

# The US Army and the Strategy of Punitive Measures

A Monograph

by

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## **Abstract**

The US Army and the Strategy of Punitive Measures, By MAJ Mike Obal, 45 pages.

Previous armies that have successfully imposed their will upon an adversary provide operational planners lessons on how to transition to conflict resolution while maintaining a position of relative advantage. The US Army was able to impose its will upon its adversaries in multiple conflicts through the use of punitive measures. The purpose of this study is to examine the use of punitive measures by the US Army and how they brought about the peaceful conflict resolution. Carl von Clausewitz writes that war is a contest of wills. This contest is won by imposing will upon an adversary with force. This paper examines four historical examples of US Army campaigns and major operations, in which three relied on punitive measures and one did not. These events were Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley major operation, Sherman's Savannah and Columbia campaigns, the Philippines war 1898-1902, and the American Expeditionary Force following the Meuse-Argonne offensive. The study concludes that the use of punitive measures was necessary for conflict resolution during the Civil War and the Philippines War. The transition from strategies of benevolence to ones of civilian coercion were the only method to impose will on the adversary and the supportive population. The study also finds that when adversaries have already capitulated as German forces and civilians did following the Meuse-Argonne offensive then punitive measures are not necessary. Further study on selective punitive measures by the US Army and militaries can inform strategy and operational approaches against contemporary adversaries and their supportive populations.

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## **Acronyms**

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
G.O. 100	General Order 100
U.S.	United States

## Introduction

“Death, is popularly considered the maximum punishment in war, but it is not; reduction to poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly than does the destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man has demonstrated in more than one great conflict.”

- Philip H. Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan*

During the Philippine-American war, the events between 1900 and 1901 on the island of Marinduque were a foreshadowing of how the United States (U.S.) military would eventually impose its will upon the insurgents.<sup>1</sup> Marinduque is an island in southern Luzon, part of the archipelago that makes up the central Philippines. Since 1899, U.S. forces had been unsuccessful in pacifying Lt. Col. Maximo Abad’s guerillas, whose strength greatly outnumbered the lone infantry company of Capt. Devereaux Shields. On 11 September 1900 Capt. Shields led his company on a patrol from the eastern side of the island, north to the port of Santa Cruz. Abad’s men ambushed and captured the entire patrol on 13 September, a large defeat for US forces in the Philippines.<sup>2</sup>

Major General Arthur MacArthur, commander of US forces in the Philippines, countered with a punitive expedition. The arrival of the US raiding party led to the arrest of all males above the age of fifteen on the island. They ruined properties, both residential and agricultural.<sup>3</sup> These initial actions secured the release of Capt. Shields and his men. Patrols continued from the fall of 1900 through the winter of 1901 destroying all food supplies and possible shelters outside of the major towns. The landowners and merchants who were apathetic toward US forces now applied

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<sup>1</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War: 1899-1902* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 280.

<sup>2</sup> Linn, *The Philippine War: 1899-1902*, 278.

<sup>3</sup> Linn, *The Philippine War: 1899-1902*, 279.

pressure to the guerillas to surrender, thereby stopping the destruction of their businesses and lands. By April 1901, Abad had surrendered and the island of Marinduque was pacified.<sup>4</sup>

A favorable outcome in future conflicts requires adversaries to acquiesce to U.S. Army will. The enemy must be forced to relinquish opposition, because without an admission of defeat the conflict will continue. In the future, the U.S. Army will have to understand the planning and methods most likely to bring about a conflict resolution advantageous to strategic objectives. Recent and continuing contingency operations have challenged the United States Army's ability to impose its will upon an adversary. The failure to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage has stymied a transition to conflict resolution and achieving political objectives.

Carl von Clausewitz writes that war is a contest of wills. This contest is won by imposing will upon an adversary with force. Clausewitz uses the metaphor of a duel between two wrestlers each trying to gain advantage over the other.<sup>5</sup> The United States (US) Army has made Clausewitz's theory of war the underlying premise of its doctrine. In Army Doctrine Publication-1 (ADP), *The Army*, it states that as the nation's land power, the Army maintains the ability to force the nations will upon an enemy, and with the joint force must win by breaking the enemy's will.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-0, *The Army Capstone Concept*, and Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept*, both explain maintaining a technological advantage must be balanced with the understanding that war includes human, cultural, and political phenomena.<sup>7</sup> The interaction of humans on a battlefield is how nations employ coercive force over an adversary. The U.S. Army is the institution charged with the

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<sup>4</sup> Linn, *The Philippine War: 1899-1902*, 279.

<sup>5</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 75.

<sup>6</sup> Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-4.

<sup>7</sup> Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (PAM) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 9.

responsibility to accomplish this task under unified action with the other services of the United States military.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 *Unified Land Operations* is the U.S. Army's operational approach premised on the requirement to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage, not only to defeat an adversary but also create the requirements for an advantageous peace.<sup>8</sup> In his book *Pure Strategy*, Everett Dolman discusses how strategy is a continuous process to maintain a relative position of advantage.<sup>9</sup> Unlike battles or war that may have apparent victors at the tactical level, victory is not an applicable term to the enduring interaction at the strategic level. Tactical actions will culminate, and regardless of their outcome they should link to a strategic objective, which attains a position of relative advantage.<sup>10</sup> Similar to the strategy that guides the conduct of a war, major operations by the U.S. Army strive not only to impose will through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space and purpose, but also insure that gained battlefield advantage is connected to strategic objectives.<sup>11</sup>

Previous armies that have successfully imposed their will upon an adversary provide operational planners lessons on how to transition to conflict resolution while maintaining a position of relative advantage. Prior to World War II the U.S. Army had a number of conflicts in which it was successful in gaining and maintaining an advantage over its opponent. This success in many examples can be attributed to the use of punitive measures, which created the conditions for the capitulation of the enemy. The types of punitive measures used and how they were applied is critical to understanding their usefulness in coercing the enemy. Each of the examples in the

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<sup>8</sup> Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-1.

<sup>9</sup> Everett Dolman, *Pure Strategy: Power and Principles in the Space and Information Age* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 4.

<sup>10</sup> Dolman, *Pure Strategy*, 5, 14-15.

<sup>11</sup> Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 4-1.

paper highlights the use, or non-use, of punitive measures to achieve conflict termination in a advantageous manner for the U.S. Not all conflicts require punitive measures to achieve desired end states, but U.S. Army historical examples demonstrate many previous successes would not have been possible without them.

### **Literature Review**

There are many literary sources that cover the various U.S. Army major operations during the US Civil war through World War I. Mark Grimsley's, *The Hard Hand Of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* covers both the major operations of William T. Sherman and Phillip H. Sheridan. Grimsley describes how at the onset of the conflict the strategy of the Union was to gain a quick and decisive victory while relying on conciliation to win the southern public's support. The author describes how conciliation fails, and measures that induce fear with a sense of northern inevitable victory were critical to breaking the will of the southern populace.<sup>12</sup> Grimsley describes Sheridan's and Sherman's use of controlled devastation against the general population of the Confederate states. The directed actions included burning or destroying property and crops that supported the Confederate war effort or the personal property of known secessionists.<sup>13</sup> The author is able to illuminate the distinction between the restrained actions of Union forces and the uncontrolled destruction perpetrated by other armies during wars on the European continent.<sup>14</sup> While Grimsley's *The Hard Hand of War* does explain the use of punitive measures in the Civil War, it does not discuss their use in subsequent US conflicts.

The personal memoir of Ulysses S. Grant adds a depth of perspective the Grimsley's description of Sheridan's and Sherman's major operations during the last two years of the US

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<sup>12</sup> Mark Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 199, 203.

<sup>13</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 204.

<sup>14</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 214.

Civil War. Grant's Memoirs cover why the Union leadership believed the Shenandoah Valley was so critical to the southern war effort as a ground line of communication from which to raid the north.<sup>15</sup> He also discusses why the Union thought the Shenandoah Valley was of strategic value to the confederacy as an agricultural, "storehouse" for their armies in the vicinity of Richmond. Grant discusses the mission orders he gave to Sheridan to defeat Confederate forces within the valley, and to ensure the agriculture lands could no longer supply the Confederate Army. He also discusses the planning between himself and Sherman for the Savannah major operation. Grant discusses how he and Sherman realized the war must be pressed into the Confederate homeland. After successfully capturing Savannah, Grant was able to resupply Sherman with Naval assets, expanding Sherman's forces options for follow on operations. Grant discusses the impact of Sherman's march upon the confederacy and its role in ending the war.<sup>16</sup> Grant's memoirs give depth to Grimsley's findings but do not relate to how punitive measures created the conditions for a lasting peace after the Civil War.

Joseph Wheelan's, *Terrible Swift Sword: The Life of General Philip H. Sheridan* is a review of the Sheridan's entire life, with a focus on his career in the U.S. Army. Wheelan spends the five central chapters in the book describing Sheridan's Shenandoah campaign, to include its planning, execution and effects.<sup>17</sup> He explains why the Shenandoah Valley was critical to the success of the Union Army in gaining the initiative from the confederacy.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, Wheelan discusses how Sheridan executed his orders from Grant to secure the Valley and destroy

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<sup>15</sup> Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant* (New York, NY: Penguin Classics, 1999), 501.

<sup>16</sup> Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 501, 507, 519, 551, 626-627.

<sup>17</sup> Joseph Wheelan, *Terrible Swift Sword: The Life of General Phillip H. Sheridan* (Cambridge, MA: De Capo Press, 2012), 111.

<sup>18</sup> Wheelan, *Terrible Swift Sword*, 99.

its resources, which were of strategic importance to the confederacy.<sup>19</sup> John L. Heatwole's, *The Burning: Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley* provides first hand accounts of Sheridan's major operation in the Shenandoah Valley.<sup>20</sup> He provides context and a refined understanding of what the civilians thought of Sheridan's tactics and how Union soldiers went about following them.<sup>21</sup> David Coffey's book, *Sheridan's Lieutenants* offers details about Sheridan's subordinates actions during the Shenandoah Valley operation.<sup>22</sup> His book also covers the collaboration and personal thoughts of his primary lieutenants during their time in the Army of the Shenandoah.<sup>23</sup> These book all touch on the details of Sheridan's use of punitive measures within the Shenandoah Valley but do not discuss how they were linked to the Union's ability to achieve overall victory in the war.

John Marszaleks, *Sherman: A Soldiers Passion for Order* covers Sherman's entire life with emphasis on the civil war operations he took part in. Notably the book chronicles how Sherman came to use punitive measures during the Vicksburg campaign as a prelude to his later campaigns in Georgia and South Carolina.<sup>24</sup> Noah Andre Trudeau's, *Southern Storm: Sherman's March to the Sea* is a day-by-day account of Sherman's Savannah campaign. During the march Trudeau cycles between the two wings of Sherman's advancing army to tell the events both units

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<sup>19</sup> Wheelan, *Terrible Swift Sword*, 170.

<sup>20</sup> John Heatwole, *The Burning: Sheridan in The Shenandoah Valley* (Charlottesville, VA: Rockbridge Publishing, 1998), x.

<sup>21</sup> Heatwole, *The Burning*, 44-45.

<sup>22</sup> David Coffey, *Sheridan's Lieutenants: Phil Sheridan, His Generals, and the Final Year of the Civil War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2005), 45.

<sup>23</sup> David Coffey, *Sheridan's Lieutenants*, 68.

<sup>24</sup> John Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldiers Passion For Order* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1993), 230.

encountered in a simultaneous fashion.<sup>25</sup> The book relies on first hand accounts of civilians, soldiers, and Sherman himself to add context to the daily decisions made by Sherman and his commanders to execute the Savannah campaign.<sup>26</sup> *Fierce Patriot: The Tangled Lives of William Tecumseh Sherman*, by Robert L. O'Connell is a biography of Sherman spanning his time as a cadet at West Point to his death in 1891.<sup>27</sup> *Fierce Patriot* discusses how Sherman continued north into Columbia, South Carolina after having secured Savannah. Additionally, O'Connell writes about Sherman and how his punitive actions would vary by the state and objective he was focus on.<sup>28</sup> These books provided deep detail to Sherman's operation to and along the east coast, however they do not link his use of punitive measures to those used by Sheridan, or their effects in later US conflicts.

Brian McAllister Linn books, *The Philippine War 1899-1902* covers both the conventional and unconventional phases of the conflict. Linn discusses how the insurgency was initially successful following the conventional phase of operations. He also describes how the US reacted to this change in the conflict and applied a different operational approach to maintain advantage.<sup>29</sup> Linn goes on to detail the unique problems facing US commanders in their districts and their solutions to impose US will through a mix of conciliatory and punitive measures.<sup>30</sup> In Linn's Book, *Guardians of Empire* within the first two chapters he discusses the operational approach of US forces during the war. He discusses how the beginning of the insurgency brought

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<sup>25</sup> Naoh Andre Trudeau, *Southern Storm: Sherman's March to the Sea* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2009), 74.

<sup>26</sup> Trudeau, *Southern Storm*, x-xi.

<sup>27</sup> Robert L. O'Connell, *Fierce Patriot: The Tangled Lives of William Tecumseh Sherman* (New York, NY, 2015), 346.

<sup>28</sup> O'Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 173, 176.

<sup>29</sup> Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, 181, 198.

<sup>30</sup> Linn, *The Philippine War 1899-1902*, 211-212.

about the end of benevolent assimilation.<sup>31</sup> Linn examines the use of punitive pacification operations to impose US will on the population, and through them the guerillas. He also describes the co-opt of existing societal systems to isolate the insurgency.<sup>32</sup> Robert D. Ramsey III details the use of punitive measures by Brigadier General Franklin Bell during the Philippines War. In his book *A Masterpiece of Counter guerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902*, Ramsey outlines Bell's approach to the insurgency. It describes how he understood his area of operations and how he constructed his concept of the operation to separate the insurgents from the population. Ramsey's book also contains the source documents of Bell's campaign including orders as well as the republished G.O. 100 Bell used to codify his actions against the insurgents.<sup>33</sup> Linn and Ramsey are able to distill the effectiveness of punitive measures and tie them back to G.O. 100 from the Civil War. However, neither author describes the use or non-use of punitive in US conflicts following the Philippines war.

A few books cover the political strategy and military strategies used during the Civil War, which had an impact on later conflicts such as the War in the Philippines and World War I. *The principles of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American Campaigns* by John Bigelow is a primer on military and political strategy written in 1891. The book has chapters that focus both on the Shenandoah Valley, Georgia and Carolina campaigns during the civil war.<sup>34</sup> Bigelow also discusses political strategy and the difference between a focus on the adversary's government or

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<sup>31</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 12.

<sup>32</sup> Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 45.

<sup>33</sup> Robert D. Ramsey III, *A Masterpiece of Counter guerrilla Warfare: BG J. Franklin Bell in the Philippines, 1901-1902* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 17.

<sup>34</sup> John Bigelow, *Principles Of Strategy: Illustrated Mainly from American Campaigns* 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1894), 9, accessed 15 November, 2015, Google Books.

their people as military objectives.<sup>35</sup> *Lincoln's Code* by John Fabian Witt covers the impact of the code written by Francis Lieber, on the Civil War as well as the War in the Philippines.<sup>36</sup> Witt explains why the code was crafted and how it was implemented once president Abraham Lincoln published the orders in 1863.<sup>37</sup> Lincoln's code discusses how the soldiers and their leadership interpreted the laws created by Lieber, and used them to their advantage.<sup>38</sup> A book that captures the doctrine used from the Civil War through World War I is titled, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* by Andrew J. Birtle. The book shows how the union shifted its pacification practices from 1861 through 1865, using the Lieber code as a guiding document.<sup>39</sup> Birtle also writes about how the Lieber code was influential in the pacification practices used in the Philippines War, and how it supported a the shift from a policy of attraction to a policy of chastisement.<sup>40</sup> While all the works discuss punitive measures, or the laws and orders that support there employment, none of the literature holistically reviews US Army leaders decisions for use and non-use based on the conditions encountered over various campaigns.

### **Methodology**

This study analyzes four historical operations within three periods of conflict. Each major operation is an example of the U.S. Army imposing will and successfully maintaining a position

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<sup>35</sup> John Bigelow, *Principles Of Strategy*, 10.

<sup>36</sup> John Fabian Witt, *Lincoln's Code: The Laws of War in American History* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2012), 2-3.

<sup>37</sup> Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 5.

<sup>38</sup> Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 281.

<sup>39</sup> Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1998), 35.

<sup>40</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 126.

of relative advantage while transitioning from major combat operations. The first period ranges from 1864 to 1865 with the United States Army during the US Civil War. This allows the identification of components of Union raids throughout the south that were successful in breaking the will of the confederacy to fight. Sherman and Sheridan's raids and the selective use of force against private business and property were decisive in the transition to stability operations in the south.<sup>41</sup>

The second period ranges from 1899 to 1914, which encompasses the Philippine-American War, where the U.S. Army defeated both conventional and guerilla forces. The final period is during 1918, the final year of World War I, when the American Expeditionary Force Meuse-Argonne offensive helped secure the allies a position of relative advantage leading to successful war termination. From these three consecutive periods of conflict, the study searches for useful patterns in operational framing that impose will upon an enemy, and maintain advantage through the transition to conflict resolution.

### **Civil War**

Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early nearly attacked Washington D.C. on 12 June, 1864. His II Corps with 10,000 men were ten miles from the Union capital on 11 June, having arrived using a route through the Shenandoah Valley, just as previous Confederate raids into Union territory had during the Civil War. Early's forces the day prior had defeated a Union division of 7 thousand men under Major General Lew Wallace at Monocacy River. Wallace's actions delayed Early's Corps long enough to allow the Union to reinforce the capital with additional troops, compelling Early to withdraw on 12 June. Once again the Union was ineffective in closing the Shenandoah Valley as a line of operations for the confederacy. *The New*

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<sup>41</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 204.

*York Times* would report, “The old story again – the back door, by way of the Shenandoah Valley, has been left invitingly open.”<sup>42</sup>

During the fall of 1864, a major operation would take place in the Shenandoah Valley to remove Confederate control of the valley and help the Union win the civil war. Major General Phillip Sheridan was the newly appointed commander of the Army of the Shenandoah and led this operation on behalf of his theater commander General Ulysses S. Grant. During the operation Sheridan was able to impose his will upon the Confederate forces, partisans and civilian population within the Shenandoah Valley. One resident of the valley recalled, “The Union Army came up the Valley sweeping everything before them like a hurricane; there was nothing left for man or beast from the horse down to the chicken.”<sup>43</sup>

Sheridan’s Shenandoah Valley major operation began in August of 1864 with weeks of cavalry skirmishes to determine the Confederate forces disposition.<sup>4445</sup> When Sheridan learned on 15 September, 1864 that Early sent a division to reinforce General Robert E. Lee and split his remaining forces, he ordered his three Corps to attack moving north to southwest through the valley. The resulting battles of 3rd Winchester and Fisher’s Hill were Union victories forcing Early to withdrawal his remaining units east out of the Shenandoah to await reinforcements. From late September to mid October Sheridan initially moved his army south then back north,

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<sup>42</sup> Wheelan, *Terrible Swift Sword*, 95-96.

<sup>43</sup> Coffey, *Sheridan’s Lieutenants*, 1; Wheelan, *Terrible Swift Sword*, 121, 170.

<sup>44</sup> Coffey, *Sheridan’s Lieutenants*, 49.

<sup>45</sup> While Sheridan’s 1864 actions in the Shenandoah Valley are commonly called a campaign, this paper will refer to it as a major operation. The term campaign is fitting for the entirety of operations within the eastern theater of war where Ulysses S. Grant was the operational artist. Sheridan’s Shenandoah Valley major operation was somewhat geographically distinct from the rest of the eastern theater, but its actions effected Confederate and Union forces outside of the valley, especially in the vicinity of Richmond. Additionally, there were concurrent major operations ongoing within the eastern theater in support of Grant’s campaign. Therefore major operation is a more precise term to describe Sheridan’s actions in the Shenandoah Valley, as part of the larger eastern theater campaign led by Grant.

destroying the unprotected valley's resources which was locally known as "the burning." In mid October 1864 Sheridan's army would encamp at Cedar Creek to prepare for follow on operations against Early's residual forces. On 19 October 1864 Early would launch a surprise attack against the Union encampment, causing an initial rout of the unprepared Yankees. Sheridan, who was traveling to Washington D.C. during the attack, would return to rally his army and successfully counter attack defeating Early's army. By December 1864 Sheridan's major operation was complete with the Union in control of the Shenandoah Valley, and focused on remnants of Early's force and Confederate partisans.<sup>46</sup>

In the fall of 1864 Grant, prior to the appointment of Sheridan as the commander for the Army for the Shenandoah, had directed that the Confederate forces within the valley be defeated.<sup>47</sup> "If the enemy has left Maryland, as I suppose he has, he should have upon his heels veterans, militiamen, men on horseback, and everything that can be got to follow to eat out Virginia clear and clean as far as they go, so that crows flying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their provender with them."<sup>48</sup> Once Sheridan was in command Grant further instructed him that the valley's resources should be rendered useless so there was nothing left for Confederate armies to use.<sup>49</sup> Grant's orders were purposefully aimed at denying a future base of operations for Confederate forces.<sup>50</sup> His orders stated, "In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left

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<sup>46</sup> Coffey, *Sheridan's Lieutenants*, 49, 65, 67-68, 75, 78-79, 88, 92, 96-97, 99.

<sup>47</sup> Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 502.

<sup>48</sup> Ulysses S. Grant, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* 37, part II, chap. 49 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1894), 300-301, accessed 20 March, 2016, [http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Letter\\_from\\_Ulysses\\_S\\_Grant\\_to\\_Henry\\_W\\_Halleck\\_July\\_14\\_1864](http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Letter_from_Ulysses_S_Grant_to_Henry_W_Halleck_July_14_1864).

<sup>49</sup> Wheelan, *Terrible Swift Sword*, 99.

<sup>50</sup> Bigelow, *Principles Of Strategy*, 147.

to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy.”<sup>51</sup> This was fortunate for Sheridan because his supply trains could only support him as far south as Harrisonburg and he would have had to assume great risk to pursue the Confederates to the death as Grant had ordered. Grant’s directives also reflected a change from a “strategy of annihilation” to a “strategy of raids” which he had implemented upon becoming commander of the Union army. The change in strategy was necessary because the “strategy of annihilation” rested on the false premise that the Confederates could be destroyed in a decisive battle and the Union would be able to secure its territorial gains. Neither of these objectives within the strategy was attainable because the Union did not have enough troops to secure all of the newly gained Confederate territory, and by the 1860’s, “armies had proven almost invulnerable to outright destruction.” Under the “strategy of raids” forces would hold terrain that would be conducive for raids able to target Confederate armies and the resources supporting them.<sup>52</sup> Sheridan would execute Grant’s orders under the new raid strategy by developing an operational approach consisting of two main phases. In the 1st phase the defeat of Confederate army would be the main effort, and the destruction of the valley’s resources would be supporting effort. Once the valley had been secured, there would be a transition to a second phase where the main effort would be the destruction of crops, livestock, and property. The supporting effort would be the pursuit of Early’s remaining forces and partisans along Sheridan’s ground lines of communication.<sup>53</sup>

The change in Union strategy coincided with the publication of new rules of war providing the legal framework for the strategies success. Sheridan conducted the Shenandoah Valley major operation under the auspices of General Order (G.O.) 100 which had been published

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<sup>51</sup> Philip H Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General United States Army* (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1992), 255.

<sup>52</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 162-163.

<sup>53</sup> Wheelan, *Terrible Swift Sword*, 110-111; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 168.

on 24 April 1863 by Lincoln. Also known as the Lieber Code, G.O. 100 nucleus was derived from the pamphlet Francis Lieber wrote in 1862 at the behest of Commanding General Henry Halleck to give Union field commander's guidelines on how to treat different types of Confederate partisans. The original pamphlet was so liked by Halleck he commissioned Lieber to head a panel to codify a formal document for the conduct of Union forces in battle. The intent of Lieber when writing the code was to balance humanitarianism and the required violence needed to secure a peaceful war termination.<sup>54</sup> In this way Lieber was Clausewitzian in his views that the code should guide the military action that can attain the political objective of the war. The core principles within the code are the moderate use of force and the respect for unarmed civilians and their property, which are balanced by the rules related to military necessity. The requirement to act humanely, while not having specific limits on actions taken to win, left it to the commanders on the ground to make the final decisions on how to justly apply force.<sup>55</sup> Upon publication the Lieber code legitimized pacification actions Union forces were already executing in the field. Additionally, G.O. 100 gave the Union the legal structure in which they could rely on military necessity to enact harsh measures against southern civilians and Confederate partisans.<sup>56</sup>

The publication of the Lieber code marked a solidification of a strategy for how the political leadership of the Union wanted to prosecute the war effort. Initially, the Union believed it would be unnecessary to target the southern civilian population as part of the war because of the belief that the Unionists were a strong faction in the south. However, with the conflict moving in to 1863 Lincoln had decided conciliation was no longer effective and shifted the policy to include the wider southern population and their property. His signals for the change in policy

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<sup>54</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 32-34, 36-37.

<sup>55</sup> Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 236; Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 34; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 151.

<sup>56</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 35-36.

were the Emancipation Proclamation on 1 January, 1863, as well as the First and Second Confiscation Acts that had been passed as laws the in the summer of 1862.<sup>57</sup>

Although the strategy of raids began in the summer 1862 with Grant ordering his forces to forage through Mississippi, Sheridan's major operation in the Shenandoah Valley was the most explicit instance of property targeting during the conflict. "The burning" marked the use of punitive measures against the civilian population of the confederacy that had not been seen before in scale and effects. Sheridan realized that to make the Valley useless to the Confederates he would have to systematically burn everything of possible military use. This did not, however, include the small Mennonite and Dunkard communities in Rockingham County, which were abolitionist and therefore spared from the destruction. Once Sheridan had set his headquarters up in the town of Harrisonburg, he ordered his troops to move further south to the towns of Staunton and Waynesboro and begin the destruction of the surrounding resources. As Sheridan's forces moved back north on 28 September, 1864 they destroyed as much as possible including livestock, crops, mills, and other production associated structures.<sup>58</sup> In line with the plan that Grant approved Sheridan said, "I therefore advised that the Valley campaign be terminated north of Staunton, and I be permitted to return, carrying out on the way my original instructions for desolating the Shenandoah country so as to make it untenable for permanent occupation by the Confederates."<sup>59</sup> The systemic destruction of personal property continued through mid October, 1864.<sup>60</sup>

The effects of the burning were immediate on the Shenandoah Valley as well as the greater confederacy. Within the valley, the amount of destruction made the land untenable for

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<sup>57</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 8, 77-78, 92.

<sup>58</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 101; Heatwole, *The Burning*, 27-28, 32, 66, 68, 223.

<sup>59</sup> Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, 310.

<sup>60</sup> Heatwole, *The Burning*, 225.

Confederate forces of any consequential size. Since the Shenandoah was no longer a viable base of operations, the Confederate military options for further attacks into the north had been negated. The residents of Virginia were stunned by the scale of the devastation which had the psychological effect of instilling fear of further Union action against their remaining property. Strategically the resources lost to the confederacy were substantial including 2,000 barns, 70 mills, over 4,000 head of cattle and 3,000 sheep. The Confederates had lost their principle storehouse from which to support the Army of Northern Virginia. The narrative of the inevitability of the defeat of the confederacy was just as important as the material destruction in the valley, as this victory coincided with the accomplishments of other Union Armies in the eastern theater.<sup>61</sup>

The other Army in the east enjoying simultaneous success was General Sherman's military division of the Mississippi. On 2 September, 1864 Sherman and his Army captured Atlanta after forcing the withdrawal of Confederate General John Bell Hood from the city. Although the capture of a major Confederate city was a blow to the southern morale, it was not going to be enough to bring about the capitulation of the Confederacy. Sherman was now reliant on a tenuous ground line of communication consisting of a single railroad the stretched 150 miles from Nashville to Atlanta.<sup>62</sup> He realized protecting his only supply link and garrisoning Atlanta would take a significant portion of his forces and cede the initiative back to Hood and the Confederate forces now operating north of his position.<sup>63</sup> Sherman through October, 1864 backtracked one hundred miles into Tennessee trying to trap and destroy Hood's army to no

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<sup>61</sup> Heatwole, *The Burning*, 221, 225; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 168; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 501; Wheelan, *Terrible Swift Sword*, 170.

<sup>62</sup> O'Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 147-148; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 168.

<sup>63</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 168.

avail.<sup>64</sup> Sherman understood that to maintain the position of advantage he had gained over Hood, it required him to press the offense, but change the objective to the people and infrastructure of the South.<sup>65</sup>

During his occupation of Atlanta through September and October of 1864, Sherman conversed with Grant and ultimately planned the upcoming Savannah campaign. Grant believed the south, including the civilian population, constituted a military camp. This military camp consisted of an absolute government supported by a wealthy plantation class that would not surrender until the pain of the war was forced upon them. Sherman recommended to Grant on 12 September, 1864 he stop chasing Hood and attack southeast from Atlanta to Milledgeville, destroying Confederate infrastructure and property. Grant replied to Sherman that he could march all the way to Mobile and Savannah and open new bases of operations. Sherman ultimately decided on Savannah as the object of his shift of his army's base of operations and would move as soon as he could gather the supplies. By securing a new base of operation in Savannah, Sherman could rely on a sea line of communication provided by the Union navy, which enjoyed full freedom of maneuver along the coast. "I only regarded the march from Atlanta to Savannah as a "shift of base," as a transfer of a strong army, which had no opponent, and had finished its then work, from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, from which it could achieve other important results."<sup>66</sup> Additionally, continuing his march on the south Sherman told Grant he believed Hood would be forced to follow him, allowing Sherman to dictate the tempo and forcing

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<sup>64</sup> Victor D. Hanson, *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Three Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny* (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2001), 133.

<sup>65</sup> Trudeau, *Southern Storm*, 40.

<sup>66</sup> William Tecumseh Sherman, *Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman*, ed. by Michael Fellman (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2000), 580-581.

Hood to react to him.<sup>67</sup> Hood did the opposite and attacked north into Tennessee in October 1864 allowing Sherman even greater freedom of maneuver throughout Georgia.<sup>68</sup>

With the chance of Hood attacking back to Atlanta or having success in Tennessee minimal, Sherman could focus his army on the destruction of Atlanta and preparation for the march. The destruction of Atlanta would mark the beginning of Sherman's Savannah campaign and he left it useless for any military activity before the march began on 15 November, 1864. By expelling the population of Atlanta and destroying the city Sherman was already witnessing capitulation from local political leaders such as mayor James M. Calhoun of Atlanta. Prior to departing Atlanta Sherman left his wounded, many of his cannons, and other nonessential people and items. He had created an army 62 thousand men strong, not encumbered by his casualties or unneeded materials, and prepared to live off the land unrestrained by a logistics tether.<sup>69</sup> This would provide Sherman flexibility, additional manpower, and speed during the march.

On 16 November, 1864 Sherman embarked from Atlanta and began his 220-mile march to Savannah. He spread his Army over a front sixty miles wide in a formation of two wings, with each wing comprised of two Corps. The left wing was commanded by Major General H. W. Slocum and consisted of the 14th and 20th Corps. The right wing was commanded by O.O. Howard and consisted of the 15th and 17th Corps. Sherman's orders were that the Army would search liberally for supplies and food from the country side during the march with the goal of keeping ten days of provisions on hand at all times.<sup>70</sup> Soldiers were not allowed to enter homes or trespass unless they were halted or in camp for the night, at which time they were allowed to go

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<sup>67</sup> O'Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 152; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 173-174; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 517, 519-521, 532; Trudeau, *Southern Storm*, 40.

<sup>68</sup> Trudeau, *Southern Storm*, 42.

<sup>69</sup> Trudeau, *Southern Storm*, 46; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 187-188; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 526; Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 141.

<sup>70</sup> Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 146; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 169; Trudeau, *Southern Storm*, 48, 52.

and collect food and livestock. Each brigade would rely on a foraging party of fifty men under the control of an officer to execute this duty. The authority to destroy property of any kind was retained by the Corps commanders with the intent that in areas where there was no resistance then there would be no destruction. However, in areas where there was Confederate opposition the commanders were to enforce devastation proportionally to that area. Sherman's order was in accordance with G.O. 100, which provided the legal means to take punitive measures against the Confederate civilian population under military necessity. His intent with the order was to not only destroy property, but to destroy the willingness of the population of the south to continue the war effort.<sup>71</sup>

Sherman's army marched 3 hundred miles east from Atlanta to Savannah, capturing the coastal city Christmas Eve, 1864. During the march Sherman would use his wings and cavalry in deception operations to confuse Confederate forces as to where he would move next, maintaining the initiative. Throughout the march his forces encountered little resistance and enjoyed complete freedom of maneuver along their axis of advance. Sherman would suffer only one hundred dead, 7 hundred wounded and 1300 captured, mostly from Confederate partisans and Georgia militia along the route. During the march soldiers would scavenge any materials and supplies they could use, terrifying the civilian population.<sup>72</sup> The effect of Sherman's orders had made it advantageous for soldiers to take even more than they needed from the land. The order created a system of competitive foraging for the best items, with no incentive to leave any items behind for civilians as they would be consumed by the next unit in the order of march. Additionally, Sherman's army

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<sup>71</sup> Trudeau, *Southern Storm*, 52-53; Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 277, 281, 284.

<sup>72</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 169; Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 235; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 529; O'Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 158-159.

destroyed the business infrastructure supporting the war effort, the properties of the slave owning plantation class, and many civilian homes.<sup>73</sup>

Not all of the burning was sanctioned under the orders Sherman had put forth. His commanders had to a degree lost control of their men, who were taking it upon themselves to burn materials and structures beyond the scope of the orders. While Sherman and his commanders were agitated by the lack of discipline their formations showed in their penchant for burning, he believed the Confederates had brought the destruction upon themselves. However, the destruction of property was the limit of what Sherman would abide, and as such there were only isolated cases of rape or torture against the local population. He at times also relied on restraint to accomplish his objectives, which was exemplified upon the surrender of Savannah. Through negotiations with the mayor Sherman's army provided rice stores and donated northern food to the people of the city. He also supported local government, allowed the re-establishment of businesses, and encouraged the locals to continue their regular lives. In Savannah, Sherman was exercising his belief that once the Confederates had surrendered they were to be treated as fellow citizens of the United States with no malice or retribution. Rear-Admiral J. A. Dahlgren noted, "I have walked about the city several times, and can affirm that its tranquility is undisturbed. The Union Soldiers who are stationed within its limits are as orderly as if they were in New York or Boston..."<sup>74</sup>

Sherman understood the resources in Georgia were critical to the Confederate war effort. By Christmas Eve, 1864 Sherman's men had destroyed 6 million rations of sugar, coffee, bread and meat, 90 thousand bales of cotton, 7 thousand mules and horses, 13 thousand cattle, 10 million pounds of grain, and 10 million pounds of fodder. Sherman calculated his Army had

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<sup>73</sup> Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 281-282; Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 174-175; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 199-200.

<sup>74</sup> Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 282; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand Of War*, 199; O'Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 168; Sherman, *Memoirs*, 620.

destroyed or confiscated \$100 million dollars worth of goods. His army had also freed numerous slaves valued at \$275 million dollars. The destruction in Georgia had cut all of the Confederate ground lines of communication running west and isolated the rebel forces in the Carolinas.<sup>75</sup> Of more importance, the civilian population of Georgia was terrified and lost confidence in their military's ability to defend them. After the devastation southern civilians crucial to the support of their troops and cause, now had a negative effect on the southern narrative. By passing along stories of the destruction to their serving family members, many left their units to return home. Additionally, discussion of the confederacy receiving military and economic assistance from abroad stopped after the fall of Savannah.<sup>76</sup> The effects of the Savannah campaign had taken the initiative from the enemy, begun to collapse their morale, and now placed Sherman in a position of relative advantage along the coast.

Once Sherman had secured Savannah he now had the logistical flexibility to carry the war to the enemy in any direction he desired. Initially Grant wanted to take Sherman north with ships to the James River, because he thought that the land route through the Carolina's would be in bad conditions during the winter months. However, based on discussions with Sherman, they decided continuing the march north through the Carolina's would be the best course of action.<sup>77</sup> In correspondence to Grant, Sherman stated, "I do sincerely believe that the whole United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that state in the manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direct and immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia."<sup>78</sup> Grant agreed and believed that if Sherman could effect

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<sup>75</sup> Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 277; Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 234; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 551.

<sup>76</sup> Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 242, 244-245.

<sup>77</sup> Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 550-551.

<sup>78</sup> William Tecumseh Sherman, *Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman*, ed. by Michael Fellman (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2000), 574-575.

the same amount of property and livestock destruction in the Carolina's as his army did in Georgia, it would isolate Lee and make him reliant only on what supplies were left in Virginia. It would allow them to bring the war to the Carolina's, including the wealthy population of south Carolina, who Sherman and many of the Union soldiers held responsible for the initial secessionist movement.<sup>79</sup> It also would provide Grant a way to present multiple dilemmas to General Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia, which at the time was fixed by Grant in the vicinity of Richmond.<sup>80</sup>

Sherman started the Carolinas campaign on 1 February, 1865 and it ended in Goldsboro, North Carolina March 1865. The conditions for this campaign would be different for Sherman's army as the land was not as bountiful as it had been in Georgia which required him to carry more supplies. The terrain was also going to prove more difficult with rivers and wetlands at their highest levels because of winter rains. The expectations of strong defenses were taken into account during his planning process because of the importance the confederacy placed in the Carolinas. Sherman coordinated with Admiral John A. Dahlgren and General Foster to secure multiple ports along the coast to give himself added options. This would provide Sherman with a way to withdrawal by the sea if he was repulsed from the Carolinas by Confederate forces, and create supplementary lines of communication to support his forces. He again used the same commanders and formations as he did with the savannah campaign, relying on two wings, each comprised of two Corps, and roving cavalry.<sup>81</sup>

Sherman's presented a plan to Grant that would take his Army through the major cities within the Carolinas while relying on deception to keep Confederate forces unaware of his true objectives. Sherman's right wing would feint towards Charleston, South Carolina, and his left

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<sup>79</sup> Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 551; Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 236.

<sup>80</sup> Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 551.

<sup>81</sup> Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 551; O'Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 172; Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldiers Passion For Order*, 318.

wing would feint towards Augusta, Georgia. His real objective would be Columbia, South Carolina with the deception operations by his wings allowing him to retain the initiative.<sup>82</sup> After Columbia, Sherman's second objective would be Fayetteville, North Carolina and then on to his final objective Goldsboro, North Carolina. Sherman was able to capture Columbia by 17 February 1865; two weeks after his march north had begun. He continued to advance north and captured his second objective Fayetteville on 11 March, 1865. Four days later he would move on Goldsboro and fight Confederate General Joe Johnston on 19 and 21 March. Sherman forced Johnston's withdrawal and was able to seize Goldsboro by 23 March, 1865.<sup>83</sup>

Once Sherman's army had entered South Carolina they began to torch structures at a much higher rate than during the Georgia campaign. He and his men blamed the population of South Carolina for the secessionist movement more than any other Confederate state. Unlike Georgia where the foragers had been selective in their destruction, in South Carolina they did not restrict themselves. In South Carolina entire towns were burned whereas in Georgia specific homes or military related buildings were targeted. The foragers also acted as skirmishers for the main force, performing as reconnaissance and winning small engagements. Between Savannah and Columbia Sherman's forces concentrated on the destruction of the rail lines and materials depots. Due to his feints Confederates were focused on defending Charleston and Augusta, offering no protection for Columbia.<sup>84</sup> "I will then move either on Branchville or Columbia, by any curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our course as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and Augusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden,

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<sup>82</sup> Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 551; Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion For Order*, 318.

<sup>83</sup> Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 554, 558, 560-561.

<sup>84</sup> Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldier's Passion For Order*, 320-322; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 201.

pausing there long enough to observe the effect.”<sup>85</sup> Once Sherman arrived in Columbia nearly one-third of it had been burned to the ground, with a focus on the most expensive houses. Sherman blamed the destruction on the retreating Confederate forces burning cotton bails in the middle of the city, while the local population blamed the Union foragers and recently freed slaves. Sherman tried to help the local population extinguish the flames and declared it was never his intent to burn the city. He met with the local leadership and provided 5 hundred head of cattle and one hundred muskets so they could eat and provide a minimum level of security for the city. Before leaving Columbia he would order the destruction of the weapons foundries, state arsenal, and a mint.<sup>86</sup> By taking Columbia Sherman had forced the Confederate evacuation of Charleston, which was then captured by Union forces on 18 February, 1865.<sup>87</sup> Once Sherman left Columbia he would burn all of the cities his army encountered up to the North Carolina border, creating a 50-mile wide corridor of destruction and consumption of all food, rail lines, and war related materials.<sup>88</sup>

Once Sherman had entered North Carolina he let his men know that they were to treat the North Carolinians different then the South Carolinians. North Carolina at the time was not considered to be part of the “Deep South” and was believed to contain large pockets of Unionists. His intent was to deepen a divide between the people of North and South Carolina that would work to the Unions strategic advantage. His units pulled back on the amount of destruction they inflicted, and became more reliant on their ground line of communication and less on the foraging of the land. The Union Soldiers continued to take goods from the locals as well as set fires to the

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<sup>85</sup> Sherman, *Memoirs*, 585.

<sup>86</sup> Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldiers Passion For Order*, 324-325; O’Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 176.

<sup>87</sup> Doris K. Goodwin, *Team of Rivals: The Political Genius of Abraham Lincoln* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005), 696; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 560.

<sup>88</sup> O’Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 176; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 560.

pine trees to make the appearance of destruction seem grater then it actually was. The effect it had on the civilian population was one of dread, which was quickly relayed to the Confederate soldiers whose hometowns and families were threatened. Similar to the effects of the destruction in Georgia, the knowledge of widespread destruction in the Carolinas caused many Confederate soldiers to leave for home. Sherman continued north and captured Fayetteville on 11 March, 1865, reestablishing his line of communication with Grant. Reflecting on the campaign in the Carolina's Sherman believed it was a far more important part of the conflict. The Savannah campaign was a means to an end, but the campaign in the Carolina's would bring him closer to Richmond, and bring about the end of the war.<sup>89</sup>

At the conclusion of the Carolina's campaign Sherman had achieved his desired end state of breaking the Confederates will to fight by bringing punitive measures to bare upon the civilian population of the south. Sherman's aims were that through the destruction of the southern heartland it would be a political statement that the civilians of the south were at the mercy of his army. And furthermore their Confederate government and military were unable to protect them.<sup>90</sup> "These points were regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place in the Confederacy is safe against the army of the West. Let Lee hold on to Richmond, and we will destroy his country; and then of what use is Richmond?"<sup>91</sup> During the march he had destroyed the southern capability to create additional means for continuing the war. Sherman and his army had also greatly diminished the ability of the Confederates to move men and materials as well as inflicted significant short-term damage to the Southern populations ability to feed itself. It was, however, the damage to the southern morale and perceptions of the conflict that were the most important to

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<sup>89</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 202; Marszalek, *Sherman: A Soldiers Passion For Order*, 327; O'Connell, *Fierce Patriot*, 176; Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 236.

<sup>90</sup> Hanson, *The Soul of Battle*, 252; Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 191.

<sup>91</sup> Sherman, *Memoirs*, 588.

the war.<sup>92</sup> “I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy’s country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular; we are not fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies.”<sup>93</sup> As a direct result of Sherman’s raids into Georgia and the Carolinas the southern population no longer had confidence they could continue the struggle. Grants change in tactics to raids and punitive measures had brought about the end of the war, and created conditions that made Lee reject the idea of starting an insurgency in the South.<sup>94</sup>

### **The Philippines**

Similar to Sheridan and Sherman’s campaigns during the Civil War, the Philippines War saw the US Army reverting to punitive measures to impose its will on an adversary. The Philippines war was similar to the Civil War, as it started out with a strategy that wanted as little violence as possible against the civilian population in the form of benevolent pacification. When benevolence failed, US Army leadership shifted to a punitive strategy once they understood the enemy that would not acquiesce with out additional hardship.<sup>95</sup> The transition from a strategy of benevolence and attraction to one of chastisement was gradual, selective, and driven by the failure of forcing the enemy to acquiesce, which was also similar to the Civil War.

Prior to the introduction of the US forces into the Philippines, the Spanish had been fighting various Filipino rebel groups and secret societies since the summer of 1896. The main political and economic power of the Philippines resided in Manila where the Spanish had consolidated a majority of their forces. Outside of Manila the central government had divested

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<sup>92</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 203.

<sup>93</sup> Sherman, *Memoirs*, 588.

<sup>94</sup> Grimsley, *The Hard Hand of War*, 203-204.

<sup>95</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 136.

power on the rest of the archipelago to the principales, consisting of local chieftains, landowners and businessmen who controlled the poor peasants. By the 1890s under Spanish occupation the Philippines had become embroiled with lawlessness, epidemics, social tension, and rebellion. In 1897 Emilio Aguinaldo disposed of Andres Bonifacio to become the first president of the first Philippine republic after consolidating power among the various rebel factions. Although he suffered significant losses at the hands of the Spanish forces, Aguinaldo was able to claim independence and keep his forces active by shifting from a strategy of position warfare to one of protracted warfare. This necessitated him dividing the country into de facto governments in each town that would act autonomously to fight the Spanish and consolidate rebel power. Due to the stalemate in December 1897 Aguinaldo and his top staff were paid by the Spanish to go to Hong Kong in exile and end the rebellion against Spanish rule. In the spring of 1898 the Spanish American War expanded to the Philippines, and the US Navy's Asiatic Squadron under Commodore George Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet in the Manila bay. Dewey arranged for Aguinaldo to return from exile so he could gain the help of the local forces and defeat the remaining Spanish forces. Aguinaldo and his forces were able to take a majority of the Spanish controlled territory on the archipelago and isolate the remaining Spanish forces in Manila. By June 12, 1898 he had declared an independent Philippines.<sup>96</sup>

US Army forces began to arrive in the summer of 1898 under the command of Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt.<sup>97</sup> The Spanish and Filipinos had reached a stalemate outside the city walls of Manila with each other's forces both at a strength of 13 thousand. The Spanish garrison in Manila communicated to the US it wanted to surrender to them after a staged battle in which the US would then control the capital. Dewey and Merritt with his 8th Corps of 11 thousand men agreed with the Spanish plan and seized the city in the first battle of Manila on 13 August, 1898, while

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<sup>96</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902* (Chapel Hill, NC: Chapel Hill Press, 1989), 1, 6; Linn, *The Philippine War*, 15-19.

<sup>97</sup> Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency*, 8.

successfully excluding Aguinaldo and his rebels from entering. On 21 December, 1898 US President William McKinley issued a proclamation espousing benevolent assimilation of the Philippines to the new commander Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis. McKinley erroneously believed the US military had control of the entire archipelago and his proclamation desired that there be lawful rule as well as the protection of the property, lives and civil rights of Filipinos. Open conflict between Otis and the 8th Corps of now 20 thousand, against Aguinaldo's Army of Liberation numbering between 15-40 thousand started with the 2nd battle of Manila on 4 February, 1899. By 23 February, 1899 the 8<sup>th</sup> Corps had defeated the Army of Liberation around Manila and forced them into the interior of the county. Simultaneously on the islands south of Luzon known as the Visayas military district, US forces were able to defeat rebel groups that were affiliated with Aguinaldo's government and some that were not. By February 1900 US forces had seized every critical town in the Philippines.<sup>98</sup>

In November 1899 Aguinaldo and his forces realized they would be unable to match the US Army in conventional warfare and decided to implement a guerilla strategy. The Filipino's wanted to use the geography and the familiarity with the people to gain advantages they had never had in the conventional fight against US forces.<sup>99</sup> Aguinaldo and his subordinates based their insurgent tactics on those of the Native Americans, the Cuban resistance to Spain, and the Boers against the British in South Africa. With the destruction of Aguinaldo's army US forces falsely believed they had won and the conflict was over. To consolidate gains and establish control General Otis reorganized his units into battalion and company size elements to occupy all of the critical towns in the Philippines. The units were tasked to build outposts for constabulary and reconstruction related missions.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Linn, *The Philippine War*, 15, 19, 24-25, 30-31, 44, 60-61, 64, 72; Linn, *Guardians*, 12.

<sup>99</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 110.

<sup>100</sup> Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 354; Linn, *Guardians*, 12.

Aguinaldo continued to fight the occupation using guerilla tactics that included ambushes and raids through which he was able to gain the initiative from US forces. He also used a shadow government system to maintain control in the villages, collect taxes, and recruit additional fighters. Aguinaldo's did not aim to defeat the US forces, so much as he needed them to give up on a perceived unwinnable situation. With the impending November 1900 US elections Aguinaldo wanted to draw out the conflict and create enough casualties to make the war unpopular and politically untenable for US political leaders to continue.<sup>101</sup>

In response to the insurgency Otis and his forces began counterinsurgency operations to fight the rebels based on a policy of attraction. The US Army realized it would have to control and safeguard the local population while conducting a counterinsurgency and intelligence campaign across the archipelago. US political leaders knew the military portion would only fully succeed if a viable political solution were reached where the rebels were compelled to halt the insurgency. Otis and his senior leadership relied on their experience during the Civil War as well as their time conducting pacification operations against the Native Americans to formulate and implement a strategy. He believed the Filipinos could be converted into loyal citizens through trust gained by interactions with the US government and military forces. Otis's implantation of the attraction policy meant establishing firm control of his soldier's actions, while protecting the local's rights and personal property from unnecessary damage.<sup>102</sup> Additionally, one of Otis's subordinates Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell thought the population of the US would never politically support the subjugation of a people forced to follow a unwanted government, as this was not compatible with the idea that the government should generated on the motivations of its citizens. Otis's force generally abided by the rules he set forth and were able to make some

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<sup>101</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 110-112.

<sup>102</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 119.

progress in building trust within rebel held areas, but ultimately failed in bringing an end to the insurgency.<sup>103</sup>

Initially the policy of attraction did have the effect of forcing the US Army to pay for all local services, respect local customs and maintain discipline. Small unit leaders were successful in constructing over 1 thousand schools, building infrastructure, creating municipal governance and helping to provide local government services. Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur replaced Otis in May 1900 and continued the practice of attraction. Captured insurgents were usually released unless they were leadership, and amnesty was given to those willing to turn in weapons. Additionally, the success of the policy of attraction mostly relied on the force of personality of the US Army officer in command of each town. If they were able to attract the locals with respect and act in a benevolent way then the locals would believe US forces had their best interests at heart and could protect them. US Civilian leaders also were able to enhance conditions on the archipelago by building courts, reorganize locally elected governance, and establish political parties.<sup>104</sup>

Even with the successes that stemmed from the policy of attraction it was ultimately fruitless. The pacification policy of attraction failed because US forces did not fully understand the relationships of the actors within the insurgency, the US took actions detrimental to their goal of trust building, and the insurgents could rely on violence to control the population. Otis was partially correct in his understanding that the insurgency was led by the upper classes of society and that large portions of the population were undecided in their support of either side. But he miscalculated the widespread appeal of the resistance within the peasant class. The political elite funded and led the insurgency and, controlled by social position, the mass appeal of their

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<sup>103</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 119, 123.

<sup>104</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 119-123.

nationalistic cause versus that of the US attempted benevolence.<sup>105</sup> Bell would later say, “To successfully deal with the common people, the head men, the leaders, the principales are the ones we need to influence. The common hombre is dominated body and soul by his master, the principale.”<sup>106</sup> Some US Army altruistic projects had little effect on the peasants who would never see the results of an improved economy, political changes, and better governance. The programs that did impact peasants directly such as vaccinations and sanitary laws were adverse to their customs. Racist actions by US Soldiers and their lack of communication using the local language hurt trust with the locals. Confidence with the locals was also damaged by the US Army’s inability to secure the population from the insurgents. Insurgents would readily use levels of violence against civilians that US forces would not, allowing them to maintain coercive control in the villages.<sup>107</sup>

MacArthur understood that benevolent pacification had failed and would bring the hard war principles from the Civil War and the Indian Wars to the active Philippine insurgency. MacArthur wanted to change the current policy of attraction to one of chastisement. The shift happened gradually as field commanders grew tired of waiting for the approval of a change of strategy from US civilian leadership. The atrocities committed by the Filipinos as part of their insurgent strategy helped to fuel the shift in US perception of the conflict. By February 1900 the fighting had become strictly small unit engagements with ambushes and harassing fire. US units were able to adapt and win many of the engagements and pressed further into the countryside taking the offensive. Retaliation by US forces against the population took various forms and varied in degree based on locality and the commander. Some commanders would burn homes for

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<sup>105</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 124-125.

<sup>106</sup> Ramsey, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 35.

<sup>107</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 124-126.

guerilla attacks, while others instilled curfews with related punishments of death.<sup>108</sup> US forces gained back the initiative with the success of the punitive measures, so MacArthur reissued G.O. 100 20 December, 1900 to codify what was already in practice across the archipelago. The shift had given the legal means to the commanders at the battalion and company level to continue their pressure on the insurgents, destroy their shadow governance, and break the will of the upper class to continue supporting the insurgency.<sup>109</sup>

The effectiveness of the switch to a policy of chastisement can be seen in the outcome of the counterinsurgency campaign in the first district within the department of Luzon. Initially the US Army had tried and failed to bring about stability through benevolent measures. This included the support of civil government being overshadowed by the resistances use of the civil government to undermine and block US control. The municipal governments set up by the US were created in a hasty manner with ill-conceived structures. The lack of forethought by the Army made the municipal governments wholly ineffective as a means in which to establish control of the population, and in many cases the elected leaders actively supported the guerillas. Educational reforms attempted with the population by the US forces in the first district were successful but created a false sense of progress. Local US commanders believed the goodwill they received from locals for building schools meant that support for the US goals in the district was strong, when in most cases the peasants continued to support the resistance. Additionally, the size of US forces was too small to effectively counter guerilla actions outside of the population centers where they attack ground lines of communication. Any guerilla forces that could be found and attacked quickly fled to the nearest supportive town, hid weapons and supplies, and became regular citizens undistinguishable from the regular inhabitants. An investigation in to the strategy

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<sup>108</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 126, 128; Witt, *Lincoln's Code*, 354; Linn, *Guardians*, 13.

<sup>109</sup> Linn, *Guardians*, 13; Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 128-129.

of benevolent pacification by Lt. William T. Johnston within the department of Luzon identified policy failures, and informed MacArthur that the strategy needed to change.<sup>110</sup>

The local US Army commanders in the first District implemented changes immediately from benevolence to a strategy of chastisement, which would ultimately defeat the insurgency. Col. William P. Duvall within La Union shifted his focus from destroying guerilla bands to identifying and disrupting their support networks through the building of an intelligence network. Duvall hired local Guardia de Honor forces, against US Army policy, and freed captured insurgents to assist him in identifying resistance supporters in the towns to great effect. The Guardia de Honor was a sectarian group that was flipped to the US side by Duval once its leader was captured. The Guardia replaced the insurgent governance in villages, forced locals to confess misdeeds, and exposed elites that were rebel supporters. US civilian leadership complained to MacArthur and President William H. Taft that Duvall had relied on a system of terror through a sect of the population that would cause the war great harm. However, the success of Duvall through the use of the Guardia kept the relationship intact. The new commander of the first district, Brig. Gen. J. Franklin Bell reversed anti-Guardia policies, and expanded their use in the district.<sup>111</sup>

Other policy changes relating to the local populace in the first district were instrumental to bringing the insurgency under control. Travel restrictions and marshal law were put into place. Males above the age of eighteen had to have registration certificates and were not allowed outside of their town's jurisdiction with out signed permission form the village leader. All people entering or leaving a village had to check in within twenty-four hours and town leadership was forced to keep a record of all inhabitants living there; anyone not registered was to be arrested. Proclamations were made that stated support in any kind to the insurgents was illegal as was the

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<sup>110</sup> Linn, *Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 37, 40-42.

<sup>111</sup> Linn, *Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 37, 42-45.

possession of firearms.<sup>112</sup> These measures clarified who was taking enemy action and allowed the US Army to hold the locals accountable for their support. Also the punishments that the Army could impose on supporters of the insurgents were nearly as harsh as those ones used by the insurgents themselves, causing the local leaders to be vigorous in their resistance to insurgents. In the Ilocano provinces within the first district, the Army enlisted the help of the clergy in getting the locals to take oaths of allegiance to the United States. This caused thousands of insurgents to hand over their weapons and created a greater divide between the insurgents and the rest of the population. Throughout the First District power was granted to local commanders to dismiss and arrest if needed any local leaders suspected of supporting insurgents. Locals were driven by US forces back into their villages and in effect separated by the guerillas that stayed in the brush. When the local's in the villages began to support US operations the guerillas turned to terrorism to scare the population into support. This only galvanized local resistance to the insurgents and caused solidarity with the US forces. There was a focused effort by US forces to destroy crops that belonged to insurgent families as well as some use of torture and the execution of captured insurgent spies.<sup>113</sup>

In combination with the way in which the Army interacted with the local population, it also changed the way in which it combated the insurgents in the First District. From October 1900 to May 1901 continuous operation by US forces were conducted outside of the towns and villages to maintain pressure on the remaining insurgents. Very few of the patrols made contact with the guerilla forces, however they were able to locate and destroy food stores and camps. The operations greatly degraded the insurgents fighting capability; never allowing them to rest and forcing to make smaller amounts of supplies last for longer periods of time. The tempo of

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<sup>112</sup> Linn, *Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 49.

<sup>113</sup> Linn, *Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 49-50, 55-57.

operations also had the secondary effect of making locals provide information on the location or participants in the insurgency, due to their weariness of the fighting and occupation.<sup>114</sup>

By 1 May 1901 the First District had been pacified of insurgents. The results of chastisement policies against the guerillas and the locals they required support from were crucial to the success of US forces. In one account of actions within Abra province, First District Maj William C. H. Bowen said, “During the insurrection the province suffered severely; every man was either an active insurrector (sic) or a sympathizer, the consequences being the property had been destroyed right and left; whole villages had been burned, storehouses and crops had been destroyed, and the entire province was as devoid of food products as was the valley of the Shenandoah after Sheridan’s raid during the Civil War.”<sup>115</sup> Although not all of the measures described were used in every province within the first district, the availability of such means to the provincial commanders allowed them to be adaptable and tailor their counterinsurgency policies to the people and threat within their area of operations.<sup>116</sup>

MacArthur’s change of strategy and the offensive he had launched had rested the initiative back from the insurgents. His replacement General Chaffee would take command of the department of the Philippines in summer of 1901 and expand the punitive measures used by the US forces against the guerillas to bring about the termination of the conflict. Chaffee had served under Sheridan in the Shenandoah and had witnessed how effective punitive measures could be against insurgents and their supportive civilian population. He directed the final two campaigns of the conflict in the Batangas region and the island of Samar. Both were distinct by the previously unseen levels of property destruction and the widespread use of concentration camps. The generals in charge of these operations, Bell and Smith, both believed it had been a mistake to be

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<sup>114</sup> Linn, *Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 58.

<sup>115</sup> Linn, *Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 60.

<sup>116</sup> Linn, *Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War*, 61.

lenient with the locals and that the people must experience the conflict directly so they are unwilling to support its continuation. Bell commented in a telegraph to subordinates, “But not withstanding their advice, the people of Bantangas can have peace whenever they want it, and it should be our mission to make them want it as soon as we can by legitimate methods.”<sup>117</sup> Smith in his campaign on Samar Island made camps on the coast and conducted raids inland destroying all property and farmlands. Prior to his campaign Bell framed the operational environment by interviewing various Filipino’s before deciding on an operational approach. He concluded “that the only way that I could possibly succeed in putting an end to the to insurrection within the territorial limits of the brigade would be by cutting off the income and food of the insurgents, and by crowding them so persistently with operations as to wear them out.”<sup>118</sup> Bell separated the population from guerilla units by creating large concentration camps know as “zones of protection,” outside of which he torched the rest of the countryside. Any men found outside of the towns were arrested or shot by Bell’s men. The leaders of the insurgent groups in both areas surrendered to US force by the spring of 1902, and the US declared the Philippine War over by the summer. In response to congressional inquiry into the actions of Smith on Samar Island, Bell said, “what I was doing was the most humane thing I could do under the circumstances, and that my policy was inspired by sympathy and kindness and not resentment or a desire to punish.”<sup>119</sup>

### **World War I**

World War I was unlike the Philippines war in the fact the defeated conventional force of the German army did not undertake an insurgency. The will of the allied forces were imposed on the German military in such a manner during the conventional fighting that with their capitulation

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<sup>117</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 132-134; Ramsey, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 34.

<sup>118</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 134; Ramsey, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 7.

<sup>119</sup> Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency*, 134-135; Ramsey, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 14.

there was no requirement for further punitive measures against the civilian population of Germany. The American 1st Army under General Pershing had defeated the Germans during the Meuse-Argonne campaign, as part of the overall allied offensive in November 1918.<sup>120</sup> In the aftermath of the offensive German forces along the front were in disarray and withdrawing east.<sup>121</sup> “His divisions had been thrown into confusion by our furious assaults, and his morale had been reduced until his will to resist had well-nigh reached the breaking point. Once a German division was engaged in the fight, it became practically impossible to effect its relief.”<sup>122</sup> The French high command began to prepare for follow on offensives east of the Meuse River while instructions for the conduct of troops under an armistice also were published and distributed.<sup>123</sup> Allied forces were able to confirm that the German collapse was occurring across the front line and by 11 November the instructions were sent to cease all military operations in accordance with the armistice order received days earlier. With the armistice came the order to create the US third Army whose mission was to follow the withdrawing German forces to ensure treaty compliance and secure the bridges across the Rhine River. The Third Army shadowed the movement of German forces from France and Luxemburg into Germany without incident.<sup>124</sup>

1 December, 1918 the allies entered Germany and met no resistance from the local population or the retreating German military units. French high command initially planned for a mixed French-American force to occupy German territory, but Pershing declined due to a lack of

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<sup>120</sup> Joseph T. Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War* (New York, NY: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), 194.

<sup>121</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 195-196.

<sup>122</sup> John J. Pershing, *Final Report of GEN. John J. Pershing: Commander-In-Chief American Expeditionary Forces* (Washington DC, Government Printing Office, 1920), 50, accessed 23 February, 2016, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll7/id/882>.

<sup>123</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 195.

<sup>124</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 197-199, 204; Donald Smythe, *Pershing: General of the Armies* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), 245.

consensus on how the military government should interact with the German civilian population. The French leadership agreed to allow the Americans to have a sole responsibility of their sector. When the Third Army arrived in Bitburg, it established its headquarters and issued explicit orders to subordinate units detailing how US forces were to interact with the German population. Pershing stated, “In accordance with the precedent of our Government under similar circumstances, the local civil government, remained in full possession of its former power, and retained jurisdiction over all civil matters.”<sup>125</sup> The German population’s response to the presence of an American occupying force was welcoming and the Americans responded in kind. The French officers embedded with US forces took exception to the treatment of the German population by US forces as being too light and they failed to understand why there were no constraints placed on them. “Major Reginald Kann, Chief French Liaison Officer at our Headquarters, stated that the position of the French officers and soldiers on duty with the Third Army was becoming intolerable; that there were no restrictions on the German people, who received better treatment from the Americans than from their own Prussian officers.”<sup>126</sup> The French officers had to be reminded that the prior experience of the US Army in Cuba, the Philippines, and China had made them far more capable of controlling adversarial populations than any existing allied forces in Europe. Major General Joseph T. Dickman, then the commander of the Third Army told the French officers that American policy and heritage dictate the humane treatment of prisoners, non-combatants kept free from harm, the safeguard of property, protection of individual rights, local authorities maintain control, and Third Army pays for supplies it requires. Dickman went on to say that The US Military policy on how to interact with adversaries has never changed and would not change now. “The Third Army is not granting exceptional

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<sup>125</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 212, 214-215, 217-218; Pershing, *Final Report*, 54, 87; Smythe, *Pershing*, 245.

<sup>126</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 217-218; Smythe, *Pershing*, 245.

favors to the people of the territory it now occupies, but is carrying out what has been the policy of the American government for over 100 years.”<sup>127</sup> He finished by stating that any actions taken to garner ill will from the local inhabitants out of, “a demand for cringing servility from a defeated people, are considered unsportsmanlike and un-America.”<sup>128</sup> Dickman followed up this conversation with a letter to General Pershing urging that there be no change to the existing policy in how the allies treated the defeated German population.<sup>129</sup>

Dickman and the Third Army would rely on a system he referred to as firmness and justice in his unit’s treatment of the German people. The Third Army would maintain their readiness, ensure that the local population knew that they had lost the conflict and were under control of the allies. But, under Dickman’s guidance the control implemented by US forces was, “without arrogance, brutality or harshness.”<sup>130</sup> Regulations that would control or constrain the daily life of German citizens were distributed amongst the population. They included restrictions on anti-allies propaganda, any acts that the allies believed would delay their operations, and that travelers wanting to leave the Third Army area required passes. The British and French who wanted to impose stronger restrictions perceived the Third Army’s regulations as too lenient. The desire by the European allies to impose more punitive measures on the German population faded, and after a few weeks they adopted the Third Army’s regulations. The allied command wanted the US leadership to requisition various types of supplies from the locals and give them receipts that would be honored by the German government, as a form of war reparations.<sup>131</sup> Pershing and Dickman retorted that the hardships imposed on the civilians in such a system were unacceptable,

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<sup>127</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 217-218.

<sup>128</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 219.

<sup>129</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 219-220.

<sup>130</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 228.

<sup>131</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 228-229, 231.

and denied this plan. They also believed that to use this type of reparations against the German populace would be against the self-respect and norms of the American government to not cover its own debts.<sup>132</sup> The US Army strategy of firmness and justice was effective to controlling a population that had submitted to allied forces. The use of punitive measures to exact revenge or establish harsher coercive control over an adversary that had capitulated was unnecessary, and in the conditions of November 1918 would have been counterproductive.

### **Conclusion**

Previous armies that have successfully imposed their will upon an adversary provide operational planners lessons on how to transition to conflict resolution while maintaining a position of relative advantage. The US Civil War and the conflict on the Philippines from 1898-1902 were events in which the United States Army brought about a desired end state. In both cases the end states achieved was a position of continuing advantage gained by the ability to impose its will upon the adversary. What was critical to the successful imposition of that will was the legal tools available to the US Army to ensure conventional forces, unconventional forces, and civilian populations were defeated. In both conflicts the successful strategy was not apparent or employed in the beginning, but as the conflicts wore on the strategies changed. Success was due to adaptation in face of enemy resistance, which necessitated the use of punitive measures. These punitive measures can be useful to the US Army in future conflicts and do not have to lead to atrocities.

Punitive measures were critical when capitulation was not achieved through US Army operational approaches solely reliant on benevolence or policies of attraction. G.O. 100 existed to give commanders options with how to employ coercive responses to enemy conventional forces, unconventional forces, and popular supporters. It provided legal recourse to the US Army to penalize adversaries that refuse to fight in a uniform or follow the other agreed upon laws of war.

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<sup>132</sup> Dickman, *The Great Crusade: A Narrative of the World War*, 231.

Adversaries that refuse to follow the rules of armed conflict forfeit the protections offered by those agreements. Additionally, it gives a legal coercive mechanism to inflict pressure on the civilian population that supports enemy forces within the area of operations. Under G.O. 100 the population does not forfeit all rights, and is still protected from bodily harm. But their property and supplies that could be of any military use are within the right if the US Army to destroy. Additionally, the population's movements and location can be controlled in order to protect them from insurgents, or separate them from being able to support insurgents.

AEF action at end of WWI is a clear example of when the use of punitive measure is unnecessary for conflict termination. Just as the US Army has many options in combat, if the operating environment and the adversary does not necessitate certain means then those means are not utilized. After the cessation of combat in November of 1918 US Army forces began to treat the German population and surviving army forces with support and respect. This was infuriating to the French who at times would demand that they American treat the Germans with punitive measure to exact a toll from them for their actions during the war. These types of vindictive actions sought by the French were roundly rejected by US commanders as they conflict had ended and the enemy had capitulated. There was no need for punitive measures and to apply them on a admittedly defeated enemy would have been unnecessary and illegal.

The US Army should ensure that it has a capability to employ punitive measures when the situation requires. Artificially constraining the amount of damage that can be inflicted on property and supplies greatly constrains the effect US forces can have on enemy logistics as well as the will of the enemy and their supportive population. Punitive measures as shown during the civil war and Philippines can, but do not necessarily lead to atrocities. Well-trained and professional soldiers are capable of controlling and understanding what is a valid military target and what is not. A deeper institutional review and inclusion of G.O 100 in current military doctrine would be beneficial to expanding the effectiveness of US Army forces. Not considering

the effectiveness of G.O. 100 in previous conflicts will likely lead to a misuse of punitive measures if they are required again.

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