CHAPTER 4

Major Issues in the 2002 ROK Presidential Election

Daniel A. Pinkston

Since its founding in 1948, the Republic of Korea\(^{65}\) has had a strong presidential system of government except for a brief period of parliamentary rule from 1960 to 1961.\(^{66}\) There have been 16 presidential elections in South Korea since the republic was founded in 1948, including four since democratization in 1987.\(^{67}\) There were several important issues during the 2002 campaign, but a series of corruption scandals surrounding President Kim Dae-jung raised the electorate’s demand for political reforms. Economic policy and regionalism were also important during the 2002 campaign, but North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and a naval clash with North Korea in June 2002 raised concerns over security and government policy towards Pyongyang. In general, the major issues in the 2002 presidential election can be placed into three broad categories:

\(^{65}\) The views in this chapter do not represent the views of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.


corruption and political reform; inter-Korean relations; and bilateral relations with the United States.

Corruption and Political Reform

Historically, South Korean electoral politics have been characterized by a number of party realignments and political parties based upon charismatic individuals with strong support from particular regions. These “personality- and regionally-based” parties have developed from Confucian traditions and institutional rules that have enabled party leaders to enforce party discipline by controlling party finances and access to the proportional list for National Assembly elections. There were pressures to reform the nomination process before the 2002 campaign began, and the subsequent changes in party rules affected the nomination processes, which also affected the results of the December 2002 election.

The Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), the party of former president Kim Dae-jung, decided in January 2002 to hold primaries to select its presidential candidate. The party adopted an electoral college with 70,760 members, half of whom were not members of the MDP.68 While the MDP was eager to institute primaries and other innovations such as Internet voting, Lee Hoi-chang and his supporters in the Grand National Party (GNP) were reluctant to adopt such reforms since a decentralization of the nomination process increased uncertainty over Lee’s nomination and party control.

The MDP’s first primary was held in March, and Mr. Lee In-je (Rhee In-je) was considered the front-runner as the race began

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with seven candidates. However, Lee In-je lost the first three primaries in Cheju, Ulsan and Kwangju before he was able capture the fourth primary in Taejon. Meanwhile, Mr. Roh Moo-hyun (No Mu-hyön) and his supporters were building a grass-roots network through the Internet. “Nosamo,” a three-syllable abbreviation for the “group that loves No Mu-hyön,” began as an Internet discussion group among people mostly in the 20s and 30s. Nosamo membership took off during the primary season and played an important role in the mobilization of voters on the election day.

In contrast, the GNP was divided over the introduction of a primary system in January 2002. Lee Hoi-chang and his supporters claimed primaries would cause “overheated elections and greater problems with factionalism and regionalism.” A minority reformist faction in the party that included Park Kŭn-hye (daughter of former President Park Chung-hee) disagreed and strongly pushed for reforms. The party finally did adopt a primary system, but Park Kŭn-hye left the GNP and subsequently did not support candidate Lee Hoi-chang.

Polls indicated that MDP candidate Roh enjoyed strong popular support right after his nomination in April 2002, but his support

69 The other candidates were Yu Chong-kŭn (柳鍾根), Kim Kŭn-t’ae (金鎬泰), Roh Moo-hyön (盧武鉉), Kim Chung-kwŏn (金重權), Han Hwagap (韓和甲), and Chŏng Tong-yŏng (鄭東泳). See Kim Sang-yeol, “제주 유세 2라운드/ 민주7zon `내가 후보 적임,” 대한매일, 15 February 2002, p. 6.
steadily dropped in the wake of a series of scandals surrounding Kim Dae-jung. The MDP suffered overwhelming defeats in local elections held on 13 June 2002 and in by-elections for vacant National Assembly seats on 8 August 2002. The results nearly split the MDP and triggered calls for Roh’s replacement as the party’s presidential candidate.

Table 4.1 ROK Political Scandals During the 2002 Presidential Campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Accusation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 December 2001</td>
<td>Kim Ŭn-sŏng</td>
<td>Deputy Director of NIS</td>
<td>Indicted for accepting W50M bribe from MCI Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 January 2002</td>
<td>Kim Sŏng-nam</td>
<td>Nominated to head Commission on Anti-Corruption</td>
<td>Resigns over alleged bribes from businessman Yun Tae-shik, indicated for murder of his wife in late 2001. Called “Pass 21” scandal after name of Yun’s firm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 January</td>
<td>Park Jun-yŏng</td>
<td>Information Agency director</td>
<td>Resigns over alleged links to Yun Tae-shik scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-January</td>
<td>Shin Sŏng-hwan</td>
<td>Brother of Prosecutor General Shin Sŏng-nam</td>
<td>Alleged links to G&amp;G Group lobbying scandal</td>
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**ROK Turning Point**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Accusation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 January</td>
<td>Kim Ho-sŏng</td>
<td>Cheju vice-governor</td>
<td>Detained for questioning regarding Yun Tae-shik scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 January</td>
<td>Lee Hyŏng-t’aek</td>
<td>Nephew of first lady</td>
<td>Arrested for accepting bribes in G&amp;G Group lobbying scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 February</td>
<td>Lee Su-dong</td>
<td>former director of the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation</td>
<td>Arrested for taking bribes in G&amp;G Group lobbying scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 April</td>
<td>Ch’oe Kyu-sŏn</td>
<td>Former aide to Kim Dae-jung</td>
<td>Arrested for accepting bribes from Tiger Pools International in sports lotto scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>Im Jŏng-yŏp</td>
<td>Former political secretary for President Kim</td>
<td>Arrested for accepting bribes from construction firm in December 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May</td>
<td>Kwŏn No-gap</td>
<td>Former close aide to President Kim</td>
<td>Arrested for accepting bribes from venture capitalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May</td>
<td>Kim Hong-gŏl</td>
<td>President Kim’s third son</td>
<td>Arrested for accepting bribes in sports lotto scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May</td>
<td>Lee Hong-sŏk</td>
<td>assistant culture and tourism minister</td>
<td>Arrested for accepting bribes in sports lotto scandal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 June 2002</td>
<td>Kim Hong-op</td>
<td>President Kim’s second son</td>
<td>Arrested for accepting bribes from Korea National Housing Corp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The endemic scandals led to Kim Dae-jung’s resignation from the MDP, and to impeachment threats from the GNP. Although the GNP did not fulfill its threat to impeach President Kim, the party, which controlled the National Assembly, rejected Kim’s nominations for prime minister following a cabinet shuffle. Negative campaigning ensued, and the GNP strategy was to emphasize the ubiquitous scandals and to link them to Roh Moo-hyun.
Efforts to Field a Single Candidate to Oppose Lee Hoi-chang

Past presidential elections have included efforts by parties to field a single candidate. In 1987, the failure of the opposition to agree on a single candidate resulted in the election of Roh Tae-woo, but Kim Dae-jung was able to win a close election in 1997 after forming an alliance with Kim Jong-pil. In 2002, there was speculation whether Lee In-je, Park Kŭn-hye, Chung Mong-joon (Chŏng Mong-jun) and others would run for president, and if not, their potential support was considered very valuable.

As South Korea was co-hosting the World Cup with Japan, speculation began to grow over the possible candidacy of National Assemblyman Chung Mong-joon. Mr. Chung is also president of the South Korean Football Association and a vice-chairman of the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). On 17 September, Mr. Chung ended the speculation by announcing his candidacy. A new party, “National Alliance 21” was formed the following month. Mr. Chung ran to implement political reforms and to eliminate regionalism, and polls initially indicated he was ahead of Lee Hoi-chang in a two-way race.

Eventually, Chung Mong-joon and Roh Moo-hyun decided to seek a single candidacy, which was to be decided after a debate and subsequent polling. If both candidates ran, victory was almost certain for Lee Hoi-chang. The two candidates reached an agreement on 16 November 2002, with the loser of the selection process agreeing to support the winner during the campaign. Mr. Chung and Mr. Roh agreed “to seek a political revolution to replace old politics,” and that “political reform, inter-Korean

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relations, the economy and agricultural reform were urgent tasks.”

The GNP objected to the agreement between Mr. Roh and Mr. Chung, arguing that the extra TV exposure through their debates would not only be unfair, but also illegal under the election law. The GNP likened it to the alliance between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil in 1997, and another attempt to maintain “old style politics.”

The National Election Commission ruled that television stations could air only one debate between the candidates. Roh emerged as the victor in the poll following the televised debate, but only seven hours before the polls were to open, Chung withdrew his support. Chung said he withdrew his support because of Roh’s “inappropriate remarks” on the last day of the campaign regarding U.S-North Korea relations. But after
Chung’s statement, Nosamo and masses of young voters with mobile phones and Internet connections mobilized people to get to the polls, helping Roh win a close election.\textsuperscript{80}

Economic reforms and improvements in corporate governance were also important issues during the campaign, but all candidates agreed economic reform was necessary. There were only marginal differences over the degree of reforms and the speed of implementation. Given Roh’s background as a human-rights lawyer and experience as a mediator in labor-management disputes, Lee Hoi-chang appeared to have an advantage as a more centrist figure in this area. Roh supporters feared that when Kwŏn Yŏng-gil (Kwon Young Ghil) of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) was permitted to participate in the televised debates with Mr. Roh and Mr. Lee in December 2002, Mr. Kwŏn would capture some of Roh’s support. However, Mr. Kwŏn’s appearance made Mr. Roh look comparatively moderate and closer to the center than conservative Mr. Lee.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{Inter-Korean Relations}

The June 2000 summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang raised expectations for better inter-Korean relations, and many South Koreans have been disappointed with North Korea’s subsequent behavior towards the South. After returning from Pyongyang in June 2000, Kim Dae-jung said that the threat of war had been removed from the peninsula. However, a second naval clash between the two sides on 29 June 2002, in KINDS, \url{http://www.kinds.or.kr}.

\textsuperscript{80} “Roh's Young Army Used Internet to Win,” \textit{Korea Times}, 23 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, \url{http://www.lexis-nexis.com};

2002, and the failure of Kim Jong Il to fulfill his promise to visit Seoul raised questions over the effectiveness of Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy.” Speculation about a possible Seoul visit by Kim Jong Il before the election was also lurking in the background of the campaign, and the GNP opposed any such visit because they felt it would favor the MDP candidate.

During the naval clash on June 29, 2002, North Korean naval forces sank a South Korean vessel off the west coast. But, the South Korean military called off the pursuit of North Korean boats when South Korean officials learned that North Korea was preparing to respond with missile fire from shore batteries. Afterwards, the GNP harshly criticized the defense minister and the joint chiefs of staff, and demanded that the Kim Dae-jung government reconsider its policy towards North Korea. The GNP’s criticisms were even more compelling in the context of rampant corruption scandals.

All major candidates embraced some form of détente or cooperation with Pyongyang. However, Lee Hoi-chang and the GNP were critical of the “sunshine policy” because they felt that


Seoul should demand “strict reciprocity” from Pyongyang. In his acceptance speech after the nomination, Mr. Lee said he “would help North Korea on one hand and try to bring it out to a road to reform, opening, and peaceful coexistence.” However, Mr. Lee also said he “would demand that North Korea keep promises and that South Korean food [aid] goes to the mouths of the North Korean people [and not the military].” Mr. Lee even said he would “sharply increase humanitarian aid.”

Roh Moo-hyun was prepared to expand cooperation with North Korea even more than Kim Dae-jung. The South Korean president has almost exclusive authority for dealing with Pyongyang, but the president still faces constraints from the international system and from domestic political forces. Therefore, Mr. Roh and Mr. Lee would probably be closer in their approaches to Pyongyang than most people might have expected; however, Mr. Lee almost certainly would have taken a harder line than Mr. Roh. In fact, many in the Bush administration believed that Mr. Lee would win the election and reverse the “sunshine policy” and support the Bush administration’s policy of “tailored containment” towards North Korea. However, most South Koreans are opposed to the strategies designed to bring a sudden and costly collapse of North Korea. In sum, young South Korean voters shared Mr. Roh’s concern that Washington’s hard-line policy towards Pyongyang could result in greater instability or an unwanted and unnecessary war.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program became a primary issue following the revelation in October that North Korea allegedly had a secret development program to enrich uranium. The alleged HEU program clearly violated North Korea’s commitments under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), its IAEA safeguards agreement, the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the Agreed Framework, and the Pyongyang Declaration signed in September 2002 during Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang. The candidates agreed that North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons was unacceptable, but they differed on their methods to resolve the crisis.

Mr. Roh believed that pressure could backfire, and that the problem could be resolved peacefully through dialogue and persuasion. Mr. Lee agreed that the crisis had to be resolved peacefully through dialogue, but he caused a stir when he declared that North Korea already possessed nuclear weapons. U.S. intelligence officials have estimated that North Korea probably has one or two nuclear weapons, but Mr. Lee’s statement suggested that he was resolved to implement a hard-line containment strategy against North Korea even though he presented no compelling evidence to indicate that Pyongyang had become a nuclear power.

Bilateral Relations with the United States

Daniel A. Pinkston

The bilateral relationship with the U.S. has always been an important issue in South Korean elections, but most South Korean citizens probably overestimate U.S. influence on South Korean elections—especially following democratization. While most South Koreans support the bilateral security alliance with the United States, many Koreans have been suspicious about Washington directly or indirectly manipulating presidential elections. Whether such allegations are true or not, these suspicions could have contributed to Lee Hoi-chang’s demise during a period of rising anti-American sentiment.

In January 2002, Lee Hoi-chang spent seven days in the United States, meeting with senior Bush administration officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Considering the importance of the bilateral relationship, it is prudent for any South Korean presidential candidate to visit the United States prior to the election. However, Mr. Lee’s perceived closeness to the Bush administration probably harmed his electoral chances after two schoolgirls died in a U.S. military training accident that fueled mass anti-American sentiments during the campaign.

On June 13, 2002, two 14-year-old schoolgirls were killed on their way to a birthday party when they were run over by an armored vehicle. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard and Lt. Gen. Daniel R. Zannini, commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, both apologized for the incident, but the U.S. handling of the case did

not satisfy those Koreans who sought a trial in a South Korean court and revisions in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the two countries.\textsuperscript{88} On July 10, 2002, the ROK Ministry of Justice asked U.S. Forces Korea to waive its right to prosecute the soldiers accused of committing crimes while on duty; but the request was denied.\textsuperscript{89} The two soldiers were later arraigned and tried in a U.S. court martial, but both were acquitted of negligent homicide charges.\textsuperscript{90} The two soldiers left Korea for the United States on November 27, 2002.\textsuperscript{91}

While Lee Hoi-chang was perceived to be close to the Bush administration, Roh Moo-hyun had never visited the United States. Mr. Roh declined to visit the United States during the campaign, insisting he had no specific reasons to go, and that he was too busy to go for simple photo opportunities. Many U.S. government officials misunderstood Mr. Roh’s failure to visit the U.S. as a sign of his “anti-Americanism,” but Korean voters interpreted Mr. Roh’s refusal to visit the U.S. and his desire to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{91} Yonhap News Agency, “U.S. Soldiers Cleared of Schoolgirls’ Deaths Leave South Korea,” in BBC Monitoring International Reports, 27 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, \url{http://www.lexis-nexis.com}.
\end{itemize}
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revise the SOFA as leadership qualities that could put the bilateral relationship on an equal basis.

**Conclusion**

The major issues of the 2002 presidential campaign can be placed into three broad categories: corruption and political reform; inter-Korean relations; and bilateral relations with the United States. Money has always played a critical role in South Korean electoral politics, but campaign finance had been completely opaque until the implementation of a “real name financial system” in 1993. The real name system led to the prosecution of former President Chun, former President Roh, the sons of President Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, and other high level officials. South Korea’s democratization is a remarkable story, but the country has continued to struggle with the establishment of appropriate boundaries for campaign financing.

In the spring of 2002, the country was shaken by a wave of scandals surrounding President Kim Dae-jung. The shock of the scandals and public support for primaries enabled the Millennium Democratic Party to adopt a primary system for the first time in the country’s history. Under the new rules, Roh Moo-hyun had the paradoxical advantage of not possessing a traditional Korean political machine with large cash reserves. The Grand National Party focused on the corruption scandals and tried to link them to Mr. Roh, but he was “clean,” especially compared to GNP candidate Lee Hoi-chang—the product of an old-style political machine. Mr. Roh was more credible on anti-corruption and reform, and his campaign staff and supporters were able to use the Internet to compensate for his lack of traditional organization and money.
Inter-Korean relations were also an important issue during the campaign. South Koreans are divided on how Seoul should deal with Pyongyang. Generational differences do not completely explain divergent views, but there is a strong correlation between age and views on North Korea policy. The younger generation tends to view Pyongyang as less threatening; therefore, they prefer more engagement. The older generation with memories of the war has less sympathy for Pyongyang and is a stronger advocate for tougher policies toward North Korea. Most of the Roh voters probably believed hard-line policies alone would antagonize North Korea and could be counterproductive. These beliefs were reinforced by the inter-Korean naval clash in June 2002 and the sobering news that the skirmish could have easily escalated into a much larger conflict. On the other hand, hard-liners felt vindicated by the clash as a clear indication that nothing would thwart Pyongyang’s aggressive intentions.

Inter-Korean relations were closely linked to the issue of U.S.-South Korean relations during the campaign. First, many South Korean voters viewed the Bush administration’s hawkish policy towards Pyongyang as ineffective or even reckless. Koreans in both halves of the peninsula have high expectations for Washington’s Korea policies because of historical legacies and the U.S. position as a superpower. Most Koreans believe the U.S. is partially responsible for Korea’s division and that the U.S. should be more actively engaged compared to the role that most Americans think Washington should play. Different expectations about roles and responsibilities have led to disappointments on both sides.

Second, the death of two Korean girls during a U.S. military training accident very well could have tilted the close election in Mr. Roh’s favor. Koreans have complex views about the United States, and many Americans misinterpret any Korean dissatisfaction with the relationship as “anti-Americanism.” Some American press reports described Roh Moo-hyun as the
candidate of “anti-American voters,” but Mr. Roh has promoted himself as the “Korean Abraham Lincoln.” Most Koreans have very positive views of American democracy, human rights, economic power and opportunities, technology, and educational institutions. However, most Koreans have felt that power asymmetry has limited their ability to have their real concerns or dissatisfaction taken seriously by Washington. The deaths of the schoolgirls were a focal point that brought this sentiment into the presidential campaign. While GNP candidate, Mr. Lee, visited Washington to meet with high-level government officials, Roh Moo-hyun expressed his desire to maintain a strong bilateral alliance based on an “equal relationship.” Ultimately, Mr. Roh’s view resonated with the electorate that could not accept that no one would accept responsibility for the accident through resignation or reprimand, even if there had been no criminal action.

Post-Scriptum: President Roh Moo-hyun Has to be Ready for Nuclear Crisis during President Bush’s Second Term

On November 2, 2004, the American people elected President George W. Bush for his second term in the White House. He will be facing several difficult issues in East Asia in the next four years. The rise of China and possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait will certainly be important, but the administration’s management of the U.S.-ROK alliance and North Korean nuclear problem will also have serious implications for the region. The United States is critical for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, and failure could trigger a nuclear arms race or even war.

The North Korean nuclear issue is complicated by Korean division and the legacies of the Korean War and Cold War, as well as by alliance dynamics on both sides of the Military Demarcation Line. The problem is also exacerbated by an opaque and authoritarian government in Pyongyang that has reneged on a number of its international commitments.
It is impossible to know with 100 percent certainty the intentions of countries, but all delegations at the six-party talks in Beijing have agreed that a non-nuclear Korean peninsula is the ultimate goal. Skeptics in Washington argue that no deal is possible until the Korean Workers Party is ousted in Pyongyang. However, using military force to topple Kim Jong Il is prohibitively costly, and Seoul is sure to veto this option. The insecurity that could result from pursuing such a goal is unacceptable to China and South Korea.

But if we assume Pyongyang is willing to abandon its nuclear ambitions, two conditions must be met. First, Washington and Seoul must apply tremendous pressure on North Korea. Washington did the same to South Korea in the 1970s to convince President Park Chung-hee to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Now the Bush administration’s objective in the six-party process has been to increase pressure. This is a prudent strategy, but, as Mr. Roh’s government indicated so frequently in private and in public, the Bush administration is mistaken in believing that it is sufficient for gaining North Korean compliance.

A second condition for resolving the nuclear crisis is a face-saving exit for Pyongyang. The U.S. offered one to South Korea in the 1970s, and Park accepted. However, despite Mr. Roh’s appeals for more “flexibility and creativity” in Washington, the Bush administration has yet to offer a serious face-saving exit to Kim and his ruling coalition in the North. Everyone in East Asia knows this is necessary for a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but most Bush administration officials view this as “blackmail,” and therefore unacceptable.

If a negotiated settlement includes a large-scale transfer of economic resources to prop up Kim’s political machine, this would amount to extortion and it should be rejected. However, a negative security assurance, or promise not to attack North
Korea, is relatively costless for the U.S., especially if the Bush administration has no intention of launching unprovoked preemptive strikes against North Korea.

But a face-saving exit with a negative security assurance must be credible. And it must be credible in Pyongyang’s eyes. North Korean officials have said direct bilateral talks with the U.S. would help assuage Pyongyang’s concerns, but the Bush administration has chosen to label bilateral diplomacy a “concession.” Given President Bush’s record of refusing to adjust policies even in the face of disastrous outcomes, it’s unlikely the administration will talk to Pyongyang, even though Beijing and Seoul have been strongly encouraging Washington and Beijing to hold a dialogue.

Hopefully, the second Bush administration will negotiate in good faith and submit a credible face-saving offer to Pyongyang. Bilateral talks are probably the best mechanism for doing so, but this is neither an American concession nor a guarantee that Pyongyang will abandon its nuclear program. If North Korea fails to bargain in good faith and rejects a credible offer, Washington will have already established a regional coalition for tougher policies. Furthermore, this step will be necessary to gain Chinese support if North Korea’s defiance requires U.N. Security Council action.

A second term should give President Bush the confidence to exhibit the flexibility that South Korea and China have requested. So far, the Bush administration has “outsourced” its North Korea policy to China, so bad outcomes can always be blamed on Beijing’s failure to provide enough pressure on Pyongyang. However, the contradiction in this approach is that China will not exert serious pressure until the U.S. has held serious talks with North Korea.
Paradoxically, Washington’s failure to engage Pyongyang bilaterally undermines U.S. credibility and the credibility of the weak pressure exerted in the six-party process thus far. Pyongyang knows this and will exploit the weaknesses in the U.S. approach and any division among the other five parties. If diplomatic efforts to end North Korea’s nuclear program collapse without the Bush administration offering a credible face-saving exit, it is very unlikely that North Korea will capitulate. Instead, the result will likely be a nuclear-armed North Korea with an ambiguous nuclear status similar to Israel’s. Mr. Roh Moo-hyun and the rest of ROK government might be willing to live with this, but a North Korea with a steadily increasing nuclear capability will be extremely damaging to U.S. national interests and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.