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THESIS

**THE LONGUE DUREE: INDONESIA'S RESPONSE TO
THE THREAT OF JIHADIST TERRORISM 1998-2016**

by

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June 2016

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JIHADIST TERRORISM 1998–2016**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis studies the evolution of the Indonesian government's response to the threat of transnational jihadism and addresses the debate over the effectiveness of its counterterrorism policy. It poses the question: has Indonesian policy on transnational terrorism been effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups? By examining the three periods since Indonesia's transition to democracy—1998-2001, 2002-2008, and 2009-present—the prominent political and social issues considered by politicians and counterterrorist specialists can be seen through the lenses of the threats facing Indonesia and the state's response. Through these means, the evolution and effectiveness of Indonesian counterterrorism may be further measured against the context and interplay of three factors: counterterrorism policies chosen, changing nature and evolution of the jihadist groups, and public opinion. These factors enabled state capacity and the implementation of a criminal justice counterterrorism approach effectively implementing "hard" and "soft" methods. With continued implementation of this approach, Indonesia may be positioned to combat the re-emergent transnationally influenced jihadist threats. The findings and lessons learned identified in this thesis may assist countries like Indonesia in their CT strategy development, capacity building, and application.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i>
ADI	<i>Ansharud Daulah Islamiyah</i>
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AGAP	<i>Aliansi Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan</i>
ANF	<i>al-Nusra Front</i>
AQ	al-Qaeda
AQA	al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago
AQI	al-Qaeda In Iraq
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASG	<i>Abu Sayyaf Group</i>
ATF	Antiterrorism Task Force
BAIS	<i>Badan Intelijen Strategis</i>
BIK	<i>Badan Intelijen Keamanan</i> —Home Security Intelligence Agency
BIN	<i>Badan Intelijen Nasional</i>
BNI	Bank Negara Indonesia
BNPT	<i>Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan Terorisme</i>
CT	counterterrorism
DCET	Desk for Coordination of Eradicating Terrorism
DDII	<i>Dewan Daah Islamiyah Indonesia</i>
FAKSI	<i>Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam</i>
FKPT	<i>Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorism</i>
FPDI	<i>Forum Pendukung Daulah Islamiyah</i>
FPI	<i>Islamic Defender's Front</i>
FU-MUI	<i>Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Majelis Ulama Undonesia</i>
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i>
GASHIBU	<i>Gerakan Sehari Seribu</i>
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HASI	<i>Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia</i>
HASMI	Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society

HIT	<i>Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia</i>
IDC	<i>Infaq Dakwah Centre</i>
INTRAC	Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center
IPAC	Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict
IPSC	Indonesian Peace and Security Centre
IS	Islamic State
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISW	Institute for the Study of War
JAD	<i>Jamaah Ansharut Daulah</i>
JAK	<i>Jamaah Anshar Khilafah</i>
JAS	<i>Jamaah Anshorul Syariat</i>
JAT	<i>Jamaah Ansharud Tauhid</i>
JCLEC	Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation
JI	<i>Jemaah Islamiyah</i>
JTJ	<i>Jamaah Tawhid wal Jihad</i>
KISDI	<i>Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas degan Dunia Islam</i>
KM	<i>Katibah Masyaariq</i>
KN	<i>Katibah Nusantara</i>
KOMPAK	<i>Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis</i>
LJ	<i>Laskar Jihad</i>
LJu	<i>Laskar Jundullah</i>
LM	<i>Laskar Mujahidin</i>
LSI	<i>Lembaga Survei Indonesia</i>
MA	Mujahedeen Ambon
MIB	<i>Mujahidin Indonesian Barat</i>
MIT	<i>Mujahidin Indonesia Timur</i>
MJ	<i>Mujahideen Jawi</i>
MMI	<i>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</i>
MPA	<i>Majmu'ah Persiapan Al Arkhabily</i>
MUI	<i>Majelis Ulama Indonesia</i> —Council of Indonesian Ulama
NU	<i>Nahdatul-Ulama</i>
OPM	Free Papua Organization

PNPT	<i>Program Nasional Pencegahan Terorisme</i>
POLRI	National Police
PPM	Centre for Study of Islam and Society
PPTAK	<i>Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan</i>
PUPJI	<i>Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah</i>
SBY	<i>Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</i>
SD	U.S. State Department
SIRA	Aceh Referendum Information Center
START	Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i>

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Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to all of those whose lives have been lost or forever altered at the hands of terrorism. May you find peace. May the rest of us find the strength to continue to safeguard the weak and hunt down the wicked; until the day we are all able to settle our differences without the use of bullets and bombs.

Semper Fidelis

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

The phenomenon of transnational Islamic jihadism, born in the modern era, nested with domestic radical Islamic aims in Southeast Asia and came to play a critical part in influencing Indonesia's radical based Islamic groups since its democratization.¹ This thesis studies the evolution of the Indonesian governments' response to this increasing threat to its national security. This thesis asks the question: has Indonesian policy on transnational terrorism been effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND BACKGROUND

Recently, the threat posed by transnational Islamic jihadism has been rejuvenated on the world stage and within Southeast Asia through a new organization springing from the ashes of al-Qaeda In Iraq (AQI): the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).² By June 29, 2014, ISIS would declare itself to be the Islamic State (IS)—the new Caliphate under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as appointed Caliph Ibrahim.³ IS's successes on the ground and unprecedented use of social networking and media resources have enabled the group to further its reach in spreading its perverse, jihadist-oriented interpretation of Salafist ideology and beliefs throughout the world.⁴ Southeast Asian nations and Indonesia in particular have not been spared IS's propaganda and influences on its citizens.

In the context of an inquiry into the effectiveness of Indonesia's counterterrorism (CT) efforts and policies on transnational terrorism, the re-emergence of transnational jihadist threats begs the initial questions: To what extent have Indonesian radical

¹ Greg Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam* (Sydney, Australia: Univ. of New South Wales Press, 2004), 45.

² Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror* (New York: Regan Arts, 2015), 1.

³ Philip Ross, "ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State, Daesh: What's the Difference?" *International Business Times*, June 9, 2015, <http://www.ibtimes.com/isil-isis-islamic-state-daesh-whats-difference-1693495>; Hassan and Weiss, *ISIS: Inside the Army*, 1.

⁴ Hassan and Weiss, *ISIS: Inside the Army*, 170.

Islamists been mobilized, and what threats do they and their supporters present to Indonesia? With the onset of civil war in Syria, Indonesian foreign fighters have flocked to the banners of both IS and *al-Nusra Front* (ANF), the Support Front for the People of Greater Syria, the al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliated rebel group.⁵

Since IS's declaration as a modern self-designated Caliphate, Indonesians varying from foreign fighters traveling to the region (reported numbers ranging from 500 to as high as 800), numerous domestic organizations (*al-Mustaqbal* and *Mujahidin Indonesia Timur* [MIT]), and the conduct of "pledging ceremonies" by individuals in and out of the prison systems (over 2,000 alone from July to August 2014) have declared their support and or allegiance, *bai'at*, to IS.⁶ Finally, those foreign fighters from Southeast Asia fighting with IS have been organized into a cohesive fighting unit, the *Katibah Nusantara* (KN), later named *Majmu'ah Persiapan Al Arkhabily* (MPA), the Archipelago Group-in-Preparation, composed solely of foreign fighters of Indonesian and Malaysian origin.⁷ Like the Afghan veterans before them, many of these contemporary jihadist foreign fighters possess the ultimate ambitions to someday return home and establish a pan-regional Islamic State of their own, the *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara*.⁸

Despite the distances involved and seemingly small percentage that the Indonesian foreign fighters comprise within the ranks of both IS and ANF—with IS

⁵ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict* (IPAC Report No. 6) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2014), 8–9; Greg Fealy and John Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State* (Arlington, VA: Management Systems International, 2016), 7.

⁶ "Militants Planned ISIS Regime in Malaysia," *Straits Times*, April 8, 2015, ProQuest (1671000037); Elliot Brennan, "How Southeast Asia is Responding to ISIS," *Interpreter*, March 5, 2015, <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/05/How-should-we-respond-to-ISIS-in-Southeast-Asia.aspx>; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, *The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia* (IPAC Report No. 13) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2014), 1; Zachary Abuza, "Joining the Caravan: ISIS and the Regeneration of Terrorism in Southeast Asia," *Strategic Studies Institute*, June 25, 2015, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/joining-the-new-caravan/2015/06/25>; Sidney Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2015): 158, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/saa/summary/v2015/2015.jones.html>; Edward Delman, "ISIS in the World's Largest Muslim Country: Why Are So Few Indonesians Joining the Islamic State," *Atlantic*, January 3, 2016, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/isis-indonesia-foreign-fighters/422403/>; Kristen E. Schulze, "The Jakarta Attack and the Islamic State Threat to Indonesia," *CTC Sentinel* 9, no. 1 (January 2016), 29.

⁷ Navhat Nuraniyah, "How ISIS Charmed the New Generation of Indonesian Militants," *Middle East Institute*, January 9, 2015, <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/how-isis-charmed-new-generation-indonesian-militants>; IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 19; Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," 159.

⁸ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 1.

foreign fighter numbers alone estimated to be as high as 30,000—these developments cause the Indonesian government much concern.⁹ Alarms stem from the sheer number of foreign fighters drawn to the conflict—numbering hundreds more and in half the time it took for the “Group of 272” who traveled to Afghanistan between 1984–1994; the formulation of a regionally networked Malayan based fighting unit within IS; direct calls from IS for support or the waging of jihad by Indonesians back home; and the extension of networks, influence, and support with radical jihadist domestic groups.¹⁰ All of these alarms have provided substantially different contexts and subsequent potential threats to national security and the Indonesian government than previous transnational terrorist actors such as AQ and *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI).¹¹

C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESIS

This thesis addresses the debate over whether Indonesian policy on transnational terrorism has been effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups. There are two prevailing arguments answering this question. The first argues that Indonesian CT efforts have been effective through increased state capacity by establishing governmental institutions/agencies and by the professionalization of law enforcement elements. Through these means, the Indonesian government has been able to successfully ratchet up its effectiveness against transnational elements and emergent threats.¹² The second argument states that the Indonesian CT efforts and policies are ineffective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups. This stems from the government’s lack of the implementation of a comprehensive CT program consisting of

⁹ Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; Abdelhak Mamou, “ISIS Has 30,000 Foreign Fighters from More Than 100 Countries,” *Iraqi News*, May 29, 2015, <http://www.iraqinews.com/arab-world-news/isis-30000-foreign-fighters-100-countries/>.

¹⁰ Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 67.

¹¹ Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; Joseph Chinyong Liow, “ISIS Goes to Asia: Extremism in the Middle East Isn’t Only Spreading West,” *Foreign Affairs*, September 19, 2014, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia/2014-09-19/isis-goes-asia>; Yuliasri Perdani and Ina Parlina, “Government Bans Support, Endorsement of ISIL,” *Jakarta Post*, August 5, 2014, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/08/05/govt-bans-support-endorsement-isil.html>.

¹² Sidney Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches to Radical Islam since 1998,” in *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, ed. Mirjam Künkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2013), 120.

effective de-radicalization programs, prison reform, addressing religious intolerance and radical ideology, and rule of law.¹³ The lack of progress in these spheres furthers the ability of radical Islamic groups to evolve, regroup, and ultimately continue to threaten the state. The author proposes a hybrid, third theory wherein the extent of Indonesian CT efforts and policy effectiveness in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups through the criminal justice CT approach varies between ineffectiveness and effectiveness over time. Ineffectiveness has been witnessed through the inability to effectively combat the mobilization of radical Islamic groups. This is demonstrated by the persistent and continual re-emergence of radical jihadists as a viable threat to state security. Causal factors may be a lack of effective implementation of “soft” CT measures that adequately addresses: de-radicalization and disengagement programs, prison reform, religious intolerance and non-violent radical groups, and rule of law. On the other hand, effectiveness may be seen through the establishment and maintenance of requisite CT state capacities via law enforcement professionalization, adoption of anti-terrorism legislation, and the successful conduct of both “hard” and “soft” CT measures that when viewed in a cumulative and temporal manner represents a comprehensive CT strategy.¹⁴

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Indonesia had long been praised for its moderate, non-radical Islamic practices and secular based approach toward governance.¹⁵ Following the fall of the Suharto

¹³ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 120–25; Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, *Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink* (IPAC Report No. 11) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2014), 1; John Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy* (CRS Report No. R41070) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 28–29, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf>; Amy L. Freedman, “Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Asian Security Studies*, ed. Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Chinyong Liow (New York: Routledge, 2010), 269.

¹⁴ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 120–25; Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 1; Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28–29; Freedman, “Islamic Extremism,” 269.

¹⁵ James Brandon, “Syrian and Iraqi Jihadis Prompt Increased Recruitment and Activism in Southeast Asia,” *CTC Sentinel* 7, no. 10 (October 2014): 19; Peter Chalk et al., *The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment*, Santa Monica: RAND, 2009), xiv; Andrée Feillard and Remy Madinier, *The End of Innocence? Indonesian Islam and the Temptations of Radicalism*, trans. Wong Wee (Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press, 2011), 1; Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 1–2; Julie Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism in Perspective: An Assessment of ‘Jihad Project’ Trends In Indonesia,” *AsiaPacific Issues*, no. 104 (September 2012): 1–2.

regime in 1998 and the emergence of newly democratizing civil governance, events and actions by radical Islamic groups would undercut these notions.¹⁶ Just a few years into the 21st century, Indonesia was beginning to be seen as a struggling, democratizing nation facing radical Islamic influences and jihad.¹⁷ Chief among these initial developments was the widespread communal violence by newly established radical Islamic militias, *laskars*, flaring throughout the country in areas such as the Moluccas and Sulawesi.¹⁸ These developments were followed by a series of bombings from 2002 through 2005 resulting in hundreds of foreign and indigenous civilian deaths.¹⁹ These acts were made all the more damning with the discovery of the transnational jihadist organization JI domestically based within Indonesia, whose affiliates would go on to conduct further bombings and planned plots in 2009.²⁰ The succession of events all occurred within the immediate years following the attacks of 9/11 and the U.S. declared Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) with its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.²¹ To many analysts, the threat of transnational Islamic jihadism and radical Islamic ideology seemed to have found sanctuary on Indonesian soil from which future growth seemed assured.²²

Yet, despite the alarm and initial bloodshed, belief in a strengthening, democratic Indonesia would ultimately resonate with the Indonesian people. This sentiment was captured by Aspinall citing that over 75% of the voters for WiDoDo and 79% for Prabowo in the 2014 presidential elections agreed that, “democracy was ‘appropriate’ for

¹⁶ Robert W. Hefner, “Islamic Radicalism in a Democratizing Indonesia,” in *The Routledge Handbook of Political Islam*, ed. Shahram Akbarzadeh (New York: Routledge), 105.

¹⁷ Greg Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: the Faltering Revival,” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2004): 104.

¹⁸ Hefner, “Islamic Radicalism in a Democratizing Indonesia,” 105; Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia,” 109; Zachary Abuza, “Review of Noorhaidi Hasan’s *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 29, no. 1 (April 2007): 196–97.

¹⁹ Bruce Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia* (CRS Report No. RL34194) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 3–4, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL34194.pdf>.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1–4; Freedman, “Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia,” 263.

²² Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 1; Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia,” 104.

Indonesia.”²³ This belief in democracy coupled with the government’s concerted CT efforts over the course of a decade and half eventually turned the tide. However, the radical and jihadist agendas survived, and would continue their trend of evolving organizational structures, tactics, and ideologies.²⁴ This literature review will describe how Indonesian authorities responded to the transnational jihadist threat over the past decade and a half. The author will first trace the Indonesian authorities’ CT policies and efforts through three distinct timeframes reflecting the evolution of those efforts. Second, the investigation will describe areas of effectiveness and ineffectiveness; examining why those efforts were effective during one period and less effective in others. Finally, the author will consider causal factors for Indonesian CT ineffectiveness through describing the interconnectedness of non-violent and violent radical groups and the subsequent threat this poses.

1. The Indonesian CT Response: Three Periods of CT Evolution

The response of Indonesia to the threat of transnational terrorism is one that, much like the nature of the terrorist threat and structure of associated radical Islamic groups, has undergone fundamental changes since the country’s democratization in the post-Suharto years. These changes to the state response and subsequent policies have been reflective of the evolving attitudes of both the authorities and the public-at-large: from initial ardent dismissal to the eventual acknowledgement of transnational terrorism as a true threat to Indonesian national security.²⁵ By analyzing the last decade and a half through three distinct timeframes of: I. 1998–2001, II. 2002–2008, and III. 2009–present, the interplay between the evolution of Indonesian CT efforts, the changing nature of the jihadist threat, and the dynamic role of public opinion will be charted. Within each timeframe three main concepts will be briefly analyzed: 1) the radical Islamic

²³ Edward Aspinall, “Oligarchic Populism: Prabowo Subianto’s Challenge to Indonesian Democracy,” *Indonesia*, no. 99 (April 2015): 25, doi: 10.1353/ind.2015.0002.

²⁴ Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Muslim Indonesia’s Secular Democracy,” *Asian Survey* 49, no. 4 (2009): 576, doi: 10.1525/as.2009.49.4.575.

²⁵ Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 219; Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism in Perspective,” 1–2; Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, *Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia* (Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005), 5–6.

transnational terrorist and domestic terrorist threat; 2) the counterterrorist response consisting of the politics, policies, and programs; and 3) assessment of the counterterrorism response.

a. 1998–2001

With the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, the Indonesian government faced widespread communal, vigilante violence in many areas—Central Sulawesi, Maluku, and Maluku Utara, coupled with separatist movements in Aceh and East Timor.²⁶ The cumulative effect and pressing urgency of these conflicts, responsible for thousands of deaths, damage to infrastructure, and general upheaval, masked the threats the transnational jihadist groups posed during this timeframe.²⁷ The Indonesian government chalked up the incidents that did not target the government as normal criminal behavior bearing little substance and believed that the country did not suffer from a “terrorist problem.”²⁸ According to Jones, the government, whose limited state capacity and resources were stretched thin, looked at the radical Islamists as a means and source by which control and order could be garnished within the troubled areas.²⁹ The complicated nature of Indonesian radical Islam (interconnectedness of violent and non-violent radical groups), the attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent U.S. pressure to do more (identifying Indonesia’s radical groups as terrorists and calling for their disbandment by Indonesia) still did not cause great alarm and was viewed with general skepticism by both Indonesian authorities and the public at large.³⁰ These combined views culminated with

²⁶ Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 214–17; John T. Sidel, “Jihad and the Specter of Transnational Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Comparative Historical Perspective,” in *Southeast Asia and the Middle East: Islam, Movement, and the Longue Durée*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2009), 275; Daljit Singh, “Trends in Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” in *Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia in the Coming Decade*, edited by Daljit Singh (Singapore: Macmillan Publishers India Ltd., 2009), 90.

²⁷ Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 218.

²⁸ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 109–16.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Sidel, “Jihad and the Specter,” 275; Daljit Singh, “Trends in Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” in *Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia in the Coming Decade*, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: Macmillan, 2009), 89; Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 5.

Indonesia's upfront but cautious support to U.S. initiatives.³¹ This timeframe ended with the conclusion of the vigilante and interreligious violence that had spread throughout much of Indonesia; thereby freeing Indonesian government assets and capabilities that would prove vital with the coming surge of jihadist attacks.³²

b. 2002–2008

The timeframe of 2002 through 2008 would be critical for the Indonesian government as it would witness a general change in public sentiment against transnational terrorism. While successive bombings ravaged the country each year, the Bali bombing that killed and wounded over 200 people caused a massive decline in public support toward radical Islamists.³³ After the 2002 Bali bombing by JI, Bali-I, the extent of its reach throughout Southeast Asia was uncovered by Indonesian national police who tracked down the assailants in concert with U.S. and Australian law enforcement agency support.³⁴ Subsequently, for the first time, the government admitted that domestic—transnational terrorist groups, if left unchecked, could prove to be deadly threats to the Indonesian government and its citizens.³⁵ This acknowledgment was followed in kind by two actions: 1) the establishment of a national police CT unit, *Detasemen Khusus-88* (Densus-88), Detachment-88, and 2) sweeping arrests of terrorist suspects.³⁶ As cited by Abuza and Jones, the establishment of Densus-88 was critical in setting the precedence of civil-police authority over the military regarding CT, an act that only increased tensions arising between the two state elements.³⁷ As if anticipating the massive arrests, the Megawati government and Parliament further enacted an antiterrorism law in 2003 by which the Bali bombers and other jihadist affiliates were

³¹ Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 116.

³² Sidel, "Jihad and the Spector," 302–03.

³³ David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah* (Case Study No. 6) (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 4; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 4; Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27.

³⁴ Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle*, 7–12.

³⁵ Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27.

³⁶ Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 116.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 116–117; Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence*, 62.

successfully tried and jailed.³⁸ Despite the gains made through enhanced CT efforts, this timeframe was still marked by a failure of the government to label radical groups, such as JI, as terrorists. This failure was due to a lingering fear of residual public sentiment holding the belief that these actions were part of the U.S. GWOT.³⁹

Following the previous bombings and in the wake of the second Bali bombing in 2005 (Bali-II) public sentiment greatly turned against the terrorists yet again. This turn of opinion opened the door for the Indonesian authorities—in conjunction with CT support from the U.S. and Australian governments—to further make enhancement to law enforcement efforts. Gordon and Lindo asserted that this now meant politicians would be free for the most part from public backlash and negative press.⁴⁰

Years 2006 through 2008 represent nominal changes in Indonesian CT efforts. These efforts consisted primarily of continued arrests and incarcerations but was also a rebuilding timeframe for the terrorists as depicted by the surge in violence that would erupt in 2009. However, in a landmark decision during a trial in April 2008, a judge determined JI to be an illegal group, an action the government had tiptoed around until that time, but later utilized as a precedent in confronting IS.⁴¹

c. 2009–Present

The timeframe of 2009 to the present day has ushered in fundamental shifts in Indonesia's outlook on the nature of the transnational jihadist threat. Following the Jakarta bombing in 2009 and the foiled assassination attempt on the president—executed and planned by Noordin Top's ex-JI faction al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago (AQA)—Indonesia began to view transnational jihadist terrorism as an existential threat to national security.⁴² After the takedown of Top and many of his affiliates in a violent gunfight with national police, General Ansyad Mbai was placed in charge of a new state

³⁸ Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 117.

³⁹ Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 1.

⁴⁰ Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4.

⁴¹ Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 10.

⁴² Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27–29; Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 4.

agency, the National Counter Terrorism Agency, *Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan Terorisme* (BNPT), to coordinate and formulate CT policy measures and implementation.⁴³ Through the course of 2010 arrests were ramped up greatly numbering over 100 and reflecting actions that were seen previously over the course of 2003 in the wake of Bali-I.⁴⁴ Though a great step forward, the organization has since been beset by inter-agency rivalry between police and military forces that has only complicated interagency cooperation, the distribution of state resources, and effective operational execution.⁴⁵

In the context of the rise and implications of IS, Indonesian authorities have taken marked steps beyond the standard approach of making arrests to counter the emergent threat. Following a call to arms video titled “Joining the Ranks” airing on *You Tube* July 23, 2014 an Indonesian jihadist urged Indonesians to support another state entity, that of IS; a threat directly challenging notions of national loyalty and ethos of *Pancasila*.⁴⁶ State officials have outright issued a ban on IS support in August 2014 and President WiDoDo continues to mull over an interim emergency government regulation, *perppu*, that will further restrict IS support in the forms of: verbal support, overseas travel to support jihadist groups, and espousing jihadist ideology.⁴⁷ Additionally, recent botched police arrests and failure to detect the 2009 assassination attempt of the president, not only resulted in the creation of the BNPT, but also raised questions about incorporating more of the *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI) within Indonesian CT efforts. Further incorporation of the TNI into the realm of domestic security raises additional questions as to the level of trust and confidence the government places within law enforcement efforts alone to contain and combat the jihadist threat.⁴⁸

⁴³ Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28.

⁴⁴ Iis Gindarsah, “Indonesia’s Struggle against Terrorism,” Council on Councils, April 11, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p32772.

⁴⁵ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 1.

⁴⁶ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20.

⁴⁷ Abuza, “Joining the Caravan.”

⁴⁸ Sidney Jones, “The Ongoing Extremist Threat in Indonesia,” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2011): 100–01; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 11.

2. Indonesian CT: Effective or Ineffective Response?

The Indonesian authorities' response to the threat of transnational terrorism is as unique and infused with continual evolution as the terrorist organizations it purports to target. As demonstrated in the periodization of CT efforts and policies, the Indonesian government has established a pattern of reactive CT actions and policies. While effective in one time period, seen immediately following the wake of a terrorist attack, it often reverts to ineffectiveness in another. Here the initiative returns to the terrorists who evolve and adapt their means and ways to exploit the weaknesses of the government.⁴⁹

From all appearances, the Indonesian CT efforts have been effective, primarily through the focused efforts of professionalizing the police force as an effective, distinct, and separate entity from that of the military.⁵⁰ Jones furthers this analysis through the context of the Indonesian presidencies and subsequent policies implanted under their tenure. Through this approach, Jones makes the claim that the acts of terrorism throughout the years, especially in the formative democratizing timeframe, had the reverse effect of strengthening and empowering the Indonesian government.⁵¹ The strength and empowerment resulted eventually in the manifestation of state capacity: the creation of CT agencies such as Densus-88 and institutions such as the BNPT.⁵²

Yet, on further investigation, the efforts may lack the full range of a cohesive and synchronized program wherein all aspects of government agencies and legal institutions are aligned under the same unity of effort.⁵³ In lieu of the emergent threat of IS and its radical domestic supporters, the enhancement of CT efforts through legislative actions, the banning of IS support, are a pro-active attempt at pre-empting IS violence within Indonesia's borders.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Gindarsah, "Indonesia's Struggle."

⁵⁰ Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," 1. Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28; Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 213–14.

⁵¹ Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 109–10.

⁵² Jones, "Ongoing Extremist Threat," 100–01.

⁵³ Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence*, 60; Rollins, "Al Qaeda and Affiliates," 28.

⁵⁴ Abuza, "Joining the Caravan."

Analysts such as Abuza, Rollins, and the Institute for Policy Analysis and Conflict (IPAC) assess the Indonesian government response to the threat in an incremental manner, with a focus on assessing government actions in relation to terrorist attacks and the evolving nature of the terrorists groups.⁵⁵ A common approach by Abuza, Singt, and others is to focus on what Indonesia should be doing better, such as in areas of religious pluralism, and doing more to combat extremism without much context or substance behind the recommendations.⁵⁶ However, these analysts joined by Jones and Freedman indicate that persistent themes of ineffectiveness transcending the three timeframes have consisted of de-radicalization programs, failed prison management reform, religious intolerance, and insufficient rule of law or effective anti-terrorism legal instrumentation.⁵⁷ Jones states that the authorities began to implement the first of its de-radicalization and disengagement programs with speaking tours by disengaged jihadists of a supposed “non-violent nature” in 2005 with hopes of changing their peers’ mindsets.⁵⁸ In a CRS report in 2011, Rollins described these efforts as, “more cooptative in nature than ideological,” and that a large percentage of jihadists returned to jihadist activities upon release.⁵⁹ Jones agrees, adding that additional measures and attention should be paid to the corruption inherent within the Indonesian government. This corruption, according to Jones, was critical in the procurement of arms, supplies, and movement of insurgents associated with the terrorist camp discovered in Aceh in 2010.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence*, 60–64; IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 12; Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28–29.

⁵⁶ Singh, “Trends in Terrorism,” 90; Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence*, 60–64

⁵⁷ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 120–25; Abuza, “Joining the Caravan”; IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 1; Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28–29; Freedman, “Islamic Extremism in Southeast Asia,” 269.

⁵⁸ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 120.

⁵⁹ Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28.

⁶⁰ Jones, “Ongoing Extremist Threat,” 101–02.

3. Ineffectiveness Explored: The Radicals Have a Vote

The ineffectiveness of Indonesian CT efforts may stem from an inability to acknowledge the interconnectedness of non-violent extremist groups and violent ones.⁶¹ Jones captures this keenly stating that:

Every arrest of a terrorist suspect...produces new information showing that extremist networks are more extensive than previously thought and that groups are constantly evolving and mutating, with older organizations like JI losing ground to new alliances.⁶²

The radicalized groups are varied, ranging from political organizations and *laskars* operating in the open, to domestic-transnational jihadists. Yet they are commonly linked by the thread of a desire for further Shari'a implementation.⁶³

Over the course of the last decade, radical Islam in Indonesia has evolved to include a marked increase in the use of non-violent means: an action that has thus allowed radical groups to survive and evolve out in the open within a modern democracy.⁶⁴ The use of non-violent means is demonstrated by JI's spiritual leader and co-founder Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's moves in 2002–2003 to align JI with pro-establishment and political parties.⁶⁵ Ramakrishna underlined the inherent dangers of such actions stating that:

Only very recently have terrorism watchers based in the region conceded that while it's true that holding extremist views doesn't necessarily mean proclivity to violent action, it is equally a fact that belief in the ideology is a precursor to action for those who commit violence in the name of jihad.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Jones, "Ongoing Extremist Threat," 101–02.

⁶² Ibid., 91.

⁶³ Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 1–2; Gindarsah, "Indonesia's Struggle."

⁶⁴ Jones, "Ongoing Extremist Threat," 101–02.

⁶⁵ Greg Barton, "The Historical Development of Jihadi Islamist thought in Indonesia," in *Radical Islamic Ideology in Southeast Asia*, ed. Scott Helfstein (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2009), 45–46.

⁶⁶ Kumar Ramakrishna, *Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: The Power of the Manichean Mindset* (New York: Springer, 2015), 7.

Non-violent, radical Islamic fundamentalist organizations, allowed to operate without constraint by the government, quite often have affiliated militant groups from which networking, recruitment from one to the other, and the enabling of working toward aligned objectives—increased Shari’a policy implementation—still occur.⁶⁷ Examples of the complicated, interwoven networking include the conservative political group *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia’s* (MMI) affiliated militant wing *Laskar Mujahidin* (LM) and JI’s Ba’asyir considered a prominent MMI member.⁶⁸

Indonesian authorities and analysts alike commonly argued that the direct ties between transnational jihadists, Indonesian transnational elements, and domestic radical Islamic groups, such as laskars and communal vigilante groups, were weak—if existing at all. This notion was once reinforced by Jones pointing to major ideological rifts and disparate objectives held by the overarching leaderships of the organizations as evidence.⁶⁹ However, this may not be the case with the reverse evidence of closer, stronger network ties holding more water. This is due to the complexity of Indonesian radical Islamic networking and inherent evolutions of the organizations. Supporting evidence may be found in the case of the MMI and JI affiliations and AQ and JI supporting various laskars with funding and fighters in the Moluccas and Sulawesi conflicts of 1998 to the early 2000’s.⁷⁰ Further radical group interconnectedness lie in the growing influence since 2007 of *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI)—a radical non-violent advocacy group—and the recent discovery of ties to a militant offshoot *al-Muhajirun*. Al-Muhajirun not only has direct linkages to IS, but has played a coordinating role in the

⁶⁷ Fred R. von der Mehden, “Islam in Indonesia in the Twenty-First Century,” in *Asian Islam in the 21st Century*, ed. John L. Esposito, John O. Voll, and Osman Bakar (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), 22–24; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 1–3.

⁶⁸ Von der Mehden, “Islam in Indonesia,” 23; Fealy, “Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia,” 113–14.

⁶⁹ Sidney Jones, “Review of Paul J. Smith’s ‘Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability,’” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, no. 1 (April 2005): 147.

⁷⁰ Von der Mehden, “Islam in Indonesia,” 23; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 3; Hefner, “Islamic Radicalism in a Democratizing Indonesia,” 114; Zachary Abuza, “Borderlands, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Southeast Asia,” in *The Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization*, ed. James Clad, Sean M. McDonald, and Bruce Vaughn (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2011), 92–93.

recruitment of Indonesians to the jihadist organization's cause.⁷¹ Therefore, the evidence suggests that the relationship between non-violent and violent organizations may have been and continues to be more tangible than originally thought.⁷² Numerous analysts acknowledge that the two may be in fact interrelated along lines of inter-networking and support, with radicalized domestic elements providing the context for the latter to rebuild, educate/train, recruit, and operate within.⁷³

4. Conclusion

In summary, this literature review identified themes pertinent to the Indonesian authorities' response to the transnational jihadist threat and mobilization of radical Islamic groups over the past decade and a half. First, the Indonesian authorities' CT efforts and changing public opinion were analyzed through three distinct timeframes: I. 1998–2001, II. 2002–2008, and III. 2009–present. This reflects the evolution of those efforts against the evolving jihadist threat. These timeframes were demarcated by events conducted by the terrorists and the subsequent reactions of the Indonesian government and public sentiment. By the time of the aftermath of the Bali-II bombing, public sentiment had turned against the Islamic jihadists and proved to be a critical component in the enhancement of Indonesian CT efforts. From 2009–present, the threat of transnational jihadism had re-emerged and was hard felt by the Indonesian public on multiple occasions yet again. Further negative public sentiment toward transnational jihadist terrorism enabled the government to further enhance state capacity with the creation of the BNPT and other CT efforts. In light of the acknowledged threat to national security that IS and its supporters posed, Indonesia would adopt pre-emptive measures

⁷¹ Singh, "Trends in Terrorism," 88; IPAC Report, *Evolution of ISIS*, 1–3; Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 122.

⁷² Von der Mehden, "Islam in Indonesia," 23; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 3; Hefner, "Islamic Radicalism in a Democratizing Indonesia," 114; Abuza, "Borderlands, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Southeast Asia," 92–93.

⁷³ Sidel, "Jihad and the Spector," 304–09; Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence*, 2–3; Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia," 109; Von der Mehden, "Islam in Indonesia," 23–28; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 1–6; Gindarsah, "Indonesia's Struggle"; Abuza, "Borderlands, Terrorism, and Insurgency," 92–93.

with the banning of IS support to contain and prevent transnational terrorism and the further mobilization of radical Islamic groups to the cause.

Second, the CT areas of effectiveness and ineffectiveness, capturing why those efforts were effective during one period and less effective in others was described. Areas of effectiveness were linked to the professionalization of Indonesia's law enforcement and creation of CT agencies such as Detachment 88 and BNPT. Ineffectiveness was linked to the lack of attention and resources to complimentary CT programs such as de-radicalization, prison reform, and legal reform. Finally, the author described Indonesian CT ineffectiveness by describing the potential linkage and interconnectedness of non-violent and violent radical Islamic groups and the subsequent threat they pose. This literature review further identified the need for additional research to more fully understand and explain why Indonesia's CT policies and program as a whole has experienced timeframes of ineffectiveness and effectiveness over the past decade and a half.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

In answering the question of whether a state's policies on transnational terrorism are effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups, a single case study will provide the most detailed data and analysis by which both unique and general conclusions and methodologies may be drawn. Furthermore, through a temporal approach and breaking down the timeframe encompassing Indonesia's shift to a democratic form of governance in 1998 to the present day into three distinct time-periods, the prominent political and social issues that were factored by state politicians and CT specialists may be seen. To date, Indonesia's CT efforts, their effectiveness and ineffectiveness, have been mostly measured against the changing structure and nature of the threat posed by transnational and networked domestic radical Islamic groups. This has been performed incrementally and viewed in relation to the terrorists' actions and evolutions. Conversely, the standpoint of viewing these radical groups' evolutions and actions as reactions to public sentiments and state CT efforts has received little attention. It is the author's aim that this investigation will identify the effective and ineffective policies by which

Indonesia may further direct CT support and resources in combatting the contemporary, re-emergent threat of transnational terrorism and the further mobilization of domestic radical Islamic groups.

Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia contains the largest Islamic demographic with 87.2% of its population of 255,993,674 and further constitutes the worlds' largest Muslim population at approximately 12.7% of the global *umma* community.⁷⁴ With such a large Muslim population, the dynamics and extremes of Islamic radicalization and its interplay within the confines of a modern and secular, democratic form of governance may readily be studied. Should even an extremely small percentage of the Indonesian populace become radicalized and vocal, the effects on Indonesian society, the political sphere, and Southeast Asian ethnic Malay and Muslim populations may be profound. Barton captures this sentiment when he stated that, "The pattern of history points to the fact that, even if it only directly affects a minute fraction of Indonesian society, the advent of Jemaah Islamiyah-al-Qaeda-style jihadi Islamism in the Indonesian archipelago marks a sea of change in Indonesian Islam."⁷⁵

The Indonesian case study further contains the context by which all pertinent themes to the question may be studied: the origins and base of operations for the first transnational jihadist organization in Southeast Asia through JI, a myriad of loosely linked domestic radical Islamic groups with disparate goals and objectives, the historic to contemporary interactions with transnational jihadist terrorism, and the example of a states' CT response to both transnational and domestic radical jihadists.⁷⁶ The Indonesian CT policies and actions will be measured against the context of the desired end-states and subsequent results found in jihadist group evolutions, context of public sentiment at the

⁷⁴ "World Fact Book: Indonesia," Central Intelligence Agency, last modified May 11, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>; "Muslim Population By Country," Pew Research Center, January 27, 2011, <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/>.

⁷⁵ Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle*, 86.

⁷⁶ Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 4; Barton, "Historical Development of Jihadi," 45; Sidney Jones, "The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 59, no. 2 (2005): 169–70, doi: 10.1080/10357710500134475.

time, terrorist group lethality rate comparisons through statistical data available, and the major CT and terrorist actions that occurred.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will be organized into five chapters using the temporal analysis format. Following the first chapter, Chapters II, III, and IV will investigate Indonesian CT policy as it relates to transnational terrorism and radical Islamic groups captured through the three distinct timeframes of: 1998–2001, 2002–2008, and 2009–present. Within these timeframes, the threat(s) facing the Indonesian government, the state’s CT response, and an overall assessment of the timeframe will take place. Within each timeframe the evolution and overall effectiveness of the Indonesian CT program will be viewed through the influences and context of three primary factors: the changing nature and evolution of the jihadist groups, Indonesian CT response, and public opinion.

The conclusion will provide a summary and synthesis of the author’s observations and findings during the research. Furthermore, the generalized observations and implications drawn from the Indonesian case study that may be applicable for utilization by countries facing the similar threats of transnational jihadism and domestic radical mobilization will be discussed. A step beyond for potential future research poses the question: does a correlation exist between the re-emergent rise of communal violence, the mobilization of radical jihadist groups, and transnational terrorist influences within specific regions of Indonesia exist, and if so, to what extent does this pose a threat to Indonesian unity, national security, and that of the region today?

II. 1998–2001: A MATTER OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTEGRITY

A. THE THREAT OVERVIEW

In August of 2000, former President Wahid addressed the People's Consultative Assembly stating that a, "Wave of disintegration is threatening the existence of the unitary state and national unity."⁷⁷ As the Suharto regime fell in 1998 and during the proceeding years of the nation's ascent toward democratic governance, Indonesia faced a myriad of diverse and widespread domestic pressures that would pose significant threats to national sovereignty and integrity. Two main threats would emerge during this timeframe predicated around the sudden and sharp rise of the use of political violence by domestic actors. The first consisted of increased provincial public sentiment in favor of political action through violent and non-violent means for new and decades old separatist movements in areas such as East Timor, Ambon, Aceh, and Papua.⁷⁸ The second would be associated with the widespread surge of communal, vigilantism erupting between Christians and Muslims and the subsequent rise of militant Islamic *laskars*, militias.⁷⁹ Overshadowed by these two pressing threats yet omnipresent in the shadows was the growing power and overall threat posed by transnationally linked, domestic based terrorism by radical Islamic Jihadists.⁸⁰ The primary domestic threats and pressures while leading the government to further ignore the threat of transnational terrorism would ultimately assist in the establishment of the government's criminal justice CT approach through the narrowing of the TNI's main directives and establishment of civil institutional capacity.

⁷⁷ Michael Malley, "Indonesia: The Erosion of State Capacity," in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 191–92.

⁷⁸ Andrew Holt, "Indonesia and the Global War on Terrorism: Jakarta's Mediocre Response to Terror," in *Unmasking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities*, ed. Julie Sirrs, Mahan Abedin, and Christopher Heffelfinger, vol. I (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2004), 453; Lawrence C. Reardon, "Interpreting Political Islam's Challenge to Southeast Asia: International Terrorism, Nationalism, and Rational Choice," in *Democratic Development and Political Terrorism: The Global Perspective*, ed. William Crotty (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 2005), 201.

⁷⁹ Holt, "Indonesia and the Global War," 453.

⁸⁰ Reardon, "Interpreting Political Islam's Challenge," 202–03.

Together, the armed separatist movements and communal, laskar-driven conflicts would be responsible for the deaths of an estimated 22,000 civilians and combatants, nearly two million displaced persons, untold damages to infrastructure, and general upheaval across the country.⁸¹ The cumulative effect and pressing political urgency of the two main sources of conflict would not only transfix the nation's attentions, but call for the allocation of its scant resources and limited capacities. Furthermore, these combined domestic pressures masked the threat to national security and further enabled the conditions for increased mobilization of the networked domestic and transnational jihadist groups during this timeframe and in the immediate years that followed.⁸²

1. Separatist Movements Emboldened

Suharto's swift departure and the ensuing political turmoil that was compounded by weak civil state institutions, left much room for movements within many provinces with long held desires for autonomy or independence to make their bids once again.⁸³ Some of these movements had been longstanding such as those of East Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya) while others saw these sentiments gaining new ground in areas such as Riau and Ambon.⁸⁴ Fueling the separatist sentiments within both new and old movements within these provinces were grievances based over natural resource exploitation and the lack of fair treatment economically and politically by the central government.⁸⁵ East Timor would be the first and only province to receive outright independence from Indonesia following the urging and assistance of the international community coupled with a United Nations supervised referendum in 1999 that saw 78% of East Timorese

⁸¹ Edward Aspinall, "How Indonesia Survived: Comparative Perspectives on State Disintegration and Democratic Integration," in *Democracy and Islam in Indonesia*, ed. Mirjam Kunkler and Alfred Stepan (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2013), 127.

⁸² Andrew T. H. Tan, "Counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia Post-9/11," in *International Terrorism Post-9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses*, ed. Asaf Siniver (New York: Routledge, 2012), 208–09; Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 218.

⁸³ Malley, "Indonesia: Erosion of State," 195.

⁸⁴ Reardon, "Interpreting Political Islam's Challenge," 202. Dan G. Cox, "Political Terrorism and Democratic and Economic Development in Indonesia," in *Democratic Development and Political Terrorism: The Global Perspective*, ed. William Crotty (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 2005), 262; Aspinall, "How Indonesia Survived," 130–31.

⁸⁵ Aspinall, "How Indonesia Survived," 130–31.

voting for independence.⁸⁶ This independence for the Timorese would come at a high cost and not before the violence between the Indonesian military, pro-Indonesian militias—the *Mahidi*, *Besi Merah Putih* and *Aitarak Militia*—and anti-Indonesia militias resulted in over 2,000 lives lost and the displacement of nearly 850,000 persons.⁸⁷ Subsequently, the loss of East Timor would further galvanize and harden the resolve of both the Indonesian public and the government to retain at all costs the remaining sovereign borders of Indonesia.⁸⁸

Separatist sentiments in Aceh province had run deep dating back to the *Dar-ul Islam*, Abode of Islam, Insurgency between 1948–62, wherein Acehnese rebels joined the forces of the movement’s leader Kartosiwirjo from 1953–58 against the secular, nationalist forces of the Republic under Sukarno.⁸⁹ Autonomous concessions were given to the region by the Republic then and would only strengthen independence minded feelings in the years to come.⁹⁰ Since late 1976, the movement took on an armed struggle through the formation of the Free Aceh Movement or *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM). Through the use of brute force Suharto mobilized the Indonesian military and turned Aceh into a militarized zone.⁹¹ With approximately 12,000 troops the Indonesian military was able to mitigate GAM’s effects but not without the cost of thousands of civilian lives in the process.⁹² On the eve of Suharto’s departure in 1998, the discovery of mass graves brought forth again the dormant Jakarta-focused resentments. These resentments manifested into further recruitment and support for GAM—reaching as many as 10,000

⁸⁶ Cox, “Political Terrorism,” 255.

⁸⁷ Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion State,” 196–97; Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 215; “Indonesia,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>, last modified January 14, 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=15&search=Indonesia&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table>.

⁸⁸ Andrew Tan, “The Persistence of Armed Muslim Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Implications after September 11,” in *Globalization and the New Terror*, ed. David Martin Jones (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004), 219; Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 217.

⁸⁹ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema’ah Islamiyah*, trans. Dave McCrae (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 2013), 38–39.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 41.

⁹¹ Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 202.

⁹² Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 198.

members—as well as the creation of the university student based, non-violent activist group the Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA) in 1999.⁹³ That same year, SIRA would go on to organize a mass demonstration with upwards of 1 million of the 4 million provincial residents.⁹⁴ During this timeframe, GAM's use of guerrilla-insurgent and terrorism based tactics enabled them to dominate the rural areas while the Indonesian Army controlled the main urban centers—a situation similar to that experienced during the DI insurgency over three decades prior.⁹⁵

In 2000, a ceasefire was brokered between the government and GAM leadership yet the fighting continued sporadically.⁹⁶ From 1998 to 2001, the escalation of the movement and fighting approached the loss of nearly 3,000 lives.⁹⁷ In addition, GAM accounted for 33% of the total terrorist attacks perpetrated against the Indonesian government, as seen in Figure 1, that killed 106 and wounded another 124. Ranging from bombings and small arms attacks, these strikes demonstrated an average lethality rate of 2.6 casualties per attack, as seen in Figure 2.⁹⁸

The charts depicted within the following figures were created from data adapted from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism's (START's) Global Terrorism Database (GTD) GTD-2 data sets from years 1998 to 2014. The GTD-2 data set defined terrorist attacks meeting the following criteria:

1. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; 2. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the immediate victims; and 3. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law.⁹⁹

⁹³ Malley, "Indonesia: Erosion of State Capacity," 198.

⁹⁴ Ibid.; Aspinall, "How Indonesia Survived," 135.

⁹⁵ Aspinall, "How Indonesia Survived," 135; David Kilcullen, "Globalization and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17, no. 1 (2006): 47, doi: 10.1080/09592310500431521.

⁹⁶ Reardon, "Interpreting Political Islam's Challenge," 202.

⁹⁷ Malley, "Indonesia: Erosion of State," 200–01.

⁹⁸ START, "Indonesia."

⁹⁹ Ibid.

To maintain the integrity of the data set, categorizations of suspected or attributed perpetrators established by GTD were maintained by the author such as “Muslim extremist” and “Muslim fundamentalist,” due to the inability to attribute these categories to align either as a separatist, radical Islamic vigilante, domestic or transnational terrorist group. The use of “lethality rate”—the resulting number configured through dividing the total number of attacks attributed to a specific group by the combined total of the resulting killed and wounded—was similar in design and adapted from de Graaf’s use of the concept to capture the level of an attack’s effectiveness.¹⁰⁰




Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks by Group, 1998–2001.

¹⁰⁰ Beatrice de Graaf, *Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 254.




Figure 2. Average Lethality Rate per Terrorist Attack, 1998–2001.

Within the Protestant majority province of West Papua—while not nearly as costly in lives and property damage as the Free Aceh Movement—resentment toward Jakarta and its policies reemerged in 1998.¹⁰¹ Dating back to its inception in 1965, the movement was based on armed resistance with the establishment of the separatist group Free Papua Organization (OPM). While much of the 1970s and early 1980s saw bloody fighting with Indonesian forces, the 1990s would see the movement add a non-violent protest element with the inclusion of a Papuan political activist organization to achieve political ends.¹⁰² Despite the addition of the non-violent base of support, OPM mounted a small series of terrorist attacks causing minor damages to property and wounding six people.¹⁰³ As shown in Figure 1, these attacks only accounted for 1.5% of the total terrorist attacks faced by Indonesia during the timeframe of 1998–2001; yet, these strikes demonstrated an average lethality rate of 1.5 casualties per attack as seen in Figure 2.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State Capacity,” 201–02.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ START, “Indonesia.”

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

2. Communal Violence and the Mobilization of Islamic Laskars

The second major threat to the national integrity of the newly democratizing nation was the sharp emergence of communal, vigilante violence throughout the country in areas such as Central Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Maluku, and Maluku Utara.¹⁰⁵ The communal violence that erupted and the threat it posed to Indonesian state unity can best be understood through the context of four variables: 1. the emergence of hardline ethno-religious radical groups; 2. the links to radical transnational Jihadist actors; 3. the main issues at the root of the conflicts; and 4. how this drama played out through the example of the conflict within the Molukus.

Prior to his fall from power, Sukarno relaxed the suppression of Islamic organizations in a final bid to retain control and power following the economic crisis of 1998 and declining support of political elites.¹⁰⁶ This action inadvertently opened the door for the rapid establishment and further involvement of Islamic organizations and the rapid establishment of numerous Islamic political parties within Indonesian society throughout the late 1990s.¹⁰⁷

The increased Islamization within Indonesian society took on two principal forms: the first through moderate, democratically or civic based and the second through orthodox, fundamentalist based. Then and now, the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims retain membership within the two dominant and moderate Islamic based organizations: the *Nahdatul-Ulama* (NU) and the *Muhammadiyah* Islamic civic organization. These groups espouse nonviolence, tolerance, are secular-democratically oriented, and contain memberships in the tens of millions of Indonesians—purported to be approximately 85–90% of the population.¹⁰⁸ Islamic radical hardliners or orthodox fundamentalists would be drawn to organizations such as the Indonesian *Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas*

¹⁰⁵ Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 214–17; John T. Sidel, “Jihad and the Spector,” 275; Singh, “Trends in Terrorism,” 90; Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 204.

¹⁰⁶ Merlyna Lim, “Radical Islamism in Indonesia and its Middle Eastern Connections,” Rubin Center, August 29, 2011, <http://www.rubincenter.org/2011/08/radical-islamism-in-indonesia-and-its-middle-eastern-connections/>.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 203; “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links,” *Strategic Comments* 8, no. 4 (2002): doi: 10.1080/1356788020843.

degan Dunia Islam (KISDI)—‘Committee for Solidarity With the World of Islam’—the *Dewan Daah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII)—‘Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication.’¹⁰⁹ The *Majelis Mujahedeen Indonesia*, a radical umbrella group for multiple radical Islamic organizations established by Abu Bakar Ba’ashir in 1999, would further establish and enable networking ties for Islamic militant groups such as *Laskar Jihad* (LJ) and *Islamic Defender’s Front* (FPI).¹¹⁰ Over the course of this timeframe, the MMI was able to gather approximately 100 of these groups under its wing with the establishment of 30 branches throughout the country. While operating in the political sphere in an open manner, the list of supporters and members were never maintained on file to prevent any future potential incriminations.¹¹¹ Ba’ashir, later to be associated as the spiritual leader of JI, was quoted by Reardon as stating, “The MMI is an institution where a lot of people gather at the table to discuss how to get our vision of shari’a implemented into national laws...As long as Muslims are the majority, the country should be ruled by shari’a.”¹¹²

While the design, scope, and membership of the militias varied, groups like LJ were believed to harbor desires for the establishment of an Islamic State or at a minimum the increased implementation of *shari’a*, Islamic law, throughout all of Indonesia.¹¹³ Despite these desires and containing members with multiple laskar and radical group memberships or affiliations, LP and FPI leadership held fast to the principle that it was wrong to utilize armed force against a Muslim state regardless of how corrupt it was perceived to be. These groups possessed ultra-nationalist leanings and saw themselves as the true defenders of state integrity where and when the state could not do so itself.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ Paul James Carnegie, “Is Militant Islamism a Busted Flush in Indonesia?” *Journal of Terrorism Research* 4, no. 2 (September 2013), doi: 10.15664/jtr.563.

¹¹⁰ Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 202–03; “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links”; Carnegie, “Militant Islamism.”

¹¹¹ Gordon P. Means, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009), 171.

¹¹² Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 203.

¹¹³ Ibid., 202; “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links”; Paul J. Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency: Is the Threat of Militant Islamist Groups in Indonesia Diminishing?” in *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War*, ed. Scott Nicholas Romaniuk and Stewart Tristan Webb (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2016), 127.

¹¹⁴ Arabinda Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism?* (Hackensack, NJ: Imperial College Press, 2015), 71.

Conversely to the mobilization of pro-Indonesia laskars, other laskars such as *Laskar Jundullah* (LJu) and its leader Agus Dwikarna outlined designs on how to achieve the condition of an Islamic State through a four phased short-term and long-term approach with the assistance of AQ funding and training. Phase-one consisted of sabotage operations throughout the archipelago to further sow disorder; Phase-two consisted of coopting and coercing TNI and *POLRI* (National Police) members; Phase-three consisted of infiltrating and coercing political and civil organizations to the cause; and the long term phase, Phase-four, consisted of expanding the laskar to a 10,000 man force and furthering linkages and ties to transnational, Philippine radical groups such as *Abu Sayyaf Group* (ASG).¹¹⁵

The radical and militant training of many laskar members and leaders stemmed from two primary sources: first, *Wahhabi-Salafist* networks throughout the Middle East, and second, actual combat or training experiences gained during the Soviet-Afghan War by Indonesian and Southeast Asian foreign fighters.¹¹⁶ These experiences abroad and subsequent networking coupled with domestic linkages stemming from the DI insurgency—wherein remaining insurgents had gone underground during the Suharto and Sukarno years—further enabled the possession of broad based radical Islamic ties and linkages.¹¹⁷ While not a fully encompassing list, Table 1 demonstrates the growth and captures some of the linkages formed between domestically based and oriented radical Islamic groups, their militant offshoots, and transnational jihadist actors over this timeframe and beyond.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵ Maria A. Ressa, *Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia* (New York: Free Press, 2003), 97.

¹¹⁶ Lim, "Radical Islamism in Indonesia"; "Indonesia's Terrorism Links."

¹¹⁷ Lim, "Radical Islamism in Indonesia."

¹¹⁸ Carnegie, "Latent Insurgency," 127; "Indonesian Terrorist Groups," Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, last modified February 18, 2016, <http://www.trackingterrorism.org/libproxy.nps.edu/group/forum-umat-islam>.

Table 1. Indonesian Radical Islamic Groups.¹¹⁹

Paramilitary - Radical Islamic Groups	Linked Domestic Organization
Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI - Defenders of Islam Army)	Front Pembela Islam (FPI - Islamic Defenders Front) / Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas degan Dunia Islam (KISDI) / Dewan Daah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII)
Laskar Mujahedeen Indonesia (LMI - Indonesian Mujahedeen Militia)	Majelis Mujahedeen Indonesia (MMI - Indonesia Mujahedeen Assembly)
Laskar Jihad (LJ) - Army of Jihad	Forum Komuinkasi Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama'ah (FKAWJ) / KISDI / DDII / DI
Laskar Jundullah (LJu)	MMI / JI / Abbu Sayyaf Group (ASG) / Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) / Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
Laskar Sabilah	
Negara Islam Indonesia (NII - Indonesian Islamic State)	DI
Forum Umat Islam (FUI - the Islamic People's Forum)	
Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia (Forkami, the Indonesian Muslim Communication Forum)	
Hamas Indonesia	
Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI - Party of Liberation Indonesia)	
Gerakan Islam Reformi (Garis - The Islamic Reformist Movement)	
Gerakan Pemuda Kabah	
Dar-ul Islam (DI)	JI / KI
Wahdah Islamiyah	
Komando Jihad (KI)	DI
Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI - Islamic Youth Movement)	
Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (Mujahedeen KOMPAK)	
Transnational - Domestically Oriented and Based Groups	Linked Transnational & Domestic Organizations
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)	al-Qaeda (AQ) / KOMPAK / MMI / LJu / MILF / KMM / ASG
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)	IS
Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) / Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB)	IS
Lintas Tazim - Tanzim AQ Indonesia for Serambi Makkah (TAQSIM)	JI / JAT / DI / KOMPAK / FPI
Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah (JAS)	al-Nusra Front / AQ

The violent communal conflicts generally hinged around ethno-religious strife and the vying for domestic political and economic power between Christian and Muslim elites as the centralized government began devolving power down to the district levels.¹²⁰ In the wake of rising separatist sentiments and minorities pressing for further political, social, and economic mobility and control, violent clashes between what was at first spontaneous mobs turned more and more violent and edged on outright civil war. Local ethno-religiously inspired political elites mobilized the public into radical, militant camps to contest for power and establish order within the void left by government inaction.¹²¹ As depicted in Figure 1, the terrorist attacks committed by LJ, FPI, and Muslim extremists during this timeframe accounted for 6% of all known and attributed

¹¹⁹ Adapted from Carnegie, "Latent Insurgency" 127; Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, "Indonesian Terrorist Groups"; "Indonesia's Terrorism Links"; Ressa, *Seeds of Terror*, xv; Lim, "Radical Islamism in Indonesia"; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 64–65, 71; Carnegie, "Militant Islamism."

¹²⁰ Reardon, "Interpreting Political Islam's Challenge," 202; Malley, "Indonesia: Erosion of State," 204; Aspinall, "How Indonesia Survived," 131–33.

¹²¹ Malley, "Indonesia: Erosion of State," 210; Aspinall, "How Indonesia Survived," 134–35.

terrorist attacks.¹²² These attacks demonstrated an average lethality rate of 2 LJ, 4 FPI, and 8.7 casualties per attack for LJ, FPI, and Muslim extremists, respectively, as demonstrated in Figure 2.¹²³

Communal strife within the Moluku islands, specifically surrounding the city of Ambon, would become one of the most violent and bloody of all, and further demonstrates the unique political and social complexities involved within these conflicts. The demographics of Ambon consisted of one favoring Christian protestants, to include the offices of provincial governance, until Muslim immigration resulted in a more even split.¹²⁴ By 1999, Ambonese Christian Protestants touted the idea of forming a separate Christian state. Later that year, Kao villagers attacked and killed hundreds of Muslims and displaced another 10,000.¹²⁵ Indonesian public sentiment subsequently became enraged over the highly publicized incident. This public sentiment fanned the passions and desires of a demonstration with numbers peaking around 100,000 within Jakarta decrying for the declaration of a “Holy War” on behalf of Maluku’s Muslims.¹²⁶ In response to this growing communal violence, in 2000 LJ mobilized and dispatched approximately 3,000 militants to thwart the Christian moves and hopefully gain the upper hand of placing the province’s political scene firmly within Muslim hands.¹²⁷

3. Growing Power of Transnational Terrorist Networks

With the states’ attention focused on the pervasive threats of separatism and to a lesser extent communal violence, an environment in which both domestic and transnational jihadist radical actors (JI and AQ) could further manifest within Indonesia was enabled.¹²⁸ The manifestation of Jihadist activities would be attributed to three

¹²² Data adapted from: START, “Indonesia.”

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 205; Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 202.

¹²⁵ Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 205.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 202.

¹²⁸ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 254–55; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 129; “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links.”

additional factors: the permissive or enabling environments provided by the communal violence, radical Islamic networking, and the conduct of terrorist attacks.

First, the communal violence between Christians and Muslims transpiring all over the country from Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and the Molukus provided both the religious context and the physical arena for these transnationally oriented jihadists to mobilize, infiltrate, and operate within. These arenas subsequently allowed for JI to further entrench critical components of its unique, regionalized cell structure finally onto Indonesian soil. This complex structure complete with “sleeper cells” consisted of four *Mantiqis* or regional divisions: (I) Malaysia, South Thailand, and Singapore; (II) Java and Sumatra; (III) the Philippines, Brunei, East Malaysia, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Maluku; and (IV) Papua and Australia.¹²⁹ *Mantiqis* II and III were critical nodes responsible for managing and executing JI’s training, fund raising, and recruitment.¹³⁰ From these *Mantiqis* and with Indonesia established as its base, JI would not only begin the process of attempting to usher in the *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara*, the Islamic State, but an expanded version of a wider pan-regional caliphate encompassing Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and Cambodia called the *Darulah Islamiah Raya*.¹³¹

Second, the longstanding and newly created relationships or network linkages further reinforced both the means and ways of conducting armed attacks through training, monetary resources, and logistics for its members and further tactical opportunities that complemented operational and strategic aims.¹³² Through these interactions, JI’s credibility or “jihadi clout,” its transnational jihadist ideology, and recruitment of additional members were demonstrated, gained, or further cemented. Throughout these conflicts some figures reported JI having trained as many as 2,000 combatants of

¹²⁹ Means, *Political Islam*, 170.

¹³⁰ Kumar Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalization in Indonesia* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), 162; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 63–65.

¹³¹ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism*, 63–65; Rohan Gunaratna, “The Al-Qaeda Threat and the International Response,” in *Globalization and the New Terror: The Asia Pacific Dimension*, ed. David Martin Jones (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004), 58.

¹³² “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links”; Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda Threat,” 58–59.

Indonesian and foreign descent by 2003's end.¹³³ It is unclear, however, whether these numbers were included within or in addition to JI's self-declared membership of 2,000 jihadists and over 5,000 sympathizers within this timeframe.¹³⁴

Third, beginning in 2000 this timeframe saw the initial ramp up of jihadists utilizing terrorism as a tactic through the conduct of terrorist attacks that would later be attributed to JI and AQ.¹³⁵ The targeting of these attacks ranged from foreign, transnational targets such as the Philippine ambassador (August 2000) to domestic, state institutions such as the Jakarta Stock Exchange (September 2000) and the simultaneous bombings of 11 to as many as 30 Christian churches in different Indonesian cities—West Java, Riau, Bandung, East Java, Nusatenggara, Medan, Northern Sumatra, and Batam Island—during Christmas Eve services (December 2000).¹³⁶ During this timeframe, the tactical level influences imparted by AQ and other transnationally linked groups' could be seen within the domestic attacks. These consisted of near simultaneously occurring, multiple complex-attacks involving small arms and explosives.¹³⁷ As demonstrated in Figure 1, transnational groups accounted for 15% of the terrorist attacks during this timeframe and further demonstrated an average lethality rate of 3.9 casualties per attack per Figure 2.¹³⁸

B. THE STATE RESPONSE

To the disparate threats facing the country, the Indonesian government would respond through the employment of both hard and soft CT measures. Hard measures would be implemented predominantly through the use of the Indonesian army, *Tentara*

¹³³ Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 129.

¹³⁴ Sidney Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 111.

¹³⁵ Data adapted from START, "Indonesia."

¹³⁶ Reardon, "Interpreting Political Islam's Challenge," 203; Saipul Hamdi, Paul J. Carnegie, and Bianca J. Smith, "The Recovery of a Non-violent identity for an Islamist *Pesantren* in an Age of Terror," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 69, no. 6 (2015): 699, doi: 10.1080/10357718.2015.1058339; David Martin Jones, Michael L. R. Smith, and Mark Weeding, "Looking for the Pattern: Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia--The Genealogy of a Terror Network," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26, no. 6 (2003): 450, doi: 10.1080/10576100390248284; Gunaratna, "Al-Qaeda Threat," 59.

¹³⁷ Jones, Smith, and Weeding, "Looking for the Pattern," 450; START, "Indonesia."

¹³⁸ Data adapted from START, "Indonesia."

Nasional Indonesia and conduct of kinetic actions and operations against the separatists. Conversely, soft measures through diplomacy consisting of concessions and negotiations were utilized against both separatists and the laskars at the domestic levels with a more *laissez faire* approach toward the latter. Additionally, despite not addressing and acknowledging transnational radical Islamic terrorism within its own borders at this time, Indonesia employed diplomacy as it entered into numerous international level cooperative agreements addressing the threat of transnational terrorism through multilateral agreements within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹³⁹

1. Separatist Carrots and Sticks

With maintaining the integrity of the country at the forefront of public and government sentiments and prioritization, the separatist movements—Aceh Province specifically—were dealt with via the hands of the TNI. While employing a two-pronged approach encompassing both hard and soft CT measures, the emphasis under the TNI was that of hard CT measures. By 2003, the failure of soft CT measures such as the 2000 cease-fire, the escalation of terrorist attacks by GAM, and increased skirmishes with the TNI further resolved the government to place Aceh under martial law and to sanction the launch of a new military offensive with nearly 30, to 40,000 soldiers backed by heavy air and mechanized support in a bid to stamp out armed resistance for good.¹⁴⁰

As in Aceh, West Papua would come to feel the weight of Jakarta's soft and hard CT measures. In 2000, the anniversary of the West Papuan independence, additional troops and anti-separatist legislation were imposed such as a ban on flying the West Papuan flag.¹⁴¹ As a result the fighting would continue between OPM and the TNI, albeit on a sporadic, low-level scale.¹⁴² Yet, where the soft measures seemed to fail in Aceh, they appeared to garner some traction in Papua. Under Megawati in 2001, the Indonesian House of Representatives finally voted in favor of legislation providing "special

¹³⁹ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 148.

¹⁴⁰ Reardon, "Interpreting Political Islam's Challenge," 202; Holt, "Indonesia and the Global War," 454.

¹⁴¹ Malley, "Indonesia: Erosion of State," 202.

¹⁴² Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 255.

autonomy” to the province. These special autonomous provisions, generally more lenient than those offered elsewhere, addressed the base anti-Jakarta grievances in the spheres of natural resources—with a higher percentage of revenue retention by the province—and political concessions unique to the Papuan case—the retention of the seat of governor by native Papuans only.¹⁴³

2. A Tempered Approach toward Islamic Extremism: The Militant Laskars

Unlike the government’s military led CT approach predominantly utilized to respond to the separatist movements, it took a *laissez-faire* approach—one of collaboration and appeasement—with the radical Islamic groups. This tempered policy of appeasement was subsequently rooted in and the result of three factors: the lack of political clout within the government, the high level of visibility Islamization was seen to have had throughout the greater society, and the government’s need for the use of the radical Islamic militias to restore order until dependable, state entities could be utilized. The altering of this strategy of appeasement toward one of government action would be effected only after increased pressures by the U.S. in the wake of the attacks of 9/11.

One of the first legislative actions passed in the wake of Suharto’s hasty departure in 1998 was the overturning of the 1963 *UU Anti-Subversi*, Anti-Subversion Laws, laws that had been utilized by the government to suppress communist and radical Islamic groups such as DI.¹⁴⁴ For the first time in decades, the more radical Islamic groups that were formally repressed, discredited, and forced underground could now mobilize and act in the open. To this Feillard and Madinier remarked, “For radical Islam, this period was the age of possibilities.”¹⁴⁵ With the move toward democracy coupled with the rise of political and fundamentalist Islam throughout many spheres of society, Indonesian politicians were overly sensitive to not being viewed as “more open” toward opposition parties and groups. Thus, the government was unable and even unwilling to be seen as going back on such a critical, democratic principle. Furthermore, it could ill afford the

¹⁴³ Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 203.

¹⁴⁴ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 62–63; Carnegie, “Militant Islamism.”

¹⁴⁵ Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 88.

potential for any political and social backlash such actions could potentially draw forth and further incite within the public.¹⁴⁶

By looking the other way the weak central government and successive waves of presidential administrations allowed for the militant, vigilante, and radical groups to establish order in many areas with contentious politically and socially charged conflicts. Such use was demonstrated often during this timeframe as seen in 1998 with President Habibie's call for the radical militants' protection of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and again with the government's tacit failure to stop their initial use in the communal conflicts erupting nationwide throughout the early 2000s.¹⁴⁷ In addition to the government's initial indifference, the TNI and police at the local and national levels seemed ambivalent at best. This was demonstrated when three leaders of LJ appeared before President Wahid declaring their support and intention to deploy jihadist fighters to the Molukus and other regions. Despite the president's refusal and ordering of the TNI to intervene and stop their movement, LJ fighters were not only unhindered in their movements but also provided government owned ships and were transported to the conflicts.¹⁴⁸ Further accusations of TNI and local police led training, arms supplies, monetary payoffs, and collusion with the laskars soon surfaced in these regions.¹⁴⁹ From Kalimantan, Sulawesi, to the Molukus, police and TNI security forces generally stood aside as the communal conflicts and violence erupted all around them.¹⁵⁰

The pressures by the U.S. in years following the events of 9/11 played heavily on the government's change of strategy in dealing with the communal conflicts. In the wake of the attacks by AQ on America, mounting reports began to surface of existing network linkages through membership and logistical-financial support between many of the Islamic militias—LJ, LMI, FPI, and LPI—and AQ that were raised by U.S. officials,

¹⁴⁶ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 62–63.

¹⁴⁷ Means, *Political Islam*, 292–93.

¹⁴⁸ Abuza, review of *Laskar Jihad*, 198.

¹⁴⁹ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 282; Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches 1998," 116; "Indonesia's Terrorism Links."

¹⁵⁰ Malley, "Indonesia: Erosion of State," 208–09.

fellow ASEAN members (Singapore and Malaysia) and various news agencies.¹⁵¹ Despite the Megawati government being one of the first dignitaries to appear in Washington with condolences after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent pledges to assist U.S. Global War on Terrorism efforts—backed by a historic economic aid package of \$650 million—the resolve both in the Indonesian cabinet and wider public sentiments supporting those ends was substantially different.¹⁵²

Commiserate with the increase of U.S. military and CT actions in the early years of GWOT, anti-U.S. rhetoric increasingly emanated from large swaths of the Indonesian public, radical Islamic groups, Islamic laskars, and even government cabinet members such as Vice President Hamzah Haz.¹⁵³ This rhetoric consisted of Indonesian public views seeing the “War on Terror” as a “War on Islam”—enflamed by U.S. continued support to Israel, military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and later U.S. rhetoric of Southeast Asia as a “Second Front in the War on Terror”—were further compounded by growing resentment toward Jakarta for its lack of condemning these U.S. actions.¹⁵⁴ Cumulatively these anti-U.S. sentiments made the government’s abilities to respond to the mobilization of radical Islamic groups all the more politically volatile. Thus the extent of the Indonesian government’s resolve to combat the mobilization of radical Islamic groups and transnational terrorists surfaced yet again.

The combined political pressures from internal and external elements forced the Megawati government’s hand to attempt to tone down the public’s rhetoric by releasing relatively anti-U.S. statements of its own disagreeing with certain aspects of GWOT (invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq), rallying the moderate Islamic voices of NU and

¹⁵¹ “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links”; Carnegie, “Militant Islamism”; Tan, “Persistence of Armed Muslim,” 226–27.

¹⁵² “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links”; Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 116.

¹⁵³ Rizal Sukma, “Indonesia’s Islam and September 11: Reactions and Prospects,” in *The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends, and Counterstrategies*, ed. Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002), 179–186; Anthony L. Smith, “A Glass Half Full: Indonesia-U.S. Relations in the Age of Terror,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 25, no. 3 (December 2003): 455–56.

¹⁵⁴ Sukma, “Indonesia’s Islam,” 179–86; Smith, “Glass Half Full,” 455–56; Noel M. Moranda, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Counter-Terrorism,” in *Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum*, ed. Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Moranda (New York: Routledge, 2010), 150; Von der Mehden, “Islam in Indonesia,” 28.

Muhammadiyah, and taking measured CT actions that resulted in the interrogations of numerous laskar fighters and members.¹⁵⁵ Additionally, Indonesian officials subsequently began a campaign of engagement and negotiation with all parties.¹⁵⁶ Going into the early 2000s, one by one the communal conflicts would begin to peter out. The government began to replace corrupted local police and military units with increased visits by government officials to coordinate the laskars to leave the regions, and the concluding of fragile peace agreements between Muslims and Christians such as the Malino I and II accords in Poso, Sulawesi.¹⁵⁷ This was seen in the Molukus on February 12, 2002 when the Indonesian military finally acted and instituted a neutral zone between the warring factions. A measure that came “too little, too late” as the conflict saw the killing of an estimated 5,000 people and the displacement of nearly 800,000 others.¹⁵⁸

3. Transnational Terrorism

The response by the government to the rise of transnational jihadists would be profoundly different than that to the separatists, laskars, and radical Islamic groups. The blatant denial to the existence of terrorists within its borders would be the government’s official stance, predicated upon the tenuous and strained conditions of the domestic political and social atmospheres. Despite this, the state still embarked upon taking measures through entities such as ASEAN that would establish the frameworks and begin the process of shifting regional behavioral and cooperative norms. These agreements, while not achieving anything of great tangible substance during this timeframe, would prove vital in the years to come in combating transnational terrorism.

In December of 2001, Lieutenant General A.M. Hendropriyono, the Indonesian National Intelligence Agency Chief, made the announcement that intelligence gathered

¹⁵⁵ Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia* (New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2006), 207; Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 209; Sukma, “Indonesia’s Islam,” 186–88; Amitav Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region* (London: Cornell Univ. Press, 2012), 249; Sukma, “Indonesia’s Islam,” 181.

¹⁵⁶ Malley, “Indonesia: Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 209; Sukma, “Indonesia’s Islam,” 186–88.

¹⁵⁷ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 254–55; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 149, 158; Sukma, “Indonesia’s Islam,” 186–88.

¹⁵⁸ Reardon, “Interpreting Political Islam’s Challenge,” 202.

pointed to the presence of AQ and other transnational terrorists being behind both the training of radical jihadists within Indonesia and the communal violence breaking out in Sulawesi.¹⁵⁹ Despite this and other mounting evidence of the transnational jihadist presence within Indonesian borders with growing networks, membership recruitment, financing, and training with AQ elements, the government simply ignored and disavowed such statements and warnings as unsubstantiated.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, Indonesia's first civilian defense minister Juwono Sudarsono rebuffed U.S. assistance to prevent further AQ incursions into the Indonesian radical scene as early as 2000. Former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Ambassador Gelbard, assessed the Indonesian government's views on terrorism during this timeframe:

We found that even as terrorist groups in Indonesia were making themselves quite evident through their actions, and even announcing their intentions, there was a very conscious effort on the part of the government to ignore their actions and refuse to take any kind of measures against them... Their failure to move only allowed these groups to grow and consolidate themselves.¹⁶¹

While gradually ratcheting up its response in its own way to radical Islamic laskars, the political situation was so precarious that a crackdown on suspected transnationally linked radical jihadists through hard CT measures was not possible nor even likely achievable.¹⁶² Furthermore, the government lacked clarity as to who exactly the “transnationally linked” or radical jihadists terrorists could be. As seen in Figures 1 and 2, the sheer number of potential offenders for enacting the violence and terrorist attacks that appeared within this timeframe was staggering. Culprits ranged from separatists, criminal gangs, militant laskars—seen as the manifestations of the TNI—to attacks simply found unattributed—a common occurrence in Indonesian terrorist attacks. These diverse options enabled the government to blame the most self-benefitting options:

¹⁵⁹ James Cotton, “Southeast Asia after September 11,” in *Globalization and the New Terror: The Asia Pacific Dimension*, ed. David Martin Jones (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2004), 187.

¹⁶⁰ Paul J. Smith, “Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to the Terrorism Money Trail,” in *Essentials of Counterterrorism*, ed. James J. F. Forest (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015), 109–110; Holt, “Indonesia and the Global War,” 455.

¹⁶¹ Ressa, *Seeds of Terror*, 98.

¹⁶² Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 281.

political rivals or the TNI who were believed to be grasping at straws in a bid to retain power and influence.¹⁶³

With concrete, hard CT measures generally off the table, Indonesia did pursue measures during this time to address transnational terrorism through the multilateral cooperative agreement approach via ASEAN. The ASEAN multilateral cooperative agreements would address the issue of “transnational crime” of which terrorism would be specifically mentioned. The agreements agreed upon predominantly focused on the prevention and combating of terrorist acts within specific CT arenas such as the commercial aviation sector and attempts by terrorists to weaponize chemical and biological agents. Other agreements consisted of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), and two resolutions of the Security Council (1368/2001 and 1373/2001).¹⁶⁴ This timeframe further saw the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, signed by all ASEAN members including Indonesia at the 7th ASEAN Summit meeting in November 2001, that saw and declared transnational terrorism as a, “Profound threat to international peace and security.”¹⁶⁵ Yet even here, Indonesia’s tempered approach and its conscious recognition of the political volatility stemming from its domestic situation ensured that religion was not directly attributed to terrorism through the declaration having, “Rejected any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race.”¹⁶⁶ These collective measures would plant the seed for further cooperation, whether bilaterally or multilaterally within the region and internationally, but would have further implications with the subsequent transnational jihadist attacks that would transpire both within Indonesia and Southeast Asia from 2002 and beyond.

¹⁶³ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 113–15; Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 218; Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

¹⁶⁴ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 148.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 219; Shankari Sundararaman, “South-East Asian Perceptions on the ‘War Against Terrorism,’” *Strategic Analysis* 26, no. 3 (2002): 402, doi: 10.1080/09700160208450055.

¹⁶⁶ Moranda, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” 151.

C. ASSESSMENT

This timeframe, one filled with the threat of armed separatist movements, communal violence, and rise of militant laskars and radical Islamic groups, cumulatively set the conditions for the growing power and further manifestation of transnational jihadist actors. While public sentiment was inherently focused on suppressing the separatists within the political and societal spheres, it also became more aware of the growing presence of Islamization and Islamic radical groups throughout the country. With the attacks of 9/11, professed Indonesian support to the U.S., external international pressures, and internal domestic developments that affected the government's ability to act, the government would adopt at first a rather passive CT approach. As Pedahzur and Perliger quoted Qualter, "While public opinion does not govern, it may set limitations on what governments do."¹⁶⁷ Yet despite these sentiments and time of political volatility, the state was able to lay the foundations of a criminal justice based CT program. These measures would later prove critical in its abilities to wage an effective CT program against the emergent threat of transnational jihadist terrorism.

The two main threats to national sovereignty and integrity faced by the state during this timeframe, separatist movements and intra-communal violence, would lead Indonesia to utilize its limited resources and capacities to safeguard the unity and integrity of the state first and foremost. These threats were representative of both vertical and horizontal threat types.¹⁶⁸ The traditional, vertical threat was demonstrated with the armed separatist groups within the movements of Aceh and Papua that were levied directly against the state and would therefore imperil state integrity. The viewing of these threats as paramount and the subsequent allocation by the government of its scant resources against them appears justified given both the preponderance of the high number of combined associated terrorist attacks at 97, 36% of those experienced by Indonesia as seen in Figure 1, and average lethality rate of 2 casualties per attack resulting from the

¹⁶⁷ Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, "The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Israel," in *The Consequences of Counterterrorism*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (New York: Russell Sage, 2010), 355.

¹⁶⁸ Aspinall, "How Indonesia Survived," 132.

approximately 255 killed or wounded.¹⁶⁹ To this threat, the government decided on the clear distinctive use of hard CT approaches through the TNI with intermittent use of soft approaches, such as negotiations and the provision of autonomous concessions to achieve a peaceful resolution. Aceh's autonomous provisions would come on the heels of the TNI's final military operation in 2003 and the devastating tsunami that struck the province in 2004, which were captured within the Helsinki Accords of 2005.¹⁷⁰ Despite receiving autonomy, West Papua would continue to see the harboring of grievances against the government and the existence of an armed struggle through OPM conducting terrorist attacks until the present day.¹⁷¹

Conversely to the vertical threat of the separatists, the communal violence between ethno-religious communities and radical, militant Islamic groups was representative of horizontal threats through the threatening of state unity that contained an element of criminality.¹⁷² With the lack of robust and strong state institutions and capacities, this horizontal threat proved far more politically volatile in the democratizing years for the government to both manage and cope with. To approach this horizontal threat of radical, the state would first further entrench civil control and institutions over the means of internal security through two ways. First through setting the conditions domestically for the solidification of civil control over CT operations through the criminal justice model, and second through external cooperation through ASEAN. These state institutions and initial capacities at the domestic and diplomatic levels would prove critical to the criminal justice CT approach. This approach treats the act of terrorism as a criminal act and brings to bear the might of the criminal justice institutions such as the police and legal systems.¹⁷³

For Indonesian democracy to thrive and take root, establishing civil control or preeminence within state institutions was paramount. This was a gradual process that

¹⁶⁹ Data adapted from START, "Indonesia."

¹⁷⁰ Anthony L. Smith, "Glass Half Full," 300–02.

¹⁷¹ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 74.

¹⁷² Sundararaman, "Southeast Asian Perceptions," 397.

¹⁷³ Pedahzur and Perliger, "Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies," 338.

occurred in part through the determination of which state institution would hold sway over internal and external aspects of state security. First the Indonesian military, the *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (ABRI), while predominately allowed to reform itself, was renamed the TNI in a bid for the military to begin the process of distancing itself from past human rights violations, direct associations with the *Golkar* political party, abdication of nearly half of its seats in parliament, as well as other aspects of social and economic domination and control.¹⁷⁴ Second, the domestic, national and local police elements were broken away from control under the TNI as a separate entity, the *POLRI*, and placed under the direct control of the civilian government—presidential control—and tasked only with the maintenance of internal security. While appearing as noninvasive measures, both actions reduced the power of the military through a more narrowly defined role, from being one encompassing political, economic, and security spheres to that of one more singularly oriented on national defense.¹⁷⁵

Internationally and diplomatically, Indonesia took measures such as the strengthening of multilateral agreements via ASEAN and initial dialogue, aid arrangements, and tempered support of the U.S. GWOT. While the ASEAN agreements did not achieve anything of tangible substance in and of themselves, they did set the precedent of these formerly uncooperative and often hostile states to concede to the requirement of multilateral cooperation in the realm of combating transnational terrorism. These actions would later prove to be critical, foundational elements in implementing an effective and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy equipped with both “hard” and “soft” approaches due to the long reaching tentacles of the JI and AQ networks.

D. CONCLUSION

Despite these foundational advances, this timeframe should be viewed as one of CT ineffectiveness as the Indonesian government treated incidents that did not target the

¹⁷⁴ Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 202–03.

¹⁷⁵ Carnegie, “Militant Islamism”; Pujo Wahyono, *Transnational Crime and Security Threats in Indonesia*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 13; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 159.

government as normal criminal behavior that did not present a national security threat.¹⁷⁶ This view only reinforced the government's belief that the country did not face a "terrorist problem" requiring concerted CT actions.¹⁷⁷ Thus the limited existing state capacity and resources could be devoted to dealing with the threats of separatist and communal conflicts. The complicated nature of Indonesian radical Islam (the interconnectedness of radical Islamic groups, *laskars*, and transnational actors), the attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent U.S. pressure for Indonesia to do more (by identifying domestic radical Islamic groups as terrorists and assisting U.S. GWOT efforts) still did not cause great alarm. Instead these were viewed with general skepticism by both Indonesian authorities and the public at large.¹⁷⁸ This view was reflected in Indonesia's upfront but cautious support to U.S. GWOT initiatives.¹⁷⁹ This timeframe ended with the conclusion of the vigilante and interreligious communal violence that had spread throughout much of Indonesia thereby freeing Indonesian government assets and capabilities that would prove vital in responding to the coming surge of jihadist attacks.¹⁸⁰ While born in the timeframe of 1998–2001, the criminal justice CT approach would be codified and professionalized further in the wake of the Bali-I attack and the subsequent wave of terrorist attacks that ravaged the archipelago from 2002–2008.

¹⁷⁶ Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 109–16.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Sidel, "Jihad and the Spector," 275; Singh, "Trends in Terrorism," 89; Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 5.

¹⁷⁹ Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 116.

¹⁸⁰ Sidel, "Jihad and the Spector," 302–03.

III. 2002–2008: TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM ASCENDS TO THE FORE

A. THREAT OVERVIEW

The timeframe of 2002 through 2008 would be critical for the Indonesian government as it would bear witness to major changes and shifts within Indonesian social and political spheres in their efforts to combat the emergent threat posed by domestic radical Islamic jihadists and transnational terrorism. These changes in society—stemming from a shift in public sentiment against radical Islamic jihadists and transnational terrorism—and government abilities—the subsequent increased state capacity and entrenchment of the criminal justice counterterrorism approach—were a direct result of jihadist terrorist attacks. This threat to Indonesia during this timeframe manifested through the deadly waves of bombings that would sweep the country, killing and wounding foreign tourists and, more often than not, innocent civilian Muslims.

While other threats such as the separatist movements in Aceh and West Papua and the communal, vigilante violence in Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and the Maluccas would persist into and peter out early on during this timeframe, the nature of the threat posed by the domestic radical and transnational jihadists demonstrated the urgent need for civil state capacity to effectively combat and mitigate their effects. For the first time the government would admit and confront the fact that if jihadist transnational terrorist influences on domestic radical Islamic groups was to be left unchecked, it would pose a clear and deadly threat to foreign interests, the Indonesian government, and the lives of its citizens.¹⁸¹ The cumulative effect these variables—shifting public sentiment, increased state abilities, and capacity (law enforcement and judiciary)—imparted within this timeframe was the entrenchment of the criminal justice CT approach and the resulting degradation of the jihadists’ capabilities and effectiveness.¹⁸² This further led to the terrorists responding in kind through evolutions in their means and ways coupled with

¹⁸¹ Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27; Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, 24.

¹⁸² Gillian S. Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase: The Many Faces of a Terrorist Group,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 33, no. 11 (2010): 1000, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2010.514697.

their subsequent fracturing into disparate subgroups. This fracturing, however, would further enable the jihadist movements to endure through the pressures of the state and continue to persist as a festering threat into the future as in times past.

1. The Bombings and Transnational Jihadist Influences

The deadly string of bombings and terrorist attacks attributed to *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) and al-Qaeda (AQ) were associated first with the Bali bombing on Kuta beach October 12, 2002, Bali-I, that killed over 200 and wounded over 300 more.¹⁸³ This attack and those that followed would stand out among the myriad of Indonesian terrorist attacks and threats of this timeframe due to two primary factors. First, the attacks clearly demonstrated the impact and lethality transnational jihadist influences had upon domestic jihadist actors within Indonesia. Second, the bombing attacks galvanized the supporting or impartial sentiments of two key elements within Indonesian society against the radical jihadists' means and ways: the Indonesian public and civic supporting laskars such as *Laskar Jihad* (LJ) and *Islamic Defender's Front* (FPI).¹⁸⁴

In the weeks and months following the bombing, the existence of JI and AQ influences coupled with the realization of the extent of JI's reach throughout Southeast Asia—long suspected and declared by Singaporean and U.S. government officials—was uncovered and formally acknowledged by Indonesia whose national police had tracked down the assailants in concert with U.S. and Australian law enforcement agency support.¹⁸⁵ Bali-I would quickly be followed by the execution of a string of subsequent bombings on targets consisting of the J. Marriott Hotel (2003), the Australian Embassy (2004), and Bali-II (2005) by JI and AQ and their affiliates.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Jason Burke, *The 9/11 Wars* (New York: Penguin, 2012), 156; Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 4; Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27; Means, *Political Islam*, 171–74.

¹⁸⁴ Means, *Political Islam*, 179.

¹⁸⁵ Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle*, 7–12.

¹⁸⁶ Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 4; Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27.

The discovery of the linkages between AQ and JI through the investigations that followed these bombings led to a debate as to what the full extent of the relationship and influences between AQ and JI amounted to. Since early 2005, Jones, later backed by Gross and Barton, adamantly declared that the relationship was more on the surface than containing any true depth of influence or containing any lasting longevity and that the transnational nature was developed by and for domestic, regional purposes alone.¹⁸⁷ Other analysts from Barton to Abuza advocated the idea that it was at AQ's prodding and influences that served as the critical causal factor for both the breakaway from DI and the establishment of JI's structure, overarching ideology, and source of funding.¹⁸⁸ Burke advocated a third, hybrid theory based on the ties of the Bali-I bombers and others that encapsulated not direct AQ influences per se, but AQ methodology similar to those advocated for by Abu Musab al-Suri—an AQ affiliate who espoused the molding of AQ methodologies with local conditions and atmospherics by domestic jihadists to accommodate a more comprehensive and holistic movement—and the associated training received by returning foreign fighters from Afghan training camps of the 1980s and early '90s within South Asia that held direct Saudi Arabian ties.¹⁸⁹

The main points from these theories of influence and networking, whether direct or indirect, consist not only of the complicated nature of pin-pointing the transnational terrorist ties with domestic actors, but includes the highly lethal impact such influences may impart on the subsequent domestic initiated attacks. The lethality or effectiveness may stem from an infusion of the transnational terrorists and or the returning indigenous jihadist veterans who exert influences on the target selection, planning, and execution of operations either alongside or by the domestic radical jihadist groups alone. Hegghammer captured this phenomenon in 2013 while studying the driving factors for participation by jihadists from non-Muslim western states. His data sets showed that, "The presence of a

¹⁸⁷ Jones, "Changing Nature," 172–73; Max L. Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007), 102–06; Barton, "Historical Development," 42–44.

¹⁸⁸ Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?: The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (Lowy Institute Paper 05) (Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2005), vii–ix; Abuza, "Borderlands, Terrorism, and Insurgency," 93.

¹⁸⁹ Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 152–57.

veteran increases—by a factor around 1.5—the probability that a plot will come to execution, and it doubles the likelihood that the plot will kill people.”¹⁹⁰

The Indonesian case demonstrates well the application of Hegghammer’s findings regarding the impact of returning foreign fighter and veteran influences on demonstrated lethality rates (the average rate of those killed and wounded per attack) when examining the attacks experienced during the timeframe of 2002–2008. This is achieved by reviewing the associated terrorist actors seen in Figure 3 and the comparison of the lethality rates in Figure 4. Here AQ’s direct influences and assistance such as funding was associated with one of the most lethal attacks experienced by Indonesia to date, Bali-I, as this single attack demonstrated a lethality rate of 502.¹⁹¹ Bali-I aside, further holistic analysis of JI’s remaining attacks during this time period reveals a lethality rate of 65.5 per attack, an already alarmingly high lethality rate in its own right. When combining JI and JI in concert with AQ attacks an aggregate lethality rate of 101.8 casualties per attack is demonstrated, an increase of 36.3 casualties per attack.¹⁹² Further evidence may be seen through the Islamic laskars (*Aliansi Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan* [AGAP], FPI, and LJ) who possessed direct or loose network ties to JI, contained cross memberships, or possessed transnational jihadists within their ranks.¹⁹³ Despite the small number of attacks conducted, these groups generally achieved rather high individual lethality rates (LJ 10, Mujahedeen Ambon [MA] 10, FPI 2, AGAP1) and a high combined lethality rate of 5.8 casualties per attack.¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, the lethality rate results for JI and to a lesser extent the Islamic radical laskars surpass those achieved by other domestic groups employing terrorism without external transnational influences. These groups, though accounting for the conduct of more attacks per Figure 3 (Unknown 60%, GAM 19%, and OPM 4%), generally inflicted both lower individual lethality rates (Unknown 4.2, GAM

¹⁹⁰ Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 1 (February 2013): 11–12, doi: 10.1.017/S0003055412000615.

¹⁹¹ Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ “Indonesia’s Terrorism Links”; Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda Threat,” 58–59.

¹⁹⁴ Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 161–69; Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

3.4, and OPM 5.4) and a lower combined average lethality rate of 3.3 casualties per terrorist attack as seen in Figure 4.¹⁹⁵




Figure 3. Terrorist Attacks by Group, 2002–2008.




Figure 4. Average Lethality Rate per Terrorist Attack, 2002–2008.

¹⁹⁵ Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

2. Turning the Tide: A Shift in Public Sentiment

The U.S.-led NATO bombing and invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 did much to sway Indonesians against supporting GWOT efforts and further buttressed the oft espoused idea of a seemingly “War against Islam” by the west.¹⁹⁶ By early 2003, these sentiments were reflected in a Pew Global Attitudes survey—the Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American think tank based in Washington, D.C. surveying the attitudes of adult (18 and older) Muslim and non-Muslim state populations—that saw an increase from 33% of Indonesians polled in 2002 to 59% of those polled again by Pew who felt Islam itself was threatened.¹⁹⁷ Sebastian captured the Indonesian publics’ sentiments of endorsement for jihadist acts—citing a national opinion poll taken by the Centre for Study of Islam and Society (PPM) based in Jakarta in 2001 and ‘02 that was analyzed by Liddle—that stated:

46% in 2001 and 54% in 2002 agreed, “That the ideals and struggle of Islamic movements and organizations (like Islamic Defenders Front, Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam, and others) to implement *syariat* in the government and society must be supported.”¹⁹⁸

Despite holding these beliefs in the context of Islam in relation to these and other world events, by the end of the wave of domestic bombings in 2005 Indonesian views regarding support for the use of violent terrorist means and ways had shifted profoundly. Prior to the conduct of Bali-I in October, in the summer of 2002 Pew polling found that of those asked 27% “often” or “sometimes,” 16% “rarely,” and 54% “never” felt it was justifiable in striking civilian targets through suicide bombings and violent means.¹⁹⁹ With the exposure of JI following Bali-I, JI would ardently claim its desire to target the “far enemy” consisting of western institutions or symbols and foreign tourists as well as “near

¹⁹⁶ Sukma, “Indonesia’s Islam,” 179–86; Smith, “Glass Half Full,” 455–56; Moranda, “ASEAN Regional Forum,” 150; Von der Mehden, “Islam in Indonesia,” 28.

¹⁹⁷ Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 150–51.

¹⁹⁸ Leonard Sebastian, “Indonesian State Responses to September 11, the Bali Bombings and the War in Iraq: Sowing the Seeds for an Accommodationist Islamic Framework?” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16, no. 3 (October 2003): 434, doi: 10.1080/0955757032000132353.

¹⁹⁹ Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2005), 2, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2005/07/14/islamic-extremism-common-concern-for-muslim-and-western-publics/>.

enemy” targets such as local Catholics. With the capture and trial of the Bali-I chief JI commander Imam Sumadra, this justification was reiterated publically within Sumadra’s deposition as he stated that the target represented, “The gathering place of international terrorists—that is, Israelis/Jews, Americans, Australia, and other countries involved in the destruction of Afghanistan during Ramadhan 2001.”²⁰⁰ Yet the Indonesian public experienced and bore witness to the mounting evidence to the contrary with bombing after bombing resulting in high numbers of innocent Indonesian Muslim casualties.²⁰¹ Subsequently in a Pew 2005 survey following the last attack, Indonesian public sentiment shifted further away from support of terrorist acts with 15% stating that it was “often” or “sometimes,” 18% “rarely,” and 66% “never” justified to target civilians.²⁰² These public sentiments resonated further during this timeframe as captured by Oak in two 2006 polls—taken by the private Indonesian surveying company *Lembaga Survei Indonesia* (LSI) and translated by Taylor Fincher—that reflected 78% of those polled who believed the death penalty for the main Bali-I bombers was a just ruling and a further 80.7% who did not believe in the act of violent jihad.²⁰³

For the civic-minded laskars such as LJ and FPI, the killing of innocent, fellow Muslims and the perceived targeting of the Indonesian state was beyond the scope and intent of their aims and represented a “bridge too far.” Internal fracturing within LJ soon appeared and in the immediate days following Bali-I, LJ’s leader Jafar Umar Thalib—in addition to FPI’s Habib Rizieq Shihab during the same timeframe—declared the cessation of operations throughout the archipelago and both group’s disbanding.²⁰⁴ Questions remained as to the true extent of the wider LJ membership’s support of the leadership’s decisions as only 300 or so jihadists out of the supposed thousands that were mobilized and deployed had returned to their points of origin.²⁰⁵ Despite these remaining

²⁰⁰ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 117.

²⁰¹ Ibid.; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 999.

²⁰² Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Islamic Extremism*.

²⁰³ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1002, 1012.

²⁰⁴ Abuza, “Review of *Laskar Jihad*,” 199; Means, *Political Islam*, 179, 303; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 999–1001.

²⁰⁵ Abuza, “Review of *Laskar Jihad*,” 199; Means, *Political Islam*, 179.

concerns, these shifts in public sentiment and distancing by fellow jihadists turned the tide within the political sphere and would have profound repercussions for the domestic-transnational jihadists while simultaneously opening the door to the Indonesian government to seize the initiative.

3. Jihadist Internal Discords, Group Evolutions, and New Threats

International pressures stemming from the high number of foreign tourists killed, the growing loss of public and laskar support, and increasing state abilities and capacities to combat the jihadist threat were factors that played a part in JI conducting an internal evaluation and making structural and operational adjustments. This led to the sudden fracturing among JI members as to the means and ways of continuing the fight and the restructuring of the movement as a whole. These differences in opinions and objectives or what Shapiro coined as “preference divergence,” hinged around those who advocated targeting the “near enemy”—defined as government or civil entities that were allied to or in agreement with western ways—focusing direct action efforts on elements of the Indonesian government, and those who advocated targeting of the “far enemy”—defined as western governments and their civilians—focusing direct action efforts on western civilians, governments, and symbols of globalization both on Indonesian soil and abroad.²⁰⁶ Compounding this further were the divergent beliefs on the use of violent means to achieve desired end-states, the specific types of violent means to be utilized—targeted assassinations or bombing campaigns—and the timing of implementation.²⁰⁷

Following Bali-I, many JI radicals led by Ba’asyir denounced the bombings and their high loss of innocent Muslim lives as counterproductive to gaining the crucially needed public support. Thus, Ba’asyir shifted toward advocating for the means and ways

²⁰⁶ Jacob N. Shapiro, *The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2013), 29; Abuza, “Borderlands, Terrorism, and Insurgency,” 89; Sidney Jones, “Ongoing Extremist Threat,” 91; Greg Barton, “Indonesia’s Year of Living Normally: Taking the Long View on Indonesia’s Progress,” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2008), 130–31; Barton, “Historical Development,” 45; Mohammed M. Hafez, “Illegitimate Governance: The Roots of Islamist Radicalization in the MENA,” in *Governance in the Middle East and North Africa*, ed. Abbas Kadhim (New York: Routledge, 2012), 95.

²⁰⁷ Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1004.

to refocus and transform the organization around non-violence.²⁰⁸ In 2005, following the last of the series of bombings from 2002–04, Ba'asyir was quoted as saying:

They all had good intention, that is, Jihad in Allah's way, the aim of the jihad is to look for blessing from Allah. They are right that America is the proper target because America fights Islam. So in terms of their objectives, they are right, and the target of their attacks was right also. But their calculations are debatable. My view is that we should do bombings in conflict areas not in peaceful areas. We have to target the place of the enemy, not countries where many Muslims live.²⁰⁹

One of the first hardline groups who advocated for the continued use of violent means through bombing campaigns against “near enemy” and “far enemy” targets was led by Hambali, Azahari, and Noordin Top. Following Bali-I, Top—also known as *Anshar el-Muslimin* and *Thoifah Muqotilah* by his associates—would form al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago or *Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad*.²¹⁰ A self-radicalized jihadist who ardently translated AQ's magazine articles, Top adapted the AQ ideology in concert with local conditions along the lines and ideas professed by al-Suri, and saw himself as the means to continuing the militant legacy of JI.²¹¹ To further grow and support his new faction, Top reached out to JI mid-level leader Sarwo Edi Nugroho. Top requested various resources consisting of funding, explosives, and jihadists to carry out his plans. Nugroho flatly rebuffed Top, stating that:

Because we have different chains of command, in addition to which our vision, mission, and selection of targets is different...You don't have to use bombs everywhere but by kidnapping or shooting, or using other methods, you are likely to hit the right target.²¹²

Through AQA, the reign of bombing attacks on the “far enemy” located on Indonesian soil would continue.²¹³ Top's group was later linked and implicated in the subsequent

²⁰⁸ Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4; Jones, “Ongoing Extremist Threat,” 91.

²⁰⁹ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah's Fifth Phase,” 1004.

²¹⁰ Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 157; Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, 163; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 130.

²¹¹ Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 157; International Crisis Group (ICG), “Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks,” *Asia Report*, no. 114 (May 2006).

²¹² Shapiro, *Terrorist's Dilemma*, 29–30.

²¹³ Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4.

bombings of the Marriott Hotel 2003, Australian Embassy 2004, Bali-II 2005, and Jakarta 2009, though JI would continue to be suspected as the culprits by the authorities.²¹⁴ To orchestrate his wave of bombings Top broke the traditional operational mold—terrorist attacks by groups acting alone—by astutely corralling a variety of loosely aligned networks of radical jihadist groups and members from JI elements—JI in Sumatra for the ‘03 attack and the East Java division, Central Java JI alumni, the revived Dar-ul Islam faction, and Ring Banten for the ‘04 attack.²¹⁵ His faction would continue to pursue its violent campaign, posing a continued threat and vexing both the JI establishment and Indonesian authorities into the next timeframe of 2009–present.²¹⁶

Finally from 2005 to 2008 JI underwent further organizational and ideological changes with its abdication from the use of violence due to a belief that the timing was bad; Indonesians were simply not ready for an armed uprising in the present. Instead Ba’asyir formed *Jamaah Ansharud Tauhid* (JAT), Partisans of the Oneness of God, in September of 2008 and devoted itself to re-building the ranks and conduct the groups restructuring through religious—*dakwah*—and educational—*tarbiyah*—outreach.²¹⁷ As stated by Gordon and Lindo, the denunciation of the use of violence into the present by JI was not one denouncing the overall use of violence as a legitimate tactic; violence and jihad was and still is advocated by JI/JAT to be used in the future or another location given the right societal and political conditions.²¹⁸ Furthermore, through its functions of *dakwah* and *tarbiyah*, JI/JAT advocated less for the establishment of a regional caliphate pursued by the decentralized administratively separate regional Mantiqis, but would espouse the goal of establishing the DI-rooted, Islamic State of Indonesia through a more centralized administrative and leadership model. This construct would consist of three

²¹⁴ Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 4; Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27.

²¹⁵ ICG, “Terrorism in Indonesia.”

²¹⁶ Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 157; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1004.

²¹⁷ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, *Indonesia’s Lamongan Network: How East Java, Poso and Syria Are Linked* (IPAC Report No. 18) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2014), 1; International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh,” *Asia Report*, no. 189 (April 2010), 2; Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism in Perspective,” 4; Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 4; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1004; Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 129.

²¹⁸ Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 10; Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 473.

divisions with the first focused on eastern Indonesia, the second emanating from Poso, Central Sulawesi, and the third covering western Indonesia.²¹⁹ Beyond the regional divisions, JAT further incorporated structure down to the district and even small cell levels. Operationally, some JAT cells would exist in the covert, militant realm while the organization as a whole would exist more in the main public eye and work toward tightening networks and relationships with the remaining radical Islamic militias and vigilante groups.²²⁰

B. THE STATE RESPONSE

The Indonesian government did not completely adjust course leading up to the attack of Bali-I as it initially continued to maintain its rather indirect, tempered response in dealing with the radical Islamic groups and jihadists. Resonating within the Megawati government during this timeframe were fears of political backlash and sensitivities associated with confronting the radical Islamists and overall lack of wanting to be seen as U.S. “lackeys” stemming from any provided GWOT support.²²¹ Yet the declaration that the attack of Bali-I was due in part to those with direct links to AQ enabled the government to admit it had a real terrorist problem, a problem it could now garner support for and allocate resources against in response.²²²

With international attention focused on the high number of foreign tourists killed and wounded coupled with the discovery of a domestic transnational organization, JI, linked closely with AQ designated as the principle suspects, the criminal nature of the act and calls for bringing them to justice took center stage. Subsequently, overtures and attempts at trying to determine the full extent of the ideological justifications and grievances were subordinated.²²³ These factors caused the Megawati administration to empower the established criminal justice institutions to handle the state response.²²⁴ This

²¹⁹ Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, 162; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000.

²²⁰ Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism in Perspective,” 4.

²²¹ Means, *Political Islam*, 301.

²²² Smith, “Glass Half Full,” 458.

²²³ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 117–18.

²²⁴ Means, *Political Islam*, 174.

action would unknowingly and indirectly further entrench the criminal justice CT approach toward combating the mobilization and actions of the transnational and domestic jihadists. This facilitation of state institutional empowerment was followed in kind by three actions: first, the building of “hard” CT capacity through the creation, professionalization, and actions of law enforcement institutions and agencies; second, the subsequent convictions and sentencing through newly enacted CT legislation; and third, the eventual directed targeting of the ideology by the government through the initiation of the “soft” CT measures of de-radicalization and disengagement programs.²²⁵ Thus, these actions coupled with the turning of public sentiment against the jihadists and the receipt of backing by mainstream-moderate Muslim groups NU and Muhammadiyah provided the Indonesian government the “ability” it previously lacked to effectively engage the jihadists.²²⁶

1. CT Capacity: Creation and Professionalization of CT Law Enforcement

As the Megawati administration, later the *Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono* (SBY) administration, and the governmental institutions gained the ability to act, the acquiring of CT capacity and achieving effectiveness presented the next hurdle to actively counter and effectively combat the mobilization and effectiveness of the radical domestic and transnational jihadist terrorists.²²⁷ Through the creation of CT institutions and special units coupled with the professionalization of those entities and the *POLRI*, the national police, this capacity and capability was achieved; actions that further entrenched the criminal justice CT approach. First we must understand both what CT institutional changes were initially implemented and the process and source by which further developments and professionalization would manifest. This process would be witnessed through the interplay of the newly created state institutions and the sources of assistance provided by the international community, specifically the U.S. and Australia. Second, the law enforcement’s actions taken during and following this professionalization process

²²⁵ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 116.

²²⁶ Means, *Political Islam*, 303; Smith, “Glass Half Full,” 458.

²²⁷ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 110.

against the jihadists will be described through its employment of “hard” CT measures with the conduct of arrests or killing of JI leadership.

Despite a seemingly tempered and offhand approach by the Megawati administration in outward rhetoric, the administration began to take decisive actions through the institution of emergency acts and the high level of empowerment granted to the *POLRI* and the national intelligence agency, the *Badan Intelijen Negara* (BIN).²²⁸ Through Instruction 4/2002 Megawati placed under the control of the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs the newly formed Desk for Coordination of Eradicating Terrorism (DCET) with the directive of creating and instituting an overarching CT policy. Under Instruction 4/2002 and 5/2002, the head of the BIN was directed to lead and align all efforts of the state’s intelligence agencies and communities such as the *POLRI*, the security agency, and the TNI Strategic Agency.²²⁹ Chief among the CT agency creations that year that was established from, “Disciplined and honest officers who are exceptionally well paid by Indonesian standards,” was that of the *POLRI*’s elite CT unit, Densus-88.²³⁰ This unit would be at the forefront of Indonesia’s civil based, criminal justice CT approach and employment of “hard” CT measures; actions that were much to the TNI’s discontent and further detriment to TNI and *POLRI* relations.²³¹ By 2004, Densus-88 was expanded to include regional, provincial level teams to further augment local level *POLRI* elements.²³² In the wake of the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing, the Antiterrorism Task Force (ATF) was placed under the BIN with the mandate of tracking down terrorists throughout the archipelago and further coordinating and instilling a unity of effort among the TNI’s special operations units and *POLRI* CT units such as Densus-88. To further instill a “whole of government” approach and “unity of effort” among the disparate ministries—the Ministries of Justice, Finance,

²²⁸ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 149–51.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000, Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 129.

²³¹ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 116–17; Abuza, *Political Islam*, 62; Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 130.

²³² Noorhaidi Hasan, “Towards a Population-Centric Strategy: The Indonesian Experience,” in *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia*, ed. Roel Meijer (Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael,’ 2012), 24.

Foreign Affairs, and Attorney General's Office among others—were each represented within the ATF and expected to cooperate.²³³

Knowing that the planned attacks, those to come, and the survival of JI required sources of funding, Indonesian authorities quickly turned to staunching the flow of capital to jihadist groups by creating institutional capacities specifically tailored for those pursuits. To this end, beginning in 2002 new legislation would be drafted with the newly created *Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan* (PPTAK)—Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (INTRAC) tasked specifically with the monitoring and enforcing the anti-money laundering and counter-financing terrorism regulations.²³⁴ In further concert with the PPTAK, the Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) was tasked with additional monitoring and adherence to those regulations. Despite these institutions, the enforcement and achievement of set goals and desired end-states of devised action plans has been fraught with roadblocks, corruption, and the inherently difficult nature of establishing connections and the freezing of financial assets.²³⁵

The international attention brought forth from Bali-I, stemming from the 88 Australian tourists killed of the 202 and others wounded—the namesake of Densus-88 in the deceased honor—would lead to a high level of law enforcement support to Indonesia. All told, ten states would contribute manpower, resources—such as forensics teams and trainers from the U.S. CIA, FBI, and USA special-forces—and funding to assist the Indonesians in the subsequent bombing investigations and law enforcement professionalization that ensued.²³⁶ Densus-88 would be of particular importance and be on the receiving end of the majority of funding and specialized training through programs such as the U.S. State Department's (SD) Diplomatic Security Initiative.²³⁷ Through the U.S. Anti-terrorism Assistance program Indonesia received \$40 million between 2002–2007, an amount exceeded only by security contributions given to Afghanistan,

²³³ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000.

²³⁴ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 150.

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Means, *Political Islam*, 303.

²³⁷ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000.

Columbia, and Pakistan.²³⁸ This aid was further reinforced by Australia contributing \$10 million from 2002–2006 in conjunction with the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in 2004—with the additional boost of \$36.8 million by Australia in February that year—with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) tailoring and conducting joint CT training alongside the *POLRI* and Densus-88.²³⁹ The JCLEC’s primary directive is both preparedness and training based, with the overarching goal for the provision of, “A range of training and capacity building programs to enhance the operational expertise of regional law enforcement personnel for dealing with all forms of transnational crime, including terrorism.”²⁴⁰ The creation of CT institutions such as the ATF, JCLEC, and elite law enforcement units like Densus-88 further enabled intelligence gathering capabilities that were previously lacking in regard to the aspect of domestic criminal acts deemed critical components to combating the transnational and domestic radical jihadist threat. Yet, due to the controversy and human rights sensitivities such institutions and their actions solicit within the public spheres, it would not be until 2011 that legislation further enabling the BIN to legally acquire intelligence through specific measures would be codified.²⁴¹

Armed with the newly acquired CT capacity, the Indonesian authorities were quick to put them to use in the timeframe following Bali-I through the successful “hard” CT actions of Densus-88 targeting JI leadership and key membership. Between 2002 and 2009, law enforcement authorities would arrest approximately 464 JI operatives and kill 40, that according to Oak equated to nearly 23% of the JI reported members during the groups’ operational peak.²⁴² These high numbers of arrests and subsequent convictions would surpass those of other nations facing transnational and domestic jihadist based threats during this timeframe.²⁴³ While the major gains were unable to prevent the execution of the devastating wave of bombing attacks that followed Bali-I and

²³⁸ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000.

²³⁹ Ibid., 999–1000.

²⁴⁰ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 152.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² Hasan, “Population-Centric Strategy,” 24; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000.

²⁴³ Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 5.

culminated with Bali-II in 2005, each arrest and the intelligence gathered—such as a copy of JI’s doctrinal organizational and operating procedures, *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah* (PUPJI), which further listed key leadership figures—led authorities to conduct further operations.²⁴⁴ These culminated with JI loosing much of its high-level leadership and determined, experienced members, as seen in the Appendix, “JI’s Major Leaders and Key Figures,” established through the work of Oak.²⁴⁵

2. CT Capacity: Antiterrorism Legislation and Chaos in the Courts

As the Megawati administration relied upon the *POLRI* to take the lead in the fight against the jihadists, it soon became apparent that further steps would have to be taken in both the legislative and judiciary realms to combat, try, and convict the jihadist bombers of Bali-I and beyond. The discussion over and subsequent fears associated with such specified “antiterrorism legislation” harked back to the oppressive, anti-sedition styled laws of colonialism and the authoritarian Suharto years, and would spark country wide debate for their utility and need by Islamists and human rights activists alike.²⁴⁶ While the measures instituted would be far less severe than those instituted by other Southeast Asian states, they would undergo further contestation and overruling by the courts themselves despite the continued bombing campaigns of the jihadists during this timeframe.²⁴⁷

Within weeks of Bali-I, Megawati through emergency decree powers—decrees that were later ratified into law under the anti-terrorism bills by Parliament in March of 2003—pushed through two specific measures, “Regulation In-Lieu of Law No. 1/2002 on the Eradication of Terrorist Act,” and, “Regulation In-Lieu of Law No. 2/2002 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism in Relation to the Bomb Explosion Incident in Bali, 12 October 2002.”²⁴⁸ These laws and the subsequent ones that followed were

²⁴⁴ Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, 162; Means, *Political Islam*, 303; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 991, 1000–16.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 117.

²⁴⁷ Means, *Political Islam*, 303–05.

²⁴⁸ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 117; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 149.

fundamental in further codifying and entrenching the criminal justice CT approach to combat the jihadists. The regulations defined what the state would constitute as acts of terror and further asserted that all crimes of terror would be tried within the civil vice military courts.²⁴⁹ To the government, terrorism would be specifically defined as, “Any violent act that could create terror or insecurity among the public or cause destruction of vital facilities.”²⁵⁰ Through these regulations suspects could be held for up to six months for questioning and the type of evidence accepted was broadened to include those gathered by the intelligence community from wire-taps, electronic media, banking records, etc. Furthermore, a conviction could carry with it a minimum sentence of three years confinement or a maximum sentence of death.²⁵¹

While these regulations served to further detain, question, gather evidence pertaining to the cases of those arrested and suspected jihadists of the Bali-I bombing and beyond, almost overnight issues of jurisprudence arose and called into question their legitimacy. Between 2002 and 2004, many of those Bali-I suspects such as Ba’asysir would be tried and sentenced in accordance with the 2003 legislation with three death penalties and one life sentence being the most extreme sentences given.²⁵² As captured by Means, Article 28 of the Indonesian constitution states, “The right of citizens not to be prosecuted retroactively is a basic human right that shall not be diminished under any circumstances.”²⁵³ On these grounds the legitimacy of the legislation and subsequent Bali-I trial rulings would be raised by both activists and Ba’asyir’s lawyers, who would appeal to Jakarta’s District Courts and ultimately receive a reduced sentence.²⁵⁴ In 2004, the Constitutional Court passed a ruling that overturned the verdicts stemming from the use of the anti-terrorism laws for the Bali-I and Marriott bombings citing, “The provisions of that law sanctioning retroactive application were unconstitutional and

²⁴⁹ Hasan, “Population-Centric Strategy,” 23.

²⁵⁰ Means, *Political Islam*, 303.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 303–04; Hasan, “Population-Centric Strategy,” 23.

²⁵² Means, *Political Islam*, 304.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

therefore void.”²⁵⁵ This verdict would affect some 27 cases and further complicated the judicial process by failing to determine whether those cases were therefore retroactively categorized as “mistrials.”²⁵⁶ While muddying the waters of the 2002–2003 timeframe, those terrorists arrested and tried for the subsequent wave of bombings in 2004–2005 were tried from 2006–2007 without issue according to the anti-terrorism laws of 2003.²⁵⁷

A final form of legislative contention arose from whether to label JI as a terrorist organization, which being an illegal and therefore banned organization meant its members were subject to the antiterrorism laws and arrest. In the highly Islamist and politicized atmosphere of the early 2000s, Indonesia had disregarded earlier labeling of JI by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, passed in 1996 that had identified JI led by Ba’asyir as a terrorist organization.²⁵⁸ This despite the fact that the government had no issue identifying as illegal and prosecuting a myriad of “deviant” Muslim and other religious sects and their leadership.²⁵⁹ For the government, part of the issue relied upon the general belief that it could not deem an “Islamic community”—the literal translation of *Jemaah Islamiyah*—as a terrorist organization.²⁶⁰ The vice president went further, stating: “How can we ban an organization that does not exist? Who is the chairman? Who are the members? Where is the headquarters?”²⁶¹ In addition, security agencies themselves could not decide between them which path was best. Here the TNI’s *Badan Intelijen Strategis* (BAIS) believed that it was easier to track and monitor radical groups who operated in the open than those who were banned and forced underground. Conversely, the *POLRI’s Home Security Intelligence Agency* (BIK) held the counter belief that banning radical groups is precisely the course of action to take with application to those political movements whose activities support or espouse the creation for an

²⁵⁵ Means, *Political Islam*, 304–05; Barton, *Indonesia’s Struggle*, 23–24.

²⁵⁶ Means, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia*, 304.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 5; Means, *Political Islam*, 324.

²⁵⁹ Means, *Political Islam*, 324.

²⁶⁰ Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 5.

²⁶¹ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1008.

Islamic State such as *Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia*.²⁶² Yet in April 2008, a South Jakarta District Court judge determined JI to be an illegal organization, an action the government had tiptoed around until that time.²⁶³ With this established precedent, the government would later adapt its use when confronting IS and domestic IS supporters.

3. Overtures at Addressing the Ideology—Deradicalization and Disengagement

As the capacities and abilities of the Indonesian government grew, so too did the growing number of incarcerated jihadists within the prisons throughout the archipelago. By the end of 2004, the SBY administration acknowledged the need for discourse targeting the radical jihadist ideology itself.²⁶⁴ SBY was not alone in holding these beliefs with some in government institutions supporting the use of the “soft” CT measures of deradicalization and or disengagement—terms vaguely defined with varied meanings—as additional means by which to combat the jihadists. At the “grassroots” level the belief not only was shared, but also began to grow and manifest into ad-hoc measures and actions taken by the *POLRI*. First the terms will be defined and second, the means and ways of implementation will be discussed.

The term deradicalization in its most basic form implies a transformation of beliefs or, as an International Crisis Group report states, “The process of creating an environment that discourages the growth of radical movements by addressing the basic issues fuelling them.”²⁶⁵ Contrary to deradicalization, disengagement is more behavior oriented and simply seeks to lead the jihadist to abandon the use of violence as a means to an end and attempts social reintegration.²⁶⁶ These definitions are broad based and open

²⁶² Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 130.

²⁶³ Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 10; Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 128.

²⁶⁴ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 118.

²⁶⁵ Noorhaidi Hasan et al., “Introduction,” in *Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Indonesia, Algeria and Saudi Arabia*, ed. Roel Meijer (Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael,’ 2012), 10; International Crisis Group, “‘Deradicalisation’ and Indonesian Prisons,” *Asia Report*, no. 142 (November 2007): 1.

²⁶⁶ Zachary Abuza, “The Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in South East Asia: A Preliminary Assessment,” in *Leaving Terrorism behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement*, ed. Tore Bjørgo and John Horgan (New York: Routledge, 2009), 198; Hasan et al., “Introduction,” 10.

to diverse methodological processes for implementation that vary from state to state. For Indonesia, these methodologies appeared to hinge around three means: acts of “kindness” by the *POLRI* toward the jihadists, the distribution of monetary assistance to acquiescing jihadists, and talking tours by disengaged jihadists such as Nasir Abas—former JI Deputy Head of Mantiqi III—and Ali Imron—the younger brother to one of the Bali-I bombers.²⁶⁷

Through the *POLRI*, both processes were seen as potentially viable and effective “soft” CT measures that could impart short and long-term effects on the reduction of those possessing radical Islamic beliefs and the rates of jihadist recidivism.²⁶⁸ Such sentiments were captured in an interview with the BBC when General Ansyad M’Bai stated, “We shouldn’t see these radical groups as black and white...In our experience, no one could be a terrorist forever.”²⁶⁹ The *POLRI*’s first spheres for these overtures to manifest into direct action occurred in the least likely of all places, through the additional measures implemented by Densus-88 under the leadership of Superintendent Tito Karnavian and Brigadier General Surya Dharma.²⁷⁰ With many members of the elite CT unit being devout Muslims, the agents began to not only treat the jihadists with respect and kindness in their dealings and handling of them in accordance with Islamic principles while in police care, but conducted daily prayers alongside and conversed with them afterward.²⁷¹ In addition to gaining actionable intelligence, it was hoped that these interactions would be viewed by the jihadists as examples running counter to the extremist beliefs that all *POLRI* and Indonesian government officials were *murtad*—apostates—or *kafir*, “infidels in matter of belief,” and that any assistance from them was

²⁶⁷ Kristen E. Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach to Jihadist Deradicalization,” *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 8 (July 2008); ICG, ““Deradicalisation,”” 1; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 154; Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 194.

²⁶⁸ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 153–54.

²⁶⁹ Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 193.

²⁷⁰ Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 130; Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 199.

²⁷¹ Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 130.

haram, forbidden.²⁷² Thus, these simple acts of kindness and exposure to a counter narrative would spark further internal questioning by the jihadists as to other aspects and tenants of the radical, extremist ideology.²⁷³ In addition, monetary assistance from the *POLRI* to many of the families of jihadists further solidified these openings and subsequent successes, though it also becomes the main incentive for many.²⁷⁴

With the succession of bombing campaigns of 2002–2005, the same sentiments about the killing of fellow Muslims that caused rifts within the *JI* organization led to the disengagement of some jihadists within the holding cells of the regional *POLRI* units and state prison system alike. Those disengaged jihadists such as Abas, who were held in high regard within jihadi circles, were allowed to write and publish disengagement oriented works in prison and were further utilized on speaking tours to other Indonesian prisons to further disengage other jihadists recently arrested before they were interrogated.²⁷⁵ Karnavian was quoted as saying that, “When their Islamic argument is already defeated, then it is easy for us. Then we enter.”²⁷⁶ By 2007, the Indonesian Parliament acknowledged the work of the *POLRI* and announced the backing of the deradicalization and disengagement programs, yet allotted funding to combat root causes of radicalization such as poverty alleviation leaving the *POLRI* to continue its work in an underfunded ad-hoc manner.²⁷⁷

C. ASSESSMENT

The timeframe of 2002–2008 began with the state still lacking the ability and subsequent capacity to effectively respond to the pressures and threat posed by Islamic radical jihadists. *JI* and *AQA* failed to capitalize on the government’s initial weaknesses in ability and capacity to effectively respond leading up to Bali-I and further failed to

²⁷² Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach”; Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 199; Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), xv; Peter Mandaville, *Islam and Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 426; ICG, “Deradicalisation.”

²⁷³ Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach.”

²⁷⁴ ICG, “Deradicalisation,” 1.

²⁷⁵ Schulze, “Indonesia’s Approach”; Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 199.

²⁷⁶ Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 199.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 199.

anticipate the subsequent negative impact the deaths of innocent fellow Muslims would solicit from the Indonesian public during the years 2002–2005. In this manner, JI and AQA’s continued violent actions only had the effect of strengthening as opposed to weakening the state.²⁷⁸ Yet the resiliency of the jihadist groups to conduct organizational and ideological evolutions in the face of these failures was demonstrated with the group and radical jihadist movement continuing its existence well into the future.²⁷⁹

As the bombing campaigns continued the state’s abilities to respond through civil CT capacities and response grew exponentially between the years 2002–2005. This was seen first with the implementation of criminal justice CT agencies, units, judicial legislation, and the decisive use of “hard” CT measures through arrests and incarcerations of jihadist leadership and key members; and second through the early implementation of “soft” measures such as deradicalization and disengagement programs and processes. The state was not only able to create and achieve CT capacity, but in the manner of doing so through the incorporation of both “hard” and “soft” CT measures it had instituted a comprehensive and effective criminal justice CT model by the timeframe’s end.²⁸⁰ This approach would be one that not only incorporated elements to combat the jihadist actions, but also began the means by which to further address the mobilization of individuals into radical jihadist groups.

1. “Hard” CT Measures

The effectiveness of the Indonesian criminal justice CT approach through the creation of CT agencies and the use of “hard” measures was achieved through a combination of sound law enforcement and judiciary processing and incarceration of jihadists. JI and AQA would come to feel the full weight of this effectiveness with great losses in key leaders and members at the hands of the newly created and professionalized ATF, Densus-88, *POLRI*, and other state entities. This was evident with the capture or the death of leaders such as Ba’asyir (arrested October 2002 and served only 26 of a 36

²⁷⁸ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 115.

²⁷⁹ Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 157; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000–04; Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, 162.

²⁸⁰ Hasan et al., “Introduction,” 10.

month jail sentence), Abu Rusdan (arrested April 23, 2003), Hambali (arrested August 2003), Amrozi and Mukhlas bin Nurahsyim (arrested and sentenced to death November 2002), Imam Samudra (arrested and sentenced to death November 2002), Zarkasih (arrested June 2007), Abu Dujana (arrested June 2007) and many more (see the Appendix).²⁸¹ The loss of such leadership and experience, according to Byman is catastrophic for a terrorist organization and its operational capacity:

Generators of terror such as bomb makers, trainers, document forgers, recruiters, and leaders are both scarce in number and require many months if not years to perfect their skills. If these generators of terror can be eliminated through arrests, killings, the organization as a whole is disrupted. The movement may still have many willing recruits, but it is no longer effective.²⁸²

Without the “hard” CT measures, antiterrorism bill legislation of 2003, and the judiciary conviction efforts by the state, it is reasonable to infer that the amount of attacks and those killed and wounded would have potentially been higher and resulted in many more lives lost and damages sustained to property. Such a claim may be made given the jihadists’ high lethality rate and propensity for action as seen in Figures 3 and 4.²⁸³ The impact of these arrests and the neutralization or convictions of core leaders and members can not be overstated and is seen when placing the convicted terrorist convictions of Figure 5 against the jihadist lethality rates in Figure 6.²⁸⁴ Under this context, the steady drop in the jihadist lethality rate in the years following Bali-I may be correlated with and attributed to the loss of jihadist group leadership and core members. Despite Top’s attempts at cobbling together coalitions of disparate and loosely aligned jihadists who desired to continue the struggle through violent means, he was simply unable to achieve

²⁸¹ Ressa, *Seeds of Terror*, 215; Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, 162–65; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000.

²⁸² Daniel Byman, *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 365.

²⁸³ Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 117; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 149; Means, *Political Islam*, 304; Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

²⁸⁴ Gindarsah, “Indonesia’s Struggle”; Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

the high lethality rates of years past as seen with the 2008 lethality rate dropping to 26.5.²⁸⁵




Figure 5. Convicted Terrorists in Indonesia, 2000–2012.




Figure 6. Jihadist Lethality Rates, 2002–2008.

²⁸⁵ ICG, “Terrorism in Indonesia,” 2; Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

2. “Soft” CT Measures

While initiated and funded through “grass-roots” methodologies, the incorporation of “soft” CT measures through deradicalization and disengagement programs by the very organization conducting the ‘hard’ CT actions, the *POLRI* and Densus-88, can be seen as attempts at furthering the criminal justice CT approach toward a comprehensive CT strategy.²⁸⁶ The effectiveness of these programs was limited and difficult to assess due to the small number of participants and ad-hoc nature of the methodologies. Of the hundreds of jihadists incarcerated early on during this timeframe only 10–20 decided to disengage and opt to further work with the *POLRI*.²⁸⁷ By 2007, an additional 20 family members and jihadists, incentivized by monetary assistance, directly participated in disengagement counseling of the 400 potential candidates asked.²⁸⁸ Yet the jihadist cooperation and intelligence gathered during interrogations (following attempts at disengagement reported by the *POLRI* and Densus-88) was a variable that further enabled the *POLRI* to conduct raids and arrests; actions that ultimately contributed to bringing about jihadist operational ineffectiveness.²⁸⁹ The deradicalization and disengagement strategy, while in its infancy during this timeframe, set the foundation from which further developments could later be implemented and processes explored such as further incorporation of civil society’s moderate Muslim groups, NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as the more hardline MUI that would be incorporated in the timeframe of 2009–present.²⁹⁰

3. Shortfalls of Indonesia’s Criminal Justice CT Approach

Despite the gains made through capacity and enhanced CT efforts, this timeframe was still marked by a failure of the government to label radical Islamic groups such as JI as terrorists until the landmark decision by the Jakarta District Court in 2008; a precedent

²⁸⁶ Hasan et al, “Introduction,” 10.

²⁸⁷ Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 199.

²⁸⁸ Ibid., 200.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., 197–99.

²⁹⁰ Hasan et al, “Introduction,” 9–10; Abuza, “Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah,” 199.

later to be utilized in confronting IS.²⁹¹ The persistence of such a failure was due in part to the lingering political sensitivities surrounding political Islam and the initial political clout many radical Islamic groups possessed. This was further compounded by a lingering fear by government officials of residual public sentiment holding the belief that the state's CT actions were a part of the U.S. GWOT.²⁹²

Furthermore, this timeframe underlined some shortcomings of the Indonesian criminal justice CT approach through identified issues within the judicial and prison systems. This is demonstrated within the justice system where the incorporation of convicted jihadists to participate within amnesty programs, such as the annual Independence Day amnesty that was designed to reduce normal criminal behavior, has meant less time in prison due to 'good behavior' and the potential for increased jihadist recidivism upon release. Abuza cited that 12 of the 33 Bali-I bombers as well as 10 of those charged with aiding and executing Bali-II would receive reduced sentences under such programs.²⁹³ Additionally, the means and ways for jihadist activities and recidivism to continue both in and outside of prison were enabled by the prison system itself. Here jihadist prisoners were mixed with general population criminals and were afforded much leeway with the means to communicate with the outside world via phones and computers.²⁹⁴ These issues cumulatively allowed the jihadist ideology and the groups to persist and pursue more recruits.²⁹⁵ In an interview in jail with CNN in 2007, Abu Dujana stated, "It [JI] will continue to exist and continue to move on with its plans."²⁹⁶

D. CONCLUSION

The enabling key element to the state's abilities to first build CT capacity and second to take direct action against the jihadists came in the wake of the sequence of

²⁹¹ Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 10.

²⁹² Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*; Vaughn et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 1.

²⁹³ Abuza, "Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah," 200.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., 200–01; ICG, "Deradicalisation," 2.

²⁹⁵ Abuza, "Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah," 200; Carnegie, "Latent Insurgency," 130; ICG, "Deradicalisation," 2.

²⁹⁶ Abuza, "Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah," 197.

bombings starting with Bali-I in 2002 to Bali-II in 2005 when public sentiment greatly turned against the terrorists. This turn of opinion subsequently gave the Indonesian authorities the political and societal “go ahead” to further initiate “hard” CT efforts. These efforts consisted of enhancing and professionalizing the state’s law enforcement agencies—in conjunction with resources and monetary aid from the U.S. and Australia—and the passing of appropriate judicial legislation and actions.

The cumulative effect of these variables—shifting public sentiment, increased state capabilities, and professionalized capacity—were entrenched and codified in a “hard” criminal justice approach to combating the mobilization and violent actions of the jihadists. The “backbone” of this CT program and its demonstrated effectiveness—seen in the degraded capabilities and operational effectiveness of the jihadists—stemmed directly from the government’s reliance on the “hard” approach and its limited employment of “soft” (“grassroots” disengagement and deradicalization efforts) CT measures whose effectiveness was difficult to gauge at best.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁷ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000.

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IV. 2009-PRESENT: JIHADIST RESILIENCY AND THE ISLAMIC STATE

A. THREAT OVERVIEW

Echoing back to the timeframe of 1998–2001, this time period of 2009 to 2016 encompasses similar internal and external entities posing both vertical and horizontal threats toward Indonesian integrity, national security, and unity. As before, vertical threats consist of the continued OPM separatist movement in West Papua threatening national integrity as well as the direct influences and supported attacks by jihadist transnational terrorists and their affiliated domestic Islamic radical groups. In addition, communal and religious intolerance–based violence is appearing yet again as a growing horizontal threat through many new and old regions of the country posing a threat to national unity—graphically depicted below in Figure 7: Indonesian Separatist, Communal, and Jihadist Violence, 1965–2016.²⁹⁸ The focus here will be on the threat posed by domestic radical and transnational jihadist groups.

Two themes may be seen within the single threat posed by jihadist transnational terrorism within this timeframe. First, domestic radical jihadist groups would persist with violent acts of terror into and throughout much of this timeframe from 2009–2016, seen through Noordin Top’s al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago (AQA) and Santoso’s *Mujahidin Indonesia Timur* (MIT). Second, the rise of civil wars in Syria and Iraq between 2011–13 and appearance of transnationally linked jihadist factions—AQ’s *al-Nusra Front* (ANF) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that was quickly followed by the Islamic State (IS) by 2014—would see the rejuvenation of transnational terrorist group influences throughout many parts of the world. Regarding Indonesia, the IS would expand its global strategies to further network, incorporate into their global designs, and evolve the active domestic jihadist groups.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁸ Adapted from International Crisis Group, “Indonesia–2016–2012,” last modified June 1, 2016, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/Search%20Results.aspx?keywords=Indonesia>.

²⁹⁹ Ross, “ISIL, ISIS, Islamic State”; Jasminder Singh, “Katibah Nusantara: Islamic State’s Malay Archipelago Combat Unit,” *RSIS Commentary*, no. 126, (May 2015), <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/CO15126.pdf>.

Along these two themes, this timeframe may further be divided into two distinct parts with varying means, ways, and nature of the overall threat the jihadists pose to the state. The first would begin with the actions and resiliency of domestic radical groups such as JI, JAT, Top's AQA, *lintas Tanzim*, and later MIT led by Santoso, who conducted what Jones and IPAC dubbed, "Low-tech and low-casualty,"—in comparison to years past—revenge based attacks on the *POLRI* and government symbols from 2009 through 2012 and beyond.³⁰⁰ The second timeframe from 2013 to the present day would see further jihadist rejuvenation through the impact and influences of the Syrian civil war and the IS culminating with the conduct of the first IS supported domestic jihadist attack in Jakarta on January 14, 2016.³⁰¹

1. Domestic Jihadists and the Rise of ISIS/IS–2009–2012

By 2009 much of the JI network was dismantled within Indonesia and across Southeast Asia. For Indonesia, this was achieved through the state's effective implementation of the criminal justice CT approach coupled with the significant loss of public support toward the jihadists' actions, which together played a key role in the group's move toward adopting the non-violent path.³⁰² This however, would not be the end for those JI members and other jihadist splinter groups still bent on conducting further bombings and continuing the struggle by violent means. These groups would continue threatening the "near enemy" of the Indonesian government as well as that of the "far enemy" of foreign interests and targets.³⁰³

In the wake of the 2005 Bali-II bombing by AQA and the subsequent arrest of many of its associates and actors by the *POLRI* and Densus-88, Top's group—with close associate Dulmatin—were on the run from authorities and remained relatively quiet as

³⁰⁰ "Violent Extremism," Institute For Policy Analysis of Conflict, accessed May 13, 2016, <http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/index/4/Violent-Extremism>.

³⁰¹ Schulze, "Jakarta Attack," 29.

³⁰² IPAC, "Indonesia's Lamongan Network," 1; International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise," 2; Chernov Hwang, "Terrorism in Perspective," 4; Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 4; Oak, "Jemmah Islamiyah's Fifth Phase," 1004; Carnegie, "Latent Insurgency," 129.

³⁰³ Jones, "Ongoing Extremist Threat," 91–93; Hafez, "Illegitimate Governance," 95.

they attempted to re-outfit, regroup, and plan the next phase of operations from 2005–08.³⁰⁴ This “rest and refit” time-period is captured in Figure 6, demonstrated by the group’s inactivity following the attack in 2005 until its reemergence with attacks in 2008.³⁰⁵ In July of 2009, a complex attack consisting of two separate suicide bombings on the Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels in the center of Jakarta’s business district resulting in the deaths of 9 and over 50 wounded, rocked the country out of its “jihadless” slumber.³⁰⁶ Authorities quickly learned that Top had once again orchestrated, planned, and executed the attacks with former JI members and disparate elements of jihadist splinter groups spread across the archipelago.³⁰⁷ In June of that year, Top’s second major planned operation failed when his plot to assassinate SBY was uncovered and foiled by the *POLRI* and Densus-88. With the authorities now in hot pursuit and during the conduct of numerous raids, the leaders of AQA would be killed in shoot-outs with the *POLRI* and Densus-88 that resulted in TOP being killed in September 2009 and Dulmatin in March 2010.³⁰⁸

Prior to his death in 2010, Dulmatin had followed Top’s lead and organized multiple radical jihadist groups such as elements of JI, JAT, FPI, Ring Banten, and *Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis* (KOMPAK) who were disenfranchised with both JI and AQA’s lackluster leadership, organizational structures, and objectives. With apparent funding and other support from Ba’aysir, Dulmatin went on to establish his own training complex in Aceh under the name *al-Qaida Indonesia Wilayah Serambi Mekkah*.³⁰⁹ Here Dulmatin attempted to draw forth more recruits from the local populace and hoped to institute his plan titled *lintas Tanzim*, cross-organization; wherein regional bases of operations could be established from which both recruitment to the ideology and

³⁰⁴ Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence?*, 130.

³⁰⁵ Data adapted from START, “Indonesia”; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 130.

³⁰⁶ International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings,” *Asia Briefing*, no. 94 (July 2009): 1; Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 128.

³⁰⁷ International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Noordin Top’s Support Base,” *Asia Briefing*, no. 95 (August 2009): 1; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 130.

³⁰⁸ Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 130–31.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., 131; ICG, “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise,” 1; Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism in Perspective,” 4.

militant group through dakwah within the communities and further attacks on the state could be planned and orchestrated from.³¹⁰ Dulmatin was further joined by Oman Rochman, known also as Aman Abdurrahman, a radical cleric who espoused and justified violent jihad in the name of instituting shari'a as the guiding jurisprudence for all Indonesians and the killing of those blocking its institution.³¹¹ Together, Dulmatin and Abdurrahman hoped the lintas Tanzim plan would further re-unite many of the disparate jihadist splinter groups that had appeared with JI's disavowal of the use of violent means, and further provide them with the structure, operational, and long-term strategic guidance they perceived as lacking within the jihadist movement.³¹² Ultimately, the project failed to coopt additional Acehnese to the cause and the jihadist camp's activities and location were relayed to the authorities by locals; resulting in the *POLRI* and Densus-88 March 2010 raid of the camp wherein 48 jihadists were arrested and 8 killed with Dulmatin among them.³¹³ For his part in the provision of direct support through funding and advising of Dulmatin, Bays'ir would be convicted and receive a 15-year sentence.³¹⁴

Undeterred by these setbacks, the resiliency of multiple jihadist groups continued to emerge in AQA's wake from 2010 and into 2013 with the continued focus of jihadist group efforts on both the "far" and "near" enemy. Here groups such as JAT, MIT, the short lived *Mujahidin Indonesian Barat* (MIB), HASMI, the Sunni Movement for Indonesian Society, the *Abu Hanifah Cell*, and *Abu Omar's* network, operating out of West Java, planned to attack multiple foreign targets such as the foiled plot to bomb Myanmar's Embassy in response to that country's handling of the Muslim Rohingya refugee crisis in 2013.³¹⁵ Despite the facts on the ground—the limited scope of

³¹⁰ ICG, "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise," 1; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 130–31; Carnegie, "Latent Insurgency," 132.

³¹¹ Carnegie, "Latent Insurgency," 132.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ ICG, "Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise," 1; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 130–31.

³¹⁴ David Gordon and Samuel Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 5.

³¹⁵ Carnegie, "Latent Insurgency," 132; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, *Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin of Western Indonesia* (IPAC Report No. 5) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2013), 1; Rohan Gunaratna, "A Face among the Crowd: Profiling the Man behind the Foiled Plot to Attack Myanmar's Embassy in Jakarta," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis* 5, no. 6 (June 2013): 3; Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," 153.

operations and dwindling resources—the attacks continued with Santoso’s MIT straddling the timeframes by initiating an all out campaign against the local *POLRI* units and Densus-88 throughout the mountainous Sulawesi region beginning in 2011 and continuing to the present day.³¹⁶ MIT would further become the premier jihadist group in Indonesia for militant training, garnishing support and members from Sumatra, Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Java, and serve as one of the base elements for IS initiatives in the region through its headquarters and “*qaedah aminah*”—secure base—outside Poso, Sulawesi.³¹⁷

2. Jihadist Transnational Terrorist Influences Reemerge—2013–2016

The emergence of the Syrian civil war and the rise of the IS would reinvigorate transnational jihadist ideologies that would alter the scope of the Indonesian jihadist threat. First, as the seeds for such rejuvenation had already been laid and maintained with the continued desire to focus on the “near” and “far” enemy through violent means by many of the domestic Indonesian jihadist groups from 2009–12. Second, as a result of the Syrian conflict transnational jihadist ideological influences were rejuvenated via the Islamic “eschatology” surrounding the end of days prophecies and jihad in the defense of Muslims under threat as championed by the IS propaganda machine.³¹⁸ Here prophetic predictions, *nubuwa*, foretell of the commencement of the apocalyptic battle, “*Malhamah al-Kubra*,” between the armies of the “true believers” and “infidels” that will usher in the final days; set to take place within the region of “*Sham*,” or the Levant region encompassing Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.³¹⁹

Together, these factors would come to pose three main threats to Indonesia: First, a resurgence of domestic jihadist group unification and solidarity through declared IS or ANF bai’at, support or allegiance. Second, an unprecedented number of Indonesian

³¹⁶ Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 29.

³¹⁷ Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “Terrorism in Indonesia: A Fading Threat?” *Southeast Asian Affairs* (2014): 140; IPAC, “Indonesia’s Lamongan Network,” 1.

³¹⁸ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 2; Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 29.

³¹⁹ IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 1; Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 2; Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” 155.

foreign fighters—reported to potentially be as high as 800 strong (though likely to be around 500–600 given those intercepted by authorities, killed in combat action, or returned home)—have been drawn to the region ushering in unique threats.³²⁰ Finally, the third factor lies with the desires of the IS to expand its outreach with the incorporation of a Southeast Asian *wilayat*, IS sponsored and affiliated province, potentially in Sulawesi or to the direct north in the neighboring islands of southwest Philippines.³²¹

a. A Reinvigorated Yet Divisive Jihadist Home Front

The Syrian conflict has served to simultaneously galvanize and unite the disparate Indonesian domestic jihadist groups along two fronts. Individual jihadists and radical jihadist groups would be forced to align their affiliation and pledge of bai'at to either AQ's ANF or the IS with neither group holding complete sway over Indonesia's jihadists. If proper, *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Jamaah Anshorul Syariat* (JAS)—a militant offshoot spawned from JAT with the sons of Ba'asyir (Abdul Rahim and Abdul Roshid) due to Ba'asyir's pledge to IS—continue to maintain the traditional alignment of support and efforts to AQ and ANF.³²² While ardent advocates of Islamic fundamentalism and the use of armed jihad to achieve its goals, these groups neither agree with the IS's ideology, means, and ways—the “wholesale” killing of innocent Muslims and non-believers—nor view the IS as the legitimate, reincarnated Caliphate under the leadership of Cali Ibrahim, al-Baghdadi.³²³

On the other hand, the IS's mass appeal, propaganda, and pledged support have served to loosely unite or at the least align loyalties and objectives of nearly a dozen Indonesian domestic radical jihadist groups (despite initial reports to the contrary). Led by the endorsement of spiritual clerics Ba'aysir and Abdurrahman and the currently active jihadist Santoso, commander of MIT, the list of IS advocates captured by Fealy, Schulze, IPAC, and others consists of: MIT (the first to swear IS allegiance), MIB, JAT,

³²⁰ Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 29–30.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 14–15.

³²³ Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 29–30; Hassan and Weiss, *ISIS: Inside the Army*, 1.

Jamaah Tawhid wal Jihad (JTJ), the *Forum Pendukung Daulah Islamiyah* (FPDI), the *Bima Group*, *Katibah al-Iman*, Ring Banten, *Laskar Jundullah*, *Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam* (FAKSI), and *Gerakan Mahasiswa Untuk Syariat Islam* (Gema Salam).³²⁴ Between August and November of 2015, the leaders and members of these and other groups met and began discussions. The discussions centered on establishing a united front or coalition from which a more focused unity of effort in establishing the *Daulah Islamiyah Nusantara*, the Indonesian Islamic State, could be garnered.³²⁵ This gathering, first under the unofficial term given by Indonesian intelligence circles, *Jamaah Ansharut Daulah* (JAD)—Partisans of the Sate Group—in March 2015, was followed officially by the jihadists themselves with the founding of *Ansharud Daulah Islamiyah* (ADI)—Partisans of the Islamic State—in August 2015, which was again later changed to *Jamaah Anshar Khilafah* (JAK)—Partisans of the Caliphate—by November 20, 2015, as the goals and methodologies became more focused and aligned with those of the IS.³²⁶ Even here all IS supporters are not behind JAK as some such as Abdur Rohim bin Thoyib, Abu Husna, refused to join JAK and formed *Katibah al-Iman*, though he stated he would continue to advise and work with JAK members.³²⁷ As demonstrated by tracing the actions and the threats posed by the diverse jihadist groups in the previous timeframes leading up to the present, IPAC stated, “Pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia have emerged from existing radical networks that have never gone away. They may have morphed, realigned, regrouped and regenerated but they are not new.”³²⁸

Distinct to the contemporary jihadist threat to Indonesia is the support for the IS that has manifested throughout society beyond the traditional jihadist networks. This has taken form through three methods: first, by mass demonstrations of pledged bai’at in the

³²⁴ Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 30; Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, *Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence* (IPAC Report No. 25) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2016), 1; Peter Chalk, “Islamic State Goes Global: ISIL Spreads in Indonesia,” *National Interest*, December 21, 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/islamic-state-goes-global-isil-spreads-indonesia-14696>.

³²⁵ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 1.

³²⁶ IPAC, *Disunity among Indonesian*, 6; Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 29–30.

³²⁷ IPAC, *Disunity among Indonesian*, 6–7.

³²⁸ IPAC, *Indonesia’s Lamongan Network*, 1.

public domain; second, through social media channels and one-on-one methods within the private domains; and third, through the state prison systems where both mass and private pledging ceremonies have taken place.³²⁹ Together these domains have collectively seen pro-IS individuals participating in the thousands.³³⁰ Of these, the social media and Internet domains have been the most daunting to track and mitigate by CT officials while conversely providing an effective means for IS propaganda dissemination.³³¹ By these means, the IS may recruit directly via to prospective candidates through chat rooms, websites posting various written documents and blogs, and the use of high quality produced and extremely graphic videos of jihadists in action.³³² One such site is *Millah Ibrahim*, which according to Fealy is one of the highest visited and main pro-IS sites, that possesses a visitor-counter that as of January 2016 depicted 700,000 visitors of which 172,000 emanated from Indonesia.³³³ The potential for further exposure of Indonesians to IS propaganda is only growing as seen in the 2011 statistics provided by *Techinasia*, a private Singapore based media and technology firm, that reported 35.4 million Indonesians were already using Facebook—the second largest and growing Facebook population in the world—with another 4.8 million engaged on Twitter—the fourth largest and growing population in the world.³³⁴

The high capacity for mobilization imparted within these environments, whether at the individual and or collective levels through declared bai'at or tacit support has magnified the means and ways by which Indonesians may participate in pro-ISIS activities.³³⁵ These activities are diverse and may consist of the provision of funding and

³²⁹ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 8; Guy Wilson, *Will Islamic Extremism in Indonesia Affect Australia's Security in the next Ten Years?* (Australia: Centre for Defense and Strategic Studies, 2016), <http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Wilson%20IPSP%20Islamic%20extremism.pdf>; Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," 157–58.

³³⁰ Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," 157–58.

³³¹ Abuza, "Joining the Caravan."

³³² Ibid.

³³³ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 8.

³³⁴ Stefanie Kam and Robi Sugara, "Indonesia, Malaysia and the Fight Against Islamic State Influence," *Diplomat*, September 11, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/indonesia-malaysia-and-the-fight-against-islamic-state-influence/>.

³³⁵ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 8.

resources, support to deployed foreign fighters and their families, the furthering of propaganda efforts, the conduct of recruitment, and the translating of Arabic jihadist manuscripts etc.³³⁶ Therefore, the number of participants may be incalculable and beyond the ability to effectively track and efficiently monitor by CT agencies.

b. The Foreign Fighter Phenomena

The potency of the threat posed by Indonesian foreign fighters fighting in the Levant for both ANF and IS emanates from multiple factors. These unique factors are first seen with the speed by which the number of Indonesian foreign fighters have amassed under the black banners of IS and ANF forces when compared to the Mujahedeen and AQ in the Soviet Afghan and Afghan civil wars of the 1980s and '90s. Unlike the gradual buildup of Indonesian foreign fighter departures to South Asia that attracted approximately 300–400 fighters over the course of a decade, in a matter of only two years, beginning in 2013, that number has nearly doubled with those going to IS and ANF in Syria.³³⁷ Second, IS in particular has greatly expanded upon an approach employed by mujahedeen affiliates in the past through Malay foreign fighter inclusion regarding tactical, operational, and strategic initiatives (strategic initiatives to be covered under the third threat factor of a Southeast Asian wilayat).³³⁸

For Ba'aysir and other Malays looking to get to the battlefields and training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan from the 1980s through '90s, the first stop consisted of indoctrination and basic training with the *Al-Ghuraba* cell out of Karachi, Pakistan.³³⁹ Often this is as far as the Indonesian “mujahedeen” got with even fewer numbers actually experiencing combat. Under the IS construct implemented on September 26, 2014, Malay fighters traveling from the Southeast Asian nations of Malaysia and Indonesia, Singapore, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and the Philippines have been organized and

³³⁶ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 8.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*, 9.

³³⁸ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 9; Singh, “Katibah Nusantara.”

³³⁹ Singh, “Katibah Nusantara”; Fakir Husain and Shannon Theo, “ISIS Fighters from Malaysia, Indonesia Form Military Unit,” *Straits Times*, September 26, 2014, Proust (1565496270).

incorporated into the *Katibah Nusantara Lid Daulah Islamiyah*, the Malay Archipelago Unit, that was later named the *Majmu'ah Persiapan Al Arkhabily*, the Archipelago Group-in-Preparation, before utilization elsewhere in the IS.³⁴⁰ Located in al-Shadadi, al-Hasakah province of Syria and established in September of 2014, the new Malay foreign fighters to the region receive months of ideological indoctrination, extensive and focused military training—topics consisting of tactics, strategy, and weapons specialization ranging from sniper, individual, and crew served weapons employment and bomb making—basic Arabic language training, and finally assessment for utilization within the IS.³⁴¹ Following this initial training, IS utilization of the Malays has ranged from suicide bombers (approximately 20%), forward deployed infantry, IS guard forces, various leadership positions, and other IS administrative roles.³⁴² This approach and directed attention by the IS with Malay foreign fighters of the MPA resulted in the group achieving a string of successes on the battlefield in April of 2015 with the capture of five previously held Kurdish areas within Syria.³⁴³

Recent in-fighting between the MPA's commander BahrumSyah and Abu Jandal in mid 2015 over payment allocations to the fighters led to a break up with the formation of a second katibah established as the *Katibah Masyaariq* (KM), Forces of the East, that would be based in Homs.³⁴⁴ Additionally, the potential emergence of yet another Southeast Asian group in Syria called the *Mujahideen Jawi* (MJ)—reported to have been established sometime in January 2016 and composed of Malays from Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, and the Philippines—may further enable other Indonesian jihadist groups with differing goals and beliefs to gain critically needed combat

³⁴⁰ Nuraniyah, "How ISIS Charmed"; IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 19; Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," 159; Schulze, "Jakarta Attack," 30; Singh, "Katibah Nusantara."

³⁴¹ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 2; Schulze, "Jakarta Attack," 30.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Singh, "Katibah Nusantara."

³⁴⁴ IPAC, *Disunity among Indonesian*, 1–3.

experiences.³⁴⁵ Due to the groups' fairly recent establishment, additional information is not currently known. With these elements all engaged in highly kinetic and prolonged combat environments, the exact numbers of those jihadists killed under the banner of IS has been hard to determine with analysts believing the number to be around 60, with the core element of the MPA now estimated at numbering 24–36 due to combat losses and splintering with the KM.³⁴⁶

Conversely to the IS foreign fighters from both existing Indonesian jihadist groups and the masses, many of those traveling to Syria to join ANF have come strictly from JI proper, who maintained its AQ allegiances and disavowed IS practices and legitimacy.³⁴⁷ JI closely vetted and screened those who have been sent, originally under the pretext of providing humanitarian assistance and support through its *Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia* (HASI), which has sent nearly a dozen delegations to the region between 2012 and '14.³⁴⁸ The numbers supporting ANF from JI have been estimated to be under 50 and reported to be composed primarily of non-combatants performing roles such as humanitarian support, Arabic-Malay translations, and scholarly religious work of the JI core tenants of dakwah and tarbiyah staying months at a time in theater.³⁴⁹ Though non-combat in nature and non-IS aligned, some of these delegations and individuals have already or plan to return to Indonesia.³⁵⁰

For the most part the numbers of foreign fighter returnees have been low, believed to be in the twenties to date, with many having been deported from Turkey, caught in transit, or those that had become disenfranchised with the IS.³⁵¹ Per Jones, the preponderance of the 200 deported by Turkey and other states are those jihadists heading

³⁴⁵ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 7–8; “Jihadist Says Expect More M’sian Suicide Bombers,” *Daily Express*, January 12, 2015, <http://www.dailyexpress.com.my/news.cfm?NewsID=96086>.

³⁴⁶ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 2.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., 7; Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 30.

³⁴⁸ IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 1; Jones and Solahudin, “Terrorism in Indonesia” 143.

³⁴⁹ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 7.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., 9.

³⁵¹ Ibid., 9–10.

to the combat zone accompanied with family and children.³⁵² Fears of arrests by Indonesian authorities are further compounded by the desires of many jihadists to remain in defense of the Caliphate and or die within the Levant as martyrs as opposed to on Indonesian soil prevents others from returning.³⁵³

c. *The IS Southeast Asian Wilayat*

Initially, the designs and aims of Indonesian jihadists and IS alike were for foreign fighters to travel and take up arms under the black banner on the soil of the Levant, with the general aims of sowing discord and furthering IS recruitment within Indonesia.³⁵⁴ With JAK and other Indonesian jihadists groups advocating and fighting for an Islamic State of Indonesia, the IS's overtures for the establishment of a wilayat in the region may further entice these groups and others to refocus domestic activities toward these mutually supporting ends-states.³⁵⁵ Two developments would appear early in 2014 and by late 2015 that would further enable this shift in a strategic paradigm. First, the actions of Indonesian authorities in concert with states such as Turkey, Singapore, and Malaysia were now making travel to the Levant a much more difficult and risky venture with a high probability of interdiction by state authorities.³⁵⁶ Second, the heightened Indonesian jihadist's interest in a Southeast Asian Caliphate and the growing success of the IS's MPA construct further refocused IS global ambitions and its strategic calculus surrounding both Indonesia and Southeast Asia.³⁵⁷ These two mutually supporting factors led to further calls to action by jihadists and IS supporters to take up arms on the domestic, Indonesian front by Indonesian jihadist leaders such as Bahrin Naim—directly

³⁵² Sidney Jones, "Battling ISIS in Indonesia," *New York Times*, January 18, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/battling-isis-in-indonesia.html?emc=eta1&_r=0.

³⁵³ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 10.

³⁵⁴ Molly Simio, Harleen Gambhir, and the ISW Counterterrorism Team, "ISIS-Linked Activity in Southeast Asia: January 1 to March 2, 2016," Institute for the Study of War, March 2, 2016, http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20in%20Southeast%20Asia%20%281%29-01_4.pdf.

³⁵⁵ Simio, Gambhir, and ISW CT-T, "ISIS-Linked Activity"; Nuraniyah, "How ISIS Charmed."

³⁵⁶ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 11; Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," 160; "Jihadist Says Expect More M'sian Suicide Bombers."

³⁵⁷ Schulze, "Jakarta Attack," 30; Harleen Gambhir, "ISIS Global Strategy: March 2016," *Institute for the Study of War*, March 25, 2016, <http://understandingwar.org/map/isis-global-strategy-march-2016>.

linked to the January 14th Jakarta attacks—from within the IS and by the Indonesian jihadist groups alike.³⁵⁸ These consist of jihadist leaders such as Abu Muhammad al-Adnani—calling for the targeting of the “far” enemy, “wherever they may be found,” as early as February 2015—and Indonesian jihadist cleric Aman Abdurrahman who issued the following fatwa in the days preceding the January 2016 Jakarta attack:

Emigrate [hijrah] to the Islamic State and if you cannot emigrate, then wage jihad with spirit wherever you are, and if you cannot wage war or you lack the courage to do so, then contribute your wealth to those who are willing to do so. And if you cannot contribute, then urge others to undertake jihad. And if you cannot do that, then what is the meaning of your loyalty oath [bai’at]?³⁵⁹

For Southeast Asia, this call to take up arms would further reinforce the re-emergent calls for a pan-regional Southeast Asian Caliphate as once advocated for by the likes of JI.³⁶⁰

The concept of taking the fight to the domestic home-fronts of the foreign fighters and the establishment of a Southeast Asian Caliphate may potentially have been in the strategic plans of al-Baghdadi and the IS all along going back as early as 2014.³⁶¹ This is seen with the IS’s second intended use of the MPA: to form and prepare a vanguard of IS vetted and battle tested Southeast Asian jihadists to one day return to the region and create a “distant caliphate” or linked *wilayat*, IS province.³⁶² This *wilayat* would be similar in design and scope to that underway within Libya at the time of this writing.³⁶³ This strategic shift by the IS regarding Indonesia and Southeast Asia was captured by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) which in November of 2015 depicted a map of the Southeast Asian region as considered the, “Far Abroad Ring,” wherein jihadists were to,

³⁵⁸ Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 30.

³⁵⁹ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 9–10; IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 10.

³⁶⁰ Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” 161–62.

³⁶¹ Paul Rogers, “Islamic State: In Retreat or Transition?” *Oxford Research Group*, April 25, 2016, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/paul_rogers_monthly_briefing/islamic_state_retreat_or_transition.

³⁶² Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” 159; Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 30.

³⁶³ Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 30.

“Attack and polarize,” the Muslim states deemed *apostate* or the “near” enemy.³⁶⁴ By March 2016, ISW reports and a new map graphic depicted an IS strategic shift for the region as the IS now considered the region the, “Near Abroad Ring,” with goals to, “Establish affiliates and increase disorder.”³⁶⁵ Additionally, sharp rhetoric by MPA members toward officials back home throughout 2015 and ’16 increased and led to the posting of a video in Malay on January 25, 2016 that further warned Malaysian and other Southeast Asian officials for their continued arrests of pro-IS jihadists.³⁶⁶ These threats, while not turning into actual attacks, have demonstrated a continued focus on the region and the foreboding of future attacks to come.³⁶⁷

With the location left undeclared, Southeast Asian jihadists from the Philippines and Indonesia, both abroad in the Levant and domestically at home, have been vying for the prestigious recognition as the declared IS wilayat.³⁶⁸ Locations under consideration consist of the southwest islands of the Philippines—under aligned groups *Abu Sayyaf Group* and the *Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters*—or within Indonesia’s highly mountainous island of Sulawesi—home to IS and JAK aligned MIT who currently controls a small mountain top track of territory outside Poso in Sulawesi.³⁶⁹ This island has been a hotbed of jihadist activity and focus going back to the communal violence of the post-Suharto era, JI’s attempts to establish a headquarters in 2008 as a point from which to grow the Islamic State, and to Santoso’s MIT jihadist training camps and continued fight against the government to the present day.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁴ Gambhir, “ISIS Global Strategy.”

³⁶⁵ Gambhir, “ISIS Global Strategy.”

³⁶⁶ Ibid.

³⁶⁷ Simio, Gambhir, and ISW CT-T, “ISIS-Linked Activity”; “Jihadist Says Expect More M’sian Suicide Bombers.”

³⁶⁸ Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 30; Sidney Jones, “Counter-terrorism and the Rise of ISIS in 2014,” Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, January 2015, <http://www.understandingconflict.org/en/conflict/read/33/Counter-Terrorism-and-the-Rise-of-ISIS-in-2014>.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 204; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000; Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 30.

B. THE STATE RESPONSE

Despite the appearance of similar threats facing the state as in the days of 1998–2001, distinct to the 2009-present timeframe would be the state’s response to the nature of the transnational jihadist threat and mobilization of domestic radical Islamic groups. With the established criminal justice CT model in place, complete with the capacity and highly professionalized capabilities of the *POLRI*, obtained during the 2002–08 timeframe, the Indonesian government was now postured to maintain the pressure and attempt to gain the initiative over the jihadist groups. This would transpire first through a shift in the outlook on the jihadist threat in 2009; second, through the continued and steady execution of “hard” CT measures consisting of further institutional capacity building, arrests and killing of jihadist members and leadership; and finally third, a shift in focus on combating the IS ideology with the continued and increased conduct of the “soft” CT measures.

1. Shifting Outlooks, Continued Capacity Growth, and “Hard” CT Measures

Following the Jakarta bombings of 2009 and the foiled assassination attempt on SBY—executed and planned by Top’s AQA—Indonesia began to transform its views on the threat posed by transnational jihadist terrorism from one of terrorism as an act of criminal behavior posing a danger to the lives of its civilians and foreign interests to that of one as a substantiated threat to the state’s national security.³⁷¹ The revenge and retaliation centric attacks conducted by the jihadists naturally led to the targeting of the Indonesian officials, culminating in the assassination attempt on the president.

This shift in view by the government, subsequently led to the creation of yet more state CT institutions and capacity. With the intelligence oversight of the foiled assassination attempt and other perceived CT mishandlings by the *POLRI* going back to 2009, the TNI would now be incorporated to form a more cohesive CT response by the

³⁷¹ Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27–29; Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 4; Vaughn, et al., *Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 4; Jones, “Ongoing Extremist Threat,” 91.

national security elements.³⁷² In 2010, through “Presidential Decree No 46/2010,” the *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*—the National Counter Terrorism Agency—was established under the leadership of General Ansyad Mbai.³⁷³ Functionally, the BNPT was designed to prevent terrorism not only by formulating CT policies regarding prevention and institutional capacity enhancements, but to further coordinate and oversee the execution of operations to be conducted by both the TNI Special Forces units and the *POLRI* with Densus-88.³⁷⁴ The BNPT would further be responsible for the delicate orchestration between efforts by the TNI and the *POLRI*, the judicial system, and wider Islamic “civil society.”³⁷⁵ Past animosities and rivalries between the TNI and *POLRI*—the two branches responsible for state security—stemming from differences in the manner of delineating areas of responsibility, supported-supporting roles, and resource allocation dating back to earlier timeframes complicated the BNPT’s initial efforts.³⁷⁶ Furthermore, the organization had to overcome these and other issues such as charges of corruption and human rights violations against Densus-88 that may have slowed its initial effectiveness in the early years of its establishment.³⁷⁷ These issues appeared to have worked themselves out as the TNI special operations units had taken a supportive role, with Densus-88 remaining the lead strike element in operational execution from 2012.³⁷⁸ Yet by 2014–15, the rising political influence of the TNI with the president coupled with the *POLRI*’s inability to capture Santoso, together enabled the TNI to conduct “exercises” with the goal of locating Santoso themselves.³⁷⁹ This was generally viewed

³⁷² Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 153; Jones, “Ongoing Extremist Threat,” 100; IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 3.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Jones, “Ongoing Extremist Threat,” 100–01; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 153.

³⁷⁵ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 153.

³⁷⁶ Jones, “Ongoing Extremist Threat,” 100–01; IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 1; Muh Taufiqurrohman, “Counterterrorism in Indonesia: Quo Vadis?” *Counterterrorist Trends and Analysis* 5, no. 6 (June 2013): 8.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Taufiqurrohman, “Counterterrorism in Indonesia” 7–8.

³⁷⁹ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, *The Expanding Role of the Indonesian Military* (IPAC Report No. 19) (Jakarta: IPAC, 2015), 1–2; Kanupriya Kapoor and Randy Fabi, “Indonesian Military Launches Anti-IS Operation on Eastern Island,” *Reuters*, April 20, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-military-idUSKBN0NB0JM20150420>.

by the *POLRI* as an attempt by the TNI to further carve out a more prominent CT role.³⁸⁰ Issues for the BNPT now consist of getting the appropriate amount of funding, resources, and institutionalized methodologies for programs such as the ill-developed “soft” CT measures.³⁸¹ In addition to the BNPT, by 2011 a new “Intelligence Bill” was passed that allowed the BIN to conduct intelligence through the implementation of “hard” CT measures (before now unseen within the new democracy) such as enhanced interrogations, wiretapping, funds tracking that immediately invoked calls for its repeal by Islamists and human rights advocacies alike.³⁸²

Following the 2009 attacks and through the course of 2010, raids and arrests by the *POLRI* and the subsequent judicial convictions were greatly ramped up, peaking at over 100 as seen in Chapter III, Figure 5: Convicted Terrorists in Indonesia, 2000–2012.³⁸³ This response was also taken in the wake of jihadist actions that were seen previously over the course of 2003 in the wake of Bali-I and the subsequent jihadist bombing campaign through 2005.³⁸⁴ The arrests and the killing of key leadership and other jihadi members during the conduct of Densus-88 raids is another feature that persisted into this timeframe and earned much backlash and demonstrations by right wing Islamic conservative organizations and radical groups. Coincidentally, many of these groups are those with direct links to militant groups such as HASMI, Hizb ut-Tahir, JI/JAT, and others.³⁸⁵ The targeting and “liquidation” of many members of the jihadi leadership was demonstrated time and time again with the killing of Top, Dulmatin, and Santoso’s second in command Daeng Koro in April 2015—said to be the key element of MIT’s military training program that likely trained hundreds of jihadists from 2010–2014.³⁸⁶ This targeting and neutralization of many of the top jihadist leadership has been

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

³⁸¹ IPAC, “Disunity among Indonesian,” 14.

³⁸² Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 149.

³⁸³ Gindarsah, “Indonesia’s Struggle against Terrorism.”

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ Taufiqurrohman, “Counterterrorism in Indonesia” 8–9.

³⁸⁶ Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 130–31; IPAC, *Indonesia’s Lamongan Network*, 14.

effective in dampening the effectiveness and lethality of the groups, as captured by Acharya who cited that, “According to a report of the Institute for Economics and Peace, Indonesia was among five countries in the world that witnessed the largest decrease in the impact of terrorism, rising to 29th position in 2011 from 9th position in 2002.”³⁸⁷ The leadership targeting has not been as completely effective as it could be. Those leaders not killed but arrested, such as Ba’asyir and Abdurrahman, are currently serving long jail sentences in state prisons where the lax prison rules and access to communications has enabled both to continue to serve as the ideological mouthpieces for pro-IS groups such as JAT and the JAK coalition.³⁸⁸ In addition, the targeting came at a high cost as Santoso and his jihadist’s campaign of retribution attacks on the regional *POLRI* units and outposts demonstrated.³⁸⁹

Despite the creation of the BNPT and incorporation of special operations units of the TNI, Indonesia’s “hard” CT responses to the IS threat has continued to rely heavily upon the conduct of arrests and the targeting of leadership by Densus-88.³⁹⁰ These operations end not only with arrests, but with high numbers of jihadist leaders and members killed.³⁹¹ As of June 2015, over 274 jihadists were arrested and incarcerated within 26 different prisons.³⁹² Where the scope of arrests earlier in this timeframe were focused primarily within Sulawesi, West Java, Aceh, and Kalimantan, arrests of pro-IS supporters and affiliated jihadists is more pervasive and spread out across the entire archipelago as seen within Figure 7.³⁹³ Here, pro-IS arrests have been conducted in nearly every major region and main-island of the state with the same further focus points of south Sulawesi, West Java, Sumatra, and Kalimantan.³⁹⁴

³⁸⁷ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 255.

³⁸⁸ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 1–2; Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 5.

³⁸⁹ Schulze, “Jakarta Attack,” 29.

³⁹⁰ ICG, “Indonesia–2016–2012.”

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*

³⁹² Department of State (DoS), “Country Reports on Terrorism 2014–Indonesia,” June 19, 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5587c74f53.html>.

³⁹³ ICG, “Indonesia–2016–2012.”

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*





Figure 7. Indonesian Separatist, Communal, and Jihadist Violence, 1965–2016.³⁹⁵

The pervasive threat of pro-IS activities across the archipelago and the rising number of Indonesian foreign fighters, led Indonesian CT authorities to make further adjustments beginning in 2014. In the wake of IS propaganda and calls to join the fight abroad or at home in August of 2014, in September President Yudboyono issued a statement revealing a “Seven-Point Instruction,” that sought to direct the state’s response in a more tailored manner to combat the emergent and unique IS threats.³⁹⁶ These points consist of efforts to ultimately deter, prevent, and punish those Indonesians supporting or participating in pro-IS activities and foreign fighting: 1. Selective issuance of passports and visas to the Middle East; 2. Enhanced monitoring of those already in Syria and Iraq;

³⁹⁵ Adapted from Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, "Indonesia: Administrative Divisions: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 1998," *University of Texas*, last modified June 8, 2016, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/indonesia_adm_98.jpg, ICG, “Indonesia–2016–2012,” and Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 195–209.

³⁹⁶ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20.

3. Stricter monitoring of foreigners within Indonesia; 4. Improved prison security and monitoring of incarcerated terrorists; 5. Increased and enhanced security measures within regions of jihadist activities (Poso, Ambon, East Java, and Central Java); 6. Focused attention addressing and countering the IS ideology; 7. Stronger prosecution and punishments for convicted jihadist terrorists.³⁹⁷ Problems immediately arose as to how and by what judicial mechanisms these overtures could be enforced to effect change and see improvements. The BNPT's director Mbai stated shortly after that some judicial mechanisms already existed that could be utilized such as Article 23 of the 2006 Citizenship Law, that IPAC cited as stating that Indonesians could be arrested who, "Voluntarily takes an oath or declares loyalty to a foreign state or part of such a state."³⁹⁸ The "Seven-Point Instruction" has yet to be implemented by the newly elected President WiDoDo as he is currently deciding upon an interim emergency government regulation, *perppu*, that will further restrict IS support along those very lines.³⁹⁹

2. "Soft" CT Measures Explored: Addressing the Ideology

While the conduct of "hard" CT measures saw little change in the response to IS, the government would embark upon a fundamental shift in its CT strategies in combating the mobilization of IS inspired jihadist groups by focusing on the ideology. This was reinforced following the January 14th attacks with Luhut Binsar Panjaitan, Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, stating that, "The Government is planning to take a soft approach toward alleged IS sympathizers, in contrast to Western counterterrorism practices."⁴⁰⁰ This shift came in the wake of the call to arms video titled, "Joining the Ranks," airing on *You Tube* 23 July 2014 that consisted of an Indonesian jihadist urging Indonesians to support and pledge their allegiances to the IS, a religious-state entity at odds with the principles of the Republic of Indonesia. To the Indonesian government this threat directly challenged the notions of national loyalty and ethos of *Pancasila*,

³⁹⁷ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20–21.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

³⁹⁹ Aubrey Belford, "Indonesia Looks to Stop Militants Overseas from Returning Home," *Reuters*, January 19, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-blast-law-idUSKCN0UX0X6>.

⁴⁰⁰ William Mackey, "Indonesia: Staying Calm and Carrying on," *Diplomat*, January 27, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/indonesia-staying-calm-and-carrying-on/>.

specifically that of “Unity in Diversity.”⁴⁰¹ Thus it was not enough to simply arrest or kill the jihadist IS supporters and leave the ideology alone to further fester. That month security officials of the *POLRI*, TNI, and BIN, led by the BNPT and Coordinating Minister of Security Djoko Suyanto, declared the IS a “banned organization.”⁴⁰² This group of officials was further quoted by IPAC as stating that there would now be, “An all-government effort to prevent the establishment of IS branches and the dissemination of its teachings.”⁴⁰³

A unique element incorporated in combating the IS ideological narrative is the State’s drive to create institutionalized deradicalisation and disengagement program capacities. Additionally, the state reached out to the Islamic civil society to further legitimize and assist the “soft” CT efforts in achieving better effects throughout the wider public and jihadist in the prison systems.⁴⁰⁴ To tackle one of its core tasks of “prevention,” the BNPT produced a strategic four-year plan with four principle goals in 2011: 1. Projecting the state’s CT narrative through increased awareness; 2. Protecting critical infrastructure and public domains from terrorist acts; 3. Confronting and mitigating the terrorist ideology; and 4. Preventing the spread and reducing the effect of the jihadist ideology through disengagement and de-radicalization programs.⁴⁰⁵ To effect these objectives with the lofty goal of 80% implementation across these fronts by 2014, in 2012 the BNPT further created the *Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorism* (FKPT).⁴⁰⁶ The FKPT would consist of local clerics, scholars, leaders, and organizations existing at the provincial level—existing in 23 of 34 by 2014’s end—that would implement the counter ideological discussions and events.⁴⁰⁷ The BNPT further expanded the programs’ participants to not only include the moderate, mainstream Islamic organizations of *Nahdhlatul-Ulama* (NU) and Muhammadiyah, but the

⁴⁰¹ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20.

⁴⁰² Ibid.; Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” 160.

⁴⁰³ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20.

⁴⁰⁴ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 4; Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 130.

⁴⁰⁵ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 4.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid., 4–5.

incorporation of the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*—Council of Indonesian Ulama—(MUI), the Ministry of Religion and universities such as the Islamic State University of Surakarta, and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, as well as other non-governmental organizations.⁴⁰⁸ This inclusion brought about outreach that could further target the youth, the demographic believed to be the most exposed and susceptible to the IS ideology, through means and ways such as sports programs, movies, advertisements, and public assemblies.⁴⁰⁹

On the front of disengagement and de-radicalization the State looked to map out a more cohesive and delineated program through multiple institutionalized programs beginning in 2013. This was initiated with the BNPT in concert with the Indonesian independent counter Islamic radicalization think-tank, the Nusa Institute, and the drafting of the Deradicalisation Blueprint that outlined the means and ways to go about collecting data on radical jihadist prisoners and the subsequent provision of treatment to achieve de-radicalization or disengagement end-states.⁴¹⁰ To monitor progress and further coordinate the programs along other ministries within the state, the BNPT instituted the *Program Nasional Pencegahan Terorisme*—National Terrorism Prevention Program—(PNPT).⁴¹¹ In addition to tackling the initial issue of funding, the PNPT focused its efforts on those regions and provinces most affected by the jihadist ideology with pointed efforts to reinforce anti-jihadist ideology throughout the school systems, mosques, television broadcast networks, and prisons.⁴¹² For the prisoners, ex-prisoners, and their families alike, occupational outreach and support programs were further implemented.⁴¹³ Augmenting these efforts though with far less coordination, unity of effort, or division of labor and responsibilities between the numerous governmental agencies involved (the BNPT, TNI, and Corrections system) was the institution and building of the Indonesian

⁴⁰⁸ Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 130; IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 3–4.

⁴⁰⁹ DoS, “Country Reports on Terrorism.”

⁴¹⁰ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 6.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 7.

⁴¹³ Ibid.

Peace and Security Centre (IPSC) in Sentul, West Java.⁴¹⁴ While designed initially to handle the hardcore jihadists, the facility shifted focus to that of a “rehabilitation” and transition site for soon to be released prisoners.⁴¹⁵

Yet despite these institutional capacity advancements, the effectiveness of the “soft” measure employment is difficult to gauge and the results are mixed. Since the Bali-I bombings and pointed CT measures by the state, Indonesia has arrested approximately 900 radicals with over 600 convicted for terrorism and incarcerated, a number that is surely to grow with recent arrests of pro-IS affiliates.⁴¹⁶ Of these individuals incarcerated, Idris and Taufiqurrohman cite that only 200 have participated directly within deradicalisation and disengagement programs with 23 of these having returned to jihadist activities upon release.⁴¹⁷ Many radical Islamic non-governmental organizations—*Gerakan Sehari Seribu* (GASHIBU), the *Infaq Dakwah Centre* (IDC), and *Yayasan Rumah Putih*—have been cited by Acharya as taking measures to undermine government efforts by protesting in public, distributing counter propaganda, and providing funds to the families of prisoners and newly released prisoners.⁴¹⁸

C. ASSESSMENT

This timeframe of 2009–2016 has witnessed similar threats to Indonesia at the horizontal and vertical security levels that the new democracy had faced in 1998–2001. Yet two distinct themes exist within this timeframe seen by the nature of the threat posed with the re-emergent, ominous transnational influences and the shift in focus in the means and ways of combating the jihadist threat by the state. First is the re-emergent influences of transnational actors upon the domestic jihadist scene that have brought about the

⁴¹⁴ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 7–8.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴¹⁶ Zora A. Sukabdi, “Terrorism Indonesia: A Review on Rehabilitation and Deradicalization,” *Joint Terrorism Research* 6, no. 2 (May 2015): 36, doi: 10.15664/jtr.1154; ICG, “Indonesia–2016–2012”; Irfan Idris and Muh Taufiqurrohman, “Current State of Indonesia’s Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation Programme,” in *Terrorist Rehabilitation: A New Frontier in Counter-Terrorism*, ed. Rohan Gunaratna and Mohamed Bin Ali (London: Imperial College Press, 2015), 76.

⁴¹⁷ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 75.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*

foreign fighter dilemma and the mobilization of jihadist radical groups into a more unified, yet still fractured, front that portends a more active and lethal jihadist threat. Second, the shift in the Indonesian government's view on the designation of the level of threat the jihadists posed led to the focusing of efforts toward targeting the IS ideology via "soft" measures. These "soft" measures have been further reinforced by the growing anti-IS public sentiments.

1. Transnational Influences and Lethality

The ability and willingness by domestic jihadist actors to be influenced and even incorporated within transnationally oriented group strategies, whether the ANF or IS, while simultaneously retaining domestically nuanced goals and campaigns has reemerged during this timeframe.⁴¹⁹ This methodology as outlined by Burke, was employed by the likes of Top, Dulmatin and carried further by Santoso and his affiliates in the present day.⁴²⁰ This combination of mutually supporting domestic and transnational jihadist objectives and strategies may portend a contemporary shift in Indonesian jihadist group activities and lethality. This phenomenon would be similar to that seen when JI and AQ attempted to align efforts in the previous timeframe as demonstrated through the increased lethality rates witnessed in Figure 4: Average Lethality Rate per Terrorist Attack, 2002–2008.⁴²¹ While the data by the GTD has yet to be collected for the timeframe depicting the influences of the Syrian conflict and the rise of IS from 2015 to the present, we may still derive insights as to the projections of Indonesian jihadism in lieu of the contemporary developments. As depicted in Figure 8, this timeframe would see acts of terror conducted by jihadists accounting for 19% (MIT 7%, JAT 5%, JI 4%, and Muslim Fundamentalists 3%) of the total attacks experienced by Indonesia and inflicting an aggregate lethality rate of 3.8 per attack over the course of the timeframe of 2009–2014 as seen in Figure 9 (JI 10.5, MIT 1.9, JAT 1, and Muslim Fundamentalists 1.6).⁴²²

⁴¹⁹ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 76.

⁴²⁰ Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 152–57; Schulze, "Jakarta Attack," 29.

⁴²¹ Data adapted from START, "Indonesia."

⁴²² Ibid.




Figure 8. Terrorist Attacks by Group, 2009–2014.⁴²³




Figure 9. Average Lethality Rate per Terrorist Group per Attack, 2009–2014.⁴²⁴

⁴²³ Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

⁴²⁴ Ibid.

While the “unknown” category remains the largest, the combined impact of jihadist terrorist activity seen in the high value targets chosen and the high percentage of attacks compounded by the continued high lethality rate (though degraded from other timeframes) further reinforce the Indonesian authorities justification for the levying of jihadist terrorism as a threat to national security in the present day.

Though the “far” enemy may have been the lofty and highly prized targets for the jihadist groups during the first part of this timeframe, the main focus and actual attention of these groups’ actions remained a combination of revenge based assassinations and bombing attacks on local police stations, local officials, non-Muslims in Cirebon, Sulawesi, and Java and spree of bank robberies.⁴²⁵ These actions were more often than not foiled or resulted in the death and arrests of many of the jihadists. Despite the efforts of Santoso and others, these disparate groups lacked not only unity, but shared the same problems of poor military training and education, lack of veterans with real combat experience, logistical resources (equipment and funding), and the requisite leadership up and down the chain of command across the functional aspects of warfare.⁴²⁶ The cumulative effect of these factors was the resulting lack luster performance, effectiveness, and perceived drop in lethality as one jihadist group is replaced or “outperformed” by another as seen in Figure 10.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁵ Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism in Perspective,” 4–5; IPAC, *Weak, Therefore Violent*, 11–14.

⁴²⁶ IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 11.

⁴²⁷ Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”




Figure 10. Jihadist Group Lethality Rates, 2009–2014.⁴²⁸

Should the IS foreign fighters and radical non-combatants decide to return to Indonesia in mass numbers or individually selected by IS/ANF leadership, the current state of domestic jihadist affairs may experience a significant and dynamic shift. First, the current void in experienced domestic jihadist leadership and lack of combat tested, knowledgeable fighters will be filled.⁴²⁹ As detailed by Hegghammer’s study and demonstrated by the actions of returning Afghan foreign fighters within Indonesia’s not too distant past, should even a small percentage of these contemporary foreign fighters decide to engage in domestic jihad or the furthering of radical Islamic ideology the impact will be profound. The combat-tested jihadi veteran from the IS would bring not only enhanced jihadi clout or credibility to that domestic group—aiding further recruitment—but the enhancement to the groups’ operational efficiency, increased propensity to carry out attacks, and enhanced lethality; all of which portend a

⁴²⁸ Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

⁴²⁹ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 3; IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 11; Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” 160.

disconcerting future for the state and its security forces.⁴³⁰ According to Fealy, JI's prime directive in sending HASI delegations was to gain and enhance their member's jihadist repertoire through enhanced networking and practical application experiences for the future establishment of an Islamic State on Indonesian soil.⁴³¹

The second principle threat of the reemerging transnational influences combined with these returning foreign fighting veterans and the capabilities they bring is their ability to influence current domestic jihadist groups in the bridging of the gap from the, "Low-tech and low-casualty," based attacks occurring predominately against the "near" enemy to a more nuanced and more lethal return to targeting the additional, symbolic "far" enemy targets.⁴³² While lacking in the desired level of lethality and demonstrated competency by the suspected JAK jihadist affiliates in the January 14, 2016, Jakarta business district attack—killing 8 and wounding 20—the complex nature and target selection represented both target selection forms consisting of local police for "near" and Starbucks for the "far" enemy—and further speaks to this manifestation.⁴³³ While the January 2016 attacks in Jakarta have generally been analyzed as a demonstration of continued inefficiency and degraded lethality, the degree of lethality as described in this study (those killed and wounded) portends an upward trend with JAK achieving a lethality rate of 28.⁴³⁴

2. Indonesia's CT Shifting Focus and Public Sentiment

The government's shifting views on its stance regarding the nature of the jihadist terrorism threat was demonstrated in this timeframe following the 2009 bombing and assassination attempt and the 2013 call to arms video by the IS. First the nature of the threat was elevated from that of purely a criminal in nature outlook, prevailing from

⁴³⁰ Hegghammer, "Should I Stay," 11–12; Abuza, "Joining the Caravan"; Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence*, 67; IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 11.

⁴³¹ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 9.

⁴³² IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 11–12; IPAC, "Violent Extremism."

⁴³³ IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 10–11; Mackey, "Indonesia: Staying Calm."

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

1998–2008, to that of a threat against national security. With such an elevation, the TNI would now have to be incorporated and play a larger role, potentially upsetting the very foundation of Indonesia’s criminal justice CT approach. Yet as seen previously, the *POLRI* and Densus-88 continued to maintain the lead in arrests and the conduct of raids. With the rise of IS and its brutal, intolerant ideology, the state further reinforced the sentiments of jihadist terrorism as a threat to national security and the very ideology and belief in the state’s principles of Pancasila.⁴³⁵ This recognition now caused the state to acknowledge and combat the extremist ideology it had long shied away from. This was addressed with the establishment of state capacity to better coordinate, monitor, and effect deradicalisation and disengagement programs. While believed to be incoherent and non-comprehensive by groups such as IPAC, the very fact that the government addressed first the institutional short falls and then the means and ways to include the additional elements of the wider civil society are evidence to the contrary.⁴³⁶

While the government aggressively looked to grow state institutions and capabilities in response to the IS threat, in the critical CT realm of public support and hearts and minds, increasing anti-jihadist public sentiments further reinforced and positioned Indonesia to both counter and endure the jihadist propaganda and attacks. Since 2009, the anti-jihadist views have been on the rise as captured in a series of Pew polls. A 2009 Pew poll stated that 13% “often” or “sometimes” justified the use of suicide bombing, a number that would further drop to 6% in 2013.⁴³⁷ The 2013 Pew poll further underscored the notion of anti-jihadist views depicting that 93% “rarely” and “never” saw suicide bombings as justified.⁴³⁸ The publics’ negative views and feelings

⁴³⁵ Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 153; Jones, “Ongoing Extremist Threat,” 100; IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 3; IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20.

⁴³⁶ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 1.

⁴³⁷ “Muslim Publics Share Concerns about Extremist Groups,” *Pew Research Center*, September 10, 2013, <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/10/muslim-publics-share-concerns-about-extremist-groups/>.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

toward the actions and ideology of the IS has also seen such positive reinforcement with a 2015 Pew poll with an overwhelming 79% of the Indonesians polled possessing an “unfavorable” view of IS.⁴³⁹ Beyond the polls, the actions of the wider public have further reinforced this notion with banners and signs across the archipelago with IPAC reporting, “[name of town] rejects ISIS,”⁴⁴⁰ The disavowal of the IS and its ideology by nearly every Muslim organization manifested into the formation of a cohesive and united anti-IS front through the *Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah Majelis Ulama Undonesia* (FUMUI) which declared its anti-IS stance and pro-government/Pancasila stance on August of 2014.⁴⁴¹ Oddly enough, the comments made and the propaganda efforts of the AQ aligned jihadists has served to further galvanize the Indonesian public further away from the IS ideology and legitimacy.⁴⁴²

D. CONCLUSION

The combined effect of the shift from “hard” to “soft” in Indonesia’s CT approach and the continued anti-IS/jihadist public sentiment represent a momentous change in Indonesian CT policy. While not losing sight of the impact that “hard” CT measures had on jihadist organizational means and ways—demonstrated by Indonesia’s continued effective implementation of raids and arrests—the government broadened its efforts by instituting state-sanctioned capacity building in concert with civil society focused on “soft” measures. Though currently weak and failing to achieve its full potential effectiveness as noted by numerous analysts, it is nonetheless an action that pointedly addresses the long-term ideological element of the fight against jihadist terrorism. Thus this timeframe has still witnessed—despite the weak level of “soft” measure effectiveness—Indonesia’s criminal justice CT approach having achieved the institution

⁴³⁹ Jacob Poushter, “In Nations with Significant Muslim Populations, Much Disdain for ISIS,” *Pew Research Center*, November 17, 2015, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/>.

⁴⁴⁰ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 20.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁴⁴² Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 15.

of a “comprehensive” CT strategy, one that seeks to address and integrate both “hard” and “soft” CT measures. As Carpenter, Levitt, Simon, and Zarate, wrote:

The conflict between these two visions [modernity and radical Islam] constitutes a struggle for the hearts and minds of the majority of Muslims, who abhor violence, but who—out of sympathy, apathy, or fear—will not or cannot confront the extremists in their communities. Any strategy, therefore, that does not skillfully contest the claims and actions of radical extremism cannot succeed.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴³ J. Scott Carpenter et al., *Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2010), 2.

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V. CONCLUSION

Ironically, if we have been successful in preventing [and] deterring actual incidents, then complacency does tend to set in because we believe that nothing is ever going to happen. But that's when you also need to still be alert and to be aware. And that's true for members of the public as well as members of the security forces.⁴⁴⁴

—Teo Chee Hean

Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister and Home Affairs Minister

A. INTRODUCTION

The Syrian and Iraqi civil wars that gave rise to al-Nusra Front and the declaration of the Islamic State in the Levant (with the IS espousing for the establishment of distant *wilayats*, provinces) has rejuvenated the threat of transnational terrorism worldwide, drawing foreign and domestic jihadist fighters to the cause and ideology under the black flag. Indonesia—containing a large percentage of the world's Muslim community—and Southeast Asia are among those targeted by these jihadist manifestations emanating out of the Middle East. This thesis has studied the evolution of the Indonesian government's response to the threat of transnational and domestic jihadist terrorism and addressed the debate over its counterterrorism policy effectiveness. This thesis asked the question: has Indonesian policy on transnational terrorism been effective in combating the mobilization of radical Islamic groups? The views of CT analysts in the debate appear to be polarized between the views that either Indonesian CT is largely effective due to its professionalized CT capacity or conversely ineffective due to its lack of progress in certain specific arenas such as prison reform and effective “soft” CT employment. Yet on further inspection, a different counterterrorism narrative comes to light in concert with the “hybrid” hypothesis. This narrative denotes the implementation of a highly effective and comprehensive criminal justice CT approach that has developed over time, incorporating at first “hard” then “soft” CT measures as the Indonesian political conditions and public sentiments changed. As demonstrated, the overall system is more

⁴⁴⁴ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 207.

analogous to that of a “pendulum swing,” going back and forth between periods of ineffectiveness and effectiveness. In this manner, the CT ineffectiveness of 1998–2001 was followed in 2002–2008 by a period that mixed effectiveness and ineffectiveness, which reflect the combination of “hard” CT measures and limited “soft” CT measures. Finally, the period from 2009 to the present has witnessed relative effectiveness through “hard” CT measures with growing, yet weak “soft” capabilities. This “pendulum swing” phenomenon was cited by Acharya in regard to the jihadist threat itself, which has swung back and forth from incorporating domestic jihadist goals with those of transnational ones and then back to domestically oriented ones.⁴⁴⁵

This chapter will serve as a summation of the prominent themes and trends that have emerged in Indonesian CT from 1998 to the present day. First, we will review the major themes and elements of Indonesia’s CT program drawn from each timeframe reviewed. Second, the Indonesian CT program shortfalls and policy recommendations for further combating the mobilization of domestic and transnational jihadist threats will be briefly described. Finally, a “step beyond” identified during the course of this research will be proposed for the conduct of further study.

1. The Timeframes: A Summation

Starting with Indonesia’s shift to a democracy in 1998, the near decade-and-a-half long campaign combating jihadist terrorism has been further broken down into three distinct time-periods: 1998–2001, 2002–2008, and 2009–present. In this manner, the prominent political and social issues considered by politicians and CT specialists were witnessed through the lenses of the threats that the Indonesian state faced at that time coupled with the state’s subsequent CT responses. By these means, the evolution and effectiveness of Indonesian CT was further measured against the context and interplay of three primary factors: CT policies chosen, the changing nature and evolution of the jihadist groups, and public opinion. These factors enabled the state the ability to build the capacity for the eventual implementation of an effective and comprehensive criminal justice CT approach inclusive of “hard” and “soft” methods. Evidence of the

⁴⁴⁵ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 76.

effectiveness of these factors may be seen in the gradually degraded capabilities and lethality rates—those killed or wounded per terrorist attack—of the jihadists over the timeframe 2002 through 2014, evidenced by viewing the jihadist lethality rates in Figures 6 and 10.⁴⁴⁶ With continued implementation of this approach and focus on identified shortfalls, Indonesia may be positioned to weather and combat the re-emergent transnationally influenced jihadist threats. The findings and lessons learned identified in this thesis may further assist countries whose demographics and political structures are similar to Indonesia's in their CT strategy development, capacity building, and application.

a. 1998–2001

This timeframe was consumed by the threat of armed separatist movements and communal violence through the rise of militant laskars and radical Islamic groups which cumulatively set the conditions for the growing power and further manifestation of transnational jihadist actors through *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI).⁴⁴⁷ This timeframe was demarcated with the state and public sentiments being inherently more focused on the larger threats toward state unity and integrity, and culminated with utilization of its limited resources, efforts, and attention to those ends. Simultaneously, the government became more aware of the growing presence of Islamization and the rise of Islamic radical groups emanating out of Java and other trouble spots spreading throughout the archipelago but could ill afford to confront the added political strife.⁴⁴⁸ Yet the ability of the state compounded by the unwillingness of its security forces to act against militant laskars was less direct and tangible than how it could respond to the separatists and resulted in a more passive or hands-off approach.⁴⁴⁹ To gain the ability to act during this politically volatile timeframe, the state sought to wrest control of the means and ways to enforce security away from the TNI, which had controlled them during the preceding

⁴⁴⁶ Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

⁴⁴⁷ Means, *Political Islam*, 170; Tan, “Counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 208–09; Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 218.

⁴⁴⁸ Acharya, *Whither Southeast*, 62–63.

⁴⁴⁹ Means, *Political Islam*, 292–93; Abuza, “Review of *Laskar Jihad*,” 198.

authoritarian era. Civilian influence was achieved by imparting a separation within the security sphere with the TNI made responsible for external, existential security threats and placing the *POLRI* in charge of domestic security issues and under direct civilian control.⁴⁵⁰ Thus with the act of terrorism already viewed as a criminal act by the government, it would fall on the *POLRI*'s shoulders to respond to the threat in the future. Despite these foundational advances, the timeframe would generally be marked by the government's belief that the terrorist incidents were not a substantial and separate threat to be reckoned with. To the civil authorities, they were likely acts conducted by or linked to one of the numerous major threats already facing the state or by those seeking political influences.⁴⁵¹ The state simply believed that the country did not suffer from a jihadist "terrorist problem."⁴⁵²

b. 2002–2008

With the ascendance onto the jihadist world stage by JI in the wake of the Bali-I bombing in 2002 and the subsequent bombings that followed until Bali-II in 2005, Indonesia was not only be forced to come to grips with the fact that it possessed a jihadist terrorist problem, but quickly needed to implement CT measures and take actions to combat the emergent threat.⁴⁵³ The violent acts themselves and the senseless killing of innocent Muslims would galvanize the public's and civic-minded laskars' sentiments against the jihadist means and ways.⁴⁵⁴ These combined factors thus afforded the state the ability to take the measures and actions required through further CT capacity building along the criminal justice CT approach. Through international monetary aid and training support for *POLRI* intelligence, investigative, and special CT units such as Densus-88—emanating primarily from Australia and the US—state CT capacity and its subsequent

⁴⁵⁰ Carnegie, "Militant Islamism"; Wahyono, *Transnational Crime*, 13; Feillard and Madinier, *End of Innocence*, 159.

⁴⁵¹ Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 113–15; Vickers, *History of Modern Indonesia*, 218; Data adapted from START, "Indonesia."

⁴⁵² Jones, "Indonesian Government Approaches," 109–16.

⁴⁵³ Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 27; Barton, *Indonesia's Struggle*, 24.

⁴⁵⁴ Means, *Political Islam*, 179.

professionalization were achieved.⁴⁵⁵ Simultaneous to the training and development was the employment of these capabilities through “hard” CT measures such as targeted leadership and member arrests and kills, and the implementation of the Anti-Terror Bill of 2003 and incarcerations by the judicial system.⁴⁵⁶ Though with minimal initial effects, the state also initiated its expansion of CT policies with the inclusion of “soft” measures consisting of deradicalization and disengagement programs. Together, all of these efforts contributed to the gradual collapse of JI’s pan-regional Southeast Asia designs and organizational infrastructure, the further degradation of the jihadist lethality rates (demonstrated in Figure 6), and the eventual evolution and shift of jihadist goals and objectives.⁴⁵⁷ This was vividly captured with JI’s disavowal of the use of violence—until another stated time in the future—to achieve the now changed desired end-state for an Islamic State of Indonesia.⁴⁵⁸

c. 2009–2016

Two distinct themes surfaced within this timeframe through the nature of the threat posed by domestic jihadist groups and re-emergent transnational influences from the Syria-Iraq conflicts and the IS, and the adapted CT outlook taken on by the state. First, the re-emergent influences of transnational actors upon the domestic jihadist scene have brought about a new jihadist dilemma. This dilemma appeared through the growth of jihadist foreign fighters coupled with the mobilization of domestic jihadist groups into a more unified, but fractured front. These developments portend a more active and lethal jihadist threat for Indonesia’s future. When the seasoned, combat-experienced foreign fighters of the now numerous Southeast Asian combat battalions within the IS make their way home, the long void in jihadist group leadership, military training, and operational

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid., 303; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 999–1000.

⁴⁵⁶ Hasan, “Population-Centric Strategy,” 24; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000; Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 5; Jones, “Indonesian Government Approaches,” 117; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 149.

⁴⁵⁷ IPAC, *Indonesia’s Lamongan Network*, 1; ICG, “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise,” 2; Chernov Hwang, “Terrorism in Perspective,” 4; Fealy and Borgu, *Local Jihad*, 4; Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1000–04; Carnegie, “Latent Insurgency,” 129; Data adapted from START, “Indonesia.”

⁴⁵⁸ Gordon and Lindo, *Jemaah Islamiyah*, 10; Burke, *9/11 Wars*, 473; Ramakrishna, *Radical Pathways*, 162.

execution will be filled.⁴⁵⁹ The presence of veterans and the transnational influences upon groups such as JAK, may result in the potential for a higher propensity, complexity, and increased lethality in domestic jihadist attacks than those experienced previously during this timeframe as seen with the January 14, 2016, Jakarta attack that produced a lethality rate of 28 killed and wounded.⁴⁶⁰ These returnees will come home to already established IS or ANF aligned domestic jihadist groups such as JAK or JI/JAS who have adapted the ideologies and goals of the transnational actors to domestically nuanced campaigns with local and or regional goals.⁴⁶¹

The second prominent theme is the shift in the Indonesian government's views on the jihadist threat itself and the subsequent change within its CT approach targeting the jihadist ideology. The focus is not only on "hard" CT measure employment but involves the inclusion of targeting the IS ideology via "soft" measures. Growing-anti-IS public sentiments have further reinforced the shift in CT measures. This shift in focus is a culmination of two singular events: the aborted assassination attempt on the president in 2009 and the call for loyalty to the new caliphate of the IS in 2014. The former sparked a re-designation of the jihadist threat from a criminal act to one that posed a national security threat, while the later directly confronts the Indonesian state and principles of Pancasila.⁴⁶² During the timeframe of 2002–2008, the state had gingerly tackled the issue of confronting the jihadist ideology, relying on grass roots initiatives within the *POLRI* and wider civil society.⁴⁶³ Now the jihadist ideology and later that of IS would be confronted directly with state institutions such as the BNPT directing and coordinating a "whole of government approach" in concert with direct civil society participation and the establishment of the *Forum Koordinasi Pencegahan Terorisme*.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁵⁹ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 3; IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 11; Jones and Solahudin, "ISIS in Indonesia," 160.

⁴⁶⁰ IPAC, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 10–11; Mackey, "Indonesia: Staying Calm."

⁴⁶¹ Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 76.

⁴⁶² Rollins, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates*, 28; Acharya, *Whither Southeast Asia*, 153; Jones, "Ongoing Extremist Threat," 100; IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 3; IPAC Report, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20.

⁴⁶³ Acharya, *Whither Southeast*, 153–54.

⁴⁶⁴ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 4; IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20.

2. Policy Shortfalls and Recommendations

Over the course of nearly a decade and a half of concerted efforts by the state, Indonesia has made much progress in establishing CT capacity and executing a criminal justice CT approach in a comprehensive manner. This execution, while incorporating both “hard” and “soft” measures has only recently shifted its trajectory via a concerted effort and focus on that of the jihadist ideology itself. While this shift in CT approach is in itself a tremendous milestone for Indonesia, the following CT policy shortfalls will be outlined in recommendation form for further combating and countering the transnational jihadist threats and mobilization of radical jihadist groups.

To counter the threat of both the IS ideology and threat of further domestic mobilization, Indonesia must first look to implement former President Yudboyono’s, “Seven-Point Instruction” plan that sought to refine and specifically tailor the state’s CT efforts and responses against the threat posed by the IS.⁴⁶⁵ These tenets were inclusive and encompassed nearly all the prominent security threat themes and CT program shortfalls posed by both the IS influences and domestic jihadist elements. These areas span the ideology of IS, the handling of foreign fighters (both those going and those returning), passport controls, prison reforms, the allocation of CT resources and efforts toward specific trouble regions (Sulawesi, Moluccas, and Java), and judicial concerns ranging from prosecution mechanisms to incarceration term lengths.⁴⁶⁶ There is yet much to be seen in the realm of combating the jihadist and IS ideology as the BNPT’s FKPT initiative still requires further establishment throughout the remaining provinces, additional funding from the state, and better metrics at determining effectiveness.⁴⁶⁷ Chief among the issues within the prisons is the non-segregation of pro-IS and jihadist terrorists from the general population, a situation that breeds further recruitment and jihadist recidivism upon release.⁴⁶⁸ While the support to IS has been banned, it lacks the clout and the mechanisms by which the judiciary enforcement may be carried out. The

⁴⁶⁵ IPAC, *Evolution of ISIS*, 20.

⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 20–21.

⁴⁶⁷ IPAC, *Countering Violent Extremism*, 4.

⁴⁶⁸ Fealy and Funston, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support*, 21.

current anti-terrorism laws lack the specific clauses for combating the challenges posed by the IS such as the going, training, and fighting abroad by Indonesians under the allegiances of a terrorist organization.⁴⁶⁹

In addition to the “Seven-Points of Instruction” plan, at the international level, Indonesia has only recently and rather tacitly joined the coalition of Muslim countries combatting the IS. Aligned through the efforts of Saudi Arabia, 34 Muslim countries have vowed to unite and coordinate their efforts against the IS. In February 2016, Indonesia had agreed to join Malaysia and others by taking part in the advisory “Joint Coordinating Committee” within the coalition.⁴⁷⁰ If the full backing of Indonesia’s domestic civil societal and moderate Islamic organizations may be garnered, these efforts should be expanded to include increased material and physical resources along military and humanitarian assistance lines. This action could reinvigorate and potentially increase Indonesia’s eminence throughout the wider Muslim *umma* as a growing regional leader.

3. A Step Beyond: The Rise of Communal Violence

The horizontal threat to national unity through communal violence is appearing yet again within those regions that had experienced that violence in 1998–2003 such as Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Moluccas and West Java. Though on a smaller scale than the timeframe of 1998 to the mid 2000s, distinct to the present is the appearance of communal violence on the rise within regions that previously did not experience it before such as in Aceh, Sumatra, Central Java, and West Papua.⁴⁷¹ Adding to this already unsettling notion is the corresponding and rising number of arrests of pro-IS supporters and affiliates by the *POLRI* within all of these regions of rising communal violence both old and new.⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁹ Belford, “Indonesia Looks to Stop.”

⁴⁷⁰ Ed Payne and Salam Abdelaziz, “Muslim Nations Form Coalition to Fight Terror, Call Islamic Extremism ‘Disease,’” *CNN*, December 22, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/14/middleeast/islamic-coalition-isis-saudi-arabia/>; Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Arabia’s Master Plan against ISIS, Assad and Iran in Syria,” *National Interest*, February 16, 2016, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/saudi-arabias-master-plan-against-isis-assad-iran-syria-15221>.

⁴⁷¹ ICG, “Indonesia–2016–2012.”

⁴⁷² Adapted from ICG, “Indonesia–2016–2012,” and Malley, “Indonesia: Erosion of State,” 195–209.

A step beyond for potential future research poses the question of whether or not a correlation exists between the re-emergent rise of communal violence, the mobilization of radical jihadist groups, and transnational terrorist influences within specific regions of Indonesia? If so, what factors cause the perpetuation of the jihadist activism and focus on those regions and to what extent does this pose a threat to Indonesian unity, national security, and that of the Southeast region today? Should the Indonesian government fail to respond through the use of its criminal justice CT approach, the future for the state and its citizens may be as dark and as ominous as the ambitions of those under the black flag that seek to replace it. In 2013, an IPAC report forewarned, “It is the resilience of networks that keep coming back in new forms and may endure long enough to provide the seeds of a more dangerous movement if or when domestic or international circumstances change.”⁴⁷³

⁴⁷³ IPAC, *Weak, Therefore Violent*, 1.

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APPENDIX. “JI MAJOR LEADERS AND KEY FIGURES”

Table 2. “JI Major Leaders and Key Figures”⁴⁷⁴

Leader	Sentence	Current status	Date	Description
Yazid Sufaat	Arrest	Released	December-01	Suspected involvement in Christmas Bombings
Agus Dwikarna	Arrest	In jail	March-02	Connections with Al Qaeda
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir	Arrest	Released	October-02	Founder; Former Emir
Amrozi	Death	Dead	November-02	Bali I Bombings
Imam Samudra	Death	Dead	November-02	Bali I Bombings
Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas	Death	Dead	December-02	Bali I Bombings
Ali Imron	Arrest	In jail	January-03	Bali I Bombings
Mas Selamat Kastari	Arrest	In jail	February-03	Former head of JI’s Singapore cell
Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusdan	Arrest	Released	April-03	#2 to Ba’asyir; Involvement in Bali I and Christmas 2000 bombings
Hambali	Arrest	In jail	August-03	Organized Christmas Bombings
Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi	Arrest	Dead	October-03	Key operative and bombmaker
Azahari bin Husin	Death	Dead	November-05	Top JI bombmaker
Ainul Bahri, alias Abu Dujana	Arrest	In jail	June-07	Military leader of JI
Zuhroni alias Nuaim alias Zarkasih	Arrest	In jail	June-07	“Emergency Emir” of JI in 2004
Abdurrahim bin M Thoyib alias Abu Husna	Arrest	In jail	January-08	Believed to have replaced Zarkasih as Emir after his arrest
Mohammed Jibril	Arrest	In jail	August-09	Owner of the <i>jihadist</i> publishing company Ar-Rahmah Media, was part of a group with clear contacts with Al Qaeda 10 years ago
Noordin Top	Raid	Dead	September-09	Leader of JI’s operational faction; Responsible for many terrorist attacks in Indonesia
Syaifudin Zuhri bin Ahmad Jaelani	Raid	Dead	October-09	Noordin’s accomplice and protégé

⁴⁷⁴ Oak, “Jemmah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase,” 1016.

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