Sarajevo 1914: An Examination of the Context by which Austria-Hungary Responded to the Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand

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Abstract

The assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophia in Sarajevo in 1914 is remembered as the event which sparked the First World War, yet it came at a time when other assassinations of political leaders, such as US President William McKinley, did not produce such a devastating result. The difference lies in the context in which the assassination occurred. The Sarajevo assassination was conducted by revolutionaries from within Austria-Hungary but masterminded by actors in neighboring Serbia. Austria-Hungary suspected Serbian involvement in the assassination and planned to eliminate the Serbian threat while avoiding wider war. Unfortunately for Austria-Hungary, a long succession of Balkan crises created animosity between them and Russia compounded by their respective competing alliances. Austria-Hungary was constrained in their ability to exact punishment against Serbia without risking a worldwide conflict. Nonetheless, Austria-Hungary, in close consultation with Germany, attempted to move against Serbia without eliciting a Russian response. Their gamble proved catastrophic. This paper examines the context in which the assassination took place and shows how Austria-Hungary felt compelled to respond as they did to the assassination. This paper also applies lessons learned from Austria-Hungary’s plight in 1914 to potential situations today for the United States and allies with the goal of provoking thoughtful consideration of US foreign policy in future crises.
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Introduction

June 28th of this year will mark the 100th anniversary of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, Heir Apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife in Sarajevo. The 1914 assassination is remembered as the event which sparked the First World War, yet it came at a time when other assassinations of political leaders, such as US President William McKinley, did not produce such a devastating result. The difference lies in the context in which the assassination occurred, particularly in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. The assassins themselves were ideologically motivated terrorists who believed in the crime they committed and intended upon using this event to signal the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but they did not act alone. They received help from Serbia in the form of an insurgent organization holding significant influence in the political life of the country. The victim, Austria-Hungary was a leader in the international system of the day preserving the monarchic principle by which most of Europe’s other empires and states operated. Austria-Hungary viewed the assassination of their Heir Apparent as a direct threat to the empire’s existence, but when they sought retribution for the crime, they awakened a clash among Europe’s competing alliances. This paper focuses on the situation in Austria-Hungary and argues that forces of nationalism and radicalism compelled them to respond forcefully to the assassination, but controversy regarding their Balkan policy limited their ability to act without provoking wider war.

The Multi-National Empire: Austria-Hungary’s Dilemma

Austria-Hungary, which had long existed as a multi-national empire, served as a common protector of eleven nationalities, but the awakening of national identity from the late nineteenth into the early twentieth centuries threatened its existence. Austria-Hungary, also known as the Hapsburg Empire, was primarily a security arrangement directed first of all at protecting
Christian Europe from invasion by the Muslim Ottoman Empire. In his book *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, Samuel Williamson writes, “Acting as a buffer state, the monarchy [Austria-Hungary] represented for the European governments a cushion against the Russians, the Balkan states, and the Ottoman Empire.”2 Austria-Hungary maintained this role serving the wider security interests of Europe until the eve of World War I. Though this sustained the empire, Williamson goes on to characterize it as, “always weakened by its internal contradictions [that of being home to eleven nationalities].”3 The mid-nineteenth century saw the cultivation of national awakening among the nationalities in Austria-Hungary, and it was particularly the awakening of a South Slav identity which was the focus of Austria-Hungary’s nationalities problem.

The rise of national identity in Europe before World War I necessitated a change in political arrangements; however, it did not immediately result in the creation of nation-states, as Austria-Hungary contemplated options for the nationalities problem under their governance. The two most prominent options for the nationalities problem are best summed up by Arthur J. May in his book *The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1914*, “One called for the organization of a third unit of the realm containing the Yugoslav subjects of the Hapsburgs [known as trialism]; the other, more far-reaching, the conversion of the Monarchy into a ‘monarchical Switzerland,’ in which each nationality would have considerable control over local affairs but the economic solidarity of the realm would be preserved and the federalized state would present a united front in its dealing with foreign powers [centralism].”4 The inception of the Hapsburg Empire predated the rise of nationalism. While it originated as an Austrian empire, the other nationalities came into the empire under separate arrangements offering varying degrees of autonomy. The Great Compromise of 1867 was the first political arrangement made in response to nationalism. This
arrangement established the Dual Monarchy, in which Austria agreed to share power with the Magyars (Hungarians) in an effort to keep them in the empire. In accordance with the monarchic principle, Hungary established a king, which was the mark of a legitimate nation at the time. This created a precedent; however, where other nationalities sought similar recognition and rights for themselves.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who became politically active in the 1890s, saw the dilemma that a Dual Monarchy created and often blamed the Hungarians for problems in the Empire. Vladimir Dedijer, in *The Road to Sarajevo* quotes the Archduke, “…the so-called noble, gentlemanly Magyar is a most infamous, antidynastic, lying, unreliable fellow, and that all the difficulties which we have in the Monarchy arise exclusively from the Magyars.” He considered it treasonous that the Hungarians demanded equal share in the Empire and criticized the Great Compromise of 1867. As the Slavs began to demand more rights within the Empire, the Archduke went on to say “if we want peace and quiet in the Austrian Monarchy, if we want the chance to conduct a strong foreign policy, beneficial to all nations, in association with our Allies, there is only one way and one necessity, and that is to smash the preponderance of the Magyars. Otherwise we shall with absolute certainty become a Slav Empire, and trialism, which would be a misfortune, will be achieved.” Dedijer summarizes the Archduke’s view on nationalism by writing, “He treated these rights as an imperial gift which he could bestow, rather than something which the people themselves possess,” although he did consider trialism for the sake of countering Hungarian influence. Ultimately, the Archduke favored any option which preserved the Hapsburg Empire. Though he is sometime seen as an advocate for national rights, it was by no means the kind of ethnic national rights espoused by his assassins.
The Characteristics of South Slav Nationalism

South Slav identity was formed in Austria-Hungary through the experience of the Croats and the Slovenes; however, with the incorporation of the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was no longer an exclusively domestic issue. The contemporary reader is familiar with the role of ethnic identity in nationalism; however another aspect of the rise of nationalism is historicopolitical identity. In his book *The Multi-national Empire*, Robert Kann contrasts the historicopolitical version with the ethnic,

In the Hapsburg lands, traditional historic nationalism worked with marked difference [from subsequent ethnic nationalism]. Promoted by conservative forces, it was not much concerned with adjusting the borders of the empire in conformity with the dreams the various nationality groups had of past national glories. But it was very seriously concerned with upholding, regaining, and adjusting the rights, the privileges, and the social structure of the historical entities, ‘kingdoms or lands,’ which, in the course of time, had joined the association of the Hapsburg lands.  

Kann goes on to say, “Undoubtedly, a great shift to the forces of ethnic and, to some extent, even racial nationalism occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century; but the national idea, incorporated in the concept of the historicopolitical entity, never fully succumbed to these forces.” Kann’s explanation of the two versions of nationalism demonstrates that the rise of nationalism did not necessarily signal the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The historicopolitical identity, particularly supported by nobility of various ethnicities, operated successfully within the empire. Conversely, the more popular form of ethnic nationalism would eventually become disenfranchised with the empire.

South Slav nationalism began as a push for reform within the Hapsburg Empire, and it became one of its major ethnic nationalist movements. Kann attributes the roots of this identity to Napoleon, who established the state of “Illyria” in the Hapsburg territories of Slovenia and Croatia from 1809-1814. Kann writes about the French education system in the south Slav
regions “It replaced the limited and sporadic instruction (which had existed chiefly through the good services of the monasteries alone) with a general, free system of elementary instruction in the vernacular languages, Croatian and Slovene.” This inspired further development of the South Slav language, as Slovene linguist Bartholomaeus Kopitar contributed a grammar of Slav languages. This work, and others by Kopitar in the early nineteenth century, formed a foundation for pan-Slav identity which flourished under the protection of the Hapsburgs. Kopitar even proposed that Slavism remain under Hapsburg protection, as opposed to the competing pan-Slavism of Russia. Kann quotes Kopitar regarding the Hapsburg Empire, “…she should be the true center of a Slav culture opposed to the barbaric Russian Pan-Slavism.” Such was the thinking of one of the main proponents of South Slav nationalism in its infancy, but as it grew, it would be harder to contain within the empire.

Of the forms of nationalism, ethnic identity was the main form of nationalism which grew in popularity. Dedijer takes note of one of the leading figures behind south Slav nationalism. Dedijer says in short, “Among the South Slavs, as in Scandinavia, Germany, Hungary and Slovakia, Romanticism greatly influenced the struggle for national emancipation…Among the Croats in the nineteenth century a leading figure in the struggle for unification of the South Slavs was the Roman Catholic Bishop of Djakovo, Josip Juraj Strossmayer…By preaching unity of the South Slavs, he advocated at the same time closer relations among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.” Romanticism encouraged works of art and literature in the native tongue, and such feats created an identity among the people in ways that were not restricted to the nobility. As a bishop of the Catholic Church, Strossmayer was in a good position to influence the masses. While Strossmayer’s work promoted the peaceful enterprise of cultural enrichment, popular literature around the turn of the century glorifying
upheaval and rebellion against established authorities, appealed to some within the empire who would become disaffected by Austro-Hungarian actions in the Balkans.

**Ottoman Power Vacuum: The Occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The Bosnian uprising against Ottoman rule in 1875 created a political crisis which eventually marginalized Ottoman influence in their European territories and created a power vacuum in which Austria-Hungary and Russia competed for influence in this troubled region. The 1875 uprising was the latest in a series of uprisings against Ottoman abuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was in decline, and its once-important border regions were no longer important as the frontier for a thrust into the heart of Europe. Dedijer explains that “At the same time Bosnia and Herzegovina lost their strategic importance for the Empire; from being one of the bases for a thrust against Vienna it became a faraway province. Many landlords from Hungary came to Bosnia and imposed themselves on the already overburdened villagers.”

Hungarian landlords, in this sense, were not representatives of the Hapsburg Empire but were members of a higher class establishing another layer of taxation and demands upon the peasants. This created a situation where the peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina were burdened and exploited by the landlords while the Ottoman Empire lost control of the area. The man who assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand (Gavrilo Princip) was born into a family of peasants of Bosnian-Serb ethnicity who faced such abuses. During the uprising, Princip’s family fled to neighboring Austria-Hungary only to return once violence subsided. Russia intervened in Bosnia-Herzegovina on behalf of their fellow Slavs and ended the violence in 1878 with the Treaty of San Stefano, which was settled according their demands. Subsequent revision of this treaty in the Congress of Berlin that same year; however, would strain relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Balkans.
At the time the Congress of Berlin met, Europe was at peace and the creation of the Three Emperors’ League just a few years prior to the Congress was a major cornerstone for international security at the time. The foreign ministers of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia sought to arrange a meeting among their Emperors for a better relationship among the monarchies. Sidney Fay describes the occasion in his book *The Origins of the World War*, “When, however, the Austrian Emperor’s consent had been secured, it was finally arranged that the three monarchs, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, should visit Berlin together in the second week of September, 1872. This interview of the three Emperors, accompanied by extraordinary gala festivities meant to impress the world, resulted in a still closer understanding between the three Eastern Powers.” Shortly after this meeting, the Three Monarchies codified their solidarity with military cooperation agreements. It was this framework for peace and preservation of the monarchic principle that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand yearned for; however, the Three Emperors’ League began to unravel because of disagreements stemming from the Congress of Berlin.

With the decline of the Ottoman Empire, the Congress of Berlin had the task of settling Balkan disputes. Romania and Serbia were recognized as independent states in this Congress, but the agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina was a half-way house toward Austria-Hungary’s annexation of these provinces. One point upon which the powers agreed was that the Ottoman Empire was grossly abusive and negligent in administering Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Austria-Hungary needed to administer the troubled provinces. Dedijer recounts the details of the agreement,

Under pressure from the great powers, Turkey had to give way and accept the decision of the Berlin Congress [that of ceding administration to Austria-Hungary], but only after Count Andrassy [Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister] had signed a note on the eve of the last day of the Congress, July 17, 1878 to the effect that the sovereign rights of the Sultan
would not suffer any diminution as a result of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; that the occupation would be regarded as provisional; and that an agreement on the details of the occupation would be made between the two governments immediately after the closing of the Congress.\textsuperscript{17}

It was in this context that Austria-Hungary began the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Though Bosnia-Herzegovina was to officially remain within the Ottoman Empire, the occupation meant that Austria-Hungary gained an advantage in Balkan affairs at Russia’s expense. The decision was also unpopular within Bosnia and Herzegovina, as Austro-Hungarian soldiers had to fight their way into the country.\textsuperscript{18} It was at this time that Princip’s family returned to Bosnia, and Gavrilo was born during the time of occupation. Bosnia and Herzegovina would eventually be annexed after 30 years of occupation. During this time, the Three Emperors’ League diminished and Austria-Hungary’s relationship with Russia was sour. Russia had joined in alliance with France and in entente with Great Britain, while Austria-Hungary was in a competing alliance with Germany and Italy.\textsuperscript{19} Misunderstandings over the Balkans carried the potential for wider conflict.

**Annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Balkan Wars**

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was a diplomatic move to officially bring the southern Slavs into the Austro-Hungarian orbit at a time when Hapsburg influence was losing popularity in the Balkans. The 1903 assassination of the Obrenovic dynasty in neighboring Serbia marked a shift in Serbian politics from a pro-Hapsburg to a pro-Russian foreign policy, a move which threatened to pull Slavic loyalties away from Austria-Hungary. By 1908, Austria-Hungary thought something had to be done to prevent losing control over their south Slav population. Luigi Albertini, in his tremendous work *The Origins of the War of 1914*, shows the significance behind the decision to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina with the following quote from Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Aehrenthal in a meeting before the Cabinet, “Our policy of
making Serbia economically and politically dependent and treating her as a negligible quantity had foundered. Only a third party would profit by a conflict between Serbia and the Monarchy. Politically we must urgently beg for such a conduct of Croatian, Dalmatian, and Bosnian affairs as would place the center of gravity for the Serbo-Croat people within the Monarchy.”

Aehrenthal also timed this move to counter possible repercussions from the Young Turk rebellion, a popular revolt in Turkish Macedonia which forced the Ottoman government to reform into a more representational government. Albertini emphasized two main points by which Aehrenthal viewed the Young Turk issue as problematic: the new government in the Ottoman Empire might pressure Austria-Hungary into conducting their own internal reform, and that the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (still officially part of Ottoman Turkey) might insist on abiding by the Turkish reforms. By pulling Bosnia-Herzegovina officially away from Ottoman Turkey, Austria-Hungary could pre-empt reform movements in these provinces. Austria-Hungary had to obtain the consent of the Treaty of Berlin powers prior to annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the way by which they obtained consent the following year (1909) had similar characteristics to the diplomatic crisis of 1914.

In 1909, tense diplomatic negotiations ensued among the Treaty of Berlin signatory powers regarding the annexation. Russia was particularly reticent to accept the annexation, but they decided not to intervene due to being ill-prepared for war. Albertini writes, “Russia, who had not yet healed her wounds caused by the Japanese war and the ensuing revolution [in Russia], was in no state to face a conflict.” Without support from Russia, Serbia had to also accept the annexation despite their protests. Given Austria-Hungary’s success in obtaining consent to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they would later believe similar actions in response to the assassination would produce similar results. While the annexation was a
political victory for Aehrenthal and Austria-Hungary, the Balkan Wars marginalized Austria-Hungary’s position in the Balkans.

The first Balkan war of 1912 came at the heels of the Italian defeat of the Ottomans, a war which exposed the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. Sensing an opportunity, the Balkan states of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece (collectively known as the Balkan League) went to war with Turkey. Russia helped shape the Balkan League, as Albertini notes that “a leading role in all these Balkan agreements was played by Russia and her representatives in Sofia and Belgrade.” By conquering Ottoman territory and dividing it among themselves, the Balkan states were able to prevent Austria-Hungary from gaining further territorial acquisition in the Balkans and allowed Russia to maintain influence in the region.

After the first Balkan war, most of the Ottoman possessions in Europe were lost, effectively redrawing the map of Europe and forcing Austria-Hungary to contain Serbia’s gains. In the peace agreement which ended the fighting, the Balkan League managed to gain most of the spoils from the Ottoman Empire, leaving Austria-Hungary only a couple strategic blocking options. Denying Serbia access to the sea became a major concern for Austria-Hungary, as Serbia’s land-locked disposition made them dependent on Austria-Hungary for trade. For this reason, Austria-Hungary supported the autonomy of Albania. Austria-Hungary also wanted to exert influence over the Sanjak, a frontier region between Serbia and Montenegro which used to be occupied by Austria-Hungary but was abandoned in exchange for Russia’s agreement to the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This concession became problematic during the Balkan Wars. Albertini writes of Austrian Foreign Minister Berchtold, “…he would not tolerate Serbian expansion in the Sanjak. It would lead, he said, to a union with Montenegro, and the new Slav State thus formed would exercise a constant pull on the Slavs in Austria-Hungary and be a
continual threat to the safety of the Monarchy, constituting an intolerable barrier both to the south and towards the Adriatic.” Following the First Balkan War, Austria-Hungary believed themselves to be on the defensive in their Balkan policy and that they were doing damage control.

The Second Balkan war immediately broke up the Balkan League, but Austria-Hungary had even less influence in determining the subsequent peace agreement. In this conflict, disagreement over geographic divisions brought Serbia, Greece, and Romania together against Bulgaria. After fighting, peace was arranged and borders re-drawn without Austro-Hungarian input. Williamson summarizes the significance of how Austria-Hungary wanted to influence decisions in the second Balkan War but couldn’t, “…on 10 August [1913] the Balkan powers concluded the Treaty of Bucharest that dashed Berchtold’s [Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister at the time] hopes for a salvage operation in the Balkans.” Berlin preemptively accepted the Treaty of Bucharest as agreed upon by the Balkan states in this war, but as Williamson goes on to say “With Berlin’s move negating any possibility of boundary revisions, the Peace of Bucharest had only disagreeable consequences for Vienna.” Though Austria-Hungary was intimately involved in Balkan affairs, they could not act without Germany’s support, as German power was needed to deter a wider war. Further complicating matters, Austria-Hungary found Germany ignorant of their position in the Balkans, making their support difficult to obtain. Such were the conditions for Austria-Hungary and their foreign policy in the Balkans. The Balkan wars concluded without a widened conflict; however, tensions increased with each crisis. Serbia became emboldened by their victories buttressed with Russian support, while Austria-Hungary was marginalized. But the newly drawn borders in the Balkans were not the only
concern for Austria-Hungary, as events in neighboring Serbia created strife in the empire and were instrumental in bringing about the assassination in Sarajevo.

**Insurgency in Serbia: The Black Hand**

The year 1903 took an ugly turn for Serbia, due to the assassination of the pro-Austrian King and Queen of the Obrenovic dynasty. This event created an unstable political situation and introduced an insurgent element which caused trouble in neighboring Austria-Hungary. Those responsible for the Obrenovic assassination included Colonel Dragutin Dimitrievic, who eventually led a secret society (known only after World War I) called the *Black Hand*. The *Black Hand* was formed by the assassins of the Obrenovic dynasty and stemmed from *Narodna Odbrana*, a society created in response to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Albertini draws the connection between these groups and the *Mlada Bosna* movement (in which the assassins were involved), “*Mlada Bosna* was nothing more than a collective term for a youth movement scattered in numerous societies and small revolutionary cells. Under the aegis at first of the *Narodna Odbrana*, and later of the *Black Hand*…Pan-Serb propaganda was carried on all over Bosnia-Herzegovina in agricultural cooperatives, choral societies, and ‘Pobratsimstvo’ (a Temperance ‘Brotherhood’) all of which cloaked political aims.”

Before the Sarajevo assassination, Colonel Dimitrievic (also known as “Apis”) had been influential in Serbian politics, thanks to the increased power given the military caste through victory in the Balkan wars. Albertini shows that this created a power struggle in Serbia,

…after the Second Balkan war, when the problem of administration in the newly acquired territories arose, sharp conflicts flared up between the army and the police. The new officials sent to Macedonia by the Government were unequal to their admittedly difficult task, while at the same time a government decree, issued at the beginning of 1914, gave the civil authorities precedence over the military. This decree raised a veritable storm among the officers, who collectively petitioned that it should be rescinded. 
In a matter of a few months in 1914, Nikola Pasic was forced to resign as Prime Minister of Serbia. He was reinstated shortly before the assassination. Around the time of this political turmoil, in January 1914, a meeting took place in France between members of the *Black Hand* and organized by a close “Apis” confidant, Commander Voja Tankosic. Albertini obtained detailed statements from Serbian diplomatic officials, who at the time were aware of this meeting and its role in the assassination plot. Some of the statements include,

> Its [the meeting’s] purpose was in the first place to prepare an outrage against the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, then others against important civil and military personages in various parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, including Vienna. It was hoped by these means to incite the Slav element in Austria-Hungary to revolt and even to cause a general European war.

> The decision was made to carry out the plan.

> …Princip was kept on in Belgrade until the end of May receiving instruction in the use of a Browning 9mm from Ciganovic and Tankosic. All the Brownings for the outrage were bought by Dimitrievic himself.\(^{33}\)

The assassination was undoubtedly linked to the *Black Hand*, yet the details of their connection to the crime were buried in obscurity thanks to the successful radicalization and recruitment of Bosnian assassins and their ability to maintain secrecy.\(^{34}\)

**The Radicalizing of the Sarajevo Assassins**

As Balkan problems increased for Austria-Hungary, a segment of the South Slav population became radicalized, among whom were the Sarajevo assassins. Initially motivated by ethnic nationalism, the assassins became radicalized from tales of tyrannicide in both popular literature and folklore. Dedijer mentions the significance of the story of Wilhelm Tell and the Swiss rebellion against Hapsburg rule. He writes,

> With an interest in humanity and aspiring idealism, looking for the natural and spontaneous in the literature of his day and the past, Schiller [a poet and one of the leading figures of Romanticism in Germany] chose for the subject of his verse-drama *Wilhelm Tell* a revolt of Swiss peasants against the tyranny of the Hapsburg governors.
The struggle was uneven and lasted several decades until the Hapsburgs finally had to admit the loss of their Swiss possessions. The main character of Schiller’s drama, Wilhelm Tell, is a legendary figure in Swiss folklore. The story goes that his assassination of Gessler, the Hapsburg bailiff (governor) of Schwyz and Uri, led to the uprising of the Swiss farmers.35

The storyline of Wilhelm Tell runs parallel to what the assassins hoped to accomplish in Sarajevo.

The assassins also found inspiration within Serbian folklore. The battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 is the center of Serbian identity, as it was there that the medieval Serbian Kingdom began to fall before the Ottoman Turk invasion. Regicide played a part in this struggle, as a Serb named Milos Obilic slipped behind enemy lines and assassinated the Ottoman Sultan during the course of this battle. Consequently, the memory of Kosovo is marked by both military defeat and the vengeful act of assassination, and it is etched on the minds of all Serbian people. Author and traveler John Reed is quoted by Dedijer as saying “Among the Serbs every peasant soldier knows what he is fighting for. When he was a baby, his mother greeted him: ‘Hail, little avenger of Kosovo.’”36 For the assassins, Kosovo could be avenged through assassination and the overthrow of Hapsburg rule.

The assassins were not only inspired by literature and the Kosovo legend, but they had contemporary heroes to emulate as well. The most prominent among the modern assassins was Bogdan Zerajic. Just two years after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zerajic attempted to kill the Hapsburg Emperor Franz Josef. He hesitated and never made an attempt on the Emperor, rather waited to make an attempt on the life of the Austro-Hungarian governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina (General Marijan Varesanin). This attempt failed, but thinking it successful, Zerajic committed suicide after firing shots at the governor. Dedijer tells of this assassination and explains its significance,
Zerajic’s act has been compared with similar deeds in modern European history. Just as the attempted assassination in 1878 of the Governor of St. Petersburg, General Trepov, by Vera Ivanovna Zasulich, triggered the wave of terrorist acts by Narodnaya Volya which culminated in the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, so Zerajic’s attempt marked the beginning of a systematic use of political assassination against the leading figures of the Hapsburg realm. After seven similar incidents and a dozen detected and undetected plots, the climax was reached with the violent death of Franz Ferdinand, on June 28, 1914, on the same street in Sarajevo and only one block away from where Zerajic fired his last shots.37

Some of the other attempts alluded to in this quote include an attempt on the Governor of Croatia (Count Cuvaj) in 1912, in which his wife was shot and killed.38 This attempt was made by a Croatian by the name of Luka Jukic, who as Dedijer accounts underwent a personal radical transformation, “Luka Jukic himself had undergone a remarkable transformation. As late as 1906 he led demonstrations against Serbian youth, but six years later, after the increase of oppression in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, he came to the conclusion that an understanding between the Croats and Serbs was the only guarantee for the future of the South Slavs.”39 Evidence from one of Jukic’s co-conspirators during trial reveals what they hoped to accomplish, “With the attempt against the life of the Governor we wanted not only to remove him personally, but also to bring an end to his office, and in such a way as to stir our people to action. Jukic told me that ‘we should kill Cuvaj [Governor of Croatia], because it is not a crime but a good deed when a tyrant is killed.’”40 In similar fashion, Princip would later declare in his trial, “I do not feel like a criminal because I put away the one who was doing evil…Austria represents the evil for our people, as it is, and therefore it should not exist.”41 The assassins perceived killing Hapsburg officials as an act of tyrannicide. One of the Sarajevo assassins (Vaso Cubrilovic) helped tie the significance of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to the legend of Kosovo when he told Luigi Albertini after the First World War, “The Serbs carry on a hero cult, and to-day with the name of Milos Obilic they bracket that of Gavrilo Princip: the former stands
for Serb heroism in the tragedy of Kosovo Polje, the latter for Serb heroism in the final liberation.” For these radicalized assassins, they did not have a formula for a new government, but they hoped to facilitate South Slav national liberation through the act of assassination.

The Sarajevo assassins associated themselves with a culture of secret societies in Bosnia and Herzegovina collectively known as Young Bosnia, or the Mlada Bosna, through which Serbia’s Black Hand could promote revolutionary activity in Austria-Hungary. Mlada Bosna societies were bound together by a common goal of South Slav unity and overthrow of the Hapsburg Empire. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were all part of this movement, which served as a means to bridge ethnic divides. Dedijer recalls the contribution of Mlada Bosna to South Slav unity, “The most positive contribution of the Young Bosnians to the South Slav struggle for national liberation was that they tried to rise above the religious and national strife which raged among the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ethnically the purest South Slav province but divided into various religious and national groups by its historical development.” Dedijer goes on to say that the Hapsburgs tried exploiting the natural contention among the South Slavs in an attempt to divide and rule. Realizing the Mlada Bosna movement provided a radicalized populace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and given the precedence of assassination attempts in these troubled provinces, Austro-Hungarian authorities knew that the subsequent assassination in Sarajevo was part of a larger threat to the empire.

The Assassination

The assassination itself is worth recounting to the affect that it was nearly botched, in which case war may have been averted, barring another Balkan crisis. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie celebrated their 14th wedding anniversary in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. Though the day was personally significant to the Archduke, it was also supposed to be
strategically important for restoring Austria-Hungary’s image in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dedijer observes, “An internal political reason influenced the Archduke. He had been advised that the Serbs, after their military success [in the two Balkan wars], were gaining the upper hand in the two provinces.”\textsuperscript{45} For Serbian nationalists though, the timing of the visit was contentious. The day of the visit happened to coincide with the most important day for Serbs. The day was St. Vitus’s Day, or Vidovdan, the day commemorating the battle of Kosovo in 1389. Seton-Watson explains the significance this particular day in 1914, “After more than five centuries this defeat had been wiped out by Serbia’s victory at Kumanovo in 1912, but in 1913 the acute tension which produced the Second Balkan War had prevented any proper celebration of the day.”\textsuperscript{46} This day was properly celebrated in neighboring Serbia; however, Bosnia-Herzegovina was having their Imperial master-to-be honored with an official visit. Thanks to good intelligence, training, and logistics, the assassins; among them Gavrilo Princip, lined the route on which the Archduke and his wife would be traveling. Among the six assassins in all, only one of them made an attempt on the Archduke’s life as the motorcade went along the Appel Quay (road going along the Miljacka River in Sarajevo). Nedeljko Cabrinovic (friend of Princip and one of the original plotters) threw a bomb at the Archduke. Dedijer writes, “The bomb fell exactly behind him [the Archduke] on the car’s folded roof, but did not explode at that moment. It fell to the street and burst under the next oncoming car, wounding a dozen people.”\textsuperscript{47} Among the wounded were military members of the Archduke’s entourage. The procession made its first stop at the town hall with the Archduke shaken up but not wounded; however, the fact that members of his entourage were wounded and that the Archduke intended on visiting them at the hospital provided another opportunity for the assassins. After the visit to the town hall and the official speech by the Archduke, the motorcade took off for the next destination – a museum. The
Archduke’s driver managed to misunderstand that the Archduke wanted to visit the wounded first, so he made a wrong turn. Dedijer continues,

Stepping hard on the brake, the driver stopped the sports car just in front of a shop, close to the crowded pavement. At that instant a short young man with long hair and deep-set blue eyes took out a revolver. A policeman saw the danger and was on the point of grabbing his hand, when he was struck by someone standing nearby, presumably a friend of the assassin. Pistol shots were heard. The killer was only a few steps from his target. It seemed at first as though this attempt failed too. General Potiorek [Governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina] saw both the Archduke and the Duchess motionless in their places. But as the car was backing down the Appel Quay, the Duchess fell toward the Archduke and the Governor saw the blood on the Archduke’s mouth.48

Gavrilo Princip succeeded in assassinating Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. If the Archduke’s car did not make a wrong turn, there’s a possibility that he would still be alive, and given his desire for peace and understanding among Europe’s monarchies, his presence may have assisted in limiting the repercussions of another Balkan crisis.49 It’s impossible to predict what might have been, but the fact that the assassination happened independent of any larger crisis at the time made it a crisis in and of itself demanding a response from Austria-Hungary.50

**Examination of Serbian Complicity in the Assassination**

One aspect of the Sarajevo assassination which is difficult to understand is the level of involvement the Serbian government had in the plot. The secretiveness of the assassins themselves and the fact that the Serbian government was not forthcoming on what they knew of the assassination inhibits a full understanding of Serbia’s complicity in the crime. Albertini describes how Serbian Prime Minister Pasic knew of the assassination plot and attempted to relay the information to Austro-Hungarian officials. In an ex post facto investigation into the plot, Albertini quotes a testimony provided by the Serbian military attaché in Vienna (Colonel Lesanin) about Serbia’s knowledge of the plot against the Archduke:

The Serbian Government knew of the plot that was being hatched at Sarajevo; in fact a telegram from Pasic reached the Serbian Legation at Vienna in the first fortnight of June
asking the Minister Jovan Jovanovic to let the Austrian Government know that, owing to a leakage of information, the Serbian Government had grounds to suspect that a plot was being hatched against the life of the Archduke on the occasion of his journey to Bosnia. Since this visit might give rise to regrettable incidents on the part of some fanatic, it would be useful to suggest to the Austro-Hungarian Government the advisability of postponing the Archduke’s visit.  

But Jovanovic did not inform the correct person nor did he convey the right information. Fay lays out three things Jovanovic did wrong. He writes,

On or about June 5 the Serbian Minister in Vienna, Mr. Jovan Jovanovic, made a communication to Bilinski, the Austro-Hungarian Joint Finance Minister, but not to Berchtold or the Austrian Foreign Office as he should properly have done according to diplomatic procedure…2. It is possible that Jovanovic, as he himself alleges, made his communication ‘on his own initiative.’ But it is to be observed that in his earlier letter to Dr. Bogitcevic he says nothing of this…3. The ‘warning’ was given in the most general terms; it contained no hint of the possibility of assassination by civilian conspirators or of any plot such as was actually on foot…It referred only to the possible danger of disloyalty among the troops.”

This was hardly actionable intelligence on the plot and appeared to be speculation.

Consequently, Bilinski was not moved by Jovanovic’s words, and the visit to Sarajevo continued.

It’s sufficient to say Austria-Hungary was not properly notified of the plot by Serbia, but also Jovanovic’s sincerity in sharing information about the plot seems to be in question.

Albertini observes, “…in the very days when Pasic was sending instructions for giving Vienna warning of the plot, J. Jovanovic was designated by the Black Hand to be Foreign Minister in the new Government which was to replace that of Pasic who had resigned.” Instead of becoming Foreign Minister, Jovanovic became Serbian Minister to Vienna, but the point is that the Black Hand had firm control over some of Serbia’s acting ministers. Even if Pasic sincerely wanted to warn the Archduke of the threat to his life or cooperate in arresting the criminals or foiling the plot, he was constrained by the Black Hand. Given these constraints, it’s doubtful Serbia would
have been cooperative in investigating the crime, and sensing this, Austria-Hungary decided to take firm action against Serbia in response to the assassination.

**Diplomatic Crisis and Missed Opportunities**

Early scholarship on the origins of the First World War generally marginalized the significance of the assassination as a mere pretext for war that Germany and Austria-Hungary were planning. But having a plan for war does not necessitate using it, and while Austria-Hungary fell short of going to war in previous Balkan crises, the assassination (viewed in context of previous assassination attempts and agitation in Bosnia-Herzegovina) was a very different and more substantial threat. Emperor Franz Josef saw punishing Serbia and the criminal agitation of pan-Serb propaganda as necessary for stabilizing peace among all European Monarchs. At the same time, Austria-Hungary did not want to provoke a European war. Joachim Remak says of the assassination, “Sarajevo was more than an excuse for war; it was one of its major causes.”

The July crisis of 1914 is too complex for this paper to recount, but suffice it to say that Austria-Hungary chose to consult their closest ally Germany in formulating a response to the assassination, while leveraging Germany’s strength to deter wider war.

Austria-Hungary was determined to crush Serbia in a localized conflict. Emotions were high, and Foreign Minister Berchtold received numerous correspondences from his ministers in Serbia conveying the elation of the Serbian populace over the assassination. In one account from Ritter von Storck, Secretary of Legation in Belgrade written the day after the assassination, “The accounts of eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another’s arms in delight, and remarks were heard, such as: ‘It serves them right, we have been expecting this for a long time,’ or ‘This is revenge for the annexation.’” Even as time passed, the emotional feeling did not diminish.
Von Giesl, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Belgrade, wrote the following regarding radicalism in Serbia to Foreign Minister Berchtold on 21 July,

Newspapers, not among the most extreme, discuss the powerlessness and decrepitude of the neighboring Monarchy in daily articles, and insult its officials without reserve and without fear of reprimand…Even the official organ refers to the internal condition of Austria-Hungary as the true cause of this wicked crime. There is no longer any fear of being called to account. For decades the people of Serbia have been educated by the press, and the policy at any given time is dependent on the party press; the Great Serbian propaganda and its monstrous offspring the crime of June 28th, are a fruit of this education.59

Consequently, Austria-Hungary blamed Serbia for the crime, and they were determined all the more to destroy them; however, they had to be careful not to incite a Russian reaction.

Austria-Hungary made a political calculation that they could act in a limited war against Serbia without provoking Russian intervention. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and subsequent revolution marginalized the Russian military, but by 1914 Russia nearly recovered from this setback. Understanding this, Austro-Hungarian Army Chief of Staff Conrad von Hoetzendorff noted how Austria-Hungary’s chances of limited war diminished with time. Seton-Watson summed up Conrad’s view, “in 1909 it would have been a game with open cards, in 1913 it would still have been a game of chances, in 1914 it had become a game of luck.”60

Nonetheless, Austria-Hungary was determined to punish Serbia, and similar to the Balkan Wars, they consulted with their ally Germany for top-cover in the eventuality of Russia’s involvement on Serbia’s behalf. Bernadotte Schmitt explains how Germany and Austria-Hungary rationalized their decision for limited war:

The German and Austro-Hungarian records leave no doubt that the German Emperor and the German Government understood that Count Berchtold desired to undertake an immediate military action against Serbia…they accepted and approved this policy and urged its immediate execution, even at the risk of war with Russia. The German reasons appear to have been (1) There was a feeling that the Dual Monarchy must either restore its prestige by a successful war or face disintegration; (2) a good cause seemed to exist against Serbia; (3) if this case were properly exploited, other powers would not interfere;
Though Germany made plans to fight if Russia was to get involved, it was a most dangerous scenario rather than a desired one. One way to prevent a wider war was to gain the sympathy of the other powers, but with Austria-Hungary engaged in close consultation with Germany they limited their chances for broader diplomatic engagement similar to the Congress of Berlin.

Immediately following the assassination, the Archduke and his wife were given a swift and secret burial at the exclusion of outside dignitaries, but by doing this, Austria-Hungary missed an opportunity to dialogue with the other powers and win international sympathy ahead of the ensuing diplomatic crisis. Luigi Albertini notes the significance of this mistake. Albertini conveys the belief of another author (Victor Naumann) writing on the assassination in 1925, “Naumann, however, maintains…that Berchtold would have liked the Emperor to ask the royalties coming to Vienna for help in obtaining adequate compensation from Serbia, in the hope that from a sense of monarchical solidarity they would not refuse…” Albertini continues with his own assessment of how the funeral revealed the sad state of Austria-Hungary, “It only served to reveal the tottering condition of the Monarchy which even in the midst of such bereavement could not present a united front to the world.” It’s difficult to say that a meeting during the funeral would have averted war. Europe remained split in competing alliances with strained Russian and Austro-Hungarian relations at the center.

Thanks to previous Balkan crises, Russia was particularly suspicious of Austria-Hungary’s intentions regarding Serbia and would not allow them to undertake military operations there. Schmitt quotes Russian Foreign Minister Sazanov as saying to the British minister to St. Petersburg, “Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and secure of the support of France, [it] will face all the risks
of war.” Any move by Austria-Hungary would be perceived as upsetting the balance of power in the Balkans. Furthermore, Albertini criticized Austria-Hungary for naively expecting similar results from their diplomatic success following the 1908 annexation, “They [Austria-Hungary] should have known that Russia could never allow Serbia to submit, because this would have been a far greater humiliation to herself than the one she suffered in 1909, which was still acutely resented by those in charge of Russian policy.” Nonetheless, Austria-Hungary was willing to try their luck.

Before engaging in conflict with Serbia, Austria-Hungary wrote and delivered to them an ultimatum, copies of which were issued to other European powers, as a means of presenting their case before Europe in the hopes of establishing justification for their cause. Delay in delivering this ultimatum (it was delivered 23 July) was problematic, but so was the content of the ultimatum itself. French historian Pierre Renouvin quotes British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, “any nation that accepted conditions like that [demands from the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum] would really cease to count as an independent nation.” The main point of contention was demands which did not respect Serbian sovereignty. Albertini notes, “Particularly Points 5 and 6 infringed on her [Serbia’s] sovereignty by demanding acceptance of the collaboration of Austrian representatives in the suppression of the Pan-Slav movement and in the hunt for those who took part in the plot.” Serbia, confident in Russia’s support, rejected the ultimatum. Gale Stokes, examining Serbian diplomatic communications, notes that “the telegrams from St. Petersburg [Serbian diplomats to St. Petersburg reporting to Belgrade] from July 24 through July 28 were instrumental in creating the impression in Serbia that the fundamental reason Russia went to war was to protect Serbia.” Upon rejection of the ultimatum, crisis diplomatic communications ensued. A larger war was unfavorable for both
Austria-Hungary and Germany. Nonetheless, the Central Powers could not avoid mobilizations, and once they began, a domino effect set in motion in which the great powers shifted their strategy to the military leaders who implemented offensive strategies to gain the decisive advantage over their enemies. Austria-Hungary wanted a limited war to punish Serbia, but they overplayed their hand leading to the unintended consequence of world war.

Conclusion

Austria-Hungary was constrained in their response to the assassination. Their disputes with Russia in the Balkans left them unable to win international sympathy for their cause against Serbia and awakened hostilities between Europe’s competing alliances. Consequently, the ensuing world war dismantled the international system, destroying all members of the former Three Emperors’ League. We are not immune to a similar catastrophe. For example, the crisis in Ukraine shows the United States and NATO do not have a common understanding with Russia over international security. Any further complications from Ukraine (or even the Caucasus) could bring both sides into conflict. Consequently, we should learn lessons from the Sarajevo assassination and apply them in context today. Future terrorist attacks on the United States or our allies may not grant us the leverage to respond as we did after 9/11. For example, what would be our response to a terrorist attack originating from a Russian or Chinese ally? Our actions could provoke wider conflict. Such a possibility was proposed by Cambridge University professor Margaret MacMillan and is quoted in an editorial by Ian Johnston for The Independent in which she warns, “Instead of muddling along from one crisis to another, now is the time to think again about those dreadful lessons of a century ago in the hope that our leaders, with our encouragement, will think about how they can work together to build a stable international order.” It is time to take her advice.
Endnotes

1 Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 21-26. Vladimir Dedijer looks at political assassinations between 1792 and 1914 and presents the motives of the assassins in the following groups: “political murders for personal reasons…acts of individuals suffering from mental disorder…tyrannicide…political assassinations as an expression of revolt against national or colonial oppression…dynastic murders.” He classified the murders of Presidents Lincoln, Garfield and McKinley as “acts of individuals suffering from mental disorder.”


5 Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 136.

6 Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 137.

7 Ibid.

8 Kann, *The Multinational Empire Volume I*, 34.


11 Kann, *The Multinational Empire Volume I*, 250. The nineteenth century also saw the rise of “pan- Slavism” in which all Slavic people would unify to demand equal rights with the staunch support of Russia. After recounting the events of the first pan-Slav Congress in 1867 (on the heels of the Great Compromise), May writes, “Pan-Slavism at the time was too closely identified with Orthodox Christianity to appeal warmly to the Roman Catholic Slavs of Austria, and linguistic disparities presented another big barrier to Slav cooperation.” (May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1914*, 51)

12 Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 76.

13 Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 31.

14 Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 34. The abuses were outlined in the peasants’ demands sent to Turkish authorities and quoted as follows:

1. That Christian girls and women should no longer be molested by the Turks.
2. That their churches should no longer be desecrated, and that free exercise of their religion should be accorded them.
3. That they should have equal rights with the Turks before the law.
4. That they should be protected from the violence of the Zaptiehs, the local gendarmerie.
5. That the tithe-farmers should take no more than they were legally entitled to, and that they should take it at the proper time.
6. That every house should pay in all only one ducat a year.
7. That no forced labor, either personal or by horses, should be demanded by the government; but that labor, when needed should be paid for, as was the case all over the world.


16 Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume II*, 8-9. Here Archduke Franz Ferdinand opposes war with Serbia, hates Italy and preferred the Triple Alliance include Russia instead (as a fellow monarchy).

17 Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 62.

18 Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 31. He cites the official Hapsburg military document for occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878 in which he writes “In the tradition of the Hapsburg army, only a few months after the end of the campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Historical Department produced a detailed history of the operations, with neat maps of each battle fought; all together 5,198 men were killed, wounded or missing among them 178 officers.”

19 Fay, *The Origins of the World War Volume I*, 34. Fay notes that “the greatest single underlying cause of the War was the system of secret alliances which developed after the Franco-Prussian War. It gradually divided Europe into two hostile groups of Powers who were increasingly suspicious of one another and who steadily built up greater armies and navies. Though this system of alliances in one sense tended to preserve peace, inasmuch as the members of one group often held their friends or allies in restraint for fear of becoming involved in war themselves, the system also made it inevitable that if war did come, it would involve all the Great Powers of Europe.”


21 Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume I*, 197. Albertini writes “Andrassy, in the document presented on 13 July 1878 to the Turkish delegation at the Congress of Berlin, had declared, not only that the Austrian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would not infringe the Sultan’s suzerainty, but also that this occupation was to be
only provisional. And if, in view of the new spirit in Turkey, it was more necessary than before to grant political freedom to the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was all the more urgent to forestall any tendencies on their part to leave the Monarchy, as Aehrenthal had already explained at the Joint Cabinet meeting of 1 December 1907. The time had now come to act.”

22 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume I, 223-224. Russia was defeated by Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and had to rebuild their military. Russia also had to put down a popular revolution against the government in 1905.

23 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume I, 291. Albertini reproduces the Serbian response to Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, “Serbia recognizes that she has not been injured in her right by the fait accompli created in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that consequently she will conform to such decision as the Powers shall take in regard to Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin [the article giving Austria-Hungary occupational duties in Bosnia-Herzegovina]. Submitting to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes already now to abandon the attitude of protest and opposition which she maintained in regard to the annexation since last autumn and undertakes further to change the course of her present policy towards Austria-Hungary to live henceforward with the latter on a footing of good-neighbourliness.” [full quote continues to page 292]

24 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume I, 300. Albertini quotes an author named Nincic in a magazine named Affaires Etrangeres (Paris, 1936) on p. 509, “The crisis of 1908-1909 contains all the elements that were to recur in 1914 and were the direct cause of the Great War. The grave events which preceded the declaration of war on Serbia in 1914 all developed within the framework of the situation created by the annexation crisis. So much are they impregnated with it, that one may safely say that, but for the crisis caused by Austria-Hungary in 1908-1909, the Great War would not have taken place, at least at so near a date. A match postponed is sometimes a match won.”


26 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume I, 379. Albertini summarizes the important aspects by which peace was derived after the First Balkan War, “the frontier of Turkey-in-Europe to be marked by a straight line between Enos and Midia, all territory west of that line to be ceded by Turkey to the Balkan states, except Albania whose frontiers and whose regime should be left to the decision of the Powers…”


29 Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, 149.

30 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume I, 491. Albertini writes, “Hence the utter incomprehension of the German rulers, in regard to the Balkan problem and the position, needs, and appeals of the Monarchy, lasted on until after the Sarajevo crime and had dire repercussions on the attitude taken up by the Balkan States at the outbreak of the World War.”


34 Fay, The Origins of the World War Volume II, 92. Fay writes, “The three youths who planned to murder the Archduke sought to give the impression at their trial that their relations in Belgrade had been rather with the Narodna Odbrana than the ‘Black Hand.’”

35 Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, 161.

36 Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, 235.

37 Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, 236.

38 Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, 277. Dedijer writes, “The attempts of Luka Jukic, Planinscak, Dojcic, and Aljinovic had a considerable influence on the Young Bosnians, particularly Gavrilo Princip. When Franz Ferdinand was killed there was some truth in the statement in Pester Lloyd’s [Hungarian newspaper] editorial that ‘Jukic’s attempt was just a dress rehearsal for Princip’s shots.’”

39 Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, 256.

40 Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, 270. This is a quote from fifteen-year old co-conspirator Djuro Cvijic during his trial for the attempted assassination of Governor Cuvaj.

41 Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, 337.

42 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume II, 47 (notes)

43 Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo, 213.

44 Ibid.
Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 286. Dedijer also writes before this quote, “From the point of view of Austria-
Hungary’s foreign policy, too, it was desirable that the Archduke be present in Sarajevo – as a gesture against Serbia
and her increased role in the Balkans after her victories in the 1912 and 1913 wars.”


Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 319.

Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, 15.

Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 131. As stated earlier, the Archduke
preferred the peace and cooperation of the Three Emperors’ League and would liked to have revived that.
Additionally, Williamson recounts a conversation between the Austro-Hungarian generals, the Foreign Minister, the
Archduke and Emperor in which they contemplated military action against Serbia after the First Balkan War, “After
listening to the give and take, Franz Joseph, ‘unusually serious, composed, and determined,’ emphatically sided with
Berchtold [Foreign Minister]. For the one person in the monarchy who alone could tilt the balance for peace or war,
the future course remained that of peace, not war. In doing so the emperor/king supported his foreign minister
against his generals and his nephew [the Archduke originally sided with the generals]. The military would persist in
their demands for action. But the Archduke almost immediately backed away from a belligerent policy and returned
instead to his own more cautious, peaceful stance of September and October. Hereafter, the two Hapsburgs would
stand together, until one fell and left the other alone against the generals.”

Remak, “1914—The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered,” 362. Joachim Remak states regarding Austria-
Hungary’s position after the assassination, “Its vital interests were involved, in a way those of no other European
state were in 1914; not Russia’s and not Germany’s, not those of France nor of Great Britain.”


Legation Jovan Jovanovic said to Colonel Lesanin that he was concerned by the fact that, after a few minutes
thoughtful silence, Bilinski showed no sign of attaching great importance to the communication and confined
himself to remarking, when saying good-bye and thanking him: ‘Let us hope nothing does happen.’”


Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914 Volume II*, 134. The exact words of the conclusion to the demarche
from Emperor Franz Josef to Kaiser Wilhelm II are, “But this will only become possible if Serbia, which at present
forms the pivot of Pan-Slav policy, is eliminated as a political power factor in the Balkans. You, too, since the
recent terrible happenings in Bosnia, will feel convinced that a reconciliation of the differences whi ch sunder us
from Serbia is no longer to be thought of and that the stabilizing peace policy of all European monarchs will be
menaced as long as this focus of criminal agitation in Belgrade lives on unpunished.”

“militant diplomacy” as the option Austria-Hungary wanted to use after previous attempts to use “diplomatic and
military intimidation had not worked earlier.”


*Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War,* “VIII Austro-Hungarian Red
Book,” 448.

*Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War,* “VIII Austro-Hungarian Red
Book,” 451.


Ibid.


minister to Belgrade (Giesl) that had it not been for the untimely death of Russia’s minister to Belgrade (Hartwig) on
10 July 1914, Serbia may have accepted the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum in all its points. Albertini quotes Giesl as
saying that Hartwig “would certainly have managed to persuade the Serbian Government to agree to unconditional
acceptance of all our demands…Had Hartwig been alive on the critical 25 July, the World War would not have
broken out. It is difficult to say that war could be avoided if Hartwig was still alive, but it was among the turbulent moments of July, 1914.

69 Stokes, “The Serbian Documents from 1914: A Preview,” 77-78.

70 Editorial, Independent, 05 January 2014.
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