NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

CREATING A LEARNING ORGANIZATION FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TO COMBAT VIOLENT EXTREMISM

by

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September 2016

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			*Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188*
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY ***(Leave blank)***	**2. REPORT DATE** September 2016	**3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED** Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CREATING A LEARNING ORGANIZATION FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TO COMBAT VIOLENT EXTREMISM			**5. FUNDING NUMBERS**
6. AUTHOR(S) John Eric Powell			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			**10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.			**12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE**

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

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14. SUBJECT TERMS combating violent extremism (CVE), counter radicalization, online asynchronous discussion, computer mediated communication, collaboration, strategic thinking, learning organizations, law enforcement partners			**15. NUMBER OF PAGES** 103
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE** Unclassified	**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT** Unclassified	**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

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CREATING A LEARNING ORGANIZATION FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TO COMBAT VIOLENT EXTREMISM

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2016**

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This is a proof-of-concept project for an online law enforcement learning organization dedicated to combating violent extremism (CVE), specifically, counter-radicalization techniques to be implemented by state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. Although there are many different forms of violent extremism, examples in this paper reflect those threats from Islamic violent extremism. Even so, this proposed law enforcement learning organization model could be used to facilitate countermeasures against all forms of violent extremism. The paper proposes utilizing an asynchronous online discussion format for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to enter into dialogue about counter radicalization as well as to provide resources for law enforcement training cadre and command staff. This learning model concept will augment current CVE counter-radicalization strategies in the United States, allowing for greater dialogue, information, and idea sharing. Additionally, two curriculum options are presented to augment the learning organization concept. The project's foundation is within the online asynchronous discussion and related instructional design body of research.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AQ	Al Qaeda
CHDS	Center for Homeland Security and Defense
CMC	Computer-mediated communication
CSLD	Center for Strategic Leadership and Development
CVE	Combating violent extremism
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
ELP	Executive Leaders Program
FC	Fusion center
FCLP	Fusion Center Leaders Program
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
IC	Intelligence community
IS	Islamic State
IPA	Intergovernmental Personnel Act
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
LE	Law enforcement
NFCA	National Fusion Center Association
NPS	Naval Postgraduate School
OAD	Online asynchronous discussion
SHP	State highway patrol
SLT	State, local, and tribal
SP	State police
SSM	Soft systems methodology
UAPI	University and Agency Partnership Initiative
USAWC	United States Army War College
VUCA	An acronym describing an external environment using the terms volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. The term originated at the United States Army War College.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank the United States Naval Postgraduate School, the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS), and the United States Department of Homeland Security for allowing me to participate in this program. Of any of my academically related endeavors, this has been my favorite and most rewarding.

Additionally, I wish to thank Drs. David Brannan and Anders Strindberg for their consideration of my substantive health challenges throughout the latter part of this program. This appreciation is also extended to CHDS Academic Associate Dr. Erik Dahl, and the chair for the Department of National Security Affairs, Dr. Mohammed Hafez, for their consideration as well. Dr. Lauren Wollman has been a steadfast counselor and great research professor along the way. Lastly, Ms. Catherine Grant is an amazing editor.

For the last nine months, I have been blessed to have been chosen as a visiting professor at the United States Army War College's Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group within the Center for Strategic Leadership. Professor Bert Tussing has been an incredible mentor. His knowledge of homeland defense and civil support, coupled with his tremendous writing ability, has inspired me to learn as much as possible about threats and challenges to public safety. My colleagues, Dr. Allen Miller, Colonel Tony Manetta, and Colonel Patrick Cusick have been top-shelf teammates and friends.

Of anyone I could count as the most valued teammates would be my family. I'd like to thank my father, who is United States Air Force veteran from the Cold War of the 1960s and who instilled in me the values of being an American, as well as my mother, who has been my greatest lifelong proponent—both have provided me with my protective proclivities for every member of our great Republic. My wife, Carol, who is truly the smartest member of our small family and deserves a great deal of accolades. She kept me focused on this task. Her son, Randy, is an exceptional example of a young man who exemplifies the best our country has to offer. Our Maltese puppies, Kfir and Grits, further helped me to understand what it means to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves.

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I. INTRODUCTION

I dedicate this first chapter in a similar manner as Henry Mintzberg did in his 1998 text, *Strategy Safari: A Guided Tour through the Wilds of Strategic Management*: "I dedicate this project to such people who are more interested in open fields than closed cages." Imagination and creativity, coupled with intellectual capital, are the effective countermeasure for challenges to be faced by state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in their mission to counter violent extremism.

A. BACKGROUND

In the United States, the mission of combating violent extremism (CVE) is a recent challenge for all stratifications of law enforcement: federal, state, local, and tribal (SLT). Until 2001, CVE was not generally a part of entry-level or continuing education for state, local, or tribal (SLT) law enforcement personnel; however, currently, state and local law enforcement agencies across the country find themselves responding to these emerging threats. Understandably, they are searching for guidance with this new mission. For example, the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) indicates, "communities of all sizes are dealing with individuals and groups that proffer violent interpretations of ideologies, radicals hoping to identify and groom new recruits, and individuals that are radicalizing to violence" (2014, p. vii). In addition, McCants and Watts (2012) point out that there are several U.S. government documents on the CVE mission; however, none provide a consensus on what CVE is nor how those efforts are to be accomplished. A substantial part of the overall CVE challenge, apart from kinetic events, is the counter-radicalization process for those persons at risk to become terrorists. Counter radicalization works to provide positive, multidisciplinary, non-lethal intervention(s) with those at risk to becoming radicalized prior to a violent extremist act. The White House CVE Summit in 2015 decreed, "CVE encompasses the preventative aspects of counterterrorism as well as interventions to undermine the attraction of extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence" (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2015). Furthermore, three specific programs were highlighted to

accomplish the collective White House advocated CVE mission: 1) building awareness, 2) countering extremist's narratives, and 3) emphasizing community-led intervention (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2015).

This counter-radicalization challenge is one that SLT law enforcement agencies can find themselves ill equipped to face, both in experience and under existing doctrine. For most SLT law enforcement agencies, there are just a few concrete, comprehensive resources to assist with or provide guidance for this task. Most all are written documents and do not facilitate nationwide discussion of which strategies work and which do not. This is a substantive focus of this paper as CVE and specific counter-radicalization strategies emerge.

New and evolving Islamic terror groups threaten domestic security. In September 2011, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) asserted, "the nature of the threat from international Islamic terrorist groups is likely to change" after events such as the Arab Spring and the death of Osama bin Laden. New terror aberrations, such as the Islamic State (IS), currently dominate headlines with its savagery in the Middle East, while groups like Al Qaeda (AQ) still pose a significant threat globally. Even though this country has not experienced the massive loss of life as it did during the attacks of September 11, 2001, it has experienced deadly events such as the Fort Hood massacre, the Boston Marathon bombing, workplace beheadings from radicalized individuals, as well as multiple foiled terror attacks over the last 14–15 years. In successful interventions against violent extremists in Garland, Texas (Conlon & Sgueglia, 2015) and Chattanooga, Tennessee (Slovin, 2015), local law enforcement officers have successfully stopped terrorists in the act of attacking civilians.

In August 2011 the White House published a document entitled *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, a guide to assist SLT law enforcement agencies with the CVE mission. It was the follow-on document to the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (White House, 2011b). *Empowering Local Partners* (White House, 2011a) was the first document of its kind from the executive branch addressing violent extremism and radicalization, and it is one of the two documents central to this project. The other is the *Strategic Implementation Plan for*

Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, which was presented in December 2011 (White House). Both documents were foundational to what was presented in the White House CVE Summit of 2015. Subsequently, it was the first document from the federal executive branch that spoke to the general issues surrounding SLT law enforcement in CVE and counter-radicalization roles. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a three-part strategy that supports the *Empowering Local Partners* document (White House, 2011a). The DHS (2015) *Approach to Countering Violent Extremism* has three broad objectives: 1) understanding violent extremism, 2) support local communities, and 3) support local law enforcement.

Violent extremism is not a new threat to the United States, but it now has many more variables than it did previously. This research initially provides examples of Islamic violent extremism, as it is an immediate national threat; however, the project envisions application to all forms of violent extremism. Other forms of violent extremism include the horrific North Charleston African-American church active shooter incident that claimed the lives of nine people in a white supremacist, hate-filled extremist rampage by Dylann Roof (Sanchez & Payne, 2015). Many domestic groups can be categorized as violent extremists, such as domestic terrorists (e.g., Aryan Nations, New Black Panther Party). The CVE mission is not just limited to radical religious ideology. For example, DHS (2015) explains that violent extremism threats to the homeland are "neither constrained by international borders nor limited to any single ideology." Local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies need to be aware of many different violent extremism variables, such as politically driven extremism, and not just the extremism of religious ideologies. As the term violent extremism may refer different ideologies, this paper considers Islamic violent extremism as a theme; however, it is not the only dangerous ideology in American society.

The initial *Empowering Local Partners* (White House, 2011a) is structured by four major parts: 1) the challenge, 2) a community-based approach, 3) goal and areas of priority action, and 4) guiding principles. The three substantial subheadings are within the Goals and Areas of Priority Action section and deal with 1) enhancing federal

engagement, 2) building government and law enforcement expertise, and 3) countering violent extremist propaganda (White House, 2011a).

Local and state counter-radicalization efforts are the most effective strategies for combating Islamic violent extremism. Knowledge of the local communities and the relationships built upon long periods of trust are two of the most important variables to enhance success. In mainstream American policing, the community policing model is similar in its scope as it focuses on stakeholders, relationships, and shared community outcomes. Consider the following excerpt from the *Empowering Local Partners* document:

> The Federal Government will often be ill-suited to intervene in the niches of society where radicalization to violence takes place, but it can foster partnerships to support communities through its connections to local government, law enforcement, Mayor's offices, the private sector, local service providers, academia, and many others who can help prevent violent extremism. Federal departments and agencies have begun expanding support to local stakeholders and practitioners who are on the ground and positioned to develop grassroots partnerships with the communities they serve. (White House, 2011a, p. 3)

The initial *Empowering Local Partners* (White House, 2011a) document is short, eight pages in length, and does not address specific strategies to be taken by state and local law enforcement agencies in the CVE and/or counter-radicalization mission. In fact, other than very broad policy and strategy strokes (e.g., using community policing and anti-gang strategies), there is little that the White House document provides with respect to guidance or a starting point for this considerable challenge, especially counter-radicalization efforts. Subsequent efforts by the White House CVE Summit of 2015 have provided some additional guidance that three major metropolitan American cities have developed into variably successful counter-radicalization strategies. The collective experiences of the three successful major metropolitan police agencies will be of considerable value to other SLT LE agencies across the nation as we consider the numerous examples of American citizens participating in terror operations by violent activities or by substantial monetary or logistical support. For example, these actors work with ISIS, AQ, Hezbollah, and Al Shabbab with respect to actual and verbalized threats.

Examples include the Garland, Texas active shooter event from individuals inspired by the IS (Conlon & Sgurglia, 2015), the 9/11 attacks by Al Qaeda in New York City and the Pentagon, the attack on the Saudi Arabian U.S. envoy by Hezbollah, and recent calls from Al Shabbab to attack malls in the United States (Karimi, Fantz, & Shoichet, 2015).

Many radicalized individuals travel overseas to act for their cause, and some aim to return to the United States to participate in violent acts. Other radicalized individuals stay within the country to perpetuate attacks through their own violent radicalization process via the internet or cohorts, such as the IS calls for attacking U.S. military members (Fantz, 2015). Federal law enforcement and the Intelligence Community (IC) have done a very good job of tracking those known actors across the country and overseas. However, in order to mitigate the threat, state and local law enforcement must become adept at countering radicalization and violent extremism before it occurs in the United States to ensure national security. It is the state, local, and tribal assets that have the preexisting relationships and community engagement to assist federal law enforcement and IC efforts as called for by the White House Summit on CVE in 2015. Brett Lovegrove, the incident commander of the London Underground bombings of July 7, 2005, would call this preventative concept "getting to the left of boom" (B. Lovegrove, personal communication, November 9, 2011).

B. PROBLEM STATEMENT

There is very little guidance and/or substantive resource or direction for SLT law enforcement agencies relative to the CVE mission, especially with respect to counter-radicalization methodology. Furthermore, there is no venue for dialogue/debate, information sharing, or collaboration by these same law enforcement agencies related to the CVE mission as to what strategies work, do not work, and why. Subsequently, there are no venues for SLT law enforcement collaborative efforts to test alternative ideas and related countermeasures and then share those experiences among SLT law enforcement agencies across the country.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SUB QUESTIONS

The main research question is can the creation of a learning organization for state and local law enforcement enhance the mission and provide problem-solving strategies for combating Islamic violent extremism in the United States? The sub questions are:

1. What model may be proposed as a proof of concept for the law enforcement learning organization?
2. Can asynchronous discourse via computer-based internet discussion boards facilitate the combating violent extremism mission for state and local law enforcement agencies?
3. How might the concepts of strategic thinking and scenario planning be integrated into a law enforcement learning organization dedicated to combating violent extremism?
4. What collaborative methods might best be used to facilitate information sharing within the learning organization?
5. Can an introductory four-hour and 40-hour in-service program dedicated to counter radicalization and comparative methods utilizing strategic thinking/scenario planning, be of measurable value to state and local law enforcement agencies in the combating violent extremism mission?
6. What are the ancillary benefits from a state and local law enforcement learning organization dedicated to counter-radicalization?

For this research endeavor, it is very important to remember that this is the first such learning organization/collaboration strategy (CVE and counter radicalization) for SLT law enforcement agencies developed to augment the two White House monographs, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (2011a) and the *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (2011c). Revisions of this proposed learning organization/collaborative strategy are expected as the nature and locus of threats to the United States emerge and change.

D. LEARNING ORGANIZATION PROJECT PROPOSAL

This proof of concept project creates a computer-mediated communication (CMC) learning organization and curriculum development of two courses for SLT law enforcement for the purpose of CVE, specifically to address counter-radicalization methods and efforts. The project will augment the emerging practice of counter

radicalization for SLT law enforcement agencies in the United States and provide a forum for discussion, sharing ideas, and providing resources. The curriculum development piece is an example of resources that could be provided to the participants to further their knowledge and understanding to CVE. The platform for the learning organization will be a computer-based system, similar in appearance and construction to the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's University and Agency Partnership Initiative (UAPI). There are two primary institutions that this learning organization could originate from, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) and/or the U.S. Army War College's Center for Strategic Leadership and Development (CSLD), specifically within the Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group. Having both institutions partner together would be the optimal for the development of the proposed learning organization. The learning organization would be restricted to those persons involved in SLT law enforcement, fusion center, homeland security, and/or national security positions that work in the CVE or closely-related missions. Later on, invitation to broader academic institutions and resources will be considered.

Initially, the CMC learning organization CVE efforts focus upon Islamic violent extremism and counter radicalization. However, provision of resources and guidance concerning domestic terror groups, their methods, and countermeasures are envisioned as a goal of this learning organization project at a later date and as the threats develop. A soft systems methodology/action research method will engage the proof of concept project with the counter-radicalization challenge faced by SLT law enforcement agencies. The goal is to present a learning organization that addresses all forms of radicalization, not just Islamic radicalization. To do so would go against the ideals of the learning organization.

The three main goals of this endeavor will be to:

1. Create CVE and counter-radicalization-related dialogue among SLT law enforcement, bureaus of investigation, intelligence fusion centers, and homeland security offices;

2. Promote collaboration between personnel tasked to preventing violent extremism and counter-radicalization for their particular agency and to the learning organization as a whole; and

3. Provide resources such as: mission-specific online asynchronous discussion boards, examples of comparative counter-radicalization methods from other countries, curriculum development of counter-radicalization-related law enforcement in-service courses, and relevant academic monographs.

The end goal of this project is to create a learning organization to provide ideas and resources to self-directed law enforcement work teams at the SLT level.

This project proposes to include state-level law enforcement agencies (e.g., state police/highway patrol/bureaus of investigation), state office of homeland security, and intelligence fusion centers for the first phase of the project. In outreach to federal law enforcement partners, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the IC will be a vital starting point for this proposed project. Additionally, the inclusion of the U.S. military as a partner will be an important step as it is reasonable to assume that there will be state and law enforcement personnel with military experience, reserve/national guard status, and/or substantive military-related network contacts. Experientially, military participants will be valuable to the overall learning organization effort. Subsequent phases would certainly reach out to and include tribal, larger municipal, and county law enforcement agencies.

In the first phase, the agencies selected will be each of the individual state law enforcement agencies (e.g., state patrols and their specific bureaus of investigation), state offices of homeland security, as well as to the 73 intelligence fusion centers nationwide. Approximately 150 agencies will be invited to participate in the initial phase of operations. The second phase will incorporate the 200 most populous municipalities and counties by state. This will include city police, metro police, and county sheriff's offices across the country. As the learning organization development allows, agencies representing the lesser populated areas of the United States will be admitted to the organization. Those lesser populated agencies will need to provide some proof of involvement in the overall CVE mission to justify participation in the learning

organization. Those cases will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and the need to expand the CVE mission footprint may become exigent.

The literature review for this project focuses upon four strategies that are integral to this proof of concept project. These strategies are: learning organizations, strategic thinking, scenario planning, computer mediated communication, and online asynchronous discussion. Much of the learning organization ideas were garnered from the work of Peter Senge (1999, 2006) and his application of the concept for corporations. The strategic thinking modality was founded on the work of Henry Mintzberg (1994, 1998) and has not yet been applied to the law enforcement environment. The starting point for scenario planning and this project began with the work of Thomas Chermack (2011).

The soft systems methodology (SSM) was the logical choice of methodologies for the proof of concept project as it allows the learning organization to engage the challenges of CVE. Checkland and Poulter (2006) provide a short definition of SSM:

> [SSM is] an organized, flexible process for dealing with situations which someone sees as problematical, situations which call for action to be taken to improve them, to make them more acceptable, less full of tensions and unanswered questions. The 'process' referred to is an organized process of thinking your way to taking sensible 'action to improve' the situation; and, finally, it is a process based on a particular body of ideas, namely systems ideas. (p. 4)

Contributions from academia (including critical collaborative efforts with law enforcement) will be useful in the counter-radicalization effort and facilitate the overall CVE learning organization's partnership focus as the process matures. It is expected that higher education institutions across the United States will continue to produce studies with many different research methodologies concerning terrorism and conflict. As the national and international academic contributions regarding counter-radicalization methodology continue, American law enforcement will reap the benefits of the literature. Counter-radicalization strategies based upon sound research theory and pragmatic application will find their way to law enforcement via entry level and continuing education venues. With that said, presenting international comparative counter-radicalization methods to the CVE learning organization participants via law enforcement

continuing education programs, commonly referred to as “in-service programs,” would lend to more robust countermeasures for state and local enforcement.

A research consortium or related group will be initiated by the learning organization’s facilitators and participants after the CMC process creates new knowledge and the participants produce ideas and written deliverables. Sharing those ideas and written deliverables within the learning organization community will allow for greater dialogue within the context of the LE CVE mission. Basic research methodology courses will be created for those interested within the learning organization. The National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program applied research pre-course is an example of this strategy.

With consideration for measuring CVE mission outcomes, the federal government advises the local partners to define and develop their own preventing violent extremism programs (specifically to address counter radicalization). However, local and state partners require resources to assist in developing these critical programs. A starting point for this project would be a communication and collaborative space. More on this particular task will be presented in Chapter IV.

Lastly, in order for the agencies and participants to share ideas and experiences, especially failures, the organization will need to cultivate a culture of trust. The ability to learn quickly from failures and mistakes will be an important component for the overall success of the law enforcement learning organization. The ability to “fail faster” and revise counter-radicalization methods will assist state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials and their stakeholders in keeping up in a dynamic, ever-changing environment.

The CVE environment demands a nimble, creative process to produce effective countermeasures. The ability to know when countermeasures are ineffective or wrong and make the appropriate course corrections will be critical in this environment. Breaches of trust such as criticism of an agency’s policy/procedures and/or releasing confidential or classified information within the learning organization will be handled in a strict and straightforward manner and will not be tolerated.

The next three subsections will address online asynchronous discussion (OAD), facilitation, and curriculum, development, all of which are integral parts of the law enforcement learning organization concept.

1. Online Asynchronous Discussions

The most valuable product of this project will be the productive discussions by the state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies that participate in the learning organization. The ability of these agencies to dialogue, debate, analyze, and engage ideas is be the primary operative objective of the project. The proposal presented in this study will advocate an online asynchronous discussion (OAD) format facilitated by interested scholars and practitioners through the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the U.S. Army War College. Through the data collection over time, further inquiries via research endeavors will be identified.

Consider Beckett's point about the use of computer-mediated communication (CMC) and the justifications for its use:

> Computer-mediated communication (CMC) and online instruction have become integral parts of higher education, particularly in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The justifications for these forms of instruction include budget cuts, performance-based budgeting, and demands for flexible instructional delivery as well as a belief that technology-integrated discussion can promote higher-level thinking and improved writing skills. One technology-integrated instructional model is online asynchronous discussion (OAD), a communication tool used extensively to support student interaction and engagement. (Beckett, 2010, p. 315)

In addition to the interactions by the participants and the resultant professional development benefits, the proposed organization will facility "academic discourse socialization" as described by Feger and Zibit (2005). This idea is related to social identity theory as introduced at NPS by Brannan and Strindberg (2012). The participants will exhibit their own sense of belonging as they interact with other group members and develop measurable progress and problem-solving skills. This idea will be explored more later in Chapter I.

When the facilitators of the law enforcement learning organization identify and recruit stakeholders for the program. For example, the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) and the International Chiefs of Police (IACP) will be specifically targeted for marketing and advocacy. The IACP (2014) monograph on *Using Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: 5 Key Principles for Law Enforcement* will be highlighted as guidance for the SLT LE community. Additionally, the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Homeland and Security already conducts marketing for its Master of Arts program in security studies with a concentration in homeland defense and security, its Fusion Center Leaders Program (FCLP), and its Executive Leaders Program (ELP). There may be a chance that both the SLT learning organization and CHDS may be able to market each other's programs. CHDS is a proposed a stakeholder, and it could possibly include information about the program in its existing marketing material. In addition, the U.S. Army War College will have the ability to guide students through research endeavors related to defense support for civil authorities as well as advertise for one- to two-year teaching opportunities for scholars through the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA).

2. Facilitation

The facilitators of the learning organization will provide frameworks for collaboration and teaming concepts to better enhance sharing of information. The learning organization will use video conferencing, online lectures, podcasts, and related live audio-visual components to engage and keep participants interested. In addition, those the learning components will be archived for future participant use and reference. All information will be reviewed and revised as time and resources allow by all participants of the law enforcement learning organization, including facilitators. Having a historical record of the learning organization's efforts to as related to CVE, especially within concerning the counter radicalization, will be of considerable academic and professional value. One of the planned goals of the organization is social science-based research. Lastly, the participants themselves will be polled as to what resources and materials could be provided to them and how that information could be best provided. In addition to small inputs from the facilitators themselves, regular feedback mechanisms

will be introduced so that the agencies themselves help guide the overall direction of the learning organization.

What might be the role of the facilitators in the law enforcement learning organization? This is a good question, and it has not been answered within the CVE context. The course facilitators will require skill sets that assist in the development of the participant's analytical skills when needed. To be certain, the facilitator's role in the learning organization is not to teach but rather to assist in providing information and guiding discussions. The participants themselves will engage in topics that they find challenging within the CVE environment. Sharing knowledge and expertise within the context of their own experiences will be of substantial value.

3. Curriculum Development

Developing two courses related to the CVE/counter-radicalization mission will augment the CMC/OAD learning organization strategies. The first course to be developed will be four hours in length, entitled *Introduction to Strategic Thinking and Scenario Planning for Law Enforcement CVE Missions*. The course will present strategic thinking and scenario planning alternative strategies to SLT law enforcement agencies as they meet the challenge of CVE. Moreover, this course will be created with an online delivery option. Participants will view the four hours of instruction, take a short summative written examination, and be cleared for subsequent courses. Furthermore, taking this course will be a prerequisite for an eligible candidate to join the learning organization or the first course after acceptance. Additionally, the course will be submitted to each state's specific peace officer standards and training commission to be evaluated for continuing education credit to assist with certification maintenance requirements for state, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel who participate in the law enforcement learning organization. The second course, *Domestic and International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods for Law Enforcement CVE Missions*, will be elective and created for those law enforcement learning organization participants who wish to gain continuing law enforcement credit, and this will be better defined shortly.

The first course will be approximately four to five hours in length and delivered via an internet educational portal. Students will be able to log in and view the instructional materials and interact with the course at their convenience. In addition, the students will be able to stop at certain points and save their progress if needed as some students may not have the time to dedicate the time to complete the internet instruction at one sitting for various reasons. For example, some departments will not be able to release an officer for training as workload may not allow. Additionally, many agencies do not have the funds to allow officers to attend extra training. Subsequently, the facilitators responsible for curriculum development will apply to each state's version of a peace officer's standards and training commission for five hours of continuing law enforcement educational credit.

The general outline for this course is presented below and is subject to revision based upon student and agency feedback and evaluation of current needs. The course facilitators will gather course evaluation data via a mixed methods survey instrument immediately after the course and three to six months afterward to gain an idea of efficacy and value.

As this internet-based course is foundational in its scope, the students will be provided with the basic tools to progress to the 40-hour in-service on *Domestic and International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods for Law Enforcement CVE Missions*. The overall goal of this 45 hours of education will be to provide an alternative method for creating countermeasures to the CVE mission, specifically counter radicalization. The educational module is not meant to be compulsory, rather it is meant to be an augmentation to the CMC discussions.

The first day of the second course will be spent facilitating dialogue among the students as well as providing essential materials for the course (e.g., readings, PowerPoint presentations). The class will be presented with the most current challenges of counter-radicalization in the United States and abroad. Discussion of current events and case studies will facilitate this portion. Additionally, an overview of social identity theory will be presented as a framework for understanding the radicalization process. The latter part of the day will introduce the student practitioners to the basic tenets of Islam and its

unique situation of radicalization and extremism (similar to the online lecture series, *The Global Jihadi Threat*, created by Dr. Nadav Morag at the Naval Postgraduate School). The theme for the day will be to encourage student analysis of the wicked problem of counter radicalization and violent extremism and how they might continue creating effective counter measures.

The second day will include a discussion of current overall U.S. counter-radicalization strategies and examples of state/local methods. Prior to the course, the student practitioners will have prepared a five to seven minute PowerPoint presentation of their jurisdiction's counter-radicalization strategy. One of the mandates of their presentation will be to have them introduce any innovative counter-radicalization method(s) that may not be used elsewhere in the United States. Considerable value will be placed upon the student practitioners providing examples of what has and has not worked for their jurisdiction. A safe environment, devoid of blame, will allow the student practitioners to be candid with assessments, which is critical for this course (a similar construct to "Chatham House rules"). Toward the end of the day, an introduction to comparative methods will prepare the student practitioners for their next two days of class.

The third and fourth days will explore two international comparative counter-radicalization methods in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The initial phase of instruction for both methods will involve explanation of the structure of government for both countries. This discussion will lead to the students beginning to analyze methods of different governmental structures. The bulk of the day will provide examples of counter-radicalization strategies and examples for each country. Additionally, small group work will allow the student practitioners to apply their analyses to the comparative methods and reason through strategy applications with their new knowledge. Furthermore, special attention will be made to possible state and local applications of the comparative strategies and what barriers, limitations, and/or unrealistic scenarios might be for those strategies.

The last day will allow the students to employ what they have learned and apply their analysis to three problem-based scenarios. Each one of the scenarios includes a role

play situation and a specific vignette. A practice scenario, which may be graded, will be presented to the entire group prior to engaging those scenarios. Grades will be assigned by the instructional cadre along with feedback from the students on each other's contributions to the problem solving and/or strategy/policy exercise. Each exercise is expected to last approximately 60–75 minutes. Some scenarios may have several iterations in that time for the student practitioners to work through. When possible, case studies will be selected from actual counter-radicalizations situations from around the world. There will be a debriefing at the end of the day to allow for feedback for the student practitioners, the instructional cadre, and the role players that facilitated the scenarios. Lastly, a follow-on tutorial for developing rubrics to measure outcomes of the local counter-radicalization efforts of the student practitioners will be advocated and made available after the course completion. A discussion board will be created within the learning organization to foster discussion/discourse on the strategic thinking/scenario planning methods. The facilitators will conduct a qualitative assessment of strategic methods through content analysis of discussion board themes. The analysis would provide content themes that facilitators and/or academic participants could use to follow critical topics.

This learning organization project also proposes creating a continuing education curriculum to provide participants with a foundational course that presents international comparative methods of counter-radicalization policies and strategies. This effort for the prevention of violent extremism is similar to the strategies found in the White House's *Empowering Local Partners* document (2011a). Additionally, the reason for the inclusion of fusion centers with state law enforcement entities is fusion centers' unique mission of intelligence analysis and dissemination. This collaboration will be synergistic as fusion centers, with their mission centered on information sharing, intelligence, and dissemination, will provide a different perspective than that of SLT law enforcement agencies. As CVE and counter-radicalization resources continue to grow, sharing information will help to ameliorate common problems.

State and local law enforcement personnel will benefit from international comparative counter-radicalization training. No state law enforcement agency, bureau of

investigation, homeland security office, or fusion center currently offers a comparative method counter-radicalization course to personnel who are tasked with this mission. Also, any curriculum development process in this area would assist in addressing the shortcomings of the *Empowering Local Partners* document (White House, 2011a). Additionally, a course in this specific subject area would provide needed background and assist law enforcement in creating more comprehensive, localized counter-radicalization strategies. State law enforcement assets were selected for the law enforcement learning organization as they have direct links to specialized enforcement, resources, and have an established network with smaller county and municipal partner agencies. This course may be used for the partner agencies at a later date when best practices have been proven and a learning organization established for counter radicalization.

This second of the two courses will be a 40-hour in-service course entitled, *Domestic and International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods for Law Enforcement CVE Missions*. The prerequisite for this course will be the first course, four-hour strategic thinking/scenario planning course. In the beginning, this second course will be a traditional classroom course that mobile training teams will deliver across the country. The learning organization facilitators and/or their appointees will provide on-ground training to state and local law enforcement agencies. Through this process, not only will the course include CVE and counter-radicalization materials but the foundation of the course will include strategic thinking and scenario planning. In addition, this course will synergize with the CMC-related materials. As the course is delivered across the country and continually revised to meet the needs of the participants, the course length may shorten or lengthen, depending upon what the data leads the learning organization to do. The ability of the students to understand, synthesize, and make applications of counter-radicalization strategies for their own jurisdiction will be the major outcome for the course.

With respect to the length of the proposed courses, a balance must be maintained between time to provide critical material to the law enforcement personnel and time away from their critical duties. Creating a focus group of subject matter experts will provide an avenue for discourse to forge curriculum goals and objectives, search the existing

research and practice literature, evaluate and incorporate material, create audio-visual or internet instructional content, and create an evaluation system that encourages critical feedback. The evaluative system will be significant as the unconventional threats from Islamic terrorism are dynamic and have many different participating groups (e.g., the Islamic State Boko Haram, Hezbollah, Hamas, Al Shabbab, Al Qaeda and its many affiliates) and tactics. Changes to the course are expected, and we need to be able to create effective countermeasures with a quick turn-around time. Measuring the efficacy of the learning organization and its curriculum will be as important to the development of content.

For both courses, the law enforcement learning organization's facilitators will provide a course curriculum application to each state's version of their peace officer standards and training commission. The reason for this application process is to allow each state's peace officer and training standard's commission to review and approve the curriculum to count for their particular state's continuing education requirements. This application will provide curriculum evidence to SLT law enforcement continuing education decision makers to allow law enforcement officers to have tangible continuing education credit for their attendance and successful completion. The courses are explained in detail in Chapter IV and also presented in in detail the appendix sections of the project.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

> Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.
>
> —Sun Tzu

A. INTRODUCTION

For this project, the literature review is a critical analysis of the extant literature and seeks to explain the four separate subject areas into the concept of a law enforcement learning organization. These subject areas are: 1) online asynchronous discussion (OAD), 2) strategic thinking, 3) scenario planning, and 4) collaboration. A major component of the proposed SLT enforcement learning organization will be asynchronous discussion boards, similar to what are found in undergraduate and graduate-level internet-based courses.

The two White House CVE documents from mid-to late 2011, *Empowering Local Partners* and *Strategic Implementation Plan*, have brought SLT law enforcement agencies a substantial challenge for creating strategies for CVE, specifically concerning counter radicalization. Consider these same documents in light of Mintzberg's (1998) discussion of the idea of "disjointed incrementalism" as an illustration of an emerging learning model by Charles Lindblom (1968) in his textbook entitled, *The Policy-Making Process*. According to Mintzburg:

> He described policy making (the label in government) as a 'serial,' 'remedial' and 'fragmented' process, in which decisions are made at the margin, more to solve problems than to exploit opportunities, with little regard for ultimate goals or even for connections between different decisions. Lindblom argued that many actors get involved in the process, but they are hardly coordinated (2614) by any central authority. 'Various aspects of public policy and even various aspects of any one problem or problem area are analyzed at various points in time with no apparent coordination' he wrote (p. 105). At best, the different actors engage in an informal process of 'mutual adjustment.' (Mintzberg, 1998, Kindle locations 2617–2625)

The current administration's strategies for the CVE mission, especially in the area of counter radicalization, could be considered as disjointed and disorganized with little regard to direction or measurements for success. Lindblom's (1968) explanation of the involvement of "many actors" who are "are hardly coordinated" could well explain some of the consternations faced today by the overall homeland security enterprise, not just what state and local law enforcement agencies are facing in the CVE mission. In this case, disjointed incrementalism is a learning model that needs to be avoided. It is necessary to engage in healthy discussion and discover resultant effective countermeasures to combat the complex CVE threat.

The *Empowering Local Partners* document brought forward critical reviews from many different venues (White House, 2011a). For example, Ed Husain, the Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies from the Council on Foreign Relations, summed up the White House document when he wrote, "Homegrown radicalization of Americans precedes 9/ 11, but it has taken the U.S. government over ten years to produce a document aimed at preventing 'violent extremism in the United States' and yet it says worryingly little" (2011).

Nearly 15 years have passed since the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Even with multiple examples of radicalized violent extremist events over that period, the threat of radicalization leading to violent extremist acts has not been taken seriously. This fact was not lost on Husain when he explicated:

> But the modus operandi of the White House's new policy paper, it seems, is not to offend Muslims. Consequently, the document falls short of outlining a robust, credible, and confidence-inspiring plan. The strategy avoids the vital issues of defining the threat, the ideas behind al-Qaeda, where extremism festers, and how the government plans practical responses to it. The paper relatedly states the obvious about federal responsibilities of 'convening' and 'strengthening stakeholders,' and suggests little new. And while the paper claims to work with 'local communities' (read Muslims), it disregards the common complaints from U.S. Muslim communities about the FBI's entrapment of their radicalized youth—a practice that should be replaced by de-radicalization programs or dialogue under surveillance (as is the practice in Europe). (Husain, 2011)

The Council on Foreign Relations is not the only group to provide criticism of the White House document and its strategies. Muslim advocacy organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union, various U.S. Congress members, and non-governmental agencies have also expressed their misgivings about the document. For instance, Sullivan (2011) stated that U.S. lawmakers felt that the Obama administration's strategy "is short on details and fails to name a single point of coordination for all of the various initiatives at the federal and local levels." Coordination, or at least some form of clearinghouse of information, will be critical for this process. Additionally, SLT law enforcement agencies will need to share information as the process is developed. No such venue exists for SLT law enforcements agencies at this time.

As a reaction to the multiple criticisms of the *Empowering Local Partners* document, the White House produced a follow-on document in December 2011, entitled *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.* This document was also criticized as its main focus seemed to protect First Amendment rights. It is apparent that no specific, creative strategies for combating violent extremism or specific counter-radicalization techniques existed in these early documents; rather, it appears that there was a scramble in place to place this mission into pre-existing community policing programs (Temple-Ralston, 2011). Even though the documents addressed the issue of partners and organizers, there was no direction for the selection or development for those people (Bjelopera, 2011). Aziz (2011) takes issue with the *Strategic Implementation Plan* document by criticizing:

> despite the White House's seemingly benign approach to counterterrorism, its implementation produces adverse effects similar to Representative Peter King's confrontational tactics' referring to the congressional hearings on homegrown terrorism. Aziz is in agreement, stating, 'If the government is serious about partnering with Muslim communities, it must stop behaving like an adversary. For starters, community outreach programs should not be exploited to spy on Muslims, recruit undercover informants, and fake false promises.

It is readily apparent that pro-security and pro-Muslim organizations alike have been quite critical of the *Empowering Local Partners* as well as *Strategic Implementation Plan* documents, albeit for different reasons. Analyses of the critiques from both

perspectives indicate both initial White House documents fall well short in the area of strategy. At this point, SLT law enforcement agencies have little in the way of guidance and direction in the CVE and counter-radicalization missions apart from the recent IACP (2014) and White House CVE Summit (2015) documents. However, there are strategies that have arisen that may prove to be foundational in these missions. For example, in 2014, the International Association of Chiefs of Police created a document entitled, *Using Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: 5 Key Principles for Law Enforcement* (IACP, 2014). This document is limited to a community policing model for the CVE mission, but it does address some of the broad suggestions from the *Empowering Local Partners* document (White House, 2011a). The five key principles included in the document are:

1. Foster and enhance trusting partnerships in the community
2. Engage all residents to address public safety matters
3. Leverage public and private stakeholders
4. Utilize all partnerships to counter violent extremism
5. Train all members of the department (IACP, 2014, pp. vii–viii).

The last key principle is of interest as it suggests that all members of a department be trained in the IACP-recommended modality. The IACP states, "training should be up to date and unbiased, stress the differences between countering violent extremism and counterterrorism, and be mandatory for all members of the department" (2014, p. viii). This point is one of the first recommendations for selection and development of SLT law enforcement personnel as described by Bjelopera (2011). Caution should be practiced in training all law enforcement members in the collective CVE mission. Some SLT LE members may require an "awareness-level" of training, while a core group of personnel are trained to perform the mission for the agency.

During a policy forum address for the Washington Institute, Matthew Levitt (2010) spoke to the issue of two already implemented counter-radicalization strategies. He stated:

> Two fundamental strategies for disrupting the radicalization process have already been implemented to some degree: integrating immigrant

> communities and supporting alternatives to extremist ideologies. Integration builds resiliency by minimizing the local grievances and alienation that radicalizers typically use as a point of entry to introduce their violent worldview. U.S. efforts on this front have generally been successful, in part due to America's inclusive, immigrant-friendly environment, aggressive anti-discrimination legislation, and strong belief in equal opportunity.

In the same presentation at the Washington Institute, Levitt (2010) provides a solid exemplar for the creation of the SLT LE learning organization with respect to understanding the CVE environment when he speaks to the issue of "community engagement" below:

> Contesting violent extremism also requires countering the radical Islamist narrative. This does not mean banning despicable, but protected speech; rather, it means openly contesting extremist views by offering alternatives and fostering deeper ideological debate. The objective in either case is to strengthen the moderate center against the extremist pole and help Muslim communities become more resilient in confronting the challenge. Community engagement and "hard" counterterrorism are key elements of this comprehensive strategy, but in the wide space between them, counter-radicalization efforts must be emphasized. (Levitt & Carpenter, 2010)

Levitt and Carpenter (2010) addressed a Policy Forum luncheon at the Washington Institute. Carpenter indicated his thoughts on strategy for the CVE mission prior to both White House documents when he described:

> In developing its strategy to counter radicalization, the Obama administration should emphasize that radical Islamist theology is the key driver of the violence espoused by al-Qaeda and its cohorts. At a minimum, this development should be done internally to provide bureaucratic clarity and improve intradepartmental and interagency coordination on these issues. Such a move would strengthen a whole-of-government approach and better align budgets and programs with declarative policy. (Levitt & Carpenter, 2010)

In developing this project as a proof of concept, the ideas of both Leavitt and Carpenter will be synthesized to solve the problem faced by state and local law enforcement partners.

The soft systems methodology (SSM) was the logical choice of methodologies for the proof of concept project as it allows the learning organization to engage the challenges of CVE. Checkland and Poulter (2006) provide a short definition of SSM:

> [SSM is] an organized, flexible process for dealing with situations which someone sees as problematical, situations which call for action to be taken to improve them, to make them more acceptable, less full of tensions and unanswered questions. The 'process' referred to is an organized process of thinking your way to taking sensible 'action to improve' the situation; and, finally, it is a process based on a particular body of ideas, namely systems ideas. (p. 4)

Checkland and Poulter summarized this research method in a manner that provides a preview of why the state and local law enforcement learning organization utilized it. They explain:

> In summary, then, we have
>
> - a problematical real-world situation seen as calling for action to improve it;
> - models of purposeful activity relevant to this situation;
> - a process of using the models as devices to explore the situation; and
> - a structured debate about desirable and feasible change. (Checkland & Poulter, 2006, p. 11)

The CVE and counter-radicalization mission is the real-word situation calling for action to improve it, as the authors Checkland and Poulter (2006) indicate. The learning organization model will be the purposeful activity relevant to the situation and used to explore it. The product of discussion/discourse through the online asynchronous discussion forums will assist in the debate about desirable and feasible change. More will be explained on the SSM process in Chapter III.

B. LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS

The starting point for the learning organization is with the work of Chris Argyris (1991) and Peter Senge (1999, 2006), who are considered by many to be the subject matter experts of this particular concept. The type of learning organization that Senge (2006) describes is foundational to the proof of concept that this research seeks to create

for the law enforcement learning organization. In order to bring the idea to fruition, the mission of the learning organization must be well defined; it should facilitate healthy and productive discussion/discourse on the subject matter, as well as maintain momentum once the project is started. Not having a clear direction for the law enforcement learning organization would kill the project before it gets started.

The primary mission of the law enforcement learning organization will be to create a resource for information and secure site for sharing information on combating violent extremism, especially counter-radicalization efforts, at the SLT levels. As time passes, a repository of information will be created, archived, and available for analysis for practitioners and scholars with permission to access.

It will be up to the participants and facilities to maintain momentum once the organization is up and running; it will be a shared approach. CVE is a dynamic environment with many political and psycho-social variables and constructs to consider. If the participants choose to utilize the learning organization to change focus and direction as threats change, the learning organization could be of tremendous value. The ability of the organization to "recycle" itself will enhance its ability to survive and remain useful.

There are several foundations upon which the law enforcement learning organization will be built: online asynchronous discussion, strategic thinking, scenario planning, and collaboration. As the learning environment and participants allow, these four concepts will be woven into the overall construct of the learning organization. After the initial start-up of the project, it is envisioned that weaving in the foundations will be one of the facilitator's major operational roles, almost as important as facilitating discourse itself.

Alarid (1999) presents two key theoretical fundamentals contributed by Chris Argyris, whose main research focus was organizational learning and organizational behavior:

> Argyris (1973, 1974) specified two theoretical assumptions of personality and organizational theory. The first assumption was that organizations have a life of their own. Organizations exist because goals become too

> complex for one individual to achieve. Large traditional organizations are inflexible in supporting individual change and growth and encourage dependence, apathy, and compliance.
>
> A second assumption was that individual traits, abilities, and needs exist on a continuum rather than in a vacuum. This means that individuals are complex and have changing needs requiring appropriate organizational responses to fulfill individual maturational perspectives. These two assumptions also fit the community policing philosophy, which assumes not only that the individual worker has changing needs inside the organization, but that the outside community in which the officer serves has unique problems and developments. (p. 324)

As Alarid's research focuses upon law enforcement learning organizations and community policing, his project was of particular interest with respect to the proposed law enforcement CVE learning organization (1999). Both White House documents *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (2011a) and the *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (2011c) speak to utilizing pre-existing community policing models to assist in counter radicalization. Argyris's work deals with organizational change, which will be paramount that the facilitators of the organizational course. SLT LE organizations will need to quickly identify internal and external organizational barriers and remove or significantly mitigate them. Argyris's description of "traditional organizations are inflexible in supporting individual change and growth and encourage dependence, apathy, and compliance" is what the law enforcement learning organization seeks to avoid (Argyris, 1999).

On the subject of law enforcement and learning organizations, Alarid (1999) believes:

> To create a learning organization in criminal justice, particularly in law enforcement departments, it is important to explore the theoretical underpinnings of human relations theory tied to organizational learning. In law enforcement administration, the human relations perspective focused on individual needs within the organization, a preference for an informal style of organizational interaction, and a concern for motivating factors to improve productivity in the workplace. (p. 322)

Alarid's contentions have been considered for the law enforcement learning organization project. Participants and their agency's command staff responsible for CVE planning and operations will be polled regularly on their particular needs as related to the CVE mission, especially with regard to counter-radicalization efforts. With the data from those needs assessments, the facilitators will focus their efforts on meeting those needs via CMC. As information sharing continues between participants, facilitators can steer information or discussion groups toward information deemed critical or important to the agencies' missions. An informal asynchronous communication process will be the day-to-day norm, with the exception of webinars, phone communications, video-conferencing, or the like. The motivation for the participants in the learning organization will be a collective/collaborative effort to create effective CVE strategies.

Collective stress scan be a significant variable with groups, especially those that deal with exigent situations, as the law enforcement learning organization may experience. Reason indicates:

> Stress shared within a group can create reactions that may have long-term implications for its progress. Some psychologists believe that groups as large as an entire nation can share stress and may experience post-traumatic stress after a difficult national or international event. (Reason, 2010, Kindle location 1006).

Terrorism events perpetrated by Islamic extremist actors are expected in the future, and law enforcement agencies across the country will be pressured to demonstrate what they are doing to combat the threat. Additionally, those personnel involved in the CVE mission will experience their own stressors as they are expected to perform and produce results when these attacks occur. The collective efforts of the participants in the learning organization will be a problem-solving resource and possible an outlet for the stressors during or after these chaotic events. Subsequently, the creation of the in-service modules on strategic thinking and scenario planning as well as comparative methods should assist these agencies in their problem-solving strategies and decrease the stress by providing effective ideas for countermeasures.

C. ONLINE ASYNCHRONOUS DISCUSSION AND COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMMUNICATION

One of the starting points for the proposed SLT law enforcement learning organization will be computer mediated communication (CMC) through dedicated discussion boards. These are also known as online asynchronous discussions (OAD). The first subject area for an OAD proposed for this project is counter radicalization. There are few studies dedicated to facilitating online discourse, and none deal with issues related to homeland security. The majority seem to deal with higher education venues. Beckett (2010) investigated the use of OAD and asynchronous discussions for academic discourse socialization. In his review of the literature, the following points on CMC and OAD are well taken. He writes:

> Computer-mediated communication (CMC) and online instruction have become integral parts of higher education (Jones, Johnson-Yale, Millermaier, & Perez, 2008; Lin, 2008; Mason, 1989). The justifications for these forms of instruction include budget cuts, performance-based budgeting, and demands for flexible instructional delivery (Harris, 1998). (Beckett, 2010, p. 315)

As law enforcement agencies face budget cuts, forced layoff of personnel, and inadequate staffing, they will have to do more with less. The quest to find alternative methods for effective policing will become more persistent as financial resources become scarcer. The public will demand the same or better service out of law enforcement, regardless of agencies' budgetary woes, and the CVE mission will be no different. Departmental counter-radicalization efforts will inevitably have priorities placed ahead them, such as day-to-day routine operations and fuel.

The benefits of CMC and OAD methods is well explained in Beckett's article as the five following demonstrate:

> Technology-integrated instruction can promote higher-level thinking and improved writing skills (Lin, 2008). OADs are seen as forums where shy and reticent students can voice their opinions without the anxiety they often experience in face-to-face discussion due to linguistic and cultural differences (Yildiz & Bichelmeyer, 2003).
>
> OADs can facilitate academic discourse (Warschauer, 1997). OADs can facilitate professional socialization and community building (Lord &

> Lomicka, 2004). OADs facilitate thoughtful and extended engagement at students' convenience (Henri, 1992; Thomas, 2002). (Beckett, 2010, pp. 315–316)

The proposed learning organization strategy utilizing OAD methods will entail sharing information on what works and what does not work with respect to certain parts of the CVE mission. For example, sharing information on counter-radicalization efforts will be the first OAD-related task of the learning organization and its facilitators. Learning will occur through sharing information and inquiry between the law enforcement learning organization participant to agency. Facilitators will provide guidance and/or resources when requested or an opportune time is presented. The facilitators will poll participants (and agencies) periodically to find out what their particular needs are in their given CVE mission. The CVE environment is dynamic, and the resources required today may not be the same as what may be needed six months to a year from now. OAD may provide a dynamic, responsive vehicle to the ever-changing CVE environment.

The facilitators of the learning organization will emphasize a safe environment for sharing information with the OAD venue. There must be an environment of trust within the learning organization. This will take time, but the end result could yield information that will allow the organization to fail faster and learn quicker from CVE countermeasures that do not work. Imagine a participating organization sharing a CVE countermeasure or counter-radicalization modality that did not work. Sharing that type of information will be immensely valuable as other agencies will react to the information and implement other countermeasures as necessary.

Internal dialogue/discussion will be the most common events within the learning organization. The transaction of discourse and sharing information are critical to the health of the learning organization. There may be some effort by the facilitators to bring about positive discussion amongst the participants. Encouraging and facilitating an environment that values discussion of failures as much as successes will be critical to the learning organization. Facilitation does not mean "micro-management;" however, it would be prudent for the facilitators to be prepared to make minor adjustments to the

discussion boards when needed. The Eberly Center at Carnegie Mellon University's Eberly Center for Teaching Excellence and Educational Innovation explains:

> Discussions can be an excellent strategy for enhancing student motivation, fostering intellectual agility, and encouraging democratic habits. They create opportunities for students to practice and sharpen a number of skills, including the ability to articulate and defend positions, consider different points of view, and enlist and evaluate evidence. (Carnegie Mellon University, n.d.)

The facilitator's role will be to optimize the counter-radicalization discussion by having participants' defend their positions and strategies in their discussions when needed. It is noted that other participants will be challenging assumptions and providing feedback as well.

D. STRATEGIC THINKING

For this section, we must ask, why is strategy important? Werner (2010) provides a cogent explanation in his textbook describing scenario analysis when he provides an explanation that augments the argument for including strategic thinking as a tenet for the SLT law enforcement learning organization as:

> A strategy can clarify the purpose of the organization. Vision statements, mission and goals are meant to sound good, inspire, and give a general definition of what an organization seeks to be.' Additionally, 'this is what we are, this is our business, and this is how we propose to go about it. This is the course of action we must take, the pattern of decisions that must be made to get to the desired future destination. (Werner, 2010, Kindle location 664)

The business of the SLT law enforcement learning organization is to discuss, create, and provide viable, rational, and successful counter-radicalization strategies across the United States. The desired future destination is decreasing radicalized violent extremism.

The purpose of the SLT law enforcement organization is clear. The organization will seek to cultivate discussion, share information, and create an environment to foster problem-solving strategies for the CVE mission, specifically counter-radicalization efforts. As Werner (2010) explained above, "this is how the organization's purpose translates into things that must be done" (Kindle location 664). As a strategy for our

learning organization, we want to make sure that our participants know there is the "logic and purpose" to our program. Providing exemplars of proven state and local CVE programs will be a good place to start, especially if those exemplars are a result of the collective discourse of the learning organization.

What is strategic thinking? How will it apply to the state and local law enforcement learning organization? The Center for Applied Research (2001) provides a solid definition: "Strategic thinking focuses on finding and developing unique opportunities to create value by enabling a provocative and creative dialogue among people who can affect a company's direction." The idea of the center's description previously will enable the SLT law enforcement agencies to engage in "provocative and creative dialogue," as noted above, to assist in the counter-radicalization challenge. Strategic thinking will be the overall theme of the state and local law enforcement learning organization project. Even though the roots of strategic thinking are within the corporate business world construct and outlined by the strategist Sun Tzu, its application and worth cannot be ignored for law enforcement. One of the two curriculum development endeavors for the project will involve an introduction to strategic thinking to foster its use, especially within the OAD venue. It is expected that encouraging the use of strategic thinking during subject-related discourse will provide unique problem solving strategies. The strategic thinking and scenario planning continuing education is meant to augment the OAD. It can be taken as a before entering into the CMC or utilized to better understand the machinations of the learning organization. If this approach is not feasible, then having the course as a resource (e.g., setting it up through a massive open online course and/or a learning management system) would be of considerable value to the students. The law enforcement learning organization will utilize an applied form of strategic thinking, specifically to the CVE mission of counter-radicalization.

In case of the state and local law enforcement learning organization, the benchmark organizations are violent Islamic extremist groups. The 12 questions Stowall (2008) brings forth should be revisited frequently by all of the facilitators and participants alike. The premise that "everyone in the organization has to be a contributor, not just a performer" is emphasized in a manner that is inclusive, not exclusive, in its application.

Each law enforcement agency and each member of that agency's CVE team that participates in the learning organization will have input. Not only will participants reflect on their contributions to the overall organization, they should reflect and revise their own contributions to their local, tribal, or state jurisdiction, constantly reinforcing and reevaluating their own mission effectiveness. Such an evaluative component is critical in the success of the project. Steven Stowall, from his 2006 text, entitled *Ahead of the Curve: A Guide to Applied Strategic Thinking*, adds, "the organization's success is dependent on each individual's ability to contribute to the whole and become more valuable to the organization and society" (Kindle location 118) This idea lends to Stowall's contention that "organizations want people who can act" and "think, look ahead," and "anticipate change" (Kindle location 118). It is his thought that "every employee an entrepreneur" (Stowall, 2008, Kindle location 118). Furthermore, Stowall also provides for what he calls "bottom-up strategy" as individual contributors, not just managers, can provide direction for strategy. This concept is important for the law enforcement learning organization as the individual participants in the OAD on counter radicalization, as they share ideas, can collectively drive an effective counter-radicalization strategy or build upon or validate those strategies that work.

The situation that Stowall (2006) describes would be the optimal outcome for the law enforcement learning organization; it is a reasonable goal to seek to achieve. Turning each law enforcement participant into a strategist is a motivation factor itself. This "bottom-up" strategy allows for a greater number of ideas to flow into the organization for consideration. To have all participants invest in their work will be a focal point for the facilitators and should be reinforced often.

There are seven specific steps, in two distinct phases, in the strategic thinking process as explained by the Harvard Business School (2010). Phase 1 is described as "setting the stage" and consists of 1) seeing the big picture, and, 2) articulating strategic objectives" (Harvard Business School, 2010, Kindle location 93). The law enforcement learning organization's facilitators will understand and articulate the learning organization's mission within the counter-radicalization construct, explaining the current and future radicalization threats to the country as well as discussing and soliciting for

those strategies that are effective in this mission while guaranteeing civil liberties and public trust. Phase 2 is described as "applying your skills." It has five specific steps consisting of 1) identifying relationships, patterns, and trends, 2) getting creative, 3) analyzing information, 4) prioritizing your actions, and 5) making trade-offs (Harvard Business School, 2010, Kindle location 93). The five steps in Phase 2 good starting points for the facilitators with respect to doctrine within the learning organization.

The goal of the in-service training is to assist in building strategic thinking skill set, which in turn synergizes scenario planning efforts. Encouraging creativity, new alternatives, and the ability to keep one's mind open for other possibilities is one that is typically not encouraged in the paramilitary environment of law enforcement. The strategy will attempt to encourage creative and asymmetrical thinking.

Pietersen (2002) speaks to a related issue he terms strategic learning. His ideas are of value as they speak to the issue of renewal, which is a valuable outcome for the learning organization. He posits, "To succeed, companies must generate insights, create focus, achieve alignment, and motivate change continuously, in a dynamic cycle of renewal. This cycle is the essence of Strategic Learning" (Pietersen, 2002, Kindle location 700).

Pietersen's idea of thinking "cycle, not straight line" is a process that will prove itself to be quite valuable for the organization as a whole (2002). The dynamics of CVE and the counter-radicalization process are dynamic ones, not static ones. If the law enforcement learning organization does not account for a changing environment, its collection of strategies from shared dialogue will not keep up with the threat. It is not yet known if the facilitators will introduce this idea or if the idea will generate itself through our learning organization's own work.

E. SCENARIO PLANNING

Chermack (2011) provided his idea of "turbulent fields," which can be correlated with the violent extremism and radicalization. He suggests, "few would disagree that most contemporary organizations are heavily steeped in turbulent fields. Turbulent fields are worlds in which dynamic processes create significant variance" (Chermack, 2011,

Kindle location 380). Additionally, this idea of turbulent fields fits with the idea of the law enforcement learning organization being able to adapt as Pietersen (2002) suggests. Few would disagree that the counter-radicalization mission environment would qualify as a turbulent field by Chermack's definition.

The United States Army War College (USAWC) provides another exemplar of the complex environment of counter radicalization and violent extremism. Chermack (2011) provides the USAWC with the concept of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA) (Kindle location 388). Considering the challenges that SLT law enforcement has with the counter-radicalization mission in the United States, coupled with the recent Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 9/11 review commission report (2015), indicate that the inadequate FBI budget does not lend itself to the "social and prevention role in the CVE mission" (Hoffman, 2015, p. 112). SLT law enforcement agencies find themselves in the VUCA environment.

The learning organization would learn from the VUCA idea facilitated by the U.S. Army War College. The ability to address volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity within the CVE environment as a day-to-day objective of the learning objective would be a tremendously appreciated skill for the participants and their stakeholders. Discussion and analysis of concepts and ideas in the complex and chaotic environment of combating violent extremism fits well here.

Scenario planning is a concept that should be brought forward to the learning organization soon after a reasonable tempo of dialogue and information sharing is achieved. Examples of counter-radicalization scenario planning could be brought to the group for their analysis and critique. Fine tuning these scenarios and the collective group's use of scenario planning and experience could be used as model exemplars for future use and revision. In addition, archiving those scenarios and the dialogue created by those scenarios could provide valuable insight for social science research. Creating conversation and debate within the learning organization is the goal of the scenario strategy. Chermack explains he has learned that "the community of practitioners building learning organizations that learning faster than competitors is the ultimate competitive advantage" (2011, Kindle location 109). The scenario planning exercise would augment

the ability of the practitioners to understand the environment and provide a manner in which to learn faster and gain an advantage.

There are four major outcome categories of scenario planning per Chermack (2011): "1) changed thinking, 2) informed narratives or stories about possible or plausible futures, 3) improved decision-making about the future, and 4) enhanced human and organization learning and imagination" (Kindle location 559). Chermack's contentions will enhance the creation of problem-solving strategies as time goes on and participants communicate and collaborate with each other. It is hypothesized that that the CMC venue, the use of OAD, and the two in-service courses will synergize and realize his four major outcome categories.

Additionally, the SLT law enforcement learning organization needs to address performance-based scenario planning as one of the methods/strategies for the SLT law enforcement learning organization. This specific issue is also addressed in the limitations section in Chapter V. It is of critical importance that limitations of the proof of concept are addressed prior to implementation of the learning organization and the CMC. Performance-based scenario planning "includes an outcome of performance improvement" (Chermack, 2011, Kindle location 559). Initially, facilitators can create metrics to evaluate the SLT law enforcement learning organization. As the learning organization evolves, feedback loops from the participants can assist with revising metrics and evaluative methods in order to improve organizational efficacy.

Groups bringing forward successful and creative scenario planning concepts and strategy would be invited to a central area and realistic scenarios could be both developed and worked through; a think tank of scenario planning in the CVE mission could be a real outcome of the learning organization. This is related to a substantial vision of the USAWC and its efforts within homeland defense and security. During a commander's all-call on September 29, 2014, Commandant William E. Rapp indicated that the future focused mission will be the "think-tank" for strategic thinking for the United States Army (personal communication). Additionally, part of that presentation included an expanded role for the homeland defense and security mission. As the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant threat appears to expand, this mission may become critical as many radicalized

Islamists, as well as other international and domestic extremist groups, focus their hatred of the United States. The current terrorism activity level of IS in Europe (e.g., Belgium, France, Turkey) should be an indicator of things to come or to be planned for in the United States. State, local, and tribal law enforcement countermeasures to this threat will be of critical importance.

III. METHODOLOGY

> Strategy is the great work of the organization. In situations of life or death, it is the Tao of survival or extinction. Its study cannot be neglected.
>
> —R. M. Grant, *Contemporary Strategy Analysis*

A. BACKGROUND

An action research/soft systems methodology was selected for this proof of concept project as it addresses a current problem and allows the practitioner to enter into a problem-solving construct. Stringer explains the methodology as:

> Action research is a systematic approach to investigation that enables people to find effective solutions to problems they confront in their everyday lives. Unlike traditional experimental/scientific research that looks for generalizable explanations that might be applied to all contexts, action research focuses on specific situations and localized solutions. (2007, p. 1)

The concept of using a law enforcement learning organization to address specific challenges to Islamic violent extremism via investigational methods and focus on solutions at the local level fits the spirit of the White House 2011 documents pertaining to empowering local partners, as the process is interagency and information sharing for best practice.

Soft systems methodology (SSM) is a form of action research that provides a process that fits this learning organization project. The four-step method aligns itself to the problem-solving actions that the learning organization will bring to SLT law enforcement. The methodology provides a four-step cyclical model as described by Checkland and Poulter (2006):

1. Finding out about the initial situation that is seen as problematical.
2. Making some purposeful activity models judged to be relevant to the situation. Build each model as an intellectual device on the basis of a particular worldview.
3. Using the models to question the real situation. This brings structure to a discussion about the situation, the aim of which is to find changes that are

both arguably desirable and also culturally feasible in this particular situation.

4. Define/take the action to improve the situation. Since the learning cycle is in principle never ending, it is an arbitrary distinction as to whether the end of a study is taken to be defining the action or actually carrying it out. Some studies will be ended after defining the action, some after implementing it. (pp. 13–14)

As the four steps by Checkland and Poulter (2006) are considered, the SLT law enforcement learning organization's development framework is evident. First, the problematical situation that needs to be addressed is the issue of radicalized individuals committing violent extremist acts within the United States. Local, state, and tribal law enforcement agencies will be increasingly tasked with the mission of addressing this and related issues. Currently, there are limited resources to address the counter-radicalization mission, but even so law enforcement is engaging with it. For instance, pilot programs for LE CVE missions and examples of other counter-radicalization efforts are found in major metropolitan cities such as Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. Second, the purposeful activity of the participants in the learning organization will allow for augmentation of emerging counter-radicalization strategies within a resource and discussion forum dedicated to sharing information about the mission. The information could include departmental strategies, barriers to implementation, unforeseen challenges, mistakes within practice, etc. Third, the learning organization will be the model by which to investigate the situation. It can provide ground truth to debunk policy and practitioner myths as well as to provide validation in the complex environment of counter radicalization. Lastly, the learning organization will aid national counter-radicalization activities by providing a clearinghouse forum for discussion of which strategies work and which do not, and it can provide resources to agencies that are or active in the counter-radicalization mission (e.g., training activities through curriculum development within the learning organization) or actively creating a counter-radicalization mission.

For the purpose of the proposed SLT law enforcement learning organization, the problematical situation that needs investigation would be the lack of direction, resources, and strategies provided to SLT law enforcement agencies by the federal government for the CVE mission, especially with regard to counter radicalization. It is well documented

that there is little guidance provided from the federal government for this mission. Furthermore, SLT law enforcement agencies have little/no experience in this mission and require resources to assist them with creating successful countermeasures. Subsequently, it is expected that some STL law enforcement organizations may not know what they need with respect to skill sets in the CVE and the counter-radicalization mission; however, the proposed learning organization affords them the opportunity to better understand the environment.

The purposeful activity model proposed is a learning organization that utilizes CMC and OAD methods, webinars, and curriculum development of courses related to the CVE mission for participating agencies. It is through these methods that we will explore effective CVE and counter-radicalization methods assigned to SLT law enforcement agencies. CMC and OAD models are well-developed intellectual models within the higher education environment and will similarly serve the learning organization. In addition, OAD discourse also facilitates writing and critical thinking skills (Lin, 2008). These abilities will translate into valuable skill sets for SLT LE personnel to use in the CVE mission. The initial method to assist in questioning and improving the problematic situation presented to the SLT law enforcement concerning the CVE mission, especially in the area of counter radicalization, will be CMC mediated discourse via an OAD computer. As the problem is hypothesized as a never-ending problem, a never-ending thread of discourse is envisioned to assist in combating the threat. Additionally, the webinars and two proposed CVE-related courses will assist and synergize the CMC and OAD methods employed by the learning organization.

Addressing the challenges provided by the CVE mission, particularly counter radicalization, to SLT law enforcement agencies will be the primary mission of the proposed learning organization. This process is a cycle, one that is continually revising the learning activity. Moreover, the CMC and OAD methods facilitate the cyclical model as described by Checkland and Poulter (2006). Herr (2005) reinforces the definition of action research and provides a salient example of why this method is employed in this particular project as well the basis of the intellectual framework to be utilized by it. He posits, “action research is best done in collaboration with others who have a stake in the

problem under investigation" (Herr, 2005, p. 3). It is obvious that the SLT law enforcement agencies across the country have a stake in the problem they are attempting to ameliorate.

B. STUDY DESIGN, LEARNING ORGANIZATION, AND RELATED COURSE DEVELOPMENT

This study will employ the SLT law enforcement learning organization to address the overall challenge of the complex environment of counter radicalization and the emerging doctrine to fulfill this mission by SLT law enforcement agencies. This is posited as a purposeful activity model and intellectual device to solve problems and facilitate productive discussions and effective countermeasures related to the CVE mission.

For this section, there will be two different evaluative methods. One is to compare pre- and post-SLT participant readiness with respect to the CVE mission. The second method will evaluate the two courses developed for the learning organization for applicability to the mission and efficacy within the mission. The curriculum evaluation section will provide information as to what needs to be changed to better align the courses with effective and valid countermeasures. These sets of developed survey instruments are created as descriptive methods, as the instrumentation attempts to describe the current status of the CVE mission, especially counter radicalization by SLT LE agencies.

A mixed methods (quantitative and qualitative) instrument will evaluate the baseline as to what SLT law enforcement agencies require to be effective in the CVE mission, especially with regard to counter-radicalization methods. The baseline measures will dictate future CMC and OAD methods as well as the inquiry into related materials to assist in the CVE mission.

After the learning organization comes into operation, it is imperative to measure the CMC and OAD venues for effectiveness as well as to evaluate the two courses (*Introduction to Strategic Thinking and Scenario Planning for Law Enforcement CVE Missions* and *Domestic and International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods*

for Law Enforcement CVE Missions). The evaluation will be a two-phase method that will consider the initial implementation as well as the incorporation of the two courses developed to augment the project. The survey instrumentation for this section will use mixed methods research and will provide information as to efficacy toward the CVE mission. This task would be completed after approval of the project and implementation of the curricula.

For the two proposed courses, it is important for course facilitators to know if the participants view them as important and effective in the CVE mission. This course is not taught in any SLT law enforcement continuing education or even as an entry-level course for law enforcement elsewhere, and it must be must be evaluated with that fact in mind. The outline for the *Introduction to Strategic Thinking and Scenario Planning for Law Enforcement CVE Missions* course can be found in Appendix A. The outline for the *Domestic and International Comparative Counter-radicalization Methods for Law Enforcement CVE Missions* course may be found in Appendix B.

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IV. PROPOSED MODEL

> The future often acts like a drunken monkey stung by a bee—it is confused and disturbing, and its behavior is completely unpredictable.
>
> — T. J. Chermack, *Scenario Planning in Organizations: How to Create, Use, and Assess Scenarios*

A. THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION: STRATEGIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis proposes several recommendations for the overall learning strategies of the proposed learning organization. The first recommendation is to establish an overall strategy and purpose for the state law enforcement learning organization endeavor. There are proven strategies that have been presented to organizations that will assist with the task. For example, Senge (1999) offers seven strategies to meet the challenge of strategy and purpose:

1. Use scenario thinking to investigate blind spots and signals of unexpected events.
2. Combine scenario thinking and explorations of organizational purpose.
3. Develop stewardship as an organizational ethic and practice.
4. Engage people continually around organizational strategy and purpose (explain the internet forum idea).
5. Expose and test the assumptions behind the current strategy.
6. Focus on developing better strategic thinking and ethical thinking capabilities.
7. Learn to pay attention to subtle shifts in the sense of possibility. (pp. 496–503)

Senge's strategies can assist the learning organization to develop its mission and vision statements. State, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel should engage counter-radicalization issues ethically as a central tenant to this effort. The development by law enforcement of better strategic thinking methods will be key. The second idea this thesis recommends for the law enforcement learning organization is to foster and nurture

an environment of creativity and imagination within the learning organization community. This should be expected of the organization from the beginning.

Senge (1999) describes learning:

> The basic meaning of a learning organization—an organization that is continually expanding its capacity to create its future. For such an organization, it is not merely to survive. "Survival learning" or what is more often termed "adaptive learning" is important—indeed it is necessary. But for a learning organization, "adaptive learning" must be joined by "generative learning," learning that enhances our ability to create. (p. 14)

Creativity and the ability to adapt will be essential components of the counter-radicalization effort. If the radical adversaries are creative, the personnel tasked to provide countermeasures should be as well. One of the goals for the project is to create healthy and effective SLT law enforcement dialogue on the counter-radicalization mission. This will be a challenge, as Crowley (2012) points out:

> In America, we tend to overlook the "presence of strife, envy, faction" in our daily intercourse. "Argument" has a negative valence in ordinary conversation, as when people say "I don't want to argue with you," as though to argue generates discord rather than resolution. In times of crisis, Americans are expected to accept national policy without demur. (Kindle location 80)

Recommendation three is for the learning organization is to create the access rights and infrastructure for the state law enforcement learning organization. It is necessary for the organization to have a secure website with screened access as the venue in which to present information to law enforcement agencies. Andresen (2009) asserts there are two distinct OAD mechanisms he has found to be very important in an asynchronous OAD forum "the role of the instructor and achieving deeper/higher learning" (p. 250). It will be important for the LE CVE learning organization to be aware of these two mechanisms. With respect to the role of the instructor, Andresen (2009) contends, "the instructors felt that the virtual classroom, including the asynchronous discussion forum became more intimate" and "instructors found that their teaching involved deeper cognitive complexity (cognitive role)" (p. 250). Thus, having a secure website would facilitate both of these instructor (facilitator) roles to some degree. With

respect to achieving deeper/higher learning, Andresen (2009) referred to the work of Zhu (2006). Zhu (2006) "has found that high levels of interconnectedness between learners leading to higher levels of knowledge construction must be explicitly built into the discussion assignment and nurtured by the instructor" (p. 252). The SLT LE learning organization facilitators will need to be selected for not only their knowledge base; they must also be competent in fostering discussion.

The majority of communications for the learning organization are expected to be at the unclassified for official use only (U/FOUO) and law enforcement sensitive (LES) classifications. Facilitated discussion among those who are performing and/or planning for the counter-radicalization mission is critical in the process of participant learning. Part of creating infrastructure for the learning organization is the creation of discussion boards for personnel to share information and ask questions of fellow agencies across the country so as to identify best practices for preventing violent extremism. These discussion boards will be a staple of the organization. Additionally, participants and facilitators will be able to post up-to-date news, links, and information related specifically to counter radicalization and prevention violent extremism as new information is gathered and processed.

The fourth recommendation this thesis has for the learning organization is to gather baseline data from the SLT learning organization participants as to what their current counter-radicalization efforts are, what works well, and what does not work. This endeavor would compile data as to what strategies and policies, if any, SLT law enforcement agencies, intelligence fusion centers, and state homeland security offices are currently using. Additionally, having the baseline data will allow the organization to follow trends and accelerate the learning curve and mitigate mistakes in the counter-radicalization mission. Furthermore, the exploration and analysis of successful multi-disciplinary models employed by the SLT law enforcement agencies and other organizations (e.g., fire service, emergency medical services, the healthcare community at-large, Muslim clerics, and Muslim community leaders) will be of substantive value to the organization at large.

In addition to these recommendations, the learning organization will need to seek funding streams and best budgetary practices for the endeavor. These issues will be important to explore as future financial forecasts for state and local government continue to be grim. Staffing and personnel issues should be part of the consideration as well.

B. ENHANCING COLLABORATION THROUGH STRATEGIC PLANNING AND SCENARIO PLANNING

This thesis officers several recommendations to the learning organization to enhance collaboration along the lines of strategic thinking and scenario planning. The first is that the learning organization should seek federal law enforcement and military partnerships from the start. SLT partners may be seen as "clusters" of working groups for bringing new ideas and information to federal and military agencies as a value-added component of this organization.

The second recommendation for collaboration is to consider partnering with the state, municipal, and county-level agencies and plan for measured growth without loss of communication efficacy. In addition, it is reasonable to predict that the initial collaboration effort will be limited to law enforcement and ancillary personnel; however, the value of other relevant professions should not be excluded in the long-term planning of the consortium. Academia, social work professionals, healthcare professions, and the like could contribute to the body of knowledge and provide valuable advocacy for the mission. The inclusion of these individuals should not be at the cost of the organization's mission; rather, their inclusion should be in a collaborative, creative spirit.

The third recommendation to facilitate collaboration is to create a "safe" environment for sharing information within the learning organization. It will be as important to learn what works as much as what does in the counter-radicalization mission. We recommend that promotion of a "blameless" environment to allow the states to share what has not worked—similar to the firefighter near-miss program or the critical incident stress debriefing program. To create the type of learning environment, we have to allow for and accept mistakes. We need what Kofman (1995) calls for, the creation of "safe-failing" spaces within the organizational culture. The ability to discuss problems,

barriers, and overt mistakes in the nation's counter-radicalization effort is paramount to achieving the learning organization's objectives. As part of the fostering an open and safe collaboration environment, it would be good to establish a rewards system.

The fourth recommendation we have is for the learning organization to make certain the learning organization earns and keeps the public's trust. Covey (2006) explains, "a 2005 Harris poll revealed that only 22% of those surveyed tend to trust the media, only 8% trust political parties, only 27% trust the government, and only 12% trust big companies" (p. 11). The learning organization endeavor will have significant implications for public trust, even though the exact efforts of the organization will be largely unknown to a large segment of the population. Knowing that the general public has little trust in governmental organizations should motivate the organization and the agencies participating to not only meet the counter-radicalization mission, but to do so in a manner that conveys transparency, fairness, and a sound ethical foundation. There must be consistent efforts on the part of the learning organization to establish trust within and outside the organization. Any breach of trust should be deal with swiftly to preserve the good of the organization and its stakeholders.

The fifth recommendation to enhance collaboration is for the learning organization to encourage state and local participants to create smaller "self-directed work teams" for meeting the local mission. A goal of the learning organization should be to encourage and advocate the idea of SLT law enforcement to stand up self-directed work teams to work on the counter-radicalization efforts for their jurisdiction. Orsburn (2000) explains, "a self-directed work team is a highly trained group of employees, from six (6) to eighteen (18), on average, fully responsible for turning out a well-defined segment of finished work" (p. 5). The work of these local teams should be shared with the learning organization. Taking into consideration labor and related human resources budgetary restraints, SLT law enforcement teams assigned to the counter radicalization should number six to 18 personnel per team as in Orsburn's model (2000). However, smaller agencies may be able to do with less.

The sixth recommendation for collaboration is that the learning organization develop an internal and external stakeholder skill set to survive in a traditional

bureaucratic environment. Developing political savvy and diplomacy to work with internal and external stakeholders will assist in ameliorating bureaucratic processes that may impede CVE efforts.

Providing a positive, interpersonal communication process with external stakeholders will be critical to achieving the counter-radicalization learning organization mission. Bratton (2012) notes, "keeping your supporters happy with the pace and direction of the collaboration is key" (p. 239). In the case of the counter-radicalization mission, this means providing critical information and intelligence when needed or requested by governing officials. The facilitators of the learning organization must be available to answer questions and provide guidance for strategy, policy, and evaluation for stakeholders and/or oversight organizations. Feedback loops between the learning organization and stakeholders must be evaluated frequently.

A seventh recommendation concerns the learning organizations group dynamic and the proper assignment of roles within the organization. Bolman (1997) explains:

> In small groups, as in large organizations, the fit between the individual and the larger system is a central human resource concern. A group's role system is critical. The right set of task roles helps get the work done and makes optimal use of each member's resources. (p. 153)

These informal roles, as described by Bolman (1997), will be best utilized as peer review roles and/or roles that target the individual's specific personal interests, apart from their contributions to the group, in counter radicalization. Additionally, as SLT law enforcement agencies become engaged in the learning organization, the selection process for personnel engagement in the mission will be a critical component. Selecting law enforcement personnel who have the skill set to understand the substantive complexities and be proponents for the counter-radicalization mission, as well as to value and appreciate the level of commitment to perform the mission, will be key to the learning organization's success.

The eighth recommendation toward building collaboration is the reinforcement of the individual participants' value and worth to the overall counter-radicalization mission, and individuals' to the contributions to the learning organization should not be

minimized. They should be encouraged, perhaps even through the use of a rewards system as previously mentioned. The individual's worth and value to the SLT learning organization will build because of the collaborative nature of the OAD and CMC environment. The issue of "contagiousness" is correlated with the exceptional threat of radicalization and violent extremism in all forms to the United States and the collective "contagious" desire to contain the threat by SLT law enforcement agencies. With respect to "little cause can have big effects," one can reflect upon the mayhem, carnage, and havoc that one or two radicalized individuals can have in the United States. Examples include the Fort Hood active shooter Nidal Hassan, the Tsnarnev brothers in Boston, McVey in Oklahoma City, or Dylann Hood in Charleston, South Carolina. The SLT law enforcement learning organization will strive for the occasions to address in which counter-radicalization strategies can make differences and keep people safer in our country. Those individuals and teams who provide rational and effective strategies will be promoted by the learning organization facilitators after careful evaluation and shown as best practitioners to the entire learning organization.

C. EVALUATION METHODS

This section explains evaluative methods for learning organization as well as salient cautions in the feedback process that are worth heeding. Objective, rational, and measurable feedback loops will provide the SLT LE learning organization with the valid data needed for positive growth and efficacy of the organization.

1. Evaluative Methods and Feedback

This section is comprehensive as the success of the curriculum project may hinge upon the ability of the curriculum to 1) serve as a catalyst to guide to counter-radicalization policy and/or strategy development and 2) be dynamic and adapt to the changing threat that the adversary might employ or the change in the adversary identity. The curriculum may be kept relevant and valid by utilizing strategic thinking instead of strategic planning as outlined by Mintzberg (1994). A static curriculum will not survive the imagination of the extremist threat.

Strategic planning may be too static a method for the foundation of this curriculum. Morrison (1994) points out:

> Strategic planning is about analysis (i.e., breaking down a goal into steps, designing how the steps may be implemented, and estimating the anticipated consequences of each step). Strategic thinking is about synthesis, about using intuition and creativity to formulate an integrated perspective, a vision, of where the organization should be heading.

As the course developers interpret data from the experiences of the students, they must be cognizant that strategic thinking must be employed in the evaluative methodology as much as it is in the development/revision methodology. The idea of synthesis is important in the SLT law enforcement learning organization concept as it is a key innovative step in the collaborative process of information sharing. Synthesis of counter-radicalization methodology within the learning organization can provide the agencies the ability to respond and critically evaluate their own strategies and implement revisions necessary to be successful.

Use of a quantitative and qualitative (mixed methods) survey instrument after the first several courses will provide optimal data for the proposed curriculum. The quantitative data will most likely provide useful measures of central tendency easily obtained from a computer statistical program like the Statistical/Software Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The qualitative data will be interpreted via content analysis. Intelligence analysts from the state law enforcement agencies and the fusion centers may be the ones who provide the qualitative data that cause substantive curriculum revision in future as they will be some of the first personnel to recognize a change in the Islamic radicalization threat.

A second, post-attendance survey will be sent to course participants to find out if the curriculum has made any impact upon the local counter-radicalization efforts of the student practitioners. Collecting the post-attendance data will steer curriculum revision as "best practices" are identified and a learning organization emerges. Lastly, the notion that a best practice may be final during its initial application and success phase is false within the VUCA environment. A current "best practice" might find itself changed significantly

within a month, six months, or a year. In this particular environment, best practices will be consider dynamic and fluid in their use.

2. Cautions

The *Empowering Local Partners* (White House, 2011a) and *Strategic Implementation Plan* (White House, 2011c) documents, both focusing on countering al-Qaida ideology, are dated five years ago, prior to the rise of the Islamic State. The focus of this timeframe indicates the dynamic violent Islamic extremism threat as groups change, transform, realign, become stronger, and weaker. The threats to the United States changes with time and the actors involved. The threat can and will shift from group to group, dependent upon the situation. This is another reason that the measurement and feedback component of the curriculum project is critical.

The course facilitators should have skillsets that develop the students' analytical skills. The ability of the students to understand, synthesize, and make applications of counter-radicalization strategies for their own jurisdictions will be the major outcome for the course. The proposed curriculum for a five-day, 40-hour comparative counter-radicalization course syllabus is found in Appendix C.

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V. CONCLUSION

Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

—Sun Tzu

A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

The creation of an asynchronous online discussion forum and curriculum related to preventing violent extremism and counter radicalization for law enforcement officers and related personnel is a reasonable outcome as data is collected from the overall effort. As data would be collected from the participants of the CMC discussion boards, content themes will be derived and collected in a manner that allows curriculum developers to identify modules of instruction that practitioners deemed critical or worthy in their day-to-day environment. Although this effort seems tactical and operational in its scope, the bigger picture is the strategic concept of a feedback loop.

Curriculum revision should be a constant process as the VUCA environment dictates that strategic thinking and adapting to changing threats are the cornerstone for successful operations. Additionally, finding out what curriculum intervention do not work (e.g., outright failures or modules deemed ineffective by practitioners) is critical in this process.

Agencies that have successes in the counter-radicalization mission may want to participate in a mentoring or exchange program with each other. The selected people could serve as leaders in the "best practices" portion of the mission. Grant money may be able to be used for this effort via governmental or private funding streams. Consider this the "Fulbright" program for counter-radicalization personnel. Funding constraints will limit this interventional strategy, but it would be a positive collaborative effort to bring thought processes and systematic processes to agencies that may not have the experiential component or successful history of interventions. These mentoring/exchange programs do not have to be long-term in scope. A three-day to one-week contact will prove sufficient in some circumstances to allow for thoughtful dialogue and course changes.

Another recommendation is to provide a vehicle to encourage advocate academic research (e.g., descriptive or action-research oriented studies) in the area of preventing violent extremism. This could lead to creation of a peer-reviewed journal or contribute substantially to trade or peer-reviewed journals, such as the *Homeland Security Affairs Journal*, the *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, or the *Homeland Defense and Civil Support Journal*. It would be worth exploring a partnership with an academic institution such as the Naval Postgraduate School's CHDS or the Army War College Homeland Defense and Security Issues Group of the Center for Strategic Leadership and Development with an established research institutional review board. The latter inclusion of academia (with subsequent operational security clearances and/or other accepted security provisions) will provide greater chances for expansion of research subject material and research efforts.

This program might serve to augment marketing the pre-existing missions of the Naval Postgraduate School's CHDS Master of Arts Degree Program, Executive Leaders Program, and the Fusion Center Leader's Program. A group of personnel performing the counter-radicalization mission might be marketed to as candidates for the three NPS programs listed above. This would provide NPS with more candidates for screening and review and thusly maintain the quality of the students selected to the programs. Subsequently, the Master of Strategic Studies Program at the U.S. Army War College may benefit by National Guard and/or U.S. Army Reserve personnel applying to and performing research in CVE.

It is critical to include the buy-in for the learning organizations from major stakeholder associations. Examples could include the Naval Postgraduate School's Fusion Center Leadership program graduates, selected Executive Leaders Program graduates, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Fusion Center Leaders Program, principal academicians from NPS, and the U.S. Army War College. It is important that this collection of practitioners and academics, coupled with the collaborative efforts across all levels of the organization, be endorsed by national-level organizations that can reliably validate their efforts. The following three

recommendations are provided in order to start the SLT LE learning organization and begin the process of interaction and curriculum sharing.

1. Stand up the online asynchronous discussion forum with the first phase participants.

This step begins the process of the SLT LE OAD discussion forum and begins the dialogue for the preventing/combating violent extremism for state police departments, state bureaus of investigation, and fusion centers. This first phase will begin information sharing on their particular CVE mission sets, what has worked in the past, and what has not. As the CVE environment is ever-changing, new trends/observations by the state-level departments will be encouraged for dissemination to the larger group.

2. Stand up the SLT LE CVE curriculums for continuing education.

Two specific SLT LE continuing education programs were created in this project. The first was to introduce participants to engage within the SLT LE OAD forum. The second was designed specifically as an SLT LE continuing education course for those officers and ancillary personnel actively engaged in the CVE mission. As soon as the SLT LE OAD forum is created, these two LE continuing education course offerings should be marketed to target participants.

3. Course facilitators should begin evaluating feedback on the SLT LE OAD as soon as data opportunities present themselves.

The course facilitators should begin evaluating forum trends and issues as soon as data collection will allow. The will allow the facilitators to evaluate the amount of information sharing within the OAD, its effectiveness, and trends/issues affecting the forum participants. Additionally, the course facilitators will be vigilant for any situations that breach agency to agency trust. Lastly, the facilitators will seek opportunities for scholarly involvement and/or opportunities for investigation into facets of the CVE mission.

B. LIMITATIONS

With respect to a proof of concept project, addressing limitations prior to implementation are critical to the success of the learning organization. Much of the limitations section here derives from the work of D. H. Meadows (2008) *Thinking in Systems*. Meadows offers eight limitations from his research that directly apply to this proof of concept project: policy resistance, tragedy of the commons, drift to low performance, escalation, success to the successful competition exclusion, shifting the burden to the intervener, rule beating, and seeking the wrong goal. Maintaining awareness of the eight limitations as described by Meadows (2008) is of critical importance to the initiation of the learning organization and its subsequent early success. Understanding the limitations will provide strategies for collaboration and initial development that will prove fruitful to creating an inclusive and trustful environment.

1. Policy Resistance

Meadows (2008) explains that when "various actors try to pull a system stock towards various goals, the result can be policy resistance" (Kindle location 2195). This would be expected to happen in the creation of the learning organization as law enforcement organizations will pull toward their own organizational goals a similar manner. Collaborative efforts and establishing trust between the facilitators and law enforcement CMC participants needs to be emphasized to mitigate resistance. Moreover, initial full disclosure of the learning organization and its goals will be critical as the project begins.

Meadows (2008) indicates the way to ameliorate resistance would be to "let go of it, bring in all the actors, and use the energy formerly expended on resistance to seek out mutually satisfactory ways for all goals to be realized—or redefinitions of larger and more important goals that everyone can pull toward together" (Meadows, 2008, Kindle location 2195). Initial assessments (e.g., specific needs assessments for CVE for state law enforcement agencies) will be of value here to steer the direction of the CMC as well as be responsive to the constituents to be served.

2. The Tragedy of the Commons

Meadows (2008) speaks to the issue of the tragedy of the commons by explaining that "with a commonly shared resource, every user benefits directly from its use but shares the costs of its abuse with everyone else" (Kindle location 2295). He also indicates that the resource (in this case, the learning organization and the CMC) could be *overused and abused* (Meadows, 2008, Kindle location 2295). In the case of the learning organization, abuse and overuse could be categorized as distrust issues and not participating fully in the CVE mission of discourse via the CMC. Another example would be sharing law enforcement CVE failures inappropriately or constantly raiding the CMC discussions without bringing new or valuable information.

3. Drift to Low Performance

The drift to low performance as described by Meadows as "allowing performance standards to be influenced by past performance, especially if there is a negative bias in perceiving past performance, sets up a reinforcing feedback loop of eroding goals that sets a system drifting towards low performance" (2008, Kindle location 2341). This is a very important factor that should be tracked by the facilitators of the CMC program and the continuing education augmentations. Negative bias on past performance is an important factor to watch for in the SLT law enforcement learning organization as it is a new mission for agencies across the country. Any successful attack by extremists would be considered a failure in strategy; this perception would likely be exacerbated by the media.

Meadows (2008) explains the solution of the drift to low performance is to *keep performance standards absolute*. He adds, "standards [can] be enhanced by the best actual performances instead of being discouraged by the worst" (Meadows, 2008, Kindle location 2295). In most organizations, optimal performance from all members is very unrealistic. Optimal performance typically comes from a low percentage of participants, average performance comes from most participants, and low performance comes from a low percentage of participants (as illustrated by a bell curve model). Keeping the learning organization from suffering from drift to low performance will be the work of the

facilitators and their collaborative interactions. Absolute standards may not be realistic in this dynamic environment and should be considered such.

4. Escalation

Meadows (2008) explains the escalation phenomena as "when the state of one stock is determined by trying to surpass the state of another stock—and vice versa—then there is a reinforcing feedback loop carrying the system into an arms race" (Kindle location 2398). The facilitators in the learning organization must monitor for this phenomenon in all of the organization's processes. Meadows explains that the way to avoid escalation is "to avoid getting in it. If caught in an escalating system, one can refuse to compete (unilaterally disarm), thereby interrupting the reinforcing loop. Or one can negotiate a new system with balancing loops to control the escalation" (2008, Kindle location 2409). A novel idea would be for an independent group to come in periodically and evaluate the learning organization process and, more importantly, evaluate realistic group/organizational expectations. This is a consideration for the feedback loop introduced earlier.

5. Success to the Successful—Competitive Exclusion

Meadows eloquently explains success to the successful—competitive exclusion as follows, "if the winners of a competition are systematically rewarded with the means to win again, a reinforcing feedback loop is created" (2008, Kindle location 2487). The CMC process must be constructed to allow success for all involved, no matter the level of government, demographic stratification, or law enforcement mission. The reinforcing factor here is keeping people safe. As counter-radicalization efforts improve and prove to be effective, the reinforcing feedback loop is actualized. Small, local agencies should be able to contribute just as the larger agencies when this proof of concept progresses to the second phase. Being able to massage the smaller agencies and keep them in the efforts will be a substantive challenge to the facilitators as the contributions of every agency will contribute to the body of knowledge. Additionally, it bears remembering that the next innovative idea may not come from a state law enforcement agency with substantial resources, it may come from a smaller local entity.

6. Shifting the Burden to the Intervener—Addiction

The explanation offered by Meadows about shifting the burden to the intervener provides an opportunity for interpretation. He explains this limitation as "shifting the burden, dependence, and addiction arise when a solution to a systemic problem reduces (or disguises) the symptoms, but does nothing to solve the underlying problem" (Meadows, 2008, Kindle location 2577). The SLT LE learning organization process must be attentive to its original mission of CVE and providing a platform of ideas, successes, and failures to the CMC participants at large. Another possible challenge may come from future academia participation with respect to not understanding the issue at hand and introducing uninformed, or worse, politically motivated discourse that could prove to be harmful to the learning organization. The ability to be vigilant to maintain dialogue and keep participants on target will be part of the criteria by which facilitators are chosen. This strategy goes to the inclusion of academia as well.

7. Rule Beating

Meadows explains rule beating as the "rules to be governed a system can lead to rule beating—perverse behavior that gives the appearance of obeying the rules or achieving the goals, but that actually distorts the system" (2008, Kindle location 2632). Peer pressure from the agencies involved may alleviate the problem and assist the facilitators in their efforts to observe for violations of situations such as ignoring/skirting civil rights processes, ignoring material classification, or breaching organizational trust by presenting proprietary material outside of the group. The initial orientation to participation in the learning organization should include baseline rules with respect to participation and subsequent sharing of information. It is not expected that this event will be a major challenge as the mission-centric objective of the learning organization is sharing CVE efforts within a CMC project.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

An area for future research would be the feasibility and possibility of creating a leaning organization, similar to the one proposed in thesis, for emergency/disaster management and emergency medical services. Emergency/disaster management and

emergency medical services are fragmented and have many different forms of composition and proficiency within the rank and file at the SLT level. Each of these professions has similar dynamics and multiple threat variables to the CVE mission. Just as the CVE mission, neither profession has created a learning organization to enhance mission capability.

For emergency/disaster management, a learning organization with foundations of strategic thinking, scenario planning, and collaboration would be logical places to start. Scenario planning would be of particular importance as the "all-hazards" response model is the norm for operations. For emergency medical services, investigating various methods to facilitate practice-based patient outcomes research would be an avenue to explore as it is the evolving trend for the profession. It is logical that collaborative methods would be a starting point for that endeavor.

D. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This type of law enforcement-specific learning organization endeavor as proposed in this thesis has not been attempted in this country, nor has it been a major focus of SLT stakeholders. If this learning organization endeavor were to move forward, there would no doubt be a variety of mistakes made along the way. Those mistakes should not be feared as mistakes provide opportunities for learning and improvement. There will be dysfunctional information and interpretation, and there will be political considerations to manage. However, if focus is placed on the negatives more than the positives, the possibility of failure will be high. Myles Horton and Paulo Friere (1991) taught us that we make the road by walking. We need to start walking if law enforcement in the United States is to prevent violent extremism and meet the counter-radicalization mission.

Through collaboration and the foundation of strategic thinking, the proof of concept model can evolve. Learning will occur at the local level (within the agency) and also at the national level (through what is contributed by the local agencies and carried forward to the organization itself). The ultimate outcome would be for the law enforcement organization to work and then create a similar model for emergency

management and emergency medical services, which have similar dynamic/fluid environments and complex adaptive systems of their own.

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APPENDIX A. INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC THINKING AND SCENARIO PLANNING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT CVE MISSIONS

- Introduction and Course Objectives (15 minutes)
- The Fall of Strategic Planning and the Rise of Strategic Thinking (60 minutes)
- Examples of Law Enforcement Applications of Strategic Thinking for the Combating Violent Extremism Mission (60 minutes)
- Introduction to Scenario Planning for Law Enforcement (30 minutes)
- Building the Toolkit for Law Enforcement Scenario Planning: Creating a Framework and Facilitating Discourse for Your Agency (60 minutes)
- Examples of Law Enforcement Applications of Scenario Planning for the Combating Violent Extremism Mission (60 minutes)
- Course Summary and Solicitation for Scenario Planning Examples (15 minutes)

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APPENDIX B. SYLLABUS FOR COMPARATIVE COUNTER-RADICALIZATION COURSE

Day One	Course introduction and distribution of materials
0800 to 1700	The Scope of the Problem of Radicalization and Violent Extremism, an overview of the European Union and the U.S.
	Introduction to Social Identity Theory
	Overview of Islam—A History of the Religion and the Foundations of Radicalization and Violent Extremism
Day Two	Discussion of the Current U.S. Counter-Radicalization Policies
0800 to 1700	Student Presentations of Counter-Radicalization Policies in Their Local Jurisdiction (Timed)
	Introduction to International Comparative Methods
Day Three	Comparative Government and Methods: The United Kingdom
0800 to 1700	Small Group (Practitioner) Collaboration and Analysis Exercises
Day Four	Comparative Methods: The Netherlands
0800 to 1700	Small Group (Practitioner) Collaboration and Analysis Exercises Workshop for Practitioners to Analyze and Apply Comparative Techniques for a Local Counter-Radicalization Problem
	Briefing for Simulations and Role-Play
Day Five	Role Play Exercise #1—Practice
0800-1700	Role Play Exercise #2—Situation "A"
	Role Play Exercise #3—Situation "B"
	Role Play Exercise #4— Situation "C"
	Exercise and Course Debrief How to Measure Outcomes for Counter-Radicalization (Online/ DVD)

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APPENDIX C. PHASE ONE: LIST OF STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERS

Alabama

- Alabama Department of Public Safety—Highway Patrol Division
- Alabama Department of Public Safety—Alabama Bureau of Investigation
- Alabama Fusion Center
- Alabama Department of Homeland Security

Alaska

- Alaska State Troopers
- Alaska Bureau of Investigation
- Alaska Information and Analysis Center

Arizona

- Arizona Department of Public Safety—Highway Patrol Division
- Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center

Arkansas

- Arkansas State Police—Highway Patrol Division
- Arkansas State Fusion Center

California

- California Highway Patrol
- California State Threat Assessment Center
- Central California Intelligence Center (Sacramento)
- Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center
- Northern California Regional Intelligence Center (San Francisco)
- Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center (Orange County)
- San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center

Colorado

- Colorado State Patrol
- Colorado Bureau of Investigation
- Colorado Information Analysis Center

Connecticut

Connecticut State Police

Connecticut Bureau of Investigation

Connecticut Intelligence Center

Delaware

Delaware State Police

Delaware Information and Analysis Center

Florida

Florida Highway Patrol

Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Florida Fusion Center

Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (Orlando)

Southeast Florida Fusion Center (Miami)

Georgia

Georgia State Patrol

Georgia Bureau of Investigation

Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center

Hawai'i

Hawai'i Department of Public Safety—Hawai'i Sheriff's Office

Hawai'i Pacific Regional Information Clearinghouse

Idaho

Idaho State Police

Idaho Criminal Intelligence Center

Illinois

Illinois State Police

Illinois Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center

Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center

Indiana

Indiana State Police

Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center

Iowa

Iowa State Patrol

Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center

Kansas

Kansas Highway Patrol

Kansas Intelligence Fusion Center

Kentucky

Kentucky State Police

Kentucky Department of Criminal Investigation

Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center

Louisiana

Louisiana State Police

Louisiana State Analytical and Fusion Exchange

Maine

Maine State Police

Maine Information and Analysis Center

Maryland

Maryland State Police

Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center

Massachusetts

Massachusetts State Police

Massachusetts Commonwealth Fusion Center

Boston Regional Intelligence Center

Michigan

Michigan State Police

Michigan Intelligence Operations Center

Detroit and Southeast Michigan Information and Intelligence Center

Minnesota

Minnesota State Patrol

Minnesota Joint Analysis Center

Mississippi

Mississippi Highway Patrol

Mississippi Analysis and Information Center

Missouri

Missouri State Highway Patrol

Missouri Information Analysis Center

Kansas City Regional Terrorism Early Warning Interagency Analysis Center

St. Louis Terrorism Early Warning Group

Montana

Montana Highway Patrol

Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center

Nebraska

Nebraska State Patrol

Nebraska Information Analysis Center

Nevada

Nevada Highway Patrol

Nevada Threat Analysis Center (Carson City)

Southern Nevada Counter-Terrorism Center (Las Vegas)

New Hampshire

New Hampshire State Police

New Hampshire Information and Analysis Center

New Jersey

New Jersey State Police

New Jersey Regional Operations Intelligence Center

New Mexico

New Mexico State Police

New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center

New York

New York State Police

New York State Intelligence Center

North Carolina

North Carolina State Highway Patrol

North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation

North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center

North Dakota

North Dakota State Highway Patrol

North Dakota State and Local Intelligence Center

Ohio

Ohio State Highway Patrol

Ohio Strategic Analysis and Information Center

Cincinnati/Hamilton County Regional Terrorism Early Warning Group

Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (Cleveland)

Oklahoma

Oklahoma Department of Public Safety - Oklahoma Highway Patrol

Oklahoma Information Fusion Center

Oregon

Oregon State Police

Oregon Terrorism Information Threat Assessment Network

Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania State Police

Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center

Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (Philadelphia)

Southwestern Pennsylvania Region 13 Fusion Center (Pittsburgh)

Rhode Island

Rhode Island State Police

Rhode Island State Fusion Center

South Carolina

South Carolina Highway Patrol

South Carolina Law Enforcement Division

South Carolina Information and Intelligence Center

South Dakota

South Dakota Department of Public Safety—Highway Patrol

South Dakota Fusion Center

Tennessee

Tennessee Highway Patrol

Tennessee Bureau of Investigation

Tennessee Fusion Center

Tennessee Office of Homeland Security

Texas

Texas Department of Public Safety—Highway Patrol Division

Texas Fusion Center

Houston Regional Intelligence Service Center

North Central Texas Fusion Center (McKinney)

Utah

Utah Department of Public Safety—Utah Highway Patrol

Utah Statewide Information and Analysis Center

Vermont

Vermont State Police

Vermont Fusion Center

Virginia

Virginia State Police

Bureau of Criminal Investigation—Virginia State Police

Virginia Fusion Center

Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center (Fairfax)

Washington

Washington State Patrol

Investigative Services Bureau—Washington State Patrol

Washington State Fusion Center

Homeland Security Division—Washington State Patrol

Washington, District of Columbia

DC Metro Police Department

Washington Regional Threat and Analysis Center

West Virginia

West Virginia State Police

West Virginia Intelligence Fusion Center

West Virginia Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Wisconsin

Wisconsin State Patrol

Wisconsin Department of Justice—Division of Criminal Investigation

Wisconsin Statewide Information Center

Southeastern Wisconsin Threat Analysis Center (Milwaukee)

Wisconsin State Homeland Security

Wyoming

Wyoming Highway Patrol

Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation

Wyoming Fusion Center

Wyoming Office of Homeland Security

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APPENDIX D. PHASE TWO: LIST OF MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY LAW ENFORCEMENT PARTNERS

Alabama

- Birmingham Police Department
- Jefferson County Sheriff's Office
- Montgomery Police Department

Alaska

- Anchorage Police Department

Arizona

- Phoenix Police Department
- Tucson Police Department
- Mesa Police Department
- Glendale Police Department
- Scottsdale Police Department
- Chandler Police Department
- Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
- Pima County Sheriff's Department

Arkansas

- Little Rock Police Department

California

- Los Angeles Police Department
- Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
- San Diego Police Department
- San Diego County Sheriff's Department
- San Jose Police Department
- San Francisco Police Department
- Long Beach Police Department
- Fresno Police Department
- Fresno County Sheriff's Department
- Sacramento Police Department

Sacramento County Sheriff's Department
Oakland Police Department
Santa Ana Police Department
Anaheim Police Department
Riverside Police Department
Riverside County Sheriff's Department
Stockton Police Department
Bakersfield Police Department
Modesto Police Department
Fremont Police Department
Glendale Police Department
Chula Vista Police Department
Orange County Sheriff's Department
Bernardino County Sheriff's Department
Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department
Alameda County Sheriff's Department
Contra Costa County Sheriff's Department
Kern County Sheriff's Department
Ventura County Sheriff's Department
San Francisco County Sheriff's Department
San Mateo County Sheriff's Department
San Joaquin County Sheriff's Department

Colorado

Denver Police Department
Colorado Springs Police Department
Aurora Police Department
El Paso County Sheriff's Department

Connecticut

Bridgeport Police Department

Delaware

Wilmington Police Department

Florida

Jacksonville Police Department

Duval County Sheriff's Department

Miami Police Department

Metro Dade County Police Department

Tampa Police Department

Hillsborough County Sheriff's Department

St. Petersburg Police Department

Pinellas County Sheriff's Department

Hialeah Police Department

Orlando Police Department

Orange County Sheriff's Department

Broward County Sheriff's Department

Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department

Georgia

Atlanta Police Department

Fulton County Police Department

Gwinnett County Police Department

DeKalb County Police Department

Cobb County Police Department

Hawai'i

Honolulu Police Department

Idaho

Boise Police Department

Illinois

Chicago Police Department

Cook County Police Department

Indiana

Indianapolis Police Department

Fort Wayne Police Department

Iowa

Des Moines Police Department

Kansas

Wichita Police Department

Kentucky

Lexington—Fayette County Division of Police

Louisville Metro Police Department

Jefferson County Sheriff's Department

Louisiana

New Orleans Police Department

Baton Rouge Police Department

Shreveport Police Department

Maine

Portland Police Department

Maryland

Baltimore Police Department

Baltimore County Police Department

Montgomery County Police Department

Prince George's County Police Department

Baltimore City Police Department

Massachusetts

Boston Police Department

Cambridge Police Department

Lowell Police Department

Springfield Police Department

Worchester Police Department

Michigan

Detroit Police Department

Wayne County Sheriff's Department

Oakland County Sheriff's Department

Macomb County Sheriff's Department

Minnesota

Minneapolis Police Department

Hennepin County Sheriff's Department

St. Paul Police Department

Mississippi

Jackson Police Department

Missouri

Kansas City Police Department

St. Louis Police Department

St. Louis County Police Department

Jackson County Sheriff's Department

Montana

Billings Police Department

Nebraska

Omaha Police Department

Lincoln Police Department

Nevada

Las Vegas Metro Police Department

Henderson Police Department

New Hampshire

Manchester Police Department

New Jersey

Newark Police Department

Jersey City Police Department

Bergen County Police Department

Essex County Sheriff's Department

Hudson County Sheriff's Department

New Mexico

Albuquerque Police Department

Bernalillo County Sheriff's Department

New York

Buffalo Police Department

Erie County Central Police Services

Monroe County Sheriff's Department

Nassau County Police Department

New York City Police Department

Rochester Police Department

Suffolk County Police Department

Westchester County Department of Public Safety

Yonkers Police Department

North Carolina

Charlotte- Mecklenburg Police Department

Raleigh Police Department

Wake County Sheriff's Department

Greensboro Police Department

Durham Police Department

North Dakota

Fargo Police Department

Ohio

Columbus Police Department

Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Department

Franklin County Sheriff's Department

Hamilton County Sheriff's Department

Cleveland Police Department

Cincinnati Police Department

Toledo Police Department

Akron Police Department

Oklahoma

Oklahoma City Police Department

Oklahoma County Sheriff's Department

Tulsa Police Department

Oregon

Portland Police Department

Multnomah County Sheriff's Department

Pennsylvania

Philadelphia Police Department

Pittsburgh Police Department

Allegheny County Police Department

Montgomery County Sheriff's Department

Rhode Island

Providence Police Department

South Carolina

Columbia Police Department

South Dakota

Sioux Falls Police Department

Tennessee

Memphis Police Department

Nashville-Davidson County Metro Police Department

Shelby County Sheriff's Department

Texas

Houston Police Department

Harris County Sheriff's Department

San Antonio Police Department

Dallas Police Department

Dallas County Sheriff's Department

Austin Police Department

Fort Worth Police Department

Tarrant County Sheriff's Department

El Paso Police Department

El Paso County Sheriff's Department

Arlington Police Department

Corpus Christi Police Department

Plano Police Department

Garland Police Department

Lubbock Police Department

Laredo Police Department

Bexar County Sheriff's Department

Travis County Sheriff's Department

Collin County Sheriff's Department

Hidalgo County Sheriff's Department

Denton County Sheriff's Department

Utah

Salt Lake City, Utah

Salt Lake Unified Police Department

Vermont

Burlington Police Department

Virginia

Virginia Beach Police Department

Norfolk Police Department

Chesapeake Police Department

Fairfax County Police Department

Washington

Seattle Police Department

King County Sheriff's Department

Pierce County Sheriff's Department

Snohomish County Sheriff's Department

Tacoma Police Department

West Virginia

Charleston Police Department

Wisconsin

Milwaukee Police Department

Madison Police Department

Milwaukee County Sheriff's Office

Wyoming

Cheyenne Police Department

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