations, orders, e-learning, computer based training, language courses, knowledge management across all the SAF. This SAF LMS Learning Management System, similar to US Army Computer Based Education, is integrated in the LDP to provide modern individual education. Its importance as an individual learning tool increased along *Armee XXI*. For example, the Land Forces Training Center, where the author of this study worked for several years, manages the entire course offerings using this platform. This includes: booking a course, information distribution, examining individual pre-course requirements, conducting online tests, education, and education-

⁸⁸ Swiss Armed Forces, 70.025d, *Führungsausbildung in der Schweizer Armee* (Bern: BBL, August, 2009), 3.

controlling. At the end of the course the individual has acquired skills and competencies that are included in the platform under the personal profile of the officer.

LDP in *WEA*

WEA aims to achieve more effective leadership training and education. The training model for the direct level officers will be changed by increasing the age of service to 40 years from 36 years and the total number of service days from 600 in the current *Armee XXI* to 680. Several lines of effort in the training concept under *WEA* directly affect the LDP across the three LDM domains. The lines of effort are: the changing role of COF; enhanced communication to the public about the value of military leadership experience; increased advertising or discussion of the attractiveness and effectiveness of military leaders' experience in politics, in the economy, and in the general population. Additional measures to support the lines of effort are the improved synchronization between civil and military education, a new educational voucher, a better recognition of military leadership experience on the civilian education curriculum.⁸⁹

Institutional domain

The education and training to become a platoon leader under *WEA* will increase from 53 to 64 weeks. This is a 18 percent increase in the length of time an officer spends in the institutional domain learning their craft. The LDP offers a balanced combination of education and the training in an logical sequence. All future leaders will serve for a complete RS before attending the squad leader education and practical training. After

⁸⁹ Daniel Baumgartner, "Ausbildungskonzeption der Zukunft," 44-47.

successfully complete the 15-week officers school, the new officers will oversee the training and education as a platoon leader during an entire RS. In the same way, company commanders will act in this function for the 15 week RS as practical training. The LDP will offer a methodology appropriate to combine education and practical application at the different levels of responsibility.

The designated Training Command Commander underlines the importance of the new COF's role as trainer, coach, and educator for the militia leaders. The purpose is to create the most learning opportunities for the young leaders by gaining experience as early as possible. It is not only about technique and tactics but also about enabling the development of a command climate and the ability to exercise mission command through each phase. COF and career NCOs engaged in the institutional domain must possess the competencies to direct and develop the militia leaders in an appropriate way.⁹⁰

The changes to levels of responsibility under *WEA* should provide a better environment to train leaders. In fact, with exception of the officers school, all the other training periods will be led by the same school commander. In addition, a platoon leader will train and lead a platoon across the IBT, FBT and CT. Compared to the *Armee XXI* a young leader will have the opportunity to build a cohesive team through mutual trust starting from day one of RS instead of taking charge from a contract officer after thirteen weeks. This will result in the unit career team applying the mission command principles effectively.

⁹⁰ Daniel Baumgartner, "Ausbildungskonzeption der Zukunft," 44.

The AFC will continue to conduct the education for staff officers, general staff officers, and commanders at company level and above. Because the RS will last only 15 weeks, the CT will train units at the company level. Consequently the practical training for battalion commander, GS officers, staff officers will be integrated in the operations command when subordinate units perform the yearly refresh courses.⁹¹

COF education will continue in a similar way as under *Armee XXI*, *WEA LDP* will modify the way future COF are prepared to face the education at the Military Academy. The new system offers a new legal status for ongoing COF which is different from the legal status of contract serviceman. During the COF candidate phase, leaders gain experience as company commander or deputy company commander. After successfully attending the selection 2 at SAF level, the COF aspirant is integrated in a unit career team without a specific function. This time provides an incredible learning opportunity about the profession without the same constraints as contract officers. Organizational level leaders can set the conditions for a positive climate and culture which should motivate the COF candidate/aspirant to continue the education as COF.

Operational domain

The newly created Operations Command will foster a better Lesson Learned process across all operational units, schools and centers of excellence. Division and mechanized brigades will provide a realistic context for the practical training of battalion commanders and staff officers. Therefore, optimal learning opportunities will be provided to these officers. Direct-level officers, as platoon leaders, will be able to serve in a more

⁹¹ Ibid., 45.

flexible way by increasing the militia retirement age to 40 years. Demanding scenarios and complex exercises will create ideal learning opportunities for leaders at all levels during CT. To effectively address the rapidly changing and complex environment leaders need to be educated and trained to exercise disciplined initiative within a commander's intent, accept prudent risk and create shared understanding within their organization. All of this should occur due to the changes inherent in *WEA* within the institutional domain.

Self-development domain

The *WEA* training strategy requires a considerable effort focused on convincing and inspiring the best people to serve as leaders in the SAF. Several measures will be implemented to increase the attractiveness of this message. First, SAF will actively communicate the added value of military leadership to the Swiss population within the economy and politics. Second, militia leaders receive a credit voucher which can be used to finance civilian professional development or advanced training. For a platoon leader the voucher value is more than 13,000 USD.⁹² Third, better synchronisation between military service and civilian jobs will provide the officer with a more flexible possibility to serve. Fourth, university and other institutes for higher education will recognize the particular function of an officer which will equate to a reduction of the curriculum.

All these measures will better enable self-development in civilian domain - and for sure the acquired civilian skills can be useful for the military leaders - the researcher

⁹² Swiss Armed Forces, 81.078d, *WEA Neues Ausbildungs- und Dienstleistungsmodell: Vorteile auch für die zivile Aus- und Weiterbildung* (Bern: BBL, 2017), 6.

did not find a comprehensive concept to guarantee long term military self-development for a COF across his work function and militia function.

SAF LRM in WEA compared with US Army LRM

The purpose of this section is to answer the secondary research question: What leadership attributes and competencies are necessary for successful organizational level leaders within the SAF? The analysis address the SAF LRM using the US Army LRM as a frame looking for potential gaps that can influence the application of mission command philosophy.

The SAF LRM in the current system and under *WEA* will not significantly change. SAF LRM is a model aligned to the Competency Model of the Swiss Federal Administration and adapted to the specific needs in the SAF as illustrated in Figure 15, Triangle of leadership competencies. For example, looking to section 2 as in Figure 12, LDP for COF under *WEA* the requirements are adapted and further exams assess competencies in language and the physical performance. Another example is the LRM for GS officers candidates presented in APPENDIX B “SAF GS Officers Candidate Requirements profile”. The committee selecting the GS officers candidates evaluates their potential in addition to the listed requirements. In the same way, the SAF utilizes the potential evaluation seen in APPENDIX C “Potential Evaluation and Indicators Leader Development Defense” as a tool to assess and select appropriate candidates for further development as civilian employees and COF.

The researcher compared the US Army LRM attributes of character, presence, and intellect and the sub elements of each to the SAF LRM. These two models are presented in figures 19 and 15 and appendix A of this paper. The researcher framed the

SAF LRM competencies using the US Army LRM Competencies. Although the author found a correlation between almost all nine US Army competencies and the competencies of the SAF LRM, some particularities emerged by this comparison. Appendix D “SAF LRM AND US Army LRM Combined” summarizes well this analysis.

First, the US Army leads and develop concepts presents several competencies with a particular emphasis on the emotional intelligence aspects like builds trust, creates a positive environment / Fosters esprit de corps. Second, the researcher did not find a correspondent competency within the SAF LRM which equates to “extends influence beyond the chain of command”. A possible explanation is the different leadership definition between the US Army and SAF. The US Army defines leadership as “the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation to accomplish the mission to improve the organization.”⁹³ The SAF leadership definition uses more neutral words, like “directing the subordinate’s action to achieve a goal. The unit’s collective performance is generated from the planned cooperation from each of its member.”⁹⁴ In the Swiss definition the aspect of improving the organization is also not mentioned.

Figure 20, Principles of mission command linkage to Army leadership requirements, offers a good overview of how the US Army attributes and competencies relate to mission command philosophy.

⁹³ Department of the Army, ADP 6-22, 3.

⁹⁴ Swiss Armed Forces, 51.002d, *Dienstreglement (DR 04)*, 5.

In conclusion, after this comparison between the SAF and US Army LRM, the author can affirm that SAF LRM has all the relevant competencies a good leader should have. The difference is in the choice of the words and the American emphasis on more emotional intelligent terms than the SAF.

<i>Principles of Mission Command</i>	<i>Army Leadership Requirements (ADRP 6-22)</i>
Build cohesive teams through mutual trust	Develops others—builds effective teams. Builds trust—sets personal example; sustains a climate of trust. Demonstrates the Army Values and decisions consistent with the Army Ethic. Leads others—balances subordinate needs with mission requirements. Extends influence beyond the chain of command—builds consensus and resolves conflict. Creates a positive environment—fosters teamwork.
Create shared understanding	Communicates—creates shared understanding. Demonstrates interpersonal tact—interaction with others. Leads others—provides purpose, motivation, and inspiration. Extends influence beyond the chain of command—uses understanding in diplomacy, negotiation, consensus building. Builds trust—uses appropriate methods of influence to energize others. Creates positive environment—supports learning. Gets results—designates, clarifies and deconflicts roles.
Provide a clear commander's intent	Leads others—provides purpose. Communicates—employs engaging communication techniques. Gets results—prioritizes taskings.
Exercise disciplined initiative	Leads others—influence others to take initiative. Demonstrates the Army Values—duty. Demonstrates self-discipline—maintains professional bearing and conduct. Demonstrates mental agility—anticipates uncertain or changing conditions. Gets results—accounts for commitment to task.
Use mission orders	Leads others—provides purpose without excessive, detailed direction. Develops others—expands knowledge. Gets results—executes plans to accomplish the mission the right way.
Accept prudent risk	Leads others—assesses and manages risk. Gets results—identifies, allocates, and manages resources. Stewardship—makes good decisions about resources.

Figure 20. Principles of mission command linkage to Army leadership requirements

Source: Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 6-22, *Leader Development* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 2015), 1-5.

SAF LDP and LRM enable mission command philosophy

This section consolidates the findings from the preceeding sections in order to answer the primary research question: how the planned changes under *WEA* prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy.

LDP and Mission command philosophy

The *WEA* will significantly improve the LDP for direct level leaders and consequently for leaders at the organizational level. The planned changes will better prepare leaders to operate using the mission command philosophy in several ways.

First, LDP will offer a balanced combination of education and training in an logical sequence. All the future leaders will serve for a complete RS before getting through all the steps necessary to become a trained platoon leader. In addition, the training and education time to become an officer will increased from 53 to 64 weeks.

Second, platoon leader will be responsible for an entire RS through all the phases from IBT to CT for their unit. This will allow the new officers to build a cohesive team through mutual trust from the first day. The reduced change of organizations and responsabilties along the LDP will also permit the unit COF to create a positive environment, create shared understanding, and exercise disciplined initiative.

Third, the COF will assume a new role by creating challenging learning opportunities for the new leaders. Accepting prudent risk, COF will give platoon leaders

the possibilities to gain experience in the art of command. The new COF's role is to "train and develop subordinate leaders and develop cohesive and effective teams."⁹⁵

Fourth, an enhanced communication about the added value of military leadership experience will increase the attractiveness and its acceptance in politics, in the economy, and in the population. Additional measures will improve the synchronization between civil and military education. Military leaders will receive an educational voucher to use for a civil education or personal development. Moreover, a better recognition of military leadership experience will allow to shorten civilian education.

Fifth, the adapted LDP for future COFs offers a consistent preparation to understand the role of COF in real context, to face the selection 1 and 2 more professionally, and with coherent legal basis. This new way will create incredible learning opportunities for future COFs and allow them to gain significant experience.

One area that will need an improvement is the self-development domain. Despite all planned measures to convince the best people to serve as a leader and the LDP's changes, the author did not find a comprehensive concept to guarantee a consistent long term military self-development for COFs across work and militia function.

SAF LRM and mission command philosophy

By comparing the SAF LRM and the US Army LRM, the study discovered that the Swiss model contains all the most important competencies needed to be a successful leader. SAF LRM is a basic model that can be adapted to the specific profile

⁹⁵ Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, *Train to win in a complex world* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 2016), 1-5.

requirements as for example of GS officers candidates. The difference between the US Army and SAF LRM is more in the selected word to describe the attributes and competencies than the substance. The different leadership definitions helps to explain these LRM diversities. US Army and SAF LRM present all the characteristic to apply mission command philosophy effectively.

Summary

Chapter 4 analyzed how the planned changes under *WEA* prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy by answering the secondary research questions. The first section explores the differences between LDP under *Armee XXI* and *WEA* using the US Army LDM and its three domains. In the second section, the author compared the US Army and SAF LRM and tried to find potential gaps that can influence the application of mission command philosophy. The overall findings demonstrate that *WEA* changes have the potential to improve the preparation of SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy in several ways. The *WEA* LDP offers enhancement in the institutional, operational, and self-development domains. An improvement in the self-development domain is necessary to develop leaders more effectively in the specific military domain. The SAF LRM contains all the necessary competencies an effective and successful leader need by leading along mission command principles.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to research how the planned changes under WEA prepare SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings by providing the most relevant aspects discovered within chapter 4. In the first section the author provides an interpretation of the described results, and their implications. The second section presents recommendations for further study and for action.

Brief summary of findings from chapter 4

The changes planned in the *WEA* can improve the LDP for organizational level leaders and prepare them to operate under mission command philosophy in several ways. The LDP will provide a balanced combination of education and training sequences allowing the candidate leaders to gain practical experience throughout all the steps from soldier to trained platoon leader. Being in charge for a complete RS cycle of his platoon will create the ideal conditions to build cohesive teams through mutual trust. In the same way, COF can consistently create a positive environment during 11 week longer LDP with reduced changes of responsibilities. COF will develop subordinate leaders and create effective teams. Improved communication to the Swiss public about the quality of military leadership experience will enhance acceptance of the Military and possibly increase recruitment and retention. Military leaders will receive an educational voucher to use for personal self-development or further civilian development. By a better

synchronization between military service and civilian education, the attractiveness to embrace a military leadership pathway will increase. The self-development domain does not have a long-term comprehensive concept for COF across their work and militia functions. The SAF LRM contains all the necessary competencies required of a leader to effectively apply mission command philosophy.

Interpretation of findings described in chapter 4

What do the results mean? The planned changes under *WEA* set the conditions to achieve improved leadership training and education. The LDP changes under *WEA* will create favorable conditions to apply mission command philosophy in the institutional domain. Consequently, better educated leaders can use their skills and competencies when in the operational domain.

The implementation of all these changes is the biggest challenge within the SAF. Because *WEA* will significantly modify DOTMLPF-factors and because of its complexity it is difficult to see in advance all the possible effects, some of which may be cumulative. The negative experiences in 2004 with the *Armee XXI* will not impede the implementation of this next reform.

According to Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, “Organizations don’t get things done. Plans and program don’t get things done. Only people get things done. Organizations, plans, and programs either help or hinder people.”⁹⁶ People will make the difference in how successfully the *WEA* will be implemented. How is it possible to create the positive

⁹⁶ Colin Powell, and Tony Koltz, *It worked for Me: In Life and Leadership* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2012), 279.

environment across all the personnel categories within the SAF to ensure an effective start January 1, 2018? One of the critical aspects is to move COF using mission command philosophy.

People change their behavior when they are motivated to do so, and that happens when you speak to their feelings. Nineteen logical reasons don't necessarily do it. You need something, often visual, that helps produce the emotions that motivate people to move more than one inch to the left or one inch to the right. Great leaders are brilliant at this.⁹⁷

This excerpt from an interview with leadership expert John P. Kotter demonstrates the importance of the art of command more than the science of control in times of change. The mission command philosophy allows leaders to balance these two aspects of commanding.

Recommendations

For further study

This research study focused on the planned changes under *WEA* and the impact on leadership preparation leading to the ability to operate under mission command philosophy. Because these principles are so important to create effective, adaptive and successful leaders, the author proposes further research to assess how organizational-level leaders apply mission command philosophy in the *WEA* after the implementation. Some aspects of the proposed research might include interviews of senior leaders or a survey of organizational level leaders to conduct the proposed research as an extension of this current project.

⁹⁷ John P. Kotter, "*The Power of Feelings*," *Leader to Leader* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2003), 25-31.

For action

Self-development and the life-long learner

In the SAF there is no comprehensive, long-term concept for leader self-development to ensure a consistent long term military self-development for COFs across work and militia function. Before creating a concept for this domain, the role of an organizational level leader like a COF, is to develop subordinate leaders and create cohesive, effective teams. Under this conditions, a leader can inspire and direct followers to become a life-long learner. “One interesting place to start is with reading lists.”⁹⁸ By providing coherent and functional reading lists, clearly defined SAF commanders and leaders can contribute to enhance the self-development domain.

L3: Listen, Learn and then Lead

The author attended an elective A722 Emotional Intelligence for Leaders at US Army Command and General Staff Course and developed a personal emotional intelligence model that can help COFs to become a better commander and a better leader. The relation between US Army LRM and the emotional intelligence was presented in this elective⁹⁹. Most important, this personal model can support organizational level leaders during the *WEA* implementation phase to better apply the mission command philosophy.

⁹⁸ James R. Stavridis and R. Manning Ancell, *The Leader's Bookshelf* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017), 5.

⁹⁹ Gerald F. Sewell, “Emotional Intelligence and the Army Leadership Requirements Model,” *Military Review* (November-December 2009): 96-97.

The model was inspired by General Stanley McChrystal's TED Talk "Listen, Learn and then Lead"¹⁰⁰ along with Goleman's Emotional Intelligence model.¹⁰¹

First, Listen to yourself, to your emotions, feelings as part of self-awareness. Listen to others selected people among family, friends, superiors, followers help to improve the social awareness. To effectively listen is necessary to create the positive environment and conditions. Sometimes is better to be in the nature than in the office. Location matters.

Second, Learn from your failures, your experience, other's experience. Creating learning opportunities for yourself and other is a leaders' task. Becoming a lifelong learner helps to develop the self-development domain. Reading interesting books about great leaders can also "provide(s) a chance for young leaders to experience an enormous variety of life experience without leaving home or school."¹⁰²

Third, Lead. Lead yourself and others like a humble gardener who shapes the ecosystem,¹⁰³ selects the seeds, provides water, and most importantly tends branches, trees and flowers. The choice is in how to use your time and energy to develop, inspire and improve yourself and others to be a better leader.

¹⁰⁰ Stanley McChrystal, "Listen, Learn...then Lead," *TED Talk*, March 2011, accessed February 14, 2017, https://www.ted.com/speakers/stanley_mcchrystal.

¹⁰¹ Goleman, *Primal Leadership*, 29-31.

¹⁰² Stavridis, *The Leader's Bookshelf*, 2-3.

¹⁰³ McChrystal, *Team of Teams*, 225-226.

Summary and conclusions

The purpose of this study was to research how the planned changes under *WEA* prepares SAF organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy. The findings indicate *WEA* changes prepare, in a better way than the current process, organizational level leaders to operate under mission command philosophy. Despite the positive findings, how the changes in *WEA* are implemented can be more important than the content it-self. The ability of COF to apply mission command philosophy across the SAF and create a positive environment during the transition will be decisive for success.

GLOSSARY

Collective Training. “Collective training integrates and synchronizes the skills learned at the individual skill level. Individual skill proficiency is the basis for collective proficiency. Training in units focuses on improving unit, Soldier, and leader proficiencies. Commanders and other leaders ensure unit training plans prioritize and execute collective training to maximize the operational performance of the unit. Collective training not only includes unit-level tasks and events, but also requires individual skill proficiency, and capitalizes on multiechelon, joint, interagency, and multinational forces training opportunities as often as needed.”¹⁰⁴

Contract serviceman. “Officer or NCO hired for a limited period of time.”¹⁰⁵

Federal Assembly. “Switzerland's legislative branch is composed of the 200-seat National Council, representing the population of the cantons, and the 46-seat Council of States (each canton has two seats and the half-cantons have one).”¹⁰⁶

Federal Council. “Highest executive authority of Switzerland, composed of seven members. The Federal Councilors represent the main parties and are elected by the Federal Assembly. Each Federal Councilor heads a government department. Decisions are made along the concordance principle.”¹⁰⁷

Individual training.” Individual training allows individuals to master fundamental skills. Although schools and units provide individual training, individuals are responsible for their own professional growth and for seeking out self-development opportunities.”¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Departement of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August, 2012), 3.

¹⁰⁵ Reichen, “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 121.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Departement of the Army, ADP 7-0, 3.

Security Policy Report (SPR). “The SPR is a strategic document published by the Federal Council that describes threats and dangers, strategy, and tasks of the different instruments of security policy.”¹⁰⁹

Service day. “A service day is a day when militia personnel serve in a function in the Armed Forces. The maximum service days in a year per individual is defined by law.”¹¹⁰

Single service servicemen. “Servicemen who accomplish their military service in one period instead of over multiple refresher courses. In order to maintain the militia concept, the number of single service servicemen is limited to 20 percent of an age-group.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Reichen, “Swiss Armed Forces Reform,” 122.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

APPENDIX A

EVALUATION CANDIDATE LEADERS AND LEADERS REPORT



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Schweizer Armee

Persönlichkeitsprofil –
VERTRAULICH bearbeiten

Evaluation candidate Leaders and Leaders Report for Training and Operational Domain

Evaluation from superior

Typ of Service: _____ Service under (unit): _____

Function/candidate as: _____ Duration: _____

Evaluation ☐ ☐ Intermediate Evaluation

Grade scale

- | | | |
|---|----------------|--|
| 5 | Excellent | übertrifft die Anforderungen in hohem Mass (von andern in gleicher Funktion kaum erreicht) |
| 4 | Very good | übertrifft die Anforderungen deutlich |
| 3 | Good | entspricht den Anforderungen |
| 2 | Satisfactory | entspricht knapp den Anforderungen |
| 1 | Unsatisfactory | entspricht den Anforderungen nicht |

Verhaltensmerkmale	Remarks
A. Personal and Social competencies	
1. Personal attitude	
... tritt als verlässliche, geradlinige und loyale Persönlichkeit auf.	
... denkt und handelt selbständig und eigenverantwortlich.	
... reagiert auf Kritik gelassen und lösungsorientiert.	
... zeigt Initiative und Engagement, nimmt Rückschläge als Herausforderung wahr..	1----2----3----4----5
2. Social behavior	
... pflegt in jeder Position einen geradlinigen, kameradschaftlichen Umgang.	
... begegnet anderen offen und verständnisvoll.	
... nimmt Konfliktpotential wahr, geht Konflikte sachlich und lösungsorientiert an.	
... kann sich in Gruppen gewinnbringend integrieren.	1----2----3----4----5
3. Intellectual capabilities	
... erfasst Sachverhalte rasch und vollständig.	
... kann erworbene Kenntnisse in die Praxis umsetzen.	
... entwickelt Lösungen.	
... lernt aus begangenen Fehlern.	1----2----3----4----5
B. Leadership competencies	
1. Capabilities as Commander or Leader	
... kann den Sinn seines Anliegens überzeugend vermitteln.	
... wirkt durch eigenes Beispiel mitreissend.	
... bleibt auch unter Belastung zuverlässig und konzentriert.	
... trifft Entscheidungen überlegt und zeitgerecht.	1----2----3----4----5

Stand am 01.01.2016

Form 05.004 d / SAP 2528.0761

2. Communication behavior		
... drückt sich offen und direkt aus, hört anderen aktiv zu.		
... gibt die Informationen regelmässig, zeit- und stufengerecht weiter.		
... verfügt über eine natürliche Gestik und Mimik.		
... kann Inhalte kurz, bildhaft, einfach und verständlich vermitteln.	1----2----3----4----5	
3. Leadership techniek / Work techniek / Staffwork		
... befiehlt das Wesentliche bestimmt, korrekt und situationsgerecht.		
... setzt seine Unterchefs gezielt und sinnvoll ein.		
... kontrolliert zweckmässig und in konstruktivem Klima.		
... qualifiziert Unterstellte seriös und fair.	1----2----3----4----5	
4. Capabilities as Trainer and Educator		
... setzt angemessene Ziele und verfolgt sie konsequent.		
... vermittelt die Ausbildungsinhalte verständlich, methodisch richtig und empfängerorientiert.		
... lebt die wesentlichen Werte vor und bemüht sich um Sinnvermittlung.		
... nimmt Einfluss auf die Werthaltung der Unterstellten und fördert ihre Eigenverantwortung	1----2----3----4----5	
C. Professional competencies (SME)		
1. Professional performances		
... hat ein ausreichendes militärisches Wissen.		
... verfügt über solide Kenntnisse im spezifischen Fachbereich.		
... kennt die Reglemente und kann ihren Inhalt in die Praxis umsetzen.		
... ist bereit, sich im Fachbereich auf dem aktuellen Stand zu halten.	1----2----3----4----5	
2. Results form Inspection, Exams, Test physical Performance		
- Exams	- Tests	1----2----3----4----5
3. Special Remarks		
D. Global evaluation:		
1----2----3----4----5		
Approved by Senior Leader:	Date	Signature
E. Improvement Remarks (Goals / Propositions / Measures)		
F. Proposal for specific Development Activities / Promotion		
Superior: Date and Signature		Leader / Candidate Leader: Date and Signature

Source: Adapted by author from Swiss Armed Forces, Reglement 51.013 d, *Qualifikations- und Mutationswesen in der Armee (QMA)* (Bern: BBL, March 1,2012), 111-112, (status as of January 1, 2015), [Translated by author].

APPENDIX B

SAF GST OFFICERS CANDIDATE REQUIREMENTS PROFILE



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
Confederaziun svizra

Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung,
Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport VBS
Schweizer Armee
Höhere Kadernausbildung der Armee HKA

Requirements profile and potential evaluation (GS Officers candidates)

Personal competencies	1	2	3	4
Eigenverantwortung / Selbständigkeit				
Loyalität				
Belastbarkeit / Stressresistenz				
Gründlichkeit				
Uneigennützigkeit				
Selbstdisziplin				
Selbstmotivation				

Social competencies	1	2	3	4
Leadership (Führungskompetenz)				
Teamfähigkeit				
Kameradschaft				
Kritik- und Konfliktfähigkeit				
Kommunikationsfähigkeit				
Fähigkeit zur Vernetzung				

Methodology competencies (Staff officers skills)	1	2	3	4
Rasche Auffassungsgabe				
Lernfähigkeit				
Logisches, analytisches und vernetztes Denkvermögen				
Präsentationstechnik				
Fähigkeit zur Visualisierung				
Schriftliche Ausdrucksfähigkeit				
Sprachkompetenz				
Informationsmanagement				

Professional competencies (SME)	1	2	3	4
Taktisches Verständnis				
Allgemeinwissen				
Militärisches Wissen				
Sicherheitspolitische Kenntnisse				
Unternehmerisches Denken				

Potential evaluation		
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
high Potential	Middle Potential	Low Potential

Requirements					
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	1.5 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	3.5 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
exceeded	Clearly fulfilled	fulfilled	not fulfilled	clearly not fulfilled	unsuccessful


<input type="checkbox"/> Evaluation, which exclude the candidate from th selection.

Source: Adapted by author from Swiss Armed Forces College, *Militärisches Anforderungsprofil für Generalstabsoffiziere* (Luzern: HKA, February 7, 2013), accessed February 1, 2017. http://www.vtg.admin.ch/content/vtg-internet/de/organisation/hka/gsts/_jcr_content/contentPar/tabs/items/dokumente/tabPar/downloadlist/downloadItems/182_1474449376734.download/130207_anforderungsprofilgstof.pdf.

APPENDIX C

POTENTIAL EVALUATION AND INDICATORS LEADER DEVELOPMENT

DEFENSE



Source: Adapted by author from Swiss Armed Forces, *Potentialeinschätzung KE V: Leitfaden für Vorgesetzte*. Bern: BBL, August 2016, 1.

Potential Indicators	Level 1 Low Potential	Level 2 Middle Potential	Level 3 High Potential
1. Analysis competencies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Learning readiness and skills	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. Drive	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. Flexibility in Behavior / Adaptability	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Social Competencies	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Global evaluation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Source: Adapted by author from Swiss Armed Forces, *Potentialeinschätzung KE V: Leitfaden für Vorgesetzte*. Bern: BBL, August 2016, 7.

APPENDIX D

SAF LRM AND US ARMY LRM COMBINED

A. Personal and Social competencies	
1. Personal attitude	Discipline, Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos, Resilience, Innovation, Prepares self
2. Social behavior	Empathy, Interpersonal tact, Builds trust, Creates a positive environment/Fosters esprit de corps
3. Intellectual capabilities	Mental agility, Sound judgment, Innovation
B. Leadership competencies	
1. Capabilities as Commander or Leader	Military and professional bearing, Confidence, Sound judgment, Interpersonal tact, Leads others, Leads by example
2. Communication behavior	Interpersonal tact, Builds trust, Communicates, Creates a positive environment/Fosters esprit de corps
3. Leadership technique / Work technique / Staff work	Creates a positive environment/Fosters esprit de corps, Develops others
4. Capabilities as Trainer and Educator	Army Values, Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos, Develops others
C. Professional competencies (SME)	
1. Professional performances	Expertise, Prepares self, Gets results
2. Results from inspections, exams, test, physical performance	Fitness, Get results

Source: Table created by author.

Notes

- 1) Extends influence beyond chain of command and Stewards the profession do not have a direct correlation to SAF LRM. It happens with COF.
- 2) The methodology competencies according to Figure 15, Triangle of leadership competencies, are not used as a category in this table and in APPENDIX A but are fully integrated under Leadership competencies B2, B3, B4.
- 3) Colors mean. Blue: attributes; black: competencies.

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