NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURE 6LOWPAN COMMUNICATIONS FOR TACTICAL WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS

by

David W. Courtney

September 2016

Thesis Advisor:	Preetha Thulasiraman
Co-Advisor:	Zachary Staples

Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		*Form Approved OMB No.0704–0188*
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.		
1. AGENCY USE ONLY *(Leave blank)*	**2. REPORT DATE** September 2016	**3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED** Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURE 6LOWPAN COMMUNICATIONS FOR TACTICAL WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS		**5. FUNDING NUMBERS** W6A99
6. AUTHOR(S) David W. Courtney		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Marine Corps Systems Command and Naval Research Program		**10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.		
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		**12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE**

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

The ability to securely disseminate data in a timely manner is critical to military missions within a hostile environment. Tactical wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist of power-constrained devices spread throughout a region-of-interest to provide data extraction in real time. In this thesis, we develop cyber security mechanisms to be implemented on a tactical WSN using the 6LoWPAN protocol for use by the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Specifically, we develop an architectural framework for tactical WSNs by studying cyber security gaps and vulnerabilities within the 6LoWPAN security sublayer, which is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We develop a key management scheme and a centralized routing mechanism that is non-broadcast but feasible in an operational scenario. In addition, we modify the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure to facilitate the newly developed keying and centralized routing mechanisms. Methods to aid in deployment planning are also discussed. The tactical WSN architecture was tested against a variety of well-known network attacks. The attacks simulated were spoofing, man-in-the-middle, and denial-of-service. Through MATLAB simulations, we showed the effectiveness and efficiency of the developed cyber security mechanisms to provide integrity and reliability to a deployed tactical WSN.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), Sensor Nodes, 6LoWPAN, IEEE 802.15.4, energy constrained node, centralized routing, keying mechanism, network attacks, denial of service (DOS), man-in-the-middle (MITM), spoofing			**15. NUMBER OF PAGES** 255
			16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE** Unclassified	**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT** Unclassified	**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT** UU

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

**IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURE 6LOWPAN COMMUNICATIONS FOR
TACTICAL WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS**

David W. Courtney
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2007

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2016**

Approved by: Preetha Thulasiraman, Ph.D.
                    Thesis Advisor

                    Zachary Staples
                    Co-Advisor

                    R. Clark Robertson, Ph.D.
                    Chair, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

The ability to securely disseminate data in a timely manner is critical to military missions within a hostile environment. Tactical wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist of power-constrained devices spread throughout a region-of-interest to provide data extraction in real time. In this thesis, we develop cyber security mechanisms to be implemented on a tactical WSN using the 6LoWPAN protocol for use by the United States Marine Corps (USMC). Specifically, we develop an architectural framework for tactical WSNs by studying cyber security gaps and vulnerabilities within the 6LoWPAN security sublayer, which is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We develop a key management scheme and a centralized routing mechanism that is non-broadcast but feasible in an operational scenario. In addition, we modify the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure to facilitate the newly developed keying and centralized routing mechanisms. Methods to aid in deployment planning are also discussed. The tactical WSN architecture was tested against a variety of well-known network attacks. The attacks simulated were spoofing, man-in-the-middle, and denial-of-service. Through MATLAB simulations, we showed the effectiveness and efficiency of the developed cyber security mechanisms to provide integrity and reliability to a deployed tactical WSN.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

6LoWPAN	IPV6 over low power wide area network
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-CCM	Advanced Encryption Standard-Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
AH	Authenticated Header
BEB	Binary Exponential Back-off
BS	base station
COC	combat operations center
CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSMA-CA	Carrier-Sense Multiple Access—Collision Avoidance
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Denial-of-Service
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ESP	Encapsulation Security Payload
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IoT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet Protocol
IPSec	IP Security
IV	Initialization Vector
LoWPAN	low power wide personal area network
LSeND	Lightweight Secure Neighbor Discovery for Low-Power and Lossy Networks
MAGID	Magnetic Intrusion Detection
MIC	Message Integrity Code
MITM	Man-in-the-Middle
MPH	miles per hour
MS	master station
NHC	Next Header Compression
NSA	National Security Agency
RPL	Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks

RX-TX	receive-transmit
SEND	Secure Neighbor Discovery
TCP	Transmission Control Protocol
UDP	User Datagram Protocol
USMC	United States Marine Corps
WSN	wireless sensor network

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Internet of Things (IoT) embraces network connectivity of everyday, low power sensor devices for two-way data communications. The IoT offers the potential to extend connectivity to sensor devices and mobile nodes at the tactical edge of the battlefield at a low cost for the United States Marine Corps (USMC) within their wireless sensor networks (WSN). A "WSN is a group of sensor nodes that are geographically distributed to provide data gathering and monitoring of tasks and events" [1]. The implementation of tactical WSNs empowers the USMC to collect data within areas of interest.

The IEEE 802.15.4 standard is a physical and data link communication protocol for low power wireless personal area networks Since the IEEE 802.15.4 standard only defines the first two layers of the Open Systems Interconnection model, another protocol must be used to provide full networking functionality for the WSN [2]. The Internet Engineering Task Force's (IETF) 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) is a protocol designed to work with the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [2].

Our study into the applicability of a 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 infrastructure for USMC tactical sensor networking is focused on a structured, multi-hop static WSN rather than an ad hoc deployment. The objective of this thesis is to provide an analysis of 6LoWPAN by studying the standard's ability to 1) provide energy conservation for the low power devices that are deployed, where the sensors are static; and 2) implement and use a key management scheme that has the ability to defend against a variety of cyber attacks. In order to achieve this objective, the vulnerabilities of the cyber security mechanisms used within 6LoWPAN WSN must be evaluated.

The proposed network design incorporates the following network architecture elements: master station (MS), base station/border router (BS), and sensor nodes. The MS serves as the central node of the network providing a universal connection to external domains and accessibility and administrative privileges to the sensor nodes while located at a safe remote location away from the WSN. The BS, commonly known as a sink node,

is the transitional element within the WSN that connects the 6LoWPAN/internal environment to the public/external environment.. The sensor nodes are the end elements designed to attach to multiple types of sensors and to send data to the MS. The deployment of the devices is similar to that described in [3] but with some modifications to include the creation of the intended network, connection of the devices to the MS for bootstrapping, and deployment of the devices.

The MS's administrative control mechanisms include node control, centralized routing, and keying mechanisms. Node control from the MS removes the need to send an individual to make a modification to the BS or sensor for a new task. The centralized routing mechanism allows the MS to control the routing of the WSN and the current network status with the implementation of path indication bits. Private keys are generated using the AES-CCM 128 keying mechanism, where each node has a unique key that is only shared with the MS, and the BS has a separate keying mechanism shared with the MS to secure the data over the external domain.

The proposed 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure is based on the structure defined in [4] with header compression schemes. We modified the frame structure to incorporate the above discussed cyber security mechanisms. The first modification incorporates the path indication bits within the Path/Hop Limit byte. The path indication bits identify whether a primary or secondary route is used to transmit data to the MS. The second modification is the implementation of the AES-CCM 128 keying mechanism incorporating the use of an initialization vector and the message integrity code (MIC).

The experimental setup used to perform network simulations using MATLAB allows us to mimic multiple frames transiting the network at one time. The sensors in all simulations were the Magnetic Intrusion Detector (MAGID) described in [3]. We simulated the deployment of sensors along a two-lane intersection. There were four scenarios simulated, each representing a different speed of the vehicles traversing an intersection. These speeds are 25 miles per hour (mph), 35 mph, 45 mph and 65 mph. Simulated within these environments are three different types of attacks: spoofing, man-in-the-middle (MITM), and denial-of-service (DOS), each using a different method of

execution to exploit vulnerabilities within a network. Throughout the simulation, the phase transitions of the nodes and frames were documented for further analysis.

The network within the simulation program incorporated a modified carrier-sense multiple access-collision avoidance with binary exponential back-off (CSMA-CA BEB) protocol designed specifically for the nodes within this thesis. The network topology used in the simulation is shown in Figure 1, where a reference number is given to each node in the figure. Many nodes have a primary and secondary route to send traffic, and each node makes a determination of which route to use. A decision to use the secondary route by one node does not imply the next node in the path also uses the secondary route. The nodes selected for each attack remain the same for all scenarios to allow for comparisons between the different network environments. Each scenario had six different network implementations with five trials/simulations per implementation. A total of 30 trials were conducted for each scenario, resulting in a total of 120 trials for the program.

Figure 1.   Assignment of Reference Numbers to the Nodes of the Tactical WSN

The purpose of the spoofing attack was to test the efficacy of the MIC security mechanism added to the IEEE 802.15.4 6LoWPAN enabled frame. The MS was successfully able to perform an analysis on frames received to determine if there was a possible spoofing attack within the WSN and to determine which node to remove from the WSN to prevent further attacks, as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2.   Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received by the MS in Each of the
Five Trials for Scenario 2 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 16

The DOS attack was used to determine if the centralized routing scheme and the use of the path indication bits would be able to detect an attack or incapacitated node. The analysis presented in Figure 3 displays the use of the secondary routes, indicating possible congestion or a node malfunction, causing the WSN to operate in a non-optimal manner. Specifically, during the DOS attack on node 5, node 11 had an increase of frames utilizing the secondary route due to node 5 becoming incapacitated.

Figure 3.   Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Original Hop) in
Scenario 4 (Traffic at 65 mph) for No Attacks and
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25

Similar to the spoofing attack, the analysis performed on the MITM attack was focused on the implementation of the MIC security mechanism but also the centralized routing mechanism using the path indication bits. The results shown in Figure 4 validated the MIC security mechanism's ability to authenticate valid frames sent by the nodes. The MS was then able to determine where the attack was occurring and which nodes to remove from the WSN.

Figure 4. Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received by the MS from the Originating Node during a MITM Attack between Nodes 7 and 2

The combination of the cyber security mechanisms implemented within this thesis reflect positive results from a cyber security aspect. The use of the MIC provided integrity to the WSN by preventing the authentication of 100% of the frames received by the MS in either the spoofing or MITM attacks. The use of the centralized routing scheme ensured the WSN remained functional and reliable even when one of the two nodes connecting the BS to the rest of the WSN was disabled during the DOS attack. The implementation of the indication bits within the centralized routing scheme enabled detection of congestion within the network resulting from either traffic density or an incapacitated node. We conclude that the cyber security mechanisms developed and network structure defined provide a foundation on which future tactical WSNs used within the USMC can be based.

References

[1]   K. White and P. Thulasiraman, "Energy efficient cross layer load balancing in tactical multigateway wireless sensor networks," in *Proc. Of IEEE International Inter-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Method in Situation Awareness and Decision Support,* 2015, pp. 193–199.

[2]   J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. Sa Silva, "Security for the Internet of things: a survey of existing protocols and open research issues," in *IEEE Communication Surveys & Tutorials,* vol. 17, pp. 1294–1312, Third Quarter, 2015.

[3]   *Unattended Ground Sensor Set AN/GSQ-257 Technical Manual, TM 09632A-OI*, Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2008.

[4]   S. Raza, S. Duquennoy, and G. Selander, "Compression of IPsec AH and ESP Headers for Constrained Environments" (Draft), pp. 1–10, 2013, Sept. 2013.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife, Adrienne, for all of the support she has given me throughout this entire process.

I would also like to thank my thesis advisor, Professor Preetha Thulasiraman, for taking me under her wing and pushing me to reach my goals.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet of Things (IoT) embraces network connectivity of everyday, low power sensor devices for two-way data communications. The IoT offers the potential to extend connectivity to sensor devices and mobile nodes at the tactical edge of the battlefield at a low cost. In this thesis, we study the security of specific IoT protocols such that they can be used at the tactical edge by the United States Marine Corps (USMC) within their wireless sensor networks (WSN).

A. LOW POWER WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS

A "WSN is a group of sensor nodes that are geographically distributed to provide data gathering and monitoring of tasks and events" [1]. Sensor devices collect and transmit data to a centralized controller, also known as a base station. WSNs can be used in a variety of industrial, commercial and military applications. In recent years, WSNs have become integral to all parts of life and continue to evolve as technology advances. The use of WSNs has continuously grown and are becoming fully integrated within commercial systems as well as our homes. Due to the growth of WSNs and the increased reliability of the devices used, a WSN is an attractive intelligence gathering system to the Department of Defense (DOD). The implementation of a WSN provides the ability to remotely collect intelligence on an area-of-interest, eliminating hazardous manpower requirements. In addition, a WSN can be used to remotely "monitor deployed systems and trigger alerts at a command and control site when certain events occur" [1]. The implementation of tactical WNSs empowers the DOD to cost effectively collect reconnaissance data within critical areas-of-interest, increasing the DOD's intelligence gathering capabilities.

The deployment of tactical WSNs in remote regions requires that the sensor nodes function independently. In order to function for a period of time without manual support, the sensor devices must have their own power supply as a permanent electrical infrastructure might not be readily available. To meet the low energy consumption requirement that extends the life expectancy of the device and, thereby, the network as a

whole, WSNs have been designed to use a minimal amount of power to perform a desired task.

Tactical WSNs have been used within the military during conflicts in multiple ways. During the Vietnam War, WSNs were first deployed to detect movement along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Operation IGLOO WHITE [2]. The deployed sensors were designed to perform a range of detections to include sensing truck noises and body heat. The devices were also designed to blend in within the jungle environment by appearing to be a part of the vegetation. Operation IGLOO WHITE was determined to be a great success as WSNs, used in combination with US Air Force bombers, accounted for 90% of the destruction of equipment that was transported down the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The WSN devices in use today by the USMC for tactical networking are known as the AN/GSQ-257, Unattended Ground Sensor Set. The AN/GSQ-257 devices are part of the USMC's Tactical Remote Sensor System and have multiple configurations that enable sensing of seismic/acoustic, magnetic, and/or infrared data [3]. This is helpful in performing perimeter enemy detection and tracking enemy movements. The use of a WSN allows the USMC to remove the human element from possible danger while maintaining situational awareness with early detection from a remote location; however, the limitations of these sensor devices include 1) physical attributes, the weight and size of these sensors are considerably higher than commercial sensor nodes, and 2) limited ability to airdrop, sensors with seismic sensing capability may be air dropped whereas all other sensing functions are only available if the sensors are hand placed. Embracing the technological advancements of sensor and sensor communication over the past 20 years will enable the USMC to modernize their network infrastructure.

B.   INTRODUCTION TO 6LOWPAN/IEEE 802.15.4

One of the advantages of a sensor device is its ability to be deployed within harsh environmental conditions without a dedicated power supply. Since sensors are traditionally low power devices, a different type of communication protocol that conserves energy within the wireless environment needs to be used. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard is a physical and data link communication protocol for low power wireless

personal area networks (LoWPAN). LoWPAN is commonly used in embedded applications for real-time data extraction covering a large geographic area requiring the use of many sensor nodes [4]. The sensor nodes within the LoWPAN need to be low cost as well as able to operate unattended, use typical batteries, and communicate over multiple hops [4].

Since the IEEE 802.15.4 standard only defines the first two layers of the Open Systems Interconnection model, another protocol must be used to provide full networking functionality for the WSN [5]. The Internet Engineering Task Force's (IETF) 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) is a protocol designed to work with the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [5]. Both IEEE 802.15.4 and 6LoWPAN are specifically tailored for IoT applications [5]. 6LoWPAN is an open standard networking technology that standardizes Internet connectivity for low power wireless sensor networks. It alters the landscape by allowing "IPv6 packets to be carried efficiently within link layer frames, such as those defined by IEEE 802.15.4" [6] while reducing Internet Protocol (IP) overhead. This low overhead is achieved using cross-layer optimizations. "A powerful feature of 6LoWPAN is that while originally conceived to support IEEE 802.15.4 low power wireless networks, it is now being adapted and used over a variety of networking media including Bluetooth and Wi-Fi" [6]. By connecting to an IP based infrastructure, low power wireless networks are then connected to other IP networks and devices via IP routers. 6LoWPAN takes advantage of the well-developed end-to-end IP infrastructure, providing open standards and interoperability [6].

C.   RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES

As the use of WSNs grows in the USMC, they will become more attractive to potential attackers. In order to prevent a passive or active cyber attack, multiple security methods must be implemented to maintain an efficient and effective WSN. Comprehensive defense security mechanisms must account for multiple types of attacks. Generally, to defend against an attack, the military develops a defense model for the attack. Since there are multiple types of attacks, the military has developed multiple models to defend against each case. The development of a single model to defend against

a variety of attacks prevents the need for an expanded arsenal of defense models, saving the military manpower.

The USMC has high interest in WSNs and their ability to connect to a public domain. Currently, when their WSN devices are deployed in the field, they are deployed with a base station, known as AN/MSC-77, which contains working spaces for two individuals [7]. The AN/MSC-77 is also known as the Combat Operations Center (COC). The COC includes a dedicated power source to provide the power necessary to run all of the equipment within it. The COC must be placed in the vicinity of the WSN devices unless a repeater is used to place the unit further away, but the COC must again retain a line-of-sight with the repeater. The size of the COC is a concern since it is a large unit, as shown in Figure 1, and can be easily seen by an enemy. The current WSN used by the USMC requires the COC to be located near the deployed network even with the use of repeaters; thus, an enemy can generally avoid the area to evade detection. The current data flow from legacy equipment and sensor devices lacks automation. In order for the USMC to obtain the data from the WSN, an individual must physically go to the COC and extract the necessary information, as the COC does not transmit the data acquired from the WSN.

To facilitate seamless data delivery to and from the sensor devices, the network must be connected to another secure domain using a comprehensive communication protocol. The use of 6LoWPAN will significantly improve the information flow as it currently exists by allowing multiple operators in a unit to access sensor information despite their location. IP based information can be easily used to inform the situational awareness and common operational picture of the engaged unit.

The feasibility of using 6LoWPAN for the operational information flow scenario described above is based on its ability to do two things: 1) provide for secure energy conserving communications with regard to the limited power devices that operate over the network and 2) provide secure communications by improving upon the security sublayer currently utilized by IEEE 802.15.4. The ability to communicate using 6LoWPAN is meaningful only if physical and cyber security considerations are in place.

Figure 1.   Dimensions of the COC (AN/MSC-77) Currently Used by the USMC.
Source: [7].

In this thesis, we provide cyber security solutions for 6LoWPAN that pair with and enable current commercial sensor technology to be employed in austere and/or hostile environments to support USMC operations in a secure and energy conserving manner.

Our study into the applicability of a 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 infrastructure for USMC tactical sensor networking is focused on a structured, multi-hop, static WSN rather than an ad hoc deployment. The objective of this thesis is to better

5

understand the feasibility and effectiveness of 6LoWPAN in an operational scenario. To this end, the aim is to provide an analysis of the 6LoWPAN standard by studying the standard's ability to 1) provide energy conservation for the low power devices that are deployed, where the sensors are static and 2) implement and use a key management scheme that has the ability to defend against a variety of cyber security attacks that could cause the WSNs to become inefficient and/or ineffective. In order to achieve this objective, the vulnerabilities of the cyber security mechanisms used within 6LoWPAN WSN is evaluated. A focus on cyber security gaps and vulnerabilities within the security sublayer, a key management scheme that is non-broadcast but also feasible within an operational scenario, is determined. Finally, the effectiveness of the selected key management scheme on different threat models is assessed.

D.   THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS

To address the objectives stated above, we developed a theoretical network design framework for a multi-hop WSN that uses 6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4 such that it can be deployed for tactical operations by the USMC.

The contributions of this thesis are as follows:

- Development of a command and control (administrative control) structure of the tactical WSN that incorporates node control, a unique defined/centralized routing model, and a selected keying mechanism for data confidentiality, authentication and integrity.

- Construction of a modified 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure to incorporate the unique centralized routing model and selected keying mechanism.

- Enhancement of methods to aid in the deployment planning of the secured tactical WSN to prevent critical vulnerabilities.

- Simulation and evaluation of the proposed network framework against multiple attacks and testing for security robustness and energy conservation.

It must be noted that parts of this thesis have already been published by the author at the time of this writing [8].

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that actively studies the secure implementation of a 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 WSN for USMC operations.

E.   THESIS ORGANIZATION

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The related literature focusing on security within 6LoWPAN is outlined in Chapter II. The theoretical framework of the proposed tactical WSN model, including modifications to the frame structure, the routing scheme and keying mechanism, is discussed in Chapter III. The basis and rationale of the experimental setup as well as the threat models tested against the developed tactical WSN are explained in Chapter IV. The simulation results and analysis are given in Chapter V. The conclusion and topics for future work are proposed in Chapter VI. All the code created and used for the implementation of the network, testing models and raw simulation results are provided within the Appendix.

F.   CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, we provided an introduction and overview of WSNs, 6LoWPAN/IEEE 802.15.4 and their applicability within USMC tactical operations. The motivations and objectives of this research were discussed, followed by an outline of the thesis contributions.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II.   RELATED WORKS

There is an existing foundation of research in the literature that aims to achieve security and energy conservation within a WSN [9]. In this thesis, we focus on developing specific energy conserving security measures for a tactical WSN. To that end, we study specific tactical WSN architectures, routing mechanisms, the 6LoWPAN frame structure and related cyber security mechanisms. In the following sections, we examine current research relating to these areas to provide a basis for the work in this thesis.

A.   ARCHITECTURE OF A TACTICAL WSN

The architecture determines how the network is physically deployed and how the nodes are interconnected with one another. It also determines the types of devices to be used within the network and their functions. There has been work published on tactical WSNs that serve as a foundation for our work [10], [11]. A specific view of a tactical WSN architecture was taken in [10] for the deployment of the network in a large scale environment. The authors proposed an architectural design based on a cluster-tree network with multi-hop capability [10]. The cluster-tree design groups nodes into clusters, and a node is selected to act as a cluster head. The election of the cluster head is based on a node's residual energy level [10]. The role of the cluster head is rotated among the nodes throughout the lifespan of the deployed tactical WSN, thereby conserving nodal energy. In addition, because the network is multi-hop, it allows the network to scale to a large environment.

The architecture model developed in [10] was also used in the model developed by [11], which applied the 6LoWPAN protocol. The protocol architecture for the deployed nodes was separated into five protocol layers. Each layer was examined, detailing the functions and techniques used within the layer. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard was determined to be a suitable protocol for the physical and MAC layers [11]. While detailing the adaptation and network layers, the authors of [11] assumed that the nodes would be randomly deployed, requiring the nodes to perform a self-organizing function through address auto-configuration. Other functions that were discussed include routing

protocols, header compression, fragmentation, and energy saving [11]. Within the transport and application layers, the authors used a military application management entity that contains a military operations profile specifically defining parameters required for tactical deployment [11]. While [10] and [11] provide architectural constraints for tactical WSN deployment, cyber security mechanisms and its relationship to energy consumption was not discussed.

B.   ROUTING

Multiple methods of routing in a WSN exist, each of which is geared toward achieving a specific purpose such as energy conservation, low delay, or high throughput. A unique routing approach was taken in [9] where the objective was to conceal the sink node due to its high value as a target for an enemy attacker. In order to keep the sink node concealed, a routing algorithm was proposed that obfuscated the sink node's location within the deployed network, reducing the risk of attack while preserving the node's energy levels. While the algorithm provided an anonymity mechanism to conceal the sink node within the network, a cyber security mechanism for the network communications using encryption and authentication was not provided. The proposed routing mechanism within [1] focused on the development of an energy efficient cross-layer load balancing and routing algorithm called EZone. With the application of the EZone routing protocol, the network lifetime was maximized; however, the EZone algorithm does not provide a mechanism for secure communications.

In [5], the Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL), which uses routing control messages, was proposed as a routing mechanism for networks of low power devices. "RPL is an end-to-end routing solution based on IPv6 communications and is specially adapted for the needs of specific types of traffic flow" [12] and is capable of supporting control messages on multiple network architectures [5]. One of the disadvantages of RPL is that the protocol focuses on attacks that occur externally to the network rather than internally to the network [5]. The ability to provide a method of control over the routing scheme within the network is a form of security. This type of

administrative control over the routing of data is a strategic decision that is applied within this thesis.

C.   6LOWPAN FRAME STRUCTURE

In order to develop a feasible, secure design for tactical WSNs using 6LoWPAN, it is necessary to understand its frame structure. The composition of a 6LoWPAN frame was given in [13]. Given that the packet is reduced to a size of 127 bytes, some header information has been either removed or compressed. Two of the fields within the header that underwent significant compression were the IP addresses for the source and the destination nodes. 6LoWPAN offers two types of addressing modes where the IP address is either used in its entirety or is compressed. The compressed address mode offers the administrator an option to reduce the IPv6 address from 128 bits (16 bytes) to 16 bits (2 bytes), which saves 14 bytes per address, saving a total of 28 bytes [5]. The authors of [13] also demonstrate the implementation of a Compressed IPSecurity (IPSec) packet proposed in [14], which uses a UDP packet structure within the 6LoWPAN frame. The combination of the different compression methods and the implementation of compressed IPSec within the 6LoWPAN frame is the underpinning of our proposed frame structure in this thesis.

D.   SECURITY MECHANISMS

A survey on security for the IoT was conducted in [5], which went into detail on the security vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard in concert with the 6LoWPAN protocol. Within the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the authors of [5] discussed different security mechanisms depending on a prescribed vulnerability. The model proposed in [5] included the use of approved security modes, an access control list, and time synchronization to limit vulnerabilities, reducing the number of potential internal attacks; similar security mechanisms were used in [15]. The authors of [15] also provided greater detail on the potential attacks that could be used at each layer of the 6LoWPAN stack.

Encryption within the 6LoWPAN environment is a requirement in order to have an effective tactical WSN. Encryption has been addressed in the most recent release of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [5], [15]. Multiple encryption modes are presented for use,

11

and the challenge is for the researcher to determine what mode best fits the intended tactical WSN application. Along with encryption, there is a method to ensure data authentication called a Message Integrity Code (MIC). Again, the researcher must determine the size of the MIC needed and if the payload can sacrifice the bits needed to implement the integrity mechanism. Knowing how encryption methods operate helps determine which one to use to defend against a variety of attacks. Advanced Encryption Standard-Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code (AES-CCM) is the suggested method within the 6LoWPAN standard [5]. Within the encryption method, an Initialization Vector (IV) is used. The combined fields within the IV provide a unique value to be used along with the encryption key, creating a unique encrypted payload for each transmitted packet. The keys for encryption are either public or private. Public and private shared keys both have positive and negative aspects. The application determines the type of key to be used.

An adaptation of the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 infrastructure developed in [14] incorporates the use of encryption over the typical IP infrastructure using IPSec. IPSec is the protocol suite used for IP communications to encrypt and authenticate IP packets. The IPSec suite is an immense protocol; thus, the full implementation of IPSec is inefficient within the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 infrastructure. The authors of [14] proposed a method to reduce the overhead within the IPSec protocol while maintaining the protocol's core capabilities. IPSec on the typical IP infrastructure uses two types of headers, the Authenticated Header (AH) and the Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) header. The AH provides authentication of who sent the packet but the data is not encrypted, whereas in the ESP header, the data is encrypted, providing confidentiality to the transmitted data. Additionally, both the AH and ESP headers can be used together within the same packet. The information fields required for the AH and ESP headers are able to be incorporated within the already used header compression for the IP address and the Next Header field. The Next Header is an 8-bit field that identifies the next type of header immediately following the IPv6 header. The 6LoWPAN packet structure including the fields of the compressed header is shown in Figure 2. The proposal by [14] further examines different types of encryption methods to be used

12

within the ESP packet, including some of the security modes within the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.

```
|   octet 1      |    octet 2      |    octet 1      |    octet 1      |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|           LOWPAN_IPHC            |  Hop Limit      | Source Address|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Source Address|       Destination Address         | LOWPAN_NHC_EH |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LOWPAN_NHC_ESP|        Sequence Number            |       IV        |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|    Initialization Vector (Variable Size)          |  Source Port    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Source Port  |       Destination Port            |     Length      |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Length       |        Checksum                   |                 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                 +
|                      UDP Payload (Variable)                         |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|            Pad                   |  Pad Length    |  Next Header   |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                                    |
+                                                                    +
|             Integrity Check Value (Variable)                       |
+                                                                    +
|                                                                    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

Figure 2.   Sample Next Header Compression (NHC) Compressed IP/UDP Packet Secured with ESP. Source: [14].

The final type of security mechanism to be discussed is Neighbor Discovery. Neighbor Discovery is a method of finding neighboring nodes through which the newly added node can route messages. Neighbor Discovery is a known vulnerability of 6LoWPAN networks [5]. The vulnerability lies in verifying if the neighbor is a node that is authorized to access the WSN. Multiple methods have been proposed to deal with this vulnerability, including a Lightweight Secure Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks (LSeND) addressed in [14] as well as a variety of methods presented in [5]. Methods presented in [14] include RFC 6775-"Neighbor Discovery Optimization for

13

6LoWPAN," RFC 4861-"Neighbor Discovery for IPv6," and an adaptation of RFC 3971-"SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)." Given the complexity and known vulnerabilities of having a Neighbor Discovery protocol, limiting the capabilities of the network by disabling Neighbor Discovery mitigates both the complexity and vulnerabilities of the deployed WSN.

E.   CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, some of the current research pertaining to the methods used for the implementation of four main elements within the tactical WSN were discussed. Also demonstrated is that an abundance of research exists on WSNs in general, but work that focuses on a deployed 6LoWPAN tactical network that is secure and uses a multi-hop infrastructure is limited. Due to the limited research, 6LoWPAN is a focal point for further exploration within tactical WSNs.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

In this chapter, we discuss the theoretical framework for the design and implementation of a 6LoWPAN enabled tactical WSN using IEEE 802.15.4. This theoretical framework is developed with a focus on the cyber security mechanisms that are required for tactical deployment. We discuss 1) the network design, including the network devices used and their purpose, 2) the command and control (i.e., Network administration) parameters of the WSN, which detail specific tactical characteristics within the network (i.e., data routing and key management), and 3) the type of encryption and authentication algorithm used for the transmitted data. The network design, administrative privileges and encryption and authentication of the network are the three main components of the security architecture for the tactical WSN. We then discuss the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure and the modifications that are made to the frame in order to deal with the cyber security considerations discussed. We also discuss recommendations for the deployment of the WSN for USMC tactical operations. Finally, the three types of cyber security attacks to be performed against the network are discussed. These attacks are used as an evaluation tool for the security architecture that is developed and is discussed further in Chapters IV and V.

A. NETWORK DESIGN

The proposed network design includes multiple elements, each serving a specific purpose. The elements included within the network architecture are as follows: master station (MS), base station/border router (BS), and sensor nodes. In the following sections, a description of each element is provided along with its intended use. In addition, the cyber security mechanisms associated with each network element are also provided along with assessments on attack mitigation. The proposed network architecture is shown in Figure 3 and is based on a typical mesh network.

Figure 3.   Proposed 6LoWPAN Network Design

1.   Master Station (MS)

The MS serves as the central node of the network, as depicted in Figure 3. The proposed MS is a modified AN/MSC-77 (COC) currently used by the USMC but with modifications. As discussed in Chapter I, the typical USMC COC/MS unit must be within the line-of-sight of the WSN devices. Due to its large size, a typical COC/MS cannot be easily concealed. Rather than place the MS within the austere environment in which tactical WSNs are typically deployed, we position the MS in a structured, fortified military base, away from the tactical WSN region-of-interest, making it easier to protect. The proposed MS provides accessibility and administrative privileges to the sensor nodes while located at a safe, remote location away from the WSN. The MS has the ability to connect to each node within the internal domain since each element within the WSN supports two-way communication links. The MS can also connect to other servers outside of the WSN in order to disseminate data and populate other operator databases. When

connected to other servers and databases, the data becomes accessible to remote operators, including those deployed within the WSN's environment. The MS also provides the operator a secure position to manage and control the WSN while extracting data from the sensor nodes. The flow of information proposed in this thesis does not require USMC personnel to rely on physically retrieving the stored data.

Cyber security mechanisms for the MS have already been developed and tested throughout the military (i.e., security mechanisms for the COC are well known). The MS will not be operating within the 6LoWPAN network environment but will be able to decipher the encrypted payloads sent to it from a 6LoWPAN device. As a security measure, the encrypted payloads are the only method of communication between the nodes and the MS.

2. Base Station/Border Router (BS/BR)

The BS is the transitional element within the WSN that connects the 6LoWPAN/internal environment to the public/external environment. This is also commonly known as a sink node. The proposed BS is a secured router that transmits the data received from the sensor nodes into an external domain. The BS receives frames from the sensor nodes and removes unnecessary 6LoWPAN header information. It reassembles the payload into the compatible external network frame structure in order transit to the MS. The BS performs the same task in the reverse direction, removing unnecessary frame headers and adding the appropriate 6LoWPAN header to send the frame to the sensor nodes. Within the 6LoWPAN environment, the BS converts the addresses between the internal and external network environments since 6LoWPAN uses a modified addressing mode. The BS does not interfere with the payload because it is encrypted. The BS only contains the necessary encryption in order to connect to the MS; therefore, the frame payload to be transmitted remains secure. The actual transition of frames from one domain to the other is not the focus of this thesis and is not discussed at length.

The BS is restricted to 63 hops from the furthest node since the hop limit field within the frame structure consists of only six bits. The hop-limit field is further

discussed in Section D. Since the BS connects the WSN to an external network, it requires either a dedicated electrical supply, a generator, or robust battery supply as more power is needed to transmit a signal strong enough to reach the external domain. The BS is also able to withstand the harsh environments in which it is deployed and is much smaller than the COC since it does not need to have workstations available within the unit. The smaller size of the BS also allows it to be concealed more easily within the deployed environment. The BS should also contain anti-tamper technology to prevent physical modifications or reverse engineering of the device. Anti-tampering is already implemented on deployed USMC sensor devices [3]. We assume that the same tamper proof mechanisms can be implemented on the BS as well.

3.   Sensor Node

The sensor nodes are the end elements. Each node is designed to attach to multiple types of sensors and to send data to the MS for compilation and analysis. The node is assumed to have the sensor capabilities as described in [3], including which sensors can be connected and which modes of operation are offered. The nodes have the ability to withstand the harsh environment and the capability to relay frames to the intended destinations. The node remains at its deployed location in order to maintain a static network. This facilitates our ability to sustain its continued connection to the MS and to monitor each node's energy use. The sensor nodes communicate with the MS only through encrypted payload routed through the BS. The nodes are deployed and contain anti-tamper physical security measures as noted in the USMC manual [3].

4.   Attack Mitigation for Network Design

Vulnerabilities associated with the design of this tactical WSN include single points-of-failure and physical protection of the sensor nodes. The MS and BS are single points-of-failure to the WSN, and if removed, the network is no longer accessible and unable to be used. A denial-of-service (DOS) attack exploits this type of vulnerability. The MS has a greater impact on the WSN since it provides reachability, accessibility, and administrative privileges to the sensor nodes. The BS can be replaced by another BS without affecting the encryption or payload data transmission between the nodes and MS.

18

The vulnerability of the MS and BS is not the focus of this thesis, but the military does have similar devices in place today. Lastly, the physical protection of the nodes and BS remains an accepted risk. The deployed nodes will be able to detect an enemy approaching since the sensors can detect threatening events. The ability to sense potentially hostile events allows the sensor nodes to report suspicious data before becoming compromised, and if compromised, the node is removed by the MS to prevent further corruption within the WSN. In the end, the node is still able to perform the job it was deployed to do by detecting the enemy's presence even if it becomes compromised.

B.   COMMAND AND CONTROL (ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL)

The administrative control aspects of the WSN are critically related to its functionality as well as the implementation of its cyber security mechanisms. In this thesis, the cyber security mechanisms that are implemented enable only the necessary features required for the WSN to function. These mechanisms are controlled by the MS. The control mechanisms of the MS include node control, centralized routing, and keying mechanisms. Using a centralized entity, such as the MS, to perform these functions, we limit attacks on the network.

1.   Node Control

The MS maintains a directory of all of the networks connected to the BS as well as the sensor nodes within each network. The sensor nodes in the network are controlled by the MS via encrypted payload. The encrypted payload contains information that includes when the node provides real-time coverage or when the node stores detected events and transmits them in bulk at a later time [3]. Since all of the control messages are encrypted within the payload, the encryption provides the ability to securely control each node. The control of each node is limited to the MS. The MS serves as a centralized controller of all network functions. This centralization of control removes the need to send an individual to make a modification to the BS or sensor for a new task; instead the node can be adjusted immediately from the MS. In the event a node is in the process of being compromised, the MS can remove the node from the network as well as reset the node to delete its cryptographic and routing information, preventing the enemy from

obtaining any data. The ability to remove the node either before, during, or after it has been compromised is a mitigating factor to the risks of a node deployed in a hostile environment.

2. Centralized Routing

As has been stated, the MS contains a directory of all nodes connected in the network. The MS implements centralized routing functions by controlling each sensor node's routing table. In the network, data is either routed upstream, from the sensor node to the MS, or downstream, from the MS to the sensor nodes. For upstream data, each sensor node is only able to route data to two neighboring sensor nodes; each node has a primary path to the MS through one neighbor and a secondary path to the MS through the second neighbor. Exceptions to this include sensor nodes that are directly connected to the BS or when a sensor node is deployed to a location in which only one other node (neighbor) is within its wireless range. The sensor node also performs in the same manner downstream, but the limitation of two nodes is not enforced in order to compensate for network expansion. This gives the MS the ability to implement energy cost saving measures within the network by adjusting the routing scheme to alleviate the workload of drained nodes. Controlling the frame flow within the network is also a way to protect the network from outside attacks by not receiving and routing frames from invalid sources.

The centralized routing scheme allows the MS to add new nodes to the network by adding the new node's address information into the neighboring node's routing table via the encrypted payload. The MS also adds the necessary routing table information to the new node during the network setup. This method prevents the need for a neighbor discovery protocol, which is noted as a vulnerability within 6LoWPAN [5], [15]. The MS can also remove compromised or expired nodes by removing the node from the neighboring nodes' routing tables; thus, any data sent from the obsolete node(s) is not routed.

An example of the centralized routing scheme of deployed sensors at an intersection is shown in Figure 4. An intersection was used as an example since these devices track not only personnel but tanks or other manned vehicles [3]. The sensors are

not limited to deployment at an intersection as they may also be deployed along a perimeter of a base or along a path of intended traffic. If an anomaly within the traffic flow occurs, it may mean an impending attack or an attack by the enemy is already underway within the area. To provide full coverage of an intersection, sensors are placed on each side of the road. The primary and secondary routing paths are marked, with every node having a secondary path except for the nodes with a direct link to the BS.

Figure 4.   Centralized Routing Scheme that Depicts the Primary and
Secondary Paths for Each Node

As discussed within the description of the MS, administrative control of the nodes is performed by the MS via encrypted payloads. If a node were to become compromised, the MS edits the nearby nodes' routing tables via the encrypted payloads and then removes the compromised node from the network. An example of a compromised node and the adjustments made to the primary and secondary paths of the surrounding devices

is shown in Figure 5. In Figure 5, node 17 is the compromised node. The centralized routing scheme is adjusted to not allow a frame to be transmitted to or from the compromised node (node 17) as it is no longer in the routing tables of any node within the WSN. The routing adjustments depicted in Figure 5 include nodes 12, 13, 16, 18 and 21. Each of these nodes loses its secondary routes, thereby limiting its ability to transmit to only one other node. Essentially, all paths that contain node 17 are removed, thereby isolating the compromised node. The adjustments in the routing path force some nodes to assume additional traffic loads, but the WSN is able to remain effective until the compromised node is repaired or replaced.

Figure 5.   Centralized Routing Scheme With a Compromised Node that Depicts the Changes to the Primary and Secondary Paths of the Surrounding Devices

3. Data Transfer / Hidden Node Mitigations

A mechanism to transport data between nodes needs to be determined; however, the transporting mechanism to be used within an energy constrained environment must limit the creation of new network traffic. The authors of [14] use the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) as the basis of their packet structure, which in turn is the basis of the frame structure employed in this thesis. Unlike the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), UDP does not use a handshake dialog for connection establishment and does not transmit acknowledgements for packets received. This allows the transfer of data to occur much faster and with less overhead [16]. UDP also supports broadcast, multi-cast, and unidirectional communications. We focus on unidirectional UDP communications as it is better suited for the keying mechanism that is developed and used in this thesis. We discuss this further in the next subsections.

As mentioned above, UDP is a connectionless, best-effort mechanism used to route network traffic. This means that the sending nodes do not receive confirmation that the transmitted frame was correctly received [16]. To provide assurance that frames are received correctly within an unreliable transport protocol (i.e., UDP), we use a unique implicit acknowledgement detection mechanism. This unique implicit detection mechanism operates as described in the following paragraphs.

As previously mentioned, the communication links between the nodes are reciprocal; therefore, each node is able to see the next-hop transmission of the frame. This confirms that the frame was properly received without errors and forwarded. If the sending node does not see the next-hop node's transmission, the sending node determines the frame needs to be retransmitted and performs the retransmission after the predetermined back-off period. If the transmitting node is forwarding to a relay node to funnel the traffic to the BS, a small random increment of time (seed number) is added to the back-off period. The predetermined back-off period is similar to carrier-sense multiple access-collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) with binary exponential back-off (BEB) in which the time between retransmissions doubles after each failed transmission attempt [17]. The seed number is applied in order to prevent repeated attempts at transmitting a frame at the same time as a neighboring node. If the sending node does not see the

23

transmission of the frame from the follow-on node after four re-transmissions, the sending node repeats the same process with the node designated in the routing table as the secondary route.

The primary advantage to using an implicit acknowledgment detection mechanism is the ability to ensure that a frame was received by the next-hop node without the extra network traffic required to set up sessions or send feedback control messages (acknowledgement frames) as used by other types of protocols. Essentially, this implicit acknowledgement detection mechanism takes advantage of the listening capability that each node has to detect transmissions within its transmission range. A disadvantage to this mechanism is the possibility of the originating node detecting the transmission of the follow-on node, which is transmitting a previously received frame from another node. The receiving node then uses the transmitted frame by the follow-on node as confirmation of a successful receipt.

This implicit acknowledgement detection mechanism cannot be applied to the nodes next to the BS as a result of the BS's transition and subsequent transmittal of the frame into the public domain. The neighboring nodes of the BS is not able to detect the follow-on transmission the BS makes since it is beyond the node's capabilities. With the assumption that the BS has a dedicated power supply, the BS is continuously awake and ready to receive any frame sent to it. All of the traffic within the network is then funneled into the nodes surrounding the BS, which increases the network traffic. By limiting the BS's neighboring nodes to one transmission per frame, we reduce the possibility of congestion. With the increase in traffic density of the BS's surrounding nodes, hidden nodes also become a factor to consider. A hidden node scenario is illustrated in Figure 6, where node A and C are not able to detect each other's transmission while transmitting to node B; therefore, node A is hidden to node C and vice versa. Hidden nodes within the network also create congestion because transmissions can collide, causing the received frame to be corrupted.

Figure 6.   Hidden Node Diagram

In order to mitigate hidden nodes near the BS, extra relay nodes are used to funnel the traffic toward the BS, thereby removing possible hidden nodes from around the BS. A network implementation without the use of the extra relay nodes to funnel the network traffic is shown in Figure 7. Nodes 1 through 4 can transmit to the BS; however, nodes 1 and 2 cannot see node 4 and nodes 3 and 4 cannot see node 1, creating a hidden node problem. If nodes 1 and 4 transmitted at the same time, a collision would occur, and the frame would be lost. The use of utilizing extra relay nodes within the vicinity of the BS to avoid hidden node problems is shown in Figure 8. Within the network design and prior to deployment, the BS is moved further away from nodes 1 through 4 to allow for the addition of nodes 25 and 26 to the network. The BS is then far enough away to not be affected by nodes 1 through 4 and can only see nodes 25 and 26, while node 25 can only see 1, 2, 26 and the BS and, similarly, node 26 can only see nodes 3, 4, 25 and the BS. Nodes 25 and 26 are now functioning as a relay/sensing node and can see each other within the network. Since the extra relay nodes can see each other, the nodes do not transmit at the same time, preventing collisions from occurring at the BS. Also since nodes 25 and 26 are extra relay sensing nodes, they are able to concentrate on sensing the area around the BS to provide further physical security to the high value device.

25

One final modification was made to the delay in time between the first and second transmissions of a node. The first transmission is typically used to wake-up the receiving node, which affects the implementation of the BEB protocol. Traditionally, the BEB waits zero or one time slot before attempting a first transmission. Thereafter, the wait time doubles (two slots, four slots, eight slots, etc.) before each re-transmission. In our implementation, the BEB is modified as follows. A node waits 6.0 ms after the first transmission before trying to re-transmit. The transmitting node does not know if the next-hop node is awake, thus this time permits the next-hop node to wake-up in preparation to receive the incoming frame for the second retransmission. The BEB begins after the second transmission but with an initial back-off time delay of 10.0 ms which then doubles after each successive unsuccessful attempt to transmit to the follow-on node. Thus, in our implementation, back-off times between the first and second transmissions do not follow the typical BEB delay of zero or one time slots; doubling of wait time does not occur until after the second transmission.

Figure 7.   Network Design Without the Use of Extra Relay Nodes
to Illustrate the Hidden Node Problem

Figure 8.   Network Design With the Use of Extra Relay Nodes (Nodes 25 and 26)
to Illustrate a Remedy for the Hidden Node Problem

Each node has the ability to store frames that cannot be successfully forwarded. After a period of time, the node repeats the same process to forward the stored frame. By waiting a period of time without retransmitting, the node does not add to network congestion, thereby reducing possible collisions or delays. This is a capability already demonstrated within [3] in its ability to store all events and transmit them at a specified time given by the network administrator.

4.   Keying Mechanisms

A keying mechanism is needed to protect the information being transported between the nodes and the MS. Multiple keying mechanisms may be implemented, such as a private keying mechanism, in which each node has its own unique key, or a public keying mechanism, in which each node has both a private key specific to each node and a public key that is shared between all of the nodes. Previous research from [5] determined that after evaluating the energy requirements of public keying, private keying is the most efficient method to encrypt the payload. Public keying was also determined to have vulnerabilities, including an increase in transmissions throughout the network to update the keys. The focus of this thesis is to evaluate a non-broadcast key management method;

therefore, individual frames are also used to disseminate each key update, creating more transmissions and, in turn, increasing energy use.

With the use of a private key, each node has a unique key that is only shared with the MS. As mentioned previously, the BS does not have any of the encryption keys shared between the nodes and the MS, but the BS does have a separate keying mechanism shared with the MS. The external network and, specifically, the keying mechanism for the external network are already in use in other areas within the military and is not the focus of this thesis.

5.   Attack Mitigation for Administrative Control

Administrative control allows for mitigating factors if the WSN has nodes that are attacked via man-in-the-middle (MITM) or DOS. Each of these attacks requires an individual or remote device to be near the WSN, but the attacker is detected prior to performing the attack due to the sensing capabilities of the sensor node as previously mentioned above [3]. The centralized routing scheme prevents the intruder from further infecting and draining the rest of the network's power resources. Use of a keying mechanism also protects the data during transportation over the network; therefore, MITM or spoofing attacks are not able to change any of the data nor are they able to eavesdrop.

C.   ENCRYPTION

Multiple encryption algorithms based on private keying are available. The algorithms include the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), and RSA. Each encryption method is authorized by the National Security Agency (NSA), which sets the encryption standards for the Department of Defense and establishes key lengths for various classification levels [18]. The most recent IEEE 802.15.4 standard lists eight security modes ranging from no encryption (one mode) to different versions of AES (seven modes) [5]. As a result, AES is used as the keying mechanism in this thesis. The seven modes of AES boast different levels of encryption and authentication. Since the devices being used can be located within a hostile environment and are interacting with government networks, the highest levels of

security are required within the WSN; therefore, the data must be encrypted and authenticated. To meet these requirements, AES-CCM with 128 bit keys is used as the keying mechanism to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. It is shown that the selected encryption method also protects against MITM and spoofing. The keying mechanism is further discussed in the next section.

D.   6LOWPAN ENABLED IEEE 802.15.4 FRAME STRUCTURE

The proposed 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure is shown in Figure 9 and is based on the structure defined in [14] with header compression schemes. In this thesis, we modified the frame structure to incorporate the previously discussed cyber security mechanisms. The fields within the frame structure are defined in the following subsections.

1.   Frame Control (2 Bytes)

This field has been defined by the 802.15.4 standard [13].

2.   Source MAC Address / Destination MAC Address (8 Bytes Each)

This field has been defined by the 802.15.4 standard [13].

Bytes 1	2	3	4
Frame Control		Source MAC Address (8 Bytes)	
Destination MAC Address (8 Bytes)		LOWPAN IPHC (2 Bytes)	Path/Hop Limit
Source IP Address		Destination IP Address	
LOWPAN NHC		Flags	Frame Counter
Frame Counter (4 Bytes)			Source Port
Source Port	Destination Port		Length of IP Header
Payload (71 Bytes)			
MIC (16 Bytes)			
Next Header	CRC		

Figure 9.   Proposed 6LoWPAN Frame Structure

29

3. LOWPAN IPHC(2 Bytes)

This field has been defined by RFC 6282 [19] with no changes made.

4. Path (2 Bits) /Hop Limit (6 Bits)

The proposed centralized routing mechanism defined in this thesis limits the direction each frame can take to reach the BS from the transmitting node. This mechanism is a modification from the proposed frame structure in [14]. We use the Path/Hop Limit field in the following manner. The Path/Hop Limit field is a total of eight bits (one byte). Within the Path/Hop Limit byte, the first two bits are used to help the MS determine if there is an issue with a node routing frames. Specifically, the first two bits are used individually to determine whether the frame was transmitted over a primary or secondary route. The second bit is used only by the source node. In the event the primary route is used to send the frame, the bit is 0. If the secondary route is used, then the bit is 1. The same method is applied to the first bit and is used by all nodes except the originating node. When the MS receives the frame, it is known if a node was not able to transmit to a designated primary node. Depending on the modes of operation selected, the MS may be able to determine which node may be off line or compromised instead of waiting for a response or detection. The final six bits limit the number of hops a frame can take to 2^6-1, or 63 hops. Limiting the number of hops to 63 does not present an issue since the nodes adjacent/neighboring to the BS are not able to support a large network of nodes. In other words, we want to maintain energy efficiency within the network. By reducing the possible number of hops within the network, we provide battery relief to those nodes, particularly those near the BS, that have to transmit data regularly.

5. Initialization Vector (16 Bytes)

The IV is used to help protect against replay attacks and is also used in the CCM process to encrypt the payload [5]. The IV is shown as the shaded portion of the frame in Figure 9. To prevent replay attacks, the IV is a combination of unique identifiers. These identifiers include a frame counter (four bytes), source and destination IP address (two bytes each), source and destination port address (two bytes each), flags (one byte), and length of packet (one byte). The combination of these parameters is unique and prevents

duplicate IVs; in addition, an IV cannot be repeated during the life of the network. The sequence number field has been removed from the frame structure originally given in [14].

a. Source IP Address / Destination IP Address (2 Bytes Each)

The addresses are in the compressed 16-bit mode, thus incurring smaller overhead as described within [14].

b. LOWPAN NHC(2 Bytes)

This field is defined by RFC 6282 [19] with no changes made.

c. Flags (1 Byte)

This field is reserved for the originating source and each bit is designated by the administrator of the WSN.

d. Frame Counter (4 Bytes)

The field keeps track of the sequential order of frames sent; therefore, a separate sequence number field outside of the IV is not required.

e. Source Port /Destination Port (2 Bytes Each)

These fields have no changes or compression modifications [14].

f. Length of IP Header (1 Byte)

This field is reduced to one byte since the maximum frame size is 127 bytes.

6. Payload (71 Bytes)

The payload is the amount of data that can actually be transmitted. The data is encrypted, providing confidentiality during data transmission using the combination of the IV and the AES-CCM 128 bit key.

7.   Message Integrity Code (16 Bytes)

To provide authentication and integrity, a MIC is created within the AES-CCM mode of encryption and is attached to the end of the frame. The MIC is a hash unique to the packet and is used to verify that no changes were made to the original message. The MIC provides another layer of protection against any attack that tries to inject or change data being transmitted.

8.   Next Header (1 Byte)

This is used in higher layers and remains unchanged [14].

9.   CRC (2 Bytes Each)

This field has no changes or compression modifications [14].

E.   TRANSITION

As previously mentioned, the transition of the frame from one domain to the other must be completed by the BS. Since the 6LoWPAN frame contains information that the MS needs to properly assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the WSN, the BS must transfer information from the necessary fields of the 6LoWPAN frame to the frame used on the external domain. Fields needed by the MS include the Path, IV, Payload, Next Header, and MIC. Not included in the IV but needed by the MS to analyze the route taken within the WSN are the path indicator bits; however, this field is only required when the BS is transitioning a frame from the WSN to the MS. The path indicator bits are not required when making the transition from the MS to the WSN since the nodes deployed within the WSN do not have the capability to perform that type of analysis.

F.   DEPLOYMENT OF NODES

The deployment of the WSN is similar to [3] but with some modifications. It is proposed to first create the intended network, then connect the devices to the MS, and finally deploy the devices. Creating the network first requires setup of the key exchange for encryption purposes, the routing table to be loaded, and evaluation of ideal physical

placements for the nodes. The administrator determines the physical location of the node within the designated network.

1. Key Exchange/Routing Table

After the network is designed and all of the routing tables have been constructed, the information for each node needs to be transferred to the node and BS. Each node and BS is physically connected to the MS for bootstrapping. The private key for the device and the constructed routing table is transferred to the node and BS. The routing table is transferred to the nodes by the MS to enable the nodes to connect to the network. The key exchange consists of a private key that is only shared between the MS and the node. The physical transfer of each unique key exists to prevent an enemy from gaining access to an entire network's information simply by obtaining the key from one node. By using a private key unique to each node, the enemy only has access to that node's information. This also allows the MS to remove the node from the network by adjusting routing tables of surrounding nodes without compromising the rest of the network. Using a key also allows the MS to perform other security procedures, including resetting the node completely before it is compromised, thus preventing the enemy from obtaining information stored on the node.

2. Physical Placement

While connected, the MS is able to maintain a geographical map of deployed nodes and map the deployment of any new node. This helps determine if the pending placement of the new node is able to connect to surrounding nodes. This is critical to the deployment of the WSN since it helps track enemy movements and position. Since the MS is also able to compile data from all deployed nodes, this allows the data to be utilized by more entities. For example, warning messages can be automatically disseminated to surrounding units if a certain threshold is met, alerting them of enemy activity within the area.

3.   Network Connection

Since the physical location of the node is known and the surrounding nodes within reach, the placement of the nodes within the network can be determined. The MS can then add the node to the desired network. If the node can be added to multiple networks, then the MS must determine which network is the most energy efficient network to add the node.

G.   PROPOSED ATTACKS

Three different types of attacks are conducted in the simulated environment: spoofing, MITM, and DOS. Each attack uses a different method of execution and exploits different vulnerabilities within a network, but as previously reviewed, the implemented cyber security mechanism can either prevent or lead to the detection of an attack, which triggers the deployment of mitigation methods that maintain the integrity of the network. The attacker in each of the following scenarios is assumed to be an experienced hacker. Under this assumption, the attacker knows what MAC and IP addresses to use within the injection frame as well as the key used for the cyclic redundancy check (CRC); however, it is assumed that knowledge of the pre-shared key between the node and the MS is not known.

1.   Spoofing

Spoofing is simulated by a rogue node pretending to be a legitimate node within the network. To conduct the attack, a device is required to be within range of the next-hop node. The frame is then transmitted to the next-hop node to increase the probability that it will traverse the network. Operating under the assumption that the attacker is experienced, the frame successfully reaches the MS. The MS then examines the frame and determines the frame is not authentic since the MIC does not match, therefore dropping the frame. The MS also records the node the frame was from for future comparison. After multiple frames have been received, the MS can analyze the results and determine if there is a rogue node within the network. The actions of the rogue node can be mitigated by removing the node that was initially spoofed, denying all traffic sent by either of the nodes.

2. MITM

A MITM attack is simulated by placing a node between two network nodes. When a network node transmits a frame, the attacking node intercepts and changes the data within the frame before transmitting the original frame to the next-hop node. The frame still transits the network and reaches the MS. The MS examines the frame and determines it is not authentic while recording the result within its logs. Since a MITM attack affects more than one node, it is assumed that the MS can rapidly determine that a rogue node has invaded the network. The neighboring nodes affected by the attacking node can then be removed from the network.

3. DOS

A DOS attack is the disruption of services to a specific node within the network. To simulate a DOS attack on a node, a continuously transmitting rogue node is placed near a network node. This keeps the affected node constantly receiving from the rogue node, which prevents the network node from transmitting any detected events or forwarding any frames from other nodes. Using the path indicator bits within the frame, the MS can determine where the disruption is occurring and modify the networks routing tables to mitigate the disabled node.

H. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Within this chapter technical, physical and administrative controls were discussed in order to provide a secure networking environment for a deployed tactical WSN. The physical infrastructure of the network design was discussed along with technical controls for each element within the design. To provide administrative controls over the deployed tactical WSN, a centralized routing mechanism is used in conjunction with a route indicator (path bits). A modified implicit detection mechanism is also implemented to provide assurance of transmitted frames between nodes. Next a keying mechanism was selected to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication to the information sent. In order to implement the proposed network design, centralized routing mechanism, and keying mechanism, the frame structure was modified and discussed. Finally, in order to

deploy a secure, tactical WSN, the preparation of the tactical WSN was discussed and critical steps were recommended.

IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

In this chapter, we discuss the experimental setup used to perform network simulations using MATLAB. These simulations test the efficacy of the cyber security mechanisms implemented in the theoretical framework. We start by describing the characteristics of the sensor nodes used in the simulations, the phases of operation of each sensor node and the frame parameters. We then describe the network parameters in relation to the simulation. Lastly, we discuss the simulation program including the different WSN modules that were developed, the required user files, and the simulation logs.

A. SENSOR PARAMETERS

The sensor-node attachment for the purpose of detecting events is not the focus of this thesis; however, some detection parameters are assumed in order to have a fully functioning network simulation. The sensors in all simulations are the Magnetic Intrusion Detector (MAGID) described within [3]. This sensor is designed to detect large vehicles such as tanks and small vehicles as well as individuals; although, detection ranges vary depending on the power level being used and the element size.

During the simulations, sensors are set on a low power setting and emplaced along a two-lane intersection. The deployment of the nodes with an attached MAGID are shown in Figure 10. The low power setting has a maximum range of 15.0 m for the detection of vehicles, whereas the maximum range for the detection of individuals is 4.0 m [3]. The ranges are illustrated by the ellipses in Figure 10 to exhibit the detection areas of the deployed sensors. The extra relay nodes near the BS are not shown in Figure 10 since the focus of the figure is to illustrate sensor coverage.

Figure 10.   MADIG Deployment Coverage of an Intersection (Extra Relay Nodes
Providing Coverage to the BS are Not Displayed)

As mentioned in Chapter III, the extra relay nodes are used to funnel the network
traffic to the BS and prevent hidden nodes. In addition, the extra relay nodes provide
coverage to the WSN's only single point of failure, the BS. A close up view of the BS,
demonstrating how the extra relay nodes function together as a sensing node and the
resulting coverage is shown in Figure 11.

Figure 11.   Close-up View of the MAGID Deployment Coverage of the Extra Relay
Nodes Used to Funnel Traffic to the BS and Avoid Hidden Nodes

B.   NODE CHARACTERISTICS

Each node transitions between multiple phases of operation/execution. The various phases of node operation along with the amount of power (in mW) that is used at each phase and the duration of each phase (in ms) are outlined in Table 1. These metrics identify the amount of time and energy used by the node to perform its functions in the simulations. The duration times shown in Table 1 were adopted from [20]; however, we rounded these times to the nearest millisecond because the simulation program we developed is based on one millisecond increments.

The Receive-Transmit (RX-TX) requires the node to switch from receiving to transmitting in order to transmit the frame and then switch back to receiving; thus, the execution of transmitting a frame requires two RX-TX phases, one to switch from

39

receiving to transmitting and two to switch from transmitting to receiving. The RX-TX phase within [20] has a period of 0.4 ms, which totals 0.8 ms during the transmission and receiving process of a frame. Since our simulation program's smallest increment in time is 1.0 ms, 0.8 ms is rounded to 1.0 ms and is used to represent the two RX-TX switching phases detailed in Table 1.

To complete a frame transmission, the node must execute the following phases, totaling a period of 7.0 ms: CSMA, RX-TX switch, transmit, and RX-TX switch.

Table 1.   Phases of Node Operation. Adapted from [20].

Phase	Power Draw	Duration
Wakeup	20 mW	1 ms
Pre-process	24 mW	4 ms
CSMA-CA	72 mW	2 ms
Transmit	90 mW	4 ms
Receive	72 mW	4 ms
RX-TX switch	54 mW	1 ms
Post-Process	24 mW	1 ms
Waiting	72 mW	Varies
Go to Sleep	20 mW	1 ms

Multiple logs record the status of the node throughout the lifespan of the network. One log only records each time a node transitions from one phase to another, while another log tracks the status in which the node is currently, and a third log is used to record the node's time in phase by the millisecond. The node's status logs are critical since they are used by multiple modules within the simulation program. The node's status logs include the expiration time for the phase in which the node is to prevent the node from performing/entering another phase. In most simulation programs, detailed status change logs and current node status logs are not available to the researcher, limiting a researcher's ability to troubleshoot any errors. As this network is meant to be deployed by the USMC, the ability to troubleshoot is imperative; thus, we provide the researcher with the pertinent logs. These logs are further discussed in Section G of this chapter.

Within [20], encryption was not addressed. We assumed encryption was not incorporated into the power and time metrics given in Table 1; therefore, we incorporated

the time and power draw for encryption into the simulation. In [21], metrics for various brands of sensor nodes performing multiple methods of encryption with varying key sizes are given. To give the best results, we chose to use the TelosB platform since it is more power efficient [21]. Within the TelosB platform, we used the power draw and times obtained from the implementation of AES 128 to match our WSN model. The power draw and time metrics with AES 128 incorporated are shown in Table 2.

Table 2.   Power Draw and Duration Time to Perform AES-128 Encryption. Adapted from [21].

Key size (bits)	Encryption	
	(ms)	(µW)
128	3.77	7.47

The nodes within the simulation are only awake for the time period in which there is activity. If a node does not have any activity for 25.0 ms, it transitions to the sleep phase. The duration of 25.0 ms was chosen to compensate for transmissions occurring when the node is processing a received frame from a node that is hidden from the transmitting node. The duration of 25.0 ms accounts for the time between the third and fourth transmissions, CSMA-CA, and both the RX-TX switch phases between actual transmissions of a frame, allowing the follow-on node to see the retransmission before entering its sleep phase.

There may be instances when the transmitting node cycles through both the primary and secondary routes without a confirmation of the next hop node transmitting the frame. In this situation, the transmitting node stores the packet and waits 1.0 s plus a seed number between 1 and 200. This provides enough time for the network to clear any data congestion, transmit all the frames to the BS, and allow all the nodes to enter their sleep phase.

C.   FRAME PARAMETERS

As with a node, the frame also transitions through multiple phases. The phases include creation (unprocessed), transmission, processing, and completion. A log is also

maintained, which tracks the status of the frame as it transitions between phases. Within the log, a phase expiration is attached to each node's entry and coincides with the duration metrics used for the nodes.

D. NETWORK PARAMETERS

As previously discussed, the network implements a modified CSMA-CA BEB protocol with an additional seed number added to the BEB for frames transiting from the neighboring nodes to the BS. The primary focus of this section is to discuss the modified CSMA-CA BEB and the parameters used. We also discuss the addition of the seed number for the nodes forwarding traffic to the BS via an extra relay node.

1. Modified CSMA-CA BEB

CSMA-CA BEB is a protocol that determines a set time period between transmissions of the same frame to avoid collisions with other transmissions from other nodes. Once the initial time period is determined, each retransmission doubles the previous time period between the transmitted frames [17]; however, this model is used within the IEEE 802.11 standard and assumes that each node is awake and receiving the frame [17]. Within the simulated network, when the nodes are no longer forwarding or sensing other events, they go to sleep to conserve energy. This sleep feature requires the transmitting node to send a frame to wake-up the next hop node. Even though it only takes 1.0 ms for a node to wake up, the transmitting node must take into account that the next-hop node might already be awake and receive the frame successfully; thus, the time the transmitting node must wait before beginning the second transmission process is 6.0 ms, which permits receipt of the next-hop node's transmission.

After the second transmission, the typical BEB takes place with the initial back-off period of 10.0 ms, then 20.0 ms after the third transmission and 40.0 ms after the fourth transmission. If forwarding of the frame has not been detected after completing the fourth transmission, the transmitting node switches the frames next-hop destination to the secondary route. The transmitting node then performs the same sequence again while simultaneously adjusting the designated path bits within the header.

42

2. Seed Number

The CSMA-CA BEB protocol also provides a method to alleviate network congestion in the node by retransmitting at different set time intervals [17]. To prevent the occurrence of two nodes transmitting at the same time near the BS, a seed number between 1.0 and 4.0 ms is added to the back-off time. The seed number creates disparity between the back-off times between transmitting nodes. With the application of the seed number, neighboring nodes that initially transmit at the same time has a smaller probability of retransmitting at the same time since each node applies a random seed number to the BEB. This helps mitigate congestion caused by collisions as the network begins to taper to the BS.

E. SIMULATION PROGRAM

To replicate the network, the simulation must be able to mimic multiple frames transiting the network at one time. Multiple parts of the network must also be able to function simultaneously. Given these factors into consideration, the driving mechanism of the program is time based. For every iteration, each function is cycled through the network while logs track each node's status, time in phase, frame status, and the creation of new events within the network. In the following subsections, the different modules that were programmed in MATLAB to deal with the various network functions performed within the simulated environment are discussed.

1. Main

The cornerstone of the simulation program is the module, Main. In Main, the network is created when multiple modules assign user supplied files to simulate an already deployed network. The files contain the routing table, node addresses, events to simulate, and empty logs for the simulation. Logs created within the simulation include a PCAP log, a transiting packets log, and each node's time in phase log. Within the Main module, the researcher may select which event table to use during the simulation. The event table provides sensor detections which simulates a series of real-life events that trigger a node to create a frame which is subsequently transmitted to the MS. Main is also where the researcher can select the type of attack and determine which node the attack

targets within the network. This information is then used by the other modules within the simulation program.

2. Run Simulation

Within Run Simulation, the timer begins at 0.0 ms and increases by 1.0 ms after cycling through all functions. The timer appends a 10.0 s cushion after the last event to ensure the network is clear and all retransmissions have been completed. Without an added cushion, the nodes within the network are not able to complete all phases; the time cushion ensures the network is free from active packets. Once the simulation time is computed, the simulation begins cycling through the major functions 1.0 ms at a time. These functions mimic multiple aspects of the network, which including detecting collisions, ensuring the nodes and frames transition to the next phase, the creation of new packets due to a triggered event, and the tracking of the nodes phase status to calculate its total power draw.

3. Check For Errors

The Check For Errors module is one of the sub modules within the Run Simulation module. It cycles through all open frames within the network. The module specifically looks for nodes that are transmitting and compares them to a precompiled list of nodes that affect the receiving node. If a neighboring node of the receiving node is also transmitting, a collision occurs and data is not correctly received. The affected frames are then marked with an error and are not successful during the processing of the frame, resulting in retransmission from the transmitting node.

4. Check Node Status

The next sub module within the Run Simulation module is the Check Node Status module. This module performs the necessary transitions to ensure each node transitions to its next phase at the appropriate time as the nodes within the network cycle through different phases. The Check Node Status module checks the node's current status and compares the phase expiration time within the log and the current time. If the phase expiration time is reached, the node's status is changed by removing the node from its

current phase and placing it in a waiting phase; this allows the node to transition into another phase in the following modules. Multiple logs are maintained to record each phase transition of the nodes; however, the transition is not yet recorded in the time in phase log since the node may transition into another phase in later modules.

5. Check For Open Packets

The Check For Open Packets is also a sub module contained within the Run Simulation module. It cycles through all of the active or open frames within the network, checking the phase expiration times attached to each frame. When the phase expiration time of the frame is over, the next phase to be executed for the frame is initiated. This module is used to perform the processing of a new or received frame and transmit the packet. Before executing the next phase, the node status is also checked to ensure the node is available to perform the next phase of the frame. The following are sub modules contained within the Check For Open Packets module.

a. *Transmission*

The main function of the Transmission module is to simulate the frame's transmission within the network. The module checks the neighboring nodes to determine if one is transmitting by listening to see if the channel is clear, a key piece of the CSMA-CA protocol implemented within the simulation. After determining the neighboring nodes are not transmitting, the node then transitions into a transmitting state. At this point, the transmitting node transitions and the module cycles through all of the neighboring nodes while performing the necessary node transitions.

b. *Processed Received Packet*

The Processed Received Packet module contains a simulation of bit errors in which one bit error is inserted for every 100,000 bits. The bit errors are executed by a function that randomly inserts the bit error, so this has the potential to occur anywhere within the frame. The frame is then checked for the correct addresses, and the frame's CRC is calculated and compared to the transmitted CRC to determine if any errors were observed. The CRC code was obtained from [22] and modified to fit the CRC length

required by the network. If the frame passes all of the checks, the frame's header is appended with the addresses required for the next transmission.

6. New Events

The New Events module (also a sub module of the Run Simulation module) checks the event table for the established time threshold at which event detection occurs. Once the time threshold is reached, a data frame is created. To prevent skipping over the triggered detection, the simulation references the frame's status log, which ensures that the frame cycles through each phase along with the affected node. The encryption of the frame and the appending of the MIC are also performed within this module. The code for the encryption was obtained from [23] and modified to perform both the encryption as well as MIC within the simulation. Finally, the module checks the status of the triggered node to determine if and when the transition must take place. The New Events module must be the last transitioning stage due to the fact that the node continues until it has completed the current process before entering the waiting phase.

7. Check For Energy Use

At the end of every cycle within the Run Simulation module, each node's current status is tallied and entered into the node time in phase log. This log is then utilized to determine the power draw for each node during the simulation timeframe.

8. Attack Modules

There are three different types of attacks conducted within the simulation program, and each has its own module. Subsections of code have been added within the other modules to facilitate simulation of the following attacks.

a. Spoofing

In the spoofing attack, the node selected by the researcher is imitated, and spoofed frames are injected into the network at the next-hop node. The intent of the spoofed node within this thesis is to inject frames with incorrect information while blending in with network traffic. To blend in with the network traffic, the frame injection occurs when the

46

receiving node is still awake, which can be done by the rogue node observing the receiving node's transmission behavior. By only injecting when the node is awake, we can infer that an event detection has occurred within the WSN. Since the injected frame transits at nearly the same time as the traffic generated from valid transmissions, the injected frame does not stand out. Considering the frames are injected when the receiving node is awake, the number of injected frames is dependent on the receiving node's activity and varies between each simulation trial.

To simulate the rogue node's monitoring of the receiving node, the rogue node checks the receiving node's status every 100.0 ms. If the receiving node's status is in the waiting phase and none of the neighboring nodes are transmitting, the rogue node injects a frame. After injecting the frame, the rogue node does not perform another injection until 1.0 s later.

b. DOS

In the DOS attack simulation, the researcher selects a node to be affected. To simulate the attack, a rogue node that is constantly transmitting frames is placed near the desired node and noted by the researcher within the transmission file. The rogue node's continuous transmission forces the receiving node's status to stay in the receiving phase. While in the receiving phase, the affected node does not perform any other functions within the network, rendering the node incapacitated.

c. MITM

The MITM attack requires the researcher to select two neighboring nodes since the attack occurs during the frame transmission. Once the nodes are selected by the researcher, a frame sent by an affected node is changed prior to the processing of the receiving node. The change of the frame between the transmission and processing phases simulates a rogue node between the two nodes performing a MITM attack. Unlike the Spoofing module, the MITM attack is performed on each transmitted between the two affected nodes.

9.   Display

The Display module displays the results and a log analysis after the conclusion of the simulation. The analysis is similar to what the MS performs in an actual deployed network. The analysis includes determining whether secondary routes were used for each node and the number of frames sent by each node that was not authenticated. Part of the analysis performed within the simulation but not able to be performed by the MS includes the percentage of successful frames that transited the network, the amount of time each node spent within a phase, and the power draw of each node in the simulation.

F.   SIMULATION USER FILES

The module Main requires user provided files to build the network prior to executing the simulation. These files setup the devices by defining their capabilities as well as the network's capabilities. Within the files, the nodes and frames also receive a reference number to simplify the process. The reference number prevents the need for a researcher to reference each node by its address and each frame by its IP address and sequence number. Within this simulation program, the reference number for each node ranges from 1 to 27 and each frame obtains its reference number in sequential order from one in whole increments until there are no more frames carrying event information.

1.   Nodes (Create Nodes)

Within this simulation 27 nodes are created with node 27 acting as the BS. Each node is assigned an IP and MAC address as well as a randomly generated key that is shared with the MS.

2.   Routing Table (Create Routing Table to Master)

The routing table used contains both the primary and secondary paths for all of the nodes.

3. Affected Nodes (Create Energy Table)

To determine which neighboring nodes are affected during the transmission of a frame, the researcher provides a file containing a list of all of the nodes and which nodes it affects when transmitting.

4. Events (Create Event Table)

The event table is used to trigger the detections within the program. Each event entry denotes a time the event is triggered and the node that detected the event. The actual event is not necessary and is not recorded since it is not the focus of this thesis. Within this thesis four event tables were used. Each table focuses on a speed a vehicle would likely travel. The speeds for each of the four tables are 25, 35, 45, and 65 miles per hour (mph). Each table also contains event triggers of an individual walking alongside a street to increase the number of detections, which in turn creates more traffic within the tactical WSN. When vehicles are transiting the intersection, a spacing of 2.0 to 3.0 s is used to simulate a typical roadway environment. The parameters within each scenario are shown in Table 3.

Table 3.   Parameters Used for each of the Four Scenarios that Are Simulated

Scenario	Vehicular Speed (mph)	Time of Last Detection (ms)	Number of Detections	Average (Detections per Second)	Detections per Node
1	25	159,763	1080	6.76	45
2	35	117,763	1104	9.37	46
3	45	96,763	984	10.17	41
4	65	76,763	984	12.82	41

G. SIMULATION LOGS

Mentioned throughout this chapter is the use of logs within the simulation. This is beneficial to the researcher as it provides a way to examine how the frame transits the network and aides in network troubleshooting. Similar logs are used within other well-known simulation programs such as NS3 but do not provide the in-depth network logging that this simulation program provides.

1.   PCAP

The PCAP log records every transmission that is made by a node within the network. The entry contains the frame number, time at which the transmission occurred, the source node number, the destination node number, and the entire binary form of the frame.

2.   Open Packets

The open packets log contains every individual frame created during the simulation. Each line within the log is assigned to a frame, and the recorded data represents the functions through which the frame transits. Each line in the log contains the frame number, phase expiration time, the status of the frame, the number of transmission attempts made by the current node, the source node number, destination node number, and any incurred errors.

3.   Node Status

The node status log records the current status of each node. Each node is assigned a line within the log. Contained within the log are the node number, phase expiration time, the phase the node is in, and the sequence number of the last frame that originated from the node.

4.   Node Status Table

The node status table records every transition made by a node. In this log, the node is not assigned a line, but a new entry is made when a node transitions between phases. Within each entry is the node number, the time the transition occurred, the phase the node was in, and the phase to which the node transitioned.

5.   Time in Phase

Within this log, each node is assigned a line, and the time spent within each phase is recorded. This log is updated within the Check For Energy Use module, where the phase of the node is checked and the value within the respective phase for the node is incremented by one. Ultimately, the log provides the researcher with the amount of time

the node spent within each phase, which is then used to determine the power draw of the node.

H. CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, the sensors used within the simulation along with their deployment methodology were examined. In addition, the node parameters used to determine power draw upon the completion of the simulation were examined in-depth. The incorporation of the phases into the frame and network parameters was then discussed. The modules within the simulation program were determined by detailing the critical modules within the program, including the test modules. The different files programmed in MATLAB to build the network were explained in depth. A detailed discussion of the series of logs that are maintained throughout the simulation was also provided.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V.   SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

An assessment of the proposed 6LoWPAN WSN is needed in order to validate the effectiveness of the implemented cyber security mechanisms. While the focus is on the cyber security mechanisms within a 6LoWPAN enabled WSN, it must be anticipated that these WSNs can be deployed to different types of environments. The different types of environments create varying levels of network traffic. We simulate these different environments using four scenarios that mimic the varying levels of traffic density. The scenarios developed within this thesis mimic vehicles transiting an intersection at different speeds. These scenarios then allow the researcher to determine the effects of the implementation of the proposed cyber security mechanisms within a variety of simulated network environments with each simulation listed as a trial.

The network topology used in the simulation is shown in Figure 12. A reference number is given to each node in the figure. The reference number provides a simple method for the researcher to reference a node within the program and within the user created files. There are four scenarios simulated, each representing a specific speed of vehicles traversing an intersection. The first scenario represents vehicles traveling at 25 miles per hour (mph), the second at 35 mph, the third at 45 mph, and the last scenario represents vehicles traveling at 65 mph. Each of the four scenarios are initially simulated with no attacks occurring. These trials act as the normal conditions of the tactical WSN, creating a baseline to compare the results from simulations that incorporate attacks performed on the WSN.

The nodes selected for each attack remain the same for all scenarios to allow for comparisons between the different network environments. The total number of trials conducted for each scenario is as follows: five trials with no attack, five trials with a spoofing attack on node 24, five trials with a spoofing attack on node 16, a DOS attack on node 5, a DOS attack on node 25, and an MITM attack between nodes 7 and 2. In total, each scenario has six different network implementations with five trials per implementation, resulting in a total of 30 trials for each scenario. This results in a total of

120 trials for the program. Due to space, we show and discuss only a subset of the results obtained.

In the following subsections, each attack is discussed and analyzed. An analysis of each of the attacks is displayed from the view of the MS with the implemented cyber security mechanisms in place; these mechanisms lead to either the detection or mitigation of the attack. The power draw for each node, which is not analyzed by the MS, is also discussed. Within the analysis slight variations within the results may be observed due to the implementation of frame errors. The frame errors are caused by frames being dropped or not properly received and can occur undetected on the last hop to the BS.

Figure 12.   Assignment of Reference Numbers to the Node of the Tactical WSN

A. RESULTS

1. Spoofing

The purpose of the spoofing attack is to test the efficacy of the MIC security mechanism added to the IEEE 802.15.4 6LoWPAN enabled frame. The two nodes imitated in the spoofing attack are nodes 16 and 24. Node 16 was chosen since the surrounding nodes have a higher traffic density than a node on the edge of the network. Node 24 was selected since it is on the edge of the network with limited network traffic flow and is one of the least protected nodes in the WSN. In order to detect a spoofed node within the WSN, the MIC security mechanism is used to authenticate the frames received by the MS.

The number of spoofed frames detected by the MS and sent by the rogue node imitating node 16 is shown for Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figures 13 and 14, respectively. As expected, the number of detected, spoofed frames varies between trials due to the activity of the receiving node. The number of detected, spoofed frames also varies between scenarios. This was determined through further analysis of the logs maintained during each trial. It is observed that fewer frames were injected as the speed of the vehicles being simulated increased.

We calculate and analyze the rate of the frames injected. The average number of frames injected for the five trials performed for Scenario 2 was 43 (Figure 13), while 38 frames were injected in Scenario 3 (Figure 14). The rate for frame injection per second was computed using

$$R_{FI} = FI_{Avg} / (T_{Last\_Frame} - T_{First\_Frame}) \qquad (1)$$

where R_{FI} is the rate at which a frame is injected, FI_{Avg} denotes the average number of frame injections within the scenario, and T is the time of the first and last frames within the scenario. The R_{FI} for Scenario 2 was 0.365 frames per second, resulting in an average of an injected frame every 2.74 s. The R_{FI} for Scenario 3 was 0.495 frames per second, resulting in an average of an injected frame every 2.02 s. Even though the number of injections is less as the speed increased from one scenario to the next, the rate of injections increased, which demonstrates that frames are injected at the faster speeds if

the scenarios are executed for the same amount of time. The increased rate of frame injections was expected due to the increased activity level for each node.

Since the simulation program performing the analysis of the MS can only tell if the frames being processed are spoofed, the logs were examined to determine if a spoofed frame was not detected and processed. After reviewing the logs and determining which frames were spoofed, 100% of the spoofed frames received by the BS within the program were detected and denoted as non-authenticated by the MS. Within the logs, it was also noted that not all spoofed frames were received, as a small percentage were either lost or received in error by the BS.

Figure 13.   Number of Non-Authenticated Frames Received by the MS in each of the Five Trials for Scenario 2 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 16

Figure 14.   Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received by the MS in each of the
Five Trials for Scenario 3 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 16

The number of frames detected by the MS that were sent by the rogue node imitating node 24 are shown for Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figures 15 and 16, respectively. Nodes 16 and 24 share similar characteristics in the slight variation of injected frames between trials for a given scenario as well as between the scenarios; however, since node 24 is on the edge of the network and has a low density of network traffic, the node is asleep more than node 16. This explains the difference in the average number of frame injections. The average number of frames injected for the five trials performed on Scenario 2 was 26 (Figure 15) while Scenario 3's average was 23 (Figure 16). The calculated rates were also similar to those for node 16; for node 24 for Scenario 2, R_{FI} was 0.221 frames per second, resulting in an injected frame every 4.52 s. The R_{FI} for Scenario 3 was 0.238 frames per second, resulting in an injected frame every 4.20 s.

Figure 15.   Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received By the MS in each of the
              Five Trials for Scenario 2 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 24

Figure 16.   Number of Non-authenticated Frames received by the MS in each of the
              Five Trails for Scenario 3 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 16

The average power draw for each network environment is displayed in Table 4. The spoofed node is highlighted yellow, the green shaded results signify the primary route used by the spoofed node to send a frame to the MS, and the red shaded results

58

signify neighboring nodes along the primary route. As expected, the nodes that are on the primary route (green shaded) to the MS exhibited a minor increase in power draw as well as the neighboring nodes (red shaded). The increase in power draw is expected because the neighboring nodes are affected by the spoofed frames. This increases the number of frames being transmitted by the primary route nodes, causing the neighboring nodes to receive and process the increased number of transmitted frames. The small power draw increase is noticeable but would only cause a minimal impact on the affected node's lifespan if the spoofing attack is mitigated.

Table 4.   Power Draw in mW for the Spoofing Attacks on Nodes 16 and 24

Nodes	Scenario 2			Scenario 3		
	No Attacks	Spoof-16	Spoof-24	No Attacks	Spoof-16	Spoof-24
1	17.68	18.58	17.66	18.21	18.92	18.13
2	24.58	25.44	24.83	25.51	26.40	25.80
3	24.94	25.38	25.35	24.69	25.32	25.34
4	18.08	18.08	18.54	17.37	17.37	17.83
5	6.38	6.42	6.37	7.07	6.81	6.92
6	14.87	15.54	14.79	15.34	16.06	15.14
7	17.47	18.53	17.42	19.11	20.39	19.01
8	17.20	17.12	17.62	16.53	16.49	17.18
9	14.68	14.62	15.01	14.08	13.99	14.56
10	6.76	6.77	6.75	7.38	7.32	7.32
11	4.30	4.41	4.29	5.02	5.11	4.93
12	15.11	16.25	15.06	16.10	17.37	15.96
13	14.52	14.43	15.03	15.34	15.29	16.02
14	4.47	4.43	4.47	5.91	5.85	5.92
15	11.42	12.26	11.41	11.86	12.69	11.89
16	9.87	10.68	9.87	11.40	12.28	11.59
17	9.64	9.63	10.13	11.57	11.59	12.07
18	11.19	11.14	11.88	12.27	12.20	12.95
19	6.70	6.78	6.68	8.56	8.60	8.57
20	7.57	7.66	7.54	8.67	8.79	8.71
21	7.28	7.24	7.92	9.04	9.01	9.61
22	6.73	6.70	7.59	8.37	8.31	9.13
23	4.43	4.48	4.43	5.28	5.29	5.28
24	4.44	4.42	5.00	5.50	5.43	6.08
25	24.18	25.03	24.49	24.79	25.67	25.03
26	24.65	25.19	25.18	24.99	25.53	25.56

The ability of the MS to perform an analysis on received frames to determine if there is a possible spoofing attack within the WSN, as well as to determine which node to remove from the WSN to prevent further attacks, is illustrated in Figures 13 through 16. The analysis focused on the use of the implementation of the MIC security mechanism to authenticate valid frames sent by the nodes. Variations were also visible within the results between the trials and scenarios being run, but they were expected and were accounted for in the network logs. The assumption that the frame would continue to transit the network to the MS before being detected as well as the small increase in power draw along the spoofed frames' primary route to the MS were also confirmed by the results in Table 4. Overall, the MIC security mechanism is able to provide data integrity by allowing the MS to authenticate each received frame. In addition, while the increase in the number of frames transmitted has an impact on the power draw, it is minimal, keeping the WSN functional.

2.   DOS

The DOS attack was used to determine if the centralized routing scheme and the use of the path indication bits could detect an attack or incapacitated node. The two nodes for the DOS attack are nodes 5 and 25 due to their differing characteristics within the WSN. Node 5 is on the edge of the network with limited network traffic flow and is also able to be physically accessed undetected by an individual due to the MAGID coverage. The implementation of the DOS attack on node 5 is displayed in Figure 17. Node 25 is one of the extra relay nodes deployed near the BS and handles half of the traffic within the network. An attack on Node 25 demonstrates the ability of the WSN to remain reliable if an extra relay node is incapacitated. Specifically, a DOS attack on node 25 validates the network's ability to utilize the secondary route of the centralized routing mechanism. In addition, it also validates the WSN's capability to accommodate an increased traffic load. Scenario 1 and Scenario 4 are used to compare the DOS results.

Figure 17.   Deployment of a Rogue Node Performing a DOS Attack on Node 5

a.   Original Hop

Our analysis of the DOS attack examines the centralized routing mechanism executed by the MS. Specifically, we first look at the number of frames the originating node failed to successfully send along the primary route. These results are shown in Figure 18 for Scenario 1 and Figure 19 for Scenario 4. Nodes 1, 2 and 11 are observed to have a significant increase in number of frames transiting to the next-hop node from the originating node. The increase for nodes 1 and 2 occurred during the trials in which there was a DOS attack on node 25, and the increase for node 11 occurred during the trials in which there was a DOS attack on node 5. This is expected since the primary route for node 11 is through node 5, and the primary route for nodes 1 and 2 is through node 25.

A closer examination of Figure 18 indicates that a limited number of frames from nodes 7, 8, 16, and 17 also took secondary next-hop routes. These anomalies can be

attributed to a small amount of congestion within the network as it occurs even when no attacks are executed as denoted by the results in red in Figure 18. Also shown in Figure 19 are the same anomalies that occurred in Figure 18. As shown in Figure 19, a moderate number of frames from nodes 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 also took secondary next-hop routes. This is attributed to the increased congestion from not only the DOS attack on node 25 but also the increased density of the traffic due to the faster detection rate. The network was not able to clear the congestion quickly enough, and the congestion began to spread to nodes two to three hops from the attacked node. Even though there was a greater amount of congestion in the network, it remained secure and continued to reliably deliver frames from affected nodes with near real-time precision.

Figure 18.   Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Original Hop)
in Scenario 1 (Vehicular Traffic at 25 mph) for No Attacks and
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25

Figure 19.   Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Original Hop)
in Scenario 4 (Vehicular Traffic at 65 mph) for No Attacks and
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25

The analysis presented in Figures 18 and 19 is based on the implementation of the centralized routing mechanism with the utilization of the path indication bits. The path indication bits alert the MS that the frame was not able to successfully transit the WSN along the primary route from the originating node. The use of the secondary route is an indication of possible congestion or a node malfunctioning, causing the WSN to operate in a non-optimal manner. Furthermore, this increases the power draw of multiple nodes and possibly causes more network congestion. Using the information gained from the path indication bits, we see that the MS adjusts the centralized routing mechanism for optimization.

b.   Follow-on Hop

The DOS attack is further examined through the analysis of the number of frames that were unsuccessfully transmitted along the primary route by the follow-on nodes. These results are shown in Figure 20 for Scenario 1 and Figure 21 for Scenario 4. As shown in Figure 20, a DOS attack on node 5 does not produce any significant changes in terms of the number of unsuccessful transmitted frames. This is expected since node 5 is

only a primary route for node 11 and is not a primary route for any other nodes within the network; however, the analysis of the DOS attack on node 25 shows a significant increase in nodes that sent frames that utilized a secondary route at a follow-on node. The significant increase in the utilization of secondary routes at follow-on nodes is expected since node 25 is the primary route for half of the WSN to the BS. Minor escalations at nodes 13, 17, 18, 21, 22, and 24 can be explained by congestion experienced from the surge of network traffic utilizing the secondary routes. This is more evident in Figure 21 due to the increased density of network traffic in Scenario 4.

Figure 20.   Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Follow-on Hops)
in Scenario 1 (Vehicular Traffic at 25 mph) for No Attacks and
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25

The analysis presented in Figures 20 and 21, like Figures 18 and 19 but for follow-on hops, are possible due to the implementation of the centralized routing mechanism with the utilization of the path indication bits. The secondary route information data provides an additional awareness of the WSN's status, which the MS uses in order to determine if and/or how much congestion is within the WSN. The

combination of the follow-on hop data as well as the original hop data provides a near real-time status of the WSN to the MS.

Figure 21.   Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Follow-on Hops)
in Scenario 4 (Vehicular Traffic at 65 mph) for No Attacks and
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25

c.   *Power Draw*

The average power draw for each node during the simulations of Scenarios 1 and 4, in conjunction with either a DOS attack on node 5 or a DOS attack on node 25 as well as no attacks, are shown in Figure 22 and 23. As shown in Figure 22, there are minimal changes in the power draw between no attack and the DOS attack on node 5 trials except for node 5. The increase in power draw for node 5 is expected because node 5 is constantly receiving a signal from the rogue node performing the DOS attack. It is also observed in Figure 22 that the DOS attack on node 25 affects all of the nodes up to two hops from the BS as well as nodes 7 and 8, which are three hops from the BS. This is attributed to the increase in network traffic causing congestion, which in turn increases the power draw of the affected nodes. Similar characteristics are also seen in Figure 23, with the same nodes having an increase in their power draw for both attack simulations.

The results shown in Figures 22 and 23 have a strong correlation to the results shown in Figures 18 and 19. The nodes from Figures 18 and 19, which utilized secondary routes to transmit the frame from the original hop, correspond to the same nodes with an increase in power draw in Figures 22 and 23. The increase in the power draw for the surrounding nodes is expected since it requires the originating node to first transmit to the primary route four times prior to transmitting to the secondary route. After further examination of the results in Figures 22 and 23, we find that the nodes in Figure 23 had a much larger power draw than those in Figure 22. As mentioned before, Scenario 4, shown in Figure 23, simulates an environment in which detections occur at a rate approximately two times greater than Scenario 1, shown in Figure 22. These results are expected since the nodes have less time to sleep and spend more time awake, which increases the power draw for the nodes.

Figure 22.   Average Power Draw per Node in Scenario 1 (Vehicular Traffic
                at 25 mph) for No Attacks and DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25

Figure 23.   Average Power Draw per Node in Scenario 4 (Vehicular Traffic
at 65 mph) for No Attacks and DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25

3.   MITM

Similar to the spoofing attack, the analysis performed on the MITM attack is focused on the implementation of the MIC security mechanism but also the centralized routing mechanism using the path indication bits. The wireless connection between nodes 7 and 2 was selected as the point of attack since it has a high density of traffic affecting a large portion of the network but not the entire network. The power draw of the nodes was not impacted as much as the Spoofing and DOS attacks. Shown in Figure 24 is the analysis of the power draw for no attacks and an MITM attack between nodes 7 and 2. The differences between the MITM simulations and no attack simulations are negligible since the power draw for each node is the same.

Figure 24.   Average Power Draw per Node in mW when no Attack Occurs and
during the MITM Attack Simulations between Nodes 7 and 2

The average number of non-authenticated frames over the five conducted trials for Scenario 1 is shown in Figure 25. Nodes 7, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20 and 23 have primary routes through node 7 to node 2, and these nodes had the most non-authenticated frames. The number of detections per node is 45 with a frame generated for each detection. A slight variation between the frames sent by nodes and the frames received by the MS is shown in Figure 25. The variation is accounted for by either a node along a frame's path utilizing a secondary route, resulting in the frame not transitioning through the affected nodes, or the frame being lost or dropped at the BS. The non-authenticated frames from nodes 17 and 18 are due to congestion within the network and the utilization of the secondary route, which ultimately went through the affected nodes 7 and 2.

Figure 25.   Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received by the MS from the
Originating Node During a MITM Attack between Nodes 7 and 2

The results displayed in Table 5 are the averages of the five trials modeling the MITM attack in Scenario 3. The table has three main parameters that were quantified over each of the five trials for all 26 nodes. These parameters are 1) the number of frames that were not authenticated by the MS, 2) the number of frames that took the secondary route at the originating node, and 3) the number of frames that took a secondary route along the follow-on hops. Within Scenario 3, each node has 41 instances in which the node has a detection and transmits a frame alerting the MS to the detection.

Node 7 is significant since the number of non-authenticated frames is drastically different from the 41 frames expected to be received by the MS and not authenticated. By comparing the results of the non-authenticated frames of each node and the paths taken by the frames from the originating node, we can explain the anomaly. Node 7 had an average of 26.6 frames not authenticated by the MS. This is well below the anticipated 41 frames; however, since an average of 14.4 frames transited along node 7's secondary route, the frames were not affected by the rogue node performing the MITM attack. For instance, by adding the 27 frames that were not authenticated during trial 1 (shown in Table 3) and the 14 frames utilizing the secondary route from the originating node for

trial 1 (shown in Table 3), the number of frames sent by node 7 equals 41; however, this is not the case for all of the nodes.

Table 5.   Average Results of the Five Trials of MITM Attacks
Conducted on Scenario 3

MITM 7-2	Non-Authenticated Frames						Original Hops						Follow-On Hops					
	1	2	3	4	5	AVG	1	2	3	4	5	AVG	1	2	3	4	5	AVG
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	27	25	28	28	25	26.6	14	16	13	13	16	14.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.2
12	40	41	41	41	40	40.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	39	41	40	41	41	40.4	0	0	1	1	0	0.4	0	0	0	0	0	0
16	41	41	40	41	41	40.8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	16	16	15	16	16	15.8	16	16	15	16	16	15.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	41	41	41	41	41	41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	41	41	41	38	40	40.2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	16	15	16	15	15.6
22	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0.8	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	40	40	41	41	41	40.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	1	1	1.4
24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Node 17 shares the opposite characteristics as the node's primary path to the MS does not transit through the affected nodes, but the node's secondary path does. Node 17 has a secondary route from the originating node to node 16, which then goes through nodes 7 and 2. Comparing each trial within the non-authenticated frames to the secondary routes taken at node 17, we see that the results are equal.

Just like spoofing, the MS is able to perform an analysis on received frames to determine if there is a possible attack within the WSN. These results are shown in Figure 24. Unlike in a spoofing attack, where only the follow-on nodes from the spoofing attack

are affected, the nodes prior to the MITM attack are the ones affected (as shown in Table 3). With the use of the MIC security mechanism to authenticate valid frames sent by the nodes as well as the routing information within the centralized routing mechanism, the MS is able to determine where the attack is occurring and which nodes to remove from the WSN. Overall, the MIC security mechanism is able to provide data integrity in that it allows the MS to authenticate each received frame. The centralized routing mechanism used in conjunction with the utilization of designated path bits helps determine which nodes to remove in order to provide network reliability.

B.   CHAPTER SUMMARY

We began this chapter by describing the simplified method of referencing each node by a number in order to comprehend the results given within each subsection for the different types of attacks considered. The first attack examined was the spoofing attack that was meant to test the MIC security mechanism implementation. The second was the DOS attack that tested the detection of the attack by the centralized routing mechanism implementation. The final attack, the MITM attack, tested both the centralized routing mechanism as well as the MIC security mechanism implementations.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this thesis, we studied the implementation of the 6LoWPAN protocol for tactical WSNs and examined the need for 6LoWPAN in tactical WSNs used by the USMC in operational scenarios. Through the use of 6LoWPAN, our aim was to reduce the manpower required to maintain the tactical WSN by allowing the WSN to be managed from a remote, secure location. Ultimately, 6LoWPAN provides automation to the data flow by eliminating the need of an individual to physically retrieve data from the COC. The 6LoWPAN protocol, with the addition of necessary cyber security mechanisms, can be implemented and used by the USMC to boost the abilities of its current WSNs.

In this thesis, we developed and discussed a comprehensive tactical WSN framework using 6LoWPAN that includes a hierarchical network design using defined network devices. The use of a structured/centralized network design allows for secure network reachability and accessibility. We implemented multiple cyber security mechanisms within the 6LoWPAN protocol. These security features included a centralized routing scheme, encryption, authentication and integrity. These features were applied/implemented into the 6LoWPAN frame structure. The combination of these various cyber security mechanisms and frame structure modifications create an effective and efficient tactical WSN that can be utilized by the USMC.

We evaluated our framework using MATLAB and tested it against three well-known attacks. Results obtained from the simulations focused on the effectiveness of the cyber security implementations and the power draw of each node. The results for the effectiveness of the cyber security implementations were derived from the metrics provided by the MS within the simulation. Specifically, the cyber security mechanisms that can be analyzed by the MS are the implementation of the MIC and centralized routing scheme with the use of indication bits.

73

The use of the MIC provided integrity to the WSN by preventing the authentication of 100% of the frames received by the MS in either the spoofing or MITM attacks. The use of the centralized routing scheme ensured the WSN remained functional and reliable even when one of the two nodes connecting the BS to the rest of the WSN was disabled during the DOS attack. The implementation of indication bits within the modified 6LoWPAN frame structure enabled the MS to determine that there was congestion within the network resulting from either traffic density or an incapacitated node.

The power draw for each node, which is not analyzed by the MS, was also examined. The effects of the spoofing attack demonstrated that while the injected frame within the network was not authenticated by the MS, the surrounding nodes along the frame's path to the MS were affected with an increased power draw, shortening the node's lifespan. The DOS attack had a much larger impact, especially on the node being attacked as well as on nodes up to two hops away, resulting in an increase in power draw either from the congestion or the utilization of the secondary route of the centralized routing scheme. As expected, the MITM attacks had little effect on a node's power draw.

Within this thesis we provided an effective and efficient tactical WSN using 6LoWPAN that can remain reliable and secure while deployed within harsh environments. We conclude that the developed cyber security mechanisms and network structure provide a foundation on which future tactical WSNs used within the USMC can be based.

B.   CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS

The objective of this thesis was to implement a secure tactical WSN that can be deployed in a variety of environmental conditions supporting the USMC mission. The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:

- Development of a command and control (administrative control) structure of the tactical WSN that incorporates node control, a unique defined/centralized routing model, and a selected keying mechanism for data confidentiality, authentication and integrity.

- Construction of a modified 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure to incorporate the unique centralized routing model and selected keying mechanism.

- Enhancement of methods to aid in the deployment planning of the secured tactical WSN to prevent critical vulnerabilities.

- Simulation and evaluation of the proposed network framework against multiple attacks and testing for security robustness and energy conservation.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of a secure 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 WSN for the USMC tactical space that has been evaluated against well-known attacks.

C.   FUTURE WORK

The combination of energy conservation for energy constrained devices and the implementations of enhanced cyber security mechanisms are critical for military WSN applications. The initial groundwork to achieve the security needs for the USMC tactical WSN were provided within this thesis. Future work is suggested as follows.

1.   Application of Sink Node Anonymity

The theoretical framework developed in this thesis introduces a single point of failure among the deployable devices within the WSN. This single point of failure is the BS, which is a critical asset in the network. Previous research was completed on the privacy of the BS in [9]; however, cybersecurity methods were not addressed. Providing privacy to the BS with the use of the methods given in [9] and integrating it with the security framework developed in this thesis will provide another layer of defense for the critical asset and make it harder for the enemy to identify the BS and disrupt or disable the WSN.

2.   Implementation of the BS

The BS is a critical element within the WSN and performs the transition between the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4WSN and the selected public domain. The development and implementation of a BS that is able to perform the transitions from the

WSN to multiple types of networks within one device is vital. The BS needs to be able to connect to multiple types of public infrastructures including cellular, Wi-Fi, and Ethernet as well as other possible external military IP communication forms currently in use. The development of one device with all of the capabilities also allows for the universal deployment of the WSN, not just within a restricted location in which the designated infrastructure is present.

3. Implementation of Cyber Security on a Mobile WSN

The routing mechanisms used within this thesis is static due to the nature of the devices being used; however, the use of WSNs within a mobile environment is also of value to military applications. The WSNs can be attached to individuals, providing valuable information in regard to the individual's location or biometric readings enhancing situational awareness of the deployed force. Neighbor discovery methods and authentication were not examined within this thesis but would be required for the implementation of a mobile WSN since nodes could connect within the WSN at any point. The determination of how the nodes could reliably discover each other as well as the development of a keying mechanism to provide authentication are required. The routing mechanism also needs to be adjusted continuously among the deployed devices to facilitate the organic nature of the network, as it changes with formation of the deployed forces.

APPENDIX. SIMULATION PROGRAM

```matlab
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Main %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

clc;
clear all;
close all;
format compact;

% Create globals I want to use and retain for the final product

global Packet;
global Packets;
global Open_Packets;
global PCAP;
global Timer;
global Events;
global Routing_Table;
global Node_Address;
global Node_Status;
global Node_Status_Table;
global Energy_Use;
global Packet_Retrans_Tracker;
global Keys;
global Payload;
global MAC;
global Initial_Payload;
global MAC_Check;
global MAC_F;
global Payload_Out;
global Selection;
global NodeTX;
global Enc;

% Variables for conducting an attack
global DDOS_Node;
global MITM_Nodes;
global Spoofed_Node;

global fileID;

% Where do you want the information to be stored for each run?
fileID = fopen('results/test.txt','w');

% Which Scenario would you like to run?
Selection = 1;

% Build the framework
Create();
```

```matlab
% Directed Denial of Service
% To activate the DDOS attack, uncomment and select which node you
% would like to perform the attack on.
% To simulate the attack the node will not be able to send or
% receive packets, therefore the node's status will be set to a level
% that it will not be able to interact with the deployed network.
% Node to be attacked (must be between 1 and 26
DDOS_Node = 28;
if DDOS_Node < 28
    DDOS(1);
end


% Spoofing attack
% Packets will be sent from a separate node pretending to be a node
% within the network. The spoofing node will use a neighbor node's MAC
% and IPaddresses as well as the CRC sequence. The packet is then sent
% to the Master Station where it would determine if it would pass the
% integrity check.
% Select a node to spoof (must be between 1-26)
Spoofed_Node = 28;
    Spoofing();


% Man in the Middle attack
% In this type of attack the contents of the packet will be modified
% while in transmission. It will make its way through until it reaches
% the Master Station, and at that point the MAC is tested and would
% fail.
 MITM_Nodes = [28,29];

% Initialize the Timer!
Timer = 0;


Run_Simulation();


Display();
fclose(fileID);




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Create %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Create()
% Creates the framework for the network

Create_Nodes();
Create_Routing_Table_To_Master();
Create_Packet_Table();
Create_Energy_Table();
Create_Energy_Use();
Create_Event_Table();
```

78

```matlab
    Create_PCAP_Table();


    end



    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    % Create_Nodes %
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    function Create_Nodes()
    % Use the below information to create the node for your architecture
    global Node_Address;
    global Node_MAC;
    global Node_Location;
    global Node_Status;
    global Wait_Time;
    global Node_Status_Table;
    global Keys;
    global NodeTX;
    global NodeRX;

    % number of transmissions per node
    NodeTX = [
        1        0;
        2        0;
        3        0;
        4        0;
        5        0;
        6        0;
        7        0;
        8        0;
        9        0;
        10       0;
        11       0;
        12       0;
        13       0;
        14       0;
        15       0;
        16       0;
        17       0;
        18       0;
        19       0;
        20       0;
        21       0;
        22       0;
        23       0;
        24       0;
        25       0;
        26       0;
        27       0;
        ];

    %number of receptions per node
    NodeRX = .
```

79

```
    1        0;
    2        0;
    3        0;
    4        0;
    5        0;
    6        0;
    7        0;
    8        0;
    9        0;
   10        0;
   11        0;
   12        0;
   13        0;
   14        0;
   15        0;
   16        0;
   17        0;
   18        0;
   19        0;
   20        0;
   21        0;
   22        0;
   23        0;
   24        0;
   25        0;
   26        0;
   27        0;
    ];

%   Node#   Byte 1          |      Byte 2          |      Byte 3          |
Byte 4          |      Byte 5          |      Byte 6          |      Byte 7
|      Byte 8          |
Node_Address = [
    001 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
    002 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
    003 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;
    004 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0;
    005 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
    006 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
    007 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;
```

```
     008 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0;
     009 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,1;
     010 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,1,0;
     011 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
     012 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
     013 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;
     014 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0;
     015 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
     016 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
     017 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;
     018 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0;
     019 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
     020 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
     021 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;
     022 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0;
     023 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
     024 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
     025 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
```

```
    026 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
    027 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;


    ];


Node_MAC = [
    001 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
    002 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
    003 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;
    004 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0;
    005 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
    006 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
    007 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;
    008 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0;
    009 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,1;
    010 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,1,0;
    011 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
    012 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0;
    013 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;
    014 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0;
    015 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1;
```

82

```
    016 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,1,0;
    017 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,1,1;
    018 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,1,0,0;
    019 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,0,1;
    020 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,1,0;
    021 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,1,1;
    022 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,1,0,0;
    023 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,0,1;
    024 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,1,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,1,0;
    025 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,0,1;
    026 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,1,0;
    027 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,
1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1,   1,1,1,1, 0,0,0,0,
0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,0,   0,0,1,1;
    ];


%    Node #  X Axis      Y Axis
Node_Location = [
    001     5           -22.5;
    002     5           -12.5;
    003     12.5          -5;
    004     22.5          -5;
    005     5           -32.5;
    006     -5          -22.5;
    007     -5          -12.5;
    008     12.5           5;
    009     12.5           5;
    010     32.5          -5;
    011     -5          -32.5;
    012     -12.5         -5;
    013     5            12.5;
    014     32.5           5;
```

```
    015      -22.5        -5;
    016      -12.5         5;
    017      -5          12.5;
    018      5           22.5;
    019      -32.5        -5;
    020      -22.5         5;
    021      -5          22.5;
    022      5           32.5;
    023      -32.5         5;
    024      -5          32.5;
    025      12.5       -17.5;
    026      17.5       -12.5;
    027      17.5       -17.5;

];

%    Node#    Status    Stat Time chg    Errors?      Seq #
Node_Status = [
    1        0            0                0         0;
    2        0            0                0         0;
    3        0            0                0         0;
    4        0            0                0         0;
    5        0            0                0         0;
    6        0            0                0         0;
    7        0            0                0         0;
    8        0            0                0         0;
    9        0            0                0         0;
    10       0            0                0         0;
    11       0            0                0         0;
    12       0            0                0         0;
    13       0            0                0         0;
    14       0            0                0         0;
    15       0            0                0         0;
    16       0            0                0         0;
    17       0            0                0         0;
    18       0            0                0         0;
    19       0            0                0         0;
    20       0            0                0         0;
    21       0            0                0         0;
    22       0            0                0         0;
    23       0            0                0         0;
    24       0            0                0         0;
    25       0            0                0         0;
    26       0            0                0         0;
    27       2            0                0         0;
    ];


% Node      Time
Wait_Time = [
    1        0;
    2        0;
    3        0;
    4        0;
    5        0;
```

```matlab
    6       0;
    7       0;
    8       0;
    9       0;
   10       0;
   11       0;
   12       0;
   13       0;
   14       0;
   15       0;
   16       0;
   17       0;
   18       0;
   19       0;
   20       0;
   21       0;
   22       0;
   23       0;
   24       0;
   25       0;
   26       0;
   27       0;
   ];

%Node        Time    Action from     Action to
Node_Status_Table = [
    0       0       0       0;
   ];

%random keys generated for each node to be shared with the MS
for n = 1:27
    Keys(n,1:128) = randi([0,1],1,128);
end


end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Create_Routing_Table_To_Master %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%


function Create_Routing_Table_To_Master()

% Below is the Routing table to be used
global Routing_Table;
%Catergory 1=Send Pri   2=Send Sec
% Node#     Category    Next Hop
Routing_Table = [
    1       1           25;
    2       1           25;
    3       1           26;
    4       1           26;
    5       1           1;
```

```
        6          1            1;
        7          1            2;
        8          1            3;
        9          1            4;
       10          1            4;
       11          1            5;
       12          1            7;
       13          1            8;
       14          1           10;
       15          1           12;
       16          1           12;
       17          1           13;
       18          1           13;
       19          1           15;
       20          1           15;
       21          1           18;
       22          1           18;
       23          1           19;
       24          1           22;
       25          1           27;
       26          1           27;
        1          2            2;
        2          2            3;
        3          2            2;
        4          2            3;
        5          2           11;
        6          2            7;
        7          2            6;
        8          2            9;
        9          2            8;
       10          2           14;
       11          2            6;
       12          2           16;
       13          2           17;
       14          2            9;
       15          2           20;
       16          2           17;
       17          2           16;
       18          2           21;
       19          2           23;
       20          2           16;
       21          2           17;
       22          2           24;
       23          2           20;
       24          2           21;
       25          2           27;
       26          2           27;
     ];
end
```

```
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Create_Packet_Table %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Create_Packet_Table()
% Create the table to store open packets in

global Open_Packets;
global Starter_Packet;
global Packet;
global Node_Last_Packet;
global Packet_Retrans_Tracker;
global Retrans;
global Initial_Payload;
global Packets;


Packets = zeros(1,3);


Retrans = 0;


% Initialize Packet variable
Packet(1,1:1016) = zeros(1,1016);


% Initialize Packet Retransmit Tracker
% Packet number   NewPack# Trans-Node Timer
Packet_Retrans_Tracker(1,1:4)= [0 0 0 0];


%Packet#    timer    event    # of trans    TransNode RecNode    Errors
Open_Packets = [
    0        0        0            0            0          0        99
    ];


% Frame Control
Starter_Packet(1:16) = [0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0];


% Source MAC Address
Starter_Packet(17:80) = ones(1,64);


%Destination MAC Address
Starter_Packet(81:144) = ones(1,64);


%LOWPAN_IPHC
Starter_Packet(145:160)= randi([0,1],1,16);


% Path/Hop Limit
Starter_Packet(161:162) = [0,0];       % Path
Starter_Packet(163:168) = ones(1,6); % Hop Limit


% Iniialization Vector
% Source Address
    Starter_Packet(169:184) = ones(1,16);


% Destination Address
```

87

```matlab
    Starter_Packet(185:200) = ones(1,16);

% LOWPAN NHC
    Starter_Packet(201:216) =  randi([0,1],1,16);

%Flags
    Starter_Packet(217:224) =  randi([0,1],1,8);

%Sequence Number
    Starter_Packet(225:256) = ones(1,32);

% Source Port
    Starter_Packet(257:272) =  randi([0,1],1,16);

% Destination Port
    Starter_Packet(273:288) =  randi([0,1],1,16);

% Length
    Starter_Packet(289:296) =  randi([0,1],1,8);

% Payload
aa = 297;
bb = aa + 7;
for n = 1:16
    Starter_Packet(aa:bb) = [1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1];
    aa = aa + 8;
    bb = aa + 7;
end

Initial_Payload(1:128) = Starter_Packet(297:424);

% Padding
Starter_Packet(425:864) = randi([0,1],1,440);

% Message Integrity Code
Starter_Packet(865:992) = ones(1,128);

% Next Header
Starter_Packet(993:1000) = ones(1,8);

% Field Check Sum (CRC)
Starter_Packet(1001:1016) = ones(1,16);

for n = 1:24
    Node_Last_Packet(n,:) = Starter_Packet;
end

end
```

```matlab
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Create_Energy_Table %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Create_Energy_Table()
% To determine the amount of energy use from receiving a packet

global Energy_Table;

%   TransNode   Affected Node
Energy_Table = [
    1           2;
    1           5;
    1           6;
    1           25;
    2           7;
    2           3;
    2           1;
    2           25;
    3           8;
    3           4;
    3           2;
    3           26;
    4           9;
    4           10;
    4           3;
    4           26;
    5           1;
    5           11;
    6           11;
    6           1;
    6           7;
    7           6;
    7           2;
    7           12;
    8           13;
    8           3;
    8           9;
    9           8;
    9           4;
    9           14;
    10          14;
    10          4;
    11          5;
    11          6;
    12          7;
    12          15;
    12          16;
    13          8;
    13          17;
    13          18;
    14          10;
    14          9;
    15          12;
    15          19;
```

```
    15          20;
    16          17;
    16          12;
    16          20;
    17          16;
    17          13;
    17          21;
    18          13;
    18          21;
    18          22;
    19          23;
    19          15;
    20          15;
    20          16;
    20          23;
    21          17;
    21          18;
    21          24;
    22          18;
    22          24;
    23          19;
    23          20;
    24          21;
    24          22;
    25          1;
    25          2;
    25          26;
    25          27;
    26          3;
    26          4;
    26          25;
    26          27;
    27          25;
    27          26;
];

end



%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Create_Energy_Use %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Create_Energy_Use()
% Keeps track of the amount of energy used per node during the
simulation

global Energy_Use;
% Node  Wakeup  Process   Trans   Rec     Waiting  Go2Slp Post-T-Wait
Sleep
Energy_Use = [
    1      0          0       0       0       0       0       0       0;
    2      0          0       0       0       0       0       0       0;
```

90

```
    3        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
    4        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
    5        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
    6        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
    7        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
    8        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
    9        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   10        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   11        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   12        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   13        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   14        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   15        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   16        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   17        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   18        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   19        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   20        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   21        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   22        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   23        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   24        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   25        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   26        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
   27        0          0          0          0          0          0          0          0;
    ];
end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Create_Event_Table %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Create_Event_Table()
% This is what initiates the events. Events are put in to create the
% sensing events that are simulated within the program.

global Events;
global Orig_Events;
global Scenario_1;
global Scenario_2;
global Scenario_3;
global Scenario_4;
global fileID;
global Enc;

%Choose which one you would like but comment out the others
Event_Table();

% or build your own setup

% %Scenario selection
global Selection;
```

```matlab
% which events to upload per the user's determination in "main" file
if Selection == 1
    Events = Scenario_1;
elseif Selection == 2
    Events = Scenario_2;
elseif Selection == 3
    Events = Scenario_3;
elseif Selection == 4
    Events = Scenario_4;
end

% logs for the events
[a,b] = size(Events);
Orig_Events = a;
Enc = zeros(1,26);
for n = 1:a
    Enc(Events(n,2)) = Enc(Events(n,2)) + 1;
end

fprintf('A total of %i detections were orignally uploaded. \n',a);
fprintf(fileID,'A total of %i detections were orignally uploaded.
\n',a);
end



%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Event_Table %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Event_Table()
% This is what initiates the events. Events are put in to create the
% sensing events that are simulated within the program.

%Events used in this thesis, 1-4, preloaded in their individual files
Scenario_11();
Scenario_22();
Scenario_33();
Scenario_44();



End



%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Scenario 11 %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Scenario_11()

global Scenario_1;
```

```
%time    originating node        destination node
Scenario_1 = [
0        14   27
0        19   27
447      10   27
447      23   27
894      9    27
894      15   27
1342     4    27
1342     20   27
1789     8    27
1789     12   27
2000     14   27
2000     19   27
2236     3    27
2236     16   27
4000     5    27
4000     24   27
4025     3    27
4025     16   27
4447     11   27
4447     22   27
4472     8    27
4472     12   27
4894     1    27
4894     21   27
4919     4    27
4919     20   27
5342     6    27
5342     18   27
5367     9    27
5367     15   27
5789     2    27
5789     17   27
5814     10   27
5814     23   27
6236     7    27
6236     13   27
6261     14   27
6261     19   27
7000     14   27
7000     19   27
7447     10   27
7447     23   27
7894     9    27
7894     15   27
8025     7    27
8025     13   27
8342     4    27
8342     20   27
8472     2    27
8472     17   27
8789     8    27
8789     12   27
8919     6    27
```

93

```
8919    18   27
9000    14   27
9000    19   27
9194    9    27
9194    15   27
9236    3    27
9236    16   27
9367    1    27
9367    21   27
9447    10   27
9447    23   27
9814    11   27
9814    22   27
9894    9    27
9894    15   27
10261   5    27
10261   24   27
10342   4    27
10342   20   27
10789   8    27
10789   12   27
11025   3    27
11025   16   27
11236   3    27
11236   16   27
11472   8    27
11472   12   27
11919   4    27
11919   20   27
12367   9    27
12367   15   27
12814   10   27
12814   23   27
13000   5    27
13000   24   27
13025   3    27
13025   16   27
13261   14   27
13261   19   27
13447   11   27
13447   22   27
13472   8    27
13472   12   27
13894   1    27
13894   21   27
13919   4    27
13919   20   27
14342   6    27
14342   18   27
14367   9    27
14367   15   27
14789   2    27
14789   17   27
14814   10   27
14814   23   27
```

```
15000    5    27
15000    24   27
15236    7    27
15236    13   27
15261    14   27
15261    19   27
15447    11   27
15447    22   27
15894    1    27
15894    21   27
16342    6    27
16342    18   27
16388    8    27
16388    12   27
16789    2    27
16789    17   27
17025    7    27
17025    13   27
17236    7    27
17236    13   27
17472    2    27
17472    17   27
17919    6    27
17919    18   27
18367    1    27
18367    21   27
18814    11   27
18814    22   27
19000    14   27
19000    19   27
19025    7    27
19025    13   27
19261    5    27
19261    24   27
19447    10   27
19447    23   27
19472    2    27
19472    17   27
19894    9    27
19894    15   27
19919    6    27
19919    18   27
20000    5    27
20000    24   27
20342    4    27
20342    20   27
20367    1    27
20367    21   27
20789    8    27
20789    12   27
20814    11   27
20814    22   27
21236    3    27
21236    16   27
21261    5    27
```

```
21261    24    27
22000    14    27
22000    19    27
22447    10    27
22447    23    27
22894    9     27
22894    15    27
23025    3     27
23025    16    27
23342    4     27
23342    20    27
23472    8     27
23472    12    27
23789    8     27
23789    12    27
23919    4     27
23919    20    27
24236    3     27
24236    16    27
24367    9     27
24367    15    27
24814    10    27
24814    23    27
25000    14    27
25000    19    27
25261    14    27
25261    19    27
25447    10    27
25447    23    27
25894    9     27
25894    15    27
26025    3     27
26025    16    27
26342    4     27
26342    20    27
26472    8     27
26472    12    27
26789    8     27
26789    12    27
26919    4     27
26919    20    27
27194    1     27
27194    21    27
27236    3     27
27236    16    27
27367    9     27
27367    15    27
27814    10    27
27814    23    27
28261    14    27
28261    19    27
29025    3     27
29025    16    27
29472    8     27
29472    12    27
```

```
29919    4     27
29919    20    27
30000    5     27
30000    24    27
30367    9     27
30367    15    27
30447    11    27
30447    22    27
30814    10    27
30814    23    27
30894    1     27
30894    21    27
31261    14    27
31261    19    27
31342    6     27
31342    18    27
31789    2     27
31789    17    27
32000    5     27
32000    24    27
32236    7     27
32236    13    27
32447    11    27
32447    22    27
32894    1     27
32894    21    27
33342    6     27
33342    18    27
33789    2     27
33789    17    27
34000    5     27
34000    24    27
34025    7     27
34025    13    27
34236    7     27
34236    13    27
34374    3     27
34374    16    27
34388    2     27
34388    17    27
34447    11    27
34447    22    27
34472    2     27
34472    17    27
34894    1     27
34894    21    27
34919    6     27
34919    18    27
35342    6     27
35342    18    27
35367    1     27
35367    21    27
35789    2     27
35789    17    27
35814    11    27
```

```
35814    22    27
36025    7     27
36025    13    27
36236    7     27
36236    13    27
36261    5     27
36261    24    27
36472    2     27
36472    17    27
36919    6     27
36919    18    27
37367    1     27
37367    21    27
37814    11    27
37814    22    27
38025    7     27
38025    13    27
38261    5     27
38261    24    27
38472    2     27
38472    17    27
38919    6     27
38919    18    27
39367    1     27
39367    21    27
39814    11    27
39814    22    27
40000    14    27
40000    19    27
40261    5     27
40261    24    27
40447    10    27
40447    23    27
40894    9     27
40894    15    27
41342    4     27
41342    20    27
41568    4     27
41568    20    27
41789    8     27
41789    12    27
42000    14    27
42000    19    27
42236    3     27
42236    16    27
42447    10    27
42447    23    27
42894    9     27
42894    15    27
43342    4     27
43342    20    27
43789    8     27
43789    12    27
44000    14    27
44000    19    27
```

```
44025    3    27
44025    16   27
44236    3    27
44236    16   27
44447    10   27
44447    23   27
44472    8    27
44472    12   27
44894    9    27
44894    15   27
44919    4    27
44919    20   27
45342    4    27
45342    20   27
45367    9    27
45367    15   27
45789    8    27
45789    12   27
45814    10   27
45814    23   27
46000    14   27
46000    19   27
46025    3    27
46025    16   27
46236    3    27
46236    16   27
46261    14   27
46261    19   27
46447    10   27
46447    23   27
46472    8    27
46472    12   27
46894    9    27
46894    15   27
46919    4    27
46919    20   27
47342    4    27
47342    20   27
47367    9    27
47367    15   27
47789    8    27
47789    12   27
47814    10   27
47814    23   27
48025    3    27
48025    16   27
48236    3    27
48236    16   27
48261    14   27
48261    19   27
48472    8    27
48472    12   27
48763    10   27
48763    23   27
48919    4    27
```

```
48919    20    27
49367     9    27
49367    15    27
49814    10    27
49814    23    27
50025     3    27
50025    16    27
50261    14    27
50261    19    27
50472     8    27
50472    12    27
50919     4    27
50919    20    27
51367     9    27
51367    15    27
51814    10    27
51814    23    27
52000     5    27
52000    24    27
52261    14    27
52261    19    27
52374     7    27
52374    13    27
52447    11    27
52447    22    27
52894     1    27
52894    21    27
53342     6    27
53342    18    27
53789     2    27
53789    17    27
54000     5    27
54000    24    27
54236     7    27
54236    13    27
54447    11    27
54447    22    27
54894     1    27
54894    21    27
55342     6    27
55342    18    27
55789     2    27
55789    17    27
56000     5    27
56000    24    27
56025     7    27
56025    13    27
56236     7    27
56236    13    27
56447    11    27
56447    22    27
56472     2    27
56472    17    27
56894     1    27
56894    21    27
```

```
56919     6     27
56919    18     27
57342     6     27
57342    18     27
57367     1     27
57367    21     27
57789     2     27
57789    17     27
57814    11     27
57814    22     27
58000     5     27
58000    24     27
58025     7     27
58025    13     27
58236     7     27
58236    13     27
58261     5     27
58261    24     27
58447    11     27
58447    22     27
58472     2     27
58472    17     27
58894     1     27
58894    21     27
58919     6     27
58919    18     27
59342     6     27
59342    18     27
59367     1     27
59367    21     27
59568     6     27
59568    18     27
59789     2     27
59789    17     27
59814    11     27
59814    22     27
60025     7     27
60025    13     27
60236     7     27
60236    13     27
60261     5     27
60261    24     27
60472     2     27
60472    17     27
60919     6     27
60919    18     27
61367     1     27
61367    21     27
61814    11     27
61814    22     27
62025     7     27
62025    13     27
62261     5     27
62261    24     27
62472     2     27
```

```
62472   17   27
62919    6   27
62919   18   27
63367    1   27
63367   21   27
63814   11   27
63814   22   27
64261    5   27
64261   24   27
65000   14   27
65000   19   27
65447   10   27
65447   23   27
65894    9   27
65894   15   27
66342    4   27
66342   20   27
66763   11   27
66763   22   27
66789    8   27
66789   12   27
67236    3   27
67236   16   27
68000   14   27
68000   19   27
68447   10   27
68447   23   27
68894    9   27
68894   15   27
69025    3   27
69025   16   27
69342    4   27
69342   20   27
69472    8   27
69472   12   27
69789    8   27
69789   12   27
69919    4   27
69919   20   27
70236    3   27
70236   16   27
70367   15   27
70367    9   27
70814   10   27
70814   23   27
71000   14   27
71000   19   27
71261   14   27
71261   19   27
71447   10   27
71447   23   27
71894    9   27
71894   15   27
72025    3   27
72025   16   27
```

```
72342    4    27
72342   20    27
72472    8    27
72472   12    27
72789    8    27
72789   12    27
72919    4    27
72919   20    27
73236    3    27
73236   16    27
73367    9    27
73367   15    27
73814   10    27
73814   23    27
74000   14    27
74000   19    27
74261   14    27
74261   19    27
74447   10    27
74447   23    27
74894    9    27
74894   15    27
75025    3    27
75025   16    27
75342    4    27
75342   20    27
75472    8    27
75472   12    27
75789    8    27
75789   12    27
75919    4    27
75919   20    27
76236    3    27
76236   16    27
76367    9    27
76367   15    27
76814   10    27
76814   23    27
77000   14    27
77000   19    27
77261   14    27
77261   19    27
77447   10    27
77447   23    27
77894    9    27
77894   15    27
78025    3    27
78025   16    27
78342    4    27
78342   20    27
78472    8    27
78472   12    27
78789    8    27
78789   12    27
78919    4    27
```

```
78919    20    27
79236    3     27
79236    16    27
79367    9     27
79367    15    27
79814    10    27
79814    23    27
80261    14    27
80261    19    27
81025    3     27
81025    16    27
81472    8     27
81472    12    27
81919    4     27
81919    20    27
82367    9     27
82367    15    27
82814    10    27
82814    23    27
83261    14    27
83261    19    27
85000    5     27
85000    24    27
85447    11    27
85447    22    27
85894    1     27
85894    21    27
86342    6     27
86342    18    27
86789    2     27
86789    17    27
87236    7     27
87236    13    27
88000    5     27
88000    24    27
88447    11    27
88447    22    27
88894    1     27
88894    21    27
89025    7     27
89025    13    27
89342    6     27
89342    18    27
89472    2     27
89472    17    27
89789    2     27
89789    17    27
89919    6     27
89919    18    27
90236    7     27
90236    13    27
90367    1     27
90367    21    27
90814    11    27
90814    22    27
```

```
91000    5    27
91000   24    27
91261    5    27
91261   24    27
91447   11    27
91447   22    27
91894    1    27
91894   21    27
92025    7    27
92025   13    27
92342    6    27
92342   18    27
92472    2    27
92472   17    27
92789    2    27
92789   17    27
92919    6    27
92919   18    27
93236    7    27
93236   13    27
93367    1    27
93367   21    27
93814   11    27
93814   22    27
94000    5    27
94000   24    27
94261    5    27
94261   24    27
94447   11    27
94447   22    27
94894    1    27
94894   21    27
95025    7    27
95025   13    27
95342    6    27
95342   18    27
95472    2    27
95472   17    27
95789    2    27
95789   17    27
95919    6    27
95919   18    27
96236    7    27
96236   13    27
96367    1    27
96367   21    27
96814   11    27
96814   22    27
97000    5    27
97000   24    27
97261    5    27
97261   24    27
97447   11    27
97447   22    27
97894    1    27
```

```
97894    21   27
98025     7   27
98025    13   27
98342     6   27
98342    18   27
98472     2   27
98472    17   27
98789     2   27
98789    17   27
98919     6   27
98919    18   27
99236     7   27
99236    13   27
99367     1   27
99367    21   27
99814    11   27
99814    22   27
100261    5   27
100261   24   27
101025    7   27
101025   13   27
101472    2   27
101472   17   27
101919    6   27
101919   18   27
102000   14   27
102000   19   27
102367    1   27
102367   21   27
102447   10   27
102447   23   27
102814   11   27
102814   22   27
102894    9   27
102894   15   27
103261    5   27
103261   24   27
103342    4   27
103342   20   27
103789    8   27
103789   12   27
104236    3   27
104236   16   27
105000   14   27
105000   14   27
105000   19   27
105000   19   27
105447   10   27
105447   23   27
105894    9   27
105894   15   27
106000   14   27
106000   19   27
106025    3   27
106025   16   27
```

```
106342    4    27
106342    20   27
106472    8    27
106472    12   27
106789    8    27
106789    12   27
106919    4    27
106919    20   27
107236    3    27
107236    16   27
107367    9    27
107367    15   27
107814    10   27
107814    23   27
108000    14   27
108000    19   27
108261    14   27
108261    19   27
108447    10   27
108447    23   27
108894    9    27
108894    15   27
109025    3    27
109025    16   27
109342    4    27
109342    20   27
109472    8    27
109472    12   27
109789    8    27
109789    12   27
109919    4    27
109919    20   27
110236    3    27
110236    16   27
110367    9    27
110367    15   27
110814    10   27
110814    23   27
111000    14   27
111000    19   27
111261    14   27
111261    19   27
111447    10   27
111447    23   27
111894    9    27
111894    15   27
112000    5    27
112000    24   27
112025    3    27
112025    16   27
112194    9    27
112194    15   27
112342    4    27
112342    20   27
112472    8    27
```

```
112472   12   27
112789   8    27
112789   12   27
112919   4    27
112919   20   27
113000   5    27
113000   24   27
113194   9    27
113194   15   27
113236   3    27
113236   16   27
113367   9    27
113367   15   27
113814   10   27
113814   23   27
114000   14   27
114000   19   27
114261   14   27
114261   19   27
114447   10   27
114447   23   27
114894   9    27
114894   15   27
115025   3    27
115025   16   27
115342   4    27
115342   20   27
115472   8    27
115472   12   27
115789   8    27
115789   12   27
115919   4    27
115919   20   27
116236   3    27
116236   16   27
116367   9    27
116367   15   27
116814   10   27
116814   23   27
117000   14   27
117000   19   27
117261   14   27
117261   19   27
117447   10   27
117447   23   27
117894   9    27
117894   15   27
118025   3    27
118025   16   27
118342   4    27
118342   20   27
118472   8    27
118472   12   27
118789   8    27
118789   12   27
```

```
118919    4    27
118919   20    27
119194    1    27
119194   21    27
119236    3    27
119236   16    27
119367    9    27
119367   15    27
119388    8    27
119388   12    27
119814   10    27
119814   23    27
120194    1    27
120194   21    27
120261   14    27
120261   19    27
120388    8    27
120388   12    27
121025    3    27
121025   16    27
121472    8    27
121472   12    27
121919    4    27
121919   20    27
122000    5    27
122000   24    27
122367    9    27
122367   15    27
122447   11    27
122447   22    27
122814   10    27
122814   23    27
122894    1    27
122894   21    27
123261   14    27
123261   19    27
123342    6    27
123342   18    27
123789    2    27
123789   17    27
124236    7    27
124236   13    27
125000    5    27
125000   24    27
125447   11    27
125447   22    27
125894    1    27
125894   21    27
126025    7    27
126025   13    27
126342    6    27
126342   18    27
126388    2    27
126388   17    27
126472    2    27
```

```
126472   17   27
126789   2    27
126789   17   27
126919   6    27
126919   18   27
127236   7    27
127236   13   27
127367   1    27
127367   21   27
127388   2    27
127388   17   27
127814   11   27
127814   22   27
128000   5    27
128000   24   27
128261   5    27
128261   24   27
128447   11   27
128447   22   27
128894   1    27
128894   21   27
129025   7    27
129025   13   27
129342   6    27
129342   18   27
129472   2    27
129472   17   27
129789   2    27
129789   17   27
129919   6    27
129919   18   27
130236   7    27
130236   13   27
130367   1    27
130367   21   27
130814   11   27
130814   22   27
131000   5    27
131000   24   27
131261   5    27
131261   24   27
131447   11   27
131447   22   27
131894   1    27
131894   21   27
132025   7    27
132025   13   27
132342   6    27
132342   18   27
132472   2    27
132472   17   27
132789   2    27
132789   17   27
132919   6    27
132919   18   27
```

```
133236   7    27
133236   13   27
133367   1    27
133367   21   27
133814   11   27
133814   22   27
134000   5    27
134000   24   27
134261   5    27
134261   24   27
134447   11   27
134447   22   27
134894   1    27
134894   21   27
135025   7    27
135025   13   27
135342   6    27
135342   18   27
135472   2    27
135472   17   27
135789   2    27
135789   17   27
135919   6    27
135919   18   27
136236   7    27
136236   13   27
136367   1    27
136367   21   27
136814   11   27
136814   22   27
137000   5    27
137000   24   27
137261   5    27
137261   24   27
137374   3    27
137374   16   27
137447   11   27
137447   22   27
137894   1    27
137894   21   27
138025   7    27
138025   13   27
138342   6    27
138342   18   27
138374   3    27
138374   16   27
138472   2    27
138472   17   27
138789   2    27
138789   17   27
138919   6    27
138919   18   27
139236   7    27
139236   13   27
139367   1    27
```

```
139367    21   27
139814    11   27
139814    22   27
140261    5    27
140261    24   27
141025    7    27
141025    13   27
141472    2    27
141472    17   27
141919    6    27
141919    18   27
142367    1    27
142367    21   27
142814    11   27
142814    22   27
143261    5    27
143261    24   27
144374    7    27
144374    13   27
144568    4    27
144568    20   27
145374    7    27
145374    13   27
145568    4    27
145568    20   27
151568    6    27
151568    18   27
151763    10   27
151763    23   27
152568    6    27
152568    18   27
152763    10   27
152763    23   27
158763    11   27
158763    22   27
159763    11   27
159763    22   27
];

end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Scenario_22 %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Scenario_22()

global Scenario_2;

Scenario_2 = [
0         14   27
0         19   27
```

```
319      10   27
319      23   27
639      9    27
639      15   27
958      4    27
958      20   27
1278     8    27
1278     12   27
1597     3    27
1597     16   27
2875     3    27
2875     16   27
3195     8    27
3195     12   27
3514     4    27
3514     20   27
3834     9    27
3834     15   27
4153     10   27
4153     23   27
4473     14   27
4473     19   27
5000     5    27
5000     24   27
5319     11   27
5319     22   27
5639     1    27
5639     21   27
5958     6    27
5958     18   27
6278     2    27
6278     17   27
6597     7    27
6597     13   27
7875     7    27
7875     13   27
8195     2    27
8195     17   27
8514     6    27
8514     18   27
8834     1    27
8834     21   27
9153     11   27
9153     22   27
9473     5    27
9473     24   27
10000    14   27
10000    19   27
10319    10   27
10319    23   27
10639    9    27
10639    15   27
10958    4    27
10958    20   27
11278    8    27
```

```
11278    12    27
11597    3     27
11597    16    27
12000    14    27
12000    19    27
12319    10    27
12319    23    27
12639    9     27
12639    15    27
12875    3     27
12875    16    27
12958    4     27
12958    20    27
13195    8     27
13195    12    27
13278    8     27
13278    12    27
13514    4     27
13514    20    27
13597    3     27
13597    16    27
13834    9     27
13834    15    27
14153    10    27
14153    23    27
14473    14    27
14473    19    27
14875    3     27
14875    16    27
15195    8     27
15195    12    27
15514    4     27
15514    20    27
15834    9     27
15834    15    27
16153    10    27
16153    23    27
16473    14    27
16473    19    27
17000    5     27
17000    24    27
17319    11    27
17319    22    27
17639    1     27
17639    21    27
17958    6     27
17958    18    27
18278    2     27
18278    17    27
18597    7     27
18597    13    27
19000    5     27
19000    24    27
19319    11    27
19319    22    27
```

```
19639    1    27
19639    21   27
19875    7    27
19875    13   27
19958    6    27
19958    18   27
20195    2    27
20195    17   27
20278    2    27
20278    17   27
20514    6    27
20514    18   27
20597    7    27
20597    13   27
20834    1    27
20834    21   27
21153    11   27
21153    22   27
21473    5    27
21473    24   27
21875    7    27
21875    13   27
22195    2    27
22195    17   27
22514    6    27
22514    18   27
22834    1    27
22834    21   27
23000    14   27
23000    19   27
23153    11   27
23153    22   27
23319    10   27
23319    23   27
23473    5    27
23473    24   27
23639    9    27
23639    15   27
23958    4    27
23958    20   27
24278    8    27
24278    12   27
24597    3    27
24597    16   27
25000    14   27
25000    19   27
25319    10   27
25319    23   27
25639    9    27
25639    15   27
25875    3    27
25875    16   27
25958    4    27
25958    20   27
26195    8    27
```

```
26195   12   27
26278   8    27
26278   12   27
26514   4    27
26514   20   27
26597   3    27
26597   16   27
26834   9    27
26834   15   27
27000   14   27
27000   19   27
27153   10   27
27153   23   27
27319   10   27
27319   23   27
27473   14   27
27473   19   27
27639   9    27
27639   15   27
27875   3    27
27875   16   27
27958   4    27
27958   20   27
28195   8    27
28195   12   27
28278   8    27
28278   12   27
28514   4    27
28514   20   27
28597   3    27
28597   16   27
28834   9    27
28834   15   27
29153   10   27
29153   23   27
29473   14   27
29473   19   27
29875   3    27
29875   16   27
30195   8    27
30195   12   27
30514   4    27
30514   20   27
30834   9    27
30834   15   27
31000   5    27
31000   24   27
31153   10   27
31153   23   27
31319   11   27
31319   22   27
31473   14   27
31473   19   27
31639   1    27
31639   21   27
```

```
31958    6    27
31958   18    27
32278    2    27
32278   17    27
32597    7    27
32597   13    27
33000    5    27
33000   24    27
33319   11    27
33319   22    27
33639    1    27
33639   21    27
33875    7    27
33875   13    27
33958    6    27
33958   18    27
34195    2    27
34195   17    27
34278    2    27
34278   17    27
34514    6    27
34514   18    27
34597    7    27
34597   13    27
34834    1    27
34834   21    27
35000    5    27
35000   24    27
35153   11    27
35153   22    27
35319   11    27
35319   22    27
35473    5    27
35473   24    27
35639    1    27
35639   21    27
35875    7    27
35875   13    27
35958    6    27
35958   18    27
36195    2    27
36195   17    27
36278    2    27
36278   17    27
36514    6    27
36514   18    27
36597    7    27
36597   13    27
36834    1    27
36834   21    27
37153   11    27
37153   22    27
37473    5    27
37473   24    27
37875    7    27
```

```
37875    13    27
38195     2    27
38195    17    27
38514     6    27
38514    18    27
38834     1    27
38834    21    27
39153    11    27
39153    22    27
39473     5    27
39473    24    27
41000    14    27
41000    19    27
41319    10    27
41319    23    27
41639     9    27
41639    15    27
41958     4    27
41958    20    27
42278     8    27
42278    12    27
42597     3    27
42597    16    27
43000    14    27
43000    19    27
43319    10    27
43319    23    27
43639     9    27
43639    15    27
43875     3    27
43875    16    27
43958     4    27
43958    20    27
44195     8    27
44195    12    27
44278     8    27
44278    12    27
44514     4    27
44514    20    27
44597     3    27
44597    16    27
44834     9    27
44834    15    27
45000    14    27
45000    19    27
45153    10    27
45153    23    27
45319    10    27
45319    23    27
45473    14    27
45473    19    27
45639     9    27
45639    15    27
45875     3    27
45875    16    27
```

```
45958    4    27
45958    20   27
46195    8    27
46195    12   27
46278    8    27
46278    12   27
46514    4    27
46514    20   27
46597    3    27
46597    16   27
46834    9    27
46834    15   27
47000    14   27
47000    19   27
47153    10   27
47153    23   27
47319    10   27
47319    23   27
47473    14   27
47473    19   27
47639    9    27
47639    15   27
47875    3    27
47875    16   27
47958    4    27
47958    20   27
48195    8    27
48195    12   27
48278    8    27
48278    12   27
48514    4    27
48514    20   27
48597    3    27
48597    16   27
48834    9    27
48834    15   27
49153    10   27
49153    23   27
49473    14   27
49473    19   27
49875    3    27
49875    16   27
50000    5    27
50000    24   27
50195    8    27
50195    12   27
50319    11   27
50319    22   27
50514    4    27
50514    20   27
50639    1    27
50639    21   27
50834    9    27
50834    15   27
50958    6    27
```

```
50958    18    27
51153    10    27
51153    23    27
51278    2     27
51278    17    27
51473    14    27
51473    19    27
51597    7     27
51597    13    27
52000    5     27
52000    24    27
52319    11    27
52319    22    27
52639    1     27
52639    21    27
52875    7     27
52875    13    27
52958    6     27
52958    18    27
53195    2     27
53195    17    27
53278    2     27
53278    17    27
53514    6     27
53514    18    27
53597    7     27
53597    13    27
53834    1     27
53834    21    27
54000    5     27
54000    24    27
54153    11    27
54153    22    27
54319    11    27
54319    22    27
54473    5     27
54473    24    27
54639    1     27
54639    21    27
54875    7     27
54875    13    27
54958    6     27
54958    18    27
55195    2     27
55195    17    27
55278    2     27
55278    17    27
55514    6     27
55514    18    27
55597    7     27
55597    13    27
55834    1     27
55834    21    27
56000    5     27
56000    24    27
```

```
56153    11    27
56153    22    27
56319    11    27
56319    22    27
56473     5    27
56473    24    27
56639     1    27
56639    21    27
56875     7    27
56875    13    27
56958     6    27
56958    18    27
57195     2    27
57195    17    27
57278     2    27
57278    17    27
57514     6    27
57514    18    27
57597     7    27
57597    13    27
57834     1    27
57834    21    27
58153    11    27
58153    22    27
58473     5    27
58473    24    27
58875     7    27
58875    13    27
59195     2    27
59195    17    27
59514     6    27
59514    18    27
59834     1    27
59834    21    27
60000    14    27
60000    14    27
60000    19    27
60000    19    27
60153    11    27
60153    22    27
60319    10    27
60319    23    27
60473     5    27
60473    24    27
60500    14    27
60500    19    27
60639     9    27
60639    15    27
60958     4    27
60958    20    27
61000    19    27
61000    14    27
61278     8    27
61278    12    27
61500    19    27
```

```
61500    14    27
61597    3     27
61597    16    27
62000    14    27
62000    19    27
62319    10    27
62319    23    27
62639    9     27
62639    15    27
62875    3     27
62875    16    27
62958    4     27
62958    20    27
63195    8     27
63195    12    27
63278    8     27
63278    12    27
63514    4     27
63514    20    27
63597    3     27
63597    16    27
63834    9     27
63834    15    27
64000    14    27
64000    19    27
64153    10    27
64153    23    27
64319    10    27
64319    23    27
64473    14    27
64473    19    27
64639    9     27
64639    15    27
64875    3     27
64875    16    27
64958    4     27
64958    20    27
65195    8     27
65195    12    27
65278    8     27
65278    12    27
65514    4     27
65514    20    27
65597    3     27
65597    16    27
65834    9     27
65834    15    27
66000    14    27
66000    19    27
66153    10    27
66153    23    27
66319    10    27
66319    23    27
66473    14    27
66473    19    27
```

```
66639    9    27
66639    15   27
66875    3    27
66875    16   27
66958    4    27
66958    20   27
67194    9    27
67194    15   27
67195    8    27
67195    12   27
67278    8    27
67278    12   27
67514    4    27
67514    20   27
67597    3    27
67597    16   27
67694    9    27
67694    15   27
67834    9    27
67834    15   27
68000    14   27
68000    19   27
68153    10   27
68153    23   27
68194    15   27
68194    9    27
68319    10   27
68319    23   27
68473    14   27
68473    19   27
68639    9    27
68639    15   27
68694    15   27
68694    9    27
68875    3    27
68875    16   27
68958    4    27
68958    20   27
69195    8    27
69195    12   27
69278    8    27
69278    12   27
69514    4    27
69514    20   27
69597    3    27
69597    16   27
69834    9    27
69834    15   27
70000    5    27
70000    24   27
70153    10   27
70153    23   27
70473    14   27
70473    19   27
70875    3    27
```

```
70875   16   27
71000   5    27
71000   24   27
71195   8    27
71195   12   27
71514   4    27
71514   20   27
71834   9    27
71834   15   27
72000   5    27
72000   24   27
72153   10   27
72153   23   27
72319   11   27
72319   22   27
72473   14   27
72473   19   27
72639   1    27
72639   21   27
72958   6    27
72958   18   27
73278   2    27
73278   17   27
73597   7    27
73597   13   27
74000   5    27
74000   24   27
74319   11   27
74319   22   27
74388   8    27
74388   12   27
74639   1    27
74639   21   27
74875   7    27
74875   13   27
74888   8    27
74888   12   27
74958   6    27
74958   18   27
75195   2    27
75195   17   27
75278   2    27
75278   17   27
75388   12   27
75388   8    27
75514   6    27
75514   18   27
75597   7    27
75597   13   27
75834   1    27
75834   21   27
75888   12   27
75888   8    27
76000   5    27
76000   5    27
```

```
76000    24    27
76000    24    27
76153    11    27
76153    22    27
76319    11    27
76319    11    27
76319    22    27
76319    22    27
76473    5     27
76473    24    27
76639    1     27
76639    1     27
76639    21    27
76639    21    27
76875    7     27
76875    13    27
76958    6     27
76958    6     27
76958    18    27
76958    18    27
77194    1     27
77194    21    27
77195    2     27
77195    17    27
77278    2     27
77278    2     27
77278    17    27
77278    17    27
77514    6     27
77514    18    27
77597    7     27
77597    7     27
77597    13    27
77597    13    27
77834    1     27
77834    21    27
78000    5     27
78000    24    27
78153    11    27
78153    22    27
78194    1     27
78194    21    27
78319    11    27
78319    22    27
78473    5     27
78473    24    27
78639    1     27
78639    21    27
78875    7     27
78875    7     27
78875    13    27
78875    13    27
78958    6     27
78958    18    27
79195    2     27
```

```
79195     2    27
79195    17    27
79195    17    27
79278     2    27
79278    17    27
79514     6    27
79514     6    27
79514    18    27
79514    18    27
79597     7    27
79597    13    27
79834     1    27
79834     1    27
79834    21    27
79834    21    27
80000     5    27
80000    24    27
80153    11    27
80153    11    27
80153    22    27
80153    22    27
80319    11    27
80319    22    27
80473     5    27
80473     5    27
80473    24    27
80473    24    27
80639     1    27
80639    21    27
80875     7    27
80875    13    27
80958     6    27
80958    18    27
81195     2    27
81195    17    27
81278     2    27
81278    17    27
81514     6    27
81514    18    27
81597     7    27
81597    13    27
81834     1    27
81834    21    27
82153    11    27
82153    22    27
82473     5    27
82473    24    27
82875     7    27
82875    13    27
83195     2    27
83195    17    27
83514     6    27
83514    18    27
83834     1    27
83834    21    27
```

```
84153    11    27
84153    22    27
84388    2     27
84388    17    27
84473    5     27
84473    24    27
85000    14    27
85000    19    27
85319    10    27
85319    23    27
85388    2     27
85388    17    27
85639    9     27
85639    15    27
85958    4     27
85958    20    27
86278    8     27
86278    12    27
86597    3     27
86597    16    27
87000    14    27
87000    19    27
87319    10    27
87319    23    27
87639    9     27
87639    15    27
87875    3     27
87875    16    27
87958    4     27
87958    20    27
88195    8     27
88195    12    27
88278    8     27
88278    12    27
88514    4     27
88514    20    27
88597    3     27
88597    16    27
88834    9     27
88834    15    27
89000    14    27
89000    19    27
89153    10    27
89153    23    27
89319    10    27
89319    23    27
89473    14    27
89473    19    27
89639    9     27
89639    15    27
89875    3     27
89875    16    27
89958    4     27
89958    20    27
90195    8     27
```

```
90195    12    27
90278    8     27
90278    12    27
90514    4     27
90514    20    27
90597    3     27
90597    16    27
90834    9     27
90834    15    27
91000    14    27
91000    19    27
91153    10    27
91153    23    27
91319    10    27
91319    23    27
91473    14    27
91473    19    27
91639    9     27
91639    15    27
91875    3     27
91875    16    27
91958    4     27
91958    20    27
92195    8     27
92195    12    27
92278    8     27
92278    12    27
92374    3     27
92374    16    27
92514    4     27
92514    20    27
92597    3     27
92597    16    27
92834    9     27
92834    15    27
92874    3     27
92874    16    27
93000    14    27
93000    19    27
93153    10    27
93153    23    27
93319    10    27
93319    23    27
93374    3     27
93374    16    27
93473    14    27
93473    19    27
93639    9     27
93639    15    27
93874    3     27
93874    16    27
93875    3     27
93875    16    27
93958    4     27
93958    20    27
```

```
94195    8    27
94195    12   27
94278    8    27
94278    12   27
94514    4    27
94514    20   27
94597    3    27
94597    16   27
94834    9    27
94834    15   27
95000    14   27
95000    19   27
95153    10   27
95153    23   27
95319    10   27
95319    23   27
95473    14   27
95473    19   27
95639    9    27
95639    15   27
95875    3    27
95875    16   27
95958    4    27
95958    20   27
96195    8    27
96195    12   27
96278    8    27
96278    12   27
96514    4    27
96514    20   27
96597    3    27
96597    16   27
96834    9    27
96834    15   27
97153    10   27
97153    23   27
97473    14   27
97473    19   27
97875    3    27
97875    16   27
98195    8    27
98195    12   27
98514    4    27
98514    20   27
98834    9    27
98834    15   27
99153    10   27
99153    23   27
99473    14   27
99473    19   27
99568    4    27
99568    20   27
100000   5    27
100000   24   27
100068   4    27
```

```
100068   20   27
100319   11   27
100319   22   27
100568   4    27
100568   20   27
100639   1    27
100639   21   27
100958   6    27
100958   18   27
101068   4    27
101068   20   27
101278   2    27
101278   17   27
101597   7    27
101597   13   27
102000   5    27
102000   24   27
102319   11   27
102319   22   27
102374   7    27
102374   13   27
102639   1    27
102639   21   27
102875   7    27
102875   13   27
102958   6    27
102958   18   27
103195   2    27
103195   17   27
103278   2    27
103278   17   27
103374   7    27
103374   13   27
103514   6    27
103514   18   27
103597   7    27
103597   13   27
103834   1    27
103834   21   27
104000   5    27
104000   24   27
104153   11   27
104153   22   27
104319   11   27
104319   22   27
104473   5    27
104473   24   27
104639   1    27
104639   21   27
104875   7    27
104875   13   27
104958   6    27
104958   18   27
105195   2    27
105195   17   27
```

```
105278   2    27
105278   17   27
105514   6    27
105514   18   27
105597   7    27
105597   13   27
105834   1    27
105834   21   27
106000   5    27
106000   24   27
106153   11   27
106153   22   27
106319   11   27
106319   22   27
106473   5    27
106473   24   27
106639   1    27
106639   21   27
106763   10   27
106763   23   27
106875   7    27
106875   13   27
106958   6    27
106958   18   27
107195   2    27
107195   17   27
107263   10   27
107263   23   27
107278   2    27
107278   17   27
107514   6    27
107514   18   27
107597   7    27
107597   13   27
107763   10   27
107763   23   27
107834   1    27
107834   21   27
108000   5    27
108000   24   27
108153   11   27
108153   22   27
108263   10   27
108263   23   27
108319   11   27
108319   22   27
108473   5    27
108473   24   27
108639   1    27
108639   21   27
108875   7    27
108875   13   27
108958   6    27
108958   18   27
109195   2    27
```

```
109195   17   27
109278   2    27
109278   17   27
109514   6    27
109514   18   27
109568   6    27
109568   18   27
109597   7    27
109597   13   27
109834   1    27
109834   21   27
110000   5    27
110000   24   27
110153   11   27
110153   22   27
110319   11   27
110319   22   27
110473   5    27
110473   24   27
110568   6    27
110568   18   27
110639   1    27
110639   21   27
110875   7    27
110875   13   27
110958   6    27
110958   18   27
111195   2    27
111195   17   27
111278   2    27
111278   17   27
111514   6    27
111514   18   27
111597   7    27
111597   13   27
111834   1    27
111834   21   27
112153   11   27
112153   22   27
112473   5    27
112473   24   27
112875   7    27
112875   13   27
113195   2    27
113195   17   27
113514   6    27
113514   18   27
113834   1    27
113834   21   27
114153   11   27
114153   22   27
114473   5    27
114473   24   27
116763   11   27
116763   22   27
```

```
117763   11   27
117763   22   27
];

end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Scenario_33 %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Scenario_33()

global Scenario_3;

%time    originating node        destination node
Scenario_3 = [
0        19  27
0        14  27
249      23  27
249      10  27
497      15  27
497      9   27
746      20  27
746      4   27
994      12  27
994      8   27
1243     16  27
1243     3   27
2000     19  27
2000     14  27
2237     3   27
2237     16  27
2249     23  27
2249     10  27
2485     8   27
2485     12  27
2497     15  27
2497     9   27
2734     4   27
2734     20  27
2746     20  27
2746     4   27
2982     9   27
2982     15  27
2994     12  27
2994     8   27
3231     10  27
3231     23  27
3243     16  27
3243     3   27
3479     14  27
3479     19  27
```

```
4000    19    27
4000    14    27
4237     3    27
4237    16    27
4249    23    27
4249    10    27
4485     8    27
4485    12    27
4497    15    27
4497     9    27
4734     4    27
4734    20    27
4746    20    27
4746     4    27
4982     9    27
4982    15    27
4994    12    27
4994     8    27
5231    10    27
5231    23    27
5243    16    27
5243     3    27
5479    14    27
5479    19    27
6000    19    27
6000    14    27
6237     3    27
6237    16    27
6249    23    27
6249    10    27
6485     8    27
6485    12    27
6497    15    27
6497     9    27
6734     4    27
6734    20    27
6746    20    27
6746     4    27
6982     9    27
6982    15    27
6994    12    27
6994     8    27
7231    10    27
7231    23    27
7243    16    27
7243     3    27
7479    14    27
7479    19    27
8000    19    27
8000    14    27
8237     3    27
8237    16    27
8249    23    27
8249    10    27
8485     8    27
```

```
8485    12   27
8497    15   27
8497     9   27
8734     4   27
8734    20   27
8746    20   27
8746     4   27
8982     9   27
8982    15   27
8994    12   27
8994     8   27
9231    10   27
9231    23   27
9243    16   27
9243     3   27
9479    14   27
9479    19   27
10237    3   27
10237   16   27
10485    8   27
10485   12   27
10734    4   27
10734   20   27
10982    9   27
10982   15   27
11231   10   27
11231   23   27
11479   14   27
11479   19   27
12000   24   27
12000    5   27
12249   22   27
12249   11   27
12497   21   27
12497    1   27
12746   18   27
12746    6   27
12994   17   27
12994    2   27
13243   13   27
13243    7   27
14000   24   27
14000    5   27
14237    7   27
14237   13   27
14249   22   27
14249   11   27
14485    2   27
14485   17   27
14497   21   27
14497    1   27
14734    6   27
14734   18   27
14746   18   27
14746    6   27
```

```
14982    1    27
14982    21   27
14994    17   27
14994    2    27
15231    11   27
15231    22   27
15243    13   27
15243    7    27
15479    5    27
15479    24   27
16000    24   27
16000    5    27
16237    7    27
16237    13   27
16249    22   27
16249    11   27
16485    2    27
16485    17   27
16497    21   27
16497    1    27
16734    6    27
16734    18   27
16746    18   27
16746    6    27
16982    1    27
16982    21   27
16994    17   27
16994    2    27
17231    11   27
17231    22   27
17243    13   27
17243    7    27
17479    5    27
17479    24   27
18000    24   27
18000    5    27
18237    7    27
18237    13   27
18249    22   27
18249    11   27
18485    2    27
18485    17   27
18497    21   27
18497    1    27
18734    6    27
18734    18   27
18746    18   27
18746    6    27
18982    1    27
18982    21   27
18994    17   27
18994    2    27
19231    11   27
19231    22   27
19243    13   27
```

```
19243      7    27
19479      5    27
19479     24    27
20000     24    27
20000      5    27
20237      7    27
20237     13    27
20249     22    27
20249     11    27
20485      2    27
20485     17    27
20497     21    27
20497      1    27
20734      6    27
20734     18    27
20746     18    27
20746      6    27
20982      1    27
20982     21    27
20994     17    27
20994      2    27
21231     11    27
21231     22    27
21243     13    27
21243      7    27
21479      5    27
21479     24    27
22237      7    27
22237     13    27
22485      2    27
22485     17    27
22734      6    27
22734     18    27
22982      1    27
22982     21    27
23231     11    27
23231     22    27
23479      5    27
23479     24    27
24000     19    27
24000     14    27
24249     23    27
24249     10    27
24497     15    27
24497      9    27
24746     20    27
24746      4    27
24994     12    27
24994      8    27
25243     16    27
25243      3    27
26000     19    27
26000     14    27
26237      3    27
26237     16    27
```

```
26249    23    27
26249    10    27
26485     8    27
26485    12    27
26497    15    27
26497     9    27
26734     4    27
26734    20    27
26746    20    27
26746     4    27
26982     9    27
26982    15    27
26994    12    27
26994     8    27
27231    10    27
27231    23    27
27243    16    27
27243     3    27
27479    14    27
27479    19    27
28000    19    27
28000    14    27
28237     3    27
28237    16    27
28249    23    27
28249    10    27
28485     8    27
28485    12    27
28497    15    27
28497     9    27
28734     4    27
28734    20    27
28746    20    27
28746     4    27
28982     9    27
28982    15    27
28994    12    27
28994     8    27
29231    10    27
29231    23    27
29243    16    27
29243     3    27
29479    14    27
29479    19    27
30000    19    27
30000    14    27
30000    19    27
30000    14    27
30237     3    27
30237    16    27
30249    23    27
30249    10    27
30485     8    27
30485    12    27
30497    15    27
```

```
30497    9    27
30734    4    27
30734   20    27
30746   20    27
30746    4    27
30982    9    27
30982   15    27
30994   12    27
30994    8    27
31231   10    27
31231   23    27
31243   16    27
31243    3    27
31479   14    27
31479   19    27
32000   19    27
32000   14    27
32237    3    27
32237   16    27
32249   23    27
32249   10    27
32485    8    27
32485   12    27
32497   15    27
32497    9    27
32734    4    27
32734   20    27
32746   20    27
32746    4    27
32982    9    27
32982   15    27
32994   12    27
32994    8    27
33231   10    27
33231   23    27
33243   16    27
33243    3    27
33479   14    27
33479   19    27
34237    3    27
34237   16    27
34485    8    27
34485   12    27
34734    4    27
34734   20    27
34982    9    27
34982   15    27
35231   10    27
35231   23    27
35479   14    27
35479   19    27
36000   24    27
36000    5    27
36249   22    27
36249   11    27
```

```
36497    21    27
36497    1     27
36746    18    27
36746    6     27
36994    17    27
36994    2     27
37194    15    27
37194    9     27
37243    13    27
37243    7     27
38000    24    27
38000    5     27
38237    7     27
38237    13    27
38249    22    27
38249    11    27
38485    2     27
38485    17    27
38497    21    27
38497    1     27
38734    6     27
38734    18    27
38746    18    27
38746    6     27
38982    1     27
38982    21    27
38994    17    27
38994    2     27
39231    11    27
39231    22    27
39243    13    27
39243    7     27
39479    5     27
39479    24    27
40000    24    27
40000    5     27
40237    7     27
40237    13    27
40249    22    27
40249    11    27
40485    2     27
40485    17    27
40497    21    27
40497    1     27
40734    6     27
40734    18    27
40746    18    27
40746    6     27
40982    1     27
40982    21    27
40994    17    27
40994    2     27
41231    11    27
41231    22    27
41243    13    27
```

```
41243    7    27
41479    5    27
41479    24   27
42000    24   27
42000    5    27
42237    7    27
42237    13   27
42249    22   27
42249    11   27
42485    2    27
42485    17   27
42497    21   27
42497    1    27
42734    6    27
42734    18   27
42746    18   27
42746    6    27
42982    1    27
42982    21   27
42994    17   27
42994    2    27
43231    11   27
43231    22   27
43243    13   27
43243    7    27
43479    5    27
43479    24   27
44000    24   27
44000    5    27
44237    7    27
44237    13   27
44249    22   27
44249    11   27
44388    12   27
44388    8    27
44485    2    27
44485    17   27
44497    21   27
44497    1    27
44734    6    27
44734    18   27
44746    18   27
44746    6    27
44982    1    27
44982    21   27
44994    17   27
44994    2    27
45231    11   27
45231    22   27
45243    13   27
45243    7    27
45479    5    27
45479    24   27
46237    7    27
46237    13   27
```

```
46485    2    27
46485   17    27
46734    6    27
46734   18    27
46982    1    27
46982   21    27
47231   11    27
47231   22    27
47479    5    27
47479   24    27
48000   19    27
48000   14    27
48249   23    27
48249   10    27
48497   15    27
48497    9    27
48746   20    27
48746    4    27
48994   12    27
48994    8    27
49243   16    27
49243    3    27
50000   19    27
50000   14    27
50000    5    27
50000   24    27
50237    3    27
50237   16    27
50249   23    27
50249   10    27
50485    8    27
50485   12    27
50497   15    27
50497    9    27
50734    4    27
50734   20    27
50746   20    27
50746    4    27
50982    9    27
50982   15    27
50994   12    27
50994    8    27
51231   10    27
51231   23    27
51243   16    27
51243    3    27
51479   14    27
51479   19    27
52000   19    27
52000   14    27
52237    3    27
52237   16    27
52249   23    27
52249   10    27
52485    8    27
```

```
52485   12   27
52497   15   27
52497   9    27
52734   4    27
52734   20   27
52746   20   27
52746   4    27
52982   9    27
52982   15   27
52994   12   27
52994   8    27
53231   10   27
53231   23   27
53243   16   27
53243   3    27
53479   14   27
53479   19   27
54000   19   27
54000   14   27
54237   3    27
54237   16   27
54249   23   27
54249   10   27
54485   8    27
54485   12   27
54497   15   27
54497   9    27
54734   4    27
54734   20   27
54746   20   27
54746   4    27
54982   9    27
54982   15   27
54994   12   27
54994   8    27
55231   10   27
55231   23   27
55243   16   27
55243   3    27
55479   14   27
55479   19   27
56000   19   27
56000   14   27
56237   3    27
56237   16   27
56249   23   27
56249   10   27
56485   8    27
56485   12   27
56497   15   27
56497   9    27
56734   4    27
56734   20   27
56746   20   27
56746   4    27
```

```
56982    9    27
56982   15    27
56994   12    27
56994    8    27
57194    1    27
57194   21    27
57231   10    27
57231   23    27
57243   16    27
57243    3    27
57479   14    27
57479   19    27
58237    3    27
58237   16    27
58485    8    27
58485   12    27
58734    4    27
58734   20    27
58982    9    27
58982   15    27
59231   10    27
59231   23    27
59479   14    27
59479   19    27
60000   24    27
60000    5    27
60249   22    27
60249   11    27
60497   21    27
60497    1    27
60746   18    27
60746    6    27
60994   17    27
60994    2    27
61243   13    27
61243    7    27
62000   24    27
62000    5    27
62237    7    27
62237   13    27
62249   22    27
62249   11    27
62374    3    27
62374   16    27
62485    2    27
62485   17    27
62497   21    27
62497    1    27
62734    6    27
62734   18    27
62746   18    27
62746    6    27
62982    1    27
62982   21    27
62994   17    27
```

```
62994     2    27
63231    11    27
63231    22    27
63243    13    27
63243     7    27
63479     5    27
63479    24    27
64000    24    27
64000     5    27
64237     7    27
64237    13    27
64249    22    27
64249    11    27
64388     2    27
64388    17    27
64485     2    27
64485    17    27
64497    21    27
64497     1    27
64734     6    27
64734    18    27
64746    18    27
64746     6    27
64982     1    27
64982    21    27
64994    17    27
64994     2    27
65231    11    27
65231    22    27
65243    13    27
65243     7    27
65479     5    27
65479    24    27
66000    24    27
66000     5    27
66237     7    27
66237    13    27
66249    22    27
66249    11    27
66485     2    27
66485    17    27
66497    21    27
66497     1    27
66734     6    27
66734    18    27
66746    18    27
66746     6    27
66982     1    27
66982    21    27
66994    17    27
66994     2    27
67231    11    27
67231    22    27
67243    13    27
67243     7    27
```

```
67479    5    27
67479    24   27
68000    24   27
68000    5    27
68237    7    27
68237    13   27
68249    22   27
68249    11   27
68485    2    27
68485    17   27
68497    21   27
68497    1    27
68734    6    27
68734    18   27
68746    18   27
68746    6    27
68982    1    27
68982    21   27
68994    17   27
68994    2    27
69231    11   27
69231    22   27
69243    13   27
69243    7    27
69479    5    27
69479    24   27
69568    4    27
69568    20   27
70237    7    27
70237    13   27
70485    2    27
70485    17   27
70734    6    27
70734    18   27
70982    1    27
70982    21   27
71231    11   27
71231    22   27
71479    5    27
71479    24   27
72000    19   27
72000    14   27
72249    23   27
72249    10   27
72497    15   27
72497    9    27
72746    20   27
72746    4    27
72994    12   27
72994    8    27
73243    16   27
73243    3    27
74000    19   27
74000    14   27
74237    3    27
```

```
74237   16   27
74249   23   27
74249   10   27
74485   8    27
74485   12   27
74497   15   27
74497   9    27
74734   4    27
74734   20   27
74746   20   27
74746   4    27
74982   9    27
74982   15   27
74994   12   27
74994   8    27
75231   10   27
75231   23   27
75243   16   27
75243   3    27
75479   14   27
75479   19   27
76000   19   27
76000   14   27
76237   3    27
76237   16   27
76249   23   27
76249   10   27
76485   8    27
76485   12   27
76497   15   27
76497   9    27
76734   4    27
76734   20   27
76746   20   27
76746   4    27
76763   10   27
76763   23   27
76982   9    27
76982   15   27
76994   12   27
76994   8    27
77231   10   27
77231   23   27
77243   16   27
77243   3    27
77479   14   27
77479   19   27
78000   19   27
78000   14   27
78237   3    27
78237   16   27
78249   23   27
78249   10   27
78485   8    27
78485   12   27
```

```
78497    15    27
78497     9    27
78734     4    27
78734    20    27
78746    20    27
78746     4    27
78982     9    27
78982    15    27
78994    12    27
78994     8    27
79231    10    27
79231    23    27
79243    16    27
79243     3    27
79479    14    27
79479    19    27
80000    19    27
80000    14    27
80237     3    27
80237    16    27
80249    23    27
80249    10    27
80485     8    27
80485    12    27
80497    15    27
80497     9    27
80734     4    27
80734    20    27
80746    20    27
80746     4    27
80982     9    27
80982    15    27
80994    12    27
80994     8    27
81231    10    27
81231    23    27
81243    16    27
81243     3    27
81479    14    27
81479    19    27
82237     3    27
82237    16    27
82374    13    27
82374     7    27
82485     8    27
82485    12    27
82734     4    27
82734    20    27
82982     9    27
82982    15    27
83231    10    27
83231    23    27
83479    14    27
83479    19    27
84000    24    27
```

```
84000    5    27
84249    22   27
84249    11   27
84497    21   27
84497    1    27
84746    18   27
84746    6    27
84994    17   27
84994    2    27
85243    13   27
85243    7    27
86000    24   27
86000    5    27
86237    7    27
86237    13   27
86249    22   27
86249    11   27
86485    2    27
86485    17   27
86497    21   27
86497    1    27
86734    6    27
86734    18   27
86746    18   27
86746    6    27
86982    1    27
86982    21   27
86994    17   27
86994    2    27
87231    11   27
87231    22   27
87243    13   27
87243    7    27
87479    5    27
87479    24   27
88000    24   27
88000    5    27
88237    7    27
88237    13   27
88249    22   27
88249    11   27
88485    2    27
88485    17   27
88497    21   27
88497    1    27
88734    6    27
88734    18   27
88746    18   27
88746    6    27
88982    1    27
88982    21   27
88994    17   27
88994    2    27
89231    11   27
89231    22   27
```

```
89243   13   27
89243    7   27
89479    5   27
89479   24   27
89568   18   27
89568    6   27
90000   24   27
90000    5   27
90237    7   27
90237   13   27
90249   22   27
90249   11   27
90485    2   27
90485   17   27
90497   21   27
90497    1   27
90734    6   27
90734   18   27
90746   18   27
90746    6   27
90982    1   27
90982   21   27
90994   17   27
90994    2   27
91231   11   27
91231   22   27
91243   13   27
91243    7   27
91479    5   27
91479   24   27
92000   24   27
92000    5   27
92237    7   27
92237   13   27
92249   22   27
92249   11   27
92485    2   27
92485   17   27
92497   21   27
92497    1   27
92734    6   27
92734   18   27
92746   18   27
92746    6   27
92982    1   27
92982   21   27
92994   17   27
92994    2   27
93231   11   27
93231   22   27
93243   13   27
93243    7   27
93479    5   27
93479   24   27
94237    7   27
```

```
94237    13   27
94485    2    27
94485    17   27
94734    6    27
94734    18   27
94982    1    27
94982    21   27
95231    11   27
95231    22   27
95479    5    27
95479    24   27
96763    22   27
96763    11   27
];

end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Scenario_44 %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Scenario_44()

global Scenario_4;

%time    originating node        destination node
Scenario_4 = [
0        19   27
172      23   27
344      15   27
516      20   27
688      12   27
860      16   27
1549     3    27
1721     8    27
1893     4    27
2065     9    27
2237     10   27
2409     14   27
0        14   27
172      10   27
344      9    27
516      4    27
688      8    27
860      3    27
1549     16   27
1721     12   27
1893     20   27
2065     15   27
2237     23   27
2409     19   27
2000     19   27
```

151

```
2172    23    27
2344    15    27
2516    20    27
2688    12    27
2860    16    27
3549     3    27
3721     8    27
3893     4    27
4065     9    27
4237    10    27
4409    14    27
2000    14    27
2172    10    27
2344     9    27
2516     4    27
2688     8    27
2860     3    27
3549    16    27
3721    12    27
3893    20    27
4065    15    27
4237    23    27
4409    19    27
4000    19    27
4172    23    27
4344    15    27
4516    20    27
4688    12    27
4860    16    27
5549     3    27
5721     8    27
5893     4    27
6065     9    27
6237    10    27
6409    14    27
4000    14    27
4172    10    27
4344     9    27
4516     4    27
4688     8    27
4860     3    27
5549    16    27
5721    12    27
5893    20    27
6065    15    27
6237    23    27
6409    19    27
6000    19    27
6172    23    27
6344    15    27
6516    20    27
6688    12    27
6860    16    27
7549     3    27
7721     8    27
```

```
7893     4    27
8065     9    27
8237    10    27
8409    14    27
6000    14    27
6172    10    27
6344     9    27
6516     4    27
6688     8    27
6860     3    27
7549    16    27
7721    12    27
7893    20    27
8065    15    27
8237    23    27
8409    19    27
8000    19    27
8172    23    27
8344    15    27
8516    20    27
8688    12    27
8860    16    27
9549     3    27
9721     8    27
9893     4    27
10065    9    27
10237   10    27
10409   14    27
8000    14    27
8172    10    27
8344     9    27
8516     4    27
8688     8    27
8860     3    27
9549    16    27
9721    12    27
9893    20    27
10065   15    27
10237   23    27
10409   19    27
12000   24    27
12172   22    27
12344   21    27
12516   18    27
12688   17    27
12860   13    27
13549    7    27
13721    2    27
13893    6    27
14065    1    27
14237   11    27
14409    5    27
12000    5    27
12172   11    27
12344    1    27
```

```
12516    6    27
12688    2    27
12860    7    27
13549   13    27
13721   17    27
13893   18    27
14065   21    27
14237   22    27
14409   24    27
14000   24    27
14172   22    27
14344   21    27
14516   18    27
14688   17    27
14860   13    27
15549    7    27
15721    2    27
15893    6    27
16065    1    27
16237   11    27
16409    5    27
14000    5    27
14172   11    27
14344    1    27
14516    6    27
14688    2    27
14860    7    27
15549   13    27
15721   17    27
15893   18    27
16065   21    27
16237   22    27
16409   24    27
16000   24    27
16172   22    27
16344   21    27
16516   18    27
16688   17    27
16860   13    27
17549    7    27
17721    2    27
17893    6    27
18065    1    27
18237   11    27
18409    5    27
16000    5    27
16172   11    27
16344    1    27
16516    6    27
16688    2    27
16860    7    27
17549   13    27
17721   17    27
17893   18    27
18065   21    27
```

```
18237   22   27
18409   24   27
18000   24   27
18172   22   27
18344   21   27
18516   18   27
18688   17   27
18860   13   27
19549   7    27
19721   2    27
19893   6    27
20065   1    27
20237   11   27
20409   5    27
18000   5    27
18172   11   27
18344   1    27
18516   6    27
18688   2    27
18860   7    27
19549   13   27
19721   17   27
19893   18   27
20065   21   27
20237   22   27
20409   24   27
20000   24   27
20172   22   27
20344   21   27
20516   18   27
20688   17   27
20860   13   27
21549   7    27
21721   2    27
21893   6    27
22065   1    27
22237   11   27
22409   5    27
20000   5    27
20172   11   27
20344   1    27
20516   6    27
20688   2    27
20860   7    27
21549   13   27
21721   17   27
21893   18   27
22065   21   27
22237   22   27
22409   24   27
24000   19   27
24172   23   27
24344   15   27
24516   20   27
24688   12   27
```

```
24860   16   27
25549    3   27
25721    8   27
25893    4   27
26065    9   27
26237   10   27
26409   14   27
24000   14   27
24172   10   27
24344    9   27
24516    4   27
24688    8   27
24860    3   27
25549   16   27
25721   12   27
25893   20   27
26065   15   27
26237   23   27
26409   19   27
26000   19   27
26172   23   27
26344   15   27
26516   20   27
26688   12   27
26860   16   27
27549    3   27
27721    8   27
27893    4   27
28065    9   27
28237   10   27
28409   14   27
26000   14   27
26172   10   27
26344    9   27
26516    4   27
26688    8   27
26860    3   27
27549   16   27
27721   12   27
27893   20   27
28065   15   27
28237   23   27
28409   19   27
28000   19   27
28172   23   27
28344   15   27
28516   20   27
28688   12   27
28860   16   27
29549    3   27
29721    8   27
29893    4   27
30065    9   27
30237   10   27
30409   14   27
```

```
28000    14    27
28172    10    27
28344    9     27
28516    4     27
28688    8     27
28860    3     27
29549    16    27
29721    12    27
29893    20    27
30065    15    27
30237    23    27
30409    19    27
30000    19    27
30172    23    27
30344    15    27
30516    20    27
30688    12    27
30860    16    27
31549    3     27
31721    8     27
31893    4     27
32065    9     27
32237    10    27
32409    14    27
30000    14    27
30172    10    27
30344    9     27
30516    4     27
30688    8     27
30860    3     27
31549    16    27
31721    12    27
31893    20    27
32065    15    27
32237    23    27
32409    19    27
32000    19    27
32172    23    27
32344    15    27
32516    20    27
32688    12    27
32860    16    27
33549    3     27
33721    8     27
33893    4     27
34065    9     27
34237    10    27
34409    14    27
32000    14    27
32172    10    27
32344    9     27
32516    4     27
32688    8     27
32860    3     27
33549    16    27
```

```
33721   12   27
33893   20   27
34065   15   27
34237   23   27
34409   19   27
36000   24   27
36172   22   27
36344   21   27
36516   18   27
36688   17   27
36860   13   27
37549   7    27
37721   2    27
37893   6    27
38065   1    27
38237   11   27
38409   5    27
36000   5    27
36172   11   27
36344   1    27
36516   6    27
36688   2    27
36860   7    27
37549   13   27
37721   17   27
37893   18   27
38065   21   27
38237   22   27
38409   24   27
38000   24   27
38172   22   27
38344   21   27
38516   18   27
38688   17   27
38860   13   27
39549   7    27
39721   2    27
39893   6    27
40065   1    27
40237   11   27
40409   5    27
38000   5    27
38172   11   27
38344   1    27
38516   6    27
38688   2    27
38860   7    27
39549   13   27
39721   17   27
39893   18   27
40065   21   27
40237   22   27
40409   24   27
40000   24   27
40172   22   27
```

```
40344    21    27
40516    18    27
40688    17    27
40860    13    27
41549     7    27
41721     2    27
41893     6    27
42065     1    27
42237    11    27
42409     5    27
40000     5    27
40172    11    27
40344     1    27
40516     6    27
40688     2    27
40860     7    27
41549    13    27
41721    17    27
41893    18    27
42065    21    27
42237    22    27
42409    24    27
42000    24    27
42172    22    27
42344    21    27
42516    18    27
42688    17    27
42860    13    27
43549     7    27
43721     2    27
43893     6    27
44065     1    27
44237    11    27
44409     5    27
42000     5    27
42172    11    27
42344     1    27
42516     6    27
42688     2    27
42860     7    27
43549    13    27
43721    17    27
43893    18    27
44065    21    27
44237    22    27
44409    24    27
44000    24    27
44172    22    27
44344    21    27
44516    18    27
44688    17    27
44860    13    27
45549     7    27
45721     2    27
45893     6    27
```

```
46065    1    27
46237   11    27
46409    5    27
44000    5    27
44172   11    27
44344    1    27
44516    6    27
44688    2    27
44860    7    27
45549   13    27
45721   17    27
45893   18    27
46065   21    27
46237   22    27
46409   24    27
48000   19    27
48172   23    27
48344   15    27
48516   20    27
48688   12    27
48860   16    27
49549    3    27
49721    8    27
49893    4    27
50065    9    27
50237   10    27
50409   14    27
48000   14    27
48172   10    27
48344    9    27
48516    4    27
48688    8    27
48860    3    27
49549   16    27
49721   12    27
49893   20    27
50065   15    27
50237   23    27
50409   19    27
50000   19    27
50172   23    27
50344   15    27
50516   20    27
50688   12    27
50860   16    27
51549    3    27
51721    8    27
51893    4    27
52065    9    27
52237   10    27
52409   14    27
50000   14    27
50172   10    27
50344    9    27
50516    4    27
```

160

```
50688    8     27
50860    3     27
51549    16    27
51721    12    27
51893    20    27
52065    15    27
52237    23    27
52409    19    27
52000    19    27
52172    23    27
52344    15    27
52516    20    27
52688    12    27
52860    16    27
53549    3     27
53721    8     27
53893    4     27
54065    9     27
54237    10    27
54409    14    27
52000    14    27
52172    10    27
52344    9     27
52516    4     27
52688    8     27
52860    3     27
53549    16    27
53721    12    27
53893    20    27
54065    15    27
54237    23    27
54409    19    27
54000    19    27
54172    23    27
54344    15    27
54516    20    27
54688    12    27
54860    16    27
55549    3     27
55721    8     27
55893    4     27
56065    9     27
56237    10    27
56409    14    27
54000    14    27
54172    10    27
54344    9     27
54516    4     27
54688    8     27
54860    3     27
55549    16    27
55721    12    27
55893    20    27
56065    15    27
56237    23    27
```

```
56409    19    27
56000    19    27
56172    23    27
56344    15    27
56516    20    27
56688    12    27
56860    16    27
57549     3    27
57721     8    27
57893     4    27
58065     9    27
58237    10    27
58409    14    27
56000    14    27
56172    10    27
56344     9    27
56516     4    27
56688     8    27
56860     3    27
57549    16    27
57721    12    27
57893    20    27
58065    15    27
58237    23    27
58409    19    27
60000    24    27
60172    22    27
60344    21    27
60516    18    27
60688    17    27
60860    13    27
61549     7    27
61721     2    27
61893     6    27
62065     1    27
62237    11    27
62409     5    27
60000     5    27
60172    11    27
60344     1    27
60516     6    27
60688     2    27
60860     7    27
61549    13    27
61721    17    27
61893    18    27
62065    21    27
62237    22    27
62409    24    27
62000    24    27
62172    22    27
62344    21    27
62516    18    27
62688    17    27
62860    13    27
```

```
63549    7    27
63721    2    27
63893    6    27
64065    1    27
64237   11    27
64409    5    27
62000    5    27
62172   11    27
62344    1    27
62516    6    27
62688    2    27
62860    7    27
63549   13    27
63721   17    27
63893   18    27
64065   21    27
64237   22    27
64409   24    27
64000   24    27
64172   22    27
64344   21    27
64516   18    27
64688   17    27
64860   13    27
65549    7    27
65721    2    27
65893    6    27
66065    1    27
66237   11    27
66409    5    27
64000    5    27
64172   11    27
64344    1    27
64516    6    27
64688    2    27
64860    7    27
65549   13    27
65721   17    27
65893   18    27
66065   21    27
66237   22    27
66409   24    27
66000   24    27
66172   22    27
66344   21    27
66516   18    27
66688   17    27
66860   13    27
67549    7    27
67721    2    27
67893    6    27
68065    1    27
68237   11    27
68409    5    27
66000    5    27
```

```
66172    11    27
66344    1     27
66516    6     27
66688    2     27
66860    7     27
67549    13    27
67721    17    27
67893    18    27
68065    21    27
68237    22    27
68409    24    27
68000    24    27
68172    22    27
68344    21    27
68516    18    27
68688    17    27
68860    13    27
69549    7     27
69721    2     27
69893    6     27
70065    1     27
70237    11    27
70409    5     27
68000    5     27
68172    11    27
68344    1     27
68516    6     27
68688    2     27
68860    7     27
69549    13    27
69721    17    27
69893    18    27
70065    21    27
70237    22    27
70409    24    27
72000    19    27
72172    23    27
72344    15    27
72516    20    27
72688    12    27
72860    16    27
73549    3     27
73721    8     27
73893    4     27
74065    9     27
74237    10    27
74409    14    27
72000    14    27
72172    10    27
72344    9     27
72516    4     27
72688    8     27
72860    3     27
73549    16    27
73721    12    27
```

```
73893    20    27
74065    15    27
74237    23    27
74409    19    27
74000    19    27
74172    23    27
74344    15    27
74516    20    27
74688    12    27
74860    16    27
75549    3     27
75721    8     27
75893    4     27
76065    9     27
76237    10    27
76409    14    27
74000    14    27
74172    10    27
74344    9     27
74516    4     27
74688    8     27
74860    3     27
75549    16    27
75721    12    27
75893    20    27
76065    15    27
76237    23    27
76409    19    27
76000    19    27
76172    23    27
76344    15    27
76516    20    27
76688    12    27
76860    16    27
77549    3     27
77721    8     27
77893    4     27
78065    9     27
78237    10    27
78409    14    27
76000    14    27
76172    10    27
76344    9     27
76516    4     27
76688    8     27
76860    3     27
77549    16    27
77721    12    27
77893    20    27
78065    15    27
78237    23    27
78409    19    27
78000    19    27
78172    23    27
78344    15    27
```

```
78516    20    27
78688    12    27
78860    16    27
79549     3    27
79721     8    27
79893     4    27
80065     9    27
80237    10    27
80409    14    27
78000    14    27
78172    10    27
78344     9    27
78516     4    27
78688     8    27
78860     3    27
79549    16    27
79721    12    27
79893    20    27
80065    15    27
80237    23    27
80409    19    27
80000    19    27
80172    23    27
80344    15    27
80516    20    27
80688    12    27
80860    16    27
81549     3    27
81721     8    27
81893     4    27
82065     9    27
82237    10    27
82409    14    27
80000    14    27
80172    10    27
80344     9    27
80516     4    27
80688     8    27
80860     3    27
81549    16    27
81721    12    27
81893    20    27
82065    15    27
82237    23    27
82409    19    27
84000    24    27
84172    22    27
84344    21    27
84516    18    27
84688    17    27
84860    13    27
85549     7    27
85721     2    27
85893     6    27
86065     1    27
```

```
86237    11    27
86409    5     27
84000    5     27
84172    11    27
84344    1     27
84516    6     27
84688    2     27
84860    7     27
85549    13    27
85721    17    27
85893    18    27
86065    21    27
86237    22    27
86409    24    27
86000    24    27
86172    22    27
86344    21    27
86516    18    27
86688    17    27
86860    13    27
87549    7     27
87721    2     27
87893    6     27
88065    1     27
88237    11    27
88409    5     27
86000    5     27
86172    11    27
86344    1     27
86516    6     27
86688    2     27
86860    7     27
87549    13    27
87721    17    27
87893    18    27
88065    21    27
88237    22    27
88409    24    27
88000    24    27
88172    22    27
88344    21    27
88516    18    27
88688    17    27
88860    13    27
89549    7     27
89721    2     27
89893    6     27
90065    1     27
90237    11    27
90409    5     27
88000    5     27
88172    11    27
88344    1     27
88516    6     27
88688    2     27
```

88860	7	27
89549	13	27
89721	17	27
89893	18	27
90065	21	27
90237	22	27
90409	24	27
90000	24	27
90172	22	27
90344	21	27
90516	18	27
90688	17	27
90860	13	27
91549	7	27
91721	2	27
91893	6	27
92065	1	27
92237	11	27
92409	5	27
90000	5	27
90172	11	27
90344	1	27
90516	6	27
90688	2	27
90860	7	27
91549	13	27
91721	17	27
91893	18	27
92065	21	27
92237	22	27
92409	24	27
92000	24	27
92172	22	27
92344	21	27
92516	18	27
92688	17	27
92860	13	27
93549	7	27
93721	2	27
93893	6	27
94065	1	27
94237	11	27
94409	5	27
92000	5	27
92172	11	27
92344	1	27
92516	6	27
92688	2	27
92860	7	27
93549	13	27
93721	17	27
93893	18	27
94065	21	27
94237	22	27
94409	24	27

```
50000   5   27
57194   1   27
64388   2   27
82374   13  27
89568   18  27
96763   22  27
50000   24  27
57194   21  27
64388   17  27
82374   7   27
89568   6   27
96763   11  27
30000   19  27
37194   15  27
44388   12  27
62374   3   27
69568   4   27
76763   10  27
30000   14  27
37194   9   27
44388   8   27
62374   16  27
69568   20  27
76763   23  27
];


end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Create_PCAP_Table %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Create_PCAP_Table()
% Creates the table in which the PCAP information is stored for each
% transmission.

global PCAP;
% Packet#   Timer   Status SrcNode    DestNode    RawPacket
PCAP = zeros(1,1021);

end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Spoof %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Spoof()
% Inserting packet for spoofing
```

```matlab
global Spoofed_Node;
global Rec_Node;
global Spoof_Pack_Num;
global Spoof_Packet;
global Energy_Table;
global Node_Status;
global Timer;
global Open_Packets;
global SpNum;
global Packet;
global fileID;
global Packets;
global Node_Status_Table;
global Timer_Spoof;
global Wait_Time;


[cc,dd] = size(Node_Status_Table);
cc = cc+1;


[b,c] = size(Energy_Table);
    d = 0;
for n= 1:b
% We know the node needs to transmit but needs to see if another node
% is transmitting
if Energy_Table(n,1) == Rec_Node
if Node_Status(Energy_Table(n,2),2) == 3;
                d = 1;
end
end
end
% checks ot see if it is able to spoof the node from the checks
% performed above
if  d == 0 && Spoof_Pack_Num > 0 && Timer_Spoof < Timer
        Timer_Spoof = Timer + 1000; % another spoof can occur in 1000ms
        Wait_Time(Rec_Node,2) = 0;


        Spoof_Pack_Num = Spoof_Pack_Num - 1; %can place a limit on the
number of spoofed frames by the user
        [q,r] = size(Open_Packets);
        q = q+1;
        SpNum = q;
        Open_Packets(q,1:7) = [q (Timer+4) 2 1 Spoofed_Node Rec_Node
0]; %log for the open frames
        Node_Status(Rec_Node,2:3) = [5 (Timer+4)]; % continuous node
status log
        Node_Status_Table(cc,1:4) = [Rec_Node,Timer,2,5]; % current
node status log
        Packet(q,1:1016) = Spoof_Packet(1:1016); %creates spoofed frame
        Packets(q,1:3) = [q Spoofed_Node Rec_Node]; %frame is logged
        fprintf('---At Time %i, Packet %i is a spoofed
packet\n',Timer,q);
        fprintf(fileID,'---At Time %i, Packet %i is a spoofed
packet\n',Timer,q);
```

170

```matlab
    end

    end


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Spoofing %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Spoofing()
% Spoofing attack

global Spoofed_Node;
global Rec_Node;
global Routing_Table;
global Spoof_Pack_Num;
global Spoof_Packet;
global Starter_Packet;
global Node_MAC;
global Node_Address;
global SpNum;
global Timer_Spoof;

Timer_Spoof = 0;
SpNum = 0;
Rec_Node = 0;


Spoof_Pack_Num = 100; %limits simulation to 100 injected frames
% not testing a spoofed frame from BS
if Spoofed_Node < 27
    [a,b] = size(Routing_Table);
for n = 1:a %find the next hop to go to from the spoofed node
if Spoofed_Node == Routing_Table(n,1) && Routing_Table(n,2) == 1
            Rec_Node = Routing_Table(n,3);
end
end
% create spoofed frame
    Spoof_Packet = Starter_Packet(1,1:1016);

% Adds Source MAC Address
        Spoof_Packet(17:80) = Node_MAC(Spoofed_Node,2:65);

%Destination MAC Address
        Spoof_Packet(81:144) = Node_MAC(Rec_Node,2:65);

% Source Address
        Spoof_Packet(169:184) =  Node_Address(Spoofed_Node,50:65);

% Destination Address
        Spoof_Packet(185:200) =  Node_Address(27,50:65);

%Sequence Number
```

```matlab
        Spoof_Packet(225:256) = randi([0,1],1,32);

% Padding
        Spoof_Packet(425:864) = randi([0 1],1,440);

% Next Header
        Spoof_Packet(993:1000) = randi([0 1],1,8);

% Payload
        Spoof_Packet(297:424) = randi([0,1],1,128);

% Message Integrity Code
        Spoof_Packet(865:992) = randi([0 1],1,128);

% Field Check Sum (CRC)
%Create the CRC for the Packet
            crc1 = Spoof_Packet(1:1000);
            crc = crc16(crc1);
        Spoof_Packet(1001:1016) = crc;
end


end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% DDOS %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function DDOS(n)
% Directed Denial of Service Attack

global DDOS_Node;
global Node_Status;
global Energy_Table;
global Cycles;
global Enc;

% creates node within table to simulate the rogue node to conduct DOS
% attack, initial set-up
if n == 1
    [a,b] = size(Energy_Table);
    Energy_Table((a+1),1:2) = [28,DDOS_Node];
    Enc(DDOS_Node) = 0;

%ensures node remains in transmitting status each cycle and that the
%affected node remains in a receiving status
elseif n == 2
    Node_Status(DDOS_Node,2:3) = [5 Cycles];
    Node_Status(28,1:5) = [28 3 Cycles 0 0];

end
```

172

```matlab
        end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% MITM %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function MITM(PN)
% Man in the Middle attack

global Packet;
global fileID;
global MITMAtt;

%Alerts user the attack was performed
fprintf('---A MITM attack was executed for packet %3i\n',PN);
fprintf(fileID,'---A MITM attack was executed for packet %3i\n',PN);
%injects random information into the payload
Packet(PN,297:864) = randi([0,1],1,568);
crc = crc16(Packet(PN,1:1000));
%adjusts the crc to properly validate at follow-on node
Packet(PN,1001:1016) = crc(1:16);

[aa,bb] = size(MITMAtt);
cc = 0;
%Logs the frames in which the MITM was conducted on to analyze
afterwards
for n = 1:bb
if MITMAtt(n) == PN
    cc = 1;
end
end
if cc == 0
    MITMAtt(n + 1) = PN;
end

end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Run Simulation %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function Run_Simulation()
% This function iterates every 1 ms to simulate a network environment.

global Timer;
global Events;
global DDOS_Node;
global Cycles;
global fileID;
```

173

```matlab
global Spoofed_Node;
global Rec_Node;
global Node_Status;

%Gets last time a sensing event is obtained
LastEvent = max(Events);

%Adds time for the sesning event to be completed
Cycles = LastEvent(1) + 10000;    %adds 10 seconds

for n = 1:Cycles
%Checks for errors from preious cycle and distributes the errors as
%required
    Check_For_Errors(Timer);

%Adjusts the Node's status once it has reached the end of its process
    Check_Node_Status(Timer);


    a = randi(100,1);
if Spoofed_Node < 27
if a <= 1 && Node_Status(Rec_Node,2) == 2 &&
Node_Status(Spoofed_Node,2) == 0
                Spoof();
end
end

%Cycles through open packets to see if it is ready for the cycle
    Check_For_Open_Packets(Timer);

%Checks for new sensing events to be added to an open packet
    Check_For_New_Events(Timer);

%Adds the time to the specific energy use tables
xxx = mod(Timer,5000);

%alerts user the program is running and how far along it is
xxxx = Timer /1000;
if xxx == 0
    fprintf('%i seconds have elapsed \n',xxxx);
    fprintf(fileID,'%i seconds have elapsed \n',xxxx);
end

% checks status of DOS rogue and affected node
if DDOS_Node < 28
        DDOS(2);
end

%Logs energy use of the nodes at the time in the cycle
    Check_For_Energy_Use();
    Timer = Timer + 1;
    LastEvent = max(Events);

%ensures last event is complete before ending the program
```

174

```matlab
    Cycles = LastEvent(1) + 5000;
end

end



%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Check_For_Errors %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Check_For_Errors(Timer)
% Checks all of the Open_Packets to show that there was an error in
% receiving a packet. It is documented that the packet was received in
% error but the node will continue its same processing sequence, it
% will just fail in processing and the transmitting node will have to
% transmit again.

%{
This is for me while programming to keep from checking another file....
Packet #    timer    event    # of trans      TransNode RecNode      Errors
Open_Packets = [
    0        0        0            0          0            0        0
    ];
%}

global Open_Packets;
global Energy_Table;

[a,b] = size(Open_Packets);    %gets the number of the amount of open
packets
for n = 1:a     % cycles through all of the open packets
    c = 0;       % variable
if Open_Packets(n,3) == 2   % Checks if a packet is being transmitted
for m = 1:a     % If a packet is being transmitted it is then checked
against all other open packets
if Open_Packets(m,3) == 2 && Open_Packets(n,5) ~= Open_Packets(m,5)  %
If will cycle itself again to see if another node is transmitting
% If another node is transmitting then it needs to check if
% the receiving node is affected by cycling through all of
% the potentialling affected nodes.
            [d,e] = size(Energy_Table);    % Gets the size of the table
for p = 1:d                     % Cycles through the table
if Open_Packets(m,5) == Energy_Table(p,1)
                        % Finds in the table the affected nodes
if Energy_Table(p,2) == Open_Packets(n,6)
                        % If a receiving node matches an affected node
                          diff=(Open_Packets(m,2) - Open_Packets(n,2));
                          check = power(diff,2);
if check < 17

                            Open_Packets(n,3) = 3;
                        % the error is placed in the original packet
end
end
```

```matlab
end
if Open_Packets(n,5) == Energy_Table(p,1)
                           % Finds in the table the affected nodes
if Energy_Table(p,2) == Open_Packets(m,6)
                           % If a receiving node matches an affected node
                              diff=(Open_Packets(m,2) - Open_Packets(n,2));
                              check = power(diff,2);
if check < 17
                                  Open_Packets(m,3) = 3;
                           % the error is placed in the original packet
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
```

```matlab
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Check_Node_Status %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Check_Node_Status(Timer)
%Adjusts the node status to the next step when the node timer is
reached

global Node_Status;
global Wait_Time;
global Open_Packets;
global Node_Status_Table;

for n=1:27       %Cycle through all of the nodes
if Wait_Time(n,2) == 25;
             % If wait time reaches 25 ms then it will go to sleep
             Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;
             % Resets wait time for next evolution
             Node_Status(n,2) = 6;    % Status 6 is going to sleep
                 [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                 Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 2 6];
             Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 1;
             % It takes 1 ms to go to sleep

end

% if the node is at 2 and still waiting, add 1 ms to energy use
if Node_Status(n,2) == 2  && Node_Status(n,1) ~= 27

             Wait_Time(n,2) = Wait_Time(n,2) + 1;
             % Adds 1 ms to the Wait time
elseif Node_Status(n,3) <= Timer            % Checks if the node is
ready to transition to the next stage
```

```matlab
% If node is either at:
%  0 = Node is asleep
%  1 = finished waking up
%  3 = finished transmitting
%  4 = finished Processing
%  5 = Finished receiving
%  6 = Going to sleep
%  7 = Waiting for Post Trans
if Node_Status(n,2) == 1
                Node_Status(n,2) = 2;
        % change node to a waiting status making it available for
        % the next function
                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 1 2];
                % entry into node status log
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 7
                Node_Status(n,2) = 2;
            % it is now in waiting phase to begin retransmission
                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 7 2];
                % entry into node status log
                Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 4
                Node_Status(n,2) = 2;
            % it is now in waiting phase to begin retransmission
                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 4 2];
                % entry into node status log
                Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 5
            % node is finished receiving
              Node_Status(n,2) = 4;
            % node is now processing
                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 5 4];
                % entry into node status log
                Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 3
            % if node is finished transmitting
              Node_Status(n,2) = 7;
            % it is now in a processing phase
                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 3 7];
                % entry into node status log
                Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;
            [c,d] = size(Open_Packets);
for aa = 1:c
if Open_Packets(aa,5) == Node_Status(n,1)
if Open_Packets(aa,4)==1 || Open_Packets(aa,4)==5
                        Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 6;
                    % Time after first transmission
% seed number inserted for BS neighbor
% nodes
if Node_Status(n,1) == 25 || Node_Status(n,1) == 26
```

```matlab
                                                    Node_Status(n,3) =
Node_Status(n,3) + randi([1,4],1,1);
end


elseif Open_Packets(aa,4) == 2 || Open_Packets(aa,4) == 6
                                Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 10; % Time
after second transmission
if Node_Status(n,1) == 25 || Node_Status(n,1) == 26
                                      Node_Status(n,3) =
Node_Status(n,3) + randi([1,4],1,1); %seed number
end


elseif Open_Packets(aa,4) == 3 || Open_Packets(aa,4) == 7
                                Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 20; % Time
after third transmission
if Node_Status(n,1) == 25 || Node_Status(n,1) == 26
                                      Node_Status(n,3) =
Node_Status(n,3) + randi([1,4],1,1);%seed number
end
elseif Open_Packets(aa,4) == 4 || Open_Packets(aa,4) == 8
                                Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 40; % Time
after fourth transmission
if Node_Status(n,1) == 25 || Node_Status(n,1) == 26
                                      Node_Status(n,3) =
Node_Status(n,3) + randi([1,4],1,1);%seed number
end
end
end
end


end
if Node_Status(n,2) == 6
                    %if node has completed its going to sleep phase
                      Node_Status(n,2) = 0;   % Node is now in sleep
                          [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                          Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 6 0];
                          % entry into node status log
end
end


end


end


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Check_For_Open_Packets %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%


function Check_For_Open_Packets(Timer)

% Check to see if a packet is ready to move onto the next function
%Packet #   timer   event   # of trans    TransNode RecNode    Errors
%Open_Packets = [
%     0         0        0           0         0           0         0
```
178

```matlab
%         ];

%    Node#     Status     Stat Time chg   Errors?
%Node_Status = [
%    1         0                0                    0;

global Open_Packets;
global Node_Status;
global Node_Status_Table;

[a,b] = size(Open_Packets);     %gets the number of the amount of open
packets
for n = 1:a      % cycles through all of the open packets

if Open_Packets(n,2) <= Timer  && Open_Packets(n,7) <= 50
% Checks if a packet is ready for next function


%Packet is ready to transition from Wakeup
if Open_Packets(n,3) == 0 && Open_Packets(n,1) > 0
% Packet is made but has not been processed

% if packet was in the wake up stage, it needs to move to processing
% the packet
%In order to move to processing the packet, the node must be waiting,
%therefore must check if node is in phase 2, waiting.

%Node is ready for the open packet to process
if Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 2) == 2 &&
Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 3) <= Timer
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 2) = 4;
% Node is now processing original packet
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) =
[Open_Packets(n,5) Timer 2 4];
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5),3) = Timer + 8;
% Time to process for Node
                    Open_Packets(n,2) = Timer + 8;
% Time to process the packet
                    Open_Packets(n,3) = [2];
% Adjusts packet status that it is now in the processing phase

end

% Packet has finished processing and ready for transmission
elseif Open_Packets(n,3) == 1 && Open_Packets(n,2) <= Timer
% Node can only go to next function if it is in state 2,
% otherwise no need to check other functions
if Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 2) == 4 &&
Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 3) <= Timer

% Function to transmit the packet and determine if it
% can transmit, this will contain a lot of code to
```

179

```matlab
    % determine the energy of the affected nodes and etc.

    %Will need to place nodes in either receiving or
    %transmitting phases and then all into a processing
    %phase.
                    Transmission(Open_Packets(n,1));


    elseif Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 2) == 2 &&
    Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 3) <= Timer
                    Transmission(Open_Packets(n,1));
    end


    % Packet has completed transmission and is ready to be post
    % processed by the Receiving Node
    elseif Open_Packets(n,3) == 2 && Open_Packets(n,2) <= Timer
    %Check Packet Status
                Open_Packets(n,3) = 3;
                Process_Received_Packet(Open_Packets(n,1));
    % Sends to function to process the packet

    % Packet has completed processing and needs to be
    % transmitted
    elseif Open_Packets(n,3) == 3 && Open_Packets(n,2) <= Timer
    % Checks node status to see if it is ready to transmit
    if Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5),2 ) == 2 &&
    Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 3) <= Timer
                    Transmission(Open_Packets(n,1));
    end

    end

    end

    end



    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
    % Process_Received_Packet %
    %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

    function Process_Received_Packet(Packet_Number)
    %Adjusts the node status to the next step when the node timer is
    % reached

    global Node_Status;
    global Packet;
    global Open_Packets;
    global Timer;
    global Node_Address;
    global Node_MAC;
    global Energy_Table;
    global Node_Status_Table;
```

```matlab
global MITM_Nodes;
global fileID;
global MITMAtt;
global SpNum;
global Rec_Node;

PN = Packet_Number;
source = 0;
aaa = 0;

% Checks for Receiving nodes status to see if it able to begin
% processingand if its timer is good

if Node_Status(Open_Packets(PN,6), 2) == 4 &&
Node_Status(Open_Packets(PN,6), 3) <= Timer
% Check to see if there was an error for the packet or node
if Open_Packets(PN,7) <= 49 && Node_Status(Open_Packets(PN,6),4) <= 99
% No errors were found, receiving node is ready for processing
            Node_Status(Open_Packets(PN,6),3) = Timer + 5;
% Sets timer on the node
            Open_Packets(PN,2) = Timer + 5;
% Time to process the packet
            Open_Packets(PN,3) = 3;
% Sets status of the Packet to have been processed

if MITM_Nodes(1) == Open_Packets(PN,5) && MITM_Nodes(2) ==
Open_Packets(PN,6)
                MITMAtt(1) = 0;
                MITM(PN);
end
%               % Add BER
                Test_Packet(1,1:1016) = Packet(PN,1:1016);
if SpNum == PN && Rec_Node == Open_Packets(PN,6)
%         % Spoof skipped BER in order to properly inject the frame
else
for pp = 1:1016
                    bb = Packet(PN,pp);
                    cc = randi(100000,1);
%performs the random BER on the frame being received
if bb == 0 && cc <= 1
                        fprintf('At time %i a BER was inserted for
Packet %i and bit # %i \n', Timer, PN, pp);
                        fprintf(fileID,'At time %i a BER was
inserted for Packet %i and bit # %i \n', Timer, PN, pp);
                        Test_Packet(pp) = 1;
elseif bb == 1 && cc <=1
                        fprintf('At time %i a BER was inserted for
Packet %i and bit # %i \n', Timer, PN, pp);
                        fprintf(fileID,'At time %i a BER was
inserted for Packet %i and bit # %i \n', Timer, PN, pp);
                        Test_Packet(pp) = 0;
end
end
end
%Check addresses
```

```matlab
                destmac(1:64) = Packet(PN,81:144);
                dm = 0;
                srcmac(1:64) = Packet(PN,17:80);
                sm = 0;
                destip(1:16) = Packet(PN,185:200);
                di = 0;


% checks to make sure addresses transmitted correctly
for ad = 1:27
if srcmac(1:64) == Node_MAC(ad,2:65)
if Open_Packets(PN,5) == ad
                            sm = 1;
end
end
if destmac(1:64) == Node_MAC(ad,2:65)
if Open_Packets(PN,6) == ad
                            dm = 1;
end
end
end
if destip(1:16) == Node_Address(27,50:65)
                 di = 1;
end

            tot = sm + dm + di;

%          % Checks CRC
          crc = crc16(Test_Packet(1:1000));
if Packet(PN,1001:1016) == crc(1:16)
            aaa = 1;
else
            fprintf('At time %i CRC Failed for Packet %i \n',
Timer, PN);
            fprintf(fileID,'At time %i CRC Failed for Packet %i
\n', Timer, PN);
end

% Sends to function to change the packet headers for the
% next transmission if it is not at the Base Station

            source = Open_Packets(PN,5);

%if everything checks out with addresses and CRC
if Open_Packets(PN,6) ~= 27 && aaa == 1 && tot == 3
                 Packet_Next_Hop(Open_Packets(PN,1));
                 crc = crc16(Packet(PN,1:1000));
                 Packet(PN,1001:1016) = crc;
                 Open_Packets(PN,4) = 0;
%if received by the BS and an error has occured logs the
%error or logged as received
elseif Open_Packets(PN,6) == 27 && Open_Packets(PN,4) == 1
if aaa == 1 && tot == 3
                      Open_Packets(PN,7) = 99; % received no error
```

```matlab
                else
                            Open_Packets(PN,7) = 96; % received with error
        end
    end
end

    else

    end% Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,6), 2) == 2 &&
Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,6), 3) <= Timer

%Now to consider the nodes that were affected


   [b,c] = size(Energy_Table);
%Cycles through the table again to set statuses
for n = 1:b

% Checks for sending node
if Energy_Table(n,1) ==  source;

              AN = Energy_Table(n,2); % Affected Node

% Node will now process the packet and discard since it is
% not to the node
if Node_Status(AN,2) == 4 && Open_Packets(PN,6) ~= AN

                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 5;
% Adjusts time for nodes next function

% Node is waiting to receive packet from receiving node to confirm that
the packet was successfully forwarded
elseif Node_Status(AN,2) == 7
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 4;
%Switch Node Status to Receiving
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 7 4];
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 5;
% Adjusts time for node's next function

end% if Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 2




end% Energy_Table(n,1) == a
end% for n = 1:b


end


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
```

```matlab
% Transmission %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Transmission(Packet_Number)
% Function to transmit the packet and determine if it
% can transmit, this will contain a lot of code to
% determine the energy of the affected nodes and etc.

%Will need to place nodes in either receiving or
%transmitting phases and then all into a processing
%phase.

global Open_Packets;
global Energy_Table;
global Node_Status;
global PCAP;
global Timer;
global Packet;
global Node_Status_Table;
global Routing_Table;
global Node_MAC;
global Node_Address;
global Events;
global Packet_Retrans_Tracker;
global NodeTX;
global NodeRX;

a = Packet_Number;
PN = a;
d = 0;
SMA = 0;
SIP = 0;

if Open_Packets(PN,4) == 4
[f,b] = size(Routing_Table);
% checks for which route it should use
    SMAC = Packet(PN,17:80);
    SIPC = Packet(PN,169:184);
for nn = 1:f
if Open_Packets(PN,5) == Routing_Table(nn,1) && 2 ==
Routing_Table(nn,2)
            Open_Packets(PN,6) = Routing_Table(nn,3);
            Packet(PN,81:144) = Node_MAC(Open_Packets(PN,6),2:65);
            nn = f;
end

end
for mm = 1:27
if SMAC(1:64) == Node_MAC(mm,2:65)
            SMA = mm;
end

if SIPC == Node_Address(mm,50:65)
            SIP = mm;
```

```matlab
end
end
if SIP == SMA
        Packet(PN,162) = [2];
else
        Packet(PN,161) = [2];
end


%Adjust new CRC
     crc = crc16(Packet(PN,1:1000));
     Packet(PN,1001:1016) = crc(1:16);


end


%Frame had a collision on the last hop
if Open_Packets(PN,4) >= 1 && Open_Packets(PN,6) == 27
    Open_Packets(PN,7) = 97;
    d = 1;
end


% frame has been transmitted 8 times and is going into storage for
% futuretransmission
if Open_Packets(PN,4) >= 8 && Open_Packets(PN,7) <= 49
    Open_Packets(PN,7) = 98;
    [j,k] = size(Events);
if j <= 3000
                tim = Timer + 1000 + randi(200,1);
                [aa,bb] = size(Packet_Retrans_Tracker);
                Packet_Retrans_Tracker((aa+1),1:4) = [PN, 00,
Open_Packets(PN,5), Timer];
                Events((j+1),1:3) = [tim Open_Packets(PN,5) 27];
end
    d = 1;
end


[b,c] = size(Energy_Table);


%variable used to determine if another node is transmitting, if it is
%transmitting d will equal 1, if any of the nodes are not transmitting
% then the transmission can occur.


for n= 1:b
% We know the node needs to transmit but needs to see if another
% node is transmitting
if Energy_Table(n,1) == Open_Packets(a,5)
if Node_Status(Energy_Table(n,2),2) == 3;
            d = 1;
if Open_Packets(a,5) == 25 || Open_Packets(a,5) == 26
                 Open_Packets(a,2) = Timer + 10;
else
                 Open_Packets(a,2) = Timer + 20;
end
end
end
```

185

```matlab
end

% If there isn't a surrounding node that is transmitting the node may
% begin  to transmit.
if d == 0
%switch Transmitting node to transmitting status
    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,5),2) = 3;
    [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
    Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [Open_Packets(a,5) Timer 2 3];
    [g,h] = size(PCAP);
    k = g + 1;
    PCAP(k, 1:1021) = [a Timer Open_Packets(a,5) Open_Packets(a,6)
Open_Packets(a,4) Packet(a,1:1016)];
    NodeTX(Open_Packets(a,5),2) = NodeTX(Open_Packets(a,5),2) + 1;


%Adjust timers for transmitting nodes
    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,5),3) = Timer + 7;


    Open_Packets(a,4) = Open_Packets(a,4) + 1;
    Open_Packets(a,3) = 2; %Adjust packet status to transmitting
    Open_Packets(a,2) = Timer + 7; %Adjust packet time

%Cycles through the table again to set statuses
for n = 1:b

% Checks for sending node
if Energy_Table(n,1) ==  Open_Packets(a,5)
%Checks for affected nodes
if Energy_Table(n,2) == Open_Packets(a,6)




%When the receiving node is found, must check its status.
% If receiving node is ready to receive, the status is
% moved to receiving
if Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 2 ||
Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 7
% Receiving node is waiting and ready to receive
                    NodeRX(Open_Packets(a,6),2) =
NodeRX(Open_Packets(a,6),2) + 1;
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) = 5;
% Switches Node Status to Receiving
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) =
[Open_Packets(a,6) Timer 2 5];
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),3) = Timer + 7;
% Adjusts time for nodes next function




%Wake up the node
elseif Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 0
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) = 1;
```

```matlab
%Node is now being woken up
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) =
[Open_Packets(a,6) Timer 0 1];
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),3) = Timer + 1;
% Time for node to wake up


%Node is going to sleep
elseif Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 6
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) = 1;
%Node is now being woken up
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) =
[Open_Packets(a,6) Timer 6 1];
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),3) = Timer + 1; %
Time for node to wake back up

end% if Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 2

end% Energy_Table(n,2) == Open_Packets(a,6)

if Energy_Table(n,2) ~= Open_Packets(a,6)
                AN = Energy_Table(n,2); % Affected Node

%When the receiving node is found, must check its status.
% If receiving node is ready to receive, the status is
% moved to receiving
if Node_Status(AN,2) == 2
                    NodeRX(AN,2) = NodeRX(AN,2) + 1;
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 5;
%Switches Node Status to Receiving
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 2 5];
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 7;
% Adjusts time for nodes next function



%Wake up the node
elseif Node_Status(AN,2) == 0
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 1;
%Node is now being woken up
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 0 1];
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 1;
% Time for node to wake up

%Node is receiving another packet
elseif Node_Status(AN,2) == 5


%Node is going to sleep
```

```matlab
elseif Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 6
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 1;
%Node is now being woken up
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 6 1];
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 1;
% Time for node to wake back up

% Node is waiting to receive packet from receiving node to confirm that
the packet was successfully forwarded
elseif Node_Status(AN,2) == 7
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 5;
%Switches Node Status to Receiving
                    NodeRX(AN,2) = NodeRX(AN,2) + 1;
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 7 5];
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 7;
% Adjusts time for nodes next function

end% if Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 2

end% Energy_Table(n,2) ~= Open_Packets(a,6)

end% Energy_Table(n,1) ==  Open_Packets(n,5)
end% for n = 1:b

end% function


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Packet_Next_Hop %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Packet_Next_Hop(Packet_Number)
% Takes the packet and adjusts the source and dest MAC addresses
% Adjusts the Next_Hop field

global Packet;
global Open_Packets;
global Routing_Table;
global Node_MAC;

PN = Packet_Number;

[a,b] = size(Routing_Table);
cat = 1;
ch = 0;
% checks for which route it should use
for n = 1:a
% checks for source in first col
% checks for primary route
% checks that the source is not the destination
```

188

```matlab
if Open_Packets(PN,6) == Routing_Table(n,1) && cat ==
Routing_Table(n,2) && ch == 0
%do not send to frame to node it previously received it from to
%prevent looping
if Open_Packets(PN,5) == Routing_Table(n,3) && ch == 0
                cat = 2;
else
%changes out source and destination addresses for the next hop
            Open_Packets(PN,5) = Open_Packets(PN,6);
            Open_Packets(PN,6) = Routing_Table(n,3);
            Packet(PN,17:80) = Node_MAC(Open_Packets(PN,5),2:65);
            Packet(PN,81:144) = Node_MAC(Open_Packets(PN,6),2:65);
            Hop_Limit = bi2de(Packet(PN,163:168));
            HLB = Hop_Limit - 1; %reduces hop limit field
            Packet(PN,163:168) = de2bi(HLB,6);
            ch = 1;
            n = a;
end
end
end

end


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Check_For_New_Events %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Check_For_New_Events(Timer)
% This function will create the new packet and check the status of the
% nodeto determine if it is busy, asleep, or in a waiting phase in
% which it canproce4ss the packet

global Events;
global Open_Packets;
global Packet;
global Starter_Packet;
global Node_MAC;
global Node_Address;
global Node_Status;
global Routing_Table;
global Node_Status_Table;
global Original_Packet;
global Orig_Events;
global Packet_Retrans_Tracker;
global Payload;
global MAC;
global Packets;

% This section Creates the Packet
    [e,f] = size(Events);
```

```matlab
for n = 1:e
% Is the frame one of the original events or was it being stored to
% be retransmitted later?
if Timer == Events(n,1) && n <= Orig_Events % Orinial event

            [a,b] = size(Packet);
%gets the number of the amount of open packets
            [q,r] = size(Open_Packets);
            [ss,tt] = size(Packets);
            ss=ss+1;

            c = a + 1;
            q = q + 1;



%Creates new standard packet
            Packet(c,1:1016) = Starter_Packet(1,1:1016);

%Need to find next hop MAC Address
            Next_Hop(1:64) = ones(1,64);
            Source(1:64) = ones(1,64);
            [z,y] = size(Routing_Table);
            Next_Node = 0;
for p = 1:z
if Events(n,2) == Routing_Table(p,1) && Routing_Table(p,2) == 1
                  Next_Hop = Node_MAC(Routing_Table(p,3),2:65);
                  Next_Node = Routing_Table(p,3);
                  Source = Node_MAC(Events(n,2),2:65);
end
end

% Adds Source MAC Address
            Open_Packets(q,5) = [Events(n,2)];

            Packet(c,17:80) = Source;

%Destination MAC Address
            Open_Packets(q,1:7) = [q Timer 0 0 Events(n,2) Next_Node
0];
            Packets((ss),1) = q;
            Packets((ss),2) = Events(n,2);
            Packets((ss),3) = Next_Node;

            Packet(c,81:144) = Next_Hop;

% Source Address
            Packet(c,169:184) =  Node_Address(Events(n,2),50:65);

% Destination Address
            Packet(c,185:200) =  Node_Address(27,50:65);

%Sequence Number
            Packet(c,225:256) = de2bi([Node_Status(Events(n,2),5)],32);
```

```matlab
            Node_Status(Events(n,2),5) = Node_Status(Events(n,2),5) +
1;


% Padding
            Packet(c,425:864) = randi([0 1],1,440);


% Next Header
            Packet(c,993:1000) = randi([0 1],1,8);


% Payload
            Encryption_Decryption(c,1);
            Packet(c,297:424) = Payload(c,1:128);


% Message Integrity Code
            Packet(c,865:992) = MAC(1:128);


% Field Check Sum (CRC)
%Create the CRC for the Packet
                crc1 = Packet(c,1:1000);
                crc = crc16(crc1);
            Packet(c,1001:1016) = crc;


% Create the original frame for comparrison
            [g,h] = size(Packet);
            Original_Packet(g,:) = Packet(c,:);



% Node is awake and ready to send frame once processed
if Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 2
                Open_Packets(q,7) = [2];
                Open_Packets(q,2) = Timer + 8;
                Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) = 4;
                Node_Status(Events(n,2),3) = Timer + 8;
                    [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                    Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [Open_Packets(q,5)
Timer 2 4];

%node is asleep or going to sleep, needs to be woken up
elseif Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 0 || Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) ==
6
                Open_Packets(q,7) = [0];
                Open_Packets(q,2) = Timer + 1;
                Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) = 1;
                Node_Status(Events(n,2),3) = Timer + 1;
                    [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                    Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [Open_Packets(q,5)
Timer 0 1];
end

% Frame was stored and now being retransmitted
elseif Timer == Events(n,1) && n > Orig_Events
% log to track retransmitted frames
            [dd,ee] = size(Packet_Retrans_Tracker);
```

191

```matlab
% transfers the information from the original frame to the
% new retransmitted frame
for ff = 1:dd
if Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,3) ==  Events(n,2) &&
Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,2) == 0
                            [q,r] = size(Open_Packets);
                            q = q + 1;
                            Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,2) = q;
                            [a,b] = size(Packet);
%gets the number of the amount of open packets
                            c = a + 1;
                            [ss,tt] = size(Packets);
                            ss=ss+1;
%Creates new standard packet
                            Packet(c,1:1016) = Starter_Packet(1,1:1016);
%Need to find next hop MAC Address
                            Next_Hop(1:64) = ones(1,64);
                            Source(1:64) = ones(1,64);
                            [z,y] = size(Routing_Table);
                            Next_Node = 0;
for p = 1:z
if Events(n,2) == Routing_Table(p,1) && Routing_Table(p,2) == 1
                                Next_Hop =
Node_MAC(Routing_Table(p,3),2:65);
                                Next_Node = Routing_Table(p,3);
                                Source = Node_MAC(Events(n,2),2:65);
end
end


                            Open_Packets(q,5) = [Events(n,2)];

                            Packet(c,17:80) = Source;


%Destination MAC Address
                            Open_Packets(q,1:7) = [q Timer 0 0 Events(n,2)
Next_Node 0];
                            Packets((ss),1) = q;
                            Packets((ss),2) = Events(n,2);
                            Packets((ss),3) = Next_Node;

                            Packet(c,81:144) = Next_Hop;


% Hop limit and path indication bits
                            Packet(c,161:168) =
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),161:168);


% Source Address
                            Packet(c,169:184) =
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),169:184);


% Destination Address
```

```
                            Packet(c,185:200) =
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),185:200);


%Sequence Number
                            Packet(c,225:256) =
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),225:256);



% Payload
%Packet(c,297:424) = ones(1,128);
                            Packet(c,297:424) =
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),297:424);


% Padding
                            Packet(c,425:864) =
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),425:864);
%            Packet(c,425:864) = zeros(1,440);


% Message Integrity Code
                            Packet(c,865:992) =
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),865:992);
%            Packet(c,865:992) = ones(1,128);


% Next Header
                            Packet(c,993:1000) =
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),993:1000);


% Field Check Sum (CRC)
%Create the CRC for the Packet
                            crc1 = Packet(c,1:1000);
                            crc = crc16(crc1);
                        Packet(c,1001:1016) = crc;


% store as an original packet for comparison
                        [g,h] = size(Packet);
                        Original_Packet(g,:) = Packet(c,:);


% node is awake and ready to transmit
if Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 2
                            Open_Packets(q,7) = [2];
                            Open_Packets(q,2) = Timer + 8;
                            Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) = 4;
                            Node_Status(Events(n,2),3) = Timer + 8;
                                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) =
[Open_Packets(q,5) Timer 2 4];


%node is either asleep or going to sleep,
%needs to be woken up
elseif Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 0 || Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) ==
6
                            Open_Packets(q,7) = [0];
                            Open_Packets(q,2) = Timer + 1;
```

```matlab
                                    Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) = 1;
                                    Node_Status(Events(n,2),3) = Timer + 1;
                                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table);
                                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) =
[Open_Packets(q,5) Timer 0 1];
end
end
end
end
end
end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Check_For_Energy_Use %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%


function Check_For_Energy_Use()
%At the end of the evolution the time is added for each node depending
on
%what stage it is in at that time

global Node_Status;
global Energy_Use;

for n=1:27       %Cycle through all of the nodes


if Node_Status(n,2) == 0     % Node Asleep
            Energy_Use(n,9) = Energy_Use(n,9) + 1;
% Document the node is asleep
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 1 % Node Waking Up
            Energy_Use(n,2) = Energy_Use(n,2) + 1;
% Document the node is waking up
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 2 % Node Waiting
            Energy_Use(n,6) = Energy_Use(n,6) + 1;
% Document the node is Waiting
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 3 % Node Transmitting
            Energy_Use(n,4) = Energy_Use(n,4) + 1;
% Document the node is transmitting
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 4 % Node Processing
            Energy_Use(n,3) = Energy_Use(n,3) + 1;
% Document the node is processing
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 5 % Node Receiving
            Energy_Use(n,5) = Energy_Use(n,5) + 1;
% Document the node is receiving
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 6 % Node Going to sleep
            Energy_Use(n,7) = Energy_Use(n,7) + 1;
% Document the node is going to sleep
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 7 % Node Waiting Post Transmission
            Energy_Use(n,8) = Energy_Use(n,8) + 1;
% Document the node is Waiting post trans
end
```

194

```matlab
    end


    end


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Display %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Display()
% This is what initiates the events. Events are put in to create the
% sensing events that are simulated within the program.

global Events;
global Packet;
global Open_Packets;
global Timer;
global Energy_Use;
global Orig_Events;
global Initial_Payload;
global MAC_Check;
global Payload_Out;
global MAC_F;
global Routing_Table;
global fileID;
global MITMAtt;
global NodeTX;
global NodeRX;
global Packets;
global Spoofed_Node;
global Packet_Retrans_Tracker;
global Enc;
global Node_Address;


c = 0;
g = 0;
[e,f] = size(Open_Packets);
h = e-1;
j = h-Orig_Events;
z = 0;
x = 0;
for n = 2:e
if Open_Packets(n,7) == 99 %frame properly received
        c = c + 1;
elseif Open_Packets(n,7) == 98
% Transmitted 8 times unsuccessfully, placed in storage at node
        g = g + 1;
elseif Open_Packets(n,7) == 97
% Failed to be received by the BS correctly (collision)
        z = z + 1;
elseif Open_Packets(n,7) == 96
% CRC or BER on final hop to BS
```

```matlab
        x = x + 1;

    end
end
d = c/h*100;
    fprintf('\nA total of %i packets were sent and %i packets were
received for a success rate of %3.2f%%. \n\n',h,c,d);
    fprintf(fileID,'\nA total of %i packets were sent and %i packets
were received for a success rate of %3.2f%%. \n\n',h,c,d);

    fprintf('A total of %i packets were dropped within the final hop
(was not fully received by BS). \n\n',z);
    fprintf(fileID,'A total of %i packets were dropped within the final
hop (was not fully received by BS). \n\n',z);

    fprintf('A total of %i packets were dropped due to CRC or BER to
header information within the final hop.  \n\n',x);
    fprintf(fileID,'A total of %i packets were dropped due to CRC or
BER to header information within the final hop.\n\n',x);

[aaa,bbb] = size(Packet_Retrans_Tracker);
if aaa > 1
    ccc = aaa - 1;
    fprintf('%i packets were stored and retransmitted at a later time.
\n\n',ccc);
    fprintf(fileID,'%i packets were stored and retransmitted at a later
time. \n\n',ccc);
end

%variables to analyze the path indication bits
[a,b] = size(Packet);
orig = 0;
second = 0;
orignode = 0;
secnode = 0;
or = 1;
se = 1;


for n = 1:a
if Open_Packets(n,7) == 99
% checks for secondary route along follow-on nodes
if Packet(n,161) == 1
for nn = 1:26
if Node_Address(nn,50:65) == Packet(n,169:184)
                    second = 1 + second;
                    secnode(se) = nn;
                    se = se + 1;
end
end
end
% checks for secondary route at originating nodes
if Packet(n,162) == 1
for nn = 1:26
```

196

```matlab
if Node_Address(nn,50:65) == Packet(n,169:184)
                    orig = orig + 1;
                    orignode(or) = nn;
                    or = or + 1;
end
end
end
end
end

% add to table for secondary routes used
for n = 1:27
    Sec_Route_Table(n,1:3) = [n 0 0];
end

[aa,bb] = size(orignode);

[cc,dd] = size(Routing_Table);

% Calculates the table to show which nodes utilized the secondary
% routesfrom the original node
if orignode > 0
for n = 1:bb
        Sec_Route_Table(orignode(n),2) = Sec_Route_Table(orignode(n),2)
+ 1;
end
end
%Calculates the table to show which nodes utilized the secondary routes
% from the original nodes along the follow-on hops
[aa,bb] = size(secnode);
next_node = 0;
if secnode > 0
for n = 1:bb
        Sec_Route_Table(secnode(n),3) = Sec_Route_Table(secnode(n),3) +
1;
end
end

    fprintf('Table: The number of packets each node sent that took a
secondary route to the Base Station.\n');
    fprintf(fileID,'Table: The number of packets each node sent that
took a secondary route to the Base Station.\n');
    fprintf('Node \t Unsuccessful First Hop \t Unsuccessful Follow-On
Hops \n');
    fprintf(fileID,'Node \t Unsuccessful First Hop \t Unsuccessful
Follow-On Hops \n');
for n = 1:26
        fprintf(' %2i \t\t %3i \t\t\t\t %3i\n', Sec_Route_Table(n,1),
Sec_Route_Table(n,2), Sec_Route_Table(n,3));
        fprintf(fileID,' %2i \t\t %3i \t\t\t\t %3i\n',
Sec_Route_Table(n,1), Sec_Route_Table(n,2), Sec_Route_Table(n,3));
end
    fprintf('\n');
    fprintf(fileID,'\n');
```

197

```matlab
aaa = 0;
bbb = 0;

% Calculates the number of authenticated frames received by the MS
Packet_Auth = 0;
pa = 1;
for ch = 2:e
if Open_Packets(ch,7) == 99
        bbb = bbb + 1;
        Encryption_Decryption(ch,2);
if MAC_F(ch,1:128) == MAC_Check(ch,1:128)
if Payload_Out(ch,1:128) == Initial_Payload
                aaa = aaa + 1;
else
                fprintf('\nPacket %i Failed Payload\n ',ch);
                fprintf(fileID,'\nPacket %i Failed Payload\n ',ch);
end
else
            Packet_Auth(pa) = Open_Packets(ch,1);
            pa = pa + 1;
end
end
end
fprintf('Out of the %i packets received, %i packets matched the
original packet sent for a %3.2f%% success rate.
\n\n',bbb,aaa,(aaa/bbb*100));
fprintf(fileID,'Out of the %i packets received, %i packets matched the
original packet sent for a %3.2f%% success rate.
\n\n',bbb,aaa,(aaa/bbb*100));
[aa,bb] = size(Packet_Auth);
[dd,ee] = size(MITMAtt);
ee = ee - 1;
% Calculates the number of spoofed frames injected into the WSN
if ee > 0 || Spoofed_Node < 27
    fprintf('A MITM or Spoofing attack was conducted and %3i packets
were not Authenticated.\n\n',bb);
    fprintf(fileID,'A MITM or Spoofing attack was conducted and %3i
packets were not Authenticated.\n\n',bb);
    fprintf('The following packets failed Authentication\n');
    fprintf(fileID,'The following packets failed Authentication\n');

    cc = 1;
for n = 1:bb
        fprintf('%5i \t',Packet_Auth(n));
        fprintf(fileID,'%5i \t',Packet_Auth(n));
if cc == 10
            fprintf('\n');
            fprintf(fileID,'\n');
            cc = 0;
end
        cc = cc + 1;
end
    fprintf('\n\n');
    fprintf(fileID,'\n\n');
```

```matlab
%creates table giving the number of unauthenticated frames from each
%originating node
    Node_Auth = zeros(1,26);
    fprintf('The following nodes had packets that did not
Authenticate\n');
    fprintf(fileID,'The following nodes had packets that did not
Authenticate\n');
    fprintf('Node \t\t # Not Authenticated\n');
    fprintf(fileID,'Node \t\t # Not Authenticated\n');
for n = 1:bb
        num = Packet_Auth(n);
        Node_Auth(Packets(num,2)) = Node_Auth(Packets(num,2)) + 1;
end
for n = 1:26
        fprintf('%i \t\t %i \n',n,Node_Auth(n));
        fprintf(fileID,'%i \t\t %i \n',n,Node_Auth(n));
end
    fprintf('\n\n');
    fprintf(fileID,'\n\n');
end

fprintf('This simulation ran for a total of %i milliseconds or %5.2f
seconds.\n',Timer, (Timer/1000));
fprintf(fileID,'This simulation ran for a total of %i milliseconds or
%5.2f seconds.\n',Timer, (Timer/1000));
fprintf('Time each node spent in each phase in milliseconds \n Node\t
WU\t Proc\t CSMA\t Tran\t   Rec\t\t RX-TX\t Wait\t GTSlp\t PTran\t
Slp\n');
fprintf(fileID,'Time each node spent in each phase in milliseconds \n
Node\t   WU\t Proc\t CSMA\t Tran\t\t   Rec\t RX-TX\t Wait\t GTSlp\t
PTran\t Slp\n');
total = zeros(1,26);
totalms = zeros(1,26);
%Creates table to display the energy use by each node
for n = 1:26
    node = n;
    wake = Energy_Use(n,2);
    proc = Energy_Use(n,3) - (Enc(n) * 4);
    trans = Energy_Use(n,4)-(NodeTX(n,2)*3);
    rec = Energy_Use(n,5) - NodeRX(n,2)*3;
    wait = Energy_Use(n,6) + NodeRX(n,2)*3;
    gtslp = Energy_Use(n,7);
    ptran = Energy_Use(n,8);
    slp =Energy_Use(n,9);
    csma = NodeTX(n,2)*2;
    rxtx = NodeTX(n,2);
    total(n) = wake * 20 + proc * 24 + csma*72 + rxtx*54 + trans * 90 +
rec * 72+ gtslp * 20 + wait * 72 + ptran * 72 + Enc(n) * 7.47 * 4 /
100;
    totalms(n) = total(n)/Timer;
    fprintf('%5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %6.0f \t
%5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %6.0f\n',
node,wake,proc,csma,trans,rec,rxtx,wait,gtslp,ptran,slp);
```

```matlab
        fprintf(fileID,'%5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %6.0f \t %5.0f
\t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %6.0f\n',
node,wake,proc,csma,trans,rec,rxtx,wait,gtslp,ptran,slp);

    end

fprintf('\nEnergy used by each node \n Node# \t\t Total mW * ms \t\t
Total mW/ms \n');
fprintf(fileID,'\nEnergy used by each node \n Node# \t\t Total mW * ms
\t\t Total mW/ms \n');
for n = 1:26
    fprintf('%i \t\t %10.0f \t\t %3.2f\n',n,total(n),totalms(n));
    fprintf(fileID,'%i \t\t %10.0f \t\t
%3.2f\n',n,total(n),totalms(n));
end




end




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% aes %
% Obtained/Adapted from: %
%
http://radio.feld.cvut.cz/personal/matejka/wiki/doku.php?id=root:en:pro
jects %
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz %
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function [output] = aes(s, oper, mode, input, iv, sbit)
% AES Encrypt/decrypt array of bytes by AES.
% output = aes(s, oper, mode, input, iv, sbit)
% Encrypt/decrypt array of bytes by AES-128, AES-192, AES-256.
% All NIST SP800-38A cipher modes supported (e.g. ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB,
CTR).
% Usage example:    out = aesdecrypt(s, 'dec', 'ecb', data)
% s:                AES structure (generated by aesinit)
% oper:             operation:
%                   'e', 'enc', 'encrypt', 'E',... = encrypt
%                   'd', 'dec', 'decrypt', 'D',... = decrypt
% mode:             operation mode
%                   'ecb' = Electronic Codebook Mode
%                   'cbc' = Cipher Block Chaining Mode
%                   'cfb' = Cipher Feedback Mode
%                   'ofb' = Output Feedback Mode
%                   'ctr' = Counter Mode
%                   For counter mode you need external
AES_GET_COUNTER()
%                   counter function.
% input:            plaintext/ciphertext byte-vector with length
%                   multiple of 16
```

200

```
% iv:                initialize vector - some modes need it
%                    ending initialize vector is stored in s.iv, so you
%                    can use aes() repetitively to encode/decode
%                    large vector:
%                    out = aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', input1, iv);
%                    out = [out aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', input1, s.iv)];
%                    ...
% sbit:              bit-width parameter for CFB mode
% output:            ciphertext/plaintext byte-vector
%
% See
% Morris Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation
% Methods and Techniques
% NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001 Edition
% for details.

% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $

error(nargchk(4, 6, nargin));

validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {});
validateattributes(oper, {'char'}, {});
validateattributes(mode, {'char'}, {});
validateattributes(input, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, '<',
256});
if (nargin >= 5)
    validateattributes(iv, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0,
'<', 256});
if (length(iv) ~= 16)
        error('Length of ''iv'' must be 16.');
end
end
if (nargin >= 6)
    validateattributes(sbit, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'scalar', '>=', 1,
'<=', 128});
end

if (mod(length(input), 16))
    error('Length of ''input'' must be multiple of 16.');
end

switch lower(oper)
case {'encrypt', 'enc', 'e'}
        oper = 0;
case {'decrypt', 'dec', 'd'}
        oper = 1;
otherwise
        error('Bad ''oper'' parameter.');
end

blocks = length(input)/16;
input = input(:);
```

```matlab
switch lower(mode)

case {'ecb'}
% Electronic Codebook Mode
% -----------------------
        output = zeros(1,length(input));
        idx = 1:16;
for i = 1:blocks
if (oper)
% decrypt
                output(idx) = aesdecrypt(s,input(idx));
else
% encrypt
                output(idx) = aesencrypt(s,input(idx));
end
            idx = idx + 16;
end

case {'cbc'}
% Cipher Block Chaining Mode
% --------------------------
if (nargin < 5)
            error('Missing initialization vector ''iv''.');
end
        output = zeros(1,length(input));
        ob = iv;
        idx = 1:16;
for i = 1:blocks
if (oper)
% decrypt
                in = input(idx);
                output(idx) = bitxor(ob(:), aesdecrypt(s,in)');
                ob = in;
else
% encrypt
                ob = bitxor(ob(:), input(idx));
                ob = aesencrypt(s, ob);
                output(idx) = ob;
end
            idx = idx + 16;
end
% store iv for block passing
        s.iv = ob;

case {'cfb'}
% Cipher Feedback Mode
% --------------------
% Special mode with bit manipulations
% sbit = 1..128
if (nargin < 6)
            error('Missing ''sbit'' parameter.');
end
% get number of bits
        bitlen = 8*length(input);
% loop counter
```

202

```matlab
        rounds = round(bitlen/sbit);
% check
if (rem(bitlen, sbit))
            error('Message length in bits is not multiple of
''sbit''.');
end
% convert input to bitstream
        inputb = reshape(de2bi(input,8,2,'left-msb')',1,bitlen);
% preset init. vector
        ib = iv;
        ibb = reshape(de2bi(ib,8,2,'left-msb')',1,128);
% preset output binary stream
        outputb = zeros(size(inputb));
for i = 1:rounds
            iba = aesencrypt(s, ib);
% convert to bit, MSB first
            ibab = reshape(de2bi(iba,8,2,'left-msb')',1,128);
% strip only sbit MSB bits
% this goes to xor
            ibab = ibab(1:sbit);
% strip bits from input
            inpb = inputb((i - 1)*sbit + (1:sbit));
% make xor
            outb = bitxor(ibab, inpb);
% write to output
            outputb((i - 1)*sbit + (1:sbit)) = outb;
if (oper)
% decrypt
% prepare new iv - bit shift
                ibb = [ibb((1 + sbit):end) inpb];
else
% encrypt
% prepare new iv - bit shift
                ibb = [ibb((1 + sbit):end) outb];
end
% back to byte ary
            ib = bi2de(vec2mat(ibb,8),'left-msb');
% loop
end
        output = bi2de(vec2mat(outputb,8),'left-msb');
% store iv for block passing
        s.iv = ib;

case {'ofb'}
% Output Feedback Mode
% --------------------
if (nargin < 5)
            error('Missing initialization vector ''iv''.');
end
        output = zeros(1,length(input));
        ib = iv;
        idx = 1:16;
for i = 1:blocks
% encrypt, decrypt
            ib = aesencrypt(s, ib);
```
203

```
                output(idx) = bitxor(ib(:), input(idx));
                idx = idx + 16;
end
% store iv for block passing
        s.iv = ib;

case {'ctr'}
% Counter Mode
% ------------
if (nargin < 5)
            iv = 1;
end
        output = zeros(1,length(input));
        idx = 1:16;
for i = (iv):(iv + blocks - 1)
            ib = AES_GET_COUNTER(i);
            ib = aesencrypt(s, ib);
            output(idx) = bitxor(ib(:), input(idx));
            idx = idx + 16;
end
        s.iv = iv + blocks;

otherwise
        error('Bad ''oper'' parameter.');
end

% ---------------------------------------------------------------------
---
% end of file




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% AES_GET_COUNTER %
% Obtained/Adapted from: %
%
http://radio.feld.cvut.cz/personal/matejka/wiki/doku.php?id=root:en:pro
jects %
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz %
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function [out] = AES_GET_COUNTER(i)
% AES_GET_COUNTER Generates counter for aes.m - an example.
% Example function implemented to simulate counter for aestest.
% Change this function to correspond to your requirements.
% i:          counter call number; 1, 2, 3,...
% out:        counter value for given counter call

% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $

global counter;
```

```matlab
switch (i)
case 1
        out = counter;
case 2
        counter(15:16) = [255 0];
        out = counter;
case 3
        counter(15:16) = [255 1];
        out = counter;
case 4
        counter(15:16) = [255 2];
        out = counter;
otherwise
        error('Index out of bounds.');
end

% ----------------------------------------------------------------------
---
% end of file




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% aesdecrypt %
% Obtained/Adapted from: %
%
http://radio.feld.cvut.cz/personal/matejka/wiki/doku.php?id=root:en:pro
jects %
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz %
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function [out] = aesdecrypt(s, in)
% AESDECRYPT Decrypt 16-bytes vector.
% Usage:            out = aesdecrypt(s, in)
% s:                AES structure
% in:               input 16-bytes vector (ciphertext)
% out:              output 16-bytes vector (plaintext)

% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $

if (nargin ~= 2)
    error('Bad number of input arguments.');
end

validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {});
validateattributes(in, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, '<',
256});
```

205

```matlab
% copy input to local
% 16 -> 4 x 4
state = reshape(in, 4, 4);
% Initial round
% AddRoundKey keyexp(s.rounds*4 + (1:4))
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(s.rounds*4 + (1:4), :))');
% Loop over (s.rounds - 1) rounds
for i = (s.rounds - 1):-1:1
% ShiftRows
    state = shift_rows(state, 1);
% SubBytes - lookup table
    state = s.inv_s_box(state + 1);
% AddRoundKey keyexp(i*4 + (1:4))
    state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp((1:4) + 4*i, :))');
% MixColumns
    state = mix_columns(state, s);

end

% Final round
% ShiftRows
state = shift_rows(state, 1);
% SubBytes - lookup table
state = s.inv_s_box(state + 1);
% AddRoundKey keyexp(1:4)
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(1:4, :))');

% copy local to output
% 4 x 4 -> 16
out = reshape(state, 1, 16);

% --------------------------------------------------------------------
---
function out = mix_columns(in, s)
% Each column of the state is multiplied with a fixed polynomial
mod_pol

% Slow version
% out = zeros(size(in));
% for col = 1:4
%     for row = 1:4
%         % for each element
%         temp = 0;
%         for i = 1:4
%             % Multiplication in a finite field of
%             % row vector of poly_mat and
%             % column vector of the in
%             % finally xor
%             temp = bitxor(temp,...
%                 poly_mult(s.inv_poly_mat(row, i),...
%                 in(i, col),...
%                 s.mod_pol, s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%         end
%         % place to out
```

```
%            out(row, col) = temp;
%        end
% end

% Faster implementation
% out = zeros(size(in));
% for col = 1:4
%      temp = poly_mult(14,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt);
%      temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(11,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(13,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      out(1,col) = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(9,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      temp = poly_mult(9,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt);
%      temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(14,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(11,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      out(2,col) = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(13,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      temp = poly_mult(13,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt);
%      temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(9,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(14,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      out(3,col) = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(11,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      temp = poly_mult(11,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt);
%      temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(13,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(9,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%      out(4,col) = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(14,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
% end

% Faster faster implementation
% out = zeros(size(in));
% for col = 1:4
%      temp = s.mix_col14(in(1,col) + 1);
%      temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col11(in(2,col) + 1));
%      temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col13(in(3,col) + 1));
%      out(1,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col9(in(4,col) + 1));
%      temp = s.mix_col9(in(1,col) + 1);
%      temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col14(in(2,col) + 1));
%      temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col11(in(3,col) + 1));
%      out(2,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col13(in(4,col) + 1));
%      temp = s.mix_col13(in(1,col) + 1);
%      temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col9(in(2,col) + 1));
%      temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col14(in(3,col) + 1));
%      out(3,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col11(in(4,col) + 1));
%      temp = s.mix_col11(in(1,col) + 1);
%      temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col13(in(2,col) + 1));
%      temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col9(in(3,col) + 1));
```

```matlab
%       out(4,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col14(in(4,col) + 1));
% end

% Faster faster faster implementation
% slice1 = zeros(4,4);
% slice2 = slice1;
% slice3 = slice1;
% slice4 = slice1;
% for col = 1:4
%       slice1(1,col) = s.mix_col14(in(1,col) + 1);
%       slice2(1,col) = s.mix_col11(in(2,col) + 1);
%       slice3(1,col) = s.mix_col13(in(3,col) + 1);
%       slice4(1,col) = s.mix_col9(in(4,col) + 1);
%       slice1(2,col) = s.mix_col9(in(1,col) + 1);
%       slice2(2,col) = s.mix_col14(in(2,col) + 1);
%       slice3(2,col) = s.mix_col11(in(3,col) + 1);
%       slice4(2,col) = s.mix_col13(in(4,col) + 1);
%       slice1(3,col) = s.mix_col13(in(1,col) + 1);
%       slice2(3,col) = s.mix_col9(in(2,col) + 1);
%       slice3(3,col) = s.mix_col14(in(3,col) + 1);
%       slice4(3,col) = s.mix_col11(in(4,col) + 1);
%       slice1(4,col) = s.mix_col11(in(1,col) + 1);
%       slice2(4,col) = s.mix_col13(in(2,col) + 1);
%       slice3(4,col) = s.mix_col9(in(3,col) + 1);
%       slice4(4,col) = s.mix_col14(in(4,col) + 1);
% end
% out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor(slice1, slice2), slice3), slice4);

% Faster faster faster faster implementation
out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor(...
    [s.mix_col14(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col9(in(1,1:4) + 1);
s.mix_col13(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col11(in(1,1:4) + 1)],...
    [s.mix_col11(in(2,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col14(in(2,1:4) + 1);
s.mix_col9(in(2,1:4) + 1);  s.mix_col13(in(2,1:4) + 1)]),...
    [s.mix_col13(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col11(in(3,1:4) + 1);
s.mix_col14(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col9(in(3,1:4) + 1)]),...
    [s.mix_col9(in(4,1:4) + 1);  s.mix_col13(in(4,1:4) + 1);
s.mix_col11(in(4,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col14(in(4,1:4) + 1)]);

% -----------------------------------------------------------------------
---
function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol, aes_logt, aes_ilogt)
% Multiplication in a finite field

% Old slow implementation
% p = 0;
% for counter = 1:8
%       if (rem(b,2))
%           p = bitxor(p,a);
%           b = (b - 1)/2;
%       else
%           b = b/2;
%       end
%       a = 2*a;
%       if (a>255)
```

```matlab
%            a = bitxor(a,mod_pol);
%        end
% end

% Faster implementaion
if (a && b)
    p = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(a + 1) + aes_logt(b + 1)), 255) + 1);
else
    p = 0;
end


% ----------------------------------------------------------------------
---
function out = shift_rows(in, dir)
% ShiftRows cyclically shift the rows of the 4 x 4 matrix.
%
%   dir = 0 (to left)
%   | 1 2 3 4 |
%   | 2 3 4 1 |
%   | 3 4 1 2 |
%   | 4 1 2 3 |
%
%   dir ~= 0 (to right)
%   | 1 2 3 4 |
%   | 4 1 2 3 |
%   | 3 4 1 2 |
%   | 2 3 4 1 |
%

if (dir == 0)
% left
% use linear indexing in 2d array
    out = reshape(in([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]),4,4);
% old safe method
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1);
%     temp = temp([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]);
%     out = reshape(temp,4,4);
else
% right
% use linear indexing in 2d array
    out = reshape(in([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]),4,4);
% old safe method
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1);
%     temp = temp([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]);
%     out = reshape(temp,4,4);
end


% ----------------------------------------------------------------------
---
% end of file


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
```

```matlab
% aesencrypt %
% Obtained/Adapted from: %
%
http://radio.feld.cvut.cz/personal/matejka/wiki/doku.php?id=root:en:pro
jects %
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz %
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function [out] = aesencrypt(s, in)
% AESENCRYPT  Encrypt 16-bytes vector.
% Usage:            out = aesencrypt(s, in)
% s:                AES structure
% in:               input 16-bytes vector (plaintext)
% out:              output 16-bytes vector (ciphertext)

% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $

if (nargin ~= 2)
    error('Bad number of input arguments.');
end

validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {});
validateattributes(in, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, '<',
256});

% copy input to local
% 16 -> 4 x 4
state = reshape(in, 4, 4);

% Initial round
% AddRoundKey keyexp(1:4)
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(1:4, :))');

% Loop over (s.rounds - 1) rounds
for i = 1:(s.rounds - 1)
% SubBytes - lookup table
    state = s.s_box(state + 1);
% ShiftRows
    state = shift_rows(state, 0);
% MixColumns
    state = mix_columns(state, s);
% AddRoundKey keyexp(i*4 + (1:4))
    state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp((1:4) + 4*i, :))');
end

% Final round
% SubBytes - lookup table
state = s.s_box(state + 1);
% ShiftRows
state = shift_rows(state, 0);
% AddRoundKey keyexp(4*s.rounds + (1:4))
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(4*s.rounds + (1:4), :))');
```

```matlab
% copy local to output
% 4 x 4 -> 16
out = reshape(state, 1, 16);


% --------------------------------------------------------------------
---
function out = mix_columns(in, s)
% Each column of the state is multiplied with a fixed polynomial
mod_pol

% Slow version
% out = zeros(size(in));
% for col = 1:4
%     for row = 1:4
%         % for each element
%         temp = 0;
%         for i = 1:4
%             % Multiplication in a finite field of
%             % row vector of poly_mat and
%             % column vector of the in
%             % finally xor
%             temp = bitxor(temp,...
%                 poly_mult(s.poly_mat(row, i),...
%                 in(i, col),...
%                 s.mod_pol, s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%         end
%         % place to out
%         out(row, col) = temp;
%     end
% end

% Faster implementation
% out = zeros(size(in));
% for col = 1:4
%     temp = bitxor(in(3,col),in(4,col));
%     temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(2,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%     out(1,col) = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(3,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%     temp = bitxor(in(1,col),in(4,col));
%     temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(2,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%     out(2,col) = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(3,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%     temp = bitxor(in(1,col),in(2,col));
%     temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(2,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%     out(3,col) = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(3,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%     temp = bitxor(in(2,col),in(3,col));
%     temp = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(3,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
%     out(4,col) = bitxor(temp,
poly_mult(2,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt));
```

```matlab
% end

% Faster faster implementation
% out = zeros(size(in));
% for col = 1:4
%     temp = bitxor(in(3,col),in(4,col));
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col2(in(1,col) + 1));
%     out(1,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col3(in(2,col) + 1));
%     temp = bitxor(in(1,col),in(4,col));
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col2(in(2,col) + 1));
%     out(2,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col3(in(3,col) + 1));
%     temp = bitxor(in(1,col),in(2,col));
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col2(in(3,col) + 1));
%     out(3,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col3(in(4,col) + 1));
%     temp = bitxor(in(2,col),in(3,col));
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col3(in(1,col) + 1));
%     out(4,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col2(in(4,col) + 1));
% end

% Faster faster faster implementation
% slice1 = zeros(4,4);
% slice2 = slice1;
% slice3 = slice1;
% slice4 = slice1;
% for col = 1:4
%     slice1(1,col) = in(3,col);
%     slice2(1,col) = in(4,col);
%     slice3(1,col) = s.mix_col2(in(1,col) + 1);
%     slice4(1,col) = s.mix_col3(in(2,col) + 1);
%     slice1(2,col) = in(1,col);
%     slice2(2,col) = in(4,col);
%     slice3(2,col) = s.mix_col2(in(2,col) + 1);
%     slice4(2,col) = s.mix_col3(in(3,col) + 1);
%     slice1(3,col) = in(1,col);
%     slice2(3,col) = in(2,col);
%     slice3(3,col) = s.mix_col2(in(3,col) + 1);
%     slice4(3,col) = s.mix_col3(in(4,col) + 1);
%     slice1(4,col) = in(2,col);
%     slice2(4,col) = in(3,col);
%     slice3(4,col) = s.mix_col3(in(1,col) + 1);
%     slice4(4,col) = s.mix_col2(in(4,col) + 1);
% end
% out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor(slice1, slice2), slice3), slice4);

% Faster faster faster faster implementation
out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor([in(3,1:4); in(1,1:4); in(1,1:4);
in(2,1:4)],...
    [in(4,1:4); in(4,1:4); in(2,1:4); in(3,1:4)]),...
    [s.mix_col2(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col2(in(2,1:4) + 1);
s.mix_col2(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col3(in(1,1:4) + 1)]),...
    [s.mix_col3(in(2,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col3(in(3,1:4) + 1);
s.mix_col3(in(4,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col2(in(4,1:4) + 1)]);

% ------------------------------------------------------------------
---
```

```matlab
function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol, aes_logt, aes_ilogt)
% Multiplication in a finite field

% Old slow implementation
% p = 0;
% for counter = 1:8
%     if (rem(b,2))
%         p = bitxor(p,a);
%         b = (b - 1)/2;
%     else
%         b = b/2;
%     end
%     a = 2*a;
%     if (a>255)
%         a = bitxor(a,mod_pol);
%     end
% end

% Faster implementaion
if (a && b)
    p = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(a + 1) + aes_logt(b + 1)), 255) + 1);
else
    p = 0;
end


% ----------------------------------------------------------------------
---
function out = shift_rows(in, dir)
% ShiftRows cyclically shift the rows of the 4 x 4 matrix.
%
%    dir = 0 (to left)
%   | 1 2 3 4 |
%   | 2 3 4 1 |
%   | 3 4 1 2 |
%   | 4 1 2 3 |
%
%    dir ~= 0 (to right)
%   | 1 2 3 4 |
%   | 4 1 2 3 |
%   | 3 4 1 2 |
%   | 2 3 4 1 |
%

if (dir == 0)
% left
% use linear indexing in 2d array
    out = reshape(in([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]),4,4);
% old safe method
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1);
%     temp = temp([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]);
%     out = reshape(temp,4,4);
else
% right
% use linear indexing in 2d array
    out = reshape(in([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]),4,4);
```

```matlab
% old safe method
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1);
%     temp = temp([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]);
%     out = reshape(temp,4,4);
end


% ------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
% end of file




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% aesinfo %
% Obtained/Adapted from: %
%
http://radio.feld.cvut.cz/personal/matejka/wiki/doku.php?id=root:en:pro
jects %
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz %
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function [output] = aesinfo(s, verb)
% AESINFO Display info about AES setting in AES structure.
% Usage:            out = aesinfo(s)
% s:                AES structure (generated by aesinit)
% verb:             verbose = 0 ... only key displayed
%                   verbose = 1 ... print all vectors/tables, words
%                                   in little-endian byte order
%                   verbose = 2 ... print all vectors/tables, words
%                                   in big-endian byte order
% output:           AES key length (128,192, or 256 bits)

% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $

error(nargchk(1, 2, nargin));

validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {});
if (nargin >= 2)
    validateattributes(verb, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'scalar', '>=', 0,
'<=', 2});
else
    verb = 0;
end

% to screen
ID = 1;

fprintf(ID, 'AES Type: AES-%d\n', s.length);
fprintf(ID, 'AES Rounds: %d\n', s.rounds);
fprintf(ID, 'GF(2^8) modulo poly: 0x%03x\n', s.mod_pol);
fprintf(ID, 'Key (%d bits/%d bytes):\n', s.length, s.bytes);
```

214

```matlab
printaryh(ID, 'key8', s.key, 1, 8, 1);
if (verb)
    printaryh(ID, 'key16', s.key, 2, 8, verb);
    printaryh(ID, 'key32', s.key, 4, 4, verb);
    fprintf(ID, 'Expanded Key (%d bytes/%d words):\n', numel(s.keyexp),
numel(s.keyexp)/4);
    printaryh(ID, 'expkey8', s.keyexp', 1, 8, verb);
    printaryh(ID, 'expkey32', s.keyexp', 4, 4, verb);
    fprintf(ID, 'Log table (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.aes_logt));
    printaryh(ID, 'logt8', s.aes_logt, 1, 8, verb);
    fprintf(ID, 'Inverse log table (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.aes_ilogt));
    printaryh(ID, 'ilogt8', s.aes_ilogt, 1, 8, verb);
    fprintf(ID, 'S-Box table (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.s_box));
    printaryh(ID, 'sbox8', s.s_box, 1, 8, verb);
    fprintf(ID, 'Inverse S-Box table (%d bytes):\n',
numel(s.inv_s_box));
    printaryh(ID, 'isbox8', s.inv_s_box, 1, 8, verb);
if (0)
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 2 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col2));
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol2', s.mix_col2, 1, 8, verb);
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 3 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col3));
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol3', s.mix_col3, 1, 8, verb);
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 9 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col9));
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol9', s.mix_col9, 1, 8, verb);
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 11 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col11));
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol11', s.mix_col11, 1, 8, verb);
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 13 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col13));
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol13', s.mix_col13, 1, 8, verb);
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 14 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col14));
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol14', s.mix_col14, 1, 8, verb);
end
end
output = s.length;


% ------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
function printaryh(ID, name, data, pack, ionline, verb)
% print byte ary data like C ary
if (verb == 0)
return;
end
data = data(:);
% pack:
switch (pack)
case 1
        items = length(data);
        vartype = 'u8';
        format = '0x%02x';
case 2
        items = length(data)/2;
        data = reshape(data,2,items)';
if (verb == 2)
            data = fliplr(data);
end
        data = sum(data.*repmat([1 256], items, 1), 2);
```

215

```matlab
        vartype = 'u16';
        format = '0x%04x';
case 4
        items = length(data)/4;
        data = reshape(data,4,items)';
if (verb == 2)
            data = fliplr(data);
end
        data = sum(data.*repmat([1 256 65536 65536*256], items, 1), 2);
        vartype = 'u32';
        format = '0x%08x';
otherwise
        error('Usupported pack parameter.')
end
fprintf(ID, '%s %s[%d] = {\n', vartype, name, items);
for i = 1:items
if (rem(i - 1, ionline) == 0)
        fprintf(ID,'           ');
end
    fprintf(ID, format, data(i));
if (i == items)
        fprintf(ID,'};\n');
break;
end
if (rem(i, ionline) == 0)
        fprintf(ID,',\n');
else
        fprintf(ID,', ');
end
end
end


% --------------------------------------------------------------------
---
% end of file




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% aesinit %
% Obtained/Adapted from: %
%
http://radio.feld.cvut.cz/personal/matejka/wiki/doku.php?id=root:en:pro
jects %
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz %
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function s = aesinit(key)
% AESINIT Generate structure with s-boxes, expanded key, etc.
% Usage:          s = aesinit([23 34 168 ... 39])
% key:            16 (AES-128), 24 (AES-192), and 32 (AES-256)
%                 items array with bytes of key
% s:              AES structure for AES parameters and tables
```

```matlab
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $

validateattributes(key,...
    {'numeric'},...
    {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, '<=', 255});


key = key(:);
lengthkey = length(key);


switch (lengthkey)
case 16
        rounds = 10;
case 24
        rounds = 12;
case 32
        rounds = 14;
otherwise
        error('Only AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 are supported.');
end


% fill s structure
s = {};
s.key = key;
s.bytes = lengthkey;
s.length = lengthkey * 8;
s.rounds = rounds;
% irreducible polynomial for multiplication in a finite field 0x11b
% bin2dec('100011011');
s.mod_pol = 283;


% s-box method 1 (slow)
% --------------------

%     % multiplicative inverse table
%     % first is zero, calculate rest
%     inverse = zeros(1,256);
%     for i = 2:256
%         inverse(i) = find_inverse(i - 1, s.mod_pol);
%     end
%
%     % generate s-box
%     s_box = zeros(1,256);
%     for i = 1:256
%         % affine transformation
%         s_box(i) = aff_trans(inverse(i));
%     end
%     s.s_box = s_box;
%
%     % generate inverse s-box
%     inv_s_box(s_box(1:256) + 1) = (1:256) - 1;
%     s.inv_s_box = inv_s_box;


% s-box method 2 (faster)
```

```matlab
% ----------------------

% first build logarithm lookup table and its inverse
aes_logt = zeros(1,256);
aes_ilogt = zeros(1,256);
gen = 1;
for i = 0:255
    aes_logt(gen + 1) = i;
    aes_ilogt(i + 1) = gen;
    gen = poly_mult(gen, 3, s.mod_pol);
end
% store log tables
s.aes_logt = aes_logt;
s.aes_ilogt = aes_ilogt;
% build s-box and its inverse
s_box = zeros(1,256);
loctable = [1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128];
for i = 0:255
if (i == 0)
        inv = 0;
else
        inv = aes_ilogt(255 - aes_logt(i + 1) + 1);
end
    temp = 0;
for bi = 0:7
        temp2 = sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 1)));
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 4 + 1)));
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 5 + 1)));
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 6 + 1)));
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 7 + 1)));
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(99, loctable(bi + 1)));
if (rem(temp2,2))
            temp = bitor(temp, loctable(bi + 1));
end
end
    s_box(i + 1) = temp;
end
inv_s_box(s_box(1:256) + 1) = (0:255);
% table correction (must be)
s_box(1 + 1) = 124;
inv_s_box(124 + 1) = 1;
inv_s_box(99 + 1) = 0;
s.s_box = s_box;
s.inv_s_box = inv_s_box;

% tables for fast MixColumns
mix_col2 = zeros(1,256);
mix_col3 = mix_col2;
mix_col9 = mix_col2;
mix_col11 = mix_col2;
mix_col13 = mix_col2;
mix_col14 = mix_col2;
for i = 1:256
    mix_col2(i) = poly_mult(2, i - 1, s.mod_pol);
    mix_col3(i) = poly_mult(3, i - 1, s.mod_pol);
```

```
    mix_col9(i) = poly_mult(9, i - 1, s.mod_pol);
    mix_col11(i) = poly_mult(11, i - 1, s.mod_pol);
    mix_col13(i) = poly_mult(13, i - 1, s.mod_pol);
    mix_col14(i) = poly_mult(14, i - 1, s.mod_pol);
end
s.mix_col2 = mix_col2;
s.mix_col3 = mix_col3;
s.mix_col9 = mix_col9;
s.mix_col11 = mix_col11;
s.mix_col13 = mix_col13;
s.mix_col14 = mix_col14;

% expanded key
s.keyexp = key_expansion(s.key, s.s_box, s.rounds, s.mod_pol,
s.aes_logt, s.aes_ilogt);

% poly & invpoly
s.poly_mat = [...
    2 3 1 1;...
    1 2 3 1;...
    1 1 2 3;...
    3 1 1 2];

s.inv_poly_mat =[...
    14 11 13  9;...
    9  14 11 13;...
    13  9 14 11;...
    11 13  9 14];

% end of aesinit.m
% ----------------------------------------------------------------------
---

function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol)
% Multiplication in a finite field
% For loop multiplication - slower than log/ilog tables
% but must be used for log/ilog tables generation

p = 0;
for counter = 1 : 8
if (rem(b, 2))
        p = bitxor(p, a);
        b = (b - 1)/2;
else
        b = b/2;
end
    a = 2*a;
if (a > 255)
        a = bitxor(a, mod_pol);
end
end

% ----------------------------------------------------------------------
---
```

219

```matlab
function inv = find_inverse(in, mod_pol)
% Multiplicative inverse for an element a of a finite field
% very bad calculate & test method
% Not used in faster version

% loop over all possible bytes
for inv = 1 : 255
% calculate polynomial multiplication and test to be 1
if (1 == poly_mult(in, inv, mod_pol))
% we find it
break
end
end
inv = 0;

% -------------------------------------------------------------------
---
function out = aff_trans(in)
% Affine transformation over GF(2^8)
% Not used for faster s-box generation

% modulo polynomial for multiplication in a finite field
% bin2dec('100000001');
mod_pol = 257;

% multiplication polynomial
% bin2dec('00011111');
mult_pol = 31;

% addition polynomial
% bin2dec('01100011');
add_pol = 99;

% polynomial multiplication
temp = poly_mult(in, mult_pol, mod_pol);

% xor with addition polynomial
out = bitxor(temp, add_pol);

% -------------------------------------------------------------------
---
function expkey = key_expansion(key, s_box, rounds, mod_pol, aes_logt,
aes_ilogt)
% Expansion of key

% This is old version for AES-128 (192?, 256? not tested):
% rcon = ones(1,rounds);
% for i = 2:rounds
%     rcon(i) = poly_mult(rcon(i - 1), 2, mod_pol);
% end
% % fill bytes 2, 3, and 4 by 0
% rcon = [rcon(:), zeros(rounds, 3)];
%
% kcol = length(key)/4;
```

220

```matlab
% expkey = (reshape(key, kcol, 4))';
% for i = (kcol + 1):(4*rounds + 4)
%     % copy the previous row of the expanded key into a buffer
%     temp = expkey(i - 1, :);
%     % each fourth row
%     if (mod(i, 4) == 1)
%         % shift temp
%         temp = temp([2 3 4 1]);
%         % s-box transform
%         temp = s_box(temp + 1);
%         % compute the current round constant
%         r = rcon((i - 1)/4, :);
%         % xor
%         temp = bitxor(temp, r);
%     else
%         if ((kcol > 6) && (mod(i, kcol) == 0))
%             temp = s_box(temp);
%         end
%     end
%     % generate new row of the expanded key
%     expkey(i, :) = bitxor(expkey(i - 4, :), temp);
% end

% This is new faster version for all AES:
rcon = 1;
kcol = length(key)/4;
expkey = (reshape(key,4,kcol))';
% traverse for all rounds
for i = kcol:(4*(rounds + 1) - 1)
% copy the previous row of the expanded key into a buffer
    temp = expkey(i, :);
% each kcol row
if (mod(i, kcol) == 0)
% rotate word
        temp = temp([2 3 4 1]);
% s-box transform
        temp = s_box(temp + 1);
% xor
        temp(1) = bitxor(temp(1), rcon);
% new rcon
% 1. classic poly_mult
% rcon = poly_mult(rcon, 2, mod_pol);
% 2. or faster version with log/ilog tables
% note rcon is never zero here
% rcon = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(rcon + 1) + aes_logt(2 + 1)), 255) +
1);
        rcon = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(rcon + 1) + 25), 255) + 1);
else
if ((kcol > 6) && (mod(i, kcol) == 4))
            temp = s_box(temp + 1);
end
end
% generate new row of the expanded key
    expkey(i + 1, :) = bitxor(expkey(i - kcol + 1, :), temp);
end
```

```
% ------------------------------------------------------------------------
---
% end of file




%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% Encryption_Decryption %
% Obtained/Adapted from: %
%
http://radio.feld.cvut.cz/personal/matejka/wiki/doku.php?id=root:en:pro
jects %
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz %
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function Encryption_Decryption(PN, Type)
%modified version of code from :

global counter;
global Packet;
global Keys;
global Node_Address;
global ct1;
global Payload;
global MAC;
global MAC_Check;
global Payload_Out;
global MAC_F;


    Payload(1,1:128) = zeros(1,128);
    MAC_F(1,1:128) =  zeros(1,128);
    MAC_Check(1,1:128) =  zeros(1,128);

    st = 297;
    sst = st + 7;
    aa = 1;
for n = 1:16
        pt(n) = bi2de(Packet(PN,st:sst));
        st = st + 8;
        sst = st + 7;
end

for nn = 1:26
if Packet(PN,169:184) == Node_Address(nn,50:65)
            cc = 1;
            ccc = 8;
for nnn = 1:16
                key(nnn) = bi2de(Keys(nn,cc:ccc));
                cc = cc + 8;
                ccc = cc + 7;
```

```matlab
        end
        end
        end

            s = aesinit(key);
            count = Packet(PN,169:296);
            MAC_Out = Packet(PN,865:992);
            st = 1;
            sst = st + 7;
            aa = 1;
    for n = 1:16
            counter(n) = bi2de(count(st:sst));
             MAC_O(n) = bi2de(MAC_Out(st:sst));
            st = st + 8;
            sst = st + 7;
    end




        ivh1 = {'00''00''00''00''00''00''00''00'...
'00''00''00''00''00''00''00''00'};
        iv1 = hex2dec(ivh1);

%_____


    if Type == 1
            ct1 = aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', pt, iv1);
            pt(17:32) = ct1(1:16);

% MSG and IV go in
            ct = aes(s, 'enc', 'ctr', pt);
% Output is the cipher Text to be used as payload
            nn = 1;
            nnn = 8;
             p = 17;

    for n  = 1:16
                Payload(PN,nn:nnn) = de2bi(ct(n),8);
                MAC(nn:nnn) = de2bi(ct(p),8);
                nn = nn + 8;
                nnn = nn + 7;
                p = p + 1;
    end


    elseif Type == 2

            pt(17:32) = MAC_O;
            outm(PN,1:16) = MAC_O;
%          outp(PN,1:16) = pt(1:16);
            ct2 = aes(s, 'dec', 'ctr', pt);
% Gives cipher text
```

223

```matlab
        p = 17;
        nn = 1;
        nnn = 8;
for n   = 1:16
          Payload_Out(PN,nn:nnn) = de2bi(ct2(n),8);
          MAC_F(PN,nn:nnn) = de2bi(ct2(p),8);
          nn = nn + 8;
          nnn = nn + 7;
          p = p + 1;
end
            nn = 1;
        nnn = 8;
        check = aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', ct2(1:16), iv1);
for n   = 1:16
          MAC_Check(PN,nn:nnn) = de2bi(check(n),8);
          nn = nn + 8;
          nnn = nn + 7;
end


end


end


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
% crc16 %
% Obtained/Adapted from: %
% https://macroware.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/crc-calculation/ %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

function [resto] = crc16(h)
%Variable initialization (CRC16 polynomial) in format
% [1 g1X g2X^2 g3X^3 g4X^4 g5X^5 g6X^6 g7X^7 g8X^8 g9X^9 g10X^10
g11X^11 g12X^12 g13X^13 g14X^14 g15X^15 1X^16]
gx=[1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1];
crcSize = 16;
% message ux (lsb first)
ux = h;
%ux = [0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0]
msgSize = 1000;
bx=[zeros(1,16)];
% shift the message through the generator polynomial to determine the
% remainder bx
for i=1:msgSize
    feedback = xor(ux(i), bx(16));
for j=crcSize:-1:2
if (gx(j) == 1)
          bx(j) = xor(bx(j-1), feedback);
else
          bx(j) = bx(j-1);
end
end
```

224

```matlab
        bx(1) = feedback;
    end
    %convert the resulting remainder to a hex representation
    remainder = uint16(0);
    j = crcSize;
    for i=0:crcSize-1
        remainder = remainder + bx(j) * 2^i;
        j = j - 1;
    end
    resto = de2bi(remainder,16);
end
```

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

[1]   K. White and P. Thulasiraman, "Energy efficient cross layer load balancing in tactical multigateway wireless sensor networks," in *Proc. Of IEEE International Inter-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Method in Situation Awareness and Decision Support* , 2015, pp.193–199.

[2]   P. N. Edwards, "We defend every place: Building the cold war world," in *The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America.*Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 3–8.

[3]   *Unattended Ground Sensor Set AN/GSQ-257 Technical Manual, TM 09632A-OI*, Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2008.

[4]   J Hui, D Culler, and S Chakrabarti, "6LoWPAN: Incorporating IEEE 802.15. 4 into the IP architecture" in *Internet Protocol for Smart Objects Alliance*, 2009.

[5]   J. Granjal, E. Monteiro, and J. Sa Silva, "Security for the Internet of things: a survey of existing protocols and open research issues,"in *IEEE Communication Surveys & Tutorials*, vol. 17, pp.1294–1312, Third Quarter, 2015.

[6]   Jonas Olsson. (2014) 6LoWPAN demystified. [Online]. Available: http://www.ti.com/lit/wp/swry013/swry013.pdf

[7]   *Sensor Mobile Monitor System AN/MSC-77 Technical Manual, TM 09856A-10/1A,* U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 2008.

[8]   D. W. Courtney and P. Thulasiraman, "Implementation of secure 6LoWPAN communications for tactical wireless sensor networks," in *IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops: IEEE Infocom MiseNet Workshop,* San Francisco, CA, 2016, pp. 962–967.

[9]   A. Callanan and P. Thulasiraman, "Achieving sink node anonymity under energy constraints in tactical wireless sensor networks," in *Proc. of IEEE International Multi-Disciplinary Conference on Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support*, 2015, pp.186–192.

[10]   S. Lee, S. Lee, H. Song, and H. Lee, "Wireless sensor network design for tactical military applications: remote large-scale environments," in *Proc. of IEEE Military Communications Conference*, 2009, pp. 911–917.

[11]   H. Song, S. Lee, S. Lee, and H. Lee, "6LoWPAN-Based tactical wireless sensor network architecture for remote large-scale random deployment scenarios," in *Proc. of IEEE Military Communications Conference*, 2009, pp.1–7.

[12]   P. Thulasiraman, "RPL routing for multigateway AMI networks under interference constraints" in *Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Communications – Selected Areas in Communications Symposium*, 2013, pp. 4477-4482.

[13]   C. Hennebert and J. D. Santos, "Security protocols and privacy issues into 6LoWPAN stack: a synthesis," in *IEEE Internet of Things Journal*, vol. 1, no. 5, pp. 384–398, Oct. 2014.

[14]   S. Raza, S. Duquennoy, and G. Selander, "Compression of IPsec AH and ESP Headers for Constrained Environments (Draft)," pp.1–10, 2013, Sept. 2013.

[15]   A. Rghioui, M. Bouhorma, and A. Benslimane, "Analytical study of security aspects in 6LoWPAN networks," in *5th International Conference on Information and Communication Technology for the Muslim World*, 2013, pp.1–5.

[16]   E. Dulaney and C. Easttom, "Mastering TCP/IP," in *CompTIA Security+ Study Guide,* 6th ed. Indianapolis, IN: JW&S, ch . 3, pp. 77.

[17]   Y. Lin, R. Hwang, and F. Baker, "Link Layer," in *Computer Networks: An Open Source Approach*, New York, NY: MGH Co, 2012, pp. 156–157, 173–175.

[18]   National Security Agency (2015, Aug.). NSA Suite B Cryptography. Suite B [Online]. Available: https://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/.

[19]   J. Hui and P. Thubert, Compression Format for IPv6 Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks, Request For Comments (RFC): 6282, Sept. 2011.

[20]   M. Siekkinen, M. Hiienkari, J. K. Nurminen, and J. Nieminen, "How low energy is Bluetooth low energy? Comparative measures with ZigBee/802.15.4,"*WCNC Workshop on Internet of Things Enabling Technologies, Embracing Machine-To-Machine Communications and Beyond*, 2012, pp. 232–237.

[21]   J. Lee, K. Kapitanova, and S. H. Son, "The price of security in wireless sensor networks," in Computer Networks, vol. 54, no. 17, pp. 2967–2978, Dec. 2010.

[22]   (2011, May 21). CRC Calculation [Online]. Available: https://macroware.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/crc-calculation/

[23]   S. Matejka. (2011, November, 20). AES - AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 encryption/decryption functions [Online]. Available: http://radio.feld.cvut.cz/personal/matejka/wiki/doku.php?id=root:en:projects

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
   Ft. Belvoir, Virginia

2. Dudley Knox Library
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California