

Planning for Post-Regime Change Environments: The Introduction of a Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership (PREPP)

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Planning for Post-Regime Change Environments: The Introduction of a Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership (PREPP), by MAJ Jennifer L. Nolan, 49 pages.

This is a study of a United States deficiency in post-regime change planning elements through the lens of Graham T. Allison's theory outlined in his book *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. The first two case studies, Kosovo and Libya, will illustrate the conflation that exists between the planning element and politically appointed decision makers. The third case study, on Nigeria, will provide an analysis of a peaceful transition of power to illustrate the need for a year-round planning element capable of presenting options for all three models of Allison's decision makers. Finally, the structure for a proposed Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership (PREPP) utilizes the historical model of President Eisenhower's National Security Council (NSC) Planning Board.

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Acronyms

DC	Deputies Committee
DIME	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic instruments of power
DoS	United State Department of State
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
GoN	Government of Nigeria
IFOR	Implementation Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MDSD	Most Different Systems Design
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	United States National Security Council
NSS	National Security Staff
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PC	Principles Committee
PPE	Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
PREPP	Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership
PRP	Pandemic Response Program
S/CRS	State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
STOR	Stabilization Force
TNC	Libyan Transnational Council
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WWII	World War II

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Regime change is an inevitable progression in the global construct, yet how the United States looks at regime change along with the post-regime change environment varies with each new president and his or her politically appointed leadership. Whether an *obligation* to the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a *choice* to cause regime change in the interest of national security, or a *peaceful* transition of power, the United States takes a reactive approach to regime change with mixed results. The United States has proven proficiency in forced regime change, yet the issue lies not with the ability to create regime change, but in post-regime change environments where nascent governments are compelled to endure a new perception of reality. As a global leader, the United States needs to take a more proactive approach in planning for post-regime change environments by leveraging the instruments of national power to ensure rapid stabilization and governance for those nation states affected. This is a study of a deficiency in United States post-regime change planning elements through the lens of Graham T. Allison's theory, as outlined in his book *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*.¹ The first two case studies, Kosovo and Libya, will illustrate the conflation that exists between the planning element and politically appointed decision makers. The third case study, on Nigeria, will provide an analysis of a peaceful transition of power to illustrate the need for a year-round planning element capable of presenting options for all three models of Allison's decision makers. Finally, a structure will be presented for a proposed Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership (PREPP) that utilizes the historical model of President Eisenhower's National Security Council (NSC) Planning Board.

¹ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson, 1999), 1-405.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to review the types of organizational planning elements in post-regime change environments throughout history. Numerous studies throughout academia, think tanks, and Congressional reports identify the need for a separate dedicated planning element, assembled prior to regime change and comprised of a civil, military, and private sector staff. Since there are numerous examples, this chapter will provide reviews on planning organizations in World War II (WWII), the Persian Gulf War, and the present day State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Through these examples, it will show the growing emphasis on utilizing a “whole of government” approach at the strategic and operational levels, which finds interagency congruence in an era of limited resources. As stated in Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, “Achieving national strategic objectives requires effective unified action resulting in unity of effort. This is accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination in the use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.”²

Bill Flavin, the Assistant Director of the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, states that in World War II the planning for war termination and the post-conflict period began in 1942, three years prior to the end of conflict. General Eisenhower devised a separate staff dedicated to post-conflict operations. This staff, led by General Lucius D. Clay, integrated both civilian and military staff and reported directly to General Eisenhower. This parallel headquarters focused on termination and reconstruction allowed for the kinetic military planners to focus on the upcoming campaign in Ardennes. A similar example is noted years later with Colonel Randall Elliott’s Kuwait Task Force, also a separate planning element dedicated to the

² Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), II-2.

reconstruction of Kuwait City. Unlike General Clay's organization, Elliot's task force stood up following the cessation of major combat operations. The Kuwait Task Force successfully integrated both civilian and military staff thanks to Colonel Elliott, who was both a Department of State senior analyst and an operations officer for the 352nd Civil Affairs Command.³ Although both WWII and Kuwait post-regime change elements were separate, dedicated planning elements, the distinct difference between them is the timeframe in which planning commenced. Both elements met the definition of success, yet the question remains: Would the US and its allies have saved blood and treasure in the subsequent Operation Iraqi Freedom by utilizing a year-round planning element dedicated to the study of post-regime change environments?

Congress attempted to answer this question in September 2008 by passing the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act. This legislation codified the existence and functions of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).⁴ Although this organization is a positive step in the evolution of post-regime change planning, its approach does not incorporate all of the instruments of national power in order to achieve a strategic end state. Additionally, this organization has a myopic focus, which monitors and plans for potential conflicts at the Department of State regional bureau level. Such an approach is reactive and likely to bring about an unbalanced strategy. If the S/CRS added planners that represent all the instruments of national power, and included the analysis of peaceful transitions of power as well as potential conflicts, it might present an ideal model for post-regime change environments.

³ William Flavin, *Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success* (Washington, DC: Parameters, 2003), 110.

⁴ Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping/stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/reserve Corps and Other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 2.

The United States National Security Strategy and National Security Presidential Directive 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, provides context and official guidance for what a future organization must accomplish, but it does not offer specifics regarding its necessary characteristics or composition.⁵ These policies provide the United States Government (USG) the freedom to design and implement a planning organization capable of predicting, reacting to, and assisting with various post-regime change environments. This monograph will endeavor to provide that design utilizing history, theory, and personal experience.

Summary

A brief review of available literature regarding post-regime change environments reveals three trends. First, the need for a dedicated planning mechanism comprised of all of the elements of national power. Second, this planning approach must be engaged prior to, during, and following regime change in order to affect outcomes in support of US policy and strategy. Third, this dedicated planning must not limit their analysis to violent regime changes; rather it needs to consider peaceful transitions of power since nascent transitions can be vulnerable to partisan warfare.

⁵ Kellie J. McCoy, *Creating Effective Post-Conflict Transition Organizations: Lessons from Panama, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq* (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2008), 8.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In 1962, American physicist Thomas S. Kuhn theorized that the discovery of "anomalies" during revolutions in science leads to new paradigms. New paradigms then force researchers to ask new questions of old data, move beyond the mere "puzzle-solving" of the previous paradigm, and change the rules of the game and the "map" directing new research.⁶ In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Kuhn argued that science does not progress via a linear accumulation of new knowledge, but undergoes periodic revolutions, also called "paradigm shifts."⁷ Kuhn expounds by stating:

This is not to suggest that new paradigms triumph ultimately through some mystical aesthetic. On the contrary, very few men desert a tradition for these reasons alone. Often those who do turn out to have been misled. But if a paradigm is ever to triumph, it must gain some first supporters, men who will develop it to the point where hardheaded arguments can be produced and multiplied.⁸

In the Kuhnian spirit, this monograph endeavors to introduce a new paradigm in post-regime change planning organizations by evaluating three disparate regime change environments that utilize Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune's theory of Most Different Systems Design (MDSD). Here, the strategy is to choose units of research that are as different as possible with regard to extraneous variables.⁹ The first case study, Kosovo, outlines the United States military and political *obligation* through various articles and treaties to both NATO and the United Nations through the fall of Slobodan Milosevic. The second case study, the deliberate removal of

⁶ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 4th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 139, 159.

⁷ John Horgan, "Profile: Reluctant Revolutionary," *Scientific American* 264, no. 5 (1991): 40-49.

⁸ Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 24-25.

⁹ Carsten Anckar, "On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Research," *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 11, no. 5 (December 2008): 389-401.

Muammar Qaddafi, illustrates a *choice* by the United States to intervene in the Libyan revolution despite the lack of international consensus on a reconstruction plan for a post-Qaddafi Libya. The third case study looks at the peaceful transition of power in Nigeria as an *opportunity* to utilize the instruments of power in a non-crisis environment for the benefit of continued regional stabilization. The analysis of these three cases in Chapter 4 will delineate trends in the structure of planning teams for regime change and post-regime change environments. The lessons learned from these three studies will illuminate the necessity for the continual political and military analysis of regime change environments.

Framework for Analysis

The planning elements delineated in the case studies mentioned above are evaluated using Graham T. Allison's theory outlined in his book *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*.¹⁰ The purpose for this methodology is to illustrate that post-regime change planning elements have the ability to influence three categories of decision-making: a rational action model, an organizational process model, or a governmental politics model. Additionally, all three case studies will outline the type of planning element, the actors, and the motivations for those actors. Table 1 outlines the methodology comparing Allison's models on decision-making and the evaluation of planning elements within the case studies.

¹⁰ Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson, 1999), 1-405.

Allison's Essence of Decision	Model I <i>rational actor</i>	Model II <i>organizational process</i>	Model III <i>governmental politics</i>
Paradigms	Governmental action as choice (Libya)	Governmental action as organizational output (Libya and Kosovo)	Governmental action as political resultant (Kosovo)
Type of Planning Element	Obama Administration	Obama / Clinton Administration, NATO, UN	Clinton Administration
Actors (Decision Makers)	President Obama, etc.	President Obama / Clinton, NATO leaders, UN leaders	President Clinton, Madeline Albright, etc.
Motivations of Actors	Arab Spring, regional stability/instability, global petroleum market	NATO – regional stability, UN/US–cessation of mass atrocities	Impeachment, scandals, Iraq, Kenya

Table 1. Methodology through the Lens of Graham T. Allison's *The Essence of Decision*.

Source: Created by author with input from Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson, 1999), 391.

Dr. Jenny Lewis outlines Allison's models: In the *rational actor model* the nation or government is a unitary rational actor, action is chosen in response to a problem, the solution is chosen from among a set of fixed options, and action is based on rational choice.¹¹ This model fits a portion of the Libya case study for the US decision to remove Muammar Qaddafi from power. The *organizational process model* sees government not as a unitary decision-maker but as a collection of loosely allied organizations, each of which has its own particular position on

¹¹ Jenny Lewis, "Graham T Allison's 'The Essence of Decision'," *Journal of Health Services Research & Policy* 12, no. 2 (April 2007): 118-19.

issues.¹² The second half of the Libya case study applies to this model through the US-led NATO Operation Unified Protector. This model will also illustrate a portion of the Kosovo case study through the organizational process between the United States and NATO. The *governmental politics model* shifts the focus to leaders and argues that leaders are not a monolithic group but a set of individuals playing against each other in a competitive game.¹³ This model will also outline events in the Kosovo case study as the internal politics, goals, and interests are addressed within the Clinton administration. The analysis of these two case studies through Allison's lens will illustrate the need for a newly proposed organization capable of proactively planning for disparate regime change environments. Subsequently, the third case study, on Nigeria, will provide an analysis of a peaceful transition of power to illustrate the need for a year-round planning element capable of presenting options to all three models of Allison's decision makers.

Case Study Omissions

The case studies considered for this monograph are limited to United States political and military operations from the end of the Cold War Era to the most recent Nigerian Elections in 2015. Even within these limitations, there are several other examples of US involvement in regime change during this period that the researcher intentionally omitted from this monograph due to methodology and theory selection.

The end of the Cold War era government collapses in Haiti and Somalia provide credible examples of US involvement in regime change. However, in both cases, the role of the United States was limited to military and humanitarian assistance prior to regime change, while the United Nations served as the lead planning element of post-regime change. Bosnia provides an

¹² Jenny Lewis, "Graham T Allison's 'The Essence of Decision'," *Journal of Health Services Research & Policy* 12, no. 2 (April 2007): 118-19.

¹³ *Ibid.*

incomplete model for the use of the instruments of national power by the Clinton Administration. Although an international peace agreement was reached between the United Nations and President Milosevic in regards to Bosnia, Milosevic just decided to turn his attention to Kosovo.

The Persian Gulf War introduced the Kuwait Task Force, which proved highly effective in reconstruction efforts, yet since Saddam Hussein remained in power, the Task Force did not support a change in regime. Because of this decision, the United States deposed Saddam Hussein ten years later in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although the Iraq research illustrates regime change planning, there is an absence in planning for post-regime change. This model for the absence of proper planning and analysis of the operational environment is the subject of several literary works. Afghanistan is an exceptional example for the paradigmatic shift in military thinking to systems dynamics and strategic foresight, yet it too proved excessive in its literary research, did not complement the framework for analysis utilized, and is not yet concluded.

Case Study Overview / Justification (Kosovo, Libya, Nigeria)

There is a wide variety of literature surrounding the Slobodan Milosevic regime change. The most dominant body of material surrounds the use of air power through the NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) under the United Nations Charter's Chapter VII, and the Security Council authorized follow-on force for reconstruction called the Stabilization Force (SFOR). The remainder of written works, from congressional reports to academic journals, center on the combination of Diplomatic, Informational, and Economic (DIME) means utilized in combination with the NATO-led military force. The planning element responsible for this coordination and synchronization was the Clinton Administration, who developed the strategic end state for the campaign years prior to the fall of Milosevic, then manipulated and synthesized the instruments of national power as the situation evolved. One of the key takeaways is that the White House looked beyond ousting Milosevic to create a strategic end state based on a stable, democratic

regime. The international community (European Union, United Nations, and United States) looked at the system dynamics, realized Milosevic's sources of power, and subsequently isolated them while simultaneously undermining his legitimacy. The unique aspect of the Kosovo Campaign is that the international community planned for the post-regime change by identifying a suitable candidate who would uphold his country's constitution and international commitments.¹⁴

Although the US-led campaign strategy resulted in regime change, much of the literature credits Russian intervention since Milosevic stepped down following a meeting with the Russian foreign minister. This intervention may have been the tipping point for Milosevic since his ultimate goal rested on US elections and a transition from the current Clinton Administration.

Overall, the research addressing Kosovo illustrates the effectiveness of a strategic planning element that uses system dynamics to achieve strategic end states. Unfortunately, this planning element is not a permanent feature of the American political system; it is lacking in formal structure and permanency due to election cycles and changes in strategic level administration.

Although the removal of Muammar Qaddafi occurred recently in 2011, there is a considerable amount of contemporary analysis on the events leading up to and including his removal from power. The preponderance of literature focuses on the post-Qaddafi regime failures and opportunities for the international community. The consensus between both pre- and post-Qaddafi writings is the lack of an agreed upon international strategic objective and end state.

In March of 2011, six months prior to the fall of Qaddafi, the Center for Strategic and International Studies promulgated that the use of armed force to intervene in Libya had no clear, meaningful strategic objective. In *The Libyan War: A Diplomatic History*, the authors outline the

¹⁴ Gregory L. Schulte, "Regime Change Without Military Force: Lessons from Overthrowing Milosevic," *Prism: A Journal for the Center for Complex Operations* 4, no. 2 (March 2013): 49.

Libya Contact Group, which was formed to support and be a focal point of contact with the Libyan people, coordinate international policy, and be a forum for discussion of humanitarian and post-conflict support.¹⁵ The White House report, *US Activities in Libya*, outlines the President's reasons for military action in Libya, and leaves the post-regime change planning to the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC), which recently formed but lacks legitimacy and experience in governance, not to mention a constitution.

It is not clear what analytic approach scholar Anthony H. Cordesman utilized, but this prediction prior to the fall of Qaddafi indicating that there is no clear winner in Libya showed the merits of strategic foresight. His analysis concluded that Libya would divide for an unpredictable amount of time into two hostile zones with either a front or ceasefire line, and a political and economic struggle would continue with periodic episodes of violence.¹⁶ With the migrant crisis reaching historic proportions in Europe, the effect of Libyan migration on international interests shows what effect the lack of a dedicated planning element focused on system dynamics can have.

The 2015 Nigerian election was the most successful democratic exercise in the country's history, building on the progress made in 2011 after a series of seriously flawed elections. For the first time in Nigerian history, a Muslim candidate was elected from the Northern region of Nigeria, which created a unique shift in power from the "elite class" to the historically marginalized population in the North.

According to White House and Congressional reports, there is an emphasis on strengthening and maintaining US-Nigerian relations since Nigerians are the single largest African diaspora group in the United States, an important trading partner for the United States,

¹⁵ Emily O'Brien, Andrew Sinclair, and Richard Gowan. *The Libyan War: A Diplomatic History, February-August 2011* (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2011), 1.

¹⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Libya: Three Possible Outcomes and the Role of Governance, Money, Gas, and Oil* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 1-3.

and the second-largest beneficiary of US private investment on the continent. The United States is not alone in employing such an approach; Parliamentary reports from the United Kingdom promulgate much of the same reasoning in their policy toward Nigeria.

Even with the emphasis on Nigeria in US policy and national security strategy, a dedicated planning effort does not exist to link all of the instruments of national power. There are working groups within the Department of State and United States Africa Command, yet they focus their efforts on Boko Haram, as do the majority of written works.

Chapter 4: Case Studies on the Essence of Decision in Post-Regime Change Environments

Kosovo: The Fall of Slobodan Milosevic

Milosevic has been at the center of every crisis in the former Yugoslavia over the last decade. He is not simply part of the problem; Milosevic is the problem.

- James P. Rubin, Chief Spokesman for the State Department, 1997-2000

The example of Kosovo outlines the difficulties for planning elements attempting to provide viable options for disparate types of decision-making elements. The various decision makers in this case study fluctuate between Graham T. Allison's *governmental politics* and *organizational process* models depending on the events presented to them in 1998 and 1999 respectively. This case study begins with a historical overview on those events leading up to and including the conflict in Kosovo through 1998, followed by an analysis of the US planning element, actors, and motivations through the lens of the *governmental politics* model. Subsequently, the analysis of events in 1999 will illustrate the *organizational process* model where several different international actors attempt to conflate their motivations in order to achieve a strategic end state.

Historical Overview

The first indicator of instability came in 1989 when President Slobodan Milosevic made changes to the Serbian constitution that stripped Kosovo of its constitutional autonomy and instituted a repressive form of rule.¹⁷ Kosovo severely restricted both work and cultural activities of Kosovar Albanians. Dr. Stathis N. Kalyvas describes the cause and effect of this situation in his book, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, "The combined effect of the reduction in available benefits, the increasing role of violence, and the civilians' orientation toward survival is a

¹⁷ Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 37.

situation in which effective threats translate into collaboration.”¹⁸ Through this logic, you can almost predict the Kosovar Albanian collaboration to rally against the Serbian government for survival, thus creating instability. Yet neither the United States nor the international community took action at this time.

In 1992, three years later, the United States showed support for the Balkans by extending diplomatic recognition to Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia, but not Kosovo. This decision by the United States only exacerbated the rising tensions in Kosovo by providing Milosevic with legitimacy to govern Kosovo as its internationally recognized president. The effect of this decision led to an escalation of violence toward Kosovar Albanians by Milosevic’s Serbian security forces. This second order from the United States not to recognize Kosovo is found in Dr. Kalyvas’ theory that control of a population is the critical factor in gaining collaboration, stating, “The higher the level of control exercised by a political actor in an area, the higher the level of civilian collaboration with this political actor will be.”¹⁹ Given this theory, President Milosevic’s actions sound logical. In order to regain control of the population, he needed to eliminate the Kosovar Albanian resistance, which would subsequently allow civilian collaboration. What is not logical yet predictable based on Milosevic’s actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that “ethnic cleansing” would be the tool utilized to eliminate this resistance. In 1992, the same year that this escalation in ethnic violence occurred in Kosovo, the UN General Assembly made this statement about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Gravely concerned about the deterioration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina owing to intensified aggressive acts by the Serbian and Montenegrin forces to acquire more territories by force, characterized by a consistent pattern of gross and systematic violations of human rights, a burgeoning refugee population resulting from mass expulsions of defenceless civilians from their homes and the existence in Serbian

¹⁸ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 117.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 111.

and Montenegrin controlled areas of concentration camps and detention centres, in pursuit of the abhorrent policy of "ethnic cleansing", which is a form of genocide.²⁰

As a response to Milosevic's alleged resumption of "ethnic cleansing," US President George H.W. Bush threatened him with unilateral military action if the Serbian aggression toward Kosovar Albanians continued. However, Milosevic ignored this threat and the Serbian aggression continued. A third effect of the US decision not to recognize Kosovo's autonomy was the creation of a shadow government within Kosovo by the Kosovar Albanians, who voted Ibrahim Rugova in as president in unofficial elections. Rugova hoped that in demonstrating their ability to run the territory in all but name, the West would come to recognize Kosovo's right to be independent, as it had for four Yugoslav republics in the early 1990s.²¹ In 1993, President William J. Clinton succeeded President Bush and Bosnia, not Kosovo, was the priority for the new Clinton Administration.

In Paris on December 14, 1995, the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia signed the peace settlement they negotiated in Dayton, Ohio. The following day, the United Nations (UN) Security Council's Resolution 1031 authorized for one year the multilateral NATO-led implementation force (IFOR) under the UN Charter's Chapter VII. On December 12, 1996, the Security Council authorized a follow-on force, dubbed the Stabilization Force (SFOR).²² This ended the war in Bosnia, yet left the international community with the lingering issue of President Slobodan Milosevic remaining in power.

In their orientation toward survival in the absence of international support, the Kosovar Albanians created the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996 to counter Serb authorities

²⁰ United Nations General Assembly, *The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (New York: 91st Plenary Meeting, 1992), 1.

²¹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 8.

²² Steven R. Bowman, *Bosnia: US Military Operations* (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2001), 1.

through violent attacks. In response, Serbian authorities repressed movement of student and ethnic populations within Kosovo. The violence between the two factions continued when, in 1998, President Bill Clinton's special envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, described the KLA as, "without any questions, a terrorist group."²³ This public recognition, although not sanctioned by the Department of State, gave Milosevic justification for his continued violence against the KLA and the ethnic Albanian population they represented.

Milosevic created a conundrum for the Clinton Administration. Serbia and its neighbors Bosnia, Kosovo, and Yugoslavia presented no real threat to US national security, yet the instability generated by these countries was and is significant to their European partners. The United States has an obligation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in this post-Cold War environment to take whatever leadership role is necessary for European stabilization. The eventual overthrow of Milosevic using both NATO air power and the combined Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) instruments of national power by the Clinton Administration proved successful, yet took longer than anyone in the United States and international community expected. To analyze the reasons for this lag in post-war reconstruction planning, we will look at the type of planning elements utilized, the actors involved, and the motivations of those actors within the timeline of events in 1998.

Planning Element

The larger, multinational planning element during the Kosovo conflict consisted of the US National Security Council (NSC), NATO, and major European leaders. From the beginning of the conflict, European leaders and the United States shared a common belief that they had to “do something” about the situation in this small territory in the heart of the former Yugoslavia; they

²³ Dag Henriksen, *Nato's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998-1999* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 126-29.

simply could never agree what that “something” was.²⁴ Yet the preponderance of planning for this conflict occurred in the NSC, which President Clinton altered during his administration by adding key members on January 21, 1993, in Presidential Decision Directive 2. The new membership of the National Security Council included the following officials: the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations (UN), the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President.²⁵ This addition introduced the economic instrument of national power, as well as an integral link to the UN, which were both critical to the NSC’s planning construct at the time of the conflict in Kosovo.

Actors

The key members of the NSC at the time of the conflict in Kosovo were dynamic leaders with divergent backgrounds, all appointed in 1997. Madeline Albright was the US Ambassador to the United Nations until taking her position as the first female Secretary of State. Longtime diplomat Richard Holbrook succeeded Albright as the US ambassador to the UN after successfully brokering the peace agreement at the Dayton Peace Accords. William Cohen was the senior Senator to Maine until taking his position as Secretary of Defense. General Wesley K. Clark, Sr., a highly decorated veteran of the Vietnam War and a Rhodes Scholar in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE), was the Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) on the Joint Chiefs of Staff until Clinton appointed him Commander, US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The only key individual not new to the NSC was Deputy National

²⁴ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 16-17.

²⁵ “Clinton Administration 1993-1997,” *Office of the Historian Website*, 1997, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/history.html#clinton>.

Security Advisor Sandy Berger who succeeded Anthony Lake to become the National Security Advisor (NSA).

Motivations of Actors

The personality dynamics between these key members and their relationship to President Clinton plays a large role in both the ability to plan for operations in Kosovo and the inability to come to an agreement regarding a political end state. These personality dynamics illustrate the *governmental politics model* where Allison deconstructs rational decision-making, stressing the extent to which political factors external to the overt international issue might affect decision-making.²⁶ When describing this dynamic, Allison's famous slogan 'where you stand depends on where you sit' is most appropriate.²⁷

At the time of the crisis in Kosovo, the president's staff dominated national security policy. In particular, Sandy Berger, who was a longtime friend of Clinton, had unfettered access, and used his position to influence policy. Richard Holbrook was a close second in influence, which made Madeline Albright's rhetoric fall flat on the ears of President Clinton. The additional and more influential factor for this planning body was the events other than Kosovo going on at the time of the conflict, which caused a grave distraction for President Clinton. The political and media influence of the Monica Lewinsky scandal, impeachment trial, and Paula Jones lawsuit all served to divert attention away from the crisis in Kosovo and leave the politically appointed NSC staff with a conundrum. Additionally, President Saddam Hussein decided to ban US and UN inspectors from Iraq, thus causing four days of US / United Kingdom (UK) limited airstrikes against Iraq. To make matters even more complex, followers of Osama Bin Laden bombed the

²⁶ Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, 4th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 80.

²⁷ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 307.

US embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam, Kenya. Although the NSC staff was actively engaged in the Iraq, Kenya, and Kosovo crises, President Clinton was markedly distracted by an ongoing impeachment trial that could have ended his Presidency. In an attempt to shield Clinton from further media scrutiny, the National Security Advisor (NSA) Sandy Berger chose not to escalate military action beyond a show of force in Kosovo. Secretary of State Madeline Albright endeavored to convince the NSC, Congress, and the President that military force (both ground and air) must be utilized to stop the human rights atrocities committed in Kosovo. Unfortunately for Kosovo, the Secretary's arguments fell on deaf ears.

While the NSC all agreed that "something" should be done about the crisis in Kosovo, Sandy Berger and the majority of the NSC did not think it was wise to go to war since the President was already on uneven footing with the American people. Madeline Albright continued her attempts to influence the NSC into military action, knowing that diplomatic negotiations with Milosevic were likely to fail. Albright's rhetoric reflected her strong belief that Milosevic needed to be forcefully persuaded to accept Kosovo's autonomy.²⁸ Yet Albright's persistence did not pay off until the January 1999 Racak Massacre, where 45 people were reportedly killed, including a 12-year-old boy and three women. All victims had been shot and the Kosovo Verification Mission team reported that it found several bodies decapitated.²⁹ Only after this event did the NSC agree to resolve the crisis in Kosovo and oust Slobodan Milosevic. Subsequently, one month following the Racak massacre, the impeachment trial ended. The day following Clinton's acquittal in the US Senate, he gave his full attention to the Kosovo crisis, devising a comprehensive plan using all of the instruments of national power (DIME) in order to force

²⁸ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 69.

²⁹ OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, *Kosovo/Kosova - as Seen, as Told, an Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998 to June 1999* (Washington, DC: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 1999).

Milosevic from power and end the conflict. Consequently, all actors in the *governmental process* model have culminated and will now shift to the *organizational model*, which introduces additional actors and motivations.

Within the sequence of events above, it is easy to see the cause and effect pattern for US action or inaction. The refusal of UN / US inspectors in Iraq, the bombing of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, not to mention the Monica Lewinsky scandal, all served as a grave distraction from the ongoing crisis in Kosovo. The initial focus of the NSC is to shield the president from additional negative press by not going to war in Kosovo, instead of looking at the long-term strategic effect of inaction. Ten years elapsed in between the first indicator of instability and the comprehensive use of DIME in Kosovo. Yet, once President Clinton was fully engaged following the end of the impeachment trial, the use of DIME in removing Milosevic from power was effective.

The important takeaways from the Kosovo US planning element through the lens of Allison's *governmental politics model* are that they were all political appointees and that they planned for Milosevic's regime change during a prolonged crisis. Political appointees such as Berger and Holbrook are acutely aware that they serve at the pleasure of the President and will do what is necessary to maintain the President's esteem. Even if you have dissenters such as Albright, the majority will silence the discord. Additionally, asking the NSC to provide in-depth planning for pre-, during, and post-regime change while working through multiple domestic and international crises is unreasonable. A year-round planning partnership composed of non-political appointees from each of the key components of the NSC staff that focuses on post-regime change environments is necessary to ensure that political machination stays out of the planning process.

In a shift to another decision-making model, the US interactions with the UN, NATO, and the Russian government illustrate the model of *organizational behavior* evident in the sequence of events that occurred in 1999. As in the *governmental politics model* above, the same

methodology analyzing the historical overview, actors, and actors' motivations is employed. Since the planning elements described above remain unchanged, this aspect is omitted.

Historical Overview

Four short days following the Racak Massacre, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Wesley Clark and Military Committee Chief Gen. Klaus Naumann held talks with President Milosevic in Belgrade. They reportedly demanded that Milosevic uphold his October commitment that included pulling back his forces from Kosovo and providing access to aid organizations, or face air strikes. However, Milosevic rebuffed NATO's threats of intervention.³⁰ With this dismissal by Milosevic, US officials, for the first time, left open the possibility that the Administration would consider sending US troops to Kosovo as part of a peacekeeping force. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger stated that although President Clinton was still opposed to sending US troops to Kosovo, "no decisions" had yet been made. Secretary of State Albright, meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, stated that peacekeeping options would be examined.

In February, French President Jacques Chirac hosted a Kosovo peace conference in Rambouillet to include members of the KLA, but not President Milosevic since he refused the invitation. The international negotiators during the conference included the United States, European Union (EU), and Russia who reported that the talks were "moving ahead," but cited no concrete progress due to the absence of the Serbian President. It is important to note that although the peace negotiations included the proposal of a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, NATO representatives were not present during the negotiations at Rambouillet. Following over two weeks in Rambouillet and several attempts at diplomatic intervention from the international

³⁰ Julie Kim, *Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September 1998 – March 1999*, (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1999), 8.

community, a final agreement had not been reached on a peace proposal. The only consensus reached by the nation states in attendance was that of substantial autonomy for Kosovo.

In March, prior to the second round of peace talks in Paris, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou held talks with President Milosevic in Belgrade. The Russian and Greek officials expressed hope that their countries' close ties with Yugoslavia would prove useful in persuading Milosevic to accept a peacekeeping agreement. Russia remained opposed to NATO's threat of air strikes against Serbia. After the talks, Foreign Minister Ivanov announced that Belgrade "decisively and finally" rejected the possibility of a foreign military or police presence in Kosovo.

Despite Milosevic's continued defiance, the Paris peace conference convened in a second attempt at a formal agreement from all parties involved. This time a delegation from NATO joined the peace talks to discuss military implementation for the accords, leading to an agreement from the Albanian delegation, who then signed the Rambouillet accords in Paris. This only infuriated President Milosevic, who then started massing Serbian troops on Kosovo's border.

As a response to Milosevic's troop movements, President Clinton publicly stated that the Kosovo conflict threatened US national interests. He warned that there would be more massacres if NATO did not act. Five days later, on 24 March, NATO launched Operation Determined Force, a strategic bombing campaign that caused Russia to suspend cooperation with NATO. After a failed UN Security Council resolution demanding an end to the NATO action, Russian President Boris Yeltsin changed course and made the decision to resume Russian involvement in peace negotiations by sending special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin to negotiate directly with Milosevic. In the face of all of this pressure, Milosevic was confronted by Russia's decision to join the alliance in urging him to accept NATO's core demands: an end to the violence, all Serb forces to leave Kosovo, international forces to enter the territory, the refugees to return, and a political

process to restore autonomy for the ethnic Albanians.³¹ After 78 days of bombing, Milosevic capitulated. Shortly thereafter, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999), which suspended Belgrade's governance over Kosovo, placed Kosovo under the administration of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and authorized a NATO peacekeeping force. Resolution 1244 also envisioned a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status.³²

Throughout these six months of intense diplomatic negotiations and limited use of military force, the combination of international actors shifted decision-making from a *governmental politics* model to an *organizational behavior* model. This is significant for planning elements confronted with the challenge of shifting from finding solutions for one individual (President) to finding solutions for many individuals with disparate motivations.

Motivations of Actors

In addition to the United States, actors outlined in the *governmental politics* model previously, the introduction of the UN, NATO, and Russian government actors presents an interesting representation of the evolution of decision-making. The UN, through its Security Council, sought to provide legitimacy to the conflict in Kosovo by condemning the 'ethnic cleansing' executed by President Milosevic. Although the UN Security Council agreed that the humanitarian atrocities were unjustified, they could not agree on NATO intervention in Kosovo. Russia and China asserted that domestic oppression was not a threat to international peace and security, and as such, the Council could not authorize an armed intervention against the wishes of

³¹ Daalder and O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 142.

³² Office of the Historian, *A Guide to the United States' History of Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, since 1776: Kosovo* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2015).

the recognized government.³³ If the UN is supposed to provide global legitimacy to any armed intervention, then why did NATO proceed with the airstrikes regardless of the stalemate? Allison explains this phenomenon in that “organizational persistence does not preclude shifts in governmental behavior.” In other words, the US and NATO can override the UN in matters of humanitarian crisis.

This is an interesting example of Allison’s *organizational behavior* model in that one organizational actor, NATO, took the calculated risk and chose to overshadow the other actor, the UN, for what they deemed to be the “greater good.” As President Clinton stated on the day NATO’s bombardment began, the alliance’s goals were threefold: “To demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s purpose so that the Serbian leaders understand the imperative of reversing course, to deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians in Kosovo, and, if necessary, to seriously damage the Serb military’s capacity to harm the people of Kosovo.”³⁴ The outcome of this calculated risk by NATO was a noticed lack of interference on the part of the UN once the bombing campaign commenced. Allison explains this in that “many different organizations not involved in major public activities interact to create new levels of complexity in trying to get anything done.” The UN could not produce results in the form of a Security Council resolution, so it relied on the other organizational actors within the model to counter the stalemate.

The key takeaway from the organizational actors in Kosovo through the lens of Allison’s *organizational behavior* model is that each decision-making organization (NATO, UN, and Russian Government) has separate and distinct motivations for acting on an international event. The key for planning elements is to identify those areas of overlap within organizational motivations to offer feasible options to those decision-making bodies capable of ratification.

³³ Brown and Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, 238.

³⁴ Daalder and O’Hanlon, *Winning Ugly*, 101.

In summary, this case study, through the lens of Graham Allison's *governmental politics* and *organizational behavior* models, illustrates the need for a Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership (PREPP) consisting of non-political appointees with access to the President through the National Security Council and the competence to influence both models of decision-making. With US presidential elections every four to eight years, this creates flexibility in the PREPP to effectively present options for disparate decision makers. In the case of Kosovo, although the NSC and NATO were ultimately successful in ousting President Milosevic, the time it took to whittle down the events other than Kosovo going on at the time of the conflict caused the loss of human lives that, with this proposed PREPP construct, may have been avoidable. Additionally, in order to address concerns in post-conflict Kosovo, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) were established by Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999. The fact that the UNMIK and KFOR are still active in 2015 may be an indicator of the inability to plan for regime change effectively. The year-round PREPP would have the unique ability to present holistic options to include the international community and the effected nation state.

Libya: The removal of Muammar Al-Qaddafi

I am not going to leave this land. I will die as a martyr at the end. I shall remain, defiant. Muammar is Leader of the Revolution until the end of time.

- Muammar Al-Qaddafi, *Address to the Nation (22 February 2011)*

The example of Libya, as with Kosovo, outlines the difficulties for planning elements attempting to provide viable options for disparate types of decision-making elements. The decision makers in this case study present a combination of Graham T. Allison's *rational actor* and *organizational process* models. This case study begins with a historical overview on those events leading up to and including the fall of Muammar Al-Qaddafi in 2011, followed by an

analysis of the US planning element, actors, and motivations through the lens of the *rational actor* model and *organizational process* models.

Historical Overview

The US has a long-standing, controversial relationship with Muammar Al-Qaddafi dating back to 1969, when Qaddafi led a military coup to replace King Idris. The United States did not actively oppose the coup, as Qaddafi and his co-conspirators initially presented an anti-Soviet and reformist platform.³⁵ Yet, starting a year later in 1970, Qaddafi and his allies gradually reversed their stance on their initially icy relationship with the Soviet Union and extended Libyan support to revolutionary, anti-Western, and anti-Israeli movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.³⁶ This led to a decline in US-Libya relations to include international sanctions, which lasted for almost four decades.

At the end of December 2008, the United States and Libya formally resumed diplomatic relations with the arrival of Ambassador Gene Cretz in Tripoli.³⁷ Penn State professor Randall Newnham's theory on Qaddafi's change of heart toward the United States during this period is comprised of longer-term factors, notably the impact of decades of economic sanctions and economic incentives, pursued not just by the United States but also by its Western allies and the United Nations.³⁸ Additionally, the George W. Bush Administration had quietly made it clear to Qaddafi that it was *not* pursuing regime change in his case.³⁹ During this period of international

³⁵ Christopher M. Blanchard, "Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy," *Current Politics and Economics of Africa* 7, no. 1 (2014): 23.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Randall Newnham, "Carrots, Sticks, and Bombs: The End of Libya's WMD Program," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

re-engagement, political change in Libya remained elusive.⁴⁰ Ultimately, inaction on the part of the government in response to calls for guarantees of basic political rights and for the drafting of a constitution suggested a lack of consensus, which set the political stage for the revolution in 2011 that overturned Qaddafi's four decades of rule.⁴¹

The protests that spread from North Africa throughout the Middle East, commonly known as the Arab Spring, filled hundreds of millions with hope of a democratic future for the region.⁴² These calls for political reform and regime change resonated with Libyans, who saw their neighbors in Egypt and Tunisia challenging their own respective dictators.⁴³ On February 15, 2011, inspired by similar events in neighboring countries, large, peaceful protests began in Benghazi and other cities, demanding political and social reforms.⁴⁴ Qaddafi had a low tolerance for the public protests and, unlike the other North African strongmen, managed to unleash the full extent of his military apparatus on the demonstrators.⁴⁵

This was the tipping point for US President Barack Obama, who made the decision to oust Qaddafi utilizing the combined instruments of national power in the interest of national security. Unlike Kosovo, whose threat to US national security took an indirect route through Europe and NATO, Libya presented a direct threat to the United States, which President Obama outlined in his report to Congress. Left unaddressed, the growing instability in Libya could ignite wider instability in the Middle East, with dangerous consequences to the national security

⁴⁰ Blanchard, "Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy," 23.

⁴¹ Ibid., 24.

⁴² Andrew Sohn and Jack Froude, *Revolutionaries and Rebels: A Case Study of Armed Groups in Post-Gaddafi Libya* (Washington DC: George Washington University, 2014), 12.

⁴³ Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: the Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), 112.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 167.

interests of the United States.⁴⁶ The United States made a rational choice to take the lead during the Libya crisis in order to balance the Middle East. This choice is explained in part by Kenneth Waltz in his *Theory of International Politics*, where he predicts “a strong tendency towards balance in the system. The expectation is not that the balance, once achieved, will be maintained, but that balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or the other.”⁴⁷

President Obama’s first attempt at achieving this ‘balance’ was February 25, 2011, shortly after the violent Qaddafi response to protests in Libya. Obama issued Executive Order 13566, which imposed significant economic sanctions on Qaddafi, his government, and close associates.⁴⁸ Subsequently, US legislation passed in both the House and Senate making those frozen assets obtained from the sanctions available for humanitarian relief purposes and to the benefit of the Libyan people.⁴⁹ On February 26, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, which demanded an end to the violence, referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, and imposed a travel ban on and froze the assets of Qaddafi and members of his family and inner circle.⁵⁰ These combined actions proved ineffective against Qaddafi’s forces, who continued their brutal assault against the Libyan people.

This Qaddafi-induced humanitarian crisis caused a paradigm shift in international relations. For the first time in history, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League called for the establishment of a no-fly zone.⁵¹ In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution

⁴⁶ "Department of State's Report on US Activities in Libya Sent to Senate," *US Federal News Service, Including US State News*, Feb. 2, 2012, 3.

⁴⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Waveland Pr Inc, 2010), 1.

⁴⁸ "Department of State's Report," 5.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

1973 on March 17, which authorized member nations to “take all necessary measures...to protect civilians and civilian populated areas” in Libya under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁵² This paradigm shift provided the Obama Administration the international legitimacy necessary for military action. On March 19, the United States acted under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 by launching Operation Odyssey Dawn to quickly establish a no-fly zone and protect the Libyan people from Qaddafi’s forces. It is important to note that Operation Odyssey Dawn was limited to air power only; President Obama made it clear that “We have the ability to stop Qaddafi’s forces in their tracks without putting American troops on the ground.”⁵³ These actions set the conditions so that, after a limited time, command of these operations transferred to NATO.⁵⁴ Less than a month later, on April 4, the US-NATO transition occurred, changing the mission to Operation Unified Protector, and the United States now only provided ‘unique capabilities’ such as aerial refueling, personnel recovery, and intelligence and surveillance.⁵⁵ The NATO operation ended on October 21, 2011, a day after the Libyan opposition forces captured and executed Qaddafi.⁵⁶ To analyze the decisions made in 2011 Libya, we will look at the type of planning elements utilized, the actors involved, and the motivations of those actors through the *rational actor* and *organizational process* models.

Planning Element

⁵² O’Brien, Sinclair, and Gowan. *The Libyan War*, 5.

⁵³ "Department of State's Report," 2.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵⁶ Philip Spassov, "NATO, Russia and European Security: Lessons Learned from Conflicts in Kosovo and Libya," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 13, no. 3 (Summer, 2014): 25.

The larger, multinational planning element during the Libyan conflict consisted of the US National Security Council (NSC), NATO, European leaders, and for the first time, leadership from African and Arab nations. Yet, as in the case of Kosovo, the preponderance of planning for this conflict occurred in the NSC, which under President Obama became the largest in US history. The new membership of the NSC under the Obama Administration re-instituted some of the officials omitted from the previous Bush Administration. New members included: Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the US representative to the UN, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff (Chief of Staff to the President), and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (National Security Advisor).⁵⁷ Although the Obama Administration will not indicate the current size of the staff, many outside estimates put it at 400, about twice the size of the George W. Bush Administration.⁵⁸

Actors

The key members of the NSC at the time of the 2011 crisis in Libya were political appointees of President Obama, with the exception of the Secretary of Defense, who continued after the Bush Administration. Hillary Clinton served as the Secretary of State after conceding the Democratic presidential nomination to then Senator Obama in 2008. In 2010, Tom Donilon took over as the National Security Advisor, a promotion from his previous position as Deputy National Security Advisor. Robert Gates continued his service as Secretary of Defense that he began in 2006 during the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He would step down on July 1, 2011, just three months prior to Qaddafi's capture and execution. The next two key members were National Security Staff (NSS) members Samantha Power and Ben Rhodes. Power served as

⁵⁷ Barack Obama, *Presidential Policy Directive-1* (Washington, DC: White House, 2009).

⁵⁸ Karen DeYoung, "White House Tries for a Leaner National Security Council," *The Washington Post*, Jun. 22, 2015.

Special Assistant to President Obama and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights. Her work on genocide and human rights would prove influential in the Libya conflict. Rhodes served as deputy national security adviser for strategic communication and has a reputation around the White House as the man who channels Mr. Obama on foreign policy.⁵⁹

Motivations of Actors

The personality dynamics between these key members, their value judgements, and their relationship to President Obama plays a large role in their ability to agree on the use of military force in Libya. To counter the dissention between the members of the NSC, President Obama initially demonstrates Allison's *rational actor* model, where the nation or government is a unitary rational actor, action is chosen in response to a problem, the solution is chosen from among a set of fixed options, and action is based on rational choice.⁶⁰ Yet, as part of Obama's rational action, he promulgates an *organizational process* model in order to provide legitimacy and limit US military involvement.⁶¹ The combination of these two decision-making models presents a unique challenge for any planning organization.

As the situation in Libya escalated, President Obama turned to the NSC for options on how to protect the Libyan population from Qaddafi's forces. The options were bifurcated between Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and NSS Staffer Samantha Power. Gates, who was already in the middle of two wars and not interested in entering another one, is on the side of doing nothing. In his book *Duty*, Gates argues his logic.

I believed that what was happening in Libya was not a vital interest of the United States. I opposed the US attacking a third Muslim country in a decade to bring about regime change, no matter how odious the regime. I worried about how overstretched and tired

⁵⁹ Mark Landler, "Worldly at 35, and Shaping Obama's Voice," *New York Times*, Mar. 16, 2013.

⁶⁰ Lewis, "Graham T Allison's 'The Essence of Decision'," 118-19.

⁶¹ Brown and Ainley, *Understanding International Relations*, 80.

our military was, and the possibility of a protracted conflict in Libya. I reminded my colleges that when you start a war, you never know how it will go.⁶²

Siding with Gates on this opinion was the military leadership, Vice President Joe Biden, and NSC Chief Tom Donilon. On the other side of the debate is Samantha Power, who is a Pulitzer Prize winning author, an expert on genocide and repression, and a strong advocate for the responsibility to protect, which is described as the responsibility of civilized governments to intervene – militarily if necessary – to prevent the large scale killing of innocent civilians by their own repressive governments.⁶³ With this value judgement and UN Ambassador Susan Rice on her side, they argued that we had a responsibility to protect civilians and prevent a massacre if we (United States) could establish a no-fly zone.⁶⁴ Influential presidential advisor Ben Rhodes also joined Power's argument, which left only Secretary Clinton on the fence and weighing both arguments. While the debate raged on between the options of doing nothing and the establishment of a no-fly zone, Secretary Gates gave specific guidance to his staff to limit sharing between the bifurcated parties.

Don't give the White House staff and NSS too much information on the military options. They don't understand it and 'experts' like Samantha Power will decide when we move militarily.⁶⁵

With Qaddafi's forces closing in on the city of Benghazi and a humanitarian crisis of epic proportions imminent, Secretary Clinton decided to side with Power's argument of establishing a no-fly zone. It all came down to President Obama, in his role as a *rational actor*, who decided to move forward with drawing up military plans for a no-fly zone option, but only if it is in

⁶² Robert M Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, Reprint ed. (New York: Vintage, 2015), 522.

⁶³ Robert M Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War*, Reprint ed. (New York: Vintage, 2015), 521.

⁶⁴ Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Hard Choices*, Reprint ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 397.

⁶⁵ Gates, *Duty: Memoirs*, 523.

combination with a UN Security Council Resolution (*organizational process* model).⁶⁶ Through this combination of Allison's two decision-making models, the United States rapidly established a no-fly zone after receiving legitimization from a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), and then turned over responsibility for the no-fly zone to a NATO led coalition.

It is important to pause here and analyze the possible influence behind the president's decisions. Samantha Power was a young freelance journalist in Bosnia at the time of the war in the 1990s. "She would argue that the failure of the Clinton administration to engage in airstrikes against the Serbs, and to take military action to stop the genocide was immoral," said Peter W. Galbraith, ambassador to Croatia at the time.⁶⁷ In the White House report to Congress on Libya, the no-fly zone in Bosnia/Kosovo is even promulgated as historical precedence.

To lend perspective on how rapidly this military and diplomatic response came together, when people were being brutalized in Bosnia in the 1990s, it took the international community two years to intervene with air power to protect civilians and a year to defend the people of Kosovo. It took the United States and its coalition partners 31 days to prevent a slaughter in Libya⁶⁸

From the actions of the Obama Administration during the Libyan crisis, one can theorize that those on the White House staff who were experienced in the Bosnia/Kosovo conflict wanted to incorporate the lessons learned from the Clinton Administration. Table 2 illustrates this theory by comparing the Kosovo and Libya case studies. The items in bold/italics are the changes from the Clinton to the Obama Administrations. The standard type denotes similarities between the two case studies, while bold denotes differences.

⁶⁶ Clinton, *Hard Choices*, 397.

⁶⁷ Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "Still Crusading, but Now on the Inside," *New York Times*, Mar. 30, 2011.

⁶⁸ "Department of State's Report," 8.

Kosovo (Clinton Administration)	Libya (Obama Administration)
Milosevic has lost legitimacy and must step down	Qaddafi has lost all legitimacy to rule and must step down
Intervening is in the interest of national security	Intervening is in the interest of national security
No ground troops	No “boots on the ground”
US must act in the name of humanitarian intervention	US must act to protect the people of Libya
Clinton Administration takes over a year to act on massacres in Kosovo due to political scandals	Obama Administration vows to prevent another ‘Kosovo like’ massacre from occurring by intervening prior to Qaddafi’s assault on Benghazi
Due to Russia and China, a UN Security Council Resolution did not pass prior to US / NATO air strikes	Obama insisted on obtaining a UN Security Council Resolution prior to military operations. UNSCR 1973 passed
US led airstrikes with NATO in support	US initially led airstrikes and then transferred all air operations to NATO
Milosevic eventually stepped down and was replaced during democratic elections	Qaddafi was captured and executed by Libyan rebels

Table 2. Kosovo / Libya Cross Case Comparison.

Source: Created by author with data from the following sources: Julie Kim, *Kosovo Conflict Chronology: September 1998 – March 1999* (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1999); "Department of State's Report on US Activities in Libya Sent to Senate," *US Fed News Service, Including US State News*, Feb. 2, 2012.

The crisis in Libya made for an uncanny parallel to decisions made during the Kosovo crisis. The use of NATO air power, a reluctance for the use of ground troops, the involvement of the UN Security Council, the insistence for regime change, and all of this in the name of humanitarian intervention. Although the NSC and NATO were ultimately successful in rapidly creating regime change through the Libyan rebels on the ground in 2011, the conflict within the NSC leadership presented considerable challenges and a lack of post-regime planning. Examining the Libya case study through the lens of Graham Allison’s *rational actor* model and *organizational behavior* model further illustrates the need for a Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership (PREPP) consisting of non-political appointees with access to the President through the National Security Council and the competence to influence both models of decision-making. With the PREPP in place, the creation of a plan to assist the Libyan people in filling the

void left behind by the execution of Qaddafi is possible. Instead, the Libyan people are still struggling in 2015 to create an entirely new system of government with minimal international assistance. The chaos left behind has created an inviting environment for terrorist organizations that will present regional security and stabilization challenges for years to come.

Nigeria: The First Peaceful Transition of Power

I cannot change the past. But I can change the present and the future. So before you is a former military ruler and a converted democrat who is ready to operate under democratic norms and is subjecting himself to the rigors of democratic elections for the fourth time.

-Muhammadu Buhari, *Chatham House Speech, United Kingdom, 2015*

The case study of Nigeria will reinforce the need for a year-round organization capable of providing options, in a peaceful transition of power, to all three of Allison's decision-making models outlined in the Kosovo and Libya case studies. The reason for the selection of a peaceful transition of power is that planners at all levels tend to overlook or marginalize peaceful transitions of power since they do not pose an immediate threat to US national interests, thus creating a *reactive* post-regime environment. The case of Nigeria seeks to illustrate the opportunities for *proactive* post-regime environment planning, allowing the USG to assist the largest and most influential country in Africa in its efforts for regional security and stability through a holistic proactive strategy. The analysis looks at US interests in Nigeria through the lens of the National Security Strategy and how the PREPP would provide options to the president for a peaceful transition of power.

Historical Overview

In 2014, Nigeria's economy (GDP) became the largest in Africa, worth more than \$500 billion and \$1 trillion in terms of nominal GDP and purchasing power parity respectively. It overtook South Africa to become the world's 21st (nominal) and 20th (PPP) largest economy in

2015; furthermore, the debt-to-GDP ratio is only 11 percent (8 percent below the 2012 ratio). The country's oil reserves have played a major role in its growing wealth and influence. Nigeria is considered to be an emerging market by the World Bank and has been identified as a regional power on the African continent.⁶⁹ Nigeria is the 12th largest producer of petroleum in the world, the 8th largest exporter, and has the 10th largest proven reserves. As Nigeria is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), petroleum plays a large role in the economy, accounting for 40% of GDP and 80% of Government earnings. However, agitation for better resource control in the Niger Delta, its main oil-producing region, has led to disruptions in oil production and prevents the country from exporting at 100% capacity.⁷⁰ Besides the petroleum industry, there are increasing economic opportunities in the areas of mineral resources, pharmacological manufacturing, and petroleum refining. Nigeria has a wide array of underexploited mineral resources that include natural gas, coal, bauxite, tantalite, gold, tin, iron ore, limestone, niobium, lead, and zinc. Despite huge deposits of these natural resources, the mining industry in Nigeria is still in its infancy.⁷¹ Additionally, Nigeria is one of the most promising and rapidly growing pharmaceutical markets in West Africa, growing at 12% annually as indicated by Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Group of Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (PMG-MAN). Finally, there are currently four inoperable oil refineries in Nigeria, presenting an opportunity for growth and independence from petroleum importation if renovated. With all of these economic challenges and opportunities in Nigeria, the most significant opportunity lies in

⁶⁹ International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Database," accessed 5 March 2016, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx>; Reuters, "Nigeria Becomes Africa's Largest Economy," accessed 5 March 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/04/nigeria-becomes-africa-largest-economy-20144618190520102.html>.

⁷⁰ International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Database"; The World Bank, "Nigeria," accessed 5 March 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria>.

⁷¹ William Saifire, "The New York Times Guide to Essential Knowledge: A Desk Reference for the Curious Mind," *The New York Times*, 2007.

the most recent peaceful transition of power between former President Goodluck Jonathan and President Muhammadu Buhari.

The election of President Muhammadu Buhari in March 2015 was the most successful democratic exercise in the country's history, building on the progress made in 2011 after a series of seriously flawed elections in the country. For the first time in Nigerian history, a Muslim candidate was elected from the Northern region of Nigeria, which creates a paradigm shift in power from the "elite class" to the historically marginalized population in the North. A 180-degree turn from the overtly corrupt Goodluck Jonathan, President Muhammadu Buhari has no such credibility deficit. In addition to a personally austere lifestyle, he is perceived as much harder on corruption than the man he is replacing. He is a former Major General in the Nigerian military who knows the importance of a United States/Nigeria military-to-military relationship and publically voiced his willingness to partner with the United States in this regard. President Buhari also has experience in the petroleum sector, as chairman of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and later minister of petroleum in the late 1970s, during which two of Nigeria's four refineries were built.⁷²

Motivations of Actors

Although he was elected in March of 2015, President Buhari did not name cabinet ministers until September, causing the public to question his commitment to government reform. The extended period to choose cabinet ministers allowed President Buhari to focus on restructuring the Nigerian army and rallying international support to contain the Boko Haram insurgency. An emphasis on combating corruption is also evident, with investigations of former

⁷² Joachim MacEbong, "Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan Just Did Incoming Buhari a Big Favour with the Fuel Crisis," *Quartz Africa*, 2015.

governors, the former security chief, and other high profile individuals.⁷³ President Buhari is taking considerable risk with his anti-corruption and economic diversity platforms. The benefactors of the systemic corrupt practices and oil-centric economy are the ‘elite’ class who used to control the ruling party in Nigeria. Now that the elites are marginalized, Buhari risks internal backlash in the form of petroleum embargos. Since Nigeria does not refine its own petroleum, it must import the refined product leaving them at the mercy of the oil subsidy companies and their elite owners.

With all of the demographic, economic, and political indicators described above, there is an increased propensity for Nigeria to become a weak or failing state. This is a concern for US national interests since Nigeria is already the largest bilateral foreign assistance recipient, with the US providing roughly \$700 million annually in recent years.⁷⁴ Although Nigeria is not facing an imminent threat of becoming a weak or failing state, the indicators are there and, left unchecked, may cause a *reactive* response from the US in the future. The next section outlines some of the *proactive* measures implemented to date based on the Obama Administration’s political and policy aims outlined in the National Security Strategy.

Planning Element (Obama Administration)

As shown in Table 3, the US policy aims toward Nigeria include five of the eight top strategic risks to US interests, outlined in the National Security Strategy.⁷⁵ In response to these strategic risks, a combined strategy of risk mitigation programs were developed between

⁷³ Zainab Usman, “In Nigeria, Newly Appointed Officials Signal Shift in Economic Policy,” *The Washington Post*, Dec. 1, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/01/was-nigerian-president-buharis-cabinet-worth-the-wait/>.

⁷⁴ Lauren Ploch Blanchard, *Nigeria's 2015 Elections and the Boko Haram Crisis* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 12.

⁷⁵ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: White House, 2015).

USAFRICOM, US Department of State (DoS), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

NSS Strategic Risks	Risk Mitigation Programs
Threats or attacks against U.S. citizens abroad and our allies	DoS and USAFRICOM negotiated for cooperative security locations on the continent capable of supporting the temporary staging of crisis response forces to protect U.S. personnel and facilities ⁷⁶
Severe global infectious disease outbreaks	DoS and USAID developed a Pandemic Response Program (PRP) to assist Nigeria ⁷⁷
Climate change	DoS and USAID support President Buhari's adoption of a legally binding UN agreement to mitigate climate change ⁷⁸
Major energy market disruptions	DoS and USAID are investing in economic diversification programs
Significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states (including mass atrocities, regional spillover, and transnational organized crime)	USAFRICOM provides training to and expanded information sharing with the Nigerian military and other regional partners, such as Cameroon, Chad, and Niger ⁷⁹

Table 3. National Security Strategy Mitigation Programs for Nigeria.

Source: Created by author.

⁷⁶ *Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs. Congressional Hearing, March 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2015).

⁷⁷ "The American People Hand Over Disaster and Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plans to the Federal Republic of Nigeria," *Targeted News Service*, Nov. 14, 2013, <http://search.proquest.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/docview/1458711958?accountid=28992>.

⁷⁸ "United Nations - Nigeria to Adopt Agreement to Mitigate Climate Change – Buhari," *AllAfrica.com*, Sep. 28, 2015, <http://search.proquest.com.lumen.cgscarl.com/docview/1717020412?accountid=28992>.

⁷⁹ *Hearing on National Defense*.

Yet the question remains, is this 'status quo' US strategy enough to keep Nigeria from becoming a weak or failing state under President Buhari's administration? The answer to that question is as complex and dynamic as the environment in Nigeria. If a crisis or escalation in violence were to occur, the availability of holistic options relevant to all three models of Allison's decision makers are necessary to mitigate threats to US national security. *Rational actors* will expect a set of fixed options for unilateral action, *organizational process* decision makers would expect a coalition or international collaboration option, and *governmental politics* decision makers expect an analysis of advantages and disadvantages to intervention as well as associated political and policy risk. Unfortunately, a year-round planning element, separate from the NSC and with the expertise to create these holistic options, does not exist in the current administration.

Planning Element (PREPP Example)

At this moment, Nigeria is in a period of post-election euphoria that can be an incredible opportunity for the United States if it is acted upon before the feeling of hope is extinguished. In order to assist newly elected President Buhari with his goals, the PREPP will propose the use of Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic instruments of national power in order to meet the US National Objectives and support a secure and stable Nigeria. The year long, permanent PREPP members of the DoD, DoS, USAID, and National Security Agency (NSA) will add subject matter experts from the Department of Commerce, US Africa Command, Department of the Treasury, and petroleum industry to plan for the unique challenges and opportunities in Nigeria. Once the full PREPP is assembled, an analysis is conducted of Nigeria's complex adaptive system to determine key elements that the United States can affect through the instruments of national power. The key elements identified by the PREPP will effect positive change in Nigeria's strategic environment if acted upon within the next 1-5 years: petroleum industry reform (Diplomatic, Economic) and persistent instability (Information, Military).

For *governmental politics* decision makers who expect an analysis of advantages and disadvantages to intervention as well as associated political and policy risk, the most recent fuel shortage in Nigeria created a crisis unmatched in recent history, linking back to the Government of Nigeria's (GoN) fuel subsidy policy. Even though the country produces about two million barrels of crude oil per-day, Nigeria's four refineries are dilapidated to the point of ineffectiveness, causing a dependency on the importation of refined products. The government pays petroleum marketers a subsidy to keep the price stable. Yet the unions and associations involved in importing fuel say the government owes them about \$1 billion in unpaid subsidies and the GoN was forced to agree to an \$800 billion payment in order to stop the fuel shortage.⁸⁰ This is a continuous loop of marketers vs. Government of Nigeria to pay what the people commonly see as a corrupt policy that extorts money from the Nigerian people. The bottom line is that under the new President Muhammadu Buhari, Petroleum Industry Reform is a priority and the United States has the ability to assist and advise the Government of Nigeria through its petroleum sector subject matter expertise. A partnership between the United States and Nigeria is a win-win for both, creating economic opportunities for the US energy sector along with job creation and refinery capacity for the Nigerian people.

For the *organizational process* decision makers who would expect a coalition or international collaboration option, insurgent group Boko Haram presents an interesting challenge and opportunity for multi-national coalition support. The growth of Boko Haram has led to persistent instability in the Northern border regions of Nigeria, spilling over into the countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Multiple factors have undermined the Nigerian security forces' response to Boko Haram, notably security sector mismanagement and corruption. By many accounts, troops are not adequately resourced or equipped to counter the insurgency, despite a rising defense budget of more than \$5 billion in 2014 (roughly 20% of the government's total

⁸⁰ MacEbong, "Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan."

budget).⁸¹ Many soldiers, particularly in the northeast, reportedly suffer from low morale, struggling to keep pace with a foe that appears increasingly well armed and trained. In the assessment of DOD officials, Nigerian funding for the military is “skimmed off the top.”⁸² For the *rational actors* who will expect a set of fixed options for unilateral action, there is an opportunity for US assistance in the area of military reform and modernization through carefully selected security cooperation and development programs. In addition to these programs, the *organizational process* decision makers would support a multinational task force aimed at defeating Boko Haram, creating regional stability between the Nigerian Border States, and promoting cooperation between the militaries of Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Cameroon. In addition to Boko Haram, there are several other challenges to stability in the region, which *rational actors* may want to address unilaterally or *organizational process* decision makers may want to form a coalition to address, both in the interest of US national security.

In the southern Niger Delta, local grievances related to oil production have fueled conflict and criminality for over a decade. Government efforts to negotiate with local militants and an amnesty program have quieted the restive region since 2009, but the peace is fragile. Some militants remain involved in local and transnational criminal activities, including piracy, drug, and arms trafficking networks. These overlap with oil theft networks and contribute to the rising trend of piracy off the Nigerian coast and in the wider Gulf of Guinea, now considered one of the world’s most dangerous bodies of water. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime suggests that most piracy in the Gulf of Guinea can be traced back to the Niger Delta.⁸³

This presents an opportunity for interagency advisement, training, and intelligence sharing. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), US Coast Guard, and US Treasury Department can provide assistance in all of the areas mentioned above in an effort to protect US national interests.

⁸¹ “Jonathan Signs Nigeria’s 2014 Budget as Defense Gets 20%,” *Premium Times*, May 24, 2014.

⁸² “Testimony of DOD Principal Director for African Affairs Alice Friend, Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs,” in *#BringBackOurGirls: Addressing the Threat of Boko Haram* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014).

⁸³ Blanchard, *Nigeria's 2015 Elections*, 4.

Overall, the case of Nigeria seeks to illustrate the opportunities for *proactive* post-regime environment planning, allowing the USG to assist the largest and most influential country in Africa in its efforts for regional security and stability through a holistic proactive strategy. The goal is to prevent or mitigate future crisis within the region through an understanding of the complex adaptive system within Nigeria and its surrounding countries and by executing a holistic strategy utilizing all of the instruments of national power.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.⁸⁴

- B. H. Liddell Hart

Throughout this study, the need for a Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership (PREPP) consisting of non-political appointees with access to the President through the NSC is evident in the disparate case studies presented. In Kosovo, although the NSC and NATO were ultimately successful in ousting President Milosevic, the time it took to whittle down the events other than Kosovo going on at the time of the conflict caused the loss of human lives that, with this proposed PREPP construct, may have been avoidable. In Libya, the NSC and NATO were successful yet again in creating regime change, this time through the Libyan rebels on the ground who captured and executed Muammar Al-Qaddafi. Although the lessons learned from Kosovo were acknowledged and addressed by the Obama Administration, the bifurcation between the NSC leadership during the Libya crisis presented considerable planning challenges, which led to a deficiency in post-regime planning. As a result, the Libyan people are still struggling in 2015 to create an entirely new system of government with minimal international assistance. In Nigeria, the recent peaceful transition of power between Goodluck Johnathan and Muhammadu Buhari should not be overlooked since it does not present an immediate threat to US national interests. Although Nigeria is not facing an imminent threat of becoming a weak or failing state, the indicators are there and, left unchecked, may cause a reactive response from the United States in the future.

Additionally, a year-round planning element such as the PREPP is capable of presenting options to all three models of Graham Allison's decision makers. With the inevitable changeover

⁸⁴ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Plume, 1991), 366.

of White House administrations every four to eight years, the need for a consistent body of planners that can analyze both peaceful transitions of power and violent regime change to a *rational actor, organizational process, or governmental politics* decision maker is necessary for risk mitigation in the threat to US national interests. The true challenge for the PREPP design is how to structure this element in a resource-constrained environment with competing priorities. Fortunately, history provided a comparative model in the form of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's NSC Planning Board construct.

Eisenhower's NSC Planning Board

Robert Cutler, who became the first special assistant to the president for national security affairs, designed the Eisenhower system. Instead of the current Principles Committee (PC) and Deputies Committee (DC) process, Cutler created a Planning Board to develop policy options for the NSC's consideration.⁸⁵ The Planning Board was "the principal policy formulating body" of the NSC. Its responsibilities were to "anticipate and identify problems and situations affecting the security objectives, commitments, and risk of the United States."⁸⁶ The PREPP construct will emulate these ideals while focusing on regime change environments.

In contrast to the PREPP construct, Cutler believed that to be effective, the President should appoint the members of the Planning Board. In his own words:

This process elevates the Planning Board member. He isn't just appointed by the Secretary of State; he has a letter signed by the President of the United States appointing

⁸⁵ Paul D. Miller, "Organizing the National Security Council: I Like Ike's," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 43, no. 3 (2013): 597.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*; Robert Cutler, "The National Security Council," In *Organizing for National Security: Studies and Background Materials Submitted to the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, By its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery*, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), 127-35.

him. This seems to me to elevate this man in his position and gives him a greater prestige to have access to the total resources of his Department.⁸⁷

The counter to this argument is illustrated in the three case studies presented. The fact that the decision makers within the NSC are politically appointed adds an additional layer of complication, with the emphasis on political risk brought to the forefront of policy consideration. The non-politically appointed planners within the PREPP will have the ability to analyze regime change holistically with policy considerations at the forefront and political considerations in the background.

Cutler also emphasized that Planning Board members should have no other duties and should serve in a year-round capacity, per Eisenhower's belief in continuous policy planning.⁸⁸ Cutler promoted vigorous debate within this continuous policy-planning construct. "How better to get to the truth than through vigorous debate between informed men, who may bear departmental responsibility to carry out the policy being debated?"⁸⁹ The best summary describing the efficacy of this model is from authors Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman:

The NSC (Board) Process was undoubtedly time-consuming. Yet as any participant would attest, it virtually assured that the key policy makers, and especially the president, has become informed about the background of various issues and their implications, and had extensively discussed US interests and possible actions before specific decisions had to be taken. This process created a context that greatly improved the odds that such decisions would be more rational, better informed, and coherent.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Robert Cutler, "Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, May 24, 1960, 86th Congress, 2nd Session," *Organizing for National Security: Studies and Background Materials Submitted to the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, By its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery*, Vol. 1, Part IV (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1961), 590-91.

⁸⁸ Miller, "Organizing the National Security Council," 598.

⁸⁹ Robert Cutler, *No Time for Rest* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 297.

⁹⁰ Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, *Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy* (Cary, NC, USA: Oxford University Press, 1998), 88, 93.

Overall, the example of Eisenhower's NSC Planning Board presents a valid model for the PREPP concept, with the exception of non-political appointees and with a focus on regime change environments. In the spirit of this model, the next section is an attempt at defining a structure for the PREPP based on theory, history, and personal experience.

Post-Regime Environment Planning Partnership (PREPP)

The proposed PREPP is comprised of enduring members and augmented by subject matter experts in other areas as the situation dictates. The enduring members should contain experienced planners (non-political appointees) from the following agencies at a minimum: Department of State, Department of Defense, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of the Treasury, National Intelligence Agency, and Department of Energy. These experienced planners will undergo a selection board and commit to a three-year term on the PREPP. To address the Eisenhower argument for political appointees, the Director of the PREPP is appointed by the President and has experience in a minimum of two member agencies. (For example, a Director who has worked for the Department of State as a Foreign Service officer and has military service). This Director will be the 'face' of the PREPP and report findings to the NSC's DC and PC forums when in the interest of US National Security.

The enduring members will meet three times a week to discuss both peaceful and violent regime change environments, while the other two days of the week are at their respective agencies to ensure they are up to date with the most recent department policies and discussions. Although the PREPP members need to stay linked into their respective departments, in the spirit of the Eisenhower model, it is important to note that they have no duties other than the PREPP.

The reason for the development of this model is not to create a new layer of complexity between the NSC and the various agencies it represents; rather, it should serve as a forum for vigorous and informed debate regarding regime change and its link to national security policy.

The structure and organization of the PREPP still warrants additional research, and this study only represents a starting point in the discussion.

The PREPP concept is timely in that, after several administrations and additions to the staff, the 2015 NSC is finally admitting that it is slow and unwieldy.⁹¹ Current NSC Chief Suzy George stated, “To ensure the NSC staff is a lean, nimble, and policy-oriented organization, we are reversing the trend of growth...to align our staffing with our strategic priorities.”⁹² The PREPP supports this concept of ‘right sizing’ by creating a planning element separate from the NSC and focused on regime change environments, since regime change has the propensity to threaten US national interests more often than not.

Conclusion

As a global leader, the United States needs to take a more proactive approach in planning for post-regime change environments by leveraging the instruments of national power to ensure rapid stabilization and governance for those nation states affected. The PREPP will not only assist in the prevention or mitigation of crises that threaten US national interests, it has the opportunity to look into the future and present proactive policy solutions for peaceful transitions of power. The PREPP is crucial at this time since the international community is faced with several peaceful transitions of power with many unknown factors. Questions such as “Who will replace Vladimir Putin in Russia?” and “What if there is a non-communist government elected in China?” should be top of mind instead of the perchance for the crisis of the moment.

⁹¹ DeYoung, "White House Tries."

⁹² Ibid.

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