



**NAVAL  
POSTGRADUATE  
SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

**DEFENSE ANALYSIS  
CAPSTONE PROJECT REPORT**

**STABILIZATION OPERATIONS THROUGH MILITARY  
CAPACITY BUILDING—INTEGRATION BETWEEN  
DANISH CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL  
OPERATIONS FORCES**

by

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December 2016

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.				
<b>1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)</b>	<b>2. REPORT DATE</b> December 2016	<b>3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED</b> Capstone project report		
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> STABILIZATION OPERATIONS THROUGH MILITARY CAPACITY BUILDING—INTEGRATION BETWEEN DANISH CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES			<b>5. FUNDING NUMBERS</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Jesper J. D. Andreassen, Kenneth Boesgaard, Anders D. Svendsen				
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Danish Special Operations Command, Aalborg, Denmark			<b>10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b> The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____.				
<b>12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			<b>12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE</b>	
<b>13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)</b>  Due to instability in Africa and the Middle East, Denmark's political commitment to deploy troops to stabilize fragile regions is not expected to decrease in the near future. The political ambition for Denmark is to conduct stabilization efforts through military capacity building under the framework of shape-secure-develop. This requires targeting both the physical and the cognitive domains. For Denmark to sustain long-term stabilization operations, different approaches to integrate and synchronize the efforts of both conventional forces and special operations forces must be explored. This capstone makes use of two different conceptual scenarios: one of conflict prevention and one of conflict intervention. With conflict prevention, we contend that conventional forces and special operations forces should be fully integrated across doctrine, organization, and technology, and predominantly advise, mentor, and train local forces. With conflict intervention, military forces should predominantly partner and assist local forces through operational mentoring liaison teams and village stability operations. This capstone makes additional recommendations related to doctrine, organization, and technology, as well as education and training.				
<b>14. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Danish Defence, military capacity building, stabilization operations, integration, synchronization, conventional forces, special operations forces, task assignment, full integration, conflict prevention, conflict intervention, doctrine, organization, technology, partner, assist, advise, mentor, train, shape-secure-develop, operational mentoring and liaison teams, village stability operations, Africa, Middle East.			<b>15. NUMBER OF PAGES</b> 141	
			<b>16. PRICE CODE</b>	
<b>17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT</b> Unclassified	<b>18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE</b> Unclassified	<b>19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT</b> Unclassified	<b>20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b> UU	

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**STABILIZATION OPERATIONS THROUGH MILITARY CAPACITY  
BUILDING—INTEGRATION BETWEEN DANISH CONVENTIONAL FORCES  
AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Due to instability in Africa and the Middle East, Denmark's political commitment to deploy troops to stabilize fragile regions is not expected to decrease in the near future. The political ambition for Denmark is to conduct stabilization efforts through military capacity building under the framework of shape-secure-develop. This requires targeting both the physical and the cognitive domains. For Denmark to sustain long-term stabilization operations, different approaches to integrate and synchronize the efforts of both conventional forces and special operations forces must be explored. This capstone makes use of two different conceptual scenarios: one of conflict prevention and one of conflict intervention. With conflict prevention, we contend that conventional forces and special operations forces should be fully integrated across doctrine, organization, and technology, and predominantly advise, mentor, and train local forces. With conflict intervention, military forces should predominantly partner and assist local forces through operational mentoring liaison teams and village stability operations. This capstone makes additional recommendations related to doctrine, organization, and technology, as well as education and training.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Denmark's involvement in stabilization operations is expected to continue in the future. The prioritized regions will be Africa and the Middle East since these regions' fragile states pose a threat to Danish and European security interests. However, the focus will likely shift from large-scale military interventions toward conflict prevention. The military's primary task will be to provide a safe and secure environment for non-military actors, emphasizing local sustainable solutions.

Building military institutions and units is a key component of this process. The local military needs to be in charge and interact with the local population, thereby legitimizing the local government and stabilizing the country. This means a small foreign military footprint and requires that foreign military advisors have good cultural knowledge, can operate with only limited support, and have a thorough understanding of the military's role as just one element in a comprehensive approach. Traditionally, special operations forces have been used for these types of missions. However, over the past decade, conventional forces have been used for certain military capacity building tasks and have gained experience with these types of missions. This overlap of mission sets between conventional forces and special operations forces should now be used to improve military capacity building and make long-term missions more sustainable by deploying a mix of conventional forces and special operations forces.

Two different scenarios are described in order to come up with a "way ahead" for military capacity building. The overall doctrinal solution in both scenarios is based on a "shape-secure-develop" strategy and should include both kinetic and non-kinetic effects. One scenario focuses on conflict prevention, while the other scenario focuses on conflict intervention. The scenarios are interconnected, since a successful conflict intervention should eventually evolve into conflict prevention.

Military capacity building in a conflict prevention scenario is best addressed via full integration, in which different units or individuals are integrated and merged into a task force. For a conflict intervention scenario, the best solution is task assignment, in which

units stay organizationally intact and conduct different missions while still working to achieve a common overall objective.

To successfully conduct military capacity building, the Danish Armed Forces must be capable of both responses. In terms of doctrine, organization, and technology task assignment seems to align well with current Danish Armed Forces' capabilities while full integration appears to present a challenge. The following recommendations could help address this challenge.

- Practical and theoretical training and education about military capacity building should be methodically integrated into the Danish military educational system at all levels for both officers and non-commissioned officers.
- Joint seminars and courses on military capacity building should be offered frequently to disseminate knowledge and ensure common understanding of doctrine and procedures.
- Joint military capacity building training exercises, including both conventional and special operations forces, should be conducted on a regular basis to ensure a common understanding of settings, doctrine, and planning according to the shape-secure-develop doctrine. The focus should be on those of the staff level.
- A joint center of excellence in military capacity building should be created. This center should collect and maintain experiences, coordinate efforts between the services and commands, and provide military guidance on military capacity building to senior military and political decision makers.
- Personnel for military capacity building should be individually selected based on criteria that relate to their advisory role.
- A dedicated joint unit to conduct military capacity building should be created.
- A database of personnel with capacity building qualifications should be created. On request and demand, personnel with the right qualifications can be designated for stabilization and capacity building missions.
- Unit deployment cycles and deployment durations have to be aligned between the services, which is especially important in full integration missions.

These recommendations are solely focused on how to improve Danish military capacity building. They do not take into account the effects that their implementation will have on other of the Danish Armed Forces' tasks. Separate studies on these effects should be conducted before any of the recommendations are implemented.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

Many people have had an influence on the process of making this capstone. We would like to thank the Chair of the Defense Analysis Department, Dr. John Arquilla, and all the professors from the Defense Analysis Department at Naval Postgraduate School. They have all added to the process of this capstone either by direct discussions of specific topics or indirectly through the different classes they teach. However, our biggest gratitude goes to our advisors, Professor Kalev Sepp and Professor Anna Simons. As a great complementary team, their guidance and critique have been invaluable to the shaping of our capstone, and we are sincerely thankful for all their help. Last, but not least, we would like to thank our families for their support. By carrying the majority of the workload on the home front, they have made it possible for us to focus on our studies and this capstone.

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## PREFACE

The purpose of this capstone is to provide solutions so that conventional forces and special operations forces can better integrate and synchronize efforts to achieve regional stabilization through military capacity building. The idea for this study came about as a response to the lack of integration and synchronization between conventional forces and special operations forces based on our personal experiences during previous deployments. Attending the postgraduate program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, has given us the time and opportunity to address this challenge. This capstone was written in close collaboration among the three of us.

The capstone presents a number of concepts and solutions of a generalizable nature, but is mainly focused on Danish interests and how the Danish Armed Forces can better integrate and synchronize conventional forces and special operations forces in military capacity building to achieve better solutions at lower costs. We have kept the project at a conceptual level in order to provide generalizable knowledge that can be utilized in a broad number of situations. By choosing this approach, we sought to be broad rather than country- or location-specific. Additional studies will be required if our ideas are to be operationalized. It is especially important to understand that the ideas and concepts presented in this capstone can only work if they are adapted to the specific countries involved and the context in which a military capacity building mission takes place.

In order to reach the broadest possible audience, this capstone has been kept unclassified, using only open-source information. More accurate classified data might exist, but will not affect the overall presented solutions. Because the capstone is intended for a Danish audience, we have chosen to use the analytical model developed by Lieutenant Colonel K. V. Nielsen of Denmark, which displays the interdependence between doctrine, organization, and technology. NATO uses the more elaborate model of Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership & Education, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability (DOTMLPFI). In order to simplify the capstone and make it more accessible to the reader, we have chosen to subsume the categories covered by

DOTMLPFI under doctrine, organization and technology in Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Nielsen's model. Furthermore, we have chosen to avoid the question of strategic, operational, and tactical levels, since this can open up an area of discussion that is irrelevant to the solutions presented. Finally, this capstone is written at a United States university and is therefore subject to the spelling and grammar of American English. However, the Danish Defence utilizes British spelling and grammar. Therefore, names of Danish institutions and units are spelled using British spelling, for example Danish Defence Command.

We sincerely hope that you will enjoy reading the capstone and that you find the proposed solutions significant.

Jesper Andreassen, Kenneth Boesgaard, Anders Svendsen

Monterey, California  
December 2016

## I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### A. INTRODUCING THE STUDY

The vast majority of wars thus far in the 21st century have been fought within states.<sup>1</sup> Although wars between states cannot be ruled out, there is little evidence pointing to a future change of the current general picture. At the same time, big interventionary counterinsurgency operations, as experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, may be over for a while.<sup>2</sup> The enormous quantity of military resources spent on these conflicts has produced only very limited results. Future stabilization efforts will instead likely be based on a strategy of a small military footprint and local solutions to local problems.<sup>3</sup> Special operations forces have traditionally been used for these types of missions. With their flexible mindset, cultural awareness, and small size, special operations forces can operate independently in remote areas to help build up the capacity of local forces. However, such efforts require a long-term commitment to be successful and special operations forces units are a scarce resource—especially for a small nation like Denmark.

After being involved in the conflict in Afghanistan since 2002 and in Iraq since 2003, Denmark has in 2015 and 2007 respectively, withdrawn the bulk of its troops from these theaters. However, Denmark's political commitment to deploy troops to support stabilization efforts is not expected to decrease in the near future for either conventional forces or special operations forces. Danish special operations forces and conventional forces have deployed to Mali and Iraq in 2016, while conventional forces are still in

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<sup>1</sup> Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014," *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 4 (July 1, 2015): 537, doi:10.1177/0022343315595927.

<sup>2</sup> David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), 267–68, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/alltitles/docDetail.action?docID=10288349>; Paul Schulte, "What Do We Do If We Are Never Going to Do This Again?—Western Counter-Insurgency Choices after Iraq and Afghanistan," in *The New Counter-Insurgency Era in Critical Perspective*, ed. Celeste Ward Gventer, David Martin Jones, and M. L. R. Smith (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 341–42.

<sup>3</sup> Kilcullen, *Accidental Guerrilla*, 271, 297.

Afghanistan.<sup>4</sup> Since “Danish security policy is based on Denmark’s aspiration to play an active role in managing global security challenges,”<sup>5</sup> such involvement could eventually lead to overstretch for special operations forces and the risk of missions being cancelled prior to having achieved their objective. Additionally, declining defense budgets, which have been the trend for most NATO countries over the last decade, can erode the coherence among the ways, ends, and means of stability operations.

The 2013–2017 Danish Defence Agreement dictated a budget cut of 10–15% (DKK 2.7 billion) and a total restructuring of the Danish Defense Forces.<sup>6</sup> In contrast to the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, special operations forces were provided with more resources via the establishment of a Danish Special Operations Command.<sup>7</sup> In a military environment in which everyone is fighting for resources, this adds to the pressure on special operations forces to deliver results. However, even with the allocation of more resources to special operations forces, there is still the challenge that special operations forces operators cannot be mass produced given the special selection and training they require. Therefore, different solutions to address the political demand for military capacity building missions must be explored.

We hypothesize that stabilization operations will be more effective if conventional forces and special operations forces synchronize and integrate their efforts to build up local military capacity, and thus enhance sustainability and cohesion in Denmark’s future engagements.

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<sup>4</sup> Throughout 2016, Denmark maintains a small contingent in Afghanistan as part of Operation Resolute Support and is currently involved in the fight against Islamic State in Iraq in Operation Inherent Resolve.

<sup>5</sup> “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice, November 2013, 1, <http://www.danida-publikationer.dk/publikationer/publikationsdetaljer.aspx?PIId=96a699ab-c874-4c9c-a22d-a8ea6fc24464>.

<sup>6</sup> “The Danish Defence Agreement 2013–2017” Danish Ministry of Defence, November 2012, 4, <http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Documents/TheDanishDefenceAgreement2013-2017english-version.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.



## **B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

The purpose of this study is to conceptualize the composition of Danish military task forces consisting of special operations forces and conventional forces for engagement in military capacity building. Our recommendations are intended for the joint Defence Command Denmark, which provides the military guidance to the Danish Ministry of Defence.

## **C. RESEARCH QUESTION**

How can Danish conventional forces and special operations forces better integrate and synchronize their efforts to conduct regional stabilization operations through local military capacity building?

## **D. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH**

By examining the predicted characteristics of possible future conflicts, and combining these with current Danish policies, we will describe the likely environment in which the Danish Armed Forces will find themselves operating. This capstone will draw on historical examples to illustrate the extent to which successful integration and synchronization might correlate with: common understanding of doctrine; joint organization and the sharing and use of technology; and whether these operations should be considered examples of “task assignment” or “full integration.”<sup>8</sup> By analyzing integration and synchronization as functions of organization, technology, and doctrine, the capstone will present possible solutions for better integration and synchronization between conventional forces and special operations forces. We base our analysis of organization, doctrine, and technology on Danish Lieutenant Colonel K.V. Nielsen’s model of “warfighting’s inner circle,”<sup>9</sup> in which organization, doctrine, and technology are seen as three interdependent variables. If one variable changes the others must change as well in order for the organization to function optimally. See Figure 1.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> The terms “task assignment” and “full integration” are covered later in this chapter.

<sup>9</sup> Mikkel Storm Jensen, “Krigsførelsens Kredsløb,” *Militært Tidsskrift* 133, no. 1 (April 2004): 177.

<sup>10</sup> The model was developed in Danish and has been translated to English by the authors.




Figure 1. Warfighting's Inner Circle<sup>11</sup>

### E. FULL INTEGRATION AND TASK ASSIGNMENT

Special operations forces and conventional forces often find themselves working alongside each other in ways that demand some form of cooperation or integration. Much has been written by military professionals on this topic, highlighting the necessity and benefits of increased integration between conventional forces and special operations forces.<sup>12</sup> At the same time, integration and the combined use of conventional, irregular and special operations forces is not a new concept and has been used by battlefield commanders many times in history. Examples include Nathanael Greene who, during the American Revolutionary Campaign of 1780–1781 in the South, utilized both types of forces against the British; T.E. Lawrence in World War 1 between 1916–1918;<sup>13</sup> the British campaign in Malaya in 1948–1960;<sup>14</sup> Vietnam's Vo Nguyen Giap during the

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<sup>11</sup> Adapted from Jensen, "Krigsførelsens Kredsløb."

<sup>12</sup> For a few examples see Joel P. Ellison and Daniel G. Hodermarsky, "Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration at the Operational Level" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012); Michael Kershaw, "The Integration of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Richard Finfera, "Leveraging Capabilities: The Integration of Special Operation Forces and Conventional Forces" (Master's thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2010).

<sup>13</sup> John Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits—How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011), 12.

<sup>14</sup> Robert W. Komer, "The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of A Successful Counterinsurgency Effort" (Santa Monica, CA, USA: Rand, February 1972).

Vietnam wars in 1945–1975;<sup>15</sup> the French effort in Algeria in 1954–1962;<sup>16</sup> and the British campaign in Northern Ireland in 1967–2007.<sup>17</sup>

Generally, integration between conventional and unconventional forces<sup>18</sup> occurs via task assignment and/or full integration.<sup>19</sup> These terms describe the use of unconventional forces as either separated or integrated<sup>20</sup> in relation to their conventional counterparts. Michael Kershaw defines integrated operations in his master’s thesis as “those in which SOF [Special Operations Forces] and GPF [General Purpose Forces] are employed to accomplish interdependent tasks necessary for the successful completion of the overall mission.”<sup>21</sup> What is important in relation to integration is the fact that forces work to achieve a common objective and to complete the overall mission. In this sense, integration encompasses both task assignment and full integration.

With task assignment, integration between the forces exists in the sense that they both work for the successful completion of the overall mission. However, special operations forces conduct tasks in isolation, and not in conjunction with conventional forces. The French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria in the years 1954–1962 represents an example of this type of integration between conventional forces and unconventional forces. During this campaign, French regular army units were used as “ground holders” in a *quadrillage*<sup>22</sup> system.<sup>23</sup> Within the *quadrillages* the sparsely

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<sup>15</sup> Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits*, 12.

<sup>16</sup> Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962* (London: Pan Books, 2002).

<sup>17</sup> Richard Iron, “Britain’s Longest War—Northern Ireland 1967–2007,” in *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 167–84.

<sup>18</sup> The term “unconventional forces” is used to describe forces that fall outside of the definition of conventional forces. When describing historical examples from Vietnam and the American-Indian war the forces integrated with the conventional forces were not special operations forces by the modern-day definition, but may well be termed as irregulars or unconventional forces. However, the point remains that these forces were not conventional, but integrated and used in conjunction with conventional forces to achieve a common objective. Furthermore, we use the term conventional forces as the equivalent to the U.S. term “general purpose forces.”

<sup>19</sup> The nomenclature of “task assignment” and “full integration” to describe the types of integration is credited to Dr. John Arquilla who mentioned these during a session in his office in May 2016.

<sup>20</sup> Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits*, 12.

<sup>21</sup> Kershaw, “The Integration of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces,” 5.

<sup>22</sup> A system of quadrille lines on a map.

populated areas were designated as *zones d'interdites* (forbidden zones) from which the population was evacuated. Subsequently, the army was allowed to fire on any person moving in the area, thus denying the Front de Liberation National (F.L.N.)<sup>24</sup> any access to food and restricting their freedom of movement. Populated and fertile zones were classified as *zones de pacification* (pacification zones) where a large number of conscripts and reservists were used to assure the security.<sup>25</sup> Finally, *zones d'operations* (operations zones) were established in which the French elite forces (the French Foreign Legion and the French paratroopers) would hunt the F.L.N.<sup>26</sup> Both the regular French forces and the elite forces shared the same overall objective of defeating the F.L.N., but were used separately within their own areas in a manner consistent with task assignment. Seen from a military perspective, the French forces were very effective in defeating the F.L.N. However, disastrous political developments finally led to a defeat for France,<sup>27</sup> and Algeria's independence in 1962.<sup>28</sup>

Full integration implies that both conventional forces and special operations forces are fully integrated and work beside each other. An example of this is Nathanael Greene fighting the British during the American Revolutionary War in 1775–1782. During this campaign, Nathanael Green combined the use of unconventional forces and regular forces in a way that kept his opponents constantly guessing about his next move.<sup>29</sup> Greene would integrate his unconventional forces with his regular Continentals. For instance, he would mass his Continentals, and when the British Redcoats attacked, Greene's unconventional units would wreak havoc, forcing the Redcoats to chase them,

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<sup>23</sup> Hugues Canuel, "French Counterinsurgency in Algeria: Forgotten Lessons From a Misunderstood Conflict," *Small Wars Journal*, March 14, 2010, 6, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/french-counterinsurgency-in-algeria>.

<sup>24</sup> Front de Liberation National (FLN) was established in October 1954 by Algerian radicalists. The organization fought for full Algerian independence from France. (Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 78–79.)

<sup>25</sup> The French commander, General André Beaufre, aimed for a physical presence of one company per 100 square kilometers. (Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 166.)

<sup>26</sup> Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 165–167.

<sup>27</sup> Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 505–534; Canuel, "French Counterinsurgency in Algeria," 10.

<sup>28</sup> Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, 520–523.

<sup>29</sup> Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits*, 30–40.

thereby creating an opening for Greene to exploit.<sup>30</sup> In this case, unconventional and conventional forces were fully integrated as they both pursued the same overall objective and worked alongside and fully integrated with each other.

Full integration and task assignment can exist simultaneously. For instance, a task force can be considered fully integrated if it consists of both conventional forces and special operations forces working together toward the same objective. However, when there are two separate task forces, one of special operations forces and one of conventional forces at the headquarters level, each can be said to be task assigned when working toward the same objective, but in a separated manner. See Figure 2 for a graphical depiction of full integration and task assignment.




Figure 2. Graphical Depiction of Full Integration and Task Assignment Depending on Organizational Level of Analysis

In Chapter II, we will outline the current trends in Danish policy, the characteristics of future conflict scenarios, and the doctrinal framework in order to ascertain a range of likely future conflict scenarios that could involve Danish troops. In Chapter III, we will describe the roles Danish special operations forces and conventional

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<sup>30</sup> Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders and Bandits*, 270.

forces have played in joint stabilization operations and describe current relevant capacities within the Danish Defence for military capacity building missions. In Chapter IV we present two generalizable conflict scenarios and conceptualize their potential responses. These scenarios will draw from historical examples. Finally, in Chapter V we will re-examine our scenarios through the lens of how Denmark could tailor its responses to make the best possible use of its forces.

## **II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS**

In this chapter, we will examine situational factors that frame the context in which Danish conventional forces and special operations forces are likely to deploy. First, we will review Danish foreign policy and defense policy. Second, we will outline the main characteristics of the environment in which Danish stabilization operations and capacity building are likely to be executed. Finally, we will define the doctrinal frame and terminology according to which stabilization operations and capacity building are currently carried out.

### **A. DANISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES**

Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, Denmark has conducted an active foreign and security policy in the international arena. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the introduction of democracy in the eastern part of Europe, any direct threat to Danish territory seemed to vanish. Denmark could now shift its foreign and security policy focus to more distant and indirect threats.

Denmark's military involvement in international missions over the last 25 years has been comprehensive—especially given its relatively small size. The most extensive involvements have been during the conflicts in the Balkans since 1992, in Afghanistan since 2002 and in Iraq from 2003–2007. These were all conflicts in which the Danish Army committed the bulk of the personnel. However, both the Danish Navy, the Danish Air Force, and special operations forces have also contributed and continue to do so.

There is no indication that Danish international involvement is likely to decline in the near future. On the contrary, an increasing number of diverse threats to Danish interests seems to point in the opposite direction. Conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa have led to refugee streams which could further destabilize those regions and result in the growth of violent extremist organizations. Indirectly, conflicts in the Middle East and Africa affect European security and cohesion. On the Eastern borders of Europe, the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and Russia's growing hostility toward its neighbors, as well as the EU and the United States, have resulted in rising tensions and

a situation which to some degree resembles that of the Cold War. Although neither situation presents a direct threat to Danish territory or sovereignty, events in the Middle East and Africa and the aggressive signals from Russia will continue to impact Denmark's future foreign and security policy.

In 2015, the Danish government appointed a commission to carry out a review of areas of interest for Denmark's foreign and security policy, defense policy, trade policy, and development policy. The findings were published in a report in May 2016. The report concluded that for Denmark to protect and enhance Danish interests in the future, Denmark must continue to contribute actively within the multilateral frameworks of the EU, the UN, and NATO.<sup>31</sup> The Russian threat can best be countered through continued economic sanctions via the EU and by a NATO-led military presence in neighboring countries, while still maintaining a diplomatic dialogue with Moscow.<sup>32</sup> In contrast, the situations in the Middle East and Africa require a comprehensive approach and a long-term plan to achieve enduring stability.<sup>33</sup>

Stabilization efforts in fragile states are important for those states' development and security. "Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World"<sup>34</sup> is a document written in cooperation between the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice. The document describes the Danish strategy and approach to conducting stabilization. An integrated approach is defined as:

an approach where all authorities or parts of an organization (e.g., the UN) involved in a given stabilization effort work together towards a commonly defined stabilization goal. This encompasses collaboration on planning, implementation, and lesson learning regarding political, development, and security-related efforts. An integrated stabilization effort may take place

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<sup>31</sup> Peter Taksøe-Jensen, "Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change—The Way Ahead for Denmark's Interests and Values towards 2030," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2016, 25–31, <http://um.dk/da/Udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/dansk-diplomati-og-forsvar-i-en-brydningstid/>.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 33–35.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 37–38.

<sup>34</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice, "Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World."



before, during, and after a conflict. Integrated stabilization efforts may well be applied without any military element. The military tool is only one of many that may be used in a given situation.<sup>35</sup>

Although stabilization efforts can take place without the use of the military, the fragile security situations found in many countries in the Middle East and Africa will likely require the use of the military to provide the basic physical security necessary to create the preconditions for other agencies to conduct their work. Military capacity building through advising, mentoring, partnering, assisting, and training<sup>36</sup> of local security forces, and the building of security institutions, are vital elements in securing long-term and sustainable stability. “Preventive security is the path to lasting stability”<sup>37</sup> and reduces the “humanitarian and economic costs of a potential conflict.”<sup>38</sup>

However, as a small country with limited resources, Denmark must prioritize and select a few countries in which it can make a difference. The focus for the past 15 years has mostly been on Afghanistan and Iraq, but regions in Africa have also received some attention, and regional programs funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence through the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund have been established for the Horn of Africa and the Sahel.<sup>39</sup> The Danish focus on the Horn of Africa has predominantly been to counter piracy. As piracy diminishes around the Horn of Africa, but increases in the Gulf of Guinea, Denmark will likely move its effort toward Nigeria, where Denmark has large commercial and maritime interests.<sup>40</sup> Denmark already has forces deployed to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and this region will continue to remain a threat to Europe and Denmark. Additionally, the spread of the Islamic State’s influence to Libya, combined with Libya’s geographic location as a

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>36</sup> The terms advise, mentor, partner, and assist are defined with some variety depending on which doctrinal framework is used as reference. The definitions of the four terms, as used in this capstone, are defined in Appendix A.

<sup>37</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Justice, “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World,” 12.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>40</sup> Taksøe-Jensen, “Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change—The Way Ahead for Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030,” 39.

migration corridor to Europe, makes Libya a strategic center of gravity in North Africa that requires increased attention.<sup>41</sup>

The most significant challenge the Danish Armed Forces face is likely to be the lack of resources to conduct and sustain an overly ambitious international program. Danish defense expenditures have gone from 2.4% of GDP during the years 1970–1984<sup>42</sup> to 1.2% of GDP in 2015<sup>43</sup>—far from the 2% mark pledged by all NATO countries to be the minimum goal by 2024.<sup>44</sup> The 2013–2017 Defence Agreement resulted in a budget cut of 10–15% of Denmark’s overall defense budget.<sup>45</sup> The aim was to achieve cost savings through streamlining and by improving efficiencies in the support structure. Furthermore, Denmark has undertaken a massive investment in new combat aircraft and these are to be financed within the existing defense budget.

Ironically, this resource scarcity may indirectly contribute to more capacity building efforts in the future. Military capacity building can be undertaken by single individuals as well as by task forces comprised of different units, which is much less costly than deploying large combat formations that require a large operational and logistical support structure, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, although capacity building abroad costs less and requires fewer personnel than do large-scale interventions, successful capacity building takes time and requires a long-term plan and commitment. Efforts can take many years and, in the case of military capacity building as part of preventive stabilization, measuring the exact impact can be difficult since the military effort is just one of many initiatives. Still, the future of Danish foreign and security policy

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<sup>41</sup> Taksøe-Jensen, “Danish Diplomacy and Defence in Times of Change—The Way Ahead for Denmark’s Interests and Values towards 2030,” 37–38.

<sup>42</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization Press Service, “Financial and Economic Data Relating to NATO Defence,” Press Release (Brussels: NATO, November 28, 1989), 4, [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_1989\\_11/20100830\\_1989-043.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_1989_11/20100830_1989-043.pdf).

<sup>43</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries (2008-2015),” Press Release, (January 28, 2016), 6, [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2016\\_01/20160129\\_160128-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160129_160128-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf)—page=6.

<sup>44</sup> “Wales Summit Declaration,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 5, 2014, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm).

<sup>45</sup> “Danish Defence Agreement 2013–2017,” Forsvarsministeren.

points toward military capacity building as a key component of integrated stabilization efforts.

## **B. GENERAL TRENDS OF FUTURE CONFLICT SCENARIOS**

Conflicts in the beginning of the twenty-first century seem to involve more non-state actors than historically has been the case. Since the end of the Cold War, countless non-state actors have emerged, particularly in Third World countries. This has added complexity to what is also an increasing number of intrastate wars. Classical state-on-state conflicts, with a defined beginning and end, have decreased in number.<sup>46</sup>

Uncontrolled territory in Africa and the Middle East has the potential to become the breeding ground for terrorist organizations. It is therefore important to examine some of the general trends in contemporary warfare that relate to Africa in particular, to define conventional forces' and special operations forces' roles in stabilization operations designed to assist sovereign African states to manage domestic and regional threats.

Experts have debated whether contemporary wars are conceptually “new,” or whether they just resemble conflicts prior to the Westphalia Peace Agreement in 1648. Since the seventeenth century, most wars in Europe have been interstate conflicts, and thus helped shape doctrine, organization, and technology within Western militaries. As has been said by Charles Tilly: War makes states, and states make war, and the making of states was a rational process whereby kings offered protection in exchange for funds (i.e., taxes). To be considered sovereign, a state should have: clearly defined borders typically guaranteed by a military force; a central government with a monopoly on violence; and a social contract between government and population in order to finance peoples' protection and the security of the state.<sup>47</sup> If a state fails to meet these characteristics, it can be considered weak or failed, thus giving other states and non-state power brokers the opportunity to fill the power vacuum. National sovereignty is undermined by

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<sup>46</sup> Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallenstein, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 2015, 537, <http://jpr.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/52/4/536.full.pdf+html>.

<sup>47</sup> Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in *From Bringing the State Back in*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 170–191.

organizations that refuse to recognize sovereign states' monopoly on violence. In some places, national borders may be obliterated, which only increases mobility for non-state actors.<sup>48</sup> In order to help stabilize a country, it is imperative to support state institutions as well as units that can counter non-state actors, whether these are insurgent groups, criminal gangs, or foreign state/non-state companies.

Interstate conflicts in Africa are rare, and the region is more prone to intrastate conflicts because of high levels of poverty, low economic growth, poor state capacity, and dependence on natural resources. Moreover, many African countries are characterized by high degrees of ethnic diversity that make it difficult to form a national identity. The terrain is rugged, and there has been poor development of infrastructure, which makes it costly for governments to project power. The states in Europe were shaped by the wars they fought, and the borders generally match the underlying demographics.<sup>49</sup> Many African states' borders are an artifact of the colonial past and were agreed upon during the Berlin Conference in 1884–85. Thus, many African countries only have juridical statehood rather than empirical statehood; this reflects the opposite of what is found in European states.<sup>50</sup> However, to re-draw the borders in Africa along ethnic lines is impractical, and therefore it is important, as never before, to strengthen state institutions in order for African governments to be able to manage their own problems. In the long run, states will only be able to enforce their social contracts with their populations if the countries are stabilized sufficiently to achieve a tolerable threshold of security and a commitment to good governance.

Many wars in Africa are identity-based wars that rally people for or against a cause. The wars have to be understood in the context of globalization that intensifies global political, cultural, economic, and military interconnectedness, and increases the

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<sup>48</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, n.d.), 224–227.

<sup>49</sup> Anke Hoeffler, "The Economics of Violent Conflict and War in Africa," *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Context and Concepts*, January 2014, 16–17.

<sup>50</sup> Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood," *World Politics*, 1982, 21–24. An empirical statehood requires a stable community, permanent population, and effective governmental monopoly of violence that can exercise control. Juridical statehood is only a normative international tribute that does not automatically entail internal cohesion in a country.

maneuverability of non-state actors. Often, it is hard to distinguish combatants from non-combatants, resulting in large-scale violations of human rights. The speed of political mobilization is significantly increased by modern electronic media.<sup>51</sup> Media, especially the Internet and television, are widely used to disseminate propaganda, thus creating an asymmetry of war.<sup>52</sup> The principle of *electronic levee en masse* points to the fact that digital connectivity has increased the speed of mass mobilization and coordination to a degree that has proved difficult for totalitarian states to counter. Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya during the Arab Spring exemplify this.<sup>53</sup> Because stabilization has to be sustainable, efforts are not only a matter of physically producing units to support a ruling government, but also require a genuine mutual relationship between government and population.

### **C. DANISH COUNTERINSURGENCY AND STABILIZATION DOCTRINE IN GENERAL**

From the Danish political perspective, stabilization engagements in fragile and conflict-affected areas of the world require an emphasis on an integrated interagency approach to develop security and development. A stabilization strategy demands a combination of diplomacy, military engagement, and development assistance, thus making the military only one of the means to be used.<sup>54</sup>

The Danish Army Field Manual<sup>55</sup> constitutes the overarching national doctrine for Danish land warfare operations at the formation level and intersects with NATO's doctrine (found in AJP-3.2 and ATP-3.2.1.). The Army Field Manual is the cornerstone for other Danish Army field manuals, and serves as a tool to provide a uniform understanding about how assets should be utilized in a coordinated framework in order to

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<sup>51</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars*, Third Edition (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), 4–8.

<sup>52</sup> Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*, vol. 2002 (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002), 12–28.

<sup>53</sup> David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of Urban Guerilla Warfare*, vol. 2013 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 206.

<sup>54</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World,” 1.

<sup>55</sup> The Danish Army Field Manual that covers formation level is called *Feltreglement I* in Danish.

achieve the best possible effect and success in the assigned area of operation.<sup>56</sup> Although the Danish Army Field Manual is the guiding manual for Danish conventional forces in stabilization operations, it is not widely utilized by the Navy, the Air Force, or special operations forces. The Danish Navy, Air Force, and special operations forces predominantly use NATO doctrine instead. Yet, even with NATO doctrine as a common reference at the joint level, the services take different approaches when it comes to stabilization operations.

According to Danish and NATO doctrine, we can define four campaign themes at the operational level: major combat operations (MC), security operations (SECURITY), peace support operations (PSO), and peace military engagement operations (PME).<sup>57</sup> The purpose of a campaign theme is to “describe the broad general conditions that exist in an area of operations and provide principles to guide planning and action as a campaign progresses...[thus]... operational objectives are realised [sic] through the assignment and execution of tactical activities.”<sup>58</sup> Campaign themes reflect an attempt to structure warfare into tangible concepts and to coordinate tactical activities in order to create the desired effects. For instance, security operations were previously called counterinsurgency (COIN) and now encompass an interaction between various tactical activities and operations that enable a society to be stabilized.<sup>59</sup> Thus, stabilization becomes a military activity that can be included in all campaign themes, but places its emphasis on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, compared to offensive or defensive major combat operations. See Figure 3.

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<sup>56</sup> Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010-001)” (Danish Army Staff, September 2014), 1.

<sup>57</sup> Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010-001),” 104-7.

<sup>58</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Land Tactics (ATP-3.2.1)” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Publication, November 2009), 1-5.

<sup>59</sup> Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010-001),” 105.




Figure 3. Campaign Themes<sup>60</sup>

The purpose of stabilization activities is to address underlying tensions and reduce the level of violence, and thereby establish conditions that create the foundation for civilian reconstruction and development toward a defined end-state.<sup>61</sup> Stability activities “impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies.”<sup>62</sup> The definition of stability operations clearly underlines the military’s role as one among a variety of tools to stabilize a country or a region. The military is not designed to conduct state building, but it is a vital component in a multidimensional comprehensive approach to strengthen the capacity of a state’s security forces and institutions. The military is also essential in helping the local forces to provide a minimum of security until the host nation can take over by itself.

Danish conventional forces are typically assigned to execute offensive activities, defensive activities, stabilization activities, and/or enabling activities,<sup>63</sup> whereas the Danish special operations forces execute either direct action, special reconnaissance, or military assistance.<sup>64</sup> Military assistance “is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through organizing training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations... [and] includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces, engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations, and civic actions supporting and influencing the

<sup>60</sup> Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 106.

<sup>61</sup> Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 901.

<sup>62</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Land Tactics (ATP-3.2.1),” 1–6.

<sup>63</sup> Danish Army Staff, “Feltreglement I (HRN 010–001),” 108–10.

<sup>64</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5),” 2–1.

local population.”<sup>65</sup> Conventional forces’ stability activities and special operations forces’ military assistance are traditionally the predominant activities in a security or a peace support operations campaign.

The development of the information environment, which has intensified since the beginning of the twenty-first century, has increased the focus on information operations<sup>66</sup> that strive to have the desired effect on an adversary’s will, understanding, and capacity, using kinetic and non-kinetic effects.<sup>67</sup> The aim is to “reinforce or affect changes in behavior, influence the will, shape perceptions, improve or degrade capabilities, and affect information systems”<sup>68</sup> of the adversary/population. An essential feature of information operations is to coordinate functions in order to support overarching efforts. It is important to incorporate the significance of information operations into the training of local forces, where the usage of the media and forming perceptions undoubtedly play a key role. Training local forces is not only a matter of training them to conduct kinetic operations, but perhaps even more importantly in population-centric warfare, to train them to conduct non-kinetic operations in order to win on the cognitive battlefield.

NATO has introduced the concept of “shape-secure-develop” which is a population-centric approach. This differs from the “clear-hold-build” strategy<sup>69</sup> which focuses on gaining and holding terrain. Between 2006 and 2014, Danish forces predominantly used the “clear-hold-build” strategy in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. This approach applied what was also known as “the ink spot principle.” However, “clear-hold-build” was hard to execute in practice because it required physical expansion. Yet, Denmark as a member of NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), did not

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<sup>65</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5),” 2–1.

<sup>66</sup> Information Operations includes: Key Leader Engagement; Presence, Posture, Profile; Psychological Operations; Civilian and Military Cooperation; Deception operations; Electronic Warfare; Computer Network Operations; Operational Security and Information Security; and Physical Destruction. FR I, p. 213–214.

<sup>67</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (AJP-3.10)” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Publication, November 2009), 1–1–1–2.

<sup>68</sup> Danish Division, “Danish Division Information Operations Handbook” (Danish Division, October 2013), 5.

<sup>69</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Guidance for the Application of Tactical Military Activities in Counterinsurgency (Study Draft 3 ATP-3.4.4.1),” 3–1—3–10.



have enough resources to cover every inch of the ground. Another flaw was the initial Western assumption that we could win the hearts and minds of the local population. Looking to the future, nothing suggests that Denmark will have the resources to be able to seize and control built-up areas or deeply remote mountains, jungles, or deserts. Also, as has been noted, the ability of outsiders to understand local actors and adversaries is often lacking.<sup>70</sup>

Judging by recent engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems that foreign forces on their own can have difficulty defeating insurgents. Thus, the best way to stabilize a country or region “is to create conditions that will enable local forces to win it for them.”<sup>71</sup> This does not mean that the concept of “shape-secure-develop” will not succeed since it may, in fact, work if local forces execute the concept in their own country. However, for it to do so under any circumstances “requires the integration of all elements of national power - diplomacy, information operations, intelligence, financial, and military – to achieve the predominantly political objectives of establishing a stable national power government that can secure itself against internal and external threats.”<sup>72</sup>

Finally, while capacity building must be a central pillar for a new or fragile state, one pitfall when it comes to re-building is to only train the “shooters.” It is equally important to train and educate those responsible for all other aspects of “shape-secure-develop,” as well.


In sum, the “shape-secure-develop” strategy can serve as a framework for stabilization in which military units contribute by providing security and help to build military capabilities. The military plays a vital role when it comes to stabilizing a country, but its roles within all three circles in Figure 4 have to be clear.

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<sup>70</sup> David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell, *Counterinsurgency In Crisis. Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare*. (New York: Columbia University Press, n.d.), 145.

<sup>71</sup> John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (United States of America: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xiv.

<sup>72</sup> Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 2005, xvi.



The bold text highlights tasks to be undertaken by military units. This, however, does not rule out that military units could engage in other activities.

Figure 4. Illustrative Tasks in the “Shape-Secure-Develop” Framework.<sup>73</sup>

#### D. CONCLUSION

Denmark’s foreign and security policy has led to increased deployments of the military since the end of the Cold War, and nothing points to this changing in the near future. However, the focus will likely shift toward capacity building of local security forces and institutions in support of local solutions to local problems. Seizing key terrain and destroying the adversary’s forces will not be sufficient in future conflicts. To stabilize situations also requires adopting a people-centric approach and a focus on winning the cognitive fight. Stabilization demands a comprehensive full-spectrum kinetic and non-kinetic approach, in which the “shape-secure-develop” strategy guides conventional forces’ and special operations forces’ approaches. It is likely, too, that conventional forces and special operations forces will need to target multiple geographic places simultaneously, and efforts will need to be sustainable over a prolonged period of time, because capacity building of units and state institutions are long-term projects.

<sup>73</sup> Adapted from North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Guidance for the Application of Tactical Military Activities in Counterinsurgency (Study Draft 3 ATP-3.4.4.1),” 3–2.

The military is just one of the tools to be applied. It is not the multi-tool that can do it all. However, the military can provide sufficient security so that other institutions and organizations can fulfill their roles in stabilization, thereby helping to resolve conflicts that not only threaten specific countries in Africa, but that also may pose a threat to the entire region and indirectly to Europe and Denmark.

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### **III. DANISH ARMED FORCES' ROLE IN STABILIZATION OPERATIONS**

The purpose of this chapter is to outline what roles Danish special operations forces and conventional forces can play in joint stabilization operations. First, the development of Danish special operations forces and conventional forces from 1991–2016 is described. This development has created an overlap in tasks that can be valuable for military capacity building missions. Second, we describe how relevant capabilities that already exist within the Danish Defence can be further developed.

#### **A. CAPACITIES OF THE DANISH DEFENCE**

The Danish Ministry of Defence is the highest command authority in the Danish military. The Ministry of Defence consists of a ministerial department and a number of agencies. Other services may contribute in a whole of government approach, but relevant to this study is the Defence Command Denmark and the Home Guard Command that both oversee military units. The Defence Command Denmark has the Army Staff, the Naval Staff, the Air Staff, and the Special Operations Command under the command of the Chief of Defence at its disposal. The Home Guard Command refers directly to the Ministry of Defence<sup>74</sup> (see Appendix C and D).

##### **1. The Royal Danish Army**

The Army has to be able to deploy a robust battle group at any time for international missions and to handle national tasks. As an alternative to the deployment of a robust battle group, the Army has to be able to deploy a joint task force to support humanitarian operations or special operations forces.<sup>75</sup> The Army has a long tradition of deploying units for peacekeeping and peace enforcing missions, though since September 11, 2001, the Army has been continuously involved in missions ranging from stability

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<sup>74</sup> “Danish Ministry of Defence,” Danish Ministry of Defence, n.d., <http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Aboutus/agencies/Pages/danish-mod-agencies.aspx>

<sup>75</sup> “Hæren,” Defence Command Denmark, n.d., [http://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/organisation/haeren/Pages/IA\\_forside.aspx](http://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/organisation/haeren/Pages/IA_forside.aspx).

activities to offensive kinetic activities predominantly, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the Army's main experiences come from recent stability operations in the Balkans (1993-present), Iraq (2003-2007), and Afghanistan (2002-2015) and capacity building in Afghanistan (2012-2014) and Iraq (2014-2016).

The Army consists of the Army Staff, the Danish Division, 1st and 2nd Brigade, and a number of regiments and centers of excellence<sup>76</sup> (see Appendix E). The Army is comprised of personnel with three different levels of training: conscripts (0-4 months), personnel on a reaction force contract (5-12 months), and professional enlisted personnel (>12 months). The Army's fundamental operational unit is the battle group, which is designed to carry out full spectrum operations ranging from major combat operations to peacetime military engagement operations in respect to the full spectrum of threats.

The battle group is a flexible task organization that can be changed depending on the assigned task. For instance, 1st and 2nd Brigade command the maneuver and reconnaissance units, and the regiments and centers of excellence train and support the units that plug into the battle groups. The Division and the two brigades are responsible for training the battle groups across the full spectrum of operations. The formations have staffs that are capable of developing and executing operational plans across the spectrum of conflict.

In stability operations, the battle group will typically include infantry; fire support; intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition, and reconnaissance support; engineers (including explosive ordnance disposal units); logistic support; and civil-military cooperation units (CIMIC<sup>77</sup>).<sup>78</sup> Officers trained in information operations and psychological operations are embedded in the battle group staff to support a non-kinetic

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<sup>76</sup> "Hæren."

<sup>77</sup> CIMIC establishes, coordinates, and provides liaison between military units and local actors such as the local population, governmental institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations. CIMIC units can include specialists within civil administration, humanitarian support, economy, trade, and cultural relations. (Danish Army Staff "Feltreglement I (HRN 010-001)," 214, 229)

<sup>78</sup> Adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence, "Standardbriefing Tilrettet Forsvaret," (Copenhagen July 15, 2015). This briefing is a standard briefing on Defence Command Denmark and its organization. It was made for the Danish Chief of Defence. It has been provided to the authors by the adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence.

approach. The Army does not have dedicated units for capacity building, but can instead utilize units consisting of professional enlisted personnel to carry out capacity building missions. However, if the Army has to deploy its battle groups continuously in a conventional fashion, it is less likely that it can support capacity building missions.

The Army's doctrine is a conventional doctrine that takes a maneuverist approach in order to undermine an adversary's will and ability to fight in the physical and cognitive domains through kinetic and non-kinetic activities and effects.<sup>79</sup> In terms of stabilization operations within the framework of security operations (counterinsurgency) campaigns, the Army utilizes the Danish Army Field Manual, NATO doctrine, and recent British and Danish experiences from engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014. The "clear-hold-build" strategy has been pivotal for army units operating in Afghanistan, and many staff officers who worked in the higher staff echelons in ISAF are familiar with the "shape-secure-develop" strategy. As a result, many Danish Army officers and non-commissioned officers have practical experience in planning and delivering capacity building assistance to local forces.

The Army's recent technological development has enhanced its command and control. Large quantities of high-tech materiel, weapons, and night-fighting equipment have been procured, and the Army is currently implementing a digital tactical communication system (HTK)<sup>80</sup> thus digitalizing the battle groups all the way down to the squad level. HTK enhances the exchange of information prior, during, and after operations and is currently being integrated with the Air Force for the purposes of conducting digital close air support. Recently, the Army has procured the Piranha 5 as the main armored personnel carrier, which offers enhanced protection against mines and improvised explosive devices. The Army is continuously looking for technological solutions that that will enable it to deploy units with a small logistical footprint.

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<sup>79</sup> Danish Army Staff, "Feltreglement I (HRN 010-001)," 113. Feltreglement is abbreviated to FR I in Danish.

<sup>80</sup> HTK is an abbreviation for "Hærens Taktiske Kommunikationssystem." HTK is a digital system to track units and individuals and push/pull digital information on the battlefield.

The Army has experience from Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of stability operations and capacity building embedded in the ranks. Senior non-commissioned officers and officers, mostly at the rank of captain and higher, have a good doctrinal and practical understanding of working together with indigenous forces in terms of training, mentoring, and advising. Available technology, (i.e., weapons systems, armor, surveillance, and communications) is of a high enough quality that Danish battle groups can work closely together with other services and allied partners or be autonomously deployed in remote areas of operation.

The Army's battle group structure is conceptually flexible, and the enlisted professional soldiers are in general mature enough to interact closely with local forces. However, the Army has so few units that it is challenged to provide sufficient personnel for expeditionary deployments. Moreover, the training cycle and production of units makes it very difficult for the Army to assign units to other services, to include, special operations forces. Doing so also shatters the internal cohesion of its core units.

## **2. The Royal Danish Navy**

The Danish Navy's core tasks encompass both national tasks and international operations. National tasks include the assertion of Danish sovereignty, search and rescue missions at sea, surveillance and control of pollution, fishery inspections, and assistance to the police and the Ministry of Taxation. Internationally, the Navy mainly contributes vessels to coalition efforts such as those undertaken by NATO.<sup>81</sup> Since 2008, Danish navy vessels have been deployed to the Indian Ocean as part of the multinational Combined Task Force 150 and Combined Task Force 151 under the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom and as part of NATO's Operation Ocean Shield. The aim has been to counter piracy around the Horn of Africa.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> "Søværnet—Den Maritime Del Af Det Danske Forsvar," Defence Command Denmark, n.d., <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/organisation/sovarnet/Pages/forside.aspx>.

<sup>82</sup> "Pirateribekæmpelse i Adenbugten," Defence Command Denmark, n.d., <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/udland/adenbugten/Pages/Adenbugten3.aspx>.



The Danish Navy includes the Naval Staff, a deployable command staff, two naval squadrons (1st and 2nd), and a navy surveillance center. 1st Squadron's primary focus is national operations in Danish waters, whereas 2nd Squadron is dedicated to international operations and combat operations. Even though 2nd Squadron is the primary contributor to international operations, vessels from 1st Squadron may be deployed in international operations if necessary<sup>83</sup> (see Appendix F).

The Navy's doctrine is a conventional doctrine that draws heavily on NATO doctrine. Even though the Danish Navy dates to 1510 and has been involved in many battles in Danish and international waters over the course of its history, it does not have a long tradition in counter-insurgency operations, stability operations, or capacity building. Therefore, it is not surprising that Navy doctrine emphasizes kinetic actions, blockades, and surveillance at sea. However, recent naval capacity building missions in East Africa have provided new experiences. The Navy has supported and trained coast guards in the Gulf of Aden and Kenya. Furthermore, the Navy has supported the buildup of East African Standby Forces that are supposed to deploy and stabilize a local conflict with only two weeks' notice.<sup>84</sup>

From a technological standpoint, the Navy frigates (launched in 2011) and command and support ships (launched in 2004) are very sophisticated vessels. The frigates, command and support ships, and multi-role frigates can all support stabilization operations. The frigates (Iver Huitfeldt class) are excellent for conducting escort duty, air defense tasks, and fire support for land operations. The command and support ships (Absalon class) can perform roles spanning from major combat operations at sea to humanitarian operations. Thus, it should be possible to use the command and support ship as a flagship, a command headquarters for land operations and/or special operations, and as transportation for conventional forces and special operations forces. The multi-role frigates are mainly used for inspection and surveillance of Danish waters, but they could be used for the same purpose as the frigates, although they are not as technologically

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<sup>83</sup> "Søværnet—Den Maritime Del Af Det Danske Forsvar."

<sup>84</sup> "Kapacitetsopbygning i Østafrika," Defence Command Denmark, n.d., <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/viden-om/udland/fn/dkfnmissioner/afrika/Pages/Kapacitetsopbygningioestafrika.aspx>.

advanced. All three types of vessel have helicopter landing pads that allow them to carry one helicopter. Between 2016 and 2018, the MH-60 Seahawk will gradually be phased in as the primary helicopter. The MH-60 has better communications systems and observation assets and sensors than does its predecessor, the Super Lynx Mk 90B.<sup>85</sup>

The Danish Navy has not been directly engaged in stabilization operations on land, and thus its personnel do not have much experience in countering insurgencies. However, Danish vessels have continuously been deployed in counter-piracy operations since 2008,<sup>86</sup> and have low intensity conflict experience in East Africa's littoral regions, as well as having assisted with capacity building of coast guards. The Navy would be a strong player in conjunction with other conventional forces and special operations forces when it comes to tactical activities, along littoral regions across a range of activities from the building of coast guards to surveillance and blockades, to supporting ground operations.

### **3. The Royal Danish Air Force**

The Danish Air Force's tasks include surveillance, assertion of Danish sovereignty, search and rescue missions, and surveillance and control of pollution. In international operations, the Air Force is capable of deploying radars, helicopters, transport aircraft, and multi-role fighter aircraft, to execute combat operations, transport operations, and surveillance operations.<sup>87</sup> Danish F-16s have been deployed in several air interdiction missions since NATO's air campaign over Kosovo in 1999. Today, these include missions over Libya, Iraq, and Syria. Since 2005, helicopters and transport aircraft have been deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan in various roles supporting ground operations.

The Air Force's organization is comprised of the Air Staff, three air wings, the Air Control Wing with command and control facilities and radars, the Air Force Training

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<sup>85</sup> "Velkommen Til Første Seahawk," Defence Command Denmark, June 6, 2016, [http://www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/overige\\_nyheder/Pages/VelkommentilførsteSeahawk1.aspx](http://www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/overige_nyheder/Pages/VelkommentilførsteSeahawk1.aspx).

<sup>86</sup> "Pirateribekæmpelse i Adenbugten."

<sup>87</sup> "Flyvevåbnet," Defence Command Denmark," n.d., [http://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/organisation/flyvevaabnet/Pages/IA\\_forside.aspx](http://www2.forsvaret.dk/omos/organisation/flyvevaabnet/Pages/IA_forside.aspx).

Center and the Air Force Tactical Staff (see Appendix G). The Fighter Wing consists of two squadrons equipped with F-16 Fighting Falcons. They are mostly used to assert the sovereignty of Danish air space, and to perform kinetic actions and air policing in international missions. The Air Transport Wing consists of C-130J Hercules transport aircraft for transport missions and Challenger CL-604 utility aircraft which have both been deployed extensively in support of international operations. The Danish Hercules crews are trained to assist Danish special operations forces with various insertion methods and supply drops. Embedded in the Air Transport Wing is an operations support squadron that can reconnoiter and establish tactical landing zones and Air Land Arming and Refueling Points.<sup>88</sup> In 2013, Danish Hercules supported French forces in Mali during Operation Serval.<sup>89</sup> The Helicopter Wing consists of EH-101 Merlin Search & Rescue helicopters/Tactical Troop Transport helicopters, Lynx Naval Helicopters (currently being replaced by the MH-60R Seahawk), and Fennec Light Observation Helicopters AS-550 C2. The Air Control Wing includes stationary and transportable long range surveillance radars and command and control facilities.<sup>90</sup>

The Air Force does not have any national service doctrine. Instead, the Air Force uses NATO's Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (AJP-3.3) as its capstone doctrine. Standard operations procedure manuals define TTPs at the tactical level for the air wings. But essentially, the Air Force has no doctrine for stabilization operations or capacity building; nor does it have much experience except for individuals who have been deployed with the Army on such missions.

The technological sophistication of the Danish Air Force is high. However, the Danish F-16's are old and will gradually be replaced by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter starting in 2021.<sup>91</sup> The Link-16 and downlinks are generally interoperable with the Army's HTK and Danish special operation forces' systems. The helicopters, in particular

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<sup>88</sup> "Flyvevåbnet."

<sup>89</sup> Forsvarshæfen Besøger Operation Serval," Defence Command Denmark, " n.d., <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/intops/Pages/ForsvarshæfenbesøgerOperationServal.aspx>.

<sup>90</sup> "Flyvevåbnet."

<sup>91</sup> "Aftale om Anskaffelse af Nye Kampfly," Danish Ministry of Defence, June 9, 2016, 1, <http://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Documents/aftale-vedr-kampflyanskaffelse-2016.pdf>

the EH-101 Merlin and the MH-60R Seahawk, are new and very technologically advanced helicopters that are able to deploy under hot/dry and hot/wet conditions in Africa. However, none of Denmark's helicopters have any offensive weapons systems that would allow them to carry out strike missions. Thus, helicopters are best utilized for observation, insertion of infantry and special operations forces, and medical evacuation.

The Air Force has recently gained deployment experience using its air platforms for various purposes, such as air interdiction in Libya, Iraq, and Syria; surveillance tasks in Iraq and around the Horn of Africa; and transport tasks in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mali. The Air Force's primary strength lies in having platforms that can support both conventional and special operations units. The operations support squadron makes it possible to insert teams that can reconnoiter air landing strips and support special operations forces or conventional forces in remote areas. The Air Force has some experience in ground stabilization activities. The Air Force has sent dog teams and individuals to various staffs and to serve in Air Force-led, but joint, operational mentoring liaison teams in Afghanistan in 2009–2012.<sup>92</sup> To develop the Air Force's ability to assist with capacity building within the framework of stabilization operations, special units would have to be developed and designated that could partner, assist, advise, mentor, and train local forces in specific air-to-ground or air-to-air operations.

#### **4. The Danish Home Guard**

The Danish Home Guard is made up of volunteers who are recruited from all walks of life. The Home Guard plays an active role in Denmark's "Total Defence Concept," which includes support to the police and the Emergency Management Agency in case of major accidents, extraordinary occurrences, major disasters, and protection of crucial installations. Since 2006, the Home Guard has deployed small teams, platoons, and individuals to different countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Georgia. The Danish Home Guard can be used in international operations, military capacity

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<sup>92</sup> "ISAF—Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT)," Combat Support Wing, accessed October 12, 2016, <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/nyheder/Documents/OMLT.pdf>.

building, military support to civilian reconstruction, and humanitarian disaster relief, primarily under the purview of the Danish Defence.<sup>93</sup>

The Danish Home Guard consists of the Army Home Guard, the Naval Home Guard, the Air Force Home Guard, the Centre for Stabilisation Engagement, and the Special Support and Reconnaissance Company (see Appendix H). Members of the Army Home Guard receive the same basic training as do army recruits, which enables them to guard fixed installations. The Army Home Guard frequently provides instructors to the Army to train army personnel. The Naval Home Guard's niche is rescue missions, surveillance at sea, and securing naval installations. The Air Force Home Guard is predominantly trained for securing air bases. The Centre for Stabilisation Engagement was established in 2011 and is responsible for the Danish Home Guard's international tasks, and contributes to Denmark's international stabilization engagement. Specifically, the Centre for Stabilisation Engagement plans, develops, and recruits personnel for stabilization operations.<sup>94</sup> Danish Home Guard personnel have been deployed as instructors in basic military training in Iraq and Kenya, as instructors in developing civilian competencies, and as personnel offering maritime advice in East Africa.<sup>95</sup>

The Home Guard's doctrine must be seen in the light of its heritage. The Home Guard was founded after the Second World War in 1949 with the sole purpose of being a national militia that could support the regular forces in case of an invasion of Denmark. Its members would have weapons and ammunition at their disposal in their homes. The Home Guard is well integrated into civilian society. Some members have never served in the regular forces, but many do have prior experience as active duty military personnel. Members all have civilian jobs and thus civilian competencies. The Home Guard relies on voluntary work; its members will only be compensated for lost earnings in cases when they are called in during regular work hours. This voluntary commitment among its

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<sup>93</sup> "Hjemmeværnet," Hjemmeværnet, n.d., <http://www.hjv.dk/Sider/default.aspx>

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Center for Stabilisering Hjemmeværnet, "CDSI Bidrag Til CHV Briefing for Attachesamlingen," (Copenhagen October, 2016). This briefing was sent to the authors via the Danish Defence intranet (FIIN) from the Danish Home Guard Command. The briefing in its entirety is restricted, but the information that this footnote references is not classified.

members produces highly motivated soldiers, and enforces the social contract between state, population, and the armed forces.

The Home Guard does not rely on advanced technology or materiel. Time does not allow for training with sophisticated weapons, equipment, or systems. However, Home Guard personnel are trained in basic military skills such as marksmanship, first aid, and guarding installations. The Naval Home Guard do have high speed rubber dinghies with modern navigation and communications equipment that enable them to patrol harbors and littoral coastlines.

The Home Guard is not suitable for combat operations in a highly mobile kinetic environment. However, the Home Guard is suitable to protect fixed installations (e.g., camps, air bases, and harbors,) as it has helped do in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Many of the Home Guards' civilian competencies and teaching skills make it a relevant asset to draw from for capacity building purposes in support of Danish conventional forces and the Danish special operations forces efforts. Furthermore, the Home Guard's members have civilian competencies that are obvious advantages when it comes to reconstruction work and disaster relief. Given the fact that the Home Guard has 46,651 members, of whom about 30% are active members,<sup>96</sup> and 15% of the total number are females,<sup>97</sup> the Home Guard harbors a huge potential as a source of support to conventional forces and special operations forces in capacity building.

## **5. The Danish Special Operations Forces**

The Danish special operations forces consist of the Danish Special Operations Command (DASOCOM) comprising two tactical units: the Danish Land Special Operations Forces (Jægerkorpset), and the Danish Maritime Special Operations Forces (Frømandskorpset) (see Appendix I). These units each have a combat element that is comprised of a number of special operations task units (SOTU) consisting of 8–10 operators with different functions and skills. The support structure consists of a staff,

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<sup>96</sup> Active members are frequently involved in active duty tasks. Non-active members are members of the organization, but do not actively participate in any Home Guard activities.

<sup>97</sup> Hjemmeværnet "Hjemmeværnet."

combat service support (CSS) and command and information support (CIS) elements, as well as a training wing (TW), which focuses on internal selection and training and patrol and parachute courses. Both Danish Land Special Operations Forces and Danish Maritime Special Operations Forces are fairly small organizations. They are manned by experienced and adaptable personnel who provide the organizations with a high degree of flexibility. However, the small number of operators makes it hard to sustain long-term missions or to conduct a number of missions simultaneously. Assigned missions and tasks are usually solved by task organizing. Depending on the task, a task force tailored for the specific mission is usually created either within each unit or as a joint venture.

Since 1991, Danish special operations forces have evolved from having a focus on long range reconnaissance and sabotage behind enemy lines to being capable of conducting the full spectrum of NATO special operations tasks: direct action, special reconnaissance, and military assistance. The Danish special operations forces have been deployed to the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa to conduct direct action and special reconnaissance missions. Although Danish special operations forces were part of the U.S.-led *Task Force K-Bar* that was deployed to Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, most of the deployments by Danish special operations forces have been short-time in support of Danish conventional forces. The Danish Government did decide to deploy Danish special operations forces to Afghanistan from 2012–2014 to build up the capacity of an Afghan SWAT<sup>98</sup>-like police unit in Helmand.<sup>99</sup> This was the first time Danish special operations forces were deployed in a capacity building role, marking a new chapter for Danish special operations forces.

The military capacity building mission in Afghanistan was not a one-time occurrence for Danish special operations forces. In April 2016, the Danish government decided to deploy a contingent of special operations forces to Iraq to advise, train, and support selected Iraqi forces in the fight against the Islamic State. The political focus on

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<sup>98</sup> Special Weapons And Tactics (SWAT)

<sup>99</sup> The Official unit name for the Danish contingent was Task Force 7 (TF-7) and it was placed under ISAF SOF, while the name of the Afghan unit was Provincial Response Company Helmand (PRC-H) placed under the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI)

stabilization in the Middle East and Africa through military capacity building has also had an effect on the training and exercises done by Danish special operations forces. Since 2015, Danish Land Special Operations Forces have participated in Exercise Flintlock, an annual U.S. and partner force special operations forces exercise in the Sahel-region that focuses on training and mentoring African partner units. In 2016, Danish Maritime Special Operations Forces participated in Exercise Obangame Express, the maritime equivalent of Exercise Flintlock, in Cameroon. The aim of these U.S.-sponsored—but African-led—exercises is not only to build the capacity of participating units, but also to promote regional cooperation to address regional and cross-border threats from groups such as Boko Haram and other violent extremist organizations. In the Danish context, contributing to these exercises can also be seen as militarily contributing to the Danish policy of integrated stabilization approaches in support of the Danish Sahel Region Plan 2013–2017.<sup>100</sup>

Although capacity building was not conducted by Danish special operations forces until the Task Force-7 mission in Afghanistan 2012–2014, most Danish special operations forces personnel deployed at least once for this mission, and the annual Flintlock and Obangame exercises have added to their experience base. Given a low turnover of personnel within Danish special operations forces, experiences can be considered more cumulative than for other units. In addition, the personnel recruited into Danish special operations forces typically bring experiences from prior deployments with other branches of service. Consequently, throughout the organization there is an understanding of the demands and challenges of military capacity building. If tasked to conduct military capacity building, Danish special operations forces would require less time to prepare than other Danish forces and could focus more quickly on the particularities of the mission.

In terms of capacity building, the establishment of the Danish Special Operations Command provides a shorter chain-of-command and eases interagency coordination as well as cooperation with international special operations forces partners. Danish Special

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<sup>100</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Denmark’s Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World,” 23.



Operations Command's operational aim is to contribute part of a deployable Special Operations Component Command (SOCC). In the future, the framework used to set up the Special Operations Component Command might be adapted for capacity building beyond the tactical level, to help mentor and advise higher staff functions and institutions. However, the Danish Special Operations Command must first focus on becoming an efficient and well-structured organization itself before undertaking to help develop others.

As a newly established command, the Danish Special Operations Command must build everything from scratch, which takes time. This represents a challenge. A second challenge is the fact that while the Danish Special Operations Command represents an organizational improvement, the size of the tactical units remains the same. Excessive use of special operations forces personnel through back-to-back deployments will eventually lead to overstretch and may result in retention issues. This, in turn, can bring a premature end to military capacity building missions before local sustainable solutions have been fully achieved, thereby jeopardizing an integrated stabilization approach, especially since a safe and secure environment is a necessary precondition for other government agencies to conduct their tasks.

In terms of doctrine, Danish special operations forces do not have their own doctrine for military capacity building, but follow the principles and guidelines in the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) Military Assistance Handbook.<sup>101</sup> Having a flexible doctrine can be advantageous when it comes to military capacity building, since both doctrine and standard operation procedures should be tailored for the situation, the specific mission, and the units and organizations involved. For instance, a blend of special operations forces and conventional forces doctrine might be required. The army infantry background of many Danish special operations forces operators makes this feasible, although the inclusion of input from regular army infantry would help.

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<sup>101</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, "Military Assistance Handbook" (NATO, October 2015). The Military Assistance Handbook does not have to go through the NATO approval and ratification process making it easier to change based on input from the member countries.

Technologically, Danish special operations forces possess modern equipment and materiel. Possessing a technological advantage is usually associated with special operations, but when it comes to capacity building of local security forces in third world countries, state-of-the art equipment matters less. Technology can provide the training unit with better force protection, but if the goal is to help stand up self-sufficient and sustainable local security forces, the technology, equipment, and materiel used in training must be the same as that which will be available after the mission ends.

## **B. CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM**

What makes special operations forces special? NATO defines special operations as operations that are not conventional. By describing special operations as everything unconventional, this definition creates a distinction by exception, but at the same time paints too vague a picture of what special operations are. According to NATO “[s]pecial operations are military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces, manned with selected personnel, using unconventional tactics, techniques, and modes of employment.”<sup>102</sup> It can be argued that these same organizational and personal characteristics can be found among certain conventional forces (i.e., fighter pilots, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, and maybe even the modern infantryman on patrol with a small team in the jungle, desert, or mountains.) Since certain conventional forces fit this definition, the argument can be made that conventional forces are now special operations forces, or at least “SOF-like.” However, as Dr. Robert Spulak, Jr. argues: this is not the case,<sup>103</sup> and “special operations (and SOF) cannot theoretically be defined in terms of specific and unchanging missions, skills, or capabilities,”<sup>104</sup> but rather must be defined in relation to the special attributes of the personnel. In other words, “It is not the missions that define special operations but rather

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<sup>102</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “AJP-3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations” (NATO, December 2013), 1–1.

<sup>103</sup> Robert G. Spulak, Jr., “A Theory of Special Operations—The Origin, Qualities, and Use of SOF,” JSOU Report (Hurlburt Field, Florida, USA: Joint Special Operations University, 2007), 10–14.

<sup>104</sup> Spulak, Jr., “A Theory of Special Operations,” 2.

the personnel.”<sup>105</sup> This, however, does not mean that conventional forces have not evolved. They have actually evolved a great deal, but they have not evolved into special operations forces.

Danish conventional forces have changed considerably since peace support operations began in the Balkans in the 1990s. They have evolved from being a force primarily focused on responding to conventional threats from the former Warsaw Pact, to a force utilizing doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, procedures, and technology that were previously the hallmark of special operations forces. Examples of this can be seen in their conduct of close quarters battle, night operations, key leader engagements, and ability to perform counterinsurgency operations.<sup>106</sup>

Special operations forces have not become obsolete in the process. Nor are they replaceable by conventional forces. Special operations forces also evolve, and lead in development of technology, and tactics, techniques and procedures. These are introduced in the conventional forces as they become cheaper, easier to operate, and more available.<sup>107</sup> This means that special operations forces, as they move forward, may be the force most suitable to undertake exceedingly difficult missions. But it also implies that some of the missions that used to be executed by special operations forces can be shed to conventional forces.<sup>108</sup> Subsequently, with conventional forces’ increased capabilities, the prospect for integration and collaboration between the two has increased. However, all special operations missions do not have the same requirements, and because a conventional force is proficient in close quarters battle and operations at night does not automatically make it well suited for capacity building.

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>106</sup> Based on authors’ own experiences from time spent in the Danish Armed Forces.

<sup>107</sup> Spulak, Jr., “A Theory of Special Operations,” 12–13.

<sup>108</sup> Anna Simons, “SOF 2030 - An NPS Defense Analysis Seminar Report,” NPS Defense Analysis Seminar Report (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2012), 7–8, <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Schools/GSOIS/Departments/DA/Documents/SOF%202030.pdf>.

Capacity building requires mature experienced personnel who have a sense of cultural awareness and empathy.<sup>109</sup> Danish conventional forces have evolved from forces largely comprised of conscripts to a force consisting of professional personnel.<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, Danish conventional forces have gained considerable experience after being involved in peace support operations and security operations (counterinsurgency) over the past two decades. This combination of a very experienced and largely professional force makes for mature and experienced personnel. With maturity and experience usually comes a greater sense of cultural awareness and empathy, traits that are currently being put to the test as Danish conventional forces advise, mentor, and train Iraqi security forces to prepare them for the fight against the Islamic State.<sup>111</sup>

Unless capacity building missions change significantly, and so long as conventional forces continue to evolve, conventional forces should be able to undertake portions of capacity building missions previously conducted by special operations forces. The overlap between some capabilities also means that conventional forces and special operations forces should be able to work together to a greater extent than before. See Figure 5.

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<sup>109</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “Military Assistance Handbook” (NATO, October 2015), 37 & 42.

<sup>110</sup> Denmark still has conscription, but it has been limited to 4 months of service after which the conscripts either leave the armed forces or sign up and become professional soldiers. Described in more detail on page 25.

<sup>111</sup> “Indsatsen mod ISIL,” Forsvarsministeriet, April 20, 2016, <http://www.fmn.dk/videnom/Pages/danmarks-indsats-mod-isil.aspx>.




Figure 5. Overlap in Missions Between Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces

Because of the different requirements for conventional forces and special operations forces, there are conditions that need to be met in order for conventional forces to undertake capacity building missions. First, special operations forces and conventional forces can partner, assist, advise, mentor, and train different types of units depending on the different skill sets required. If the mission is counterterrorism it would be relevant for special operations forces to engage with the unit, whereas if the local force is a conventional unit conventional forces should be preferred. With their greater numbers and thanks to their experience working in and establishing large staffs, conventional forces are also likely to be better at building staff capabilities in/with/for other nations, a fact that should be taken into consideration when assigning missions. A second consideration should be that special operations forces are more flexible, can operate in a more politically sensitive environment, and require less logistical support than their conventional counterparts.<sup>112</sup> It is therefore worth weighing the need for political sensitivity and logistical support required before assigning conventional forces to a capacity building mission. A third consideration is that capacity building requires a high degree of cultural understanding, as well as certain personal and professional skills

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<sup>112</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "AJP-3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations," 1-1, 1-2 & 5-5; NATO Special Operations Headquarters, "Military Assistance Handbook," October 2015, 7.

that come from maturity and experience. Since special operations forces usually recruit the majority of their personnel from conventional forces, operators are generally familiar with both conventional and special operations. In addition, they have a higher average age and more experience. Table 1 highlights the characteristics and differences between special operations forces and conventional forces when it comes to some of the considerations that should be taken into account before assigning units to capacity building missions.

Table 1. Characteristics of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces in Relation to Military Capacity Building Missions

Special Operations Forces (SOF)	Conventional Forces (CF)
Partner with local SOF or CF	Partner with local CF
Require limited logistical support	Require high degree of logistical support
Used to operating in highly politically sensitive environment	Used to operating in less politically sensitive environment
Small units	Larger units
Rapidly deployable	Require more mission-specific training
Can operate overt/covert/ clandestine	Only overt
Limited resource	Can be produced in larger numbers
Highly flexible and adaptable	Require more time to adjust training to adapt to new mission sets.

### C. DANISH EXPERIENCES IN FULL INTEGRATION AND TASK ASSIGNMENTS

Full integration operations and task assignment operations within the Danish armed forces are well known concepts, although they have been executed at different levels. For instance, full integration has only been used at lower tactical levels. In 2012–2014 the Danish Army provided a number of enablers for Task Force-7 for a capacity building mission in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. These enablers included drivers, support personnel, and staff personnel whose use freed special operations operators for

more demanding tasks. In the operation to remove chemical weapons from Syria (Operation RECSYR) in 2013–2014, the Army and the Danish Emergency Management Agency provided engineers with special expertise in handling chemical agents. Naval special operations forces provided teams to secure the engineers whenever they had to operate on land or on other vessels. However, task assignment has been dominant. In Helmand between 2012–2014, a joint conventional force trained conventional Afghan forces in Camp Tombstone (Camp Bastion), while special operations forces trained Afghan SWAT-teams in Lashkar Gar, and other conventional forces fought in the green zone north of Gereshk. Similarly, in Iraq during 2016, conventional forces have been training Iraqi conventional forces while Air Force F-16s and special operations forces support the fight against Islamic State.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

Over the past two decades, Danish conventional forces and Danish special operations forces have changed their focus from territorial defense and peacekeeping missions to expeditionary deployments in highly kinetic environments. The Danish Army has become a highly experienced professional expeditionary force capable of carrying out stability and capacity building operations. The professionalization, experience, and organization of the Army today enables it to execute operations that were previously only undertaken by special operations forces. Elements of the Danish Navy, Air Force, and Home Guard have also deployed internationally which now enables them to likewise contribute to joint stabilization operations and capacity building. In short, all services have units and experience that can contribute to a joint stabilization operation. All services have individuals who have served in staff in higher echelons, and have gained experience in planning stabilizations operations and capacity building. All services have the organization, doctrine, technology, and mindset to enable them to work in full integration operations and/or task assignments. However, this still leaves the hurdle of how to synchronize and integrate conventional forces with special operations forces, since military capacity building is now a pivotal core task of the Danish special operations forces.

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## **IV. SCENARIO AND CONCEPTUAL SOLUTIONS**

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze likely scenarios in order to generate optimal approaches to the synchronization and integration of special operations forces and conventional forces. The main distinction between the two scenarios we present involves level of violence. In one, the focus will be on conflict prevention.<sup>113</sup> In the other, the focus will be on resolving the conflict. Both scenarios will feature some common characteristics. The differences between them will lead to the need for somewhat different approaches in terms of doctrine, organization, and technology. Historical examples will be used as supporting evidence.

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

We do not provide the degree of detail necessary for tailoring country-specific solutions to the countries we sketch. Local culture, environment, climate, infrastructure, etc., are important factors when determining the exact composition of a task force, but taking into account this level of detail on a case by case basis is beyond the scope of this study. Instead, our aim is to develop two sets of conceptual approaches that can be applied in different conflict environments. Again, although the doctrine, organization, and technology of the local partner nation should play a major role in helping to shape the nature of a task force, the focus of this capstone is on how to create coherence and synergy between Danish special operations forces and conventional forces.

### **B. SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS**

#### **1. Scenario Commonalities**

Current wars in Africa are characterized by high unemployment and weak, fragmented, and decentralized administrations, and force is now mainly directed against civilian populations.<sup>114</sup> Low-cost weapons make conflicts cheap to engage in, and make

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<sup>113</sup> In the conflict prevention scenario there can still be local conflicts, but this will be limited in size or degree of violence and not pose a direct threat to the national government.

<sup>114</sup> Münkler, *The New Wars*, 2002: 12–14.

war accessible to a number of non-state actors, such as warlords, firms, terrorists, and mercenaries. This makes it even more necessary for weak countries to mobilize a credible capacity that can counter them and strengthen institutions.

Four megatrends are said to be likely to dominate future conflict-prone areas: population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and network connectivity. The world is already seeing unprecedented concentrations of populations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.<sup>115</sup> As urban cities grow and expand beyond their infrastructural capacity, tensions are expected to rise. Power vacuums in megacities and poor governmental outreach will create opportunities for non-state actors to establish patron-client relationships with sectors of the population. Members of local populations may thus be sucked into a non-state actor's web of dependence, from which it becomes hard, if not impossible, to escape.

Littoral megacities are said to be the next primary battleground, and future conflicts will take place on the outskirts of urban areas rather than in rural environments. Network connectivity via the Internet and media will make the conflicts more population-centric than ever.<sup>116</sup> Meanwhile, traditional urban warfare, where soldiers are deployed in order to dominate key terrain, is an extremely costly affair, especially for foreign troops.

Since it has proven so difficult for military forces to control the physical environment in the twenty-first century, dominating the cognitive domain becomes vital. This in turn impacts military capacity building because it requires better integration between kinetic and non-kinetic activities, especially in the realm of information operations. In population-centric warfare, winning the support of the people is essential to deal with threats by non-state actors and to create a strong and well-functioning state.

Winning the support of the population requires that the government be perceived not only as legitimate, but also as powerful enough to eliminate or at least suppress internal threats, like an insurgency. International support to a government can help increase its legitimacy, but a visible military contingent of foreign troops can also turn

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<sup>115</sup> Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of Urban Guerilla Warfare*, 2013: 27–29.

<sup>116</sup> Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of Urban Guerilla Warfare*, 2013: 40–41.

out to be a double-edged sword. Foreign soldiers in the streets highlight the local government's lack of capacity to enforce law and order and provide security for the population. Their presence reinforces the agenda of the those who oppose the government, who want to portray the government as weak and incapable of providing security and public services. Foreign soldiers are also likely to be perceived as foreign occupiers, a message easily exploited by enemy propagandists, and something that can lead to increased support for opposition groups, as well as serving as a source of unity among them.<sup>117</sup> Two requirements for the effective conduct of military capacity building follow from this argument: the local government troops must always be in the lead, and the footprint of a foreign military contingent must be kept as small as possible.

## **2. Conflict Prevention (Scenario 1)**

The post-conflict period can also be viewed as a pre-conflict period for the next round of warfare, as illustrated in Figure 6. Some of the tasks that mark the immediate aftermath of a conflict, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration may not be needed if a conflict has not yet or recently occurred. However, other preventive military capacity building tasks are practically the same, whether we are in a pre- or post-conflict period.

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<sup>117</sup> Edward N. Luttwak, "Modern War: Counter-Insurgency as Malpractice," *Politique Étrangère*, no. 4 (2006): 849–61.




Figure 6. Evolution of Conflicts Over Time

In conflict prevention (Scenario 1), society is in a state of relative peace, but the peace is fragile and latent conflicts smolder beneath the surface, and threaten to erupt if left unaddressed. The government is in control in most of the country and enjoys the support of the majority of the population. There is no current threat to its existence or survival. However, there are small areas in the country where the government has limited influence, and local pockets of resistance exist, as do those engaging in criminal activities as well as ethnic and tribal tensions. An example of such a scenario could be Nigeria, with criminal activities in the central Niger Delta, piracy problems in the Gulf of Guinea, and challenges posed by Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in the north-eastern part of the country.

The objective in the conflict prevention scenario is to prevent conflict from erupting or re-erupting and to lay the foundation for a more stable peace in the future. This cannot be achieved solely by the military, but instead requires a comprehensive approach. The role of the military is to provide security as a pre-condition for other actors to be able to assist. To achieve viable security, military capacity building must focus on long-term effects within the framework of “shape-secure-develop.” Given the political necessity of maintaining a small military footprint, the most efficient use of military capacity building personnel and resources seems to be to affect military institutions. By placing a focus on capacity building of institutions, the efforts undertaken might not have

an immediate impact, but over time should create more enduring and sustainable effects. An example of this would be to focus on military academies and the education and training of officers. The flow of officers graduating and being assigned to different units over time, would ideally produce a chain reaction throughout the system, much as with train-the-trainer programs, whereby instructors from different units could be centrally trained by a small capacity building force, after which they would return to their units and disseminate the training and education that they received. Bottom line: The focus for a small military capacity building force should be to advise and mentor prior to conflict as a preventive measure, rather than to partner and assist during actual military operations.

### **3. Conflict Intervention (Scenario 2)**

Conflict intervention, on the other hand, arises when a violent conflict such as an insurgency or a civil war has erupted to such a degree that it poses a threat to the existence and survival of the government. The conflict is mainly internal, although external actors, both state and non-state actors, might be supporting different factions in the conflict. Although the fighting might be limited to certain parts of the country, the majority of the population is affected by the war. The conflict could have roots in a mix of religious, tribal, or ethnic tensions. Examples of this type of scenario can be found the fight with the Islamic State in Iraq, the Syrian civil war, or the insurgency in Mali.

The objective in intervening while a conflict is ongoing is to support the local government in overcoming the threat and to establish peace in the country. With an ongoing violent conflict and a substantial threat from the enemy, the short-term goal of securing the survival of the government might have to take precedence over long-term stabilization activities. Figuratively, the focus must be on the survival of the patient, before rehabilitation and prevention of further illness comes into play. However, the activities undertaken have to establish the foundation for transitioning to a conflict prevention environment (Scenario 1), and therefore the planning must be in accordance with the “shape-secure-develop” doctrine.

Time is essential, and one cannot wait for a gradual chain of effects to take place through institution-building and train-the-trainers programs. Instead, military capacity

building must focus on the units conducting the fight in order to have an immediate impact. The training must take place where the local military units are situated, which leads to a decentralized solution and the possible need for a higher number of instructors to train different units simultaneously. There might be situations when the military capacity building force will partner and assist the local forces in direct combat operations. In some critical instances, the capacity building force might even conduct unilateral military operations at the local level to create the preconditions for inserting a local partner force if this force does not have the equipment, training, or air and fire support to defeat the enemy. These requirements will naturally result in a military capacity building force that has a much larger military footprint in terms of combat support as well as combat service support. Table 2 summarizes the requirements for the two scenarios described.

Table 2. Priority of Requirements for the Different Scenarios

<b>PRIORITY OF REQUIREMENTS</b>	
<b>Conflict Prevention (Scenario 1)</b>	<b>Conflict Intervention (Scenario 2)</b>
Long-term focus (e.g., focusing on creating changes which produce a chain reaction in the system.)	Quick impact activities (with a long-term focus) (e.g., addressing the tasks at hand, winning battles, ending the conflict.)
Prioritize building institutions	Prioritize building units
Train-the-trainer + staff	Train-the-shooter
Advise and mentor	Partner and assist
Small military footprint	Larger military footprint (logistics + force protection)
Centralized position → Only indigenous forces at the local level	Decentralized position → Assist/partner at the local level
Locals in the lead and information operations activities Shape-secure-develop	

#### **4. Relationship between Scenarios**

The two scenarios described occur in the same general environment, but they represent situations at two different ends of the conflict spectrum. In reality, they could

represent two snapshots of the same country just taken some years apart, since conflicts are dynamic and one scenario can gradually evolve into the other. The purpose of the conflict intervention is to reduce the level of violence and stabilize the country, thus evolving into a conflict prevention scenario. In contrast, the purpose of conflict prevention is to avoid a violent conflict from erupting or escalating and leading to the need for conflict intervention. In either case the process can entail a gradual change over time or a sudden shift.

The long-term objective in both cases is to create an enduring and stable peace. But to achieve this objective requires that the root causes of the potential conflict be addressed and resolved. Military means can move a country from a violent conflict toward a fragile peace, but military means cannot create a stable peace. This requires good governance which involves a comprehensive approach.

As depicted in Figure 7, the two scenarios are mutually connected, and so must the solutions be. In conflict intervention, there must be a plan for how to conduct a transition toward conflict prevention. As the scenario gradually changes, so should the prioritization of requirements described in Table 2. Most conflict environments will involve a mix between the two scenarios and there will be considerable variation depending on local factors. Therefore, it is necessary to tailor the solution to the local environment and be ready to adapt as the situation changes.




Figure 7. Relationship Between Conflict Prevention and Conflict Intervention

## C. SCENARIO SOLUTIONS

### 1. Conflict Prevention (Scenario 1)

#### a. *Introduction*

In pre-/post-conflict scenarios there is little need for any direct kinetic involvement by foreign forces, and it is imperative that local forces are seen to be providing security in order to ensure that the local government is viewed as legitimate. Since the threats in this phase are not of an immediate or existential type to the local government, there may be public and political reluctance to accept foreign national forces conducting combat operations within the country, as was seen when the United States deployed troops to the Philippines in 2003 to assist in countering the terrorist threat in the southern part of the country.<sup>118</sup> Foreign forces should therefore maintain a discreet posture focused on advising, mentoring, and training local forces at the institutional level in a “train-the-trainer” setup. See Figure 8 for a depiction of the proposed response to conflict prevention.

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<sup>118</sup> The plan to send 1,700 American troops to the Philippines was put on hold because the Philippine constitution prohibited foreign troops carrying out combat missions. The Philippine population and government objected to the United States’ use of the term “combat mission,” and a spokesman of the Philippine president characterized the operation as an exercise in order to re-define the U.S. role. Eric Schmitt, “Threats and Responses: Asian Arena; Plan for U.S. Troops in Philippines Hits Snag,” *The New York Times*, March 1, 2003, International edition, sec. Online, 1, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/01/world/threats-and-responses-asian-arena-plan-for-us-troops-in-philippines-hits-snag.html>






Figure 8. Principal Priorities During Conflict Prevention.

**b. Response**

In conflict prevention, conventional forces and special operations forces should be fully integrated. This will ensure coherence and unity of effort and command. Moreover, it will leverage comparative advantages possessed by conventional forces and special operations forces, enhance probability of mission success, and ensure most appropriate use of resources. This means that conventional forces and special operations forces work closely together. The forces should focus on training the trainer and building military institutions so that local forces can utilize this knowledge and conduct “shape-secure-develop” themselves. The aim should be for foreign forces to maintain a centralized position with a relatively small military footprint adopting a low visibility approach so only local forces engage with the local people. A successful example of the use of a small military footprint to train and assist local forces is the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines from 2001 to 2014.<sup>119</sup>

<sup>119</sup> Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines consisted predominantly of special operations forces. However, this study proposes that in a fully integrated approach conventional forces can be used in lieu of special operations forces in many functions, as they possess advantages over special operations forces in some fields.

*c. An Example of Successful Capacity Building—United States in the Philippines*

U.S. forces deployed to the Philippines in 2001 in order to assist the Philippine government in countering the terrorist threat in the Southern Philippines, mainly posed by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).<sup>120</sup> Because of restrictions imposed in the terms agreed upon between the Philippine and the U.S. government, the U.S. forces could not engage in direct combat action, except for self-defense.<sup>121</sup> Therefore, the U.S. forces

provided operational advice and direct support to PSF [Philippine Security Forces] operations against the designated threat groups; (2) they helped train, equip, and improve the Philippine forces' capabilities; and (3) they conducted extensive civil–military operations (CMO) and information operations (IO) in conjunction with Philippine forces to enable combat operations, increase the population's support for the Philippine government and reduce the safe havens available to the armed groups.<sup>122</sup>

Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines was conducted as a joint operation with participation from all different services. U.S. special operations forces conducted most of the training, but conventional forces also played an important role in delivering the support needed for the operation.<sup>123</sup> The general opinion of the authors of the RAND report *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014* is that Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines was a great success. The operation reduced the overall threat, improved the capability of the Philippine security forces, and ensured increased

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<sup>120</sup> The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) appeared in 1991 and is a Salafi Jihadist organization based in the Southern part of the Philippines. It is said to be fighting for an independent Islamic state and has previously pledged allegiance to al Qaeda and recently to Islamic State. Abu Sayyaf Group is responsible for kidnappings, hijackings, bombings and beheadings. By U.S. estimates the group had over 2,000 members in 2000, but is estimated at around 400 in 2014. The group was not considered an existential threat to the Philippine government, but did contribute to instability and undermined foreign investment in the area. (Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, "U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014" (Santa Monica, Ca, USA: RAND Corporation, 2016), xviii, 11–13, <http://www.rand.org/t/RR1236>; "Philippines Unrest: Who Are the Abu Sayyaf Group?," *BBC News*, June 14, 2016, sec. Asia, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36138554>.)

<sup>121</sup> Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, "U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014," xiii.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, xiii.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, xxvii, 33.

support for the Philippine government.<sup>124</sup> Several contributing factors were said to be decisive in shaping the success of Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines: the emphasis placed on Philippine sovereignty and Philippine forces taking the lead, and the U.S. forces' very rigorous Rules of Engagement prohibiting any U.S. unilateral action, allowing only for U.S. self-defense. This meant that the Philippine forces were seen to be responsible for successfully stabilizing the area, which enhanced the credibility and legitimacy of the Government of the Philippines, and also ensured that Philippine forces did not become overly dependent on U.S. support.

U.S. forces engaged with their Philippine counterparts from the joint task force level to the battalion level at the start of the mission. In the later years of the mission the focus shifted more toward higher echelons and institution building.<sup>125</sup> Worth noting is that the RAND report found that this initial “[t]actical focus delayed institutional development and might have contributed to delayed transition,” meaning that had the mission focused on training of higher level staff and institutional growth earlier on, a transition might have occurred earlier as well.<sup>126</sup> Finally, the mission was characterized by a small military footprint which was jointly organized and deployed in such a way that as to create a synergistic effect.<sup>127</sup>

#### *d. Doctrinal Alignment*

Doctrinally, conventional forces and special operations forces must be aligned. Not only do different doctrinal approaches exist in the Danish Armed forces, but these also differ between countries, services, and alliance partners. In the case of the Malayan Emergency, the British forces had to learn the hard way that an aligned doctrinal

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<sup>124</sup> Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 114–22; Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” *Military Review*, December 2006, 8–9.

<sup>125</sup> Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 125–29.

<sup>126</sup> Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 123.

<sup>127</sup> Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” 128–29; Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 9.

approach was needed to achieve the best unity of effort and to effectively combat an insurgency. The British did not achieve any real success in Malaya in the early years of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1951). This was due to an unaligned organization and the lack of a coherent counterinsurgency doctrine.

An aligned organization and a coherent counterinsurgency doctrine did not appear until General Sir Gerald Templer took over the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya in 1952 and consolidated the work done by his predecessor.<sup>128</sup> In his book *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*, Major General Walter Walker sought to capture all of the knowledge and experience from Malaya in order to develop a counterinsurgency doctrine. By doing so, he contributed greatly to the success of the Malayan Emergency.<sup>129</sup>

Of course, being doctrinally aligned is never enough. The forces must be aligned to the *right* doctrine. This was the case in the Philippines when the U.S. forces all worked according to Foreign Internal Defense doctrine<sup>130</sup> and utilized an indirect approach to counterinsurgency as captured by Professor Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond Model.”<sup>131</sup> Ensuring that the doctrinal approach is aligned within the organization is imperative. But in order to create true unity of effort the forces must also be organized so that they deliver optimal output and sustainability.

#### *e. Organizational Alignment*

When it comes to organization the key is to task organize to fit the current conflict. It is likewise important to fully integrate and synchronize all forces under one organization. This means that the relevant forces are trained and deployed together,

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<sup>128</sup> Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lesson from Malaya and Vietnam* 2005, 77–81, 88–91.

<sup>129</sup> Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 2005, 95–97, 103–7.

<sup>130</sup> Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” xiii.

<sup>131</sup> The “Diamond Model” is developed by Professor Gordon McCormick. The model seeks to illustrate the conditions and complexity of an insurgency and describe the indirect approach necessary in order to combat it. For more on the model see: Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 4. Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 4.

serving in the same organization under the same commander. Part of the success that the British had in Malaya is attributed to their unity of command and their ability to integrate forces not only internally within the British Army, but also with local police and local forces.<sup>132</sup>

Beyond the need to fully integrate local forces, if both Danish special operations forces and conventional forces are used, they need to be integrated too. One aim of integration is to set optimal conditions for sustainability. Since different forces have different comparative advantages they can offer different forms of assistance and can be deployed for different lengths of time and in different numbers.

The task force must task organize so that the organization is able to not only sustain itself, but also mirror the organization of the partner nation. The partner nation's organization might not be organized according to NATO standards. Therefore, the task force must consist of building blocks that can conform and adapt to the partner nation's organization.

For this particular prevention scenario, it is suggested that forces organize with a "functional approach,"<sup>133</sup> meaning that the task force must organize according to the functions that need to be delivered. These will differ from situation to situation, but for a generic scenario, like the one we have described, the following functions are suggested: administration, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications, and information operations, much like parts of the J1-J9 structure so widely used in NATO. The key is to focus on the comparative advantages that each type of force possesses over the other.

Administration in this context can be thought of as the administration of personnel and the conduct of administrative tasks. While conventional forces and special operations

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<sup>132</sup> Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 2005, 104–5.

<sup>133</sup> The term "functional approach" should be understood in the context of organizational theory where a functional approach entail that all experts within a field is grouped in the same department. This is opposed to the notion of a divisionalized form of organization where the organization is "a set of rather independent entities joined together by a loose administrative overlay." And where each division is an independent entity with its own product line and a large degree of autonomy. Henry Mintzberg, *Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations*, 1st edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), 9.; briefing and slide on Henry Mintzberg by Professor Erik Jansen, briefed at the Naval Postgraduate School January, 2016. See Appendix B for a graphic depiction of functional and divisionalized organizations.

forces share many similarities when it comes to administrative functions, and because most militaries are comprised of conventional forces and do not need assistance specific to special operations forces in this realm, it makes most sense to use conventional forces to assist with administrative functions.

Intelligence support to capacity building should be a joint venture between conventional and special operations forces. Intelligence support serves two purposes. First, is to increase operational security for one's own forces and for local forces. Second, is to develop the best possible understanding of the local political and military situation, and utilize this knowledge to provide the best possible advice and mentoring to the local forces.<sup>134</sup> Meanwhile, conventional and special operations forces themselves require different intelligence products.<sup>135</sup> Consequently, in a joint mission with a fully integrated approach, the intelligence branch should be manned by a mix of conventional and special operations forces intelligence personnel. This will ensure good mutual understanding and that the right and relevant intelligence products are produced.

When planning and executing operations in which advising and mentoring are done at multiple levels, with different types of forces, and in which the focus is on institution-building and train-the-trainer, it is important to address the needs of both conventional operations and special operations. As with the intelligence branch, conventional and special operations forces also have different operational requirements. Therefore, the operations branch should include both conventional and special operations personnel.

Logistics positions should predominantly be filled by conventional forces. The nature of logistics does not differ much between conventional forces and special operations forces. Conventional forces have a significantly larger logistical setup and are able to draw upon this experience both internally when supporting the task force, but also when advising and mentoring local forces. Also, conventional forces have a numerical

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<sup>134</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, "Military Assistance Handbook" (NATO, October 2015), 77.

<sup>135</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "AJP-3.5: Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations" (NATO, December 2013), 5-2.

advantage over the special operations community in relation to logistics, and can spare a greater number of personnel.

Communications positions should predominantly be filled by conventional forces. Again, conventional forces have a numerical advantage over special operations forces, and can deliver communications assistance with less strain on the organization. Communications is often associated with technology and is normally a highly technological field. However, the local forces that Danish forces are likely to partner with will probably be less technologically advanced, hence there is no need to introduce cutting edge technology since this is not sustainable after the mission ends. Instead, the task force should focus on low-tech solutions, much as the United States did in the Philippines.<sup>136</sup>

Finally, successful use of information operations is key when it comes to “shaping” the environment. It is crucial to convey to the population that the local forces, and thereby the government, are able to provide services to the community. Information operations was a distinct “line of operations” in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines.<sup>137</sup> We believe, that in a pre/post-conflict scenario, information operations must be done by local forces. Danish conventional forces and special operations forces should advise, mentor, and train local forces in the use and practical implementation of information operations.

*f. Doctrine, Organization, and Technology*

As previously described, for the purposes of full integration, conventional forces and special operations forces must be doctrinally aligned. Task organizing and mission training should be done prior to deploying in order for conventional forces and special operations forces to be as integrated as possible from the outset. “Doctrinally aligned”

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<sup>136</sup> Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 9.

<sup>137</sup> Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and The Indirect Approach,” 6; Robinson, Johnston, and Oak, “U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014,” xiv.

does not mean new doctrine needs to be written. Instead, there must simply be agreement about which doctrine to use and which best practices should be fused.

Among the questions that need to be addressed prior to deployment are:

- Command and control: who is in command and who does the task force answer to?
- How do the services ensure doctrinal alignment?
- Budgetary issues: from which command are the funds to be allocated and how are the expenses to be divided?
- Personnel issues: which command is responsible for the administration of the personnel?
- What should be the length of the deployment?

Likewise, equipment needs to be aligned. This does not mean that all units must use the same equipment, but it is important that systems, both hardware and software, be interoperable. Many units use different systems and different software. When task organizing, this issue must be addressed. This can be done through extensive pre-mission training, when all of the equipment can be tested and interoperability issues can be resolved in simulated settings.

## **2. Conflict Intervention (Scenario 2)**

### ***a. Introduction***

Whenever the level of violence, chaos, and civil unrest is high, the primary task for the military is to provide basic security for the populace and freedom of movement around critical infrastructure and governmental institutions. Simultaneously, remote areas have to be sufficiently controlled to deny insurgents the use of these as safe havens. If remote areas are not controlled, insurgents will be able to maneuver among the population and multiply in number, and thus metaphorically “swim like fish in the sea.”<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Charleston, SC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2014), 93.



Additionally, foreign forces cannot defeat a local insurgency. At best, foreign forces can create conditions that will enable local forces to quell an insurgency themselves. Foreign forces can offer the local forces critical resources such as military hardware, combat support, training advantages, and medical evacuation. When foreign force trainers are embedded, demoralized local forces receive a confidence and morale boost.<sup>139</sup> In Scenario 2 situations (conflict intervention), it becomes imperative to “shape-secure-develop” the operational environment to set the preconditions to transition to a Scenario 1 (conflict prevention). However, “shape-secure-develop” has to be done by including local forces from the beginning, with discreet assistance by foreign forces.

Scenario 2 situations call for an overall task assignment approach, whereby special operations forces and conventional forces are utilized according to their core capabilities. Due to their ability to operate with limited support, special operations forces should predominantly be used in remote areas. Conventional forces should be used around vital infrastructure, to include in and around population centers where logistical access is important, and firepower will matter.

Although the Vietnam War is generally considered a defeat for the United States, and the U.S.’s and NATO’s success in Afghanistan since 2001 is debatable, there are concepts from both campaigns that can be considered to have been effective. For instance, the concept of village stability operations utilized in Vietnam and Afghanistan is assessed by many to have been effective.<sup>140</sup> Analysis of operational mentoring liaison teams (OMLT) that trained Afghan National Army units suggest that they, too, were

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<sup>139</sup> Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, 2005, xiv.

<sup>140</sup> According to Andrew Krepinevich and Lisa Saum-Manning, there is evidence that the concept of village stability operations was effective. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups program was considered a success until the program was terminated in Operation Switchback. (Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 70.)

Despite challenges and difficulties with village stability operations / Afghan Local Police Program in Afghanistan, it was assessed to have been a success according to the decline in the number of attacks and the increase in public support. Lisa Saum-Manning, “VSO/ALP: Comparing Past and Current Challenges to Afghan Local Defense” (RAND Corporation, 2012), 15–16, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/working\\_papers/WR936.html](http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR936.html).

effective.<sup>141</sup> Thus, use of village stability operations and operational mentoring liaison teams can both be considered worthwhile for an initial approach in a Scenario 2 situation.<sup>142</sup> See Figure 9 for a depiction of the proposed response to conflict prevention.




Figure 9. Principal Priorities During Conflict Intervention.

***b. The Use of Special Operations Forces***

The idea behind village stability operations is to create a bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy around rural villages. Security and stability are sought through the establishment of a positive relationship between the government and the local population. As security bubbles expand, and the establishment and solidification of local governance is strengthened, villages become inhospitable to the insurgents. If village stability operations are executed effectively, village-level governance is eventually

<sup>141</sup> Jan Erik Haug, “The Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team Program as a Model for Assisting the Development of an Effective Afghan National Army” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), 109, [www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502342](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502342).

<sup>142</sup> The authors acknowledge that data on unambiguous success via village stability operations and operational mentoring liaison teams are hard to retrieve and prove. The Vietnam war is generally considered a United States defeat, and the United States’ and NATO’s success in Afghanistan is debatable. Thus, there might be critics who claim that neither of the two approaches can be deemed successful.

connected to district-level governance, and district governance to national governance.<sup>143</sup> This begins with both special operations forces and local forces living among the locals, building relationships, and assisting the locals to resist intrusion by insurgents, while also re-empowering local structures.<sup>144</sup>

In the early 1960s, U.S. Army Special Forces were used in an unconventional manner to organize the rural population of South Vietnam for self-defense against insurgents and to promote allegiance to the government. To counter the rising insurgency, the U.S. Central Intelligence Service (CIA) created and ran the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program (CIDG).<sup>145</sup> Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program militias were essential to protect the villages from the Vietnamese communists.

The U.S. Army Special Forces teams lived in the villages, organized village defense forces, and provided basic medical treatment.<sup>146</sup> The Special Forces teams worked closely with local Vietnamese to build up defense systems and establish procedures that would protect their villages. Locals were trained to counter communist guerillas, and full-time strike forces were created which could serve as quick reaction forces, assist villages under attack, hunt guerrillas, and train other local people.<sup>147</sup>

In 1963, the Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program was terminated, when U.S. Special Forces were shifted to a more kinetic role in support of the conventional forces. Once the program was turned over to Vietnamese Special Forces, they proved too ill-equipped, poorly trained, and incompetently led to assume the same responsibilities as their American predecessors. As a result, the program collapsed in the fall of 1963, which

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<sup>143</sup> David C. Ellis, “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Bottom-up Counterinsurgency” (Headquarters, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan, April 1, 2011), 8, [http://stabilityinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/CJSOTF-A\\_VSO\\_ALP\\_Handbook01APR11-FINAL.pdf](http://stabilityinstitute.com/wp-content/uploads/CJSOTF-A_VSO_ALP_Handbook01APR11-FINAL.pdf).

<sup>144</sup> Ellis, “Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police Bottom-up Counterinsurgency,” 6.

<sup>145</sup> Thomas K. Adams, U.S. *Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (New York, N.Y: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998), 82–83.

<sup>146</sup> Adams, *US. Special Operations Forces in Action*, 84–85.

<sup>147</sup> Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, 69–71.

permitted the Vietnamese communists to infiltrate back into the villages.<sup>148</sup> This eventual failure underscores the need for a sustainable local solution being in place before foreign forces pull out.

Turning to Afghanistan: after the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001, remote villages were utilized as safe havens for insurgents to project violence into government controlled urban areas that often were beyond the persistent reach of the Afghan National Security Forces.<sup>149</sup> After a decade long top-down strategy by the Afghan Government, the United States, and NATO, it became necessarily difficult to maintain the support of the rural population. However, the concept of village stability operations offered a bottom-up stability program that embraced the rural Afghan villages, and sought to re-empower local institutions and re-connect them to the Afghan central government.

U.S. special operations forces lived among the people in the villages, and were able to address local grievances by re-empowering local tribal institutions to deliver security, economic development, and governance. This approach made the insurgents irrelevant in the eyes of the local Afghans, because local institutions filled the vacuum in which the insurgents had previously maneuvered.<sup>150</sup>

Arguably, village stability operations might have been even more successful if they had been carried out with local government forces in the lead. Such an approach would allow for local people in remote areas to stand on their own feet and connect with the central government. But this is often a matter of resources, since government security forces cannot be present everywhere at all times and therefore tend to focus on the most densely populated areas and key infrastructure. Nevertheless, if local forces executed the concept themselves, advised and supported by foreign forces, they could build relations with their fellow countrymen and achieve security without needing material support from the central government.

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<sup>148</sup> Krepinevich Jr., *The Army and Vietnam*, 72–74.

<sup>149</sup> Scott Mann, “Village Stability Operations -101 ‘Understanding USSOCOM’s Role in VSO and ALP in Afghanistan and Beyond,’” *The Donovan Review*, no. 2 (January 2012): 5.

<sup>150</sup> Mann, “Village Stability Operations-101,” 7.

c. *The Use of Conventional Forces*

Conventional forces are excellent for “clear-hold,” “find-fix-strike,” or “deter-disrupt-dislocate” operations, and thus play a key role in “securing” the environment around critical infrastructure and governmental institutions. However, at the same time it is a mistake for foreign conventional forces to unilaterally carry out kinetic or non-kinetic operations. In many historical cases, foreign forces have been augmented by a small number of local forces, which is wrong. T.E. Lawrence is often quoted as saying that “Do not try to do too much with your own hands [because it is] better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”<sup>151</sup>

There are numerous examples from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan of Western forces launching operations unilaterally because they were either too impatient to wait for the local forces to do it themselves, or because they mistrusted the local forces’ ability to succeed; or, sometimes both. One example is the battle of Fallujah in Iraq. In April 2004, U.S. Marines launched Operation Vigilant Resolve with four battalions and minimal Iraqi participation to “clear” the city of Fallujah that had become an insurgent hot bed, and thus posed a significant threat to Iraqi security. The Marines’ massive use of firepower, and subsequent civilian casualties generated a lot of criticism from Iraqis and some allies. The operation backfired as the U.S. was forced to withdraw. Consequently, the city was left to the insurgents who ran it under the fig leaf of a Fallujah Brigade, and transformed Fallujah into an insurgent safe haven.<sup>152</sup> In November 2004, Operation Phantom Fury was launched to “clear” Fallujah again. This time, however, six Iraqi battalions moved in behind the Marines to suppress the insurgency.<sup>153</sup> The smart preparatory work between U.S. Marines and Iraqis paid off because Iraqis did not object to the operation and a more effective “clear-hold-build” became possible.

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<sup>151</sup> T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” *Arab Bulletin*, August 20, 1917, Article 15.

<sup>152</sup> Daniel P. Bolger, *Why We Lost* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014), 171–79.

<sup>153</sup> Bolger, *Why We Lost*, 186–90.

Bitter lessons learned from involvement in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 indicate that the direct approach taken by foreign coalition forces to secure large urban areas was ineffective and exhausting. Instead, it has been suggested that more indirect means should have been used, such as training and advising local troops in order to increase their numbers and competence.<sup>154</sup> The rationale behind such an approach is that the local soldiers know the local population, the environment, and the culture, and that they should do the fighting, but initially will need support, which foreign troops can provide.

During the campaign in Afghanistan, NATO successfully used operational mentoring and liaison teams, which were considered an important factor in the development of the Afghan National Army (ANA). Operational mentoring and liaison teams performed duties similar to those of the U.S. Embedded Training Teams, and: provided training and mentoring to the Afghan National Army; served as the liaisons between NATO forces and Afghan National Army units; assisted in planning of operations; and provided necessary enabling support, such as close air support and casualty evacuation. Operational mentoring and liaison teams were small teams of 13–30 personnel, depending on the type and function of the Afghan unit they partnered with.<sup>155</sup>

For instance, the British Army eventually made effective use of operational mentoring and liaison teams in Helmand Province.<sup>156</sup> The idea was to provide planning and support during combat while the Afghan soldiers took the lead. Insurgents ranged along a spectrum from irreconcilable Taliban to young adventure seekers fighting for economic reasons. The operational mentoring and liaison teams' objective was to drive a wedge between these two extremes.<sup>157</sup> In 2011, Danish ground holding companies around critical infrastructure in the Upper Gereshk Valley lived with Afghan National

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<sup>154</sup> Ucko and Egnell, *Counterinsurgency In Crisis. Britain and the Challenges of Modern Warfare*, 156.

<sup>155</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO's Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs)" (Public Diplomacy Division, Press and Media Section, Media Operations Centre, NATO HQ Brussels, October 2009), <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/omlt-factsheet.pdf>.

<sup>156</sup> Anders D. Svendsen, "Author's notes" (Helmand Province in Afghanistan, July 2011).

<sup>157</sup> British Ministry of Defence, "Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency" (British Ministry of Defence, January 2010), 3–8.

Army units in forward operating bases. Whenever Danish and Afghan National Army soldiers went on patrols or combat missions together, embedded British operational mentoring and liaison teams acted as liaisons between the Danish companies/platoons and the Afghan companies/platoons.<sup>158</sup> At this stage of the campaign, the Danish units partnered and assisted Afghan National Army units, which gave the operations a “more” local “Afghan face.”

In January 2012, an Afghan battalion executed a “clear-hold-build” operation north of Gereshk. The aim of the operation was to “secure” key terrain in order to improve and “build” infrastructure, and thus support the locals. The specific objective of the operation was to “clear” the land between Gereshk and Patrol Base Line, 10 kilometers north of the city. Subsequently, Afghan soldiers would build checkpoints and observation posts to “hold” the ground and create the preconditions for re-building infrastructure north of Gereshk. The operation was planned by the Afghans, and British and Danish officers carried out advising. During the operation, Danish units cordoned off the area that was to be “cleared,” but the operation was exclusively executed by Afghans, mentored and advised by British operational mentoring and liaison teams.<sup>159</sup> This operation was by and large a success because Afghan soldiers interacted directly with the locals, and thus the foreign footprint was minimized.

Because it is important that overt foreign military involvement be kept to a minimum, emphasis in operations like the one undertaken near of Gereshk, should be on operational mentoring and the use liaison teams with conventional forces. While conventional forces are ideal for helping to “secure” critical infrastructure, they have to understand how to “shape” and “develop” the environment. In Scenario 2 situations, foreign forces could initially partner with local forces, while embedded operational mentoring and liaison teams simultaneously provide both partnered conventional forces, assistance, advice, and mentoring.

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<sup>158</sup> Svendsen, “Author’s notes” (Helmand Province in Afghanistan, September 2011).

<sup>159</sup> Svendsen, “Author’s notes” (Helmand Province in Afghanistan, January 2012).

*d. Doctrine, Organization, and Technology*

Doctrine does not have to be aligned between special operations forces and conventional forces in Scenario 2 situations because conflict intervention will initially require that foreign special operations forces and conventional forces operate in different segments of the environment. Because their missions usually involve different target audiences in different geographic locations they require different approaches. However, at the mission's headquarters level, there has to be mutual understanding about doctrine, and as a Scenario 2 situation evolves into a Scenario 1 situation, doctrine will have to be aligned.

Initially special operations forces and conventional forces do not have to integrate into a single functional organization, but can operate separately and maintain divisional structure. However, they will still have to synchronize and coordinate their efforts to realize the mission and facilitate the best possible transition from conflict to conflict prevention. At higher command levels and in headquarters, it will be necessary to integrate liaison officers from special operations forces and conventional forces in order to strengthen mutual understanding, unity of command, and a smooth transition.

Finally, technology in a Scenario 2 situation has to be fully integrated between special operations forces and conventional forces, because combat is likely. Technological interoperability is crucial for force protection and for integrating command, control, and intelligence. In cases of multinational involvement, interoperability is likewise essential. If the technology is fully integrated across foreign forces, then local forces will be able to draw maximum firepower whenever needed, and utilize updated intelligence for the planning and the execution of operations.

**D. CONCLUSION**

Conflict prevention and conflict intervention lie at different ends of the spectrum of conflict. What distinguishes prevention and intervention is the level of violence. In a Scenario 1 situation, levels of violence are low and the society is relative peaceful. However, the peace is unstable and latent conflicts simmer beneath the surface. In a



Scenario 2 situation, levels of violence are high and the conflict has transitioned into a full-blown insurgency or civil war.

Full integration is the approach to take for a conflict prevention scenario. This means that special operations forces and conventional forces must be fully integrated in terms of doctrine, organization, and technology. The force should be task organized according to the specific tasks at hand, comprising a mix of special operations forces and conventional forces that can capitalize on each other's comparative advantages. The task force should maintain a small military footprint working with and through the local forces. Furthermore, extensive pre-mission training is necessary to achieve mutual understanding between the forces, which turns this into the equivalent of a pre-planned deliberate mission for which time is taken to ensure that everything is as meticulously planned as possible.

In contrast, the task assignment approach suits conflict intervention. Special operations forces should focus on remote areas, and conventional forces should focus on freedom of movement around critical infrastructure and government institutions. The concept of village stability operations is a logical approach for special operations forces to take, whereas embedded operational mentoring liaison teams is the concept of choice for conventional forces.

The solutions offered for both scenarios, as well as for the transitional phase, are depicted in Figure 10. In this generic model, full integration is appropriate for task forces assigned to conflict prevention while task assignment dominates the conflict intervention end of the spectrum. During the transition phase, improved conditions and a less violent environment should result in full integration between special operations forces and conventional forces rather than a task assignment division of labor.




Figure 10. The Ratio Between Full Integration and Task Assignment in Different Scenarios

However, regardless of the scenario or the approach, the local forces have to be in the lead. Military capacity building should be an integral part of both their everyday training and their conduct of real life operations, particularly as they use the “shape-secure-develop” approach to stabilize the local environment.

## **V. ADAPTING THE CONCEPTUAL SOLUTIONS TO A DANISH CONTEXT**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this chapter is to outline actor-specific suggestions for how the Danish Armed Forces can carry out military capacity building in stabilization operations for the scenarios described in Chapter IV. First, we will compare each of the conceptual suggestions with current doctrine, organization, and technology to identify strengths and weaknesses. Second, further suggestions for how to overcome deficiencies and improve the Danish Armed Forces' ability to conduct military capacity building will be offered. These suggestions will form the basis of the recommendations presented in Chapter VI.

According to the 2013 report *Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World*, Denmark would prefer involvement in conflict prevention situations to ensure that conflicts are managed before escalating into full-scale insurgencies or civil wars.<sup>160</sup> However, in 2016 the Danish Armed Forces are predominantly deployed in conflict intervention, where the degree of violence is high.<sup>161</sup> Therefore, the Danish Armed Forces have to be capable of operating in both scenarios, but also capable of helping a conflict intervention scenario transition to a conflict prevention scenario.

### **B. DANISH CHALLENGES IN FULL INTEGRATION AND TASK ASSIGNMENT**

Many officers and non-commissioned officers have practical experience in partnering, assisting, advising, mentoring, and training local forces. The Danish Army has predominantly trained local forces in basic military skills, as seen in Afghanistan

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<sup>160</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Denmark's Integrated Stabilisation Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Areas of the World," 12–13.

<sup>161</sup> "International Operations," Ministry of Defence, January 8, 2016, <http://www.fmn.dk/eng/allabout/Pages/Internationaloperations.aspx>.

between 2011–2014 and Iraq in 2015–16.<sup>162</sup> The Danish special operations forces have some experience with military capacity building through the training of Afghan and Nigerian forces. However, Danish forces have never executed village stability operations, and Danish special operations forces have limited experience in partnering with and assisting local forces in the fight against insurgents. Another shortcoming of the Danish special operations forces is their limited ability to sustain long-term missions given their small numbers and other defense duties. Yet, whether for a conflict prevention or a conflict intervention scenario, it is imperative that Danish forces be able to sustain a mission over a long period. Consequently, Danish special operations forces will need enablers provided by, primarily, the Army, and secondarily from the Navy and the Air Force.

## **1. Doctrine**

The different services within the Danish Armed Forces are not yet sufficiently doctrinally aligned to permit for effective full integration in a conflict prevention scenario. This doctrinal discrepancy will make full integration difficult in stability operations and capacity building.

Theoretically, the Danish Armed Forces have the doctrinal foundation to execute joint and combined task assignments across the full spectrum of operations. Each service encourages close cooperation with other services, and acknowledges the need to approach military operations jointly. However, most joint exercises center around kinetic operations with an emphasis on the synchronization of fire and movement between different services and branches. There is less emphasis on creating a common understanding of how best to synchronize and integrate all services for stabilization and capacity building operations in the framework of “shape-secure-develop,” whether for conflict prevention or during conflict.

Furthermore, there is no current Danish doctrine that addresses the principles of village stability operations for special operations forces or operational mentoring and

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<sup>162</sup> Mette Aaby, “Danskere Omringet Af IS,” Danish Broadcasting Corporation, October 2016, <https://www.dr.dk/tv/se/al-asad/dr1-dokumentar-danskere-omringet-af-is>.

liaison teams. Nor are there any cross-service doctrine or planning exercises that cover how military capacity building ties into a larger plan to transition from a conflict intervention (Scenario 2) into a conflict prevention situation (Scenario 1).

## **2. Organization**

Danish Armed Forces are not yet ready to set up a fully integrated joint task force. With the reorganization of the Danish Defence Command in 2014, the staffs of the three conventional services have been located together.<sup>163</sup> However, the Danish Special Operations Command has been located elsewhere, which not only creates physical, but also psychological distance from the other commands. Meanwhile, the Danish Home Guard Command reports directly to the Minister of Defence and has the same status as the Defence Command, thereby rendering it organizationally disassociated from the other services and the special operations forces.

With the creation of joint agencies and units<sup>164</sup> under the 2013–2017 Defence Agreement, the Danish Defence has taken a step toward being able to fully integrate forces across services. The forces of the Danish Defence are already fully integrated and working jointly in the areas of administration, logistics, and communications. However, this level of integration across services does not ensure integration and synchronization between the different services or between conventional forces and special operations forces during deployments. The units themselves still need to work together in one organization under one commander and according to the same doctrine. The Danish Defence is capable of contributing components to an integrated functional organization in the framework of conventional forces and special operations forces, but to integrate means they still need to train and deploy together under the same command structure.

The organization of the Danish Defense is capable of executing task assignments across the full spectrum of operations to address a full spectrum of threats. The Danish

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<sup>163</sup> Army Staff, Naval Staff and Air Staff

<sup>164</sup> Danish Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organisation; Danish Defence Personnel Organisation; Danish Defence Estates and Infrastructure Organisation; Danish Defence Accounting Agency; Joint Movement and Transportation Organisation; Joint Military Police Centre; The Signals Regiment Joint Command Support Center.

Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the special operations forces have units that stay at medium and high readiness and can be deployed with short notice, but these forces are not specifically trained to conduct stabilization operations via military capacity building. Additionally, the small number of Danish army units, navy vessels, air force aircraft, and special operations forces overall makes it difficult to sustain long-term missions unless more units are produced, which entails recruiting and training personnel, instilling expertise and know-how and, in some cases, procuring more materiel.

The Danish Army has three battle groups comprised; each takes turns on being in high readiness status. Thus, the Army can continuously deploy a battle group for 18 months without having to produce new battalions. If the Army is tasked to sustain a larger mission for more than 18 months, cadres from the high readiness battle groups will have to be removed to form the basis of a new battle group. As a result, all battle groups will include personnel on reaction force contracts along with professional enlisted personnel.<sup>165</sup> The Army is capable of deploying experienced officers and non-commissioned officers that can form operational mentoring and liaison teams, but there is no generic plan for how to produce these teams. Additionally, allocating personnel to operational mentoring and liaison teams will weaken the fundamental structure of the Army's battle groups. Thus, if the Army has to engage in either type of conflict prevention or intervention scenario, it is important to identify how its current structure can be organized to enhance sustainability.

The Danish Navy has predominantly been engaged in counter-piracy operations along the Horn of Africa and capacity building of coast guards in East African countries such as Kenya. However, the Navy has little experience in stabilization operations that share the characteristics described in both scenarios, which requires partnering with and assisting local forces in close integration with the other Danish services.

The Danish Air Force has predominantly been engaged in air interdiction and close support operations, surveillance tasks, and transport tasks in the Middle East,

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<sup>165</sup> Personnel on reaction contract have between 5 and 12 months of training. Professional enlisted personnel have at least 12 months of training.

Afghanistan, and Africa. As such, the Air Force has gained experience in joint and combined missions with predominantly Army and special operations forces in scenarios that require use of one of its platforms. However, apart from the Air Force-led operational mentoring and liaison team in Afghanistan in 2009–2012,<sup>166</sup> the Air Force’s officers and non-commissioned officers do not have much experience when it comes to capacity building of local forces or partnering and assisting local forces in either type of scenarios.

The Home Guard has a large potential to play in support of the armed services. With approximately 46,000 members, of whom one third are active, the Home Guard can become an important enabler in stability operations. The Home Guard Command is a joint command that is manned by officers and non-commissioned officers from all services and branches. However, the Home Guard is not under the command of the Danish Chief of Defence, which complicates command and control, and thus the optimal usage and coordination of volunteer personnel in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the special operations forces.

Danish special operations forces have mainly been deployed in support of the Army on brief deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, and in support of the Navy along the Horn of Africa. Danish land and maritime special operations forces also conducted joint military assistance operations in Afghanistan from 2012–2014. Unlike the Danish Army, Danish special operations forces do not have the ability to quickly produce more soldiers to sustain a deployment over time. With a limited number of operators and the challenge of recruiting and selecting more, Danish special operations forces can only sustain a few deployments for a short duration before having to rest personnel and restore unit efficiency. The personnel within the Danish special operations forces are used to deploying in task forces tailored to the specific assignment and outside their normal organizational framework. This provides flexibility and makes them well suited for full integration. However, Danish special operations forces have not conducted training with conventional forces for the purpose of capacity building.

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<sup>166</sup> “ISAF—Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT).”

### **3. Technology**

Danish Armed Forces are capable of full integration and task assignment from a technological standpoint. All services and the Danish special operations forces are very technologically advanced and have systems that can communicate together when in an operational environment. However, some discrepancies exist in the administrative communication systems on which staff work is done. The services and special operations forces all share the same internal communication system.<sup>167</sup> However, this system can only handle up to, and including, the classification “restricted.” The services and the Danish special operations forces use different systems for higher classification levels, which creates the need for a more streamlined approach to communicating at classification levels above “restricted.”

## **C. SOLUTIONS**

The two biggest challenges in terms of military capacity building faced by the Danish Armed Forces is the problem of integrating forces and the difficulty of sustaining missions over a long time. These challenges can be solved by giving military capacity building a higher focus and priority in all aspects of training and education, as well as by looking into organizational and structural changes that can help provide a higher number of qualified personnel when forces are to be deployed in a military capacity building role.

### **1. Improving Doctrinal Deficiencies**

Increasing the focus on capacity building in training and education can be achieved through structural training and education, general training and education, and mission specific training and education.<sup>168</sup> Because structural training and education focuses on building the theoretical knowledge of the individual, subjects that improve cultural understanding, convey theories about different drivers of conflict, and offer historical examples of successful as well as unsuccessful military capacity building

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<sup>167</sup> Forsvarets Integrerede Informations Netværk (FIIN), (English: Danish Defence Integrated Information Network)

<sup>168</sup> Structural training and education encompasses the basic and advanced training of officers and non-commissioned officers to sustain the organization of the Danish Armed Forces.



should be included in the curricula taught at basic and advanced non-commissioned officers and officers training, as well as at the joint staff course.<sup>169</sup> Instilling the theoretical knowledge about military capacity building could provide junior officers and non-commissioned officers with a better understanding of the different aspects of military capacity building and could also reinforce a shared understanding of doctrine. By being able to develop a more thorough understanding of the environment and the background of a conflict, it should be easier to use doctrine and apply it correctly.

General training or education should then build on the theoretical knowledge acquired during structural training and education. General training or education can consist of activities such as courses, seminars, and different types of exercises. Seminars or courses can cover one or more specific subjects related to capacity building, or focus on a specific phase of deployment. Seminars and courses can be joint and focused either at the individual or at the unit level. Some courses could focus on specific aspects of partnering or advising and be customized to provide individuals with a higher level of expertise about particular aspects of military capacity building, such as a train-the-trainers program. Other perspectives and increased mutual understanding of different doctrines, procedures, or other subjects related to military capacity building can also be acquired through participation in working groups. Seminars can be stand-alone activities, or they can be conducted in conjunction with exercises to make sure that everyone has the same baseline knowledge.

Training exercises can help people practice full integration between special operations forces and conventional forces. Ideally, such training would focus on military capacity building in the framework of “shape-secure-develop.” The planning of an exercise should follow the same phases and procedures as the planning of a real mission, and it should be done jointly and by the same people who would be in charge of planning a real mission. The exercise should focus on staff planning procedures as well as training the actual personnel who will be advising during the deployment. Information operations

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<sup>169</sup> Basic non-commissioned officers training covers NATO OR-6; advanced non-commissioned officers training covers NATO OR-7 and OR-8; Basic officers training covers NATO OF-1; advanced officers course covers NATO OF-2; joint staff course covers NATO OF-3.

should be emphasized in order to learn how to shape the cognitive domain to avoid defaulting to kinetic operations.

Although training different audiences at different levels simultaneously can be a challenge, it is possible to do this with proper planning. A comprehensive field exercise would provide all participants with a better common understanding of the doctrine and the procedures used by different entities. Possible friction points and discrepancies could then be addressed in an exercise environment before a live mission occurs. Another alternative would be to conduct Command Post Exercises. Only the commanders, the staff, and the communication element would be involved, requiring fewer resources and personnel than traditional field exercises. The focus would still be on conducting integrated planning between different staffs or task organizing a staff with members from different services or branches to conduct joint and integrated planning.

Officers and non-commissioned officers with an appreciation for the different elements of culture and the drivers behind conflict, should be able to apply this to a specific conflict to understand its dynamics. Exercises should perform a similar function. Having conducted generic military capacity building exercises does not mean that mission-specific training, education, and exercises are not needed. Ideally, seminars, planning exercises, and full-scale exercises should be used in the mission specific phase prior to deploying. However, in reality, once Danish politicians decide to deploy troops to a conflict, there is often little time to proceed through all of these steps. Therefore, the more baseline knowledge everyone has about military capacity building and the more efficiently the different staffs, units, and individuals cooperate, the less time it should take to conduct mission-specific training prior to deploying. This means that whatever task force is put together can either be ready to deploy in shorter period of time or can deploy in the same amount of time but with a higher level of proficiency.

Education and exercises should be structured and repeated on a regular basis. Ideally, the same personnel or at least the same units should participate. This will make it possible to build on previous experiences and not start from scratch every time with new units or personnel. However, even with the same units participating, the natural turn-over of personnel will always result in a number of people taking part for the first time.

Therefore, having a structure that integrates the doctrinal and organizational lessons learned from previous activities is important. Of course, this applies not only to education and exercises, but also capturing and maintaining operational experience from deployments.

## **2. Improving Organizational Deficiencies**

Having a Center of Excellence (CoE) that focuses on military capacity building can help collect and maintain knowledge acquired from previous experiences, coordinate efforts between different services and commands, and provide military guidance and advice the military or even the political decision-makers on issues regarding capacity building. To do this, a military capacity building center should be fitted into the organizational structure of the Danish Armed Forces. It should include representation not only from all the services, but also from each of the branches as well as from the Home Guard. Since military capacity building is an integral part of, and often provides the pre-conditions for, civilian capacity building, the center should have close links to other relevant government agencies. One of the tasks for the center should be to analyze policymakers' priorities and identify valid and sustainable military capacity building missions that can support these priorities.

In general, before such a center exist and more studies are done, here is what we can say: the general composition of a task force assigned for military capacity building would depend on the mission tasks, the hostility of the environment, and the amount of support available. Partnering with a local unit in a hostile environment with limited logistical, medical, or combat support would normally be a task for special operations forces. The same would apply in an uncertain or shifting environment due to the flexibility of special operations forces and their ability to work independently with a minimum of external support. However, due to the scarcity of Danish special operations forces, it is necessary to integrate qualified personnel from the conventional forces to support and take over some of the tasks from special operations forces to sustain missions over time. Hence, as conditions change and tasks change, so should the ratio between special operations forces and conventional forces.

To be able to fully integrate with other services or with special operations forces and conduct military capacity building, personnel should be selected based on the following characteristics:

- Previous military experience
- High degree of knowledge within their field of expertise
- Maturity
- Empathy
- Interaction and communication skills
- Cultural understanding/awareness
- Ability to teach/instruct
- Ability to speak the local language

Ideally, all of the personnel deployed should have a training or advisory role, (e.g., the logistics officer will advise the local logistics officer, the intel officer will advise the local intel officer, etc.) The personnel conducting military capacity building should be officers and non-commissioned officers since they already have sufficient experience to advise, mentor, and train. Optimally, trainers and advisors should also have previous operational experience within the field which they are giving advice on.

The Danish Armed Forces are not structured to conduct capacity building and only the Danish Land Special Operations Forces have units consisting of officers and non-commissioned officers. However, the Danish Armed Forces have a high ratio of officers and non-commissioned officers to enlisted personnel.<sup>170</sup> This provides a fair number of qualified personnel to select from for military capacity building missions.

There are a number of different ways to optimize the existing organizational structure to meet the demands of military capacity building. One is to create a standing unit designated specifically for military capacity building. Establishing a permanent capacity building unit offers the advantage of being able to tailor the military force conducting capacity building from the beginning, and potentially deploying with a mixed

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<sup>170</sup> See Appendix J

and fully integrated configuration of conventional and special operations forces. Such a task force would be able to deploy rapidly either independently or in support of special operations forces, only needing mission specific training prior to the deployment. The unit could consist of a number of instructors and advisors with expertise within different fields of military capacity building, and the organization should be flexible enough to allow for task organization for different missions. The organization should also have enough depth and redundancy to be able to deploy some personnel on a military capacity building mission while at the same time others train new personnel or prepare for the subsequent rotation. The unit could be organized either within the conventional forces structure, integrated directly into the special operations forces organization, or placed under the joint military capacity building center proposed earlier. The latter option would be preferable in terms of maintaining expertise and training opportunities.

Another suggestion would be to create a database of qualified personnel. This could either supplement a standing military capacity unit or be a less expensive stand-alone alternative. When needed, these personnel could form a military capacity building task force or be assigned to and deploy with a special operation forces unit. The personnel would remain in their current positions, but would have designated functions in a “shadow” military capacity building organization, and would be asked to participate in capacity building training and exercises. This option would require a longer period of pre-deployment training before the assembled task force would be able to be considered fully integrated, and might not integrate fully before the mission.

One disadvantage to “coding” individuals is that the conventional forces would have to give them up periodically, leaving their positions unoccupied. This would affect unit efficiency and readiness, especially if key personnel were removed from a unit without proper replacements. It could also create problems if the conventional unit was ordered to deploy. To mitigate these challenges, several qualified personnel would need to be designated for each position to ensure sufficient redundancy.

While the startup of a new mission and the first deployment is usually characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, the picture should become clearer with subsequent deployments. Those designated for subsequent deployments will have a

longer time to prepare, and the experiences and lessons learned from the personnel already deployed can be incorporated into the pre-deployment training. Sustainability and continuity are key components to mission success. For reasons previously mentioned, it can take years to produce personnel qualified for military capacity building missions. The exact length of time it takes to become proficient will depend on the tasks that the personnel will be responsible for performing. If an instructor is needed to teach basic soldier skills, a sergeant with only a few years of military experience might suffice, while someone advising on defense structure and organization at a ministerial level or on staff procedures and campaign planning should have the rank of major or above, in addition to having the right background. The latter type of personnel cannot be produced but must be found within the existing organization. However, if such an individual is removed from his current unit, this will affect its readiness.

For these and other reasons, it is critical to ask how the task of conducting military capacity building should be prioritized among other military tasks. Procedures must be set up to also facilitate long-term sustainment of a capacity building mission. Currently, all services use different standards when it comes to the length of deployments. The Navy and the Air Force use three-month rotations, special operations forces usually deploy for four months, while the Army uses six-month rotations. If full integration is to be achieved, a joint task force must be able to train together prior to the deployment, which requires congruence among rotation lengths over the course of the mission.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

The Danish Armed Forces are capable of conducting task assignment, but lack the ability to effectively conduct full integration due to differences between the different services and between conventional forces and special operations forces in the use and understanding of doctrine. This qualifies the Danish Armed Forces to conduct military capacity building in a conflict intervention scenario. However, being inserted into conflict prevention situations or into the transition from conflict intervention to conflict prevention presents a challenge for the Danish Armed Forces. One solution is to include

more education and training related to capacity building in basic and advanced officers and non-commissioned officers training. This will help develop a baseline appreciation for the generic factors that affect military capacity building missions. At a minimum, a common doctrinal approach with emphasis on “shape-secure-develop” and information operations has to be strengthened via joint seminars, courses, and exercises.

Sustaining military capacity building missions over a longer period also presents a challenge for the Danish Armed Forces. There is very limited need for enlisted personnel in military capacity building, which requires experienced and mature officers and non-commissioned officers with the right skillsets and personality. The Danish Armed Forces have a preponderance of officers or non-commissioned officers, but none are specifically designated for military capacity building. One solution would be to create a joint standing unit of instructors and advisors that would be able to deploy rapidly either independently or with special operations forces. Another option, either as a supplement or as a less expensive alternative, would be to pre-designate capable personnel who then stay with their existing units, but on a regular basis participate in joint training. In both cases, the sustainment of a long-term capacity building mission will require removing designated personnel from key positions in the existing structure to deploy, which will affect the organization’s ability to address other tasks.

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## VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Future regional stabilization operations will likely have to be based on sustainable, small footprint operations that are tailored to local solutions and local problems. Defense cuts, engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan (2003-2014), and current international operations have led to an overstretch of resources, which has made it hard for Denmark to sustain long duration engagements. Increased sustainability in military capacity building can be achieved through the synchronization and integration between conventional forces and special operations forces. If the synchronization and integration are done right, Denmark will be able to provide and sustain effective military capacity building for long duration missions that will prove less expensive than the full-scale interventions seen in Iraq (2003-2007) and Afghanistan (2002-2015).

Military capacity building has become an increasingly integral component of Danish foreign policy. Instability in Africa and the Middle East indirectly threatens stability in Europe and Denmark. Therefore, the stabilization of Africa and the Middle East are in line with Danish and European security interests. Danish forces have primarily been involved in conflict intervention. In contrast, stabilization operations demand a comprehensive full spectrum kinetic and non-kinetic approach, in which the “shape-secure-develop” strategy is central. While it is true that countering an insurgency, or stabilizing a country or region, demands a comprehensive approach involving: military capacity building and security, civilian institution building, economic development, and diplomatic negotiations, the military can and should not do it all; it must focus on its specific role. Military capacity building is not only a matter of training “shooters” and units. It is also a matter of building capacities and military institutions that understand how to operate in the framework of “shape-secure-develop,” and can apply both kinetic and non-kinetic effects and teach this to the local forces.

It is useful to outline the principles of task assignment and full integration to highlight what it takes to integrate and synchronize the efforts of special operations forces and conventional forces in different types of regional stabilization operations. A

conflict prevention scenario (Scenario 1) and a conflict intervention scenario (Scenario 2) have been used in this study, to set the framework for two conceptual solutions.

If Danish forces are to be engaged in conflict prevention it is imperative that they methodically ensure that underlying tensions do not evolve into a full blown violent conflict (Scenario 2), such as an insurgency or a civil war. If Danish forces intervene in a conflict (Scenario 2), their aim should be to facilitate the conditions so that the situation transitions from conflict intervention to prevention (Scenario 1). With conflict prevention, the objective is predominantly achieved through a full integration approach, in which conventional forces and special operations forces are fully integrated across doctrine, organization, and technology. In conflict intervention, the objectives are predominately achieved through a task assignment approach, in which conventional forces partner and assist through operational mentoring liaison teams and special operations forces do the same via the concept of village stability operations. However, it is important to stress that a small, fully integrated element has to be in place from the beginning to plan and coordinate the transitional phase. In the transitional phase both conventional forces and special operations forces will have to work jointly to transition to full integration, which also means that military capacity building becomes an integrated part of both everyday training and the conduct of real life operations, in which local forces use the “shape-secure-develop” approach to stabilize the local environment.

Within the Danish Armed Forces there are units and individuals that have gained experience and knowledge about how to build up foreign military capabilities. This includes the Army, the Navy, the Home Guard, and the special operations forces. Additionally, the Home Guard is assessed to possess considerable potential to support the Defence Command Denmark. All services have organization, doctrine, and technology that enables them to conduct full integration operations and/or task force assignments. However, due to a lack of resources, synchronizing, and integrating conventional forces with special operations forces remains a major challenge. Synchronizing training and deployment cycles and ensuring that a common understanding of doctrine, planning, and execution of stability operations through military capacity exists is essential to building the framework for “shape-secure-develop.”

From a technological standpoint, the Danish Armed Forces are by and large sufficiently interoperable to carry out stability operations and military capacity building. Thus, the challenge mainly comes down to doctrinal and organizational issues. Our analysis based on our assessment of Danish foreign policy, and the capacity and capabilities of the Danish Armed Forces leads to the following recommendations:

- Scarcity of military resources makes it necessary to integrate units and personnel from the conventional forces and the special operations forces to sustain long duration stabilization missions. Particular conditions and tasks will define the appropriate ratio of conventional forces and special operations forces.
- Practical and theoretical training and education about capacity building has to be methodically instilled in the Danish military system all the way from the training of non-commissioned officers to the higher education of officers. Material to be covered should include cultural understanding, anthropology, knowledge about irregular conflicts and military assistance.
- Seminars and courses have to be offered frequently to disseminate knowledge and ensure a common understanding about stability operations and capacity building.
- Generic training exercises, to include staff work and planning exercises, should be held to ensure a common understanding of settings, doctrine, and planning. This is especially important for officers and non-commissioned officers who will form the backbone of a capacity building mission. Generic and frequent exercises will build knowledge and thus provide a solid basis for being able to plan and execute real deployments.
- Seminars, courses, and staff work exercises have to be carried out on a regular basis to maintain knowledge and develop tactics, techniques, and procedures that can be tailored for any given mission in which “shape-secure-develop” and information operations are essential.
- A joint center of excellence that focuses on military capacity building should be created. Some of its tasks should be to collect and maintain previous experiences, to coordinate efforts between the services and commands, and to provide military guidance to senior military and the political decision makers.
- Personnel have to be selected based on criteria that relate to their advisory role. Previous operational and advisory experience must have high priority in the organization. The high percentage of non-commissioned officers and officers with recent experience from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa within the Danish Armed Forces provides a pool from which the right personnel for capacity building missions can be selected.
- The Danish Armed Forces should create a dedicated joint unit to conduct military capacity building.

- The Danish Armed Forces should create a database of personnel with capacity building qualifications. By request, personnel with the right qualifications could be designated for stabilization and capacity missions.
- Unit deployment cycles and deployment length need to be aligned between the services, which is something especially important for full integration missions.

None of these recommendations will be easily implemented. Some may be impeded by structural challenges, a lack of resources, and the nature of the command structure within the Danish Ministry of Defence. The command structure between the conventional forces, special operations forces, and the Home Guard presents one challenge that will have to be addressed. Meanwhile, who is to take the lead on stabilization operations through capacity building, and where in the defense organization should a military capacity building center of excellence be located? How can Denmark create units that are designated for capacity building, and how can the Danish forces synchronize education, training, and deployment cycles? If these questions can be answered, Danish Armed Forces will move one big step closer to fulfilling the foreign security policy objectives set forth by the Danish government.

## **APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS OF PARTNER, ASSIST, ADVISE, MENTOR AND TRAIN**

The terms “partnering,” “advising,” “assisting,” “mentoring,” and “training” are defined in this appendix to avoid any ambiguity about their precise meaning in this capstone. NATO’s definition of partnering, advising, and assisting are cited from NATO’s Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (AJP-3.4.4). In the case of the terms mentor and train, these terms are not clearly defined in AJP-3.4.4. Therefore, the definitions of mentoring and training from the British Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency are used instead.<sup>171</sup>

### **A. PARTNER**

In partnering, foreign units and local forces fight as equal partners, and partnering is defined as:

Partnering attaches units at various levels to leverage the strengths of both NATO and HN [Host Nation] security forces. As an HN [Host Nation] security force’s capabilities mature, the echelon and degree of partnering decrease. As the HN [Host Nation] security force conducts more autonomous operations, NATO forces still provide quick reaction forces and other assistance as appropriate. Partner units should establish combined cells for intelligence, operations, planning, and sustainment. While effective coordination is always required and initial efforts may require completely fused efforts, HNs [Host Nations] should eventually build the capability and capacity to conduct all efforts autonomously. Unit partnerships do not replace advisory roles or functions. If partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms a three-part relationship amongst HN [Host Nation] security forces, advisers and the partner units. Partner units should look to the adviser to identify, shape, and facilitate operational partnering opportunities and training events. Advisers support the Alliance and partner unit objectives but, depending on the operational

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<sup>171</sup> Other terms related to capacity building, such as augment, monitor, liaise, lead, equip, and organize, can be found in various doctrines and literature, but since they are not used in this capstone, we are not addressing them here.

phase, the partner unit may support advisers or advisers may support the partner unit.<sup>172</sup>

## **B. ASSIST**

According to NATO doctrine: “Assisting is providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities so HN [Host Nation] security forces can meet objectives and the end state. The level of advice and assistance is based on conditions and should continue until HN [Host Nation] security forces can establish required systems or until conditions no longer require it.”<sup>173</sup> It “consists of providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities so the HNSF [Host Nation Special Forces] can meet their objectives.”<sup>174</sup>

## **C. ADVISE**

Advising aims to have local forces carry out their own planning and execution of missions, only supported by advice from qualified personnel and is defined as:

Advising is the primary type of training conducted with HN [Host Nation] security forces. Advising is the use of influence to work by, with and through HN [Host Nation] security forces. This type of training relies on the ability of the adviser to provide relevant and timely advice to HN [Host Nation] security forces... Advisers are not partners. Advising and partnering are complementary but inherently different activities. Advising requires relationship building and candid discourse to influence the development of a professional security force. Partnering incorporates training with combined operations to achieve the same goals. Advisers perform partnership-shaping functions, shape discussions with their counterparts and create opportunities for the partner units.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (AJP-3.4.4),” 5–25.

<sup>173</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (AJP-3.4.4)” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Allied Publication, February 2011), 5–23.

<sup>174</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, “NATO Special Operations Forces Military Assistance Handbook 1st Study Draft” (NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters, July 2014), 1–8.

<sup>175</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) (AJP-3.4.4),” 5–25.

#### **D. MENTOR**

The lines between mentoring and advising can be blurry. However, foreign forces have a more passive role when they are being mentored. The focus is to guide, council, support or direct indigenous armed forces on the best practice to be adopted in particular prescribed circumstances. Mentoring will usually focus on assisting the indigenous armed forces to improve their own systems and processes.”<sup>176</sup>

#### **E. TRAIN**

When foreign forces train, they typically teach local forces directly in accordance with technical and tactical manuals, and aim “to deliver military instruction direct to indigenous forces in order to achieve a given state of objective. Where possible, consideration must be given to Training the Trainer (T3).”<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> British Ministry of Defence, “Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency” (British Ministry of Defence, January 2010), 10-NaN-1.


<sup>177</sup> British Ministry of Defence, “Army Field Manual Countering Insurgency,” 10-NaN-1.

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**APPENDIX B. FUNCTIONAL AND DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE**

Functional structure



Divisional structure



\*each division contains all the necessary functions to deliver and manage the desired product

Figure 11. Depiction of Functional and Divisional Structure<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>178</sup> Adapted from Richard Daft, *Organization Theory and Design* (Cengage Learning, 2006), 101.

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## APPENDIX C. DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

# DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE




Figure 12. Organization of the Danish Ministry of Defence<sup>179</sup>

<sup>179</sup> Source: "Organisation of the Ministry of Defence," Ministry of Defence, January 2016, <http://www.fmn.dk/eng/Aboutus/agencies/Pages/danish-mod-agencies.aspx>

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## APPENDIX D. DEFENCE COMMAND DENMARK

# DEFENCE COMMAND DENMARK

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Figure 13. Organization of Defence Command Denmark<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Source: "Defence Command Organization," Defence Command Denmark, August 2016, <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/Pages/Organisation.aspx>

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## APPENDIX E. ROYAL DANISH ARMY

### ARMY ORGANIZATION

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


Figure 14. Organization of the Royal Danish Army<sup>181</sup>

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<sup>181</sup> Source: Adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence, “Standardbriefing Tilrettet Forsvaret,” (Copenhagen July 15, 2015). This briefing is a standard briefing on Defence Command Denmark and its organization. It was made for the Danish Chief of Defence. It has been provided to the authors by the adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence.

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# The Army – The Battle Group




Figure 15. Depiction of the Danish Battle Group<sup>182</sup>

<sup>182</sup> Source: Adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence, “Standardbriefing Tilrettet Forsvaret,” (Copenhagen July 15, 2015). This briefing is a standard briefing on Defence Command Denmark and its organization. It was made for the Danish Chief of Defence. It has been provided to the authors by the adjutant of the Danish Chief of Defence.

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## APPENDIX F. ROYAL DANISH NAVY

# NAVY ORGANIZATION

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Figure 16. Organization of the Royal Danish Navy<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>183</sup> Source: "The Royal Danish Navy," Defence Command Denmark, May 2016, <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/Navy/Pages/Navy.aspx>

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## APPENDIX G. ROYAL DANISH AIR FORCE

# AIR FORCE ORGANIZATION

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


Figure 17. Organization of the Royal Danish Air Force<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Adapted from “The Royal Danish Air Force,” Defence Command Denmark, May 2016, <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/AirForce/Pages/RoyalDanishAirForce.aspx>

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## APPENDIX H. DANISH HOME GUARD

### HOME GUARD ORGANIZATION

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


Figure 18. Organization of the Danish Home Guard<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> Adapted from “The Danish Home Guard,” Hjemmeværnet, <http://www.hjv.dk/sider/english.aspx>

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# APPENDIX I. DANISH SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

## SOF ORGANIZATION




Figure 19. Organization of the Danish Special Operations Forces<sup>186</sup>

<sup>186</sup> Adapted from: "Defence Command Organisation," Defence Command Denmark, August 2016, <http://www2.forsvaret.dk/eng/Organisation/Pages/Organisation.aspx>

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## APPENDIX J. DANISH DEFENCE PERSONNEL

Table 3. Distribution of Personnel in the Danish Defence<sup>187</sup>

### NUMBERS OF DANISH DEFENCE PERSONNEL

	Army	Air Force	Navy	Home Guard
Generals (OF-6 to OF-9)	9	4	3	1
Colonels (OF-5)	38	19	20	6
Lt. Colonels (OF-4)	167	58	58	18
Majors (OF-3)	346	179	187	42
Captains (OF-2)	1119	475	336	90
1st Lieutenants (OF-1)	721	226	171	17
2nd Lieutenants (OF-1)	290	93	63	0
NCOs (OR4 to OR9)	2885	1214	711	47
Privates (OR-1 to OR-3)	4662	1621	1459	57

<sup>187</sup> Source: Defence Personnel Organisation (FPS-RA-MS01), in discussion with authors, October 7, 2016.

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