# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

# THESIS

**DEPLOYMENT OF THE MILITARY IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: IMPLICATION FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN SRI LANKA**

by

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December 2016

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| REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE | | *Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188* |
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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.

| 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (*Leave blank*) | 2. REPORT DATE<br>December 2016 | 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED<br>Master's thesis | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE**<br>DEPLOYMENT OF THE MILITARY IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: IMPLICATION FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN SRI LANKA | | **5. FUNDING NUMBERS** | |
| **6. AUTHOR(S)** Don Kapila Sarath Kumara Dolage | | | |
| **7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**<br>Naval Postgraduate School<br>Monterey, CA 93943-5000 | | **8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER** | |
| **9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)**<br>N/A | | **10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER** | |

**11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES** The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____.

| 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT<br>Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. | 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE |
| --- | --- |

**13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)**

How does post-conflict militarization affect democratization in Sri Lanka? In 2009, Sri Lanka ended three decades of counter-insurgency action with the separatist LTTE. Yet the military remains active in the reconstruction processes. Critics describe the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction as an impediment to democratization. This thesis, however, argues that the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction both positively and negatively affects democratization processes in Sri Lanka.

This thesis also studies the political developments from 1948 to 2016 that resulted in the deployment of the military internally. Then, it analyzes the effects of such military roles toward democratic consolidation and civil-military relations within the frameworks of analysis provided by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, and Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei.

This thesis finds that post-conflict militarization positively affects democratic consolidation in the short term but negatively in the long term. It also finds both positive and negative effects toward democratic civil-military relations. Sri Lanka presents a unique case because militarization helped the economic growth of the country during the conflict. Hence, this research will contribute to the studies on the effects of post-conflict militarization toward democratization theoretically, and in the South Asian context.

| **14. SUBJECT TERMS**<br>Democratization, democratic consolidation, civil-military relations, militarization, post-conflict reconstruction, effectiveness of the military, democratic civilian control of the military | **15. NUMBER OF PAGES**<br>149 |
| --- | --- |
| | **16. PRICE CODE** |

| 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT<br>Unclassified | 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE<br>Unclassified | 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT<br>Unclassified | 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT<br>UU |
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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# LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| ARTRAC | Army Training Command |
| CFA | Cease Fire Agreement |
| CIMIC | Civil-Military Cooperation |
| CMR | Civil-Military Relations |
| DSCSC | Defense Services Command and Staff College |
| GoSL | Government of Sri Lanka |
| FP | Federal Party |
| INGO | International Non-Governmental Organization |
| JOH | Joint Operations Headquarters |
| JVP | Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna |
| KDU | Kotelawala Defense University |
| LTTE | Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam |
| MOD | Ministry of Defense |
| OCDS | Office of the Chief of the Defense Staff |
| PTA | Prevention of Terrorism Act |
| SLFP | Sri Lanka Freedom Party |
| UNP | United National Party |
| UPFA | United Peoples' Freedom Alliance |
| TNA | Tamil National Alliance |
| TULF | Tamil United Liberation Front |

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# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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# I. INTRODUCTION

## A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

In May 2009, the Sri Lankan state successfully defeated the separatist armed movement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a terrorist organization that set back democracy in the country.[1] The defeat of the LTTE, however, did not completely diminish security threats to the state because some groups within the Tamil diaspora continue to stoke separatist ideology.[2] After May 2009, the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) continued to deploy the military statewide to ensure continuous security from separatists as well as to counter other threats such as the emergence of extremist groups, the growth of organized crime, the challenges of maritime security and border control, and the worsening of ethnic divisions and communal violence.[3] The civil authorities claim that they are using the military to reconstruct the country while they also provide security.

Critics within and outside of Sri Lanka highlight the continuing internal use of the military in support of civil authorities, the heavy defense budget, and deployments in the Northern and Eastern Provinces as impediments to the process of democratization.[4] In this context, this research asks the important question—whether post-conflict militarization in Sri Lanka from 2010 to 2016 affected the overall democratization process negatively, positively, or both. It investigates the positive and negative effects of the militarization on the "five arenas of a consolidated democracy," as proposed by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, and the three requirements for democratic civilian control of

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[1] K.M. de Silva, "Post-LTTE Sri Lanka: The Challenge of Reconstruction and Reconciliation," *India Quarterly* 66 (SAGE Publications, September 2012): 238.

[2] Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, "Sri Lanka's National Security," *From the Field, Prism 4* (2014): 147–48, accessed March 3, 2016, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/25047/uploads.

[3] Ibid., 153.

[4] Jonathan Goodhand holds that the Northern Province came under a "hybrid governance regime consist[ing] of different military and civilian structures" while all reconstruction and humanitarian actions were to channel through a "slow and restrictive process of vetting and clearance for access." Jonathan Goodhand, "Consolidation and Militarization of the Post-War Regime," *Asian Survey* 52 (January/February 2012): 133, accessed January 20, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.1.130.

the military and effectiveness of the military in a new conceptualization of civil-military-relations (CMR) by Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei.[5]

## B.      SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question is significant for studying the implications of militarization toward the democratization of a state in a post-conflict transition to peace, particularly in the South Asian context. A study conducted by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) reveals that only 11 out of the 162 countries studied are free from conflict, as many of the remaining countries face internal conflicts.[6] For any state, the military instrument is the final means to ensure peace, stability, and security when the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments fail. The use of the military in internal roles, however, usually does affect CMR and thus the process of democratization in the South Asian Context.

In this context, this research question and the case study are significant for three main reasons. First, they help illustrate the implications of deploying the military in internal missions, particularly in a post-conflict transition to peace. During an insurgency, the state risks losing its sovereignty over considerable territory controlled by the insurgents. The Sri Lankan experience from 1971 to 2009 highlights this threat.[7] After the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, post-conflict reconstruction was the focus of the military.[8] Understanding the prospects and risks associated with the deployment of the

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[5]Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan propose five arenas of a consolidated democracy, which are described later in the chapter. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7; Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei's new conceptualization of CMR is described later in the chapter. Florina Cristiana Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 28.

[6] Adam Withnall, "World Peace? These Are the Only 11 Countries in the World That are Actually Free from Conflict," *Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP),* August 2014, accessed April 20, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/world-peace-these-are-the-only-11-countries-in-the-world-that-are-actually-free-from-conflict-9669623.html; IEP, Global Peace Index 2015, accessed June 9, 2016, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Peace-Index-Report-2015_0.pdf.

[7] De Silva, "Post-LTTE Sri Lanka," 238.

[8] Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia, "Sri Lanka: Executive Summary," accessed May 21, 2016, https://janes.ihs.com/janes/Display/1304928.

military in nation building during the transition to peace in Sri Lanka will provide useful lessons for other nations embroiled in internal conflicts.

Second, this study highlights the implications of deploying the military in post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the process of democratization. The existing literature on democratization mainly focuses on the transition from dictatorship or authoritarian regime to democracy. Some scholars hold that excessive military presence prevents post-conflict reconciliation and democratization of the areas affected by the conflict.[9] Sri Lanka provides a unique case because the defeat of the LTTE provided the state with an opportunity for reintegrating the Northern and Eastern Provinces into a democratic setting. This study is useful in understanding the complex necessity of balance between ensuring a secure environment and encouraging democratization in a post-conflict situation.

Third, this study will discuss the CMR dimension of military deployment in post-conflict reconstruction. In post-conflict societies, the military, at times, undertakes certain non-military tasks related to reconstruction and reconciliation while providing security. This idea supports that military involvement in the civilian sphere of responsibilities is necessary to a certain extent to restore normalcy, particularly considering the security aspect. In addition, sometimes civil authority may direct the military to undertake non-military functions when there is no clear line between military and civilian functions in a post-conflict situation. The Sri Lankan case is useful to understand the complexity in defining the line between military and civil responsibilities, and the effects of military deployment in non-military functions toward CMR.

## C. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review surveys the relevant academic and policy literature on the research problem of whether or not militarization in post-conflict Sri Lanka negatively or positively (or both) affected the overall democratization process from 2009 to 2016. This will provide insights on the existing theoretical concepts and frameworks that are applicable to the research question and reveal the gaps in the application of that

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[9] Goodhand, "Consolidation and Militarization of the Post-War Regime," 134.

knowledge to the Sri Lankan context. It will contribute to the refinement of existing theoretical frameworks to use in a post-conflict scenario. The main theoretical concepts and frameworks related to this research question include democratization and the consolidation of democracy, CMR, and post-conflict reconstruction. Literature on Sri Lanka was reviewed against the identified theoretical concepts and frameworks to ascertain the knowledge gaps in the Sri Lankan context.

## 1.    Democratization and Consolidation of Democracy

It is essential to understand what democracy is before we can assess the degree of democratization of a state. Democracy is an institution that gives different definitions to different people. Robert A. Dahl suggests that democracy is "a system of rights, liberties and opportunities" that are essential for the existence of a democratic government.[10] On similar lines, Alain Touraine suggests that democracy consists of three interdependent dimensions: respect for basic rights, citizenship, and the receptivity of leaders.[11] Stanford A. Lakoff sets an institutional explanation: democracy constitutes the "private sphere of civil society and the public spheres of citizenship and representative government."[12] The literature reveals the importance of functional democratic institutions towards democratization.

Linz and Stepan, along with Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, maintain that considering "free elections as a sufficient condition of democracy is an electoral fallacy"; free competitive elections are just one requirement for democracy.[13] Expanding further, Dahl establishes criteria for a democracy: "democracy provides opportunities for: effective participation, equality in voting, gaining understanding, exercising final control

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[10] Robert A. Dahl, "Political Equality in the Coming Century," in *Challenges to Democracy: Ideas, Involvement and Institutions*, ed. Keith Dowding, James Hughes, and Helen Margetts (Palgrave, 2001), 10.

[11] Alain Touraine, *What is Democracy* (Boulder,Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 26.

[12] Stanford A. Lakoff, *Democracy: History, Theory, Practice* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 31.

[13] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* 3–4; Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is…and Is Not," in *Journal of Democracy* 2 (Johns Hopkins University Press, Summer 1991): 78, accessed March 23, 2016, doi: 10.1353/JOD.1991.0033.

over the government's agendas, and inclusion of adults in the system."[14] Keith Dowding also maintains that the criteria established by Dahl are essential for a state to be fully democratic.[15] Dahl's criteria for democracy and political participation, as suggested by other scholars, are useful to assess the democratization of a state.

Schmitter suggests "five overlapping phases in the transitional phase of democracy: existence of authoritarian rule, collapse of authoritarian rule, democratic transition, democratic consolidation, and persistence of democracy."[16] Linz and Stepan suggest a standard to assess the extent of democratic transition: "a democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government and when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote."[17] Democratization puts "democratic principles into practice through specific and detailed rules and procedures."[18]

Linz and Stepan establish a threshold to democratization; they posit, "citizen's right to control the government through free and competitive elections is a sufficient condition for democratization."[19] Democratization includes liberalization that consists of a mix of policies and societal changes.[20] Although these definitions arise in seeking an understanding of transition from authoritarian systems, these criteria are useful to assess the degree of democratization of a state that regained the areas that were under de-facto control of an authoritarian non-state actor.

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[14] Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), 38.

[15] Keith Dowding, "Social Capital, Civic Literacy and Political Participation: Explaining Differences in Voter Turnout," in *Challenges to Democracy: Ideas, Involvement and Institutions*, ed. Keith Dowding, James Hughes, and Helen Margetts (Palgrave, 2001), 82.

[16] Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," in *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Geoffery Pridham (Dartmouth: Dartmouth Publishing, 1995), 541.

[17] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* 3.

[18] Ibid., 10.

[19] Ibid., 3.

[20] Liberalization includes limited media censorship, wider space for working-class activities, *fundamental* rights for individuals, releasing political prisoners, improved economic benefits distribution, and most importantly, the toleration of opposition; Ibid., 3–4.

Democratic consolidation is the process of strengthening democracy through enhanced democratic practices. In democratic consolidation, the actors, issues, and process are different from the democratic transition.[21] Linz and Stepan assert, consolidated democracy is a political situation, of which, "democracy becomes the only game in town."[22] It can occur only in the absence a serious attempt to topple the legitimate regime or to break away from the state. In other words, solutions to citizens' problems are readily accessible through the democratic institutions and mechanisms; they do not have to resort to rebellion or insurgency to win their rights. Andreas Schedler sets out a list of conditions for "rendering democracy the only game in the town."[23]

Linz and Stepan provide a comprehensive framework to assess democratic consolidation. They assert that the state needs five interacting and interdependent arenas for its existence. First is the availability of an "environment conducive to the development of a free and lively civil society."[24] Second is the availability of a valued political society, which is relatively autonomous.[25] Third is the effective enforcement of "rule of law that guarantees freedom and independent associational life" of the citizen.[26] Fourth is the availability of an adaptable state bureaucracy to assist the democratic

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[21] Schmitter, "The Consolidation of Political Democracies," 537.

[22] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* 5.

[23] Andreas Schedler, "What is Democratic Consolidation?" accessed April 4, 2016, https://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/article/16883.

[24] Linz and Stepan state, "the civil society is an arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests….Civil society can include manifold social movements, civic associations from all social strata (trade unions, entrepreneurial groups, journalists, lawyers, intellectual organizations, religious groupings), and most importantly the ordinary citizen who are not part of any organization." Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 5.

[25] Linz and Stepan state, "Political society is an arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus. Although a civil society can destroy a non-democratic regime, democratic transition and especially democratic consolidation must involve a political society." Linz and Stepan also state, "A democratic political society includes political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures by which society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government." Ibid., 8.

[26] Linz and Stepan state, "A rule of law embodied in a spirit of constitutionalism is an indispensable condition. It also requires a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong legal culture in civil society." Ibid., 7, 10.

government.[27] Last is the availability of an institutionalized economic society.[28] Of the literature reviewed, the five arenas framework asserted by Linz and Stepan is the most comprehensive framework to assess the extent of democratic consolidation of a state.

Most writers agree upon the importance of the military's subservience to democratic civilian control for democratization. One of the critical problems for a state is how to send the military back to barracks or how to continue to use it in peacetime for reconstruction without losing civilian authority after a long-term internal conflict. The five arenas framework for democratic consolidation and establishing democratic practices provides useful guidelines to understand the democratization of a state.

## 2. Civil-Military Relations

Democratic CMR is an essential condition for democratic consolidation.[29] CMR is the link between elected civilian authority and the military in making defense policy decisions. Desch states that CMR is a complex subject and "most of the theoretical and conceptual literature focuses on domestic influences such as the character of individual civilian and military leaders, the structure and norms of the military organization, the institutions of civilian government, and the nature of the society while a small part of the literature looks to international variables."[30] The Sri Lankan case demonstrates the need to address international variables in CMR. This section of the literature review focuses on analyses of theoretical and conceptual literature on CMR.

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[27] Linz and Stepan note, "A lively and independent civil society, a political society with sufficient autonomy and working consensus about procedures of governance, and constitutionalism and a rule of law are virtually definitional prerequisites of a consolidated democracy. These conditions are much more likely to be satisfied if a bureaucracy usable by democratic leaders and an institutionalized economic society exist." Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 10–11.

[28] According to Linz and Stepan, "There cannot be a consolidated democracy in a command economy or in a pure market economy. Significant degrees of market intervention and state ownership for self-sufficiency of the market requires corporation laws; the regulation of stock markets; regulated standards for weights, measurements, and ingredients; and the protection of both public and private property." Ibid., 16.

[29] Schedler, "What is Democratic Consolidation."

[30] Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 1.

Desch summarizes various indicators suggested by different analysts to measure CMR.[31] Some analysts suggest that understanding the extent of military influence in areas beyond strictly military issues is a measure of CMR; the line between civilian and military responsibilities is not clear, however, especially when the military takes on non-military functions at the request of the civilians.[32] Desch posits that excessive military influence on national policy debates is a potential problem, although he does not state what is excessive.[33]

Several scholars suggest civilian control over the military is necessary for democratization. Dahl argues, "The circumstances most favorable for competitive politics exist when access to violence…is either dispersed or denied to oppositions and to government."[34] Carl von Clausewitz furthers the importance of the military's subservience to civilian control, stating that the "subordination of the political point of view to the military is not possible and the subordination of the military point of view to the political is therefore, the only thing possible."[35] Samuel Huntington's objective control and military professionalism shaped discussions on civilian control of the military for decades. He writes, "A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state."[36]

Contrary views have emerged more recently that may be more relevant to contemporary internal conflicts. Samuel E. Finer holds that there is "no reason to argue that civilian control over the military is natural because the military is an independent political force, which possesses vastly superior organization and arms."[37] Thomas C. Bruneau also points out that there are some requirements for CMR to be effective. He

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[31] Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, 3–4.

[32] Ibid., 3.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 51.

[35] Clausewitz, Carl von, *On War,* Anatol Rapoport (England: Penguin Books, 1968), 405.

[36] Veena Gill, "India," in *The Political Role of the Military*, ed. Constantine P. Danopoulos and Cynthia Watson (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 171.

[37] Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 4–5.

states, "Efficiency in the use of resources refers to the ability to fulfill the assigned roles and missions at the optimum cost."[38] It is difficult to conceptualize the efficiency in national security matters and its objectives because assumptions are the basis of discovered material on measures of efficiency.[39]

In addition, pointing out the adverse consequences of objective civilian control, Matei posits that the "objective civilian control over the military undermining the effectiveness and efficiency of the military" can adversely affect national security.[40] The latter, therefore, proposes a new comprehensive framework for CMR. The framework addresses the requirements and priorities of both modern security issues and the process of democratic consolidation of any state. The trinity framework consists of the "democratic civilian control of the military," the military's effectiveness in performing its missions, and the military's efficiency in accomplishing the "roles and missions at minimum cost."[41] Matei states that there are two challenges in the present global environment: "one is to assert and maintain control over the military and the other is to develop effective militaries, police forces, and intelligence agencies to perform a wide variety of roles and missions."[42] The missions come under six categories: "external and internal wars, counter terrorism, crime prevention, humanitarian assistance, and peace support operations (PSO)."[43]

Matei conceptualizes control based on "authority over the institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the creation of professional norms."[44] She also suggests that the military needs three requirements to be effective. First, there must be a plan in the form of a doctrine or strategy. The second requirement is the availability of institutional mechanisms such as defense ministries, interior affairs ministries, a national security

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[38] Thomas C. Bruneau, "Efficiency in the Use of Resources," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2013), 39.

[39] Bruneau, "Efficiency in the Use of Resources," 40.

[40] Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," 28.

[41] Ibid., 26.

[42] Ibid., 29.

[43] Ibid., 31.

[44] Ibid., 30.

forum or council, and other means to establish joint or interagency cooperation.[45] Third, sufficient financial and material resources are required to equip, train and modernize the militaries.

Thomas-Durell Young describes the sources of tensions in CMR. There are conflicting interests between the civilian leadership and the military.[46] The military always struggles for equipment and training to win the wars while the elected officials have to "serve the wider policies of the state."[47] In this context, Young asserts three possible areas for tensions between the civilian leadership and the military. First is the military elite's "dissatisfaction or disappointment with political leadership" over "insufficient resources to meet the national security requirements established by the state."[48] Second, the perception that civilian leaders are anti-military and their political ideology is against the "military's professional ethos of political neutrality."[49] Third is the perception that as a moral institution of society, the military is responsible to "rescue society from corrupt or incompetent officials through a coup."[50] Finally, a division within the military over policy or strategy can result in tension between the political leadership and the military.[51]

More recently, scholars have also pointed to keeping the military in balance to civilian authority. The power elite often see the militarized society as an outcome of societal militarization. Patrick M. Regan uses the term elite as proposed by C. Wright Mills; he posits that the power elite consisted of the heads of the largest corporations, the political leadership, and the military leaders.[52] Regan defines militarism as the

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[45] Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," 30.

[46] Thomas-Durell Young, "Military Professionalism in a Democracy," in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (University of Texas Press, 2006), 23.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., 24

[52] Patrick M. Regan, *Organizing Societies for War: The Process and Consequences of Societal Militarization* (London: Greenwood Press, 1994), 6.

inculcation of military-based values to the society and militarization as the preparation of the society for war.[53] Describing how CMR shapes a militarized society, Patrick M. Regan notes Harold Lasswell's assertion: "ruling elite manipulate the threat symbols of nationalism to serve as a useful tool for maintaining popular support behind the increasing influence of the military over civil affairs of the state."[54]

In CMR theories, there is a notion that militaries are not suited for internal missions. Anshu N. Chatterjee provides a framework to analyze CMR in post-colonial democracies in considering the Indian military.[55] Chatterjee suggests that military employment in internal operations negatively affects the cohesion and professionalism of the military.[56] In such context, the Indian military's activities come under democratic civilian control, but the military's role in the insurgencies is controversial and understudied.[57] Veena Gill refers to the "use of the military for internal security" as the internal political role providing an account to the political role of the Indian Army.[58] Gill describes the politicization of the military as the socialization of the military with political values, which are outside of the traditionally expected military competence, fighting wars.[59]

Gill points out other negative implications in the use of the military for internal missions. First, the military acquires political influence due to the nature of its interaction with the polity and its internal organization. Second, it reduces the Army's impact and credibility. Third, "excessively frequent and avoidable involvement in maintaining law and order has also alienated the Army from the people, the Army being accused of behaving as an occupation force in affected states, perpetrating excesses on its own

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[53] Regan, *Organizing Societies for War,* 5.

[54] Ibid., 2.

[55] Anshu N. Chatterjee, "Shifting Lines of Governance in Insurgencies: India," in *The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei ( New York: Routledge, 2013), 168.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid., 167.

[58] Veena Gill, "India," 181.

[59] Ibid.

people and violating human rights."[60] Chatterjee notes Muthiah Alagappa's view that frequent military deployment in internal security matters creates problems because the civil authority's status relies on the balance between coercion and public support.[61] Neloufer de Mel asserts, "when civilian leaderships put military power to civil use to save the nation or to solve political problems, this process itself militarizes society."[62] The experiences of the Indian military provide a good insight into the risks involved in the military's internal security role in the South Asian context. This framework is also useful for understanding the Sri Lankan situation.

### 3.      Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Post-conflict reconstruction is a paramount process in state building after the termination of a conflict. While there is important literature that focuses on post-conflict reconstruction, it is primarily based on a mass-scale involvement of international actors such as the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), focusing on the post-Cold war period. This section of the literature review focuses on examining the concepts of post-conflict reconstruction and analyzes how those concepts can be applicable to the Sri Lankan context.

Yosef Jabareen provides a comprehensive "framework for post-conflict and on-going conflict reconstruction of a failed state."[63] Jabareen states, "post-conflict reconstruction has evolved into grand strategy with a grand narrative" in recent years, including the "creation of a new global agenda."[64] Jabareen proposes a new model to conceptualize post-conflict reconstruction. This conceptual framework "refers to a

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[60] Veena Gill, "India," 182–183.

[61] Chatterjee, "Shifting Lines of Governance in Insurgencies: India," 169.

[62] Neloufer de Mel, *Militarizing Sri Lanka: Popular Culture, Memory and Narrative in the Armed Conflict* (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2007), 23.

[63] Yosef Jabareen, "Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Ongoing Reconstruction of Failed States," *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 26 (June 2013): 107, accessed March 12, 2016, doi: 10.1007/s10767-012-9118-3.

[64] Ibid., 108.

network or a plane of interrelated concepts that together provides a comprehensive understanding" of post-conflict reconstruction.[65]

Jabareen's study uses eight important concepts to theorize post-conflict reconstruction.[66] The first concept is the condition of a failed state; the state is unable to exercise the monopoly of violence over its designated territory and its population.[67] Although the situation may change on termination of the conflict, the threat may persist in non-military forms if the root causes for the conflict have never diminished. External intervention is the second concept.[68] This concept posits that external military intervention and state building are necessary to achieve the expected international order.

The third concept is the critical aspect of sequencing the process. The sequence should be law and order, security, development of the economy, and finally democracy.[69] Emphasizing the importance of security, Francis Fukuyama writes, "state building in a strict sense is about creating the Weberian monopoly of legitimate violence over a defined territory and therefore has at its core the concentration of the means of coercion—in practical terms, armies and police—under the control of a central political authority."[70] The wrong sequencing is risky and Fukuyama asserts that state building should be accomplished on proper sequencing rather than under liberal and democratic rules, which may lead to the eventual reemergence of conflict.[71] The military has to play a vital role in providing security, reinstallation of order, disarmament of combatants, and demining.

Jabareen's fourth crucial concept is the provision of security for the reconstruction process.[72] A successful reconstruction process demands a favorable

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[65] Jabareen, "Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction," 110.

[66] Ibid., 108.

[67] Ibid., 111.

[68] Ibid.,112.

[69] Ibid., 114–115.

[70] Francis Fukuyama, "Liberalism versus State-Building," *Journal of Democracy* 18 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 12.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Jabareen, "Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction," 115–116.

environment through a balance of security, political, and economic aspects. The fifth concept is the reduction of conflict through reconstruction.[73] Economic development can play a major role in conflict prevention. A higher level of economic growth rate and income level of the citizens reduce the risk of conflict reemergence. Democratization and liberalization of the state is the sixth concept.[74] This concept involves the application of democratic and liberalization principles to the conflict-affected areas.

Use of multi-level actors is the seventh concept.[75] The reconstruction process should be an inclusive mechanism that incorporates state, non-state, and international actors. The people should realize that the reconstruction process is their own. Therefore, the greater the participation of local actors, the more the process will succeed.[76] The final concept is the holistic approach and inclusive themes of reconstruction.[77] Jabareen posits four interrelated themes for reconstruction: political, economic, social, and provision of security.[78] Jabareen's post-conflict reconstruction conceptual framework is well suited to a post-conflict context; it does not provide any mechanism to measure the implications of using the military for reconstruction, however, which is where some scholars argue on militarization in Sri Lanka.

Kristine Hoglund and Camilla Orjuela propose the conflict prevention theory, which consists of two measures "preventing a relapse to violent conflict and constructing a self-sustained peace."[79] Hoglund and Orjuela further propose four ways to undertake those two measures: the demobilization, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants; the sharing of political power; the justice and actions for

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[73] Jabareen, "Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction," 116.

[74] Ibid., 116–118.

[75] Ibid., 119.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid., 119–120.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Kristine Hoglund and Camilla Orjuela, "Winning the Peace: Conflict Prevention After a Victor's Peace in Sri Lanka," *Contemporary Social Science* 6 (2011):19, accessed February 5, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17450144.2010.534491.

reconciliation; and the post-conflict reconstruction and development of the economy.[80]
The four measures for conflict prevention suggested in the above literature are useful to
assess the reconstruction process, although they do not discuss in detail the implications
of using the military for reconstruction towards democratization.

### 4.    The Sri Lankan Context

Scholars describe Sri Lanka as a Third World "model democracy" after
independence in 1948; it completed the democratic transition according to the framework
established by Linz and Stepan early in the post-colonial phase.[81] The major threat to Sri
Lanka emerged in the 1980s in the form of a violent secessionist movement waged by the
LTTE.[82] After that, one sixth of the country (the larger part of the Northern and Eastern
provinces) fell under the control of the separatist LTTE organization.[83] The Tamils lived
in those areas under the LTTE, lost their democratic rights and experienced a drop in
living standards.[84]

After the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, the Northern and Eastern provinces
returned to *de-jure* government control; this fulfilled the prerequisite for democratic
consolidation, according to Linz and Stepan: the existence of a state. Effective
reintegration of the liberated areas with the rest of the country while preventing the
resurgence of separatism was a formidable task that lay in front of the government. The
military played a dominant role in the post-conflict reconstruction process.[85]

Some scholars suggest that internal political setting has shaped Sri Lanka's
democracy and its relationship with the military. Siri Gamage posits that liberal
democracy in Sri Lanka declined due to civilian authorities' use of the military to attain

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[80] Hoglund and Orjuela, "Winning the Peace," 21.

[81] Siri Gamage, "Democracy in Sri Lanka: Past, Present, and Future," *Asian Studies Review* 17 (1993), 107, accessed May 20, 2016, doi: 10.1080/03147539308712906; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* 3.

[82] Jagath P. Senarathne, "The Security Establishment in Sri Lanka: A Case for Reform," in *Governing Security,* ed. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (London: Zed Books, 2003), 181.

[83] De Silva, K.M. "Post-LTTE Sri Lanka," 238.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

power. Gamage holds that the transformation of the "Westminster-style parliamentary system to an executive presidential system" in 1978 increased the militarization of the political process.[86] Gamage also holds that militarization was successful in protecting the country's integrity during the separatist LTTE terrorism; therefore, it contributed to maintain state sovereignty.[87]

During the main research period of study from 2010 to 2016, former president Mahinda Rajapaksa was in power, which was the period of reconstruction, reconciliation and militarization. Some scholars hold that governance under Rajapaksa undermined the implementation of the post-conflict reconciliation process and democratic principles. Stone asserts that the military became heavy-handed and the state undertook a militarized development process instead of a real devolution of power to bring a lasting peace.[88] The Crisis Group Asia Report 2011 states that, since 2005, the military dominated the life in the north since there has been no reduction in the military presence.[89] The Crisis Group Asia Report 2013 states that Sri Lanka' democratic governance has significantly deteriorated in the post-conflict era.[90]

Some literature, however, suggests that there has been a significant transformation of the democratization process after 2015 and that the government remains at the center of post-conflict CMR and democratization. Present President Maithripala Sirisena came to power in 2015 and established a national unitary government, a coalition between the United Peoples' Freedom Association (UPFA) and the United National Front for Good

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[86] Gamage, "Democracy in Sri Lanka," 110–111.

[87] Ibid., 109, Gamage points to M. Moore's three main causes of "decline in liberal democracy in Sri Lanka: increasing domination by politicians over the elements of the state apparatus and over society generally disregarding legal and procedural formality, sharpening of ethnic conflict, and increasing recourse to arms in the attempt to attain power and the consequent physical and political strengthening of the armed forces, who have successfully protected the integrity of the state."

[88] Jason G. Stone, "Sri Lanka's Postwar Descent," *Journal of Democracy* 25 (Johns Hopkins University Press, April 2014), 151, accessed February 28, 2016, doi: 10.1353/jod.2014.0024.

[89] International Crisis Group, "Reconciliation in Sri Lanka: Harder than Ever," *Asia Report* 209 (July 2011), accessed May 8, 2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka.aspx.

[90] International Crisis Group, "Sri Lanka's Authoritarian Turn: The Need for International Action," *Asia Report* 243 (February 2013), accessed May 8, 2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/243-sri-lankas-authoritarian-turn-the-need-for-international-action.pdf.

Governance (UNFGG).[91] The Crisis Group Asia Report 2016 suggests that the change gave Sri Lanka a historic opportunity to rebuild democracy, and Sri Lanka has made significant progress.[92] The report also asserts that although the military reduced its presence and interference in civilian affairs, there is no significant change in the military's role.[93]

In addition, important literature also points to transformation of CMR and democratic practices during the conflict between the state and the LTTE.[94] Muthiah Alagappa suggests that deployment of the military in an internal role allowed the abuse of state power and erosion of democratic rights at the local level.[95] Alagappa asserts that Sri Lankan political leaders' failure to provide sociocultural and political solutions to the internal conflict resulted in adverse consequences for civil society and CMR, particularly in the conflict-affected areas.[96] Although the LTTE was defeated in May 2009, the military remains deployed in conflict-affected areas. According to the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the immediate need for military deployment was the restoration of normalcy and reconstruction tasks that are essential for nation building.[97]

Critics within and outside of Sri Lanka widely described these activities as the militarization of the state that affects CMR and democratization.[98] Ahmed S. Hashim posits that the military has intruded in "every aspect of the society, including government

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[91] International Crisis Group, "Sri Lanka: Jumpstarting the Reform Process," *Asia Report* 278 (May 2016): 3, accessed May 28, 2016, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/278-sri-lanka-jumpstarting-the-reform-process.pdf.

[92] Ibid., 1.

[93] Ibid., 17.

[94] Darini R. Senanayake, "Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence and Civil-Military Relations," in *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia,* ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto,California: Stanford University Press, 2001), 295.

[95] Muthiah Alagappa, "Introduction," in *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia,* ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 2001), 11.

[96] Alagappa, "Introduction," 19.

[97] Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia, "Sri Lanka: Executive Summary."

[98] Goodhand. "Consolidation and Militarization of the Post-War Regime," 133; *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), "Militarization of the Country –JVP," ( January 13, 2011), accessed January 22, 2016, http://lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/PrintDoc.

administration, diplomatic corps, politics, reconstruction, and the economy."[99] Hashim asserts, "Militaries are neither effective national development agencies" nor "efficient economic organizations."[100] The spread of the military's influence in spheres beyond its purview poses dangers to its professionalism, creates interests beyond military values, and possibly creates the "tendency to interfere in the political process."[101] Using the CMR framework proposed by Bruneau and Matei, this thesis examines the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction and how it shapes the CMR.

The reviewed literature on Sri Lanka's post-conflict reconstruction posits mixed effects of deploying the military in post-conflict reconstruction. Hoglund and Orjuela use the four measures model to examine conflict prevention in Sri Lanka and argue that heavy militarization becomes the approach for conflict prevention.[102] Devoic uses the same model used by Hoglund and Orjuela to examine the Sri Lankan context and posits that the deployment of military for reconstruction together with Tamil construction companies has been a useful conflict prevention technique. According to Devoic, conflict sensitivity has led the government to focus on physical reconstruction and the military plays a successful role in accomplishing reconstruction projects together with military information operations, which assisted in prevention of any separatist violence after May 2009.[103]

Some of the literature focuses on the negative effects of using the military in post-conflict reconstruction. Stone posits that the reconstruction of northern Sri Lanka has been a military project because the military officers dominated the Presidential Task Force (PTF). Also, he asserts that the PTF has denied civil society groups and media to see what has been going on, while restricting the involvement of international NGOs who

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[99] Ahmed S. Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 203.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Hoglund and Orjuela, "Winning the Peace," 28.

[103] Bozenco Devoic, "Sri Lanka: Physical Reconstruction and Economic Development as Conflict Prevention Factors," *CIRR* 69 (2013), 65, accessed February 22, 2016, doi: 10.2478/cirr-2014-0003.

are critical to the military's conduct in reconstruction works.[104] Meanwhile, the International Crisis Group reports assert that military presence in conflict-affected areas is an impediment to the reconciliation process. Conversely, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment states that the military was successful in assisting the civil authorities in the resettlement of nearly 300,000 IDPs and rehabilitation of former LTTE cadres.[105] Therefore, it is important to understand the positive and negative effects (and the literature suggests both) of deploying the military in post-conflict reconstruction.

Most of the reviewed literature does not account for the strategic environment of the country during the post-conflict reconstruction period and there is a considerable gap in the discussion on the context of using the military. The literature mainly asserts that deploying the military for post-conflict reconstruction is an impediment to democratic CMR and democratization. Using the post-conflict reconstruction framework, I examine the short-term deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction and its impact on democratic CMR and democratization in the Sri Lankan context, which will complement the existing literature.

## D.    HYPOTHESES

The literature review provides both positive and negative effects of using the military in post-conflict towards the democratization process in Sri Lanka. The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 provided the state with an opportunity to consolidate the monopoly of the use of force over the sovereign territory; there was a necessity, however, to transform the security environment for the reinstitution of the civilian bureaucracy. In view of this factor, the government continued military deployment in the internal security role and statewide nation-building efforts, particularly in the conflict-affected areas. In this context, during the period from 2009 to 2016, the military's prominent role in post-

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[104] Stone, "Sri Lanka's Postwar Descent," 150; Senior Minister Dr. Sarath Amunugama says, "unlike old traditional military, today the military especially after the war has acquired tremendous skills which are not available with civilian authorities…[We want to utilize the military's] skills to the maximum and no one can deny that they have brought a lot of discipline and efficiency to whatever they take part in." *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), "Should the Military Be in Civilian Spheres of Business?" December 3, 2103, accessed on January 22, 2016, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/.

[105] *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), "Should the Military Be in Civilian Spheres of Business?"

conflict reconstruction provides three potential hypotheses on the democratic consolidation.

The first hypothesis is that the military's deployment in post-conflict reconstruction positively affects the democratization process. Although the LTTE was defeated, the continuing separatist threat demands the continuing military deployment in consolidating security, which will then allow for political settlement of grievances of the Tamil population and the IDPs. The military was able to support the civilian bureaucracy to establish control and fulfill urgent reconstruction tasks. Meanwhile, the GoSL used the military's skilled work force for statewide nation-building projects. Deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction has had positive implications for democratization during the research study period from 2009 to 2016.

The second hypothesis is that the military's deployment in post-conflict reconstruction negatively affects the democratization process. Although the separatist threat continues after the defeat of the LTTE, there is no purpose of continuing the military's internal security role in the absence of an armed threat. Other issues require political or diplomatic solutions. The military deployment in civilian tasks undermines the civilian bureaucracy's capacity and hinders the strengthening of democratic institutions. Consequently, continued deployment of the military has negative implications towards democratization.

The third hypothesis is that the military's deployment in post-conflict reconstruction has both negative and positive implications towards the democratization process. The continuing military employment is successful in preventing the resurgence of armed separatism. Also, the military's internal security role and engagement in reconstruction were not new phenomena for Sri Lanka. On the other hand, continuing internal security presence affects the military's effectiveness and efficiency in its professional role. Although there are short-term positive implications in the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction, it has had larger negative impacts towards democratization during the research's study period from 2009 to 2016.

## E.    RESEARCH DESIGN

The research is a single case study of the post-conflict transition in Sri Lanka. This study will be qualitative research based on empirical evidence. The data will be collected from secondary sources: books, articles, journals, reports, newspaper articles, government statistics, and other sources. The study of the Sri Lankan case will contribute to understanding the effects of using the military in the internal role towards democratic CMR and thus to democratization. This section outlines the use of key concepts and frameworks to answer the research question.

First, the political developments and CMR from 1948 to 2010 are assessed. The discussion focuses on how the political developments and resultant military missions affect democratic consolidation and CMR. Linz and Stepan's prerequisite and five arenas of democratic consolidation and the trinity framework on CMR proposed by Bruneau and Matei, described above, are the models used for this purpose.

Second, the strategic environment of Sri Lanka at the end of the conflict in May 2009 is discussed to assess the need for deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction. Then, how the political developments resulted in the continued military deployment or disengagement in post-conflict reconstruction is assessed. The discussion focuses on how the military's deployment affected democratic consolidation and CMR.

Third is the analysis of effects of the post-conflict militarization toward democratization in Sri Lanka. This thesis analyzed how the different military missions affected the democratic consolidation and CMR, and derived the two aspects of the research problem. It examined the positive and negative effects of the militarization on the five arenas of democratic consolidation, as proposed by Linz and Stepan, and the effects of militarization toward democratic civilian control of the military and the military's effectiveness.

## F.    THESIS OVERVIEW

This research organizes in five chapters. The first chapter introduces the subject to provide a solid understanding of the research problem. The literature review provides scholarly concepts and frameworks on democratization, democratic CMR, post-conflict

reconstruction, and the Sri Lankan context. The second chapter discusses the political developments and CMR from 1948 to 1990, setting the background to the conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE. The third chapter is on the political developments and CMR during the high intensity conflict from 1990 to 2010. Both Chapters II and III focus on the effects of deployment of the military in internal security and nation building missions, democratic consolidation and CMR. They provide the understanding of the evolution of CMR since independence.

The fourth chapter focuses on the effects of deploying the military in post-conflict reconstruction from 2010 to 2016. This chapter applies the theoretical concepts and frameworks identified in the literature review to discuss important aspects related to post-conflict reconstruction. The fifth chapter is the analysis and conclusion. The analysis focuses on identifying the positive and negative effects of using the military in post-conflict reconstruction and statewide nation-building missions towards democratic consolidation and CMR. The conclusion summarizes the research conducted and its results.

## II.    DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: 1948 TO 1990

Ceylon became a sovereign state within the British Commonwealth of Nations on February 4, 1948.[106] Since 1948, alternating civilian governments dominated by the two main political parties of the country, the United National Party (UNP) and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), or the coalitions led by those parties governed the country. Sri Lanka has also experienced three violent armed insurgencies since 1948. Two of them were the 1971 and 1987–1990 communist insurrections of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) that attempted to overthrow the government. The third was the LTTE's separatist insurgency of 1983–2009, which attempted to establish a separate state, the Tamil Eelam, in the Northern and Eastern provinces and was able to establish de facto control over those areas by the 1990s. The combination of the different policies of the two major political parties and the resultant threats that required military missions has shaped CMR and the structure of democracy in the country. Some effects of CMR were positive, while others have been negative, for democratic consolidation.

This chapter discusses the status of democratic consolidation and the CMR of Sri Lanka from 1948 until the 1990s. It sets forth the background that is essential to examine the effects of the military's deployment during the conflict toward CMR and thus toward democratic consolidation. The discussion focuses on the critical political developments that affected the prerequisites and five arenas of democratic consolidation and CMR during two distinctive periods: the dominion period from 1948 to 1972 and the republican period from 1972 to the 1990s in which the LTTE became a significant challenge to the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

### A.    THE DOMINION OF CEYLON: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1948 TO 1972

Sri Lanka was a dominion of the British Commonwealth of Nations after independence. Since the 1930s, the country enjoyed electoral democracy and the

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[106] S.A. Pakeman, *Ceylon* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, 1964), 165.

pluralistic political system. The Soulbury Constitution of 1946 became the governing law of the country until the enactment of the Republican Constitution in 1972. The political power competition between the UNP and the SLFP and the policies of those governments resulted in critical events that shaped democratization process. This section discusses the transition to a democracy and the Citizenship Acts, the Sinhala Only Act and the rise of federalist ideology, and the JVP insurrection of 1971.

### 1. Transition to a Democracy and the Citizenship Acts: 1948–1956

Sri Lanka transitioned peacefully from a British colony to an independent state in 1948. The establishment of the executive, legislative, and judiciary institutions for the functioning of the modern state took place during colonial rule.[107] In the late 1940s, Ceylon had universal adult vote and a plural political society comprised of the center-right UNP, traditional and revolutionary left-wing parties, and communal-political parties.[108] The Soulbury Constitution of 1946 established a unitary state with a convocational device, a system of communal representation.[109] Having reached a sufficient agreement with the Ceylonese government on the future governance of the country, the British granted independence to Ceylon on February 4, 1948, as a unitary state with parliamentary democracy within the British Commonwealth of Nations.[110]

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[107] Neil De Votta states that essential elements of a state had developed in Ceylon at the time of independence. Neil De Votta, "Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," *Pacific Affairs* 73 (2000), 55–56, accessed December 19, 2015, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/2672284.pdf?acceptTC=true.

[108] D.S. Senanayake organized the United National Party (UNP) in September 1946. Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP), Marxist Communist Party (CP), and Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) were the main traditional-left parties. The Marxist-Leninist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was a revolutionist-left party. The communal political parties in the 1920s were the European Association (1918), All Ceylon Malay Association (1922), and the Ceylon Muslim League (1924). In the 1930s, more communal parties came up. They were the All Ceylon Moors' Association (1935), the Burger Political Association (1938), the Sinhala Maha Sabha (1937), the Ceylon Indian Congress (1939), and All Ceylon Tamil Congress (1944); A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka 1947–1973* (London and Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1974), 13, 130, 151.

[109] The Soulbury Constitution of 1946 provided weightage for the ethnic minority representation: Ceylon Tamils 12–14 seats, the Indian Tamils 10–8 seats, the Muslims 6–4 seats, and 6 nominated seats for the minorities in a house of 101 members. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *The Break-Up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 18.

[110] K.M. de Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka 1880–1985* (Lanham and London: University Press of America, 1986), 138.

The British colonial powers, however, left legacies that continued to affect the country's political, social, and economic arenas. The communal representation introduced by the British shaped political mobilization that followed independence; eventually, it resulted in an armed conflict that affected the consolidation of democracy. Also, the military continued its colonial culture and structure until the end of the 1950s. The majority of the population was Sinhalese Buddhists. Sri Lankan Tamils (primarily Hindus), constituted the largest minority and this has remained so (see Table 1).[111] Ceylon transitioned to a democracy with the Sinhalese Buddhists questioning whether they received their due socio-economical rights as the majority versus the favored minorities.[112] Meanwhile, Ceylon Tamils sought to maintain their political power and socio-economic benefits enjoyed during the colonial rule. The quest for selective incentives led to the political competition between the Sinhalese and the Tamils that resulted in a clash between the two groups.

Table 1.        Sri Lanka's Population by Ethnicity in Census Years.[113]

| Year Ethnicity | 1946 | 1953 | 1963 | 1971 | 1981 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sinhalese | 69.4 | 69.4 | 70.6 | 72 | 74 |
| Sri Lankan Tamils | 11 | 10.9 | 11 | 11.4 | 12.6 |
| Indian Tamils | 11.7 | 12 | 11.1 | 8.9 | 5.6 |
| Muslims | 6.5 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 7.1 |
| Others | 1.4 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 |

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[111] According to 1953 census, Sinhalese – 5,616,705, Ceylon Tamils – 884,703, Indian Tamils – 974,098, Moors and Malays – 536,889, Burghers – 45,950, and others – 7,311. Pakeman, *Ceylon,* 245.

[112] De Votta states, "In keeping with Britain's divide-and-rule policies, her authorities in Sri Lanka badly favored minority communities at the expense of the majority community's religion, language and culture. Independence was therefore seen as a mechanism by which Buddhism, the Sinhala language and its intertwined culture could be restored to its rightful place of prominence and dominance." De Votta, "Control Democracy," 58.

[113] Adapted from C.I.C.R.E.D. Series, *The Population of Sri Lanka*, 1974, accessed on August 24, 2016, Table 3.16,44, http://www.cicred.org/Eng/Publications/pdf/c cc46.pdf and Kenneth D. Bush*, The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Learning to Read between the Lines* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), Table 3.1, 40.

The emergence of ethnic, linguistic, and religious nationalism became apparent soon after independence. Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake, and his successors in the UNP, Dudley Senanayake, and Sir John Kotelawala, opted to maintain the dominion status and territorial nationalism through the policies on secularism and language parity to both Sinhala and Tamil.[114] The powerful left-wing political parties also maintained the secular policies, but they opposed the dominion status. Also, the left-wing instigated labor unrest causing severe political and economic issues; the military deployment was frequent to maintain essential public services during strikes.[115] The military's deployment to solve political problems helped to provide security, but affected the rule of law and the activities of trade unions and left-wing political parties. Also, the UNP, based on liberal democratic norms, disregarded the left-wing political parties, leaving out important groups that had a significant constituency.[116] The Indian Tamil population was a major vote base of the left-wing political parties.

Meanwhile, the Citizenship Acts of 1948 and 1949 increased the divisions within the civil and political societies.[117] The increase in the immigration of Indian Tamils became a significant problem for the country's demography. Since 1952, the GoSL deployed the military to prevent illicit immigration and the military continued this role over two decades. The military's deployment in illicit immigration prevention strengthened security but hindered the development of relevant law enforcement agencies. The Ceylon Citizenship Act No 18, of 1948, and the Indian and Pakistani Residents' (Citizenship) Act No 34, of 1949, sought to define the people of Ceylon.[118]

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[114] The new government pursued the independence and signed the Defense and External Affairs Agreement with the British on November 11, 1947. Wilson notes that D.S. Senanayake came to the defense agreement to speed up the process of gaining independence and reducing the cost of defense. Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka,* 75.

[115] In 1947 general elections, the UNP secured 98 seats while LSSP got 28 and CP got 13. Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka,* 170.

[116] Ibid., 132.

[117] Since 1940s Ceylon was negotiating with India on the grant of citizenship to Indian Tamils and reached to different formulas; those policies fall short of implementation, however. De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies,* 223.

[118] Citizenship could be by descent accorded to those peoples' fathers or grandfathers born in Ceylon before September 1948 and if born after that date, father must be a citizen or qualified to be citizen. To become a citizen by registration, they must intend to be "ordinarily resident in the island." Pakeman, *Ceylon,* 167.

Most legislators from minority communities, including Ceylon Tamils, voted for the bill; the Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC) and Sinhalese left-wing parties opposed the bill, however, because the restriction of citizenship to Indian Tamils reduced their constituency.[119]

Subsequently in 1949, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, a prominent figure in the Ceylon Tamil Congress (CTC), opposed the Citizenship Act and formed a more radical group, the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK) or Federal Party (FP). The FP gave birth to the separatist ideology, while the left-wing parties were discontented with the UNP.[120] The Citizenship Acts eventually led to the creation of a stateless population, the reduction of constituency of the left wing, and emergence of political opposition to unitary state structure. The Army embarked on a new role to assist the police to maintain law and order during the protests against the Citizenship Acts. Eventually, the Sinhala Only Act further distanced the FP from the ruling polity.

### 2.    The Sinhala Only Act and the Rise of Federalist Ideology: 1956–1972

In the 1950s, linguistic nationalism became the basis for political mobilization, affecting both Sinhala and Tamil communities. Also, the other policies and associated discontent placed pressures on the state leading to the further increase of nationalism. As a result, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike formed the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) and secured a comprehensive victory in the 1956 general elections.[121] Prime Minister Bandaranaike promoted the concept of neutralism, staying away from the Cold War power blocs. Accordingly, it cancelled the Defense Agreement with the British in 1957

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[119] Disfranchisement reduced the Indian Tamils' seats in the House from seven to none and Sinhalese representatives secured those seven seats since the 1952 elections. Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka,* 35; De Silva notes that Citizenship acts reduced the fear of Kandyn Sinhalese on electoral power of left-wing. De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies,* 155, 223.

[120] Bandarage notes that Ponnambalam, the leader of the CTC,  accused Chelvanayakam of attempting to foist on Tamil people and mislead the people because Arasu means an entity with absolute attributes of sovereignty. Also notes that ITAK's demand for federal political structure and regional autonomy for Tamils is a quest for Tamil separatism. Asoka Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka: Terrorism, Ethnicity, Political Economy* (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 2009), 38, 39.

[121] The MEP was a coalition of the SLFP, Marxist LSSP, and pro-Sinhalese Bhasa Peramuna. Marxist LSSP also changed its stance from language parity to Sinhala only. Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 42.

and took over the control of military bases in Sri Lanka; this changed the focus of the military from external roles and missions to internal security concerns. Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake posits that politicization and ethnicization of the military occurred after the taking over of the bases.[122]

Meanwhile, the MEP enacted the Official Language Act in June 1956, making Sinhalese the official language; implementation of the Act, however, stretched over a period of five years until December 1960. In response, the FP organized Satyagraha (work stoppage) to oppose the Language Act, creating ethnic tensions that led to the Sinhalese and Tamil conflicts. The ethnic clashes affected civil and political society and rule of law, setting the background for the FP to promote its federalist ideology.

The FP's quest for federal provisions shaped the competition between the UNP and the SLFP. In August 1956, the FP held a convention and set out a list of Tamil demands, including a federal constitution giving autonomy to the Northern and Eastern Provinces.[123] Prime Minister Bandaranaike entered a pact with the FP that provided for the devolution of power down to the district council. The pact also had the provision to allow both Sinhala and Tamil language administration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The UNP and Sinhalese nationalist groups opposed the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact, compelling the government to abandon it after violent riots in May and June 1958. The GoSL deployed the military to curb violence in addition to the police. Federalism versus the unitary structure of the state became the basis for conflict between the UNP and the SLFP, and the FP.

The nationalist and federalist ideologies continued to shape the power politics in the 1960s. The new government under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike continued the policies of the nationalization program and Sinhalization of the state. In 1961, the government enacted the "Sinhala Only Act" of 1956. The FP protested the Act through large-scale civil disobedience; in response, the government imposed a state of emergency in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in April 1961 and deployed the military to curb the

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[122] Senanayake, "Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence," 300.

[123] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 181–82.

protests. The deployment of the military to counter civil disobedience affected the rule of law, and civil and political societies. The military was displeased at its frequent deployment to solve internal political problems. It resulted in the abortive military coup in 1962, which will be discussed later in the chapter. In response, the government reduced the development of the military and commenced to increase the Sinhalese composition in the military.[124] Despite the SLFP's favor to the majority constituency of the country, the UNP won the 1965 general elections.[125] The competition between the UNP and the SLFP, and the FP's quest for federalism through electoral institutions, was a sign of political plurality.

The FP's federalist ideology and nationalism continued to shape politics. Amidst rising nationalism, the UNP government faced severe constraints in maintaining power. In 1965, the government also faced the threat of a suspected military coup; this led the government to reduce defense budget. The divisions within the government and pressure created by the opposition parties and Buddhist activists compelled Senanayake to abandon the Regional Council Bill.[126] In 1968, the SLFP and its Marxist allies, the LSSP and CP, formed a Samagi Peramuna (UF) to compete with the UNP and won the 1970 general elections.[127] The UF's Common Program undermined the Tamil minority's demands, though it did address the grievances of the majority of the people through electoral institutions, which was important for democratic consolidation. The UF's Common Program resulted in negative and positive effects toward democratization.

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[124] The ethnic composition of the Ceylon Light Infantry in 1960 was Sinhalese 44 percent, Tamil 32 percent, Burgher 8 percent, Muslim 12 percent, and unknown 4 percent. Donald L. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 69.

[125] Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka*, 134.

[126] The SLFP-LSSP coalition in 1964 had promised the FP to implement the district councils; together with its Marxist allies, however it formed the opposition to the bill when proposed by the UNP. De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 190, 192.

[127] The Common Program included the nationalization of private enterprise, restoration of the rice subsidy, provision of 750,000 jobs inclusive of 15,000 graduates, according Buddhism its "right place" while assuring other religions their "due rights," non-alignment, and most importantly the establishment of a republic. Wilson states that the SLFP had moved further left from left-of-center with the common program. Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka,* 147, 148.

The Common Program was politically successful but economically unsuccessful. As per the Common Program, the UF government initiated the mechanism to become a republic, which was a significant step toward democratic consolidation.[128] On the economic side, the failure to nationalize the foreign commercial banks compelled the government to impose additional levies on some social services.[129] Also, the government introduced a standardization system to deflect the charges of Tamil favoritism and provide a politically acceptable ratio of Sinhala and Tamil students' entry into medicine, engineering and science faculties. Tamil politicians opposed the standardization mechanism because it reduced the benefits enjoyed by the Tamils during the colonial rule. Meanwhile, growing tensions among the Sinhalese youth on the state's slow progress in addressing such social and economic issues provided the opportunity to the JVP for mobilizing educated Sinhala Buddhist youth for an insurrection in 1971.[130]

### 3. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Insurrection: 1971

The JVP's insurrection severely affected democratic consolidation, breaking down the function of all the government's institutions. The leader of the JVP, Rohana Wijeweera, publically ordered JVP members to take arms against the state, having criticized the UF coalition and capitalist system.[131] On April 5, 1971, the JVP conducted a coordinated island-wide attack on police stations and government installations. The government enforced a state of emergency and a curfew, giving the military and the police a full range of arbitrary powers. The uprising ended within a short time in the face of the military onslaught.[132] Different estimates suggest the number of fatalities from security personnel, JVP insurgents, and civilians ranged from 1,200 to 50,000.[133] This

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[128] The FP members opposed the new constitution's special status for Buddhism and reaffirmation of the Official Language Act of 1956, however, as attempts to subordinate the Tamil community. Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 64.

[129] Ibid., 149–50.

[130] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 241.

[131] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 56; De Silva notes, JVP insurrection was a "movement of the new left and the ultra-left against the established parties of the Marxist left, the LSSP, and CP and the populist SLFP." De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 241.

[132] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 56.

[133] Ibid., 57.

destruction caused by the insurgents, and the deployment of military with extra-judicial powers, severely affected the rule of law and civil and political societies. Later, Ceylon became a republic against the backdrop of the ethnic cleavage between the Sinhala and Tamil communities and the youth unrest resultant from political competition.

## B.   SRI LANKAN REPUBLIC: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1972 TO 1990

Sri Lanka became truly independent with the enactment of the republican constitution of 1972. The British had no more control of the country and it strengthened the sovereignty of the state. The constitution enactment became non-inclusive because the FP walked away from the constitutional committee. Also, the Tamils were conscious of being dominated by the majority Sinhalese. Thus, political competition among the UNP and the SLFP, the influence of left-wing parties and the FP resulted in critical events that affected the democratization process. This section discusses the emergence and development of the separatist insurgency, the escalation of Tamil separatist and JVP insurgencies, and the Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987.

### 1.   Becoming a Republic and Emergence of Separatist Insurgency: 1972–1977

The establishment of a republic had both positive and negative implications toward democratic consolidation. Ceylon became the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, a name linked to its Sinhalese heritage in the new constitution on May 22, 1972.[134] Becoming a republic enhanced the prospects for democratic consolidation, as the British had no more control over the country. On the other hand, it further increased the Tamils' discontent because of their fear of Sinhalese domination. The Federal Party (FP) opposed the new constitution and presented a political program known as the Six-

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[134] De Silva states that new republican constitution was the "critical starting point of a new phase in ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, a dangerously destabilizing phase which saw the triumph of the linguistic nationalism of the Singhalese consolidate through a new political and constitutional framework, but confronting the new Tamil version it taken to its logical conclusion on the form of a separatist movement," De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 240.

Point Plan.[135] Also, the two main Tamil political parties joined together to oppose the constitution and formed the Tamil United Front (TUF).[136] The government was determined not to yield to the pressures of the FP. According to De Silva, the government's stance pushed "the FP away from the moderate program embodied in the Six Point Plan, to a full-blooded insistence on separatism."[137] Thus, the state became free from British influence, but the TUF politically challenged the state's unitary structure by separatism.

The FP's inability to fulfill the Tamils' desires gave rise to the armed struggle for separatism.[138] Tamil militants increased gang robberies and the murder of police and Tamil government servants. The first political assassination of the Tamils' separatist struggle was Alfred Duraiappah, the Mayor of Jaffna, by Prabhakaran in 1975. At the same time, the TUF changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF); it adopted a convention commonly known as the Vaddukoddai Resolution claiming a separate state, the Tamil Eelam.[139] The Tamil New Tigers (TNT), which started in 1972, became the LTTE under Velupillai Prabhakaran in 1976. The TULF's separatist claim in their manifesto for the 1977 general elections posed a formidable hybrid political and military threat to the state's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[140]

Meanwhile, the governments' economic policies, designed to please its rural majority and the left, extended its control to every sector of the economy, including foreign-owned plantations. The economic growth rate fell below 3 percent while

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[135] The plan included language parity for Tamil with Sinhalese as official language, extension of citizenship right to Indian Tamils who had settled in Sri Lanka, equality of all religions, constitutional guarantee of equal rights, abolition of untouchability, and decentralized structure of government as the basis of a participatory democracy. De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 257–258.

[136] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 256.

[137] Ibid., 258. The other factors contributed to this transformation include: "the role of the educated unemployed; the significance of a new policy on university admissions in radicalizing politics in the Jaffna Peninsula; the transformation of the security forces and the police from impartial peacekeeping force into paradigms of ethnic soldiers and policemen, and finally the linkage between the politics of the Jaffna Peninsula and the politics of Tamil Nadu."

[138] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 65–66.

[139] Ibid., 66–71.

[140] Ibid., 72.

unemployment rose to almost one quarter of the labor force in 1976.[141] Government policies hindered the creation of an environment that was conducive to nourishing an institutionalized economic society. Although this economic downfall connects to the global economic downturn, the people of the South lost faith in the UF government. The Army gained a role in national development and food production and engaged in farming until 1976, helping to mitigate the economic burdens.[142] Subsequently, the UNP gained a massive victory in 1979, securing better than a five-sixths majority, while the TULF won massively to become the opposition. For the first time, the left-wing parties were unable to win a single seat, while the SLFP secured only 8 seats.[143] Thus, the left-wing parties lost their bargaining power and could not recover until the 1990s. The requests of the Tamils became the main concern for the new government.

## 2. Development of the Separatist Insurgency: 1977–1982

Prime Minister Jayewardene's second republican constitution of 1978 attempted to meet the Tamils' requests. The prime minister established a presidential form of government under the new constitution. Several legislative and administrative measures were helpful to meet some of the long-standing Tamil grievances, such as constitutional provisions for the extension of fundamental rights of Indian-origin noncitizens, recognizing Tamil as a national language, and assuring the rights of all religions.[144] The constitution introduced proportional representation in the legislature, giving minorities a strong bargaining position.[145] The abolition of the language-based ethnic quotas and the introduction of new politically and academically viable policies based on district-merits was a bold political decision in the face of opposition from the Sinhala majority and the

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[141] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 241; Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 58.

[142] Brian Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military: The Search for a Mission, 1949–2004* (San Diego: Aventine Press, 2004), 66.

[143] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 73.

[144] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 92.

[145] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 302.

SLFP.[146] It was also a democratic move as the TULF had power to affect the government's decisions.

Despite the newly adopted conciliatory policies towards the Tamil community, the TULF continued its radical stance.[147] Initially, the government attempted to handle the eruptions of communal violence under normal laws.[148] Later, the continuation of violence compelled the government to extend the laws prohibiting the militant organizations. The normal legal and police procedures were ineffective for the state to meet the challenge posed by the militants.[149] The most significant as well as controversial one was the Prevention of Terrorism Act of July 1979. The GoSL declared a state of emergency until December 31, 1979, and tasked the Army to stamp out terrorism in Jaffna.[150] The deployment of the military under the prevention of terrorism act (PTA) led to the restriction of people's freedom of movement and gathering, as well as arrests of suspects; it severely affected the rule of law, and civil and political society, in the North.[151]

At the same time, the liberalized economy helped to develop the institutionalized economy, though disparities in the distribution of benefits increased the animosity of the Tamils. The government began economic liberalization due to pressures from the IMF and the World Bank. The welfare expenditure got less focus while infrastructure investment and foreign direct investment liberalization increased; it facilitated the labor market's flexibility, eliminating the link between ethnicity and university admission. According to Biziouras, the UNP's need to outbid the SLFP caused it to distribute selective incentives to its majority constituency, disregarding the allocation of benefits to

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[146] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies,* 306.

[147] De Silva states that TULF was unwilling to or unable to move away from its separatist campaign propagated during general elections of 1977. De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 305.

[148] Ibid., 326.

[149] Ibid.

[150] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies,* 331.

[151] The PTA allows law enforcement agencies to detain suspects without trial for up to 18 months and bring the suspects to trial based on confessions inadmissible under normal law of the state. Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 101.

Tamil areas. Consequently, the inability of Tamil political leaders to provide benefits to their brethren led to radical political demands and violence.[152]

The UNP's attempt to continue power through a referendum, instead of general elections, further increased the discontent of Tamils. Jayawardene won the presidential election in 1982 and held a referendum to extend the tenure of previously elected members of the parliament in December 1982. The government won the referendum, despite the SLFP's and the TULF's opposition.[153] The TULF was distressed about not having by-elections in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, where the government got worse results than other areas.[154] Asoka Bandarage states that the UNP government lost its legitimacy and faith of both Sinhala and Tamil youth due to the fraudulent referendum, giving rise to violence.[155] The Tamils became further discontented with the government due to the failure of electoral institutions to address their political problems.

### 3.    Escalation of Insurgencies: 1983–1990

The loss of faith in the government's legitimacy paved the way to escalate the Tamil terrorists' insurgency. Tamil militants organized to wage war to form a separate state, Tamil Eelam, in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. On July 23, 1983, the LTTE ambushed a Sri Lanka Army convoy in Jaffna and killed 13 soldiers; this began the Eelam War I. According to Bandarage, pro-government gangs turned the anti-government feelings of the Sinhalese gathered at the funeral of the soldiers into anti-Tamil feelings; it led to an outbreak of arson and the murder of Tamils, commonly called the Black July riots. Violence continued for several days and resulted in the killing of hundreds, and the displacement and unemployment of tens of thousands. Two days after the eruption of violence, President Jayawardene declared a curfew on July 25, 1983 and

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[152] Nikolaos Biziouras, *The Political Economy of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 162–165.

[153] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 333–35.

[154] Ibid., 326.

[155] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 103.

deployed the military to terminate the riots.[156] Although many Sinhalese did not tolerate the riots and supported the victims, the Tamils' sense of insecurity and distrust of the Sinhalese continued to remain. On the other hand, continued terrorist attacks, such as the massacres of Sinhalese villagers in Welioya in 1984, Buddhist pilgrims in Anuradhapura in 1985, and Buddhist monks in Arantalawa in 1987, increased the Sinhalese suspicion of Tamils.[157] Thus, ethnicity became the basis for organizing of civil and political societies due to increased cleavage between the Sinhalese and the Tamils.

The subsequent actions of the government further intensified the situation. The government placed the blame for the riots on the JVP and banned it; the JVP went underground for covert politics. The sixth amendment to the constitution outlawed the support for separatism within Sri Lanka; the TULF leadership refused to swear an oath to safeguard the unitary structure of the country and fled to Tamil Nadu.[158] The political exclusion of radical political parties gave an opportunity for Tamil militants to fill the political vacuum, monopolizing the Tamil political agenda.[159] The Tamil Nadu government pressed the Indian government to intervene in Sri Lankan affairs due to the sympathy toward co-ethnic and co-religionist Tamils in northern Sri Lanka.

### 4.    The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord: 1987

India intervened in the Sri Lankan conflict, giving rise to an insurgency in the south. Indian intervention led to both the resurrections of the JVP insurgency and the LTTE's violence by the end of the 1980s. After the 1983 riots, Tamil militant organizations mushroomed and intensified attacks on the military and civilians. The Indian-mediated peace attempt in 1985 did not succeed, due to the rigid stance of both

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[156] According to Bandarage, the 1983 riots were a strategy of the dominant faction within the UNP to marginalize Tamil influence in politics, to teach the Tamil terrorists a lesson, and to deflect Sinhala discontent. Bandarage also notes Newton Gunasinghe's economic explanation; open economy of 1977 resulted in Tamil's control of economy and financial sector angered the outfaced Sinhalese businessmen. Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 107.

[157] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 120, 124.

[158] The 16th Amendment to the Indian Constitution introduced a similar ban. De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 340.

[159] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 100–111.

sides.[160] To re-establish government control in Jaffna, the Sri Lankan military conducted a military campaign, Operation Liberation, in 1987.[161] The operation was successful in eliminating the separatist terrorists; the government had to call off the operation, however, due to the pressure resultant from Indian intervention in airdropping food in Jaffna.[162] Despite heavy internal opposition, President "Jayawardene signed the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord on July 29, 1987."[163]

According to the agreement, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was to disarm the Tamil militants and provide security in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Also, the 13th Amendment of 1987 to the Sri Lankan Constitution established provincial councils, decentralizing power; the Northern and Eastern Provinces were merged to form a single province.[164] The Northern and Eastern Provinces Provincial Council, established in October 1987, and the Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) established the provincial government. The IPKF took over the security duties in the newly formed Northern and Eastern Province. Meanwhile, the LTTE abrogated the pledges given and resorted to fighting the IPKF. The LTTE engaged in attacking the IPKF and other militant groups to be the sole representative of the Tamils in the struggle for the Eelam. At the same time, the JVP resurrection escalated in the south.

The JVP resorted to violence to overthrow the government in 1987. The JVP, radicalized by the political exclusion, was able to take advantage of public opposition to the Indian intervention.[165] The government was compelled to bring back the military from the Northern and Eastern Provinces and deployed them island-wide to fight the JVP insurgency.[166] The JVP's violent campaign brought down civil administration and rule of law.[167] The economy collapsed, and by the end of 1988, there was fear that the JVP

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[160] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 125–26.

[161] Ibid., 130.

[162] K.M. De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE* (New Delhi: Penguin Group, 2012), 67.

[163] Ibid., 132.

[164] Ibid., 133.

[165] Ibid.,139.

[166] Ibid., 140.

[167] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 141.

would come to power.[168] The government granted almost unlimited powers to the military and the police to fight the JVP.[169] A number of paramilitary organizations such as the Black Cats and Green Tigers emerged to fight the JVP.[170] The second JVP ended in November 1989 leaving some 40,000 dead, although some estimated a higher number of 60,000 deaths.[171] Meanwhile, the LTTE was exhausted in the fighting with the IPKF and sought to gain breathing space with the Peace Talks with the Sri Lankan government.

The peace talks provided the LTTE the opportunity to reorganize in the face of the challenge from the IPKF.[172] In the presidential election, Ranasinghe Premadasa, who strongly opposed the Indian intervention, became the President. President Premadasa wanted to send the IPKF back to settle the South and to negotiate a political settlement with the LTTE.[173] The government held peace talks with the LTTE in October 1989. When the IPKF withdrew in March 1990, the LTTE strengthened its combat power with the arms and equipment left by the IPKF. The Sri Lankan military was confined to a few bases held during the IPKF period. In June 1990, LTTE started the Second Eelam War by killing 600 unarmed policemen who were surrendered on the government's instructions.[174] The Northern and Eastern Provinces became a state-within-a-state under the LTTE's totalitarian control, undermining the democracy (see Figure 1).

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[168] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka,*141.

[169] Ibid., 144.

[170] Ibid., 143, 144.

[171] Ibid.,143.

[172] Ibid.,152.

[173] Ibid.

[174] Ibid.,152–53.

Figure 1.    The Area Claimed for the Tamil Eelam (as of 2006).[175]



The political developments resulted in frequent deployment of the military in different missions from 1948 to 1990. These missions ranged from non-military tasks such as maintenance of essential services, construction works, agriculture tasks, and police duties such as riot control and illicit immigration prevention to counterinsurgency missions. The military's deployment in non-military tasks helped the GoSL to fill the vacuum in bureaucracy and to maintain the economy, but it affected the development of civilian bureaucracy to advance the GoSL's plans. Also, the military's deployment in a police role ensured security, but undermined the development of the capacities of law

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[175] Chanaka Talpahewa, *Peaceful Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts: Norwegian Involvement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process* (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015), Map 4, xviii.

enforcement agencies such as the police and the Department of Immigration and Emigration. Also, it affected the freedom of civil and political societies because the military acted under the emergency regulations. The military's counterinsurgency missions such as fighting the JVP and Tamil separatism were successful in maintaining the state's sovereignty providing security. It severely affected all the arenas of democratic consolidation, however, because the emergency regulations and the PTA restricted the oversight of military while providing the military relatively greater autonomy and impunity. In this context, the next section discusses the effects of the military's deployment in internal missions toward CMR from 1948 to 1990.

## C.    CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS FROM 1948 TO 1990

Sri Lanka's civil-military relations transformed from colonial to democratic relations after independence. As discussed previously, the high degree of constitutionalism maintained by the elected leaders was successful in maintaining control of the military. Also, Sri Lanka's military never had a martial tradition and continued the colonial legacies for decades. The successive governments used the military to solve the outcomes of their ineffective policies. Although the military was not satisfied by the internal roles, its professional norms compelled it to be subservient to the civil authorities. This section discusses the developments of democratic civilian control and the effectiveness of the military during the period.

### 1.    Democratic Civilian Control of the Military

The democratic civilian control established and strengthened by the successive constitutions. The GoSL frequently deployed the military in different non-military roles and it resulted in tensions between the military and the civilian leaders. The civilian control of the military was strong enough to manage those situations successfully. Following paragraphs discusses the developments of institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and the professionalism of the military.

### *a.      Institutional Control Mechanisms*

Since 1948, GoSL maintained heavy institutional control over the military.[176] The successive governments deployed the military in "firefighter" and "police officer" macro roles and, therefore, exercised greater executive civilian control over the military.[177] Under the Soulbury Constitution, the prime minster maintained the control over the military as the minister of defense and external affairs.[178] The Governor General was the Commander-in-Chief of the military; the prime minister, however, had the power to decide over the use of the military.[179] The prime minister deciding the career of the officers authorized the enlistment, commission, promotions, and retirement of the military officers; it ensured greater civilian control over the military. The subsequent constitutions continued the provisions for executive civilian control over the military.

The first republican constitution of 1972 strengthened the executive civilian control over the military. It might be a result of requirements to continue the military deployment "firefighter role" and to prevent any military coup. The president, who was an appointee of the prime minister, had emergency powers including declaration of war and peace. The prime minister had the powers to persuade the president to declare a state of emergency, however. Also, the prime minister had the authority to advice the president on important public service appointments including the chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and police.[180] Thus, the decision on careers of the military officers remained with the executive, ensuring civilian control over the military.

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[176] According to Matei, "institutional control mechanisms involve providing direction and guidelines for the security forces, exercised through institutions that range from organic laws and other regulations that empower the civilian leadership, to civilian-led organizations with professional staff." Matei, "A New Conceptualization," 30.

[177] According to Paul Shemella, "firefighter" role means the deployment of the military "in missions [including counter-insurgency and civil wars] for which no other organizations are available," and the "police officer" role means the deployment of the military primarily in law enforcement." Paul Shemella, "The Spectrum of Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces," in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson (University of Texas Press, 2006), 127, 129.

[178] Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka*, 195.

[179] The Governor General is a nominee of the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister can request from the British to recall the Governor General. Ibid.

[180] Wilson, *Politics in Sri Lanka*, 253–56.

The second republican constitution of 1978 further strengthened executive civilian control over the military. It might be a result of the suspicion on the military's political neutrality.[181] The directly elected executive president was the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defense. Also, the president had the authority to appoint public service appointments and the chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and police. Moreover, Article 55(6) of the Constitution declares that the Army, Navy, and Air Force officers are not public service officers, keeping the military directly under the chief executive's control.[182] The 1978 Constitution that asserts greater civilian control in comparison with the other institutional mechanisms continues to be in force to this date.

The military acts stipulate the role and missions of the military. These acts assign defender, firefighter, and police officer macro roles to the military. Also, the military's micro roles change at the behest of the successive governments to legitimize the deployment of the military in non-military tasks. The military acts of 1949 and 1950 legitimized the state's deployment of the military for internal missions. The acts of all three services established the military mission as the "defense of Ceylon in time of war or for the prevention or suppression of any rebellion, insurrection or other civil disturbance in the country."[183] The Army's mission also included the "performance of non-military duties necessary for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community on the order of the Governor-General."[184] An amendment to the Army Act in the late 1950s included the employment of the Army in non-military duties as the

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[181] The government doubted the impartiality of the military as a law enforcement agency because by this time the officer corps was mainly Sinhala Buddhists who were enlisted on political basis during previous SLFP led governments. De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions*, 326.

[182] Sri Lanka Army, *Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On* (Singapore: Aitken Spence Printers, 1999), 271.

[183] Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military,* 25; Ministry of Defence Sri Lanka,"Sri Lankan Military Acts," accessed July 12, 2016, www.defence.lk/main_pub.asp.

[184] Section 23 of the Army Act establishes that "If at any time it appears to the President (then the Governor General of Ceylon) that any persons have taken or are threatening immediately to take any action of such a nature and of such scale as to be calculated to deprive the people of Sri Lanka, or a substantial portion of them, of the essentials of life by interfering with the supply and distribution of food, water, fuel, or with the means of transport and communication. The President may order all or any of the members of the Regular Force to perform such duties of a non-military nature as he may consider necessary for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community," Ibid.

government intended to use military engineer units for infrastructure development projects.[185] In addition, as Blodgett states, "when the government declared a state of emergency all three services were called in aid to the civil power."[186]Thus, the military acts legitimize its deployment in a firefighter role and other non-military missions to aid civil powers, at the behest of the civilian government.[187]

The institutional mechanisms facilitated the civilians to exercise control and oversight over the military. Development of organizational mechanism for oversight was essential due to the military's deployment in "firefighter" and "police officer" roles. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the National Security Council (NSC) were the principal mechanism of control and oversight of the military. The MOD is responsible to formulate, coordinate, and execute the policies related to national security and routine administrative matters of the armed forces. The MOD exercises the control and oversight over the military through review of annual reports, management of defense procurements, allocation of budgets, authorizing enlistments, promotions, service extensions, and retirements of officers. The Secretary of Defense is the main point of contact of all service commanders on any matter related to defense. Due to this reason, since the late 1970s, retired military officers have held this post. The GoSL established the Ministry of National Security in 1984 to coordinate the military and the police on counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist activities.[188]

The NSC, the executive body of the GoSL, was informally in existence from the late 1970s is responsible to maintain national security with the authority to direct the armed forces.[189] The Prime Minister, later the executive President, who was the head of

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[185] Sri Lanka Army, *Sri Lanka Army: 50 Years On*, 96.

[186] Military aid to civil power means the "use of military personnel and equipment to support the force of law and order, particularly in operations aimed at preventing and combating terrorism." It also includes the assistance in "criminal situations where criminals have military type of weapons" and disposal of "war time weapons or terrorist devices," Oxford Reference, "Military Aid to Civil Power," accessed November 21, 2016, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100157585. .

[187] Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military*, 30; The roles assigned to the military incorporate the six major military roles introduced by Bruneau and Matei: wars, internal wars, terrorism, crime, humanitarian operations, and peace operations. Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," 31.

[188] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 352.

[189] Senaratne, "The Security Establishment in Sri Lanka," 187.

state and Commander-in-Chief, is the chairperson of the NSC. The NSC includes the Deputy Minister of Defense (if the portfolio is available), the secretaries to the president and MOD, the service commanders, the Inspector General of the Police, and the directors of the intelligence services. All the security-related matters are discussed in the NSC and the President makes the decisions.[190] Both the MOD and the NSC evolved the institutional control and oversight over the military with the change of military missions from time to time.

### b.      Oversight of the Military

There was a limited oversight of the military.[191] The constitutions of 1946, 1972, and 1978 keep the military under institutional, judicial, and legislative control and oversight. The Fundamental Rights (FR) guaranteed in the 1972 Constitution were more strongly and genuinely entrenched in the 1978 constitution.[192] Citizens could file FR violation charges against the military personnel on their official functions. Emergency regulations and the PTA provided impunity for the military personnel, however, thus restricting oversight. Although the cabinet of Ministers has the oversight over the military through budget appropriation, executive control limited the legislature's oversight. The media and civil society organizations, and NGOs, also had a limited oversight of the military through criticizing the military activities. During the 1971 and 1987–1990 JVP insurrections, however, the restriction enforced by the GoSL and the intimidations strained the oversight by the media and civil society organizations. In addition, the GoSL's perception that criticizing the military was an impediment to national security

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[190] Senaratne, " The Security Establishment in Sri Lanka," 187.

[191] According to Matei, "Oversight is exercised on a regular basis by the civilian leadership to keep track of what the security forces do….In a functioning democracy, oversight is exercised not only by formal agencies within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, but also by the independent media, NGOs, think tanks, and even international organizations such as Human Rights Courts." Matei, "New Conceptualization," 30–31.

[192] De Silva, *Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, 294–95.

compelled the media and civil society organizations to restrain themselves from overseeing and criticizing military activities.[193]

### c.    *Professional Norms*

There were constraints on the professional norms institutionalized in the military since their commencement.[194] The political developments amidst the competition between the UNP and the SLFP led to politicizing the military while ethnic tensions led to ethnicizing the military. Since 1957, the nationalization of the military took place as an effort by the political elite to mitigate the ethnic imbalances created by the British and to decolonize the military culture.[195] The decolonizing process led to politicization of the military because consecutive UNP and SLFP governments continued to politicize the military by allowing partisan elements to come into the military, thus dividing the military on political allegiances. Also, the 1962 coups created religious suspicion, as a majority of those involved in the coup were Christians.[196] In response, Prime Minister Mrs. Bandaranaike increased the Sinhalese Buddhist composition of the officer corps, relying on ethno-religious-elite loyalty (see Tables 2 and 3). This further eroded the military's professionalism as an impartial force.[197]

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[193] Wickramasinghe states that "since the outbreak of civil war the security forces have been invested with a semi-divine aura. Under the UNP government it was considered a crime against the state to criticize the security forces even if they had committed excesses." Nira Wickramasinghe, "Sri Lanka: The Many Faces of Security," in *Asian Security Practice*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto,California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 377.

[194] According to Matei, "Professional norms are institutionalized through legally approved and transparent policies for recruitment, education, training, and promotion, in accordance with the goals of the democratically elected civilian leadership." Matei, "New Conceptualization," 31. Young posits expertise, essential duties, responsibility, and corporateness as elements of military professionalism. Young, "Military Professionalism in a Democracy," 18–22.

[195] In the Army, the Tamils and Burghers were disproportionate to their numbers in the population. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives*, 69.

[196] Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives*, 23.

[197] Senanayake, "Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence," 300–302.

Table 2.        The Ceylon Light Infantry Regiment Officers' Ethnic
Composition: 1949–1974 (as a Percentage of Total Officers).[198]

| Ethnicity | 1949,51–1954 | 1956–1960 | 1963–1969 | 1972–1974 |
|-----------|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Sinhalese | 55 | 44 | 96 | 88 |
| Tamil | 18 | 32 | 4 | 12 |
| Burgher | 20 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| Muslim | 7 | 12 | 0 | 0 |
| Unknown | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 |

Table 3.        The Ceylon Light Infantry Regiment Officers' Religious
Composition: 1949–1974 (as a Percentage of Total Officers).[199]

| Religion | 1949–1954 | 1956–1960 | 1963–1969 |
|----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Buddhist | 34 | 40 | 89 |
| Christian | 59 | 36 | 7 |
| Hindu | 0 | 8 | 0 |
| Muslim | 7 | 12 | 0 |
| Unknown | 0 | 4 | 4 |

In addition, the civilian leaders used the military to solve problems resulting from their policies. For example, in 1955, Prime Minister Sir John raised two Sinhalese infantry units to support the government due to the concerns over civil unrest.[200] Later, Prime Minister Bandaranaike disbanded the two units; he approved the establishment of regular and volunteer battalions with technical skills, however, to deploy during the breakdown of essential services due to strikes.[201] Thus, military professionalism began to erode due to politicization, ethnicization, and deployment to solve political problems. The military's dissatisfaction over its use by the government led to the 1962 military coup.

The abortive military coup in 1962 and the suspected coup attempt in 1966 severely affected the military professionalism. The coup challenged the professional

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[198] Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives,* Table 3–2, 69.

[199] Ibid.

[200] Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military*, 36.

[201] Sri Lanka Army, *50 Years On*, 94.

military ethos on recognizing the supremacy of elected civilian leadership.[202] The 1962 plot was the work of a group of 24 high-ranking Army and police officers with four civilians to overthrow Mrs. Bandaranaike's government. According to Horowitz, the officers involved in the 1962 coup perceived emergency duties as civilian or police work, and strikes and ethnic riots as the product of the government's own lack or resolve. They viewed the military as helping the government out of troubles of its own making.[203] In 1966, the GoSL arrested former Army Commander Major General A.R. Udugama on charges of a coup against the newly elected UNP government; the accused was acquitted after the trial, however. Although the coup members did not have an intention to establish a military regime, the subsequent governments were suspicious of the military's professionalism.

The military remained subservient to the elected civilian government, however. The military recognized that in a democracy the will of the people as represented by the government in power was supreme. Several events highlight the military's subservience to the elected leadership. Although most of the military personnel were rural youth, only very few military personnel engaged in the JVP insurrection in 1971. Also, during Operation Liberation in 1987, the military was successful in surrounding the LTTE leadership, but at the behest of the GoSL the military abandoned the mission just at the moment of victory. In addition, during the JVP resurrection in 1987–1990, the military remained obedient to the elected government even in the face of mass public opposition to Indian intervention; also, the military's support to the JVP was negligible.[204] Further, during 1989–90, the military was obedient to the elected president despite the claims that the president provided arms to the military's formidable enemy, the LTTE.[205]

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[202] Young asserts, "Military professionalism is the systematic creation of a class of people for whom war is a profession and who pursue general and sub specializations in the art and science of conflict." Young, "Military Professionalism in a Democracy," 19.

[203] Horowitz posits that the coup respondents had personal, familial, and factional motives that led to the corporate motive of fulfillment of needs of the organization. Horowitz, *Coup Theories and Officers' Motives*, 111–112.

[204] Blodgett points to the adverse effect of obedience, stating, "after the JVP threatened the families of the soldiers, the Army became a killing tool of the President—killing anyone the soldiers thought might be a JVP supporter." Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military*, 95.

[205] Bandarage, *The Separatist Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 152.

The roles performed by the military significantly contributed to the development of training. The training resulted in the increase of professionalism through the development of expertise, ability to perform essential duties, responsibility and corporateness. Also, training directly affected the military effectiveness. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the military received training from the British.[206] Frequent deployment in anti-trade unionists' activities and police role did nothing to develop combat skills, however, but denied the time to do jungle warfare training.[207] After the coup attempts in the 1960s, the GoSL restricted military training and the military did not get time train in jungle warfare because the GoSL deployed them in national development projects.[208]

After the 1971 JVP insurrection, however, the GoSL paid attention to develop military capabilities and as a result military training improved. A large number of officers got training in India and Pakistan.[209] All three services established their own military training academies to train officer cadets and training centers to develop specialized skills as per service requirements. Also, the economic liberalization in 1978 positively affected the development of military establishments opening up to new technology.[210] In 1981, the government established the Kotelawala Defence Academy (KDA) to train officer cadets of the three services; it helped to develop the corporateness among the three services.[211] The training tremendously increased after the escalation of the Tamil separatist insurgency in 1983. The Army got training on urban warfare and counterinsurgency. Pakistan provided counterinsurgency training for 38 instructors. Also, the Army conducted Tamil language courses for the units deploy in the Northern province.[212]

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[206] 83 Officer Cadets received training at the British Sandhurst Academy from 1950 to1960. Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military,* 37.

[207] Ibid., 39.

[208] Blodgett posits that soldiers conducted the "plough shares for guns campaign in which soldiers farmed instead of being trained for war." Ibid., 55.

[209] Sri Lanka Army, *50 Years On*, 222.

[210] Ibid., 290.

[211] Ibid., 333.

[212] Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military,* 94.

## 2. Effectiveness of the Military

Newly independent Sri Lankan military lacked the effectiveness due to the absence of martial traditions and became a ceremonial force. The Defense Agreement with the British provided the military the opportunity to gain training and equipment while following the British doctrines. After the cancellation of that agreement, the progress of the military's effectiveness was slow. Also, the internal focus of the military and its frequent deployment in non-military duties affected its effectiveness. The following paragraphs discuss the development of plans and structures of the military and the allocation of resources for it.

### a. Plans: Doctrines and Strategies

The military's doctrines and strategies evolved with the changing missions.[213] The military followed the British doctrines on conventional warfare, internal security, and counter-revolutionary warfare; British military doctrines become the guidelines for the Sri Lankan military to date. The cancellation of the Defense and External Affairs Agreement with the British in 1957 officially ended the military's external mission..[214] Then the doctrine changed to jungle and anti-guerilla operations. After the failed military coups, the doctrine changed to resort to guerilla warfare in case of an external threat.[215]

Consequently, in the 1970s, the military focused the doctrines on counter guerilla/ insurgency and internal security based on British doctrine. Since 1983, the doctrinal focus of the Army and the Navy changed while the Air Force remained with the main role of transport and reconnaissance.[216] The Army's focus was on "high intensity internal security operations, low intensity counter revolutionary operations, and counter terrorist operations with Special Forces and low intensity conventional operations."[217] The Navy

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[213] According to Bruneau and Matei, plans, structures (interagency coordination and cooperation), and resources contribute to the military's effectiveness in fulfilling the six roles and missions described in Chapter I. Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," 33.

[214] Blodgett posits that frequent performance of non-military duties set the stage for an inward-focused military. Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military,* 25–30.

[215] Ibid., 35, 51.

[216] Ibid.,

[217] Ibid., 89.

began to focus on protecting the coastline using larger ships.[218] After the escalation of separatist insurgency, all three services continued to develop their tactics to counter the Tamil militants' activities.

### b.    *Organizational Structures*

The organizational structures of the military gradually developed in accordance with the performed roles and missions. The independence in 1948 led to the creation of the Ceylonese military, transforming the British Royal military into Ceylonese military forces.[219]The Army and Navy mobilized the former Ceylon Defense Force (CDF) and Ceylon Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (CRNVR); the Air Force, however, began as a new service.[220] The creation of the Army, Navy and Air Force took place respectively in 1949, 1950, and 1951 under specific government acts.[221] Since the inception, enlistment of officers and recruitment of other ranks to the military was on a volunteer basis and this practice continues to date. The establishment of new operational, administrative, and training organizations for all three armed services took place. For instance, by 1978, the Army expanded to operate from five operational commands.[222] When the military strength increased, the GoSL established a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to coordinate the counterinsurgency operational activities of the military, the police, and intelligence agencies.[223]

### c.    *Commitment of Resources*

The commitment of resources to the military increased during the period. The GoSL increased the allocation of manpower and defense expenditure initially after the JVP insurrection in 1971 and then after 1983. Thus, the roles performed by the military and the intensity of the counterinsurgency operations against Tamil separatist insurgents

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[218] Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military*, 101.

[219] Ibid., 31.

[220] The Royal Air Force did not have Ceylonese personnel. Ibid., 23–24.

[221] Ibid., 25, 30, 44.

[222] Ibid., 264.

[223] Paul Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers: The Rare Victory of Sri Lanka's Long War* (England: Pen & Sward Books Ltd, 2012), 79.

became the basis for the GoSL to increase resource commitment. Since 1971, the military strength gradually increased and rose from 20,000 in 1983 to 50,000 in 1988.[224] Also, the GoSL mobilized the Army Volunteer Force after 1971. Table 4 shows the increase of the Army's strength. The Army was mostly Sinhalese during the 1980s, with few Tamils and Muslims. There was the ongoing communication gap, as most Sinhalese soldiers were not conversant with the Tamil language and Tamils tended to look at the largely Sinhala Army as an occupying force. It affected the military's effectiveness when conducting operations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Table 4.        The Strength of the Army: 1978–1989 (Selected Years).[225]

|  | 1978 | 1980 | 1982 | 1984 | 1986 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Actual Strength | 10,309 | 11,905 | 14,217 | 14,458 | 31,455 | 38,525 | 45,373 |

The defense budget increase because of the escalation of separatist insurgency contributed to the enhancement of the military effectiveness. The defense budget allocation steadily increased until 1982 and significantly increased after 1983, as shown in Table 5. The increased budget provided the military the opportunity to increase strength, develop infrastructure, and improve training, and most importantly, to equip to fulfill the responsibilities. The allocated budget, however, was never sufficient to fulfil the needs to become a professional military organization, particularly due to lack of infrastructure and transport. Also, technological development proceeded slowly.

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[224] Rajesh Venugopal, "Sri Lanka: Military Fiscalism and the Politics of Market Reform at a Time of Civil War," in *Civil Wars in South Asia*, ed. Aparna Sundar and Nandini Sundar (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2014), 84.

[225] Sri Lanka Army, *50 Years On*, 907.

Table 5.        Defense Budget of Sri Lanka: 1978–1989
(Selected Years).[226]

|  | 1978 | 1980 | 1982 | 1984 | 1986 | 1988 | 1989 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Actual Expenditure (Sri Lankan Rupees billion) | .540 | .827 | .908 | 1,870 | 5,300 | 6,500 | 5,800 |

Moreover, equipping of the military led to the creation of an international variable for the CMR. Sri Lanka produces no warlike material and totally depends on other nations for obtaining military equipment. Since the 1970s, the military used World War II-vintage weapons and equipment brought from the British.[227] After 1971, Sri Lanka received military assistance from Australia, Britain, China, India, Pakistan, the U.S., and the USSR. After 1983, however, primarily China and Pakistan were the suppliers of military hardware. Thus, the external military hardware supplying nations became a variable in Sri Lankan CMR because obtaining military equipment from foreign nations depends on the GoSL's relations with those nations.

## D.    CHAPTER SUMMARY

Since independence in 1948, Sri Lankan political developments affected the democratization process. Independence from the British marked the country's transition to democracy with continuing historical and colonial legacies. The two major political parties, the UNP and the SLFP, engaged in a power competition through providing selective incentives to the constituency. Also, the policies of successive governments eventually resulted in the 1971 and 1987–1990 JVP insurrections and the separatist Tamil insurgency since the 1970s. By the 1990s, the LTTE gained *defacto* control over a considerable area of the Northern and Eastern provinces after the withdrawal of the IPKF. Throughout the period, both the UNP and the SLFP governments deployed the military in firefighter and police roles; this created mostly negative effects toward the civil and

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[226] Senanayake, "Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence," 311.

[227] Blodgett, *Sri Lanka's Military,* 37.

political societies and the rule of law. During the insurgencies, however, deployment of the military helped to maintain the state's sovereignty.

Meanwhile, the deployment of the military in internal missions affected the CMR. The military was under democratic civilian control, and its effectiveness gradually improved. Other than the two coup attempts in 1962 and 1966, there were no significant constraints to the CMR. The institutional control mechanisms such as the MOD and the NSC steadily increased. The executive civilian control consolidated its strength with the 1978 Constitution. Oversight of the military was relatively weak, however, due to lack of legislative oversight and centralized executive power. The politicization and ethnicization of the military eroded the military's professionalism as an impartial force; the counterinsurgency operations against Tamil separatism increased the military professionalism, however, particularly training and military effectiveness. The military strength and defense budget allocation significantly increased, giving the opportunity for the military to develop its capabilities. The total dependency on foreign nations for acquisition of military hardware created an external variable for the CMR, however. In addition, according to De Silva, since the 1960s "the country began moving from being a virtually demilitarized entity to one that was being militarized at a level unmatched in the whole of South Asia."[228] In this context, the next chapter discusses the democratic consolidation and CMR during the conflict between the government and the LTTE from 1990 to 2009.

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[228] De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, 212.

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# III.  DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
# AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: 1990–2009

The LTTE's activities after 1990 severely affected Sri Lanka's democratization. As shown in the previous chapter, by June 1990 the LTTE had gained control over considerable areas in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In response, successive GoSL used the military to maintain law and order in the areas that were under the domination of the LTTE and forced the LTTE to sit at the negotiating table. Despite the destruction resulting from the high intensity conflict, the "real GDP growth averaged 4.6 percent annually" until 1998.[229] The political power alternatively shifted between the UNP- and the SLFP-led coalitions. The GoSL's increased reliance on the military to maintain the sovereignty improved the CMR, particularly the military effectiveness; military activities under the emergency law and the PTA affected civil and political societies and rule of law, however. Thus, the CMR influenced democratic consolidation in both positive and negative ways. This chapter discusses the status of democratic consolidation and the CMR during the high intensity conflict phase from 1990 until June 2009; it sets forth the background that is essential to examine the effects of military deployment in post-conflict reconstruction toward CMR and thus toward democratic consolidation. The discussion focuses on the political developments that shaped the military missions and the effects of those military missions toward democratic consolidation and the CMR.

## A.    POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS FROM 1990 TO 2009

It is not a surprise that the rise of the LTTE and its extended domination in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, as a state-within-a-state, affected the political developments during the period. In the early 1990s, the state lost control over the monopoly of the use of force in a considerable area of the Northern and Eastern Provinces to the LTTE. The group's domination in the Northern and Eastern Provinces undermined the possibility for democratic consolidation. The military contained the LTTE from further expansion of its control, however, while simultaneously expanding

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[229] Venugopal, "Sri Lanka: Military Fiscalism," 70.

the GoSL's control over the territory through military operations. Thus, re-establishment of the GoSL's administration over the LTTE-dominated areas became the main factor that influenced political developments in the country. This section discusses the critical political developments during the period: Eelam War II and the rise of the LTTE, Eelam War III and regaining control of Jaffna Peninsula, and Eelam War IV and defeat of the LTTE 2006–2009.

### 1.    The Eelam War II and the Rise of the LTTE

The LTTE's rise affected the state's sovereignty, an important prerequisite for democratic consolidation.[230] The group began the Eelam War II and gained control in the newly amalgamated Northern and Eastern Provinces Province after abrogating the peace agreement in June 1990.[231] Although the military operations brought the Eastern Province under government control by 1992, the LTTE continued its influence in the east, operating from several remote jungle bases. Meanwhile, the military gained control over the islands of the Jaffna Peninsula; by 1992, however, the GoSL's control was limited to a few strategic bases in the Northern Province: Palaly, Elephant Pass, Mullaitivu, Islands, and Pooneryn. The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE to expand their control in the Northern and Eastern Provinces Province became a main factor that affected the state's sovereignty. The state continued to use the military to regain control over the region.

Meanwhile, the Tamil diaspora gained momentum and increased its support of the LTTE's separatist terrorism. By the early 1990s, the LTTE began to open front offices in more than 40 countries and eventually the Tamil diaspora became the main source for the LTTE to gain resources and legitimacy for the armed struggle.[232] The ideological and

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[230] Democratic consolidation is possible only in the absence of serious political groups attempting secession or overthrowing the elected government. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Democracy and Its Arenas," 5.

[231] When the Indian Army commenced its withdrawal in March 1990, the LTTE occupied the previous Sri Lankan military posts and besieged the existing military bases. Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 153.

[232] Kumar Rupesinghe, "Sri Lanka: Tackling the LTTE," in *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia through Peacebuilding Lens*, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington: the United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 254.

financial support extended by the Tamil diaspora was the main factor that enabled the LTTE to fight a protracted battle. Kumar Rupesinghe states that "by the late 1990s, the LTTE's annual income collected was between \$175 million and \$385 million."[233] Thus, the rise of LTTE was an impediment in the democratic consolidation of the state and in all arenas of democratic consolidation in the time to come.

The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE, particularly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, severely affected all five arenas of democratic consolidation discussed in Chapter I. The LTTE's totalitarian rule denied democratic alternatives to the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, while the civil society in other areas was also affected by the conflict.[234] Also, the conflict led to the militarization of the country by activities of both the military and the LTTE. Bush states that the activities of NGOs were subjected to restriction from both the GoSL and the LTTE; the emergency regulations in 1993 compelled "all NGOs to register all financial receipts" and distributions and, in 2002, the LTTE denied the "local staff of the major international NGOs" such as OXFAM, CARE, and FORUT permission to leave LTTE-controlled areas.[235] Also, Rupesinghe states that during the final battle against the LTTE in 2009, the GoSL did not allow the local or foreign media reporters and NGOs and foreign dignitaries inside the battle zone.[236] According to M.R.R. Hoole, "indeed the LTTE's armed struggle became conditional upon the complete paralysis of civil society and the silencing, if not the complicity, of institutions such as churches and centers of learning."[237] The Tamil community feared to raise their voice after the LTTE's assassination of Rajani Thiranagama of University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR), Jaffna, and chasing the UTHR members out of Jaffna.[238]

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[233] Rupesinghe, "Sri Lanka: Tackling the LTTE," 254.

[234] De Silva, "Post-LTTE Sri Lanka," 238.

[235] Bush, *The Intra-Group Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 190, 191.

[236] Rupesinghe, "Sri Lanka: Tackling the LTTE," 268.

[237] M.R.R. Hoole, "The Tamil Secessionist Movement in Sri Lanka (Ceylon): A Case of Secession by Default," accessed September 30, 2016, http://www.uthr.org/Rajan/selfdet.htm.

[238] Rajani was a critic of the GoSL, the IPKF and a supporter of the LTTE. She was killed by the LTTE when she began to criticize the LTTE's genocide policies towards the Tamils. Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 147.

Meanwhile, the military became the primary and accepted guardians of national security; the state encouraged this sentiment across the country to justify the use of the military.[239] Nira states that the "security forces have been invested by the state with a sort of semi-divine aura…it was considered a crime against the state to criticize the security forces even if they had committed excess."[240] Increased security provided an environment conducive to developing civil society organization, however; it also had a ripple effect in the development of political society.

The LTTE's rise negatively affected the political society statewide. The group's totalitarian rule in its controlled areas in the Northern and Eastern Provinces Province denied the peoples' political participation; it did not allow moderate political activity in its controlled areas. Rupesinghe states, "in the areas under the LTTE, the civilians fell completely under the writ of the LTTE, whose totalitarian control was uncontested."[241] In 2001, the TULF, ACTC and former militant groups the EPRLF and the TELO formed an alliance, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA).[242] The TNA accepted the LTTE as sole representatives of Tamils, however, "becoming what critics have called mindless and soulless puppets of the LTTE."[243] Tamils in the LTTE-controlled areas did not have the right to select their representatives because the LTTE forced the people either to abstain from voting or to vote for the candidates preferred by the LTTE.[244] There was no local government for the Tamils to articulate their political interests because the Northern and Eastern Provinces Provincial Council was dysfunctional. Also, continuing the previous practice, the LTTE asked the majority of Tamils in the North and East to boycott the 2005 presidential elections.[245] At the same time, the LTTE's assassination of Sinhala political leaders and moderate Tamil leaders further hindered the autonomy of political

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[239] Wickramasinghe, "Sri Lanka: The Many Faces of Security," 378.

[240] Ibid., 377.

[241] Rupesinghe, "Sri Lanka: Tackling the LTTE," 255.

[242] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 176.

[243] Ibid., 177.

[244] Also, the parliamentarians chosen by the LTTE are guided by the LTTE. De Silva, "Post-LTTE Sri Lanka," 247.

[245] Rupesinghe, "Sri Lanka: Tackling the LTTE," 261.

society.[246] The resulting security concerns compelled the GoSL to deploy the military to provide protection to the political leaders and for the election process statewide. Increased security helped the politicians to form political parties, create party alliances, and engage in political works, and the citizens to choose their political representatives free from LTTE intimidations.

Meanwhile, the rise of the LTTE challenged the state's rule of law. There was no space for the rule of law in the LTTE-controlled areas because neither the police nor the military were there to guarantee the peoples' rights under the rule of law.[247] The LTTE engaged in human rights violations by killing Tamil dissidents, Sinhalese, and Muslims and conducted ethnic cleansing of Sinhalese and Muslims to create a mono-ethnic Tamil state.[248] The people suffered from movement restrictions, forceful evictions, forceful conscription, and the rule of the gun enforced by the LTTE; it further challenged the state's rule of law by establishing its own judicial system.[249] The GoSL's efforts to ensure the state's security also affected the rule of law. The GoSL empowered and deployed the military to maintain the state's sovereignty. The emergency law, the PTA, military operations, and goods embargos to the LTTE-controlled areas created negative implications to the rule of law.[250] Nira states that for Sri Lanka "security means the protection of boundaries of the sovereign state from external and internal aggression. Recently, the concept broadened to include a concern for the human side of security."[251]

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[246] The LTTE assassinated President Premadasa; Ministers Wijeratne, Athulathmudali, and Kadirgamar; and presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake. President Kumaranatunga narrowly escaped a suicide attack in 1999. The TULF leader Amirthalingam and TULF politician Neelan Tiruchelvam were among the Tamils assassinated by the LTTE. Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 155, 161, 166.

[247] Rupesinghe asserts that "the slightest deviation or nonadherence to the laws imposed by Prabhakaran, or suspected disloyalty to him, resulted in dire punishments." Rupesinghe, "Sri Lanka: Tackling the LTTE," 255.

[248] "On 30 November 1990, 75,000 to 100,000 Muslims were driven out of Jaffna overnight,." Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 153, 163.

[249] Rupesinghe, "Sri Lanka: Tackling the LTTE," 255; The young people between the ages of 13 to 25, the LTTE's potential recruits were not allowed to leave the LTTE-controlled areas. Also, massive internal displacements took place on the orders of the LTTE. In April 1995, the LTTE ordered people to quit Jaffna city; Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 163.

[250] Wickramasinghe, "Sri Lanka: The Many Faces of Security," 377.

[251] Ibid., 388.

The impact on civil and political societies and the rule of law resulted from the weakened state bureaucracy.

The conflict affected the state bureaucracy's ability to implement government policies. The LTTE's coercion prevented the state bureaucracy from carrying out government instructions in its controlled areas.[252] Also, the group established its own administration, which severely undermined the state's rule.[253] On the other hand, because of security concerns in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and for better coordination with the military, the successive governments entrusted military officers to perform civil administrative duties. Since the 1990s, retired Army generals held the Northern and Eastern Provinces Province's governor and the Secretary of Defense Ministry posts.[254] The military employees effectively performed civil administrative duties; this undermined the development of civilian bureaucracy in the long run in the area and hence expanded militarization, however.

The conflict severely affected the country's economy. The North and South economic regions gradually disconnected and national economy was undermined. Venugopal asserts that the North and the East "became not just more impoverished in absolute terms, but ever more economically disconnected and irrelevant to the island's economic development as a whole."[255] The embargos enforced by the GoSL on certain goods such as petroleum products and fertilizers to LTTE-controlled areas and taxes imposed by the LTTE in its controlled areas further increased the economic constraints in conflict-affected areas. This further expanded the military's presence in the areas and the military economy helped alleviate economic burdens to a certain extent as the military purchased products of the Northern and Eastern Provinces as a part of its operations. Surprisingly, Sri Lanka did well throughout this period, creating a paradox for economists. Amidst the destruction due to protracted conflict, the successive

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[252] Despite the LTTE's de facto control, the state's administrative machinery was functional in those areas to provide essential services such as food distribution, education, and health.

[253] Rupesinghe, "Sri Lanka: Tackling the LTTE," 255.

[254] Ministry of Defense Sri Lanka, "Former Secretaries of Defense," accessed on September 26, 2016, http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=former_Defence_Secretary.

[255] Venugopal, "Sri Lanka: Military Fiscalism," 72.

governments implemented market reforms and export-driven industrialization strategies; annual GDP growth was at 4.6 percent and the exports multiplied by three times.[256] Economic growth and stability provided the governments the base to expand the military budget from U.S.$187 million in 1990 to U.S.$1522 million in 2009 (see Table 3). The employment provided by the military stabilized the socio-political conditions in implementing controversial privatization and market reforms.[257] Thus, militarization was also a result of economic growth during the conflict.

### 2.    The Eelam War III and Regaining the Jaffna Peninsula

The failure of the 1995 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) led the GoSL to regain control of the Jaffna Peninsula. President Mrs. Kumaratunga of the People's Alliance (PA) initiated peace talks with the LTTE and both parties signed a declaration of Cessation of Hostilities in January 1995.[258] The GoSL released a devolution package for limited political autonomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The NGO peace lobby began to promote the peace process; the LTTE, however, fearing the loss of control, prevented the emergence of peace movements in its controlled areas.[259] Also, the Sinhala nationalists opposed the peace process because they considered it as a capitulation to Tamil separatism and a threat to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.[260] As per previous practice, the LTTE used the peace period to purchase arms and regroup. The LTTE's intransigence led to the failure of the peace process; it broke the CFA in April 1995. The failure of a number of peace attempts and the LTTE's continuing terrorist

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[256] An economic study measures the cost of conflict as a loss of 2 to 3 percent economic growth per year. Venugopal, "Sri Lanka: Military Fiscalism," 69, 70.

[257] By the 1990s, the Army became the country's single largest employer balancing the reduction of civilian sector employment under reforms and containing the growing inequalities. Venugopal notes, "With 200,000 formal sector jobs the military became the single most important source of employment among Sinhala-Buddhist youth" in rural and agricultural districts. Ibid., 73, 89.

[258] Bandarage states, "Kumaratunga accepted the definition of the Sri Lankan struggle as an ethnic conflict between Sinhalese and Tamils and all the major grievances of the Tamils," Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 156.

[259] The peace lobby comprised a number of foreign-funded NGOs. Ibid., 158.

[260] Ibid., 158.

attacks statewide increased the majority public opinion in favor of the government's military endeavors against the LTTE.[261]

The GoSL commenced a military campaign called Operation Riviresa to regain Jaffna in August 1995. The military reestablished the GoSL's control in the Jaffna Peninsula, the Tamil heartland, in December 1995.[262] The eventual GoSL's control over the Jaffna Peninsula was a significant factor contributing to the LTTE's subsequent defeat because the LTTE lost its recruiting ground. The military deployed throughout the peninsula to prevent terrorist activities. In addition, the Army conducted Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities to assist the civilians to restore their livelihood. Following the loss of Jaffna, the LTTE shifted its capital to Kilinochchi and brought the war to the south in a series of suicide bombings and large-scale attacks on the military camps. The suicide vehicle attack on the Central Bank in January 1996 and the destruction of the Mullaitivu Army camp were significant attacks.[263] The military encouraged CIMIC duties that legitimized the military deployment on one hand, but was dissatisfied by the fall of Mullaitivu and the LTTE's continuing assassinations of local military commanders.[264] Meanwhile, the GoSL needed to open up a land route to sustain control of Jaffna Peninsula.

The military operations to open up a land route to Jaffna eventually led to a military stalemate.[265] The military began another campaign, Operation Jayasikuru, to regain territory in Vanni and Mullaitivu to open a land route between Vavuniya and Jaffna in 1997. The operation led to massive military buildup on both sides. The military regained control of Kilinochchi by 1999; the LTTE, however, regained some of its lost territories since November 1999. The loss of Elephant Pass was a failure for the GoSL because it was the strategic cut-off point linking Jaffna Peninsula to the mainland.[266] The

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[261] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 158–61.

[262] Ibid., 164.

[263] Ibid.

[264] Ibid.

[265] The stalemated influenced both the GOSL and the LTTE to seek Norway's mediation for a CFA. Talpahewa*, Peaceful Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts,* 101, 115.

[266] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 167.

setbacks suffered in Vanni led to a loss of morale for the military.[267] On the other hand, the global war on terror after 9/11 in the United States was a severe blow to the LTTE's ability to raise funds and arms overseas as the United States and its allies sought to destroy global funding for terrorism. Two years of fighting resulted in heavy losses for both the military and the LTTE. During this time, no democratic activities occurred in the Northern and Eastern provinces and the state continued to use the military as its primary force in policing.

In the meantime, the military gained a new micro role, that is, to provide security to the politicians. Due to the LTTE's threat to the politicians, the GoSL tasked military units to provide security to some politicians. For instance, Deputy Defense Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte had a large group of security men armed with automatic weapons. When the politicians engaged in political campaigns, the security personnel had an intimidating effect on the electorate, especially the political opponents of that politician.[268] Also, there were allegations that the Presidential Security Division (PSD) was involved in electoral violence and intimidation.[269] De Silva states that the use of the military by the politicians for parity political purposes became a threat to the country's democratic system.[270]

Meanwhile, President Mrs. Kumaratunga assumed office for a second term in 2000. The support from minority communal parties was critical for both the SLFP and the UNP in their political competition. The Muslim and Tamil political parties including the TNA, which had the LTTE's influence, supported the UNP; it facilitated a narrow victory for the UNP-led United National Front (UNF). The UNF established a government in 2001 for bringing peace by negotiating with the LTTE.[271] The UNF's

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[267] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 167–168.

[268] The military personnel assigned to provide protection to Minister Ratwatte were involved in the assassination of ten supporters of a rival politician of Ratwatte during December 2001 elections. Senaratne, "The Security Establishment in Sri Lanka," 198.

[269] Ibid., 199.

[270] De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, 230–231.

[271] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 176–177.

victory was a mandate for local and international peace lobbies to end military operations and resume negotiations with the LTTE.[272]

### 3. The Eelam War IV and the Defeat of the LTTE

The failure of the 2002 CFA led the GoSL to resort to military options to resolve the conflict. The GOSL signed the CFA with the LTTE in February 2002.[273] The Norwegian-facilitated peace-at-any-cost approach was a huge blow to democratic consolidation in Sri Lanka; the agreement demarcated demilitarized zones, giving the LTTE-controlled areas de jure recognition (see Figure 2), and recognized the totalitarian LTTE as the sole representatives of the Tamils in disregard of the elected Tamil representatives.[274] The agreement was not to the satisfaction of the military due to the recognition gained by the LTTE. Also, the agreement provided the LTTE the opportunity to transform its de facto control to a de jure control by establishment of its own judiciary, police, revenue collection and strong military, which consisted of ground, naval, and air forces.[275] During the peace talks, the LTTE's Eastern Leader, Karuna, broke away from the LTTE.[276] The LTTE, assisted by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), put forward a proposal for an Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA), which was a blueprint to create a separate state.[277] President Mrs. Kumaratunga dissolved the parliament in February 2004 based on mass discontent with the LTTE's military buildup, INGO support for the LTTE, and ISGA proposals.[278] The GoSL continued its commitment to the peace process, however.

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[272] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 176–177

[273] Talpahewa*, Peaceful Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts*, 127.

[274] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 183.

[275] The LTTE strength was estimated to be 30,000 by mid-2002. Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 189, 197–198.

[276] De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, 181.

[277] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 187.

[278] Ibid., 189.

Figure 2.    The Areas Controlled by the LTTE during the 2002 CFA.[279]



The SLFP-led United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) won the 2004 elections with its promise to advance the peace process. Bandarage states that mass discontent with the handling of the peace process was the reason for the defeat of the UNF and the resurgence of Sinhala nationalist parties in 2004.[280] The GoSL rejected the LTTE's claim as the "sole representative of Tamils" and the ISGA proposals.[281] The LTTE walked out of negotiations in 2004 and resumed terrorist attacks statewide. During the 2005 presidential elections, the LTTE prohibited the people from voting to prevent the UNP's Ranil Wickramasinghe assuming office. Mahinda Rajapaksa became the president and

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[279] Talpahewa, *Peaceful Intervention in Intra-State Conflicts,* Map 3, xvii.

[280] The JVP won 39 seats and newly formed Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) won 9 seats. Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 195.

[281] Ibid.

expressed his commitment to the peace process.[282] The LTTE increased terrorist activities against Sinhala civilians and military leaders. The assassination of the Deputy Army Commander, attempted assassination of the Army Commander, and massacre of civilians in Kebitigollewa resulted in a huge public protest calling for stern military action to defeat the LTTE's terrorism.[283] In 2006, the LTTE's closure of Mavil Aru dam, which denied water to civilians, compelled President Rajapaksa to instigate military actions to defeat the LTTE.[284]

The military began humanitarian operations in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The military launched its operations in the Eastern Province in September 2006 and liberated the province in July 2007 with the LTTE fleeing to the Northern Province. Soon after the liberation of the East, the GoSL implemented a recovery and development program called Nagenahira Navodaya (Eastern Re-awakening) to develop the well-being of the people and for recovery of the region.[285] Also, the GoSL commenced military operations to liberate the North in September 2007. The Northern Humanitarian Operation was the largest ever military operation in Sri Lanka. The operation was organized around four axes by five Army divisions and three tasks forces, with back-up support from the Navy and the Air Force. The LTTE was unable to stand against the military thrust and used civilians as human shields.[286] The operation successfully concluded on May 19, 2009 with the death of the leader of the LTTE, Prabhakaran, and other top leaders.[287] Thus, the government regained control of the sovereign territory. The operation led to the death of a large number of military personnel and LTTE cadres and the displacement of over 300,000 civilians, huge damage to government and civilian property, and allegations that the military had violated human rights.

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[282] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka*, 198.

[283] Ibid.

[284] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins,* 136.

[285] Ibid., 143.

[286] Ibid.,144.

[287] Ibid.,132.

The LTTE became the primary challenge to democratic consolidation of the state. The rise of the LTTE severely affected all the arenas of democratic consolidation. The successive governments tried to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The LTTE's rigid stance on a separate state and reliance on violence to attain its goal made the 1995 and 2002 CFA fail. The failure of successive peace attempts and the LTTE's increased use of terrorism compelled the GoSL to resort to military tactics to defeat the LTTE. Ultimately, the GoSL regained its control by militarily defeating the LTTE in May 2009, which allowed the possibility of democratic consolidation. The GoSL's heavy reliance on the military to maintain control significantly developed the CMR, while the CMR had both a positive and negative impact on democratic consolidation. The next section discusses the CMR in detail from 1990 to 2009.

## B.    CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: 1990–2009

Sri Lanka stepped into a new arena of civil-military relations with the commencement of the Second Eelam War. The successive civilian leaders had first tried to find a negotiated solution to the conflict; however, they were compelled to resort to the use of force because the LTTE did not compromise their demand for a separate state. Hence, the military became the most important actor in maintaining the state's sovereignty. Thus, the civilian leaders strengthened the relationship with the military. This section discusses the development of democratic civilian control and the effectiveness of the military.

### 1.    Democratic Civilian Control of the Military

The transformation of the conflict into a high-intensity, semi-conventional war demanded a larger, well-equipped, and trained military force to face the threats posed by the LTTE. Also, the successive governments used the military's victories to maintain their popularity. As a result, the successive government strengthened their control of the military while developing the military's capabilities. This section discusses the developments of the institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professionalism of the military.

### a. Institutional Control Mechanisms

The successive governments continued the executive civilian control over the military. The executive president exercised the authority in making decisions related to national security as the head of state, the commander-in-chief, and the Minister of Defense.[288] Also, the president continued to have the final approval on appointment of three service commanders and promotions, and retirements of the military officers. President Kumaratunga, during the office, appointed her uncle General Ratwatte as the Deputy Minister of Defense creating an effective link with the military.[289] Also, the 2002 UNP government appointed an elected Minister of Parliament as the Minister of Defense. In 2005, however, the president became the Minister of Defense consolidating executive civilian control over the military.

The organizational mechanisms continued to facilitate the civilians to exercise control and oversight over the military. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the National Security Council continued to be the principal mechanism of control and oversight of the military. In 1999, the GoSL officially established the NSC "to centralize political command and control."[290] The three service commanders remained principal advisors of their services to the chairperson of the NSC, the president. The powers of the MOD significantly increased after 2006 in an effort to coordinate the campaign to defeat the LTTE. The GoSL extended the responsibilities of the MOD including the police, intelligence services, defense training and education, Cadet Corps, Civil Defense Force, and the Departments of Immigration and Emigration, Registration of Persons, and Control of Dangerous Drugs, under the purview of the MOD. Moorcraft posits, "Such extensive powers provoked the criticism that Sri Lanka was a national security state."[291] Thus, both the MOD and the NSC increased the institutional control and oversight over the military.

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[288] During the 1990–2009 period, there were four executive presidents. President Premadasa from 1988–1992, President Wijetunga from 1993–1994, President Kumaratunga from 1994–2005, and President Rajapaksa from 2005–2009.

[289] Senanayake, "Sri Lanka: Transformation of Legitimate Violence," 310.

[290] Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers,* 79.

[291] Ibid.

In addition, the Secretary of the MOD became powerful in the control of the military. During 1994–2003, civilians held the post. In 2005, President Rajapaksa appointed his brother, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a retired military officer with battle experience, as the secretary of defense.[292] Gotabaya Rajapaksa's close relationship with the military and the direct link to the president was a "successful civil-military interface."[293] It served as a loyal and rapid central command, according to Moorcraft, "the key to the strategic success of the GoSL in defeating the LTTE.[294]

### b. *Oversight*

The oversight of the military remained weak during the period. The legislature, judiciary, and other organizations continued a limited oversight of the military. The Human Rights Commission became a significant oversight mechanism from 1996 because it could inquire into the civilians' complaints against military personnel on actions committed in their official capacity.[295] The militarization severely affected the oversight of the military by the civil society, however. With the increase of the intensity of the conflict, the military became the protectors of the nation and the majority of the people believed criticism of the military was the same as supporting the LTTE. Thus, any media, NGO, or civil society organization that criticized military activities was subjected to opposition with the elites' belief that it would hinder the national security.[296] Also, De Silva states that Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the Secretary of Defense, had "more influence than the Cabinet ministers, merely because he is the President's brother;" as a result, "the Cabinet has lost any independent authority or influence it may previously had in matters of defence and security-policy."[297]

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[292] Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers,*,76.

[293] Ibid.

[294] Ibid., 76–77.

[295] Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, "Establishment," accessed November 10, 2016, http://hrcsl.lk/about-us/establishment.

[296] De Silva states, "[I]n response to the escalating military crisis, the Sri Lankan government imposed draconian security measures, banning all those activities perceived as a threat to national security and giving sweeping powers to the armed forces and the police." De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, 165.

[297] Ibid., 235

### c.    *Professionalism*

The increase in the intensity of the conflict resulted in the development of the military's professionalism. The GoSL's counterinsurgency campaign demanded the development of the military's expertise, scope of essential duties, sense of responsibility, and cohesiveness. The training provided the military the required combat and professional skills for efficient performance of assigned tasks. All the three services had the opportunity to establish training facilities as per service requirements. Middle-level military officers from all services got education from the Command and Staff College established in 1997.[298] Also, foreign military training from regional countries, the U.S., China, and Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia provided the military the opportunity to develop professional knowledge and establish military-to-military relationships. In addition, the experience gained in battle enhanced the military's expertise.[299] Final military operations gave relative independence to military hierarchy to take effective routine military operations free from civilian political influence.[300]

Meanwhile, the establishment of the military Directorate of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights (DIHL&HR) served to develop the military's responsibility to follow International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR). The Joint Services Language Training Institute (JSLTI) provides Tamil language education for the military personnel to serve in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.[301] The Institute for Peace Support Operations Training Sri Lanka (IPSOTSL) provided international peacekeeping training for local and foreign trainees. The Sri Lankan military has increased its participation in UN peacekeeping missions since 2006. The participation in UN peacekeeping helped improve participants' multi-national operations capabilities and the country's services economy. Thus, increased training and experience

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[298] Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 51.

[299] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins,* 187.

[300] *Daily News* (Sri Lanka), "Redefining Civil-Military Balance."

[301] Global Security.org, "Sri Lanka-Ministry of Defence," accessed November 10, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/militray/world/sri-lanka/mod.htm.

improved the professionalism of the military, solidifying the civilian control over the military.

The military's continuing politicization and expansion into the civilian sphere of business negatively affected its professional norms, however. The military's expansion into the civilian sector and increased military strength due to the conflict led to the politicization of the military. Politicization creates a divided military, affecting cohesion and political neutrality in fulfilling responsibilities. Senanayake notes that several ex-servicemen have argued, "[P]olitical interference in the armed forces has countermanded not only the military chain of command but discipline within the armed forces at large in the war against the LTTE."[302] Also, the reliance on external procurement resulted in the deployment of the military officers in diplomatic positions in the countries that were of strategic interest for military hardware procurement. For instance, retired Army Commander General Srilal Weerasooriya became the High Commissioner to Pakistan in 1998 to facilitate defense procurements. At the same time, political-level defense procurement resulted in corruption of the military as well. Bandarage states that between U.S.$80 million and U.S.$120 million went to politicians and military officials from the allocations to purchase military equipment during the early 2000s.[303]

## 2.      Effectiveness of the Military

The internal insurgencies resulted in the development of effectiveness of the military. After the 1971 JVP insurrection, the GoSL paid its attention to increase the capabilities of the military. Further, the GoSL realized the need to increase the military's effectiveness with the escalation of separatist insurgency in 1983. Thus, the military solely focused on counterinsurgency and developed capabilities accordingly. Since 1995, the military has significantly developed its capabilities. Further, the GoSL's decision to defeat the LTTE militarily resulted in the dramatic increase of the effectiveness of the military. The following paragraphs discuss the plans and structures of the military and the commitment of resources for it.

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[302] Senanayake, "Sri Lanka; Transformation of Legitimate Violence," 312.

[303] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 169.

### a.        *Plans: Doctrines and Strategies*

The increases of the intensity of the conflict resulted in the development of strategies to counter the LTTE. The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE provided the military a legitimate military mission, that is, to maintain national security. To maintain national security, the military had to defeat the LTTE and thus military focus was on counterinsurgency; subsequently, it developed to counter-terrorism. As had been done previously, the evolution of the military doctrine was reactive to the threat.[304] During the 1990s, the LTTE launched semi-conventional military operations and the military organized and conducted operations as a conventional force. This is evident by the large-scale military operations conducted to liberate the Jaffna Peninsula and to open up a land route to Jaffna.[305] The conventional operations focused the military on gaining territory instead of separating the insurgents from the population and placed less concern on the human security aspect.

The military focused on winning hearts and minds of the people after liberation of the Jaffna Peninsula, however. The Army included civil affairs into the organizational structure, posted civil affairs officers at the brigade level, and established civil affairs offices down to the company level. These civil affairs offices conducted population and resource control tasks. Meanwhile, the military had to deploy the regular reserve personnel to maintain essential services as civilian employees were reluctant to come to Jaffna due to security concerns.[306] Despite the military's support to civil authorities to restore normalcy, the military's engagement in the civilian sphere of business led to criticism of the military deployment as militarization.

Meanwhile, after the Vanni debacle, the military's doctrinal focus changed. The military's doctrinal focus changed from conventional operations to high intensity counter-terrorism operations from the 2000s.The military realized the need to develop small group operations and night fighting capabilities. When the 2002 CFA became

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[304] Hashim notes General Fonseka's quote, "The LTTE always had the initiative and the Army was merely reacting." Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins,* 186.

[305] Sri Lanka Army, *50 Years On*, 527–31, 544, 558–561.

[306] Ibid., 540.

unsuccessful, the military changed the doctrinal focus to counter the LTTE strategies and tactics. Accordingly, the Army trained the personnel to platoon-level operations through Advance Infantry Platoon Training (AIPT) and eight-men team operations through Special Infantry Operations Teams (SIOT).[307] The Navy also developed brown water fighting capabilities with special boat squadron and blue water capabilities to interdict the LTTE fleet.[308] The Air Force developed capabilities on precise target interdiction and close air support with rotary wing platforms.[309] The joint concept to coordinate the three services and achieve the desired military effect was a significant development. The Humanitarian Operation 2006–2009 was evidence of the GoSL's clear strategy for military defeat of the LTTE increasing the size, quality and equipment of the military.[310]

### b.     *Structural Development*

The structural changes took place with the evolution of doctrinal focus of the military. Revamping of the Joint Operations Headquarters (JOH) and modernization of the armed services in response to the threat posed by the LTTE also occurred. The JOH was reinstituted in 1999 and renamed the Office of the Chief of Defense Staff (OCDS) in the early 2000s. The JOH and the OCDS was important to coordinate the armed forces during joint operations. Both the Navy and the Air Force established their ground operations forces, the Naval Patrolmen Branch and the Air Force Regiment. Also, given the magnitude of the LTTE's expansion of terrorist atrocities in the south, new organizations came up to ensure security. The Operations Command Colombo (OCC) was a joint force raised in 1995 to ensure security in Colombo.[311] The Home Guards was created under a special provision of the MOD to protect the Northern and Eastern Provinces' border villages; subsequently, the organization was revamped with military

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[307] Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers,* 53.

[308] Ibid., 59.

[309] Ibid., 66.

[310] Ibid., 77.

[311] Sri Lanka Army, *50 Years On*, 531.

training, to become the Civil Defense Force (CDF) in 2006.[312] All the structural changes significantly contributed to the development of the military's effectiveness.

Proportionate ethnic group representation might have increased the military's effectiveness as an impartial force, however. Since the 1960s, the Sinhala percentage in the military increased and by the 1990s, the ethnic composition of the military was predominantly Sinhalese, as shown in Figure 3. According to De Silva, Tamils' representation in the military declined due to two reasons. First, the Tamils were reluctant to join the military because their families were vulnerable to threats from the LTTE and its allies. Second, since the military fight had begun against Tamil separatists, "Tamils were treated with suspicion by the recruiting officers at the point of entry, and by their peers once they joined."[313] De Silva notes that an ethnically mixed force is more effective in dealing with an ethnic conflict.[314] Thus, the minority representation would have more benefit to the military for winning the hearts and minds of the people in the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Figure 3.    Ethnic Composition of the Officer Corps of the Military (as of 1996).[315]



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
[312] Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 75.

[313] De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, 234.

[314] Ibid.

[315] K.M. de Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, New Delhi: Penguin Group, 2012, Figure II, 232–233.

*c.*        *Commitment of Resources*

The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE demanded a huge increase in military resources. To facilitate the doctrinal and structural changes, resource allocation increased for organizational expansion and training of the military. The strength of the military took a sudden increase in the 1990s and almost doubled after 2005 (see Table 6), while civilian employees in the military establishment also increased. According to Regan, increased strength is an indication of the increased militarization.[316] Also, proportional to the country's population, Sri Lanka had the largest military in South Asia.[317]

Table 6.        The Strength of the Army: 1990–2010 (Selected Years).[318]

| | 1990 | 1993 | 1998 | 2003 | 2008 | 2010 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Number of personnel | 60,000 | 90,000 | 120,000 | 130,000 | 200,000 | 230,000 |

The defense budget increased to facilitate the previously discussed structural changes in the military. There has been a substantial escalation of defense expenditure from the 1990s (see Table 7). The increased defense expenditure has paradoxical effects. As mentioned previously in this chapter, increased military strength helped mitigate the effects of privatization during market reforms by balancing the public sector employment. It also helped to stabilize the economies of agricultural and rural districts, the home areas of the major portion of military members. In addition, the salary level of the military was considerably high in comparison with the other members of the public

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[316] Regan introduces a composite index to measure the extent of militarization: "active and reserve military forces; civilian employees of the military establishment; direct and indirect employees in weapon industries; membership of organized veteran groups; enrollment in military based education programs; and induced employment from weapon industries." Regan, "Organizing Societies for War," 2.

[317] As a percentage of the population, the military strength of Bangladesh – 0.18, India – 0.2, Pakistan – 0.42, and Sri Lanka – 0.68 in 1995. De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, 95.

[318] Adapted from Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers, 77;* Venugopal, "Sri Lanka: Military Fiscalism, 84; Sri Lanka Army, *50 Years On*, 906,907.

and private sectors.[319] The high level of salaries helped to develop civil and economic societies and the military to maintain obedience to the civilian leadership.

Table 7. GDP and Defense Spending: 1990–2009 (Selected Years).[320]

| Year / Spending | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defense Spending (Current U.S.$ million) | 187 | 764 | 822 | 644 | 791 | 1055 | 1511 | 1522 |
| Defense Spending (As a percentage the GDP) | 2.48 | 6.11 | 5.00 | 2.60 | 2.80 | 3.30 | 3.70 | 3.60 |
| Defense Spending (As a percentage of the Government's Spending | 7.51 | 19.22 | 18.85 | 11.06 | 11.52 | 13.90 | 16.46 | 14.56 |

C.    CHAPTER SUMMARY

The LTTE's rise since the 1990s became the significant factor that affected Sri Lanka's democratic consolidation and CMR. The LTTE gained control over considerable area in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and continued to pose a separatist threat by expanding its violence throughout the state. In response, the successive governments adapted a two-pronged policy: a military response often associated with political negotiations. The priority alternated between the two policies depending upon the success achieved from one of them or the internal political pressure and external pressure, particularly from India. Given the failure of the 1995 and 2002 CFA, the military became the sole solution to the country's protracted conflict. The military defeated the LTTE in May 2009, assuring the GoSL's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, the

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[319] In 2000, the mean average monthly salary in LKR of a soldier – 6,761, public sector – 4,656, private sector – 4,275, and casual – 2,998. Venugopal, "Sri Lanka: Military Fiscalism," 88.

[320] Adapted from Saroja Selvanathan and Eliyathamby A. Selvanathan, "Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Case Study of Sri Lanka Using Causality Analysis," *International Journal of Development and Conflict* 4 (2014),71.

deployment of the military resulted in the creation of conditions for democratic consolidation while affecting both positive and negative implications for the development of civil and economic societies, the rule of law and the civilian bureaucracy.

The CMR significantly improved because of the necessity to defeat the separatist LTTE. The civilian control of the military solidified through the executive civilian control and revamped institutional mechanisms: the MOD and the NSC. The oversight, however, continued to be limited. The increase of the military effectiveness is evident by the military's success in defeating the LTTE in a short time period. The increased strength and resources contributed to increase the militarization, thus negatively affecting the civil, political, and economic societies. On the other hand, militarization helped to create an environment conducive to democratic consolidation, particularly facilitating economic growth due to improved security. Meanwhile, increased military professionalism further strengthened the civilian control of the military. Thus, the CMR more positively contributed to democratic consideration while displaying some distinct trends.

The CMR contributed to democratic consolidation through some distinct trends in the deployment of the military. The use of the military in non-military tasks and in the civilian sphere of business became a trend; it helped to defeat the LTTE at the expense of development of civil society, civilian bureaucracy, and democratic norms. First, the sole means available for the GoSL to solve the conflict was the military because the LTTE's compromise to a negotiated solution was suspicious. Second, ensuring national security by countering the LTTE became the legitimate mission for the military. Third, civilian leaders used the military to fill the vacuum of supportive bureaucracy needed for reconstruction of conflict-affected areas. Fourth, the GoSL used the military officers to hold civilian appointments that required coordination with the military; the organizational discipline of the military was successful in delivering desired results. In this context, the next chapter discusses the implications of the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstitution toward democratic consolidation and CMR.

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# IV.    POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 created the conditions for the democratic consolidation of Sri Lanka with some continuing challenges, as discussed in the previous chapter. The Tamil diaspora emerged as a new external obstacle, further strengthening its claim for a separate state in Sri Lanka. Also, the TNA continued its claim for regional autonomy while solidifying support from Tamil Nadu. The continuing struggle for a separate state created tension for Sri Lanka; it resulted in a mass public opinion against the reduction of military presence in the North and East and downsizing the military. Meanwhile, the GoSL encountered other challenges such as the rehabilitation and the reintegration of the LTTE cadres into society, the resettlement of approximately 300,000 IDPs, the development of infrastructure, and the restoration of normalcy and law and order in the conflict-affected areas.

To address the immediate challenges, the GoSL initiated two separate reconstruction programs for the Northern and Eastern provinces. The GoSL assigned the military a prominent role in the development programs because of the military's high level of effectiveness, skilled organizations, and the need to maintain security. Thus, the military continued its deployment in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to facilitate its commitment to the reconstruction program.

Meanwhile, the GoSL redeployed the military in statewide nation-building tasks. The critics within and outside Sri Lanka describe the deployment of the military for post-conflict reconstruction and statewide nation-building tasks, the continuing high defense budget and a large military as securitization or militarization, which hinders democratization. The deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction, ensuring security and strengthening the administration, resulted in short-term positive effects towards democratic consolidation, however, while creating both positive and negative affects towards CMR. Over the long term, continuing militarization may be a hindrance to democratization. This chapter discusses Sri Lanka's strategic environment after the

defeat of the LTTE and the military's role in post-conflict reconstruction, political developments, and CMR from 2009 to 2016.

## A. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF SRI LANKA AFTER THE DEFEAT OF THE LTTE

Sri Lanka's strategic environment after the defeat of the LTTE was characterized by internal and external serious concerns that had to be addressed urgently. The foremost concern was the establishment of law and order in the areas that had been under the control of the LTTE since the 1990s. This concern was further heightened by the possibility of the resurgence of the LTTE because of the escaped LTTE cadres and hidden arms caches.[321] Hashim asserts that the sustenance of military victory requires a coordinated and sustained political follow-up, "backed up by continued intelligence, police and military vigilance."[322] The eruption of the LTTE's terrorism in Sri Lanka during the peace efforts in 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2002, and its uncompromising stance on establishing a separate state, strengthened the need for maintaining vigilance.

Meanwhile, the Tamil diaspora reorganized to pose challenges to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Immediately after the defeat of the LTTE, the new Tamil diaspora front organizations took over the struggle for the Tamil Eelam.[323] The Tamil diaspora now organized on two fronts. One side, the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE, the Kumaran Padmanadan or Rudra faction) and the Global Tamil Forum (GTF, Father S.J. Emmanual faction) sought to attain the Eelam through political and diplomatic engagement in the long run. The second side, The Tamil Eelam Peoples Assembly (TEPA, Nediyavan faction) was strongly committed to the resurgence of the LTTE to

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[321] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 200; At the beginning of the humanitarian operation, the LTTE had approximately 30,000 cadres and at the conclusion of the operations only 11,664 ex-combatants either surrendered or were forced to surrender. Since there was no specific account to the number of LTTE cadres killed or fled to other countries during the operations, it was difficult to ascertain the number of LTTE cadres who had gone underground within Sri Lanka. Also, several arms caches belonging to the LTTE were recovered, but much more had to be recovered because there was no intelligence available on them at the time.

[322] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 197.

[323] Ibid.,198.

continue the armed struggle back in Sri Lanka.[324] The Tamil diaspora needed the support of the Tamils in Sri Lanka to create a separate state, however. Hence, the GoSL was compelled to continue the military deployment throughout the island to prevent the resurgence of the LTTE, as well as to provide security to the post-conflict reconstruction process. Hashim states that "fear of the revival of Tamil extremism" led the GoSL to see everything "through the lens of national security."[325]

Meanwhile, the GoSL faced several challenges in national re-integration. Reconstruction, resettlement, and rehabilitation were the immediate matters to be handled.[326] This process included the accommodation and resettlement of approximately 300,000 IDPs, de-mining, the restoration of infrastructure and facilities, and reintegration of nearly 12,000 ex-LTTE cadres after rehabilitation.[327] These tasks were a major challenge because of a lack of bureaucratic structure and the immediate absence of civilian organizations necessary to undertake the tasks due to security concerns and lack of facilities. Also, due to the danger posed by landmines, de-mining was urgently needed for the civilian organization to access the conflict-affected areas. Thus, there was a need for an organization that could handle such security issues and undertake these challenges.

In this context, for several reasons, the military was the immediately available competent resource to create an environment conducive for the civilian organizations to assume their responsibilities. First, the military had already been deployed in the conflict-affected areas, providing security, and could be deployed for CIMIC missions. Second, doctrinally, the Army had an institutionalized and experienced organizational structure to perform the tasks necessary for the restoration of normalcy. Third, the Army's disciplined and hierarchical organization facilitated the undertakings at the behest of the GoSL, acknowledging the civilian supremacy. Thus, the GoSL deployed the military in post-conflict reconstruction in association with the civil authorities.

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[324] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 213.

[325] Ibid., 200.

[326] Don Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War: Defeat of the Tamil Tiger Terrorists who Ravaged Sri Lanka for Over 30 Years* (Pannipitiya: Stamford Lake Ltd, 2010), 183.

[327] Rajapaksa, "Sri Lanka's National Security," 145.

Moreover, the GoSL was under pressure both domestically and externally. The international pressure was exerted on the GoSL to reduce the military's strength and deployments in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, carry out political reforms, and demand war crime accountability; the TNA also made similar demands.[328] Wijewardane states, "Western governments, perhaps genuinely pursuing protection of human rights, and spurred on by a section of the Tamil Diaspora, will continue to search for opportunities to punish Sri Lanka."[329] Since the 2002 CFA, however, Sinhalese critics described the proposals to remove and minimize the HSZs, and downsize or right-size the Sri Lankan military, as an effort to degrade its power.[330] Also, they opposed the federalism as an effort to divide the country.[331] Furthermore, according to Hashim, "The Sinhala community, a majority in Sri Lanka, continues to fear the Tamils, and has a minority complex in relation to the larger Tamil population in Tamil Nadu."[332] Moreover, Tamil chauvinist mobilization in Tamil Nadu and the Tamil diaspora's active support of the quest for Tamil Eelam increased the fear among the Sinhalese on resurgence of the LTTE.[333] In this context, the GoSL maintained the military's strength and deployments.

In addition, Sri Lanka's strategic maritime location in the Indian Ocean had several implications. On one hand, it provided the opportunity to be the maritime hub in the increasingly busy East-West trade route just south of the island and, on the other hand, increased the threat of the country becoming a hub for transnational crimes. The country became a transit point for drugs and a source area for human trafficking and arms

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[328] Goodhand, "Consolidation and Militarization of the Post-War Regime," 137.

[329] Wijewardana, *How LTTE Lost the Eelam War,* 284.

[330] Bandarage, *The Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,* 192.

[331] Ibid.

[332] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 211; Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka's National Security, 148.

[333] Ibid.; Hoole asserts, "In turn the Sinhalese have acquired legitimate fears of the global spread of Tamils and developments in neighboring Tamil Nadu that have favored support groups for the LTTE that are strongly fascist and anti-Sinhalese." Hoole, "The Tamil Secessionist Movement in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)," 15.

smuggling.[334] Also, the encroachment on territorial waters by South Indian fishermen and the illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and maritime pollution are acute problems for Sri Lanka. Since independence, the Army has assisted the authorities in law enforcement. Thus, statewide military deployment became a necessity until the authorities gained control in their respective fields. The next section discusses the military's role in the post-conflict reconstruction, with the strategic environment as the backdrop.

## B.    THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

In a post-conflict situation, the military has to play a vital role until the restoration of normalcy and the other government institutes regain their control. This is true in the Sri Lankan scenario too. As discussed in the previous section, the military becomes the important organization to assist civil authorities to undertake immediate post-conflict challenges. This section discusses the roles played by the military in provision of security, reconstruction of conflict-affected areas, and statewide nation building.

### 1.    Provision of Security

As discussed previously, maintenance of security and order were paramount for post-conflict reconstruction, particularly in the conflict-affected areas. Also, according to the post-conflict reconstruction model conceptualized by Jabareen, which was discussed in Chapter I, in the sequencing of reconstruction, "security and order comes first followed by economic development and only then democracy."[335] Hence, as discussed in the previous section, it was necessary for the Army to maintain a heavy presence in the country, particularly in the Northern and Eastern province, to prevent the revival of Tamil extremism until the police could establish their control.[336] Thus, the GoSL re-deployed

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[334] Mitchell Sutton and Serge DeSilva-Ranasinghe, "Transnational Crime in Sri Lanka: Future Considerations for International Cooperation" (Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited, 2016), 6, accessed November 4, 2016, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/transnational-crime-in-sri-lanka-future-considerations-for-international-cooperation.

[335] Jabareen, "Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction," 114.

[336] De Silva states, "To bring these areas [Northern and Eastern provinces] under the control of the state again is a formidable task, something amounting to a fundamental reconstruction of the territorial structure of the island." De Silva, "Post-LTTE Sri Lanka," 238.

the Army to cover every district of the country to serve as the reserve of the police to maintain law and order and to respond during natural disasters.[337] The Army's continuing presence and clearance of thousands of the LTTE's weapon caches reduced the fear and uncertainty created by the possibility of the resurgence of the LTTE.[338] The continuing military presence may be a reason to prevent the revival of the LTTE. In that case, militarization helped the progress of democratic consolidation.

Meanwhile, continuing militarization resulted in both positive and negative effects on democratization. The GoSL's decision to maintain the military's strength without a sudden demobilization helped to stabilize the country and also to maintain security. Moorcraft quotes the observation of one American development expert, "By resisting international pressure to down-size its military, Sri Lanka has avoided the potential threat of having tens of thousands of weapons-trained and battle-hardened troops being reintegrated into the hum-drum routines of civilian life where the purchasing power of their pensions would diminish with inflation."[339]

The military's continuing deployment in High Security Zones (HSZ), however, was subjected to criticism as an impediment to reconciliation, because the legitimate land owners could not access their lands.[340] Although the GoSL pays rent for the buildings occupied by the military and allocates new lands, interest groups continue their claims to those same lands. With increased security, the establishment of police stations, and the function of civilian administration, the military reduced its security activities and presence. Also, the GoSL gradually reduced the majority of the military's HSZs in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, released the lands to legitimate owners, and lifted the

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[337] Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia, "Sri Lanka: Executive Summary."

[338] There were only three known attempts to revive the LTTE, which were instigated by the Tamil diaspora. The most serious one was the shooting of a police officer by a group of three former LTTE cadres in 2014; later, the Army killed the group in a confrontation. Vanni, *The Sunday Times* (Sri Lanka), "Four Killed: Govt Sees Bid to Revive LTTE," April 13, 2014, accessed November 7, 2016, http://www.sundaytimes.lk/140413/news/four-killed--govt-sees-bid-to-revive-ltte-2-92639.html.

[339] Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers,* 163.

[340] De Silva, "Post-LTTE Sri Lanka," 242.

emergency regulations in November 2011.[341] By 2016, the military was nearly confined to the strategic bases, performing CIMIC missions at the behest of the GoSL. Although subjected to criticism, the military's success in providing security helped restore normalcy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. In addition to providing security as previously mentioned, the military actively supported the GoSL's reconstruction program.

## 2. Reconstruction of the Conflict-Affected Areas

As per Jabareen's conceptualization of reconstruction, post-conflict reconstruction reduces the risk of conflict.[342] Also, "relief and reconstruction is an extension of political, economic, and military strategy."[343] Having realized the importance of speedy reconstruction, the GoSL implemented two main development projects in the Northern and Eastern Provinces: "Negenahira Navodaya" and "Uthuru Wasanthaya." The political strategy of the two projects was to integrate "ethnic minorities into the state and development" for consolidation of state power.[344] The military was a key player in both the development projects and, therefore, these projects were subjected to criticism as an "ethno-nationalist and militarized fashion model."[345] The following paragraphs discuss the implication of the deployment of the military in this reconstruction.

The GoSL initiated the Negenahira Navodaya project soon after gaining control in the area in 2007. It was an "accelerated three-year project" for the restoration of "normalcy in the Eastern Province."[346] The main focus of the project was the resettlement of IDPs and the development of infrastructure and livelihood to strengthen

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[341] In February 2015, out of 11,639 acres under the control of the military, only 6,152 remained as HSZs in Jaffna. The GoSL approved further release of 1,000 acres in stages. *Sunday Observer* (Sri Lanka), "Lands in HSZ in North to be Released," February 22, 2015, accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/PrintDoc.do?fromCartFul.

[342] Jabareen, "Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction." 116.

[343] Ibid.

[344] Sumith Chaminda, "Uthuru Wasanthaya and Negenahira Navodaya: Analyzing the Development Discourse," *Colombo Telegraph*, accessed October 29, 2016, https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/uthuru-wasanthaya-and-negenahira-navodaya-analyzing-the -development-discourse/.

[345] Ibid.

[346] Ibid.

the economic and social connectivity to the state's development.[347] For the purpose of security, the military established HSZs such as Sampur. The military played an important role in de-mining, providing assistance to civil authorities for infrastructure development and CIMIC tasks to assist the civilians to establish livelihood while providing security.

Meanwhile, the GoSL initiated mechanisms to provide humanitarian assistance to the people who fled the LTTE-controlled areas in the Northern Province. In April 2009, with the flow of IDPs into the GoSL-controlled areas, the GoSL appointed the Chief of the Army Staff as the Competent Authority to provide humanitarian assistance to the IDPs.[348] He coordinated the government institutions and the military while obtaining assistance from the INGOs to provide facilities to the IDPs. By the end of May 2009, the GoSL had to look after nearly 300,000 IDPs. There was a need to identify the former LTTE cadres mingled with the civilians, to de-mine, and to restore basic facilities prior to the resettlement.[349] The Army played a pivotal role in the construction of relief villages called "welfare villages" with necessary facilities. Initially, the military assisted the civilian authorities in the administration of the welfare villages and later restricted them only for the provision of security. Also, the GoSL employed retired and mobilized military reserve personnel to handle the welfare villages.

At the same time, the GoSL implemented a more comprehensive program for the resettlement of the IDPs. The Presidential Task Force (PTF) was formed in May 2009 "for resettlement, development, and security in the Northern Province."[350] The PTF adopted a three-pronged approach entitled *Uthuru Wasanthaya* (the spring of the Northern Province). The approach consisted of providing humanitarian assistance and basic facilities before the resettlement, the establishment of a speedy recovery mechanism, and finally the development of infrastructure. It was a 180-day program conducted through a well-coordinated plan with the support of line ministries, external

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[347] Chaminda, "Uthuru Wasanthaya and Negenahira Navodaya."

[348] Charu Lata Hogg, "Sri Lanka After the Tamil Tiger Defeat: Army Takes Over," *The World Today* 65 (August/September 2009), 19, accessed November 6, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41549187.

[349] *Business Today*, "Reconstruction and Resettlement in the Northern Province," accessed November 6, 2016, http://www.businesstoday.lk/article.php?artical=7454.

[350] Ibid.

agencies, the UN system, and the INGOs while the Army was an active partner in the resettlement process.[351] The major challenges for the program were de-mining and the restoration of basic facilities.

The Army greatly contributed to the mitigation of the challenges for the rapid resettlement program. The Army Humanitarian De-mining Unit (HDU) took the leading role in de-mining, accounting for over 75 percent of the areas with assistance from NGOs and INGOs.[352] Also, due to the lack of facilities in the resettlement, the military provided a head start by the reconstruction of roads and bridges, the renovation of public utilities, and even the construction of temporary shelters. With its own resources, the Army provided resettled people nearly 3,000 temporary houses.[353] The UNHCR and the governments of India and China assisted the GoSL in providing material and financial support. The rapid resettlement progress was successful in accommodating 456,000 IDPs by December 2011.[354] Also, during 2010, all the administrative institutions were functional while community-based organizations commenced to re-group.[355]

Meanwhile, the GoSL faced another challenge in the rehabilitation of ex-combatants and their reintegration in society. There were 11,664 ex-combatants who were to undergo the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. The GoSL appointed a military major general as the Commissioner General for Rehabilitation to undertake this task and implemented a comprehensive plan to rehabilitate the ex-combatants. This plan included the provision of education, birth and education certificates, vocational training, life skills training, counseling, and reintegration to civil society as lawful citizens. By May 2010, "all children formerly associated with armed groups had been released from rehabilitation centers and community–based reintegration

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[351] Business Today, "Reconstruction and Resettlement in the Northern Province."

[352] "Joint Action Plan for Assistance: Northern Province 2011," Government of Sri Lanka, United Nations & Partners, 6, accessed November 2, 2016, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/2012_SriLanka_JPA.pdf.

[353] "Joint Action Plan for Assistance: Northern Province 2011," 7.

[354] Ibid., 1.

[355] Ibid., 53.

has started."[356] The Army played an important role in the process of rehabilitation and reintegration. Also, the Army conducted a number of welfare projects such as the donation of agricultural equipment and boat engines for the beneficiaries to establish their livelihoods.[357]

The military's continuing deployment in HSZs and security activities and the engagement in civilian spheres of work were subject to criticism, however. There was an allegation that the military had appropriated lands for security purposes and involvement in development, claiming the reconstruction process "securitized development."[358] Further, the critics claimed the military's inclusion in the development program was a detriment for civil society organizations to raise their ideas during the meeting to discuss matters related to the reconstruction process.[359] Stone posits that the military dominated the PTF and it performed "unprecedented roles in what would normally be considered civilian matters."[360] While the militarization may have affected the freedom of civil society, the military's active role assisted the civil authorities to accomplish the plans for development of the Northern and Eastern Provinces successfully. The United States "under Secretary of State for Political Affairs-Designate Thomas Shannon" stated in December 2015, "the success in rebuilding Sri Lanka and reconciling the people will be an example to the rest of the World."[361]

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[356] "Joint Action Plan for Assistance: Northern Province 2011," 54.

[357] *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), "Army Extends Welfare Projects to Jaffna Islands," June 20, 2011, accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/ frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.8573.

[358] Chaminda, "Uthuru Wasanthaya and Negenahira Navodaya."

[359] Ibid.

[360] Stone, "Sri Lanka's Postwar Descent," 150.

[361] *Daily News* (Sri Lanka), "Lanka's Rebuilding and Reconciliation Success, an Example to the World-Shannon," accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/ delivery/PrintDoc.do?fromCartFul.

### 3. State-wide Nation-Building

At the same time, the GoSL deployed the military in statewide nation-building tasks.[362] Given the difficulty in sudden reduction of military strength, the GoSL deployed the military for a wide variety of tasks seeking efficient use of the available resources. The military's versatile skills, disciplined organizational structure, and resources allowed them to perform non-military duties.[363] To respond to natural disasters was a major task for the military and it successfully fulfilled its responsibilities in these situations, such as the landslides in 2014 and floods during the monsoons. Also, the military played an active role in the beautification of cities under the Urban Development Authority (UDA), which was under the purview of the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, the military engineers undertook the construction of roads, buildings, and bridges, as well as earthmoving tasks, at the behest of the government. Moorcraft states, "The sappers were naturally happy to build things, especially bridges, but some of the regular infantry complained about being deployed as laborers on new roads."[364] In addition, the military was responsible for managing many public facilities such as the three international cricket stadiums. Given the recognition gained from the GoSL and the public, the GoSL entrusted the Army to conduct short leadership training programs for university entrants in the Army camps.[365]

Meanwhile, the militarization resulted in the military's entry into economic activities. While engaged in security and reconstruction tasks, the Army units continued small businesses and large-scale businesses such as running restaurants. Also, the GoSL employed the military in public sector posts and even in diplomatic appointments. The military's expansion into the civilian sphere of business was the subject of wider

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[362] Andrew Rathmell states that "nation-building is defined by one study as the use of military force in the aftermath of a war to underpin rapid and fundamental societal transformation…[including] comprehensive efforts…aimed to engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction." Andrew Rathmell, "Planning Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?" *International Affairs* 81 (October 2005), 1014, accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569073.

[363] *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), *Should the Military Be in Civilian Spheres of Business?*

[364] Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers*, 162.

[365] Senior Minister Sarath Amunugama comments on the military stated, "we also want to utilize their skills to the maximum and no one can deny they have brought a lot of discipline and efficiency to whatever they take part in." *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), *Should the Military Be in Civilian Spheres of Business?*

criticism, however. In January 2011, the JVP said that the GoSL has "ridiculed the military by assigning them to sell vegetables" and expressed that such activities "could be a step towards the militarization of the entire country in the future."[366]

In addition, in December 2013, the UNP Economic Affairs Spokesman, Dr. Harsha De Silva, commenting on the military, stated, "they are into construction, road maintenance, park maintenance, they are operating airlines, whale watching expeditions, golf courses, resorts…even have an outlet near parliament which sells rice packets."[367] The military's expansion resulted in the militarization of civil and political societies as well as the bureaucracy. As Stepan posits, the military's engagement in state enterprises and fund raising activities becomes an impediment to democratic practices.[368] The next section discusses the political developments that took place concurrent with the reconstruction process.

## C.    POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Simultaneously, the restoration of democracy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces took place. After three decades, the Tamil political parties and the people in the Northern and Eastern Provinces could participate in politics, free from the LTTE's intimidations. The TNA won 16 seats during the parliamentary elections in April 2010 and secured 20 out of 25 councils in the Northern Province during the local government elections in 2011.[369] Also, in the Northern Provincial Council (NPC) elections held in September 2013, the TNA won 30 out of 38 seats in the council. Goodhand states that victory in the elections allowed the TNA to consolidate its position as the primary representative of the Tamils.[370] It provided the opportunity for the Tamils to advance their interests through the democratic process.

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[366] *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), "Militarization of the Country-JVP," January 13, 2011, accessed January 22, 2016, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/PrintDoc.do?fromCartFul.

[367] *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), *Should the Military Be in Civilian Spheres of Business?*

[368] Among eleven points, Alfred Stepan's tenth prerogative suggests that military's deployment in state enterprise negatively affects democratization, Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*, 94–97.

[369] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 197.

[370] According to Goodhand, the TNA's victory questions the success of the GoSL's development campaign as a mean of reconciliation. Goodhand, "Consolidation and Militarization," 131.

Critics posit that the NPC is not effective, however, because the presidentially appointed governor, an Army major general, can overrule the council decisions, and the council has to rely on the central government for funds to deliver political goods to their constituents.[371] After the 2010 presidential elections, the GoSL appointed civilians as the governors of both the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Then, during the 2015 parliamentary elections, the TNA secured 16 seats and its leader became the Leader of the Opposition, increasing the GoSL's responsiveness toward Tamils.[372] The increase of the number of political parties and voter turnout signifies the improvement of political freedom and security, as Table 8 shows. Despite the military's role in providing the security that helped to improve the electoral democracy, the TNA's main claims, besides the devolution of power to the NPC, were the de-militarization of the Northern Province.[373]

Table 8.        Voter Turnout in Northern and Eastern Provinces: 2010–2015 (as a Percentage of Total Registered Voters).[374]

| Province / Election | Jaffna | Vanni | Trincomalee | Baticaloa | Ampara |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 January Presidential | 25.66 | 40.33 | 68.22 | 64.83 | 73.54 |
| 2010 April Parliamentary | 23.33 | 43.89 | 62.2 | 58.56 | 64.74 |
| 2013 Provincial Council | 73.17 | 64.15 | 66.83 | 64.29 | 66.83 |
| 2015 January Presidential | 72.57 | 66.28 | 76.76 | 70.97 | 77.39 |
| 2015 August Parliamentary | 61.56 | 71.89 | 74.34 | 69.11 | 73.99 |

Conversely, the electoral process further strengthened the majority constituencies' claim for increased securitization. The UPFA's successive victories in presidential,

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[371] Stone, "Sri Lanka's Postwar Descent," 151.

[372] "General Election 2015 Results–Adaderana," accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.adaderana.lk/general-election-2015/index.php.

[373] The leader of the TULF, V. Anandasangaree, appreciated the "military for engaging in a true humanitarian operation" and "said there was no need for a large military presence in the Northern area now." *Sunday Observer* (Sri Lanka), "Military Role Appreciated," August 22, 2010, accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.lexisnexis.comlibproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.3733.

[374] Adaptation from http://www.electionsnews.lk and http://www.Lankaelections.com/parliamentary_election/2010/, accessed on November 8, 2016.

parliamentary, and local government elections became a strong popular mandate for maintaining the unitary structure of the state. Following President Rajapaksa's reelection, the UPFA won 144 seats in parliamentary elections and 271 councils during the local governments' elections in 2011.[375] This overwhelming popular support for the UPFA marginalized the voice of the opposition and centralized power with the UPFA. The GoSL attempted to further increase power through the glorification of the military's victory; the GoSL continued to promote the military as protectors of the nation and the popular support for it increased.[376] As a result, a number of military officers entered into politics, militarizing politics and vice versa.

Moreover, according to the majority public opinion, probing the alleged human rights violations became a betrayal of the military. Eventually, as discussed in the previous section, Sinhala nationalists opposed the devolution of power to the NPC, the set-up of any mechanism to investigate alleged war crimes, and reducing the military's strength or its presence in the Northern and Eastern provinces.[377] Eventually, militarization continued according to the will of the public opinion and thus, "the process of militarization of the political landscape has resulted in weakening the democratic institutions, mechanisms, and values."[378]

In the meantime, post-conflict economic growth was relatively high. Also, the GDP increased and reintegration of the Northern and Eastern provinces into the national economy contributed to the GDP. Acquisition of bonds and commercial loans with relatively high interest rates increased debt, however. This resulted in the depletion of foreign currency reserves and currency devaluation, and thus increased the cost of imports.[379] Similarly, defense expenditures also increased due to the inclusion of the

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[375] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 197.

[376] *Daily News* (Sri Lanka), "Redefining Civil-Military Balance," December 3, 2009, accessed January 22, 2016, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/delivery/ PrintDoc.do?fromCartFul.

[377] The Tamil political parties claim the autonomy of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, but "the Sinhalese parties represents voters who largely oppose it." Stone, "Sri Lanka's Post War Descent," 152.

[378] *Daily News* (Sri Lanka), "Redefining Civil-Military Balance."

[379] International Crisis Group, "Sri Lanka: Jumpstarting the Reform Process," 5.

UDA in the Ministry of Defense, but defense spending decreased as a percentage of GDP.[380] Also, militarization continued to stabilize the economy as the main employer of the public sector. In summary, the militarization resulted in a defense economy in the country.

Despite the increased centralization of power around President Rajapaksa, rising dissatisfaction among Sinhalese voters and even the SFP elites resulted in his defeat in the elections.[381] By the mid-2010s, critics asserted that President Rajapaksa was moving toward authoritarianism, and economic constraints and the military's heavy-handedness created dissatisfaction among Sinhalese voters and even SLFP elites.[382] In the January 2015 presidential election, SLFP's General Secretary, Maithripala Sirisena, won the election and took office; with the victory, he also became the President of the SLFP. Subsequently, during the August 2015 general elections, the UNP-led United National Front for Good Governance (UNFGG) defeated the UPFA.[383] The new President and Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe established a National Unitary Government (NUG), which consisted of ministers from both the parties. The new NUG enacted several measures to reduce militarization, paving the way for democratic consolidation. Table 9 shows a summary of data gathered from the Economic Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index. The next section discusses the effects of post-conflict militarization towards democratic CMR.

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[380] Saroja Selvanathan and Eliyathamby A. Selvanathan, "Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth," 71.

[381] Stone, "Sri Lanka's Postwar Descent," 151.

[382] Ibid.

[383] International Crisis Group, "Sri Lanka: Jumpstarting the Reform Process," 3.

Table 9.        Summary of Democracy Index: 2010–2015.[384]

| Year / Index | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rank | 55 | 57 | 89 | 91 | 87 | 69 |
| Overall score | 6.64 | 6.58 | 5.75 | 5.69 | 5.69 | 6.42 |
| Electoral process and pluralism | 7 | 7 | 6.17 | 6.17 | 6.17 | 7.83 |
| Functioning of government | 6.07 | 6.07 | 5.36 | 5.36 | 5.36 | 6.79 |
| Political participation | 5 | 5 | 4.44 | 4.44 | 4.44 | 5 |
| Political culture | 6.88 | 6.88 | 6.88 | 6.88 | 6.88 | 6.88 |
| Civil liberties | 8.24 | 7.94 | 5.88 | 5.59 | 5.59 | 5.59 |

Note: Democracy index gives different explanations to successive years. 2010—democracy in retreat, 2011—democracy under stress, 2011 - democracy at a standstill, 2012—democracy in limbo, 2014—democracy and its discontents, and 2015—democracy in an age of anxiety.

## D.    CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Balancing the relationship between the civil authorities and the military hierarchy continues to be a delicate operation. This is especially true as Sri Lanka recovers from the challenges of the protracted conflict, while still relying heavily on the military to help with the return to normalcy, as discussed at the beginning of the chapter. The continuing military engagement in the day-to-day affairs of the civil society affects the civil-military relations. This section discusses the developments of the democratic civilian control of the military and the effectiveness of the military during post-conflict situation.

### 1.    Democratic Civilian Control of the Military

Sri Lanka has managed to maintain the democratic civilian control of the military, unlike many other countries. This is particularly important due to the protracted conflict, which gave the military huge popularity and respect from the public. The successive governments exercised the control of the military in different degrees. The following paragraphs discuss the evolution of Institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professionalism of the military.

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[384] Adapted from yearly democracy index of "The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy," accessed October 20, 2016, http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX.

### a.    *Institutional Control Mechanisms*

The President continued to exercise executive control over the military. President Rajapaksa's re-election to office with 58% of the popular vote consolidated executive control. Also, the Secretary of Defense's continuing interface between the President and the service commanders, and close links with the military elite, further strengthened the executive control.[385] The increased power enjoyed by the military elite in decision-making during the humanitarian operations, however, resulted in the emergence of the military as "a quasi-independent force with substantial support of the Sinhala segment of the population."[386] Eventually, this resulted in General Fonseka seeking to further increase military strength and "not only the coordination of the activities of three forces and police but full control over them."[387] Later, General Fonseka, dissatisfied over the rejection of his requests by the executive, entered politics.

The GoSL's heavy reliance on the military in post-conflict reconstruction resulted in a division between civilian and military leadership within months of the end of the conflict. The GoSL promoted the three service commanders to four-star generals in appreciation of their contribution to the defeat of the LTTE. Also, the Army Commander, General Sarath Fonseka, was appointed as the Chief of the Defense Staff (CDS), with wider powers for coordination of the military.[388] In December 2009, General Fonseka resigned from military service and ran for the presidency in 2010 under an alliance led by the UNP.[389] President Rajapaksa won the election, illustrating his popularity and the powerful influence of Sinhalese-Buddhists' rural values.[390]

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[385] Moorcraft, *Total Destruction of the Tamil Tigers,* 79.

[386] *Daily News* (Sri Lanka), "Redefining Civil-Military Balance."

[387] Ibid.

[388] Hogg, "Sri Lanka After the Tamil Tiger Defeat."

[389] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 201, 202.

[390] De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, 242.

The GoSL "feared that Fonseka was conspiring to lead a coup attempt."[391] The reelected President Rajapaksa put General Fonseka on trial on charges of engaging in politics while in uniform and for alleged irregularities in military procurements; the trial sentenced General Fonseka to a 30-month prison term and deprived him of his civil rights and credentials earned during his military career. General Fonseka was further sentenced to a three-year prison term based on the accusation of the Secretary of Defense of war crimes.[392] Also, the GoSL forced 12 military officers into compulsory retirement based on their alleged support of General Fonseka. Despite the GoSL's actions against the former military commander, who led the battle in the field, the military remained loyal to civilian authorities.[393] General Fonseka's arrest later and the lack of reaction from the military confirmed the strength of the existing structure as a barrier to possible military coup.

President Sirisena also continued the executive control; he made several changes to improve institutional control, as well. The MOD and the NSC remain the primary institutions that control and oversee the military. During the Rajapaksa administration, the MOD expanded its purview by including the UDA. The GoSL renamed the JOH as the Office of the Chief of Defense Staff (OCDS). Also, the state's protocol list continued to keep the OCDS and three service commanders at the 17th and 18th positions after the Attorney General, ensuring the supremacy of civilian bureaucracy.[394] President Sirisena further strengthened the military's subservience to civilian authorities by appointing civil administrative officers such as the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the State Intelligence Service (SIS), while creating a new portfolio of State Minister of Defense.

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[391] The Secretary of Defense, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, stated, "He [Fonseka] is planning a military rule. It was very clear in the latter stages, in the way he had spoken and addressed the people. He said he would not allow the politicians to rob the military of the victory they had achieved and offer a political solution. He was completely trying to isolate the politics and take the country on a different path." Fonseka had vehemently denied that he was plotting a coup, however. Also, "many see it as a total fabrication aimed at stiffing the Chief Presidential contender and his political allies." *Daily Mirror* (Sri Lanka), "Were the General and JVP Involved in a Coup Conspiracy?" February 12, 2010, accessed October 19, 2016, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.1278.

[392] Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 202.

[393] Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia, "Sri Lanka: Executive Summary."

[394] OMICS International, "Sri Lankan Order of Precedence," accessed November 6, 2016. http://research.omicsgroup.org/index.php/Sri_Lankan_order_of_precedence.

Also, the Police Department reverted back to the purview of the Ministry of Interior, Rule of Law, and Public Order. The legislature still did not have control over military affairs, however.

### b.  Oversight of the Military

Meanwhile, the oversight of the military showed an improvement. The legislature continued its marginal oversight over the defense budget while the Auditor General Department continued oversight of the handling of public funds. Also, the Supreme Court and the Human Rights Commission exercised their oversight through inquiring into complaints against the military personnel about their executive actions. There were critics on the restriction of oversight by the media and civil society organizations during the Rajapaksa administration.[395] Today, however, they enjoy a relatively free environment to oversee the activities of the security sector.

### c.  Professional Norms

In the meantime, the development of military professionalism steadily increased. The MOD continued to exercise control over the enlistment, promotion, service extension, overseas leave, and retirement of the military officer corps, while the scope of military training considerably improved. The local military training, the opportunities to obtain academic qualification from recognized universities, the number of military personnel following overseas training, and the number of Sri Lankan and foreign officers attending the DSCSC significantly increased.[396] Also, since 2011, the military officers had the opportunity to follow master's degree programs at the prestigious Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). In addition, Sri Lanka commenced several multi-national exercises: "Cormorant Strike," "Mitra Shakti" with the Indian military, and "Silk Route" with the Chinese military. Moreover, Sri Lanka began to conduct annual international

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[395] International Crisis Group, "Sri Lanka: Jumpstarting the Reform Process," 28.

[396] For instance, since 2007, 882 officers completed the Command and Staff course until 2016. 98 Sri Lankan officers and 15 foreign officers graduated in December 2015. Ministry of Defence Sri Lanka, "State Minister Graces DSCSC Graduation Ceremony," accessed November 11, 2016, http://www.defence.lk/ new.asp?fname=State_Minister_graces_DSCSC_Graduation_Ceremony_20151218_02.

military seminars: the Army's "Defense Seminar," the Navy's "Galle Dialogue," and the KDU's "Defense Symposium." These events significantly contributed to the development of the military's professionalism.

Increased engagement in non-military duties, however, also affected the military professionalism. The close interaction with politicians while performing CIMIC and personal protection duties led to the politicization of the military.[397] Also, the prerogatives such as posting of retired military elites in higher offices in the public sector and diplomatic appointments influenced them to develop links with politicians, eroding the norms of military professionalism.[398] If the alternate governments continue to appoint personnel to the officer corps based on political alliances, the military will continue to be politicized. In addition, the performance of non-military tasks, such as labor in construction, the cleaning of roads, and commercial activities has eroded the military's image.[399] Also, due to the lack of a proper de-mobilization program, the retired or deserted military personnel tend to engage in crimes, further tarnishing the military's image.

The new government implemented several measures for further improvement of the military's professionalism. The new State Minister of Defense portfolio's responsibility focuses on the development of military professionalism. The military's engagement in non-military tasks was restricted and the police and the Police Special Task Force became responsible for the security of the politicians. Also, the military elite's second careers in public sector appointments have been reduced. The mechanisms for institutional control and development of professionalism have had effects on the military's effectiveness.

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[397] Veena Gill, "India," 181.

[398] Among eleven points, Alfred Stepan's sixth prerogative suggests that employment of military personnel in senior civil appointments can create various levels of instability in different sectors. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 94–97.

[399] Alfred Stepan's tenth prerogative suggests that the military employment in state enterprise can create various levels of instability in different sectors. Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics,* 94–97.

## 2. Effectiveness of the Military

The military significantly developed its effectiveness during the protracted conflict with the LTTE. The previously discussed dynamics of the strategic environment demanded the continuing military assistance for post-conflict reconstruction. Also, the sudden down-size of the military was not possible due to socio-economic and political reasons. As a result, the military maintained its strength and capabilities while getting more opportunities to develop its professionalism. Further, the experience gained in the conflict helped the military to develop strategies to face future internal conflicts and to share their experience with foreign militaries. The following paragraphs discuss the plans and structures of the military and the commitment of resources for it.

### a. Plans: Doctrines and Strategies

The military needs to define its mission and roles in the present context. The defeat of the LTTE formally ended the military's counter-terrorism mission; reconstruction and nation-building roles ended when the civilian sector took over. In this context, the military needs a careful design of its mission and roles in order to maintain effectiveness. The future military mission and roles need to derive from the national security strategy that takes into account the current and future strategic environment. The Sri Lankan Defense sector began developing strategies and doctrines. The MOD took steps to formulate the national security strategy, the OCDS began to formulate a Joint Operations doctrine and the three services formulated respective tactical-level doctrines. All these strategies and plans should contribute to the fulfillment of desired military objectives, ultimately coinciding with national interests.

### b. Organizational Structures

The defense planning structures and process continued to be the same with minor developments. The MOD and the NSC continued as the principal elements of national security planning and co-ordination of agencies. The OCDS coordinated its joint operational matters with the three branches of the armed services and the Coastal Guards. The Navy, however, increased interoperability by establishing military-cooperation with Indian, Maldivian and other navies of the Indian Ocean Rim to mitigate maritime

challenges. In addition, the military increased its role in UN Peace Keeping missions. Several military officers had the opportunity to serve as staff officers at the UN Headquarters in New York and the number of military contingents increased.

Meanwhile, the military needs to balance its ethnic group representation. As discussed in the previous chapter, the military's composition is overwhelmingly Sinhalese. Balanced ethnic group representation in the military is paramount to the development of its effectiveness. The disproportionate composition of the military may lead other ethnic groups to question the military's legitimacy. Also, as in the past, the military may be perceived as an occupation force by minority ethnic groups, when deployed in areas dominated by them. Furthermore, the military personnel need encouragement to enhance the tri-linguistic capability to be effective in internal security and disaster response missions statewide.

### c.      *Commitment of Resources*

At the same time, the resource commitment to the military steadily declined. The defense budget increased, but the UDA and recurrent expenditures such as pay and allowances consume a large portion of it. Also, the enlistment/recruitment rates decreased in comparison to the number of personnel who retired or deserted the service. As a result, the organizations became ineffective because of the lack of personnel to fill the vacancies, particularly in the Army. The island-wide deployment increased the requirement of infrastructure and other facilities. The Army units continue to lack funds for sustenance and facilities such as infrastructure and transportation, however. This was the primary reason for the Army to engage in commercial activities. Rather than continuing with partially filled military units, it would be ideal to have the essential number of units by the amalgamation of units and demobilization. Obviously, this would be a politically sensitive decision and therefore, it is essential to have a plan to provide job opportunities or to pay substantial compensation to the demobilized personnel. This may be costly in the short term, but would definitely result in improvement of the CMR and thus democratization as a whole.

## E.     CHAPTER SUMMARY

The end of three decades of destructive terrorism gave Sri Lanka the opportunity for consolidating democracy. Given the dynamics of the existing strategic environment, however, it was essential to maintain the military's surveillance to prevent the resurgence of LTTE terrorism. Meanwhile, the military was deployed in the reconstruction of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, and nation building statewide. In the short-term, continuing militarization was successful in the decline of the LTTE's possible resurgence. It contributed to the successful implementation of reconstruction programs and thus helped democratic consolidation. In the longer term, however, continuing militarization in the absence of a credible armed threat became an impediment to the development of democratic institutions, which negatively affected the consolidation of democracy.

Meanwhile, continuing militarization affected the democratic CMR. The military had been a lucrative resource available for civilian authorities to fill the vacuums in a bureaucracy, which is supportive to attain governmental policies, and effective organizations to address immediate political issues. Thus, militarization helped to maintain political as well as economic stability, impressing civilian authorities. Also, the deployment in construction and management roles improved the technical and managerial skills of the military personnel. In addition, interaction with the civilians developed the military's sense of public responsiveness. The adequate manpower facilitated the release of military personnel for peacekeeping duties as per demand. Conversely, continuing deployment in mostly the civilian sphere of business at the behest of civilian authorities led to the decline of the military's image. Also, militarization in the absence of potential armed threat led to questioning the legitimacy of the military by the public. Moreover, the overwhelming Sinhala composition of the military reduced the military's legitimacy as a national force when deployed in security missions in minority-dominated areas.

At the same time, post-conflict militarization has been a point for mobilization for both Sinhala and ethno-nationalist politics. Also, glorification of the military victory led to the militarization of society and a political focus on ethnic divisions. This resulted in an ethnic insulation that severely undermined the prospects for national reintegration,

which is paramount for the consolidation of democracy. Meanwhile, militarization led to the politicization of the military, which severely affected its professionalism and further divided the military's political loyalties. Thus, the military deployment in post-conflict reconstruction resulted in short-term positive effects towards democratic consolidation, yet had both a positive and a negative impact on the democratic CMR. The next chapter will analyze the effects of the military's deployment for internal projects working toward democratic consolidation and the CMR from 1948 to 2016.

# V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

## A. ANALYSIS

How does post-conflict militarization affect the democratization of Sri Lanka? This chapter analyzes how the deployment of the military in different missions and roles affected the democratic consolidation and the CMR to derive the two aspects of the research problem. First is the effects of the militarization toward the "five arenas of a consolidated democracy," as proposed by Linz and Stepan.[400] Second is the effects of militarization toward the democratic civilian control and effectiveness of the military as per the new conceptualization of CMR by Bruneau and Matei.[401]

The analysis used the tasks performed by the military in different missions during the previously discussed different time periods.[402] The effects are measured as positive (P), negative (N), more positive and less negative (PN), more negative and less positive (NP), and not relevant (-). The Sri Lankan case uniquely illustrates that the initial deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction was not detrimental to democratization.[403] This research finds that deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction resulted in more positive effects in the short term and more negative effects in the longer term toward democratization. Also, given the military's dependency on procurements of military equipment from foreign countries, this research confirms the influence of external variables to the CMR, as mentioned in Chapter I.[404]

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[400] Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan propose five arenas of a consolidated democracy, which is described in Chapter I. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* 7.

[401] Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei's new conceptualization of CMR is described in Chapter I. Florina Cristiana Matei, "A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," 28.

[402] As discussed in the previous chapters, the political developments resulted in different military missions and roles, and the military's deployment in those tasks had both positive and negative effects towards democratization.

[403] Hashim asserts that "militaries are not effective development agencies…the spread of the military into domains beyond its purview poses the serious danger…to interfere in the political process." Hashim, *When Counterinsurgency Wins*, 203, 204.

[404] Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military,* 1.

### 1. Military Missions, Roles, and used Military Effects

The different military effects during varying roles provide a basis to analyze the effects of militarization toward democratization.[405] The citizens who used violence against the state became adversaries and those under the military's administration became clients of the military during internal and national security missions. Table 10s summarizes the military's missions and roles resultant from critical political developments from 1948 to 1990.

Table 10. Missions and Roles Performed by the Military: 1948–1990.

| Time Frame | Military Mission | Military's Roles | Used Military effects |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1948 -1971 | Assist the police to maintain law and order | • Anti-illicit emigration<br>• Protest/riot control<br>• Aid to civil powers | • Deterrence, Prevention<br>• Deterrence, Suppression |
| 1971 -1972 | Internal Security | • Fight JVP insurrection<br>• Aid to civil powers | • Deterrence, Suppression, Destroy<br>• Deterrence, Suppression |
| 1972-1977 | Assist the police to maintain law and order | • Anti-illicit emigration<br>• Protest/riot control<br>• Aid to civil powers | • Deterrence, Prevention<br>• Deterrence, Suppression |
| | Internal Security | • Fight Tamil's militarism<br>• Aid to civil powers | • Deterrence, Suppression |
| 1977-1983 | Internal Security | • Fight Tamil separatism<br>• Aid to civil powers | • Deterrence, Suppression, Defeat, Destroy<br>• Deterrence, Suppression |
| 1983 -1990 | Internal Security/ National Security | • Fight Tamil separatism<br>• Fight JVP insurrection<br>• Aid to civil powers | • Deterrence, Suppression, Defeat, Destroy<br>• Deterrence, Suppression |

Table 10 shows the gradual militarization of Sri Lanka in response to the insurgencies. From 1948 until the 1970s the country had been a de-militarized society.

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[405] Military effects are what the military do to achieve the desired end of the military strategy.

The primary mission of the military was anti-illicit immigration; protest and riot control, and assisting civil powers to maintain essential services during strikes, were the secondary roles. Although the military performed the latter two tasks under emergency law, the use of force was limited to deterrence and suppression as shown in the table. The military's use of force increased during the counterinsurgency operations against the JVP insurrection in 1971. The entire country, except for the Northern and Eastern Provinces, became militarized during this insurrection. Since 1972, the Tamil militants also used violence and the military had to use greater force to maintain law and order. The 1979 PTA provided more impunity and autonomy for the military to fight terrorism, thus increasing the militarization.

Consequently, the escalation of the Tamil separatist insurgency in 1983 strengthened the base for the militarization of the state. Both the Tamil militant groups' domination and the military's deployment and counterinsurgency operations increased the militarization in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Further, the conflict between the GoSL and the Tamil militants became internationalized, due to the flow of Sri Lankan refugees to other countries and the emergence of the external actor, the Tamil diaspora, to fight on another front against the GoSL. Also, as discussed in previous chapters, the Tamil diaspora became the lifeline of the LTTE, providing ideological, logistical, and international support. In addition, the government of Tamil Nadu supported the separatist movements in Sri Lanka while gathering international support against the GoSL. Thus, the GoSL's focus changed from internal security to national security. Eventually, in the late 1980s, the use of violence by the JVP insurrection, the LTTE's terrorism, and the GoSL's counterinsurgency campaigns led to the militarization of the entire country.

By the 1990s, due to the magnitude of the separatist threat from the LTTE, national security became paramount for Sri Lanka. The successive governments' policies in response to the LTTE threat resulted in the increase of militarization after the 1990s, as shows in Table 11. The LTTE became the sole Tamil terrorist group fighting to gain a separate state and expanded its activities island-wide. In response, the military also grew in strength and deployed statewide, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces. Thus, given the expansion of militarization, violence became an accepted norm in the society. Also,

the growth of the military's strength and development of civil society organizations that encouraged the use of violence increased the military culture in the state. Further, the increased number of deserters from military service became a societal problem in the militarized society. Meanwhile, the military used aid to civil power and civil affairs as strategies to strengthen the GoSL's control in Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Table 11.        Missions and Roles Performed by the Military: 1990–2009.

| Time Frame | Military Mission | Military's Roles | Used Military effects |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1990-1995 | National Security | • Fight the LTTE <br> • Aid to civil powers | • Defeat, Destroy <br> • Deterrence, Suppression |
| 1995 -2002 | National Security | • Fight the LTTE <br> • Protections of politicians <br> • Civil Affairs (Jaffna) <br> • Aid to civil powers | • Defeat, Destroy <br> • Surveillance, Deterrence, Suppression <br> • Winning hearts and minds <br> • Deterrence, Suppression |
| 2002-2006 | Assist the police to maintain law and order | • Civil Affairs (Jaffna) <br><br> • Aid to civil powers | • Winning hearts and minds <br><br> • Deterrence, Suppression |
| | National Security | • Defense against the LTTE | • Deterrence, Suppression |
| 2006- 2009 | National Security | • Fight the LTTE <br> • Protections of politicians <br> • Civil Affairs (Jaffna) <br> • Aid to civil powers | • Defeat, Destroy <br> • Surveillance, Deterrence, Suppression <br> • Winning hearts and minds <br> • Deterrence, Suppression |

In the meantime, the LTTE used the CFA to regain its fighting power, particularly during the 2002 CFA period, taking advantage of the military's defensive posture. The LTTE's growth of military power and terrorist activities amidst the CFA put Sri Lanka's national security at risk. In response, the GoSL commenced military operations to defeat the LTTE in 2006. The time period from July 2006 to May 2009 has been the most militarized duration of the country, as shown in the table. The military's offensive operations against the LTTE, the LTTE's terrorist attacks throughout the country, and the

majority Sinhalese public support to the military all resulted in the highest ever militarized duration of the country's history.

Despite the defeat of the LTTE, the GoSL continued the militarization. Given the dynamics of the strategic environment discussed in Chapter IV, the GoSL did not embark on an immediate de-militarization because security was paramount for the post-conflict reconstruction process.[406] Table 12 shows the missions and  roles performed and the effects used by the military during post-conflict reconstruction period.

Table 12.    Missions and Roles Performed by the Military: 2010–2016.

| Time Frame | Military Mission | Military's Roles | Used Military effects |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010-2015 | National Security/ Internal Security | • Prevent revival of the LTTE <br> • Counter non-traditional threats <br> • Protection for politicians | • Surveillance, Deterrence, Suppression |
| | State-building | • Aid to civil authorities for reconstruction of Northern and Eastern Provinces | |
| | Nation-building | • Assist civil authorities for infrastructure construction, maintain public facilities, and social services <br> • Provide leadership training <br> • Community relations projects | |
| | Assist the police to maintain law and order | • Protest/Riot Control <br> • Aid to civil powers | • Deterrence, Suppression |
| 2015 onwards | Assist the police to maintain law and order | • Aid to civil powers | • Deterrence, Suppression |

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[406] According to Jabareen, security and order come first in the sequencing of post-conflict reconstruction because "although it may freeze the conflict temporarily, it will not prevent it from reemerging in the near future." Jabareen, "Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Reconstruction," 114.

Also, given the military's availability in location, resources, and skills in versatile fields, such as construction, demining, and management, its support was important for the civil authorities to reconstruct the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern provinces.[407] The continuation of security is a reason to deny the revival of the LTTE, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Also, the military was not required to use force in relation to the period from 1977 to 2009, as shown in Tables 6, 7, and 8.

Thus, by 2012, the military had to disengage from its roles in aid of civil power because the police and civil authorities were able to operate the administrative machinery. Moreover, the GoSL lifted the emergency law in November 2011 due to the absence of the threat of revival of the LTTE. The military continued its presence in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and in countrywide nation-building roles, however. The next section analyzes the effects of militarization toward democratic consolidation and the CMR.

## 2.    Effects of Militarization toward Democratic Consolidation

The deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction affects democratic consolidation. Continuing security is paramount for the reconstruction programs because the end of the conflict does not mark the end of security threats immediately, as discussed in Chapter I. Also, the military has to perform a vital role in assisting civil authorities until the restoration of normalcy. Moreover, there is no clear line between the responsibilities of the military and the civil authorities as discussed in Chapter I. In this context, Table 13 shows the effects of the deployment of the military in different roles toward democratic consolidation.

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[407] According to Joint Plan for Assistance Northern Province 2011, by the end of 2011, the GoSL together with international and local partners completed a major portion of the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, de-mining, and resettlement of IDPs. Government of Sri Lanka, United Nations & Partners, "Joint Action Plan for Assistance: Northern Province 2011."

Table 13.    Effects of the Military's Different Roles toward
Democratic Consolidation.

| Military's Roles | Prerequisite and Five Arenas of Democratic Consolidation | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | State (1) | Civil Society | Political Society | Rule of Law | Economy | Bureaucracy |
| Ceremonial duties | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Disaster / strike response | - | NP | - | - | P | NP |
| Protest/Riot control | - | N | N | N | - | N |
| Anti-illicit immigration | P | - | - | P | - | PN |
| Fight the JVP | P | PN | PN | PN | PN | P |
| Aid to civil powers | - | NP | N | - | P | N |
| Fight the LTTE | P | PN | PN | PN | PN | P |
| Protection of politicians | - | - | -(2) | -(2) | - | - |
| Civil Affairs | - | NP | N | - | P | N |
| Post-Conflict Reconstruction | | | | | | |
| Continuing Security (statewide) | P | NP | NP | NP | P | NP |
| Assist Reconstruction of North and East | P | P | P | P | P | NP |
| Assist Nation-building • Infrastructure construction | - | - | - | - | P | N |
| • Maintain public facilities | - | - | - | - | - | N |
| • Social services | - | NP | N | - | - | N |
| • Provide leadership training | - | NP | - | - | - | - |
| • Community relations projects | - | NP | - | - | - | N |

Notes: Consolidation of state's sovereignty. Use of security personnel for political
purposes negatively affects the arena.

### a.    *Before and During the Conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE*

Since 1948, the military has performed different missions. Counterinsurgency,
crime prevention, humanitarian assistance, and PSO were the macro roles, and they
contained a number of micro roles.[408] Those roles, which are listed in Table 10, had

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[408] Military missions come under six categories: "external and internal wars, counter terrorism, crime prevention, humanitarian assistance, and peace support operations (PSO)." Matei, "A New Conceptualization." 31.

differently affected the prerequisite and five arenas of the democratic consolidation process. It was a result of variation in the degree of use of force in achieving previously discussed desired military effects. The military frequently performed search and rescue tasks during disasters, strengthening the bureaucracy, but continuing involvement in damage mitigation undermined the development of civil society organizations' and bureaucracy's capacity to respond to disasters.

Civil society organizations, such as labor or trade unions and different interest groups that represent religious, ethnic, and linguistic values, must have the freedom to express their dissent. It is the responsibility of the police to control the protests or riots to maintain law and order. The call for the military's assistance does mean that the police had exhausted its force. When the military engage in riot or protest control, the degree of use of force was relatively high and it negatively affected all arenas; the use of the military to maintain essential services such as harbors, postal and transport services during strikes, however, positively affected the economy. Also, anti-illicit immigration duties positively affected the consolidation of the state's sovereignty and rule of law as it prevented the change of the country's demography by unlawful means; it negatively affected the development of the capacity of bureaucracy, however. The law enforcement agencies tend to rely on the military rather than developing capabilities to perform their duties.

The military's counterinsurgency roles during the JVP insurrections in 1971 and 1987–1990, and the LTTE's separatism from 1983 to 2009, helped to consolidate the state's sovereignty and more positively affected all five arenas. The autonomy and impunity with special powers given under the emergency law and the 1979 PTA negatively affected the freedom of civil society, autonomy of the political society and the rule of law, however. Also, as discussed in previous chapters, the conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE resulted in the increase of the defense budget. The increase of the defense budget decreased the allocations for economic development activities, such as infrastructure development and poverty alleviation, thus negatively affecting the economy. Conversely, defense expenditures helped to keep the South of the country in peace, giving an impression to local and international business communities of a stable

economy.[409] Further, the military has become the main public sector employer, helping to stabilize the economies in agricultural and rural districts. Thus, militarization created positive effects for the economy.

The military aid to civil powers, civil affairs, and the protection of vulnerable persons created short-term positive and long-term negative effects. During an insurgency, when a government's control is established in an area, it is the responsibility of the military to perform tasks such as maintenance of law and order, coordination of administrative matters, and assistance to civilians to establish livelihood. Hence, immediately after establishing the GoSL's control, the military's performance of such tasks in the North and East, particularly in Jaffna, positively affected the civil society, economy, and bureaucracy. The military has to disengage from these tasks, however, as the civilian authorities gain or regain their capacity to undertake such responsibilities as are under their purview. Thus, the military's continuation of such tasks became an obstacle to the development of civil and political societies, economy, and the bureaucracy. Also, the military's protection of politicians in the absence of a credible threat, and the use of security personnel by the politicians in their political tasks, severely affected the civil and political societies and the rule of law.[410]

### b.    Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The continuation of security created both positive and negative effects to democratic consolidation. In the short term it created positive affects to all arenas, but negative effects to most arenas in the longer run. As discussed in the previous chapters, continuing security is paramount to prevent the reemergence of insurgency, providing protection to the reconstruction process. The military continued security duties in a relatively low degree; however, there was no credible indication or intelligence on resurgence of the LTTE and emergency law was lifted in November 2011. Thus, the deterrence created by the presence of the military negatively affected the civil and

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[409] Saroja Selvanathan and Eliyathamby A. Selvanathan, "Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth," 76.

[410] During the 2001 elections, Deputy Defense Minister Ratwatte used his security personnel for political purposes. De Silva, *Sri Lanka and the Defeat of the LTTE*, 230.

political societies, the rule of law, and bureaucracy. As discussed in the previous chapters, deployment of the military under emergency law and the PTA restricts the freedoms of the citizen and gives impunity to the military. Also, continuing security led critics to describe Sri Lanka as a national security state; this negatively affected the economy due to the conditions laid by Western countries in giving economic concessions, such as tariff relief for exportation of garments to the Europe .[411]

The military's deployment in the Northern and Eastern provinces to assist reconstruction created positive effects and negative effects in the longer run. The military was an active partner in the reconstruction program that consisted of Uthuru Wasanthaya, Negenahira Udanaya, and the 5R strategy. As discussed previously, these projects came to an end by 2012 and there was no requirement of the military's assistance. Hence, the military's continuing presence and deployment in HSZs created negative effects toward all arenas.

The military's deployment in nation-building tasks created short-term positive and longer-term more effects that are negative. Tasks such as the construction of infrastructure and the maintenance of public facilities are civilian works. When the military engaged in such tasks, it undermined the development of civil organizations, as civil organizations cannot compete with the military's ability to produce results with low cost; this is because the military uses its own resources, which are maintained by the public funds. Also, the maintenance of public facilities, such as cricket stadiums and jogging paths, are civilian tasks. The deployment of the military in such tasks undermined the development of civilian bureaucracy.

Further, due to the popularity of the military, civil organizations and schools frequently sought the military's assistance to conduct leadership lectures and programs. This helped to develop civil society. The conduct of leadership training programs for the university entrants negatively affected the civil society, however, because those programs were not a request of the university students. Also, those programs were criticized as the

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[411] Neil DeVotta, "The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Lost Quest for Separatism in Sri Lanka," *Asian Survey* 49 (2009): 1048, accessed February 29, 2016, http://jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2009.49.6.1021.

GoSL's effort to undermine the university students' organizations. Those training programs helped the trainees to organize themselves, however, thus encouraging their participation in societal activities.

The military's participation in social services and community relations projects created both positive and negative effects. The military assisted the civil authorities in social services such as dengue awareness programs. It helped civil society organizations to strengthen themselves to perform their responsibilities. Conversely, it resulted in the civil society organizations' dependency on the military. Also, the military provided assistance to the schools, religious and charity organizations to organize their functions. Eventually, most of those organizations became dependent on the military and considered that such tasks are the military's responsibility. Conversely, the military engaged in the search and perform CIMIC tasks, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces. These events undermined the development of civil society organizations that are responsible to take up those matters.

### 3.    Effects of Militarization toward Democratic Civil-Military Relations

The deployment of the military in internal missions, particularly during post-conflict reconstruction, affects democratic CMR. The continuing security and the military's engagement in day-to-day affairs of Sri Lanka's civil society, result in the military's popularity among the public and, conversely, the decline of its image in the absence of a credible security threat. In this context, Table 14 shows the effects of deployment of the military in different roles toward democratic CMR.

Table 14.    Effects of the Military's Different Roles toward Democratic CMR.

| Military's Roles | Democratic Civilian Control | | | Effectiveness of the Military | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Institutions | Oversight | Professionalism | Plans | Structures | Resources |
| Ceremonial duties | - | - | P | - | - | - |
| Disaster /strike response | P | - | NP | P | - | - |
| Protest/Riot control | P | - | N | - | P | P |
| Anti-illicit immigration | P | - | - | - | - | - |
| Fight the JVP | P | NP | PN | P | P | P |
| Aid to civil powers | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Fight the LTTE | P | NP | PN | P | P | P |
| Protection of politicians | - | N | N | - | - | - |
| Civil Affairs | - | | NP | P | P | - |
| Post-Conflict Reconstruction | | | | | | |
| Continuing Security (statewide) | NP | PN | PN | P | P | P |
| Assist Reconstruction of North and East | - | N | NP | - | - | P |
| Assist Nation-building | - | - | - | - | - | P |
| • Infrastructure construction | - | - | NP | - | - | - |
| • Maintain public facilities | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| • Social services | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| • Provide leadership training • Community relations projects | - | - | - | - | - | - |

### a.    *Before and During the Conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE*

The military's deployment in strike and disaster responses created positive and negative effects to the CMR. Strike responses only resulted in the negative effects to professional norms because the military performed those tasks against their professional responsibilities at the behest of the GoSL. The civil authorities heavily rely on the military in disaster response. That is because the military always becomes the first

respondents in search and rescue tasks. Also, the military developed plans to assist civil authorities in disaster management.

The JVP insurrections and the LTTE's separatism significantly affected the civilian control of the military. Given the threat posed by those insurgencies, the civilian leadership exerted greater civilian control of the military. The autonomy and impunity received by the military during these insurgencies resulted in the media and civil society organizations increasing oversight over the military's actions. The President's executive powers, however, imposed restrictions on the media and NGOs for oversight. Also, the legislature, judiciary, and other public organizations did not have powers to exercise considerable oversight given the authority of the President. The military developed professional norms—expertise, sense of responsibility, and corporateness—through increased training and the experience gained, particularly during three decades of fighting with the LTTE. The politicization and ethnicization of the military during the conflict negatively affected professionalism, however. Politicization created a divided military affecting its political neutrality while ethnicization affected its impartiality.

Additionally, the insurgencies significantly affected the military effectiveness. As discussed in previous chapters, the GoSL paid attention to develop military effectiveness after the 1971 JVP insurrection. The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE was the main reason to increase military effectiveness, particularly after the 1990s. At the time of final operations, the military developed doctrines, strategies, and military structures suited to counter the LTTE. Also, the commitment of resources was high to facilitate the structural changes and plans of the military. The country's dependency on foreign assistance for military procurement, however, has been a significant factor affecting the military effectiveness. Thus, the ability of the GoSL to acquire military equipment became a variable in the CMR of Sri Lanka. Further, the increased effectiveness, military strength and defense budget resulted in the increase of militarization of the country.

The military's protection for politicians negatively affected professionalism because it led to politicization of the military and also the politicians to abuse the military. The military's role in civil affairs, however, had more positive effects toward the CMR. Frequent association with the politicians during civil affairs admittedly lead to

politicizing the military while it helps to enhance military expertise in specific skills such as construction and management. Also, the Army developed plans and structures to perform civil affairs tasks at the behest of the government.

### b. Post-Conflict Reconstruction

The deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction continued to affect civilian control over the military. The defeat of the LTTE terminated the military's three decades of military missions. Counterinsurgency and continuation of security legitimized the military's existence without downsizing. Also, the continuation of security more positively affected the CMR, as shown in Table 9. Although General Fonseka's issue created tensions on civilian control, the situation became normal. As discussed in previous chapters, given the powers of the executive President, civilian control of the military remains strong and the possibility for a military coup to succeed is unlikely.

The legislature's oversight of the military continued to remain weak, however, while judiciary exercise limited oversight. Also, the GoSL'S glorification of the military victory and the popularity of the military among the public contributed to restrict the oversight by media and civil organizations. Later, oversight of the military increased with the change of governments in 2015. Further, establishment of parliamentary committees to examine and review military procurements and expenditure, and creation of more proactive judiciary and military justice mechanisms would enhance the oversight of the military. Additionally, given the increase of the military's strength, it is necessary to create a sizable civilian defense and strategic experts who are conversant on national security issues.

The continuing training process led to the further development of professionalism. The KDU and the DSCSC and other training institutes increased their facilities and the number of foreign training opportunities also increased. The multinational exercises and international seminars mentioned in Chapter IV, and increased PSOs, further developed the military's interoperability. Politicization of the military continued to affect its political neutrality, however. The new government established the State Ministry of Defense, which has the purview of the DSCSC, Defense College, and the Cadet Corps.

This is a significant effort to professionalize the military and could be further developed by expanding the purview of the State Ministry of Defense including other joint training institutes, the KDU and the JSLTI.

The military's effectiveness was positively affected by the continuation of security. Now the military has the opportunity to assess the lessons learned and formulate new strategies and structures to prevent the emergence of any insurgency. The Army established the Army Training Command (ARTRAC) to revise and formulate doctrines and established seven Security Force Headquarters (SFHQs) island-wide to assist the police when required and to respond to disasters. Similarly, the Navy and the Air Force also did redeployments and development of their doctrines. The military needs to redefine its missions in the current strategic environment, however. In addition, the defense budget continued to grow with the addition of the UDA to the MOD. Also, the defense budget will remain because the major amount of the budget goes for recurrent expenditure, such as the pay and allowances of military personnel. Given the sensitivity of downsizing the military due to possible adverse social and economic impacts, military strength remains unchanged.

### 4.    Summary of the Analysis

Post-conflict militarization is an eventual process in the Sri Lankan context. The period from 1948 to the 1970s was a demilitarized era due to the absence of any formidable threats to security. Thus, the successive governments used the military for non-military tasks to solve political problems resultant from their policies. In the short term, the military's deployment in internal roles was successful in achieving these goals; in the longer term, however, it led to the politicization and ethnicization of the military. Since 1971, Sri Lanka has faced insurgencies that posed formidable threats to the state's sovereignty. In response, the successive governments used the military to counter those insurgencies. Decades of counterinsurgency campaigns eventually resulted in the militarization of the country.

The defeat of the LTTE did not mark an end to the insurgency. Thus, the GoSL continued the militarization to consolidate security and to implement post-conflict

reconstruction tasks. The post-conflict militarization resulted in more short-term positive effects and more negative effects in the longer term toward democratic consolidation and the CMR. Also, the external support became a variable for the CMR. Although the critics suggest downsizing the military and demilitarizing the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the GoSL cannot implement such measures immediately. Rapid implementation of such measures would lead to political and economic instability in the country. Thus, demilitarization has to be a phased process, which has to take into account the current strategic environment

## B.    CONCLUSION

This thesis argues that the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction creates positive and negative implications toward the democratization of Sri Lanka. The review of the existing literature on the subject establishes the theoretical framework on democratic consolidation and CMR, and their applications in the Sri Lankan context. Having established a framework, the thesis sets the background for understanding the implications of the political developments from 1948 to 2009 for democratization, as well as gradual militarization. In sum, the main finding of this thesis is that Sri Lanka's post-conflict militarization has short-term positive implications and long-term negative implications towards democratic consolidation and the CMR.

First, the thesis finds that the militarization of Sri Lanka is not a new phenomenon, but a gradual process due to a long-time insurgency threat. Since independence in 1948, political power has alternated between the two major political parties, the UNP and the SLFP, or coalitions led by them. The political competition between the two parties, and the significant influence of left-wing radical and militant political parties, particularly the JVP, shaped the policies of the successive governments. The combination of nationalistic politics and the failure or slow progress of economic policies eventually resulted in two insurgencies. The 1971 and 1987–1990 JVP insurrections and the LTTE's terrorism from the 1970s to 2009 ravaged the country. In response, the successive governments deployed the military in counterinsurgency efforts. Thus, militarization became a persistent theme from the 1970s onwards.

Second, since independence, the military performed a firefighter role (multiple tasks) as well as a police officer role (law enforcement). The deployment of the military in non-military roles became a constant practice of the successive governments during pressing problems, such as breakdown of law and order and essential services due to the lack of capable institutions to undertake development projects. Since independence, the GoSL deployed the military to maintain vital services during strikes. Also, the military frequently assisted the police in maintaining law and order. The use of the military by the GoSL in addressing the LTTE's terrorism had two purposes. The military prevented the LTTE from achieving its goals of establishing the separate state through military means and pushed the group to the negotiating table; the GoSL searched for a negotiated political solution. In the end, the GoSL militarily defeated the LTTE due to the failure of negotiations end as shown in the case of the Norwegian-brokered CFA . Given the strategic environment prevailing in 2009, it is not strange that the GoSL deployed the military in post-conflict reconstruction.

Third, the power alternation between the UNP and the SLFP, or coalitions led by them, resulted in the politicization and ethnicization of the military, which had a long-term impact on democratization. Both the UNP and the SLFP politicized the military by using the symbols of Sinhalese ethnicity to mobilize and recruit for the nation. The conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE further increased the process as the LTTE attacks focused on the Sinhalese. This negatively affected the military's professionalism. As discussed in the chapter III, an ethnically mixed military would be a more credible national force. Also, in the future, it would be a significant step toward the ongoing reconciliation process.

The fourth important implication of the findings is the need for the military to redefine its mission. The defeat of the LTTE ended the military's long-lasting counterinsurgency mission. Given the magnitude of the Tamil diaspora's quest for a separate state and non-traditional threats, such as transnational crimes, the military has to continue its firefighter role until relevant agencies are capable to undertake their responsibilities. Sri Lanka could be the peacemaker of South Asia by being neutral amidst the superpower competition in the context of an Indo-Asia-Pacific security

construct, due to its non-alignment with those super powers. Thus, the military could eventually change to a peacekeeper role in the region. Providing security in the Sri Lankan maritime domain, assisting major powers to strengthen protection in the Indian Ocean vis a vis piracy, increasing participation in the UN peacekeeping missions, search and rescue during disasters, assisting the police to maintain law and order—these could become the micro roles. For this, the military needs to develop conventional warfighting capabilities because, as Huntington notes, a conventionally capable force could undertake any micro roles.[412]

Fifth, although the LTTE is defeated, the immediate downsizing of the military is not possible due to several reasons. The huge public opinion against the reduction of the military's strength is the main reason. This results from the Sinhalese' suspicion on the revival of the LTTE, which is reinforced by the activities of the Tamil diaspora and the Tamil Nadu's governments, as discussed in chapter IV. Constructive diplomatic engagement with the Tamil diaspora and India, and increasing the military's effectiveness through modernization would eventually help to change that public opinion. Also, the release of military personnel into society without a proper arrangement to re-employ them would lead to increased crime rates and economic instability in rural districts. Thus, it is necessary to have a mechanism to use the skills of military personnel for national development for now, and then to reintegrate the demobilized personnel into society with employment opportunities.

Sixth, and very important implication is the effects of deployment of the military in firefighter and police officer roles toward democratic consolidation and the CMR. The security provided by the military during the insurgencies helped to develop all arenas of democratic consolidation, particularly, the protection of the state' sovereignty. Deployment of the military under emergency law and the PTS severely affected the rule of law, however. The military's deployment in nonmilitary tasks helped to develop the

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[412] Samuel P. Huntington, "Keynote: Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military," in *Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. James R. Graham (National Defense University Press, 1993), 12.

economy and supported the bureaucracy in the short term, but negatively affected the development of civil and political societies, and the bureaucracy, in the long term.

Moreover, the undertaking of the civilian sphere of business by the military negatively affected the development of bureaucracy, as well as the private sector. Contrary to the criticism that an increased defense budget means less funding for development, in Sri Lanka, militarization helped the development of the economy during the conflict, as illustrated by the economic growth rate of the country. Thus, in spite of the wider belief that the military is not a suitable actor in post-conflict reconstruction, this thesis, using Linz and Stepan's five arenas of democratic consolidation, finds that the deployment of the military positively affected the consolidation of democracy in the short term. It created a military involved in the economy and internal defense, which may have negative impacts in the longer term, however.

In addition, the deployment of the military in internal roles positively and negatively affected the democratic CMR. Civilian governments have administered the country throughout its post-colonial history. Tensions for the CMR, however, occurred during suspected military coups resultant from the political use of the military by the governments in solving political problems, as shown in Chapter II. Also, the lack of oversight of the military during the conflict, its legitimate grievances due to its sacrifices in the field, its popularity among the public as the savior of the nation, and its autonomy may result in tensions for the CMR. Meanwhile, the conflict between the GoSL and the LTTE led to a dramatic increase of the military's effectiveness. Greater experience, training and budgets helped to develop military strategies, professionalism and structures. Thus, using Bruneau and Matei's newly conceptualized trinity framework of CMR, this thesis finds that the deployment of the military in post-conflict reconstruction has both positive and negative implications toward the democratic CMR.

Finally, in Sri Lanka, the possibility for a military coup to succeed is unlikely anytime soon due to several reasons. First, the democratic civilian control of the military itself is strong enough to prevent any such attempt. Also, the military is controlled through the defense budget. Second, the military elites are knowledgeable of their responsibility in a democracy, that is, to be subservient to the elected civilian

government; in other words, the military has bought the idea that democracy is the only game in town. The division of the military on political allegiance, as illustrated by Chaminda Wijayaratne in his thesis, is the third underlining factor.[413] When political power alternates between the UNP and the SLFP, the military tends to be politically neutral and restrained from developing corporate interests. .

It is necessary to further increase the civilian control of the military. The development of mechanisms for legislative oversight over budget appropriation and spending would be useful. Also, adequate budget allocation for infrastructure development and the welfare of the military could help it to disengage from economic activities to raise funds for those purposes. The syllabus of the DSCSC needs to include CMR as a subject and the introduction of seminars on CMR for high-ranking military officers would be useful. The further development of education is essential to inculcate the ethos of human security instead of mere national security. Thus, the development of the military's professionalism is the best way to strengthen the civilian control of the military. Therefore, in the present strategic environment the best professional role for the Sri Lankan military would be the peacekeeper of the Indian Ocean.

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[413] Chaminda A.M.P. Wijayaratne,"Civil-military relations in Post-conflict Sri Lanka: Successful Civilian Consolidation in the Face of Political Competition," (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 94.

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