

AIR WAR COLLEGE

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THE EROSION OF PUBLIC TRUST:
NORMALIZATION OF DEVIANCE IN THE AIR FORCE

by

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Biography

Colonel John Bosone is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He was commissioned in 1994 following graduation from the U.S. Air Force Academy. He earned his wings at Reese AFB, Texas in 1995 and is a 2003 graduate of the USAF Weapons School. His assignments include F-16 tours at Misawa AB, Japan; Luke AFB, Arizona; Kunsan Air Base, South Korea; and Aviano AB, Italy. He held a staff tour in the J3 Directorate at Headquarters United States European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. Colonel Bosone has deployed in support of Operations Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom. Prior to assuming his current assignment he was the Director of the AETC Command Action Group, Joint Base San Antonio-Randolph, Texas. He is a Command Pilot with more than 2,600 flying hours, including 483 combat hours.



Abstract

The American people have an expectation their armed forces will operate in a competent, professional, and ethical manner. In the case of the United States Air Force, there has been an erosion of trust with the American people as a result of three key organizational failures in the last ten years. Specifically, the compromise of ICBM testing material, the misconduct within Air Force basic military training, and the results of a service-wide health and welfare inspection. The phenomenon of the normalization of deviance provides clarity on why these organizational failures occurred. The main purpose of this essay is to describe the conditions where this phenomenon exists and to enable the Air Force and commanders to thwart future organizational failures and prevent breaches of the public trust. The three scenarios are examined, as are the distinct linkages and analysis of the normalization of deviance phenomenon. Five recommendations to rebuild the public trust emerge from this paper. The first recommendation is that the Air Force must achieve consistent performance and competence in daily operations by establishing realistic mission goals, carefully balanced with other aspects of Airmen's lives. The second recommendation is the service should foster a culture grounded in fairness, respect, and dignity by continuing efforts to recruit and retain a diverse force. The third recommendation is to ensure all operations are grounded in integrity, and to ensure supervisors are aware of the risks when rules or policies are not being followed or when where oversight is lacking. The fourth recommendation is for officers and leaders to demonstrate positive and genuine concern for all Airmen, and inspire a culture where moral courage is as prevalent and held in the same high regard as physical courage. The final recommendation is the Air Force should educate its people on normalization of deviance in both Officer and Enlisted Professional Military Education.

Introduction

The American people have an expectation their armed forces will operate in a competent, professional, and ethical manner. It can be argued that the special trust the American people have in their armed forces – a trust that affords a tremendous amount of responsibility and authority when called upon to fight its wars – is perhaps the military's most valuable but fragile asset. The public trust takes years to forge, and building a reputation of professionalism and trustworthiness requires significant effort and investment. And, public trust grows increasingly over time. However, as is the case with our Nation's Air Force, a reputation of trustworthiness may be lost quickly due to organizational missteps and scandals. As such, there has been an erosion of trust between the American people and the United States Air Force as a result of three key organizational failures in the last ten years. Specifically, the compromise of ICBM testing material at Malmstrom AFB, MT, the misconduct within Air Force basic military training at Lackland AFB, TX, and the results of a service-wide health and welfare inspection challenge the professionalism and mutually binding trust between society and our Nation's Air Force. These three situations represent breaches of trust between the society and the United States Air Force. The phenomenon of the normalization of deviance provides clarity on why these organizational failures occurred. Indeed, the main purpose of this essay is to describe the conditions where this phenomenon exists and to enable the Air Force and commanders to thwart future organizational failures and prevent breaches of the public trust.

The Roadmap

Before we launch into the three scenarios, it is beneficial to describe the how this essay is organized. After establishing an understanding of professionalism and trust, I will delve into the phenomenon of the normalization of deviance. Then, I will explore the three aforementioned

scenarios and identify the particular linkages to the phenomenon. In the remaining portion of the essay I will draw some comparisons and further analyze the three scenario's connection to professionalism and trust. Then, I will conclude with recommendations on how to both prevent missteps and regain the public's trust in the Air Force.

Whereas there is a great deal of discussion regarding a general decline in the public's confidence and trust in the military, it is difficult to prove. Aside from articles written on the subject, there is a dearth of evidence to support the idea of a decline in trust. In fact, a June 2015 Gallup Poll revealed that 72% of Americans have "confidence" in the military, a full 4 percentage points higher than the historical average.¹ It is worth highlighting that this Gallup Poll measured confidence – not trust – but nonetheless reveals the American Public is overall satisfied with the military.

What is Professionalism?

Straightforward definitions are often times helpful. Webster's defines professionalism as "the skill, good judgment, and polite behavior that is expected from a person who is trained to do a job well."² Alas, this simple definition does not capture the nuance of military professionalism. For that, the influential political scientist and author Samuel P. Huntington provides some much needed clarity on the subject. Huntington contends that professionalism – military professionalism in particular – is a trusted relationship between society and its professionals, and that military forces are strictly subordinate to civilian authority. Further, as it pertains to the officer corps, there are some fundamental distinctions. First, due to the officer corps' unique experience and education, they are entrusted to evaluate the overall security status of the state and provide advice to their political masters while only using their expertise for society's benefit.³ Likewise, society must then respect and afford an adequate amount of deference to the

officer corps' professional training and expertise, complex institutions, and various subcultures.⁴ Military professionals, by skillfully and legally using their unique body of knowledge, can provide positive benefits to society. In this regard, it can be synthesized that because the military profession provides unique expertise, vital security advice, and are stewards of the public resources - there is clearly a special trust between society and the military profession.

Normalization of Deviance

Now that military professionalism and the special link to the public trust is understood, I will explain a peculiar phenomenon with far reaching implications with respect to professionalism and trust. A phenomenon known as the “normalization of deviance” occurs when individuals, teams, and organizations - often in corporations or government agencies - repeatedly drift away from acceptable standards of conduct or performance.⁵ Interestingly enough, this insidious drift continues until the behaviors become normalized or accepted as the behaviors conform to the organizational culture, and people grow more accustomed to the deviant behavior the more it occurs.⁶ It is important to note that the normalized behaviors may violate some outside legal or social standards, and people outside the organization may even view the activities as deviant. But, often the offending individuals or groups do not view these actions as wrong as “they are conforming to the cultural mandates that exist within the workgroup culture and environment where they carry out their occupational roles.”⁷

On one end of the spectrum, we see this phenomenon every day on the American roads. In many places, especially when there is little law enforcement or other external controls such as speed cameras, people will routinely and without much thought exceed the posted speed limits when their actions are congruent with other drivers. Speeding is also tolerated – but only up to the point where one receives a speeding ticket, or is involved in a near miss or collision. Indeed,

American drivers know the rules, but disregard the posted limits with nary a thought, as the deviance has become normalized. On the other end of the spectrum, the phenomenon was identified in the culture, assumptions of risk, and decision making at NASA that contributed to the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger and seven astronauts in 1986.⁸ Thus, normalization of deviance is a powerful concept that spans across society as a whole, but what are the phenomenon's broader implications in the Air Force? The following three scenarios reveal the implications and dive deeper into the myriad complexities of this phenomenon.

ICBM Test Compromise

Integrity is the fundamental premise of military service in a free society. Without integrity, the moral pillars of our military strength, public trust and self-respect are lost.

General Charles A. Gabriel,
11th Chief of Staff
United States Air Force

Policies, procedures and rules are part of an organization's culture. Similarly, whether or not they are obeyed are also part of the culture. The Malmstrom AFB test compromise scandal involved officers sharing answers for monthly ICBM combat crew knowledge tests with other officers who had yet to take the tests, and provides a powerful example of the normalization of deviance phenomenon with regard to rule following within organizations.⁹ In August 2013, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) began an investigation into alleged illegal drug use by two lieutenants assigned to Edwards AFB, California. A review of the officers' cell phones text messages revealed specific drug use that included synthetic drugs, ecstasy, and amphetamines. Further, these text messages were to or from officers assigned to various Air Force bases, including two officers assigned to Malmstrom AFB, Montana. AFOSI was able to determine these two officers were communicating illegal drug activity and testing material via their personal cell phones. In the process of the investigation, AFOSI uncovered evidence that

implicated 98 Malmstrom-assigned officers in the potential compromise of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) combat crew knowledge test material. It is worth noting that the AFOSI retained ten of the cases as these cases involved the potential compromise of classified material. The remaining 88 cases, along with the training and testing culture and leadership environment, were subjects of a commander directed investigation (CDI). The scope of the investigation covered a period of approximately two years, from November 2011 to November 2013, and revealed widespread misconduct during this period. Evidence from the CDI revealed that 79 officers were involved with sharing monthly combat crew knowledge test answers with cell phone text messaging, pictures, and other means with other officers who had not yet taken the knowledge tests. Additionally, the CDI determined that the individual acts that compromised the tests were influenced in part by Air Force and organizational training and testing culture.¹⁰ Close examination of the CDI's findings regarding culture reveal the link to the normalization of deviance phenomenon.

It is important to note the Malmstrom missileers operated in a demanding environment where the senior leaders' desire for perfection, and the resultant micromanagement by subordinate commanders resulted in an "imposing and unrelenting evaluation regimen" in an attempt to eliminate human error in the high-stakes ICBM business.¹¹ Every month a missileer would take an individual-effort 20-30 question knowledge test where the minimum score was 90%. Additional, and more comprehensive annual testing was also prescribed. But, leadership's quest for zero-defects and perfection clashed with the reality of the actual missile business – which was a challenging meat grinder that relied on teamwork, redundancy, and standardization to guarantee overall system reliability and credibility.¹² Thus, this peculiar paradox provided

fertile ground for behaviors associated with normalization of deviance to take root and subsequently whittle away at the professionalism of these missileers.

As highlighted earlier, a premise of the normalization of deviance phenomenon is that people will obey an organization's rules and policies to varying degrees. Likewise, people will violate rules for various reasons. Apropos to this case, if a group perceives rules as irrelevant to the task at hand, or if the group believes rules are obstacles to accomplishing a task, the rules are ignored.¹³ The Malmstrom CDI notes this explicitly, stating missile crew members often viewed the monthly testing – arguably a de-facto professional certification process for those entrusted with nuclear weapons – as seemingly irrelevant to their alert duties. Moreover, the missile crews believed that not clearly exceeding the 90% standard would result in restriction from mission ready status or disqualify them from coveted promotions or advancement within the missile wing.¹⁴ Lastly, while most missile crew members believed the sharing and solicitation of the test's questions and answers was wrong, many also expressed that the lines between helping and cheating were blurred.¹⁵

As a result of the Malmstrom CDI outcomes, more than 90 officers were suspended, decertified or barred from the ICBM underground missile capsules. An additional nine officers were removed from command, and though they were not directly involved in cheating they failed to provide adequate oversight of their assigned Airmen.¹⁶ And, the Malmstrom AFB Wing Commander, a 25-year veteran, resigned and noted in a goodbye message, “We let the American people down on my watch.”¹⁷ Finally, these words reverberate those of General Gabriel above, as the missileers - a key element of America's nuclear triad – engaged in activities that toppled the moral pillar of public trust.

Basic Military Training Scandal

Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power.
Abraham Lincoln

Simply put, we see the manifestation of normalization of deviance when behavior that is formerly considered improper gradually becomes accepted as normal. Supervision and other cultural and environmental facts play a role, as well. The Air Force Basic Military Training (BMT) scandal was an inappropriate relationship and sex scandal, at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. The overarching scandal involved over 40 female trainees and dozens of Military Training Instructors (MTIs). These female trainees alleged being victimized - ranging from sexual assault to unprofessional relationships - by their MTIs during and after BMT starting from 2009.¹⁸ While the initial investigation of alleged sexual assault focused on one particular MTI, subsequent investigations followed after three MTIs reported overhearing their fellow MTIs discussing their unprofessional relationships with trainees. Furthermore, a MTI was granted immunity following his court-martial conviction in exchange for additional testimony, which expanded the investigation to additional MTIs.¹⁹ In 2012 an independent CDI was commissioned based on the increasingly and serious number of allegations of misconduct by MTIs with trainees or students and to fully understand the scale and depth of the misconduct within the MTI corps and the military chain of command.²⁰

Similar to Malmstrom, cultural issues at BMT factored into the phenomenon's manifestation. As discussed, several members in the leadership chain at Malmstrom were sacked for their lack of oversight of the testing process. Likewise, at BMT there was evidence of an unhealthy climate as several leaders also did not provide adequate oversight, and in some instances allowed a culture to develop that "appeared to tolerate the MTIs' misconduct."²¹ Not surprisingly, MTI misconduct escalated in the instances where there was a lack of

accountability.²² A lack of vigilance and aggressive action by leadership, in this respect, to halt the deviant behaviors may have led to the practice's normalization. Also, evidence suggests a number of personnel – both MTIs and others involved in the training program – were unaware of rules regarding mandatory reporting of misconduct. With respect to following rules, a tenant of the normalization of deviance phenomenon is that people may violate rules because they are unaware of the rule's existence, due to the recency of the rule or otherwise.²³ Ignorance of a policy regarding required reporting of MTI misconduct, however, is troubling. This tenant of the phenomenon was demonstrated when a commander was informed, after a several week delay, of a sexual assault allegation against an MTI – and only after the commander was made aware of yet an additional allegation against the same MTI.²⁴ Finally, in a striking example of normalization of deviance with respect to MTIs violating rules they deemed irrelevant, a former MTI said, “MTIs were more likely to reprimand one another on technical skill infractions, such as marching techniques, than offenses of sexual assault, sexual harassment, unprofessional relationships, maltreatment, or maltraining.”²⁵

MTIs, and the officer's appointed over them, occupy an unquestionable position of observable authority and power within the BMT construct. These positions of power over trainees means there is an added expectation to uphold the highest standards of integrity, and professionalism. As a result of this investigations, 34 MTIs were removed from their posts and subsequently held accountable via courts-martial or through non-judicial punishment for offenses ranging from rape, sexual assault, and abusive or wrongful sexual contact. A group commander and a squadron commander were removed from command following the CDI. Additionally, five commanders – a former wing commander, a former group commander and three former squadron commanders were disciplined for not reporting problems quickly or taking appropriate

supervisory and disciplinary actions.²⁶ Indeed, when one MTI engages in misconduct, let alone dozens - and the officer chain of command does not provide effective oversight - it can tarnish the reputation of the entire profession. And, this will lead to an erosion of public trust.

Air Force Health and Welfare Inspection

Respect for ourselves guides our morals; respect for others guides our manners.

Laurence Sterne

For the final scenario, normalization of deviance's incidence is examined across a large organization. In December 2012 the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF), General Mark A. Welsh III, directed that commanders execute an Air Force-wide "Health and Welfare Inspection." The purpose of the inspection - a tool routinely used by unit commanders, command chiefs and first sergeants - was threefold. First, to reinforce expectations for the workplace environment; second, to correct deficiencies; and third, to deter conditions that may be counter to overall good order and discipline.²⁷ Commanders were directed to look for and remove items that hinder a professional working environment while emphasizing an atmosphere of respect, trust and professionalism. General Welsh stressed the importance of pride and professionalism, and stated, "When Airmen work in a setting that is consistent with our core values of integrity, service and excellence, they perform with honor and distinction - they deserve nothing less."²⁸ During the health and welfare inspection more than 100 Air Force installations and thousands of units were inspected which included the workspaces of approximately 600,000 Air Force military and civilian personnel. Commanders were directed to look for and subsequently remove inappropriate material deemed pornographic, unprofessional, or offensive. Simply, any material detrimental to a professional working environment was documented and removed.

Recall the explanation earlier in this essay with regard to normalization of deviance in its most basic form, as well as the in-depth explanations in the previous scenarios. Specifically, people may define their deviant actions as acceptable because their actions conform to the cultural norms of their organization despite the fact their actions might violate outside legal or social standards. For a professional military organization that enjoys high levels of public confidence, the results of the inspection were staggering – and disappointing. The inspection revealed 631 instances of pornography (magazines, calendars, pictures, videos that intentionally displayed nudity or depicted acts of sexual activity); 3,987 cases of material deemed unprofessional (discriminatory themes, unprofessional appearance, unprofessional content in patches, coins, heritage rooms, log books, song books); and 27,598 instances of inappropriate or offensive items (sexually suggestive items, magazines, posters, pictures, calendars, graffiti). In total, 32,216 items were reported.²⁹

The inappropriate material did not appear on the installations - and respective squadrons and work centers - overnight, but rather accumulated and promulgated over the years. The Air Force, as a professional organization, has an obligation to maintain an environment of respect, trust, and dignity in the workplace. While the inspection was a positive step toward correcting deficiencies and deterring conditions detrimental to good order and discipline, a few questions are in order. Were the rules or standards with respect to the display of inappropriate material not clear or overly complex? And, were people unaware of standards, or did they view the standards as irrelevant? Finally, why did it require the leadership at the highest levels of the Air Force to recognize, and ultimately address the problem? Alas, I contend there is no definitive answer to these difficult questions, and thus they may be considered rhetorical. Rather, even when factoring in the size and scope of the investigation, the sheer number of items deemed

detrimental to a professional working environment again demonstrates that the more such deviations from prescribed standards are allowed, the more normalized they become. In the end, the results of the inspection were made publicly available through the Freedom of Information Act, but by the same token were not widely publicized outside of normal Air Force media outlets.³⁰

Recommendations

Few men are willing to brave the disapproval of their fellows, the censure of their colleagues, the wrath of their society. Moral courage is a rarer commodity than bravery in battle or great intelligence. Yet it is the one essential, vital quality of those who seek to change a world which yields most painfully to change.

John F. Kennedy

So, where does the erosion of public trust manifest itself? It may be embroiled in the ongoing A-10 retirement debate vis-à-vis F-35 capabilities. An argument could be made that it may adversely affect the Air Force's ability to recruit America's best and brightest. Likewise, it may impart a seed of doubt in our elected officials' minds of the military advice our senior leaders provide. It may manifest itself in myriad other ways, as well. Simply stated, if the Air Force is not trusted, the service will be limited in its ability to provide vital security advice and input to public policy. Therefore, the Air Force must demonstrate its trustworthiness, while countering the normalization of deviance phenomenon, in five ways.³¹ In some respect these five recommendations may appear to emphasize existing Air Force leadership and supervisory practices. However, an understanding of the normalization of deviance phenomenon underpins these recommendations and sets them apart from current behaviors.

- **First recommendation:** The Air Force must achieve consistent performance and competence in daily operations. This can be done by establishing realistic mission goals, carefully balanced with other aspects of Airmen's lives. Perfection can be

aspirational, but should not be the standard or metric by which performance is measured. Avoid the tendency to micromanage processes, especially in high risk or high stakes missions. And, understand that a zero-defect mindset can lead to conditions where normalization of deviance may grow, as was demonstrated in the Malmstrom ICBM test compromise scenario. Finally, establish aggressive but realistic improvement goals and align recognition and advancement opportunities to incentivize the desired behaviors.³²

- **Second recommendation:** Foster a culture grounded in fairness, respect, and dignity. This can be accomplished by continuing efforts to recruit and retain a diverse force that will thrive in a respectful and dignified professional work environment. Periodic health and welfare inspections should aim to enforce well-communicated and clearly understood workplace standards to further blunt normalization of deviance. Inculcate processes that demand constant improvement, but allows for individuals to reveal issues without incrimination or penalty.³³ Look no further than the previously discussed Air Force wide health and welfare inspection for evidence of the importance of clearly communicated workplace standards.
- **Third recommendation:** Ensure all operations are grounded in integrity. This is certainly not to say that current Air Force operations are failing in this regard, but improvements can be made and continually reinforced. General Gabriel noted that integrity is the fundamental premise of military service – integrity should underpin all of our internal and external interactions. Supervisors should routinely inquire, “are there rules or policies that are not being followed or areas where oversight is lacking?” Normalization of deviance may occur when there is insufficient

supervision or manpower constraints due to deployments or reduced manning levels.

Leaders should relentlessly seek genuine feedback from subordinates at all levels, and embrace their issues.³⁴ Both the Malmstrom test compromise and BMT scandal clearly demonstrate the necessity for an engaged and responsive chain of command and leadership structure.

- **Fourth recommendation:** Officers and leaders must demonstrate positive and genuine concern for all Airmen, and inspire a culture where moral courage is as prevalent and held in the same high regard as physical courage. Leaders must be transparent about their standards and continually reinforce ethical policies and procedures in all professional respects, and must ensure those that violate established rules are held accountable.³⁵ Leaders should understand their organization's culture – especially areas of risk where normalization of deviance may find fertile ground. Similarly, be attuned to any rituals or events that correspond to a promotion, qualification, graduation, or otherwise that are professionally questionable. Are there customs that may be construed as hazing, or are rules bent when supervision is not present? Mark Twain scribed, "It is curious that physical courage should be so common in the world and moral courage so rare." Thus, encourage individuals to demonstrate moral courage - to show character in the face of difficult situations.
- **Fifth recommendation:** Without a doubt, to rebuild and subsequently maintain the public trust will take a great deal of effort along these interconnected lines of effort. Concurrently, the Air Force should deliberately educate the force on normalization of deviance, as the phenomenon is far easier, less costly, and less damaging, to prevent than to correct. Education on the phenomenon should begin in the officer accessions

phase, and continue on a regular basis during established Professional Military Education (PME) career touchpoints. Likewise, education on the phenomenon and its associated pitfalls should be woven into all levels of enlisted PME.

Conclusion

Every day, thousands of Air Force personnel serve proudly with the highest levels of courage and integrity. America trusts the Air Force, along with the other services, to defend the country and vital national interests. However, as the preceding scenarios highlight, serious damage to the public trust in the institution occurs when groups succumb to the hazards of the normalization of deviance phenomenon. As discussed, military professionalism is based on a relationship of trust with society due to the expertise, security, and stewardship of the public resources the profession provides. In this context, officers, such as those mentioned in this essay, are appointed to positions of trust in society and are afforded tremendous authority – in peace and war - to carry out their duties. There is a common thread in three scenarios presented from a professionalism and trust perspective. When officers fail to fulfill their duties, through breaches of integrity or failures in effective oversight, an erosion of the public trust results. Moreover, the loss of public trust due to a character failure may be far more difficult to overcome compared to simple competence errors.³⁶ As explained, the preceding measures should be taken to prevent future catastrophes from occurring due to the normalization of deviance phenomenon. Since building and maintaining public trust is foundational to successful peacetime and wartime military operations, it is important to move quickly toward rebuilding trust.

Finally, let us return to the beginning of this essay to recount its journey. As discussed, the American people expect their Air Force to operate in a professional manner. Over the past few years, several significant organizational failures have contributed to a steady erosion of this

special trust. It is important to note that individuals will make mistakes. But, the American people would forgive an isolated instance of misconduct by an MTI. The public would forgive an integrity breach by a single missileer, and would accept a few instances of inappropriate material in an otherwise professional environment. This is not to say that such transgressions are acceptable or tolerable, but nonetheless we should expect isolated cases of such conduct. However, the Air Force must avoid the organizational level failures that directly impact our reputation of trustworthiness, and establish a glide path of rebuilding the public trust. This trust will take years to forge, but once it has been established, the public will be more forgiving of the Air Force's minor lapses.



Notes

¹ Jeffrey M. Jones, “Confidence in U.S. Institutions Still Below Historical Norms,” Gallup. 15 June 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/183593/confidence-institutions-below-historical-norms.aspx?g_source=military%20confidence&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles

² *Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online*, “Professionalism,” accessed 21 October 2015, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/professionalism>

³ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York City, New York: Belknap Press, 1957), 14.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 7-18.

⁵ Diane Vaughan. “The Normalization of Deviance: Signals of Danger, Situated Action, and Risk,” in *How Professionals Make Decisions*, ed. Montgomery, Henry, Raanan Lipshitz, and Berndt Brehmer, (Mahwah, N.J.: CRC Press, 2005). 259.

⁶ Susannah B.F. Paletz, Christopher Bearman, Judith Orasanu, and Jon Holbrook, “Socializing the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System: Incorporating Social Psychological Phenomena Into a Human Factors Error Classification System,” *Human Factors*, vol. 51, no. 4 (August 2009): 440.

⁷ Vaughan. “The Normalization of Deviance.” 259.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 257.

⁹ Lt Gen James M. Holmes, *Report of Commander Directed Investigation Concerning ICBM test Compromise at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana & Assessment of Twentieth Air Force ICBM Training, Evaluation, and Testing Culture*, February 2014. <http://www.foia.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-140327-017.pdf>, 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹² *Ibid.*, 25.

¹³ Vaughan. “The Normalization of Deviance.” 272.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁶ Helene Cooper, “92 Air Force Officers Suspended for Cheating on Their Missile Exam,” *New York Times*, 30 January 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/us/politics/92-air-force-officers-suspended-for-cheating-on-their-missile-exam.html>.

¹⁷ Robert Burns, “Disciplinary acts against Air Force nuke officers topped 16,” *AirForceTimes.com*, 4 November 2014, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2014/11/04/disciplinary-acts-against-air-force-nuke-officers-topped-16/18478081/>.

¹⁸ “AETC Commander’s Report to the Secretary of the Air Force, Review of Major General Woodward’s Commander Directed Investigation,” 2 November 2012, Air Force Personnel Center Website. <http://www.afpc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-121114-029.pdf>, 1

¹⁹ Ibid., 7.

²⁰ “Major General Woodward’s Commander Directed Investigation, Developing America’s Airmen: A Review of Air Force Enlisted Training,” 22 August 2012. http://responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/public/docs/meetings/Sub_Committee/20131120_ROC/20_Woodward_CDIREport.pdf. iv.

²¹ Ibid., 24.

²² Ibid., 24.

²³ Vaughan. “The Normalization of Deviance.” 272.

²⁴ Major General Woodward’s Commander Directed Investigation, 34.

²⁵ Ibid., 64.

²⁶ “Air Force says 5 former Lackland commanders punished after sex scandal,” 1 May 2013, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2013/05/01/air-force-says-5-former-lackland-commanders-punished-after-sex-scandal>.

²⁷ “CSAF Directs AF-Wide Inspection.” 5 December 2012. <http://www.af.mil/News/tabid/124/Article/110028/csaf-directs-air-force-wide-inspection.aspx>

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ United States Air Force, *Results of December 2012 Chief of Staff of the Air Force Directed Health and Welfare Inspection*. <http://www.foia.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-130118-015.pdf>.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Graham Dietz and Nicole Gillespie, “The Recovery of Trust: Case Studies of Organizational Failures and Trust Repair,” *Institute of Business Ethics*, February 2012, 6.

³² Mike Hagan, “The Normalization of Deviance,” 3 march 2015. AIM Consulting, <http://aimconsulting.com/normalization-deviance-2/>

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Asa Kasher, “Public Trust in a Military Force,” *Journal of Military Ethics*, January 2003, 20.

³⁶ Steven M.R. Covey, *The Speed of Trust* (New York City, New York: Free Press, 2006), 303.

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