

Deterrence, Lily Pads, and Regionally Aligned Forces: Keys to the Successful Application of Strategic Landpower

A Monograph

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The US military uses prepositioned stocks located in Western Germany in conjunction with regionally aligned forces from the 4th Infantry Division to act as a deterrence to Russia in the European Command Area of Responsibility. Unilateral action no longer provides the necessary deterrence it once did. Multilateral allied coalitions with the introduction of lily pad bases on foreign soil, staged closer to Russia facilitates a forward deterrence posture. The US military must move current prepositioned stocks from Western Germany to allied nation lily pad bases that are closes to Russian proxy countries so the stocks can be utilized by regionally aligned forces and allied nations for deterrence

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Abstract

Deterrence, Lily Pads, and Regionally Aligned Forces: Keys to the Successful Application of Strategic Landpower by CW3 Brandon LaMothe, US Army, 59 pages.

The United States has always counted on its armed forces to win the nation's wars. Winning is accomplished by the Army playing a key role by partnering with host nations, coalition members, the use of prepositioned stocks, regionally aligned forces and lily pad bases. After more than a decade of conflict the national strategy has begun to shift away from direct conflict to a conflict prevention strategy of deterrence. With a political and military need to defeat in place foreign-born hostilities to stop the spread of regional and global hostilities, the 2008 National Defense Strategy began to stress the importance of building multi-national partner capacity through rotational force training and pre-positioned equipment reserves to defeat violent unilateral actors. The United States uses lily pad bases, rotational forces and pre-positioned stocks as strategic landpower to act as a deterrence. Modern near peer equivalents do not recognize the deterrent effect the United States is posturing towards and continue with their sovereign nation expansionism at the cost of proxy nation sovereignty.

One case study will be presented; current Russian President Putin's forces invading the Crimean Peninsula, and the lack of subsequent action by the United States and international partners to stymie the continued destabilizing effect in the EUCOM AOR.

The monograph concludes with recommendations for a whole of government approach through identification of centers of gravity for involved belligerent actors and thoughtful, decisive actions to influence the centers of gravity.

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Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AFSBn	Army Field Support Battalion
AL&T	Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APS	Army Prepositioned Stocks
AR	Army Regulation
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
BG	Brigadier General (US Army)
CBO	Congressional Budget Office
CCDR	Combatant Commander
COG	Center of Gravity
COL	Colonel (US Army)
CONUS	Continental United States
DC	District of Columbia
DR	Doctor
EAS	European Activity Set
ED	Edition
EUCOM	European Command
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GEN	General (US Army)
Gen	General (US Air Force)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JMTC	Joint Multinational Training Center

JP	Joint Publication
JRTC	Joint Regional Training Center
LCDR	Lieutenant Commander (US Navy)
Lt. Gen.	Lieutenant General (US Air Force)
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel (US Army)
LTG	Lieutenant General (US Army)
Lt. Col	Lieutenant Colonel (US Air Force)
MAJ	Major (US Army)
MSC	Mission Support Command
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NTC	National Training Center
PAM	Pamphlet
RAF	Regionally Aligned Forces
RET	Retired
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
UK	United Kingdom
ULO	Unified Land Operations
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VA	Virginia

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Introduction

The American military is one of the finest militaries in the world, successfully achieving victory after victory in nearly all its engagements. As these conflicts were touted as victorious by the military personnel on the ground as well as the media, the requirement to downsize forces to manageable levels emerged. The quantitative level of troops and equipment were at levels during Operation Iraqi Freedom (Iraq 2003 – 2012) and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan 2000 – 2014) that were financially unsustainable.¹ Both wars were averaging \$7.2 billion per month, putting a significant drain on an already weakened economy trying to recover from a prolonged recession.² Regardless of the victories achieved, the increased force and equipment levels were too costly. The need to control ballooning costs directly impacted the capability of the United States military to deter aggressive actions by belligerent nation-states in Eastern Europe through the current placement of prepositioned stocks in Western Germany, regionally aligned forces (RAF) and lily pad bases.

Due to a need for cost savings and as a result of political infighting, force reductions became a requirement. The reductions undermined the US military's ability to provide a global deterrence force. The restrictions on force projection has opened the door for global actors to erode sovereign borders and threaten regional instability.³ In the US military, the ability to project a credible deterrence force is needed to provide assurance to allied nations and to let belligerents

¹ 114th Congress, 2d Session, *Senate report 114-049 - National Defense Authorization Act* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2015), 82-83, 109 – 112.

² "The Unending War," *The Economist*, October 10, 2015.

³ 112th Congress, 2d Session. *House report 112-479 - National Defense Authorization Act* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2012), 211-212.

know the US is capable of immediate action. The ability of the United States to perform either function rises and falls with military end strength and readiness.⁴

With sequestration, which is the permanent shut down of specific money streams that support the military force, starting in fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Army experienced a shortage in readiness funding.⁵ The restricted and capped monetary expenditure limits resulted in a significantly and rapidly degraded Army. The degradation of the Army carried into FY 2014 and beyond. As a consequence of FY 2013 sequestration, reduced funding had forced the Army to postpone the reset of several thousand pieces of equipment. Thus, the Army fell behind in its efforts to recover from recent operations and prepare for the future, a challenge that continues to grow.⁶ The inability to achieve a prepared military force that responds quickly, was severely degraded due to political and financial constraints brought on by sequestration.⁷ The political constraints brought on by sequestration, placed a ceiling on the total end strength of the military

⁴ "2017 Posture Statement of the United States Army," February 14, 2016, 12-13.

⁵ Sequestration as referenced in this monograph entails the permanent cancellation of monetary resources by a specified and uniform percentage. The monetary reduction is indiscriminate and applied to every program and monetary fund within specific accounts. During a declared war, sequestration has specific exemptions that restrict the elimination or reduction of funds to pay salaries of military members forward deployed in a combat zone. 114th Congress, 2d Session, *Senate report 114-049 - National Defense Authorization Act* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2015), 82-83, 109 – 112 and 112th Congress, 2d Session. *House report 112-479 - National Defense Authorization Act* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2012), 211-212.

⁶ Committee on Armed Services, 'Statement by the Honorable John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army and General Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff United States Army (March 5, 2015), 2.

⁷ *2016 index U.S. Military strength*, Heritage: National Security and Defense, January 5, 2016, accessed January 19, 2016, <http://index.heritage.org/military/2016/assessments/us-military-power/us-army/>.

and the ability to respond quickly and with sufficient actionable force to deter a belligerent nation-state actor.

The capped end strength required a decrease in the total number of personnel serving, draining the total number of highly qualified military members from the ranks. The total end strength of personnel directly correlates to the budgetary amounts approved by Congress that are culled from sequestration guidance. Without an adequate budget to support United States military personnel and equipment abroad, those forward-deployed forces are less capable of deterring regional instability and thus, regional instabilities may gain momentum.

Due in part to sequestration, the United States government appears accepting of the possibility of regional instability through reliance on old tactics and procedures to bolster the number of readily available forces. The current strategic plan for deterrence in Eastern Europe, as outlined by the current EUCOM (European Command) Commander, Gen Philip Breedlove, revolves around a collective DoD (Department of Defense) effort to show deterrence without causing unwarranted escalation or provocation.⁸ The way to accomplish this deterrence is through RAFs and available prepositioned stocks to demonstrate an immediately available fighting force.⁹ Breedlove further outlines the need for allied nation partners to sustain the US presence in foreign countries for the foreseeable future.¹⁰ Allied nation support affords the US a location to project force from while simultaneously leveraging credibility. Allies also provide the cultural understanding needed during conflict and the additional forces needed for deterrence. Without

⁸ Gen Philip Breedlove, *United States European Command - Theater Strategy* (Stuttgart, Germany: US Government Printing Office, 2015), 5-8.

⁹ LTG Frederick "Ben" Hodges, "Army Europe: Making 30,000 troops look like 300,000," *ARMY Magazine*, Vol. 63, no. 5, April 19, 2013, 52-53.

¹⁰ Breedlove, *United States European Command - Theater Strategy*, 3.

allied support, the US military would be unable to adequately project sufficient force to act as a deterrent, thus welcoming regional instability.

There must be a conscious effort to change the tactics that have been continually implemented post-conflict, as a make-shift national defense posture while downsizing and training during peacetime.¹¹ RAF and prepositioned stocks no longer provide the deterrence they once did. RAF are deployed forward on a continuous, rotational training mission to sustain warfighter skills soldiers require to maintain warfighting readiness. If a sustained forward presence fails to deter an adversary, committed forces must be agile enough to transition rapidly to combat operations.¹² RAF are a sustained forward presence that also double as a committed force for the combatant commander (CCDR) if required for direct action. RAF's bring a small amount of organic equipment forward when they deploy. The RAF needs to be augmented with prepositioned stocks currently located in Western Germany, for the majority of their equipment needs to reduce response time and increase response speed.¹³

Research Question

Do prepositioned stock and regionally aligned forces using lily pad bases at their current locations, form a basis for strategic landpower that provides the necessary deterrence to belligerent nation-state actors in the EUCOM area of responsibility? Based on historical

¹¹ BG Steven Shapiro, "Time to go back to the basics," *Army Sustainment*, December 2012, 2-3.

¹² JP 3-0: *Joint Operations*, Change 1 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2008), Chapter V, VII.

¹³ MG Duane Gamble, COL Matthew Redding, and MAJ Craig Daniel, "Balancing sustainment priorities for a new Security paradigm in Europe," *Army News*, February 29, 2016, accessed April 19, 2016, http://www.army.mil/article/162200/Balancing_sustainment_priorities_for_a_new_Security_paradigm_in_Europe/ and CPT Corey Scharbo, "The first regionally aligned force: lessons learned and the way ahead," *Military Review*, Vol. 95, no. 04 (July 1, 2015), 85-87.

documentation of involvement and actions with the US in foreign territorial disagreements, the hypothesis answers that the continued use of prepositioned stocks and RAFs using lily pad bases from their current location are insufficient to deter or counter any military style actions from belligerent nation-state actors in Eastern Europe. Additional research was done on what units are currently the regionally aligned forces assigned to Germany. The research looks at where the current locations of pre-positioned stocks are in Germany and if those stocks are better utilized positioned closer to Russia. Finally, the research further examines if lily pad bases are useful for accommodating RAF and therefore create a credible deterrence. To do so, a contemporary case study is analyzed involving pre-positioned stock (equipment stored and maintained in specific areas) locations, RAFs (military forces that are scalable and tailorable for all requirements and assigned to support Combatant Commanders) using lily pad bases (temporary and scalable bases from which to operate from) as a deterrence through a thorough center of gravity (COG) analysis in relation to contemporary nation-state actor Russia in Eastern Europe.

Case Study Selection

The following case study and military doctrinal guidance present a contemporary, real-world scenario involving a former Cold War adversary, once again employing political and military options to regain lost territory. While there are numerous examples of countries fighting for lost territory throughout history, this research was narrowed to provide a relevant study on contemporary conditions that are constantly evolving, yet nested within not-too-distant past events involving the US and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union dissolved in the early twentieth century, and the Russian Federation emerged with the country's first democratically elected president in Boris Yeltsin. President Vladimir Putin replaced Yeltsin in 1999 as the next president when Yeltsin resigned and appointed Putin as his successor.

First, the case study analyzes the key concepts behind prepositioned stocks, RAFs, COG, and lily pad bases. The understanding and analysis include what the prepositioned stocks and

RAFs are intended for during both peacetime and wartime situations. Second, the case study examines the emergence of previously-used military expansionism techniques, such as lily pad basing and equipment stockpiling, to understand why the US continues the use of these techniques. The case study further examines the inherent possibility for the expansion of troop formations into neutral sovereign territories from lily pad bases, if left unchecked. The research excludes exact numbers of personnel and equipment locations, due to the classification level of that data. If the information is outside the realm of open-source documentation, the data is not used. In any event, any estimation of the precise numbers of personnel and equipment locations would detract from the relative importance of the research. Finally, the research demonstrates how old techniques still being used by the US are not having the desired deterrence effect on the belligerent nation-state chosen for this case study. The research further shows the possibility that a thorough understanding of the belligerent nation states' centers of gravity (source of power/influence that provides strength) should be intertwined with the US use of prepositioned stocks and RAFs as a credible deterrence.

Deterrence

Military theorist Lawrence Freedman states, "Deterrence keeps known rogue states, emerging adversaries, and those wanting to harm the US from succeeding." Freedman further lays the foundation for deterrence as a strategic concept by defining deterrence as a "coercive strategy" carried out by an actionable force.¹⁴ The actionable force must be credible in nature and have legitimacy in action to the enemy.¹⁵ Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 states, "Deterrence stems from the belief of a potential aggressor that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated

¹⁴ Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press, 2004), 27.

¹⁵ FM 3-24.2: *Tactics in Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2009), 16.

action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh any possible gains.”¹⁶ JP 1-02 states that deterrence is also “the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits.”¹⁷ Therefore, if any of these requirements are not met, deterrence is presumed to be ineffective. If deterrence is ineffective, then it is not credible or legitimate to the belligerent.

Deterrence is defensive in nature, and overt actions are left up to the belligerent.¹⁸ In near-peer equivalent force-on-force actions, the US seemingly no longer capable of providing the necessary deterrence as an individual military force. The US appears to be lacking adequate manpower, basing, cultural understanding and allied nation support to be an effective, independent-operating superpower. The US has shown the propensity to be fully capable of quick, lethal, surgical strikes through the usage of Special Forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003 – present) and Operation Enduring Freedom (2000 – present). For a longer military operation beyond surgical strikes, the US military has demonstrated an increasingly reliant need for multi-national support due to wicked problem complexity. The complex problems of the world have seemingly become increasingly no longer solvable by a lone superpower.¹⁹ More and more international incidents become solved through joint and multi-national partnership operations. Multi-national partner operations are increasingly becoming the norm from which top leaders of the US military are recognizing and emphasizing as a means by which to operate.

¹⁶ JP 3-0: *Joint Operations*, Change 1, Chapter VII, VII –2.

¹⁷ JP 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2016), 67.

¹⁸ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Reprint, 1977), 70.

¹⁹ Sharon Lewis, "The Tissue Issue: A Wicked Problem," *Jurimetrics*, Vol. 48, no. 2 (December 1, 2008), 194-195.

GEN Martin Dempsey, the 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, best spoke to the need for joint and multi-national forces during a speech given to the Danish Army Academy on August 17, 2015 in Copenhagen, when he stated, “It’s the first time in 41 years we’ve had a legitimate risk emanating from state actors, and we clearly have a persistent threat emanating from sub-state and non-state actors, that makes for a very volatile mix and makes it difficult for us to balance our resources to deal with these multiple threats simultaneously.”²⁰ GEN Dempsey’s statement is indicative of the need for further development of multi-national partnerships to foster an environment of cooperation. The cooperative multi-national partnerships will bolster force projection and deterrence for geographic areas where the US military would be slow to respond due to the locations of pre-positioned stocks and required response time.

Partner nations must be leveraged to both assist and lead the way forward. Partner nations increase the ability of the United States to project influence in geographic areas of the world where direct political and military means are not an option.²¹ Through partner nation support, a credible, actionable, legitimate force is available with sufficient lead time to act in the necessary manner and with the necessary force to be a deterrence force.²² For the US military to effectively

²⁰ Statement made by GEN Dempsey following meetings with the Danish Chief of Defense Army Gen. Peter Bartram and his staff concerning the first time since the end of the Soviet Union, the United States is facing a near-peer threat, and that is unsettling to many in the services. The full interaction between GEN Dempsey and the author of the article can be referenced at the following location: Jim Garamone, "Dempsey: U.S. Forces Must Adapt to Deal with Near-Peer Competitors," *DoD News*, Defense Media Activity, August 17, 2015, accessed November 2, 2015, <http://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/NewsDisplay/tabid/6800/Article/613868/dempsey-us-forces-must-adapt-to-deal-with-near-peer-competitors.aspx>.

²¹ Robert Kagan, "The United States must resist a return to spheres of interest in the international system," *Brookings*, February 19, 2015, accessed December 12, 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/19-united-states-must-resist-return-to-spheres-of-interest-international-system-kagan>.

²² Breedlove, *United States European Command - Theater Strategy*, 5-8.

portray itself as a larger element than it truly is in the EUCOM AOR, the US military's use of combined multi-national operations has become necessary.²³ The US military can mass limited numbers of troops through airborne operations from various units stationed in the EUCOM AOR to establish a small amount of military forces on the ground in a relatively short amount of time. To present a force that would be credible to a nation state such as Russia, a considerable amount of equipment and personnel would be required. The amount of personal and equipment cannot solely come from the United States. The United States must utilize a multi-national and joint operating environment to facilitate a robust deterrent force that is actionable against Russian provocations.

Maintaining a joint operating environment favorable to US national interests requires the US military to protect the global commons and underwrite the stability of international trade.²⁴ The use of multi-national forces establishes the foundation by which the US military builds joint international security. The demands of joint international security have forced American leadership to have almost continuous US military commitment since the end of the Cold War. The US military has executed nearly every mission across the full range of military operations from state-on-state warfare to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building, counterdrug, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.²⁵ The continued use of the US military puts a significant drain on the American population. Joint and multi-national training has helped develop a deterrence posture on foreign, sovereign soil. With the lack of

²³ JP 3-0: *Joint Operations*, Change 1, 117.

²⁴ Defense Strategic Guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 2012, Department of Defense, 7.

²⁵ Raymond Odierno and John McHugh, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*, (February 2, 2014), 3.

prepositioned equipment in forward enough locations to be relevant, the deterrence effect is diminished quickly when challenged.

When the United States seeks to deter a specific and identifiable adversary, the United States is widely successful, such as in Western Europe during the Cold War and today on the Korean peninsula. The current contemporary norm has been that the United States becomes involved in unforeseen locations such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and other adversaries the United States did not initially anticipate fighting in for any amount of measurable time.²⁶ Due to the involvements in the unforeseen locations, the US military has seemingly been extended beyond its unilateral capabilities with equipment and ready to fight personnel. To provide a legitimate deterrence, the US has shifted towards multi-national cooperation instead of unilateral operations.

Multinational partnerships afford the United States to no longer be a unilateral force, rather a multi-lateral force when engaging in conflict. Multi-lateral military action is accomplished through cooperation between allied nations with equipment availability, basing and combined forces. Without these available options, the US is not able to operate effectively from their current locations in depth. The joint fighting force of the US military as a large unilateral actor has moved to the background in favor of multi-national operations.²⁷ GEN Raymond Odierno, former Chief of Staff of the Army and the Honorable John McHugh, former Secretary of Army, explicitly stated to the need for joint and multi-national cooperation in their combined Army Strategic Planning Guidance in 2014 that the United States must request and utilize available “inter-service and inter-agency colleagues, international partner countries and employ the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),” to support or lead when and where necessary

²⁶ Odierno and McHugh, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*, 5.

²⁷ TRADOC Pam 523-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 31 October 2014), 9.

regionally.²⁸ All components of the US government, along with international partners, should be leveraged when there is a conflict that requires resolution.²⁹ The United States cannot be certain where or when it will deploy US land forces in the future. Known with almost near certainty, is that any significant US military deployment must be as part of a coalition, both for domestic and global political reasons. A coalition affords the US the ability to expand the current capabilities of a smaller, yet strategic landpower.³⁰ The ability to expand and be scalable as needed through the use of lily pad bases and prepositioned stocks is necessary with multi-national partners to provide a legitimate deterrence force.

Center of Gravity

The United States seemingly finds itself in a political standoff with near peer competitor Russia over the annexation of Crimea. The United States, with a whole of government approach, has previously misidentified accurate COGs for Russia. What the United States has previously done, post-Cold War, has seemingly been ineffective against deterring Russia. The understanding of the locations of US pre-positioned stocks in Western Germany and the use of RAF with multi-national allied nation and lily pad bases aids in a comprehensive overview of Russian COGs. Understanding the modern contemporary foundation of strategic landpowers utility is needed to facilitate a broader perspective of its application when working to deter near peer Russia.

General (Ret) Robert Cone, the former Commander of Training and Doctrine Command, gave the keynote speech at the Royal United Services Institute Land Warfare Conference in 2012

²⁸ Odierno and McHugh, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*, 4.

²⁹ TRADOC Pam 525-97, *Soldier as A System* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 16.

³⁰ Peter Singer, 'From Fuzzy to Focus: Questions to Ask about Strategic Land Power,' *Armed Forces Journal*, December 18, 2013, 3-4.

that helped revitalize the concept of Strategic Landpower.³¹ Cone's revitalization of interest in strategic landpower is due to a need for correct identification of the enemy as a complex adaptive system. The need of US military personnel to identify critical nodes, and then striking those critical nodes in either a decisive single attack or in multiple attacks. Cone's concept is soundly based on a similar theory proposed by United States Air Force Col. John Warden.³² The utility in Cone's concept revolves around understanding how an entity is driven by their COGs and how the COGs also create an identity for the entity. Cone's concept can be overlaid in the actions that Russia has undertaken in recent years, whereas Russia is attempting to prove it is able to do what it wants with its military as it sees fit. The identification of Russian COGs is a necessity to understanding Russian motivation. Understanding Russian motivation enables implementing deterrence through the use of RAF, prepositioned stocks and lily pad bases to influence the COGs.

Warden's theory revolved around the COG support system, in which the COG derives its power from its power bases or rings. Influencing one of the outside rings or nodes creates only a limited effect. Influencing the COG directly is not necessary, indirect influence can be applied to the COG through successful and extreme influence on the outer rings. A decisive blow against the COG directly is always an option. In doing so, the risk of suffering a catastrophic success is

³¹ General Robert Cone, 'Operationalizing Strategic Landpower,' *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (June 27, 2013), 2.

³² Gary Sheftick, "Army: Strategic Landpower Concept Changes Doctrine," *Army.mil/News*, February 4, 2014, accessed December 20, 2015, http://www.army.mil/article/118432/TRADOC__Strategic_Landpower_concept_to_change_doctrine/.

possible.³³ Influencing the outside rings, while moving towards the COG can be equally as effective.³⁴




Figure 1: Warden's Five Rings

Source: John A. Warden III, "Air Power for the Twenty-First Century," in Karl P. Magyar, Editor in Chief, *Challenge and Response: Anticipating US Military Security Concerns* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, August 1994), 328-29.

³³ Colonel John Warden III, 'The New American Security Force,' *Airpower Journal*, Issue 13 (1995), 75-76.

³⁴ LTC Antulio Echevarria, "Clausewitz's center of gravity: it's not what we thought," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 56, no. 1 (December 2003), 2.

Cone and Warden would both agree the necessity to develop an accurate understanding of the complex system with its inherent intricacies. Russia contains several layers of intricacies as a complex system that a single, decisive blow would not disrupt. Russia is not a single node actor, Russia contains several, multi-layered nodes of power that are very difficult, if not near impossible to influence directly.

In a complex adaptive system, under Cone's model, attacking only the nodes would invoke the systemic collapse of the adversary, leaving little choice but to surrender.³⁵ What Cone failed to develop was a thorough understanding of the various COGs the adversary draws its power from, not just an understanding of the various nodes. The COG is not limited to a physical structure; the COG can be a ceremonial piece, a religious calling or something more complex and obscure.³⁶ The COG for an enemy should not be limited to the belief that the COG primarily is a single element. As with any complex system, the singular elements help construct the whole. The whole of the system is not dependent on any one element to sustain itself.³⁷ The system shows elements of emergence and that emergence allows the system to dynamically reinvent itself by continuously learning and adapting.³⁸

The commonality between any centers of gravity is the assumption that disruption of them prevents the enemy from accomplishing their mission.³⁹ In *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz identifies the enemy COG when he states, "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is

³⁵ Cone, 'Operationalizing Strategic Landpower,' 4-5.

³⁶ Lawrence Freedman, "Stop Looking for the Center of Gravity," *War On the Rocks*, June 24, 2014, accessed January 8, 2016, <http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/stop-looking-for-the-center-of-gravity/>.

³⁷ FM 3-24: *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, Chapter 1.

³⁸ Roger Lewin, *Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos* (New York, NY: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1993), 216 - 220.

³⁹ Echevarria, "Clausewitz's center of gravity," 2.

concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity.”⁴⁰ Carl von Clausewitz was also inexplicitly stating how a COG is a complex system that can adapt and defend against attacks. Russia has undertaken similar action as described by Clausewitz in dealing with anti-Russian propaganda and perceived democratic encroachment to the Russian border.

The COG is a complex adaptive system by inherent nature.⁴¹ If there had been a more thorough examination of the critical nodes within the complex adaptive system, Cone would have come to realize that nodes are not necessarily an enemy’s COGs. If nodes are not the enemy’s COGs, then disrupting or destroying those nodes would do little more than to strengthen the resolve of the enemy.⁴² Incorrect identification of the COG and the COG’s power structure leads to an improper employment of military options.⁴³

With any complex system, the enemy has a choice in what happens, and the warfighter likely does not have a complete understanding of the operational environment.⁴⁴ During a military unit’s assessment of its enemy, underlying relationships between enemy actors might not be readily identifiable. The desired outcome or consequence of an action might not occur.⁴⁵ When deciding to strike or build a targeting list, one should include inputs such as culture, language, history of the people, religious implications, and the multitude of reactions from friendly

⁴⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, 485-6.

⁴¹ Echevarria, "Clausewitz’s center of gravity," 4.

⁴² FM 3-21.8: *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 8–1.

⁴³ Lt Col Stephen Davis, "Center of Gravity and the War on Terrorism" (2003), 12 – 18.

⁴⁴ FM 3-21.8: *The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad*, Chapter 1.

⁴⁵ JP 1-02: *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 73.

actions.⁴⁶ A COG is composed of several layers of complexity, and each layer is made up of individuals, collectives, customs, courtesies, families, and political ties. These key aspects of a COG are some of the inputs that must be included to understand better the numerous COGs for Russia. Russia contains all these layers of complexity and identifying each of the layers and their importance to Russia aids in developing a deterrence plan using prepositioned stocks, RAF and lily pad bases as an effective deterrence.

RAF and prepositioned stocks aid the United States and its allied nations in the concentration of forces throughout the world where there is not a standing army readily available. The concentration of military forces before engaging in battle is not a new concept in the history of warfare. For example, North Korea concentrated military forces, before marching south in June 1950. The Russians concentrated military forces before entering Crimea in 2014 and the Islamic State of Iraq, and al-Sham (ISIS) concentrated combat forces before entering Mosul in 2014. The concentration of force has been implemented throughout history as an offensive tactic and as a defensive tactic.⁴⁷ Throughout history and in modern warfare, nations with standing armies have concentrated forces before an engagement to gain a tactical advantage.⁴⁸ Using prepositioned stocks, RAF and lily pad basing accurately are necessary key components of deterrence.

⁴⁶ *Campaign Planning Handbook Academic Year 2016* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2016), 78.

⁴⁷ Lt. Cmdr. Christopher Van Avery, "12 new principles of warfare," *Armed Forces Journal*, July 1, 2007, accessed December 28, 2015, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/12-new-principles-of-warfare/>.

⁴⁸ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, ed. Thomas Cleary (Boston, MA: Shambhala, 2005), 85.

Prepositioned Stocks

The United States has returned all the equipment back to Germany that previously was removed between 2009 and 2013 due to downsizing and force restructuring.⁴⁹ The equipment is now designated under the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) as the European Activity Set (EAS). The EAS is comprised of equipment pre-positioned at Germany's Grafenwoehr Training Area. The prepositioned equipment is intended to enable US regionally-aligned forces and multinational partners in Europe to train and operate with while fulfilling the role as the European Response Force and NATO Response Force.⁵⁰

With the equipment repositioned to the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), the equipment now falls under Army prepositioned stocks (APS) and Army Regulation (AR) 710-1. AR 710-1 defines APS as “stocks that are positioned at land-based sites and afloat.” The only element that has not returned to this geographic region are the soldiers needed to operate the equipment.⁵¹ Without the soldiers permanently returned to the EUCOM AOR, the equipment sits in temporary storage, not being utilized. Storing the prepositioned equipment in a staged environment does offer advantages over keeping a full standing army in place at all times.

Sustainment Costs of Prepositioned Stocks

The main benefit of not having troops permanently stationed in Germany is directly attributable to cost savings, as directed under sequestration.⁵² The monetary savings not only

⁴⁹ Secretary of State John Kerry, Remarks on the United States Foreign Policy Agenda for 2016 (January 13, 2016), 7.

⁵⁰ Steven Stanhill, "405th AFSBn-Germany receives 'herculean' effort in support of European Activity Set mission," *LOGLINES*, July – August 2012, 8.

⁵¹ 2017 Posture Statement of the United States Army, 12-13.

⁵² Stephen Krasner, "Declining American leadership in the world economy," *The International Spectator*, Vol. 50, no. 4 (October 2, 2015), 175-176.

pertain to permanently stationed personnel but also to the constant wear and tear on the equipment that occurs during rotational training. Reduced usage directly correlates to reduced maintenance and operation costs.⁵³ The concept behind having prepositioned stocks aligns with the same approach performed at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Fort Polk, Louisiana in regards to equipment storage.

At both of the locations above, equipment is kept in a state of readiness aligned with training purposes only not immediately available for war deployment. The equipment, after a thorough military reset/refit program, is available for rotation into front-line units. If the equipment is not brought from a training status to a deployable status, the equipment is kept as a training aid, sent to a DoD salvage yard or placed in a foreign military sales program. The two main benefits of training units not bringing the bulk of their deployable equipment to austere locations are based upon shipping and maintenance costs. Having an equipment draw program in place in the EUCOM AOR affords the RAFs equipment to use and with enough lead time, equipment available for forward deployment to a lily pad base to act as a deterrent.

The typical cost for a unit to rotate through training at NTC or JRTC is \$25 million. Costs to ship equipment to the EUCOM AOR would increase operational costs exponentially, over having prepositioned stocks available.⁵⁴ The use of prepositioned stocks is crucial for deterring potential adversaries. With enough lead time, the US military could concentrate forces as a

⁵³ Luke Coffey, "Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in Europe Remain Vital," Heritage Organization, July 11, 2012, accessed February 1, 2016, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/07/keeping-america-safe-why-us-bases-in-europe-remain-vital>.

⁵⁴ Randy Kendrick, "Joint Logistics for the EUCOM AOR," *Army Logistician*, Vol. 38, no. 1 (February 1, 2006): 19-31.

deterrence force.⁵⁵ When an incident emerges that requires large-scale US Army intervention, troops can be brought to the location of the equipment and use the equipment as required for missions.⁵⁶ Once the US Army completes the overarching strategic mission, the US Army can return the equipment to the original storage location side.⁵⁷ By design, prepositioned equipment and materiel are the first things the US Army uses to fight.⁵⁸ With the use of prepositioned stocks, there must also be a location from which the RAF can mount an offense from or be a deterrence. To provide this basing area, the United States is gravitating towards temporary bases or lily pads.

Lily Pads

The US military rebranded the term, “lily pad” for the current era of the military.⁵⁹ Recently, lily pad re-entered the common strategy, when former General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 2015, told reporters that the Pentagon is considering the creation of new lily pads in Iraq in other hostile locations.⁶⁰ Formally called cooperative security locations, lily pads suggest small installations allowing troops in isolated

⁵⁵ United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-15-570: “Report to Congressional Committees on Prepositioned Stocks,” June 2015, 22.

⁵⁶ TRADOC Pam 525-7-1: *The United States Army Concept Capability Plan for Distribution Operations for the Future Modular Force*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2007), 8.

⁵⁷ Army Sustainment Command Public Affairs, "APS-3 Army Strategic Flotilla Rebuild Complete, Meets 2020 Strategy," *Army News Service*, September 25, 2012, 1.

⁵⁸ Kelsey McEvoy, "Army prepositioned stocks: Indispensable to America's global force-projection capability," *Torchbearer*, September 1, 2008, 2.

⁵⁹ Mark L. Gillem, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire* (United States: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 8.

⁶⁰ Jim Garamone, ‘New Base Opens Possibilities for Iraqi Forces, Dempsey Says’, *DoD News, Defense Media Activity*, (June 11, 2015), 3.

locations to deploy quickly into battle.⁶¹ Lily pads are nothing like the massive bases that characterized the US occupation of Iraq between 2003 and 2011, with their fast food restaurants, car dealerships, and swimming pools.⁶² Lily pads are not intended to be like the sprawling bases found in many foreign countries, where tens of thousands of troops and family members have lived with all the comforts of suburbia.⁶³ Lily pads allow for quick movement of forces into hostile and destabilizing areas, not for a prolonged continuous, permanent base.⁶⁴ Lily pads also contain the inherent risk of continuously growing and expanding beyond its initial utility. The benefit to using lily pad bases is through its application to quickly be established and used with prepositioned stocks and RAF to create deterrence.

Lily Pads are an excellent tool for a quick expansion of forces to mass with equipment from a pre-positioned location that is ready for combat. Lily pads can only work if the United States has permission to enter a country and establish a foothold to operate from to posture forces for deterrence. Lily Pads have the inherent ability to grow and shrink as needed to accommodate troops and equipment, where and when needed.⁶⁵ Such lily pad bases have become a critical part of an evolving Washington military strategy aimed at maintaining US global dominance by doing far more with less in an increasingly competitive, ever more multi-polar world. The relatively quick establishment of a lily pad base allows for a deterrence force to be readily available when

⁶¹ David Vine, "American military extends its reach worldwide," *Investigative Reporting Workshop*, August 25, 2015.

⁶² Eners Surd, "General: New US hub in Iraq could be 'lily pad' model," *Al-Jazeera America*, June 11, 2015, accessed November 20, 2015, <http://alj.am/w8yl>.

⁶³ Gillem, *America Town: Building the Outposts of Empire*, 272.

⁶⁴ David Vine, *Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World* (United States: Metropolitan Books, 2015), 301.

⁶⁵ Vine, *Base Nation*, 316.

needed with minimal cost and effort within striking distance of a belligerents COG. If needed, a larger force may grow and utilize the lily pad location for expansive operations.

Regionally Aligned Forces

The current methodology being utilized to show a physical deterrence and reassurance in EUCOM is to rotate various units from the continental United States (CONUS) based locations to Germany.⁶⁶ The RAF is partnered with host and allied nation militaries for training and mission understanding. The goal of regional alignment is to provide Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) with “predictable, task-organized, and responsive capabilities” that help to achieve employment of the forces to reach desired end states and to “meet other requirements across the full range of military operations.”⁶⁷ Regional alignment also provides a more efficient approach for non-traditional threats in an increasingly interdependent security environment.⁶⁸ The Army seeks to train Soldiers and grow leaders who can adapt to changing conditions across the range of military operations.⁶⁹ Regional alignment also prepares Army forces to build sustainable capacity in partners and allies to address common security challenges. This approach is consistent with principles of good governance and the rule of law.⁷⁰ Units organized under the regionally aligned force concept also provide an immediate force-in-being to assure partners and deter potential adversaries.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Coffey, "Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in Europe Remain Vital."

⁶⁷ Odierno and McHugh, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*, 5.

⁶⁸ LTG Charles Cleveland, *ARSOF Operating Concept 2022*, (September 26, 2014), 25.

⁶⁹ ADP 7-0: *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-3.

⁷⁰ TRADOC Pam 525-3-0: *Army Capstone Concept*, 13 – 36.

⁷¹ Odierno and McHugh, *Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014*, 4.

Currently, the US Army unit that is performing regional alignments in Germany is the 4th Infantry Division based out of Fort Carson, Colorado.⁷² Once overseas, the soldiers provide command and control for Army forces participating in Atlantic Resolve, which was launched this year in light of Russian intervention and aggression in Ukraine.⁷³ The 4th Infantry Division soldiers will train alongside NATO allies and partner nations in the region to build interoperability, partner capacity and relationships.⁷⁴ The multi-national cooperative training has been a staple for the US military for years. In a speech given at the Association of the U.S. Army Annual conference in 2012, General (Ret.) Odierno stated; “By aligning unit headquarters and rotational units to combatant commands, and tailoring our combatant training centers and exercises to plan for their greatest contingencies, units will gain invaluable expertise and cultural awareness, and be prepared to meet the regional requirements more rapidly and effectively than ever before.”⁷⁵ The United States has learned many lessons over the last ten years. Nothing is as important to long-term success as understanding the prevailing culture and values of belligerent nations and allied nations.⁷⁶ Understanding the relationship between culture and values aids RAFs in being a deterrent force when working with allied nations.

⁷² Maj. Frederick William and Capt. Shaun Manly, “‘Devil’ Brigade Transfers Mission to 4th Infantry Division,” *Army Magazine*, Vol. 66, no.1 (December 16, 2015), 24.

⁷³ *Special Report: America’s continued commitment to European security through Operation Atlantic Resolve*, US Department of Defense, December 9, 2015, accessed December 10, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0514_Atlantic-Resolve.

⁷⁴ Michelle Tan, “4th ID headquarters deploying to Europe,” *Army Times*, November 26, 2014, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2014/11/26/division-headquarters-europe-deployment/19543711/>.

⁷⁵ General Odierno as told by C. Todd Lopez, “Realigning regional forces aimed at preventing future wars,” *Association of the United States Army*, (October 23, 2012), 2.

⁷⁶ Raymond Odierno, “Regionally aligned forces: A new model for building partnerships,” *Army Live*, March 22, 2012, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2012/03/aligned-forces/>.

RAFs provide the military personnel needed with the necessary cultural understanding to respond with equipment from prepositioned stocks.⁷⁷ Placement at lily pad bases within striking distance to an adversary's COG provides a CCDR with a ready to fight and relevant force.⁷⁸ Without adequate equipment, available forces, and basing, a CCDR will be unable to provide a necessary deterrence towards belligerents such as Russia.

Russian Incursion

On 07 May 2012, former Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, became the 4th President of Russia (Putin's third time "elected" to the presidency) when he succeeded former President Medvedev.⁷⁹ A short two years later, Russia military equipment and personnel would be near its south-western border, at the doorstep of Crimea, based on a request from the Ukrainian exiled President Yanukovich.⁸⁰ Exiled President Yanukovich made the request to President Putin to establish "legitimacy, peace, law and order, stability and defending the people of Ukraine."⁸¹ The application for assistance from Russia was based on the Russian political belief at the time, that the Ukrainian people were "under the influence of Western countries," and there were "open acts of terror and violence," such as "persecution of people for language, political

⁷⁷ TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0: *Army Capstone Concept*, 13 – 36.

⁷⁸ Eric Gomez, "Distributed basing: The key to distributed lethality's success," *International Maritime Security*, July 7, 2015, 7.

⁷⁹ Anatoly Medetsky, "New cabinet has familiar cast of characters," *The Moscow Times*, May 22, 2012.

⁸⁰ Christopher Brennan, "Yanukovich request for protection in Russia granted, official says," *The Moscow Times*, February 27, 2014.

⁸¹ Vitaly Churkin, Interview transcript from the United Nations, March 4, 2014 as reported by CNN at <http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1403/03/cg.01.html>.

reasons, and ethnicity.”⁸² Russia, being led by Putin, felt there was an imminent threat to the sovereign Russian border shared with Ukraine where if Crimea fell and destabilized the region, Russia could be destabilized.⁸³ Russia had to act to protect itself as well as show the world it was a changed country. The current placement of prepositioned stocks in Western Germany and the rotational training of the 4th ID RAFs was insufficient in portraying a credible deterrence force against Russian troop movements into Crimea. Due to the movement of Russian troops into the Crimean Peninsula, the US-Russian relations became further strained.

As Russia underwent fundamental transformations in its political, and economic system, the relationship between China and Russian remained unchanged while the relationship with the US became further strained.⁸⁴ Russia believed that maintaining its relationships with first and third world countries would aid in transforming its international image by showing solidarity and interdependence among countries. Russia enjoys having the rest of the world view their actions as those of a nation willing to help as needed. The image helps bolster the Russian narrative that Putin flaunts showing the reforms Russia is undertaking.

Russia wants to propagate an image in the EUCOM AOR that is similar to the image the United States holds worldwide. They unequivocally want to appear willing to assist regionally as needed and have the capabilities of operating outside their territorial boundaries. The narrative

⁸² Alexey Eremenko, ‘Nine Ways Russia, Ukraine Went from Friends to Enemies,’ *Moscow News* (October 3, 2015).

⁸³ Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Russian Parliament in 2014 defending the necessity to invade Crimea. The Russian need was premised on helping Crimea politically and to correct any previous wrongs that Crimea suffered during the 1990’s. Additional video and transcript is available as of April 19, 2016 at <https://www.rt.com/politics/official-word/vladimir-putin-crimea-address-658/>

⁸⁴ Shrinkman, Paul, “The Tiger and the Bear: China-Russia Alliance Shrouded in Mystery,” *US News and World Reports*, May 14, 2014.

cited by Putin is not new, rather a tired and old narrative with a predictable ending. The world as a whole understands what Russia is attempting to do. The world view of Russia revolves around Russia trying to expand its borders and increase its communist political influence on proxy countries (within close proximity by sharing sovereign borders and can be easily influenced). Russia refuses to recognize two simple points; they cannot change their international image through territorial land grabs, and they need to work with NATO on international issues.⁸⁵ With Russia failing to understand the beforementioned points, they seemingly are willing to accept their current image on the world stage which is counter to their political narrative.

Crimea and Ukraine

For the United States or Europe to pretend that Russian relations are salvageable is irrational. The West has been in competition with Russia for many decades over hegemony in the Baltic States region. The US military has moved prepositioned stocks into Western Germany, assigned the 4th Infantry Division as the EUCOM RAF and expanded regional training on military bases with multi-national allied partner nations. Several indisputable tension points are evident: the Russian involvement in Syria, SLOCs in the Black Sea, and energy blackmail in Europe.⁸⁶ Due to Russia providing the majority of the petroleum-based resources in the Baltic region, they can readily manipulate direct costs and influence resource-dependent countries.⁸⁷ Russia has the direct ability to control proxy countries easily to show legitimacy. With this direct smart power (combination of hard and soft power), Russia can force proxy countries to recognize Russian

⁸⁵ Brian Whitmore, "A Russian Land Grab in Abkhazia?" *The Power Vertical*, March 30, 2011, accessed November 19, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/a_russian_land_grab_in_abkhazia/3542144.html.

⁸⁶ Deana Arsenian, "United States and Russia: a relationship to manage," *Carnegie*, October 1, 2015, 12.

⁸⁷ John Gannon, "Russia in the International System" (paper presented at Russian Conference: CR 2001-02), 7-8.

expansionism as legitimate.⁸⁸ As Ukraine so clearly demonstrated, Russian desires to regain territory lost to a neighbor or that has gained independence regardless of ethnic or cultural consideration. The expansion of Russia is a challenge the West must acknowledge and address proactively.⁸⁹ Russian revanchism is on full display; cloaked in the ambiguity of Nationalism and defense of allies.

February 2014, the Crimean Parliament was seized by armed men and the Russian Flag raised over the Crimean peninsula's capital building.⁹⁰ This seizure showed the world that Russia was willing and able to do what was necessary militarily to assist in supporting a request from an ally. Raising the Russian flag on Ukrainian sovereign soil was viewed on the international stage as a land grab to start expanding the Russian empire.⁹¹ The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not merely an unfortunate series of events in a faraway land, but a serious threat to European stability and more broadly, the rules-based international order. Moscow's contravention of international norms by intervening in Crimea signals a belief that it can blatantly and unilaterally manipulate regional dynamics.⁹² Equally troubling is Russia's apparent flouting of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, to which it is a member along with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine.⁹³

⁸⁸ Nicholas Davies, "In the dark on the 'dark side'," *Consortium News*, November 27, 2015.

⁸⁹ Michael Cecire, 'The Russian Invasion of Ukraine,' *Foreign Policy Research Institute* (March 19, 2015), 5-6.

⁹⁰ Russian Presidential Executive Office, 'Biography,' *Vladimir Putin: Personal Biography* (October 1, 2014), 9-10.

⁹¹ Mark Mackinnon, "Putin Moves to Annex Crimea as U.S. Denounces 'Land Grab'," *The Globe and Mail*, March 18, 2014, 6-7.

⁹² Cecire, 'The Russian Invasion of Ukraine,' 5.

⁹³ Jill Reilly and Lizzie Edmonds, "The forgotten treaty which could drag the US and UK into war with Russia if Putin's troops intervene in Ukraine," *The Daily Mail United Kingdom*, February 28, 2014, 4.

The Budapest Memorandum guarantees Ukraine's territorial sovereignty in exchange for the transfer of Kiev's nuclear arsenal to Russia.⁹⁴ The signing member countries of the memorandum agreed to come to the aid of Kiev, if there was a credible threat or the use of force against its territorial sovereignty.⁹⁵ Russia broke this memorandum when it became the aggressor. Therefore, the remaining signing countries should have rendered support Ukraine.⁹⁶ The other signing members did not render aid to Ukraine militarily, instead, the signing members are using political means by which to help Ukraine.

Russia's internationally unsanctioned and illegal commitment of forces into Ukraine threatens the very fabric of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture, which is premised on the “primacy of state sovereignty and NATO as the guarantor of that system”.⁹⁷ The sprawl of Russia into the former Russian territory of Ukraine is heightening the tension in a region already on the edge over fears of Russian domination. It will be diplomatically and militarily difficult, if not wholly impossible to dislodge Russia from the occupation and annexation of Crimea.⁹⁸ The only

⁹⁴ Genya Savilov, “Russian Armed Forces Seize Crimea as Putin Threatens Wider Military Invasion of Ukraine,” *KyivPost* (November 16, 2015), 7.

⁹⁵ Reilly and Edmonds, "The forgotten treaty which could drag the US and UK into war with Russia if Putin's troops intervene in Ukraine," 4.

⁹⁶ *U.S./U.K./Ukraine press statement on the Budapest memorandum meeting*, US Department of State, March 5, 2014, accessed December 19, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/03/222949.htm>.

⁹⁷ Cecire, “The Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” 19-20.

⁹⁸ Lawrence Freedman, "Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol.56, no. 3 (May 19, 2014): 7–42.

way Russia will voluntarily leave Crimea and Ukraine is under its own terms and timeline. There are no solid or imagined relationships that will persuade Russia to leave.⁹⁹

The United States and global community should not take Russia lightly. There are no known ends to the aggressive move that Russia did in seizing the Crimean Peninsula. The surrounding countries are friendly with Russia, but leery at the same time. No single country will be able to stop Russia from moving in other directions and reclaiming lands that were formerly part of the Russian empire.¹⁰⁰ A unity of effort approach must be taken in order to deter Russia from further land grabs. Deterring Russia is no easy task. The United States and many other countries have historically attempted to deter Russia from expanding their territory and failed.¹⁰¹ A better understanding of Russia and their COGs aids in understanding their approaches to international matters.

Russian Centers of Gravity

Development of the Russian COG analysis starts with the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and proceeds through additional analysis of Russian motivations. Vladimir Putin, cares about border security and the international legitimacy of Russian hegemony. Putin wants to be respected and have Russian interests protected. During a panel discussion at the plenary meeting of the 19th St. Petersburg Economics forum in 2015, Putin stated: “We do not act aggressively. We have started to defend our interests more persistently and consistently. Russia is not aspiring

⁹⁹ John Gannon, "Russia in the International System" (paper presented at Russian Conference: CR 2001-02), 5-7.

¹⁰⁰ John Kirby, "U.S. Department of State: Daily Press Briefing," US Department of State, January 19, 2016, accessed January 25, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/01/251782.htm>.

¹⁰¹ *The World Factbook: Russia*, Central Intelligence Agency, January 1, 2016, accessed February 1, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>.

for hegemony or any ephemeral status of a superpower. We don't impose our own standards or models of behavior and development on anyone. We want equal relations with all participants of the international community – with the US, European and Asian partners.”¹⁰² Russia does not act precipitously, but it does act. Putin, will take advantage of circumstances directly and create opportunities to exploit as he deems necessary.¹⁰³

Moscow's treatment of Ukraine is instructive. Russia did little when Viktor Yushchenko was in power.¹⁰⁴ Russia viewed Ukraine not as an immediate concern to Russian stability, merely a proxy country that Russia could do business with. Yushchenko made Ukraine relevant to Russia through trade and available warm water sea ports. Russia viewed Ukraine instability as a chance to show the world and the United States that they are a legitimate player in their respective region.¹⁰⁵

Further development of the COG with Russian involvement in Ukraine must encompass western democracy expanding.¹⁰⁶ Western democratic idealism is approaching Russian borders at an alarming speed for Putin and Russia by encouraging applications to the European Union (EU) and NATO.¹⁰⁷ Putin perceives the EU (as an extension of Western democracy) as a genuine

¹⁰² Alexei Druzhinin, "Putin: Russia Is Not Aspiring to Superpower Status, Just Wants to be Respected," *Russian Times*, June 19, 2015.

¹⁰³ TRADOC Pam 523-3-3: *The United States Army Functional Concept for Mission Command*, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), 7 – 10.

¹⁰⁴ Doug Bandow, "Obama wants U.S. to spend more on Europe's defense: Europeans should pay instead," *Forbes* (February 3, 2016), 16-18.

¹⁰⁵ Kathleen Hicks, Ernest Bower, and Heather Conley, "The State of U.S. Power: Perceptions across the Globe," Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 8, 2014, accessed November 15, 2015, <http://csis.org/publication/state-us-power-perceptions-across-globe>.

¹⁰⁶ Susan Hinely, "Western idealism and the pursuit of global justice," *Global Studies Journal* (August 23, 2011), 12-14.

¹⁰⁷ Michael Klimentyev, "Moscow will respond to NATO approaching Russian borders 'accordingly'," *Russian Times*, June 18, 2015, A8-A9.

strategic threat. The threat comes from the EU's potential to reform associated countries in ways that pull them away from Russia.¹⁰⁸ The EU's Association Agreements are incompatible with Putin's plan to expand Russia's Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan and create a "Eurasian Union."¹⁰⁹ Putin's goal is to secure markets for Russian products and guarantee Russian jobs. He also sees the Eurasian Union as a buffer against alien "civilizational" ideas and values from Europe and the West.¹¹⁰

Historical reference does not justify Moscow's current support for Ukrainian separatists; historical reference provides context for Putin to act. Putin wanted to weaken rather than annex his neighbor in its entirety. If Russia truly wants the whole of Ukraine, Russia could force Ukraine to capitulate through decreasing the flow of industrial goods and petroleum products.¹¹¹ The forceful takeover of the Crimean government was nothing more than Russia proving their ability to operate outside of their boundaries and to try and stay relevant regionally.¹¹² Russia acts in a manner that appears to show Russia is only interested in what is best for Russia.

Putin has done nothing overtly obvious as to suggest that he wants to expand further his autocratic rule over comparatively smaller Baltic countries.¹¹³ Putin has not acted upon requests

¹⁰⁸ Uri Friedman, "Putin's playbook: the strategy behind Russia's takeover of Crimea," *The Atlantic*, March 2, 2014.

¹⁰⁹ Lee Gershon, "The Eurasian Union: The other EU," *The Economist*, August 23, 2014, 65-67.

¹¹⁰ Fiona Hill and Steven Pifer, "Putin's Russia Goes Rogue," Brookings, January 23, 2014, accessed January 28, 2016, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/putin-russia-rogue-hill-pifer>.

¹¹¹ Harrison Koehli and Niahll Bradley, "Russia could force Ukraine to capitulate," *Russia Direct*, August 29, 2014, 18-19.

¹¹² Friedman, "Putin's playbook," *The Atlantic*, 2014.

¹¹³ Stephen Cohen, "Cold War Again: Who's Responsible?" Jordan Russia Center, April 2, 2014, accessed April 14, 2016, <http://jordanrussiacycenter.org/news/cold-war-whos->

from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for increased natural resource exports or to engage in multi-national training exercises.¹¹⁴ The need for additional territory does not exist for Russia. Russia attempting to grab a portion of Poland would be as foolish as trying to annex Ukraine fully. Putin fully understands the relative position of power he would be losing regionally if Russia annexed additional sovereign territory.¹¹⁵ Former Soviet Union Dictator, Joseph Stalin, already moved both countries westward at the end of World War II to redraw boundary lines settled by previous treaties and conflicts.¹¹⁶ The current Russian interests are in contrast to how Stalin challenged territorial sovereignty through direct, unrequested military power. A new and competent Russian army will not be marching on Berlin, Paris, or Madrid without provocation or national necessity.¹¹⁷

The limited prepositioned stocks, available US Army forces in Europe and Baltic States basing locations would act as little more than a temporary delay against Russia if Russia did move westward.¹¹⁸ The distance of forces and usable stocks of prepositioned equipment

responsible/#.VxABauTmrIU and Alexey Fenenko, "Why the Ukrainian crisis is dangerous for Russia," *Russia Direct*, March 3, 2014, A6-A7.

¹¹⁴ Oliver Bullough, "Vladimir Putin: The Rebuilding of 'Soviet' Russia," *BBC Magazine*, March 28, 2014, 21-23

¹¹⁵ Nina Khrushcheva, "What does Vladimir Putin really want in Ukraine?" *Reuters*, February 2, 2015, accessed February 14, 2015, <http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/02/01/what-does-vladimir-putin-really-want-in-ukraine/>.

¹¹⁶ The Soviet Union was formally dissolved in 1991, leaving fifteen new states and countries, including Russia. As a result of the 1917 Revolution, Russia became the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic which joined the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Transcaucasus Federation to create the Soviet Union. Further information can be obtained by reviewing Declaration No. 142-H, Dissolution of the Soviet Union.

¹¹⁷ Doug Bandow, "Obama wants U.S. to spend more on Europe's defense: Europeans should pay instead," *Forbes* (February 3, 2016), 16-18

¹¹⁸ Robert Scales, "Our precarious defenses in Europe," *Wall Street Journal*, November 29, 2015.

drastically decreases the deterrent effect they are meant to provide when dealing with a near peer nation such as Russia. To solve the issue of locations of prepositioned stocks and availability to RAF and multi-national partners, the prepositioned stocks should be moved to a lily pad base that is closer to the belligerent nation state actor. To act as more than a speed bump to Russian forces, the US must leverage partner nation support with equipment and personnel.¹¹⁹ Two problems with partner nation involvement involve the political agreement that would be necessary to accomplish large-scale multi-national military operations and the amount of time consumed to produce the necessary amount of forces and equipment to act as a deterrence force.

Through the use of partner nations and a systematic increase of hard power, a NATO-led force could have the possible assets to deter a large Russian incursion across Western Europe.¹²⁰ The NATO-led force would need to perform deliberate and decisive attacks on Putin and his parliament of oligarchs for Russia to recognize the futility in continuing the campaign. Destabilizing the governmental union between Putin and his oligarchs or destroying Putin directly, allows for follow-on forces to gain the initiative. Once the initiative is gained through prepositioned stocks and RAFs, Russia could possibly be forced to either capitulate, fight until every last military member is dead, a new treaty is signed, or Putin is stopped by the oligarchy.

The final COG for Russia is its desire for global recognition as a legitimate hegemony; that other countries need, so Russia can survive.¹²¹ Russia continuously works to change the

¹¹⁹ FM 3-22: *Army Support to Security Cooperation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 21 – 30.

¹²⁰ Fred Kaplan, "The NATO panic: The alarmist claims that the alliance can't defend Europe from Russia are preposterous," *Slate News*, March 5, 2014, 8-10.

¹²¹ Charles Kupchan, "The Decline of the West: Why America Must Prepare for the End of Dominance," *The Atlantic*, March 20, 2012.

negative image it has internationally. The decisive blow to the Russia image involves removing Russia from its perch of self-imposed smart power through an intensive anti-Russia propaganda campaign involving all means of internet based and printed pamphlet warfare.¹²² A method that works in conjunction with delegitimizing the Russian narrative involves providing choices for all goods and services provided by Russia. Providing natural resource options to Russian proxy countries from competitor countries such as Africa, the US, or Germany, will delegitimize the Russian influence. The United States would need to invest heavily in the foreign development of alternative energy sources. The alternative energy sources must be attractive to the proxy countries as well as financially viable to be deemed legitimate. If alternative energy sources are not a financially viable option for the Russian proxy countries, then alternate natural resources must be sought out and leveraged that can meet the proxy country's needs.

The NATO or US-led anti-Russia resource dependency must provide alternative sources of petroleum products and tangible goods to compel proxy countries to diminish reliance on Russia. Delegitimizing Russian influence in the region will not be easy but will be necessary to afford proxy countries the opportunity to develop without undue influence. A whole of government approach must be used along with partner nation assistance to delegitimize the need for Russian resources. Russia seemingly will have no problems identifying new markets outside of the proxy countries to purchase Russian natural resources. The NATO or the US led coalition must identify those potential buyers now and start applying pressure through political and media channels to act as a deterrence to future Russian aggressions in the European region.

Application of pressure to proxy countries can be applied with soft power (political means) initially and moved to hard power (military means) if compliance does not happen. There

¹²² Alex Lantier, "Anti-Russia Propaganda and the Fabrication of a New Pro-War Consensus," *World Socialist*, March 21, 2014, 3-4.

is the necessity to understand that hard power against a belligerent such as Russia would be futile and senseless if done as a unilateral actor, a multi-national cooperation would need to be done with the use of pre-positioned equipment, RAFs and lily pad bases.¹²³ Political soft power and leveraging of diplomatic and economic actions is the most likely successful approach to impact directly the Russian COGs of Vladimir Putin, proxy country natural resource reliance and the Russian narrative. Russia does not respond to direct hard power in a manner that would be conducive to negotiations and any middle ground.¹²⁴

Recommendations on Russian Incursion

As of June 2015, there currently are less than 40,000 US military personnel permanently stationed in Germany. If required, this military personnel could render immediate action against a Russian advance. The likely hood of the success of any single attack against Russia as a unilateral actor would be doubtful. Multiple, multi-national attacks in conjunction with RAFs and prepositioned stocks that were closer to the Russian border through the leveraging of lily pad bases would prove to be the most effective method. The readily available amount of US military personnel that could quickly respond with any decisive blow is questionable. Leveraging of the US Army's sister services and multi-national allied nation partners would be required for any formidable military strike or military disruption.¹²⁵

There are currently no forward positioned lily pad bases near Russia that could be utilized as a springboard for further strategic actions. The lack of lily pad bases, either as

¹²³ Stephen Lendman, *Flashpoint in Ukraine: How the US Drive for Hegemony Risks World War III* (United States: Clarity Press, 2014), 4-6.

¹²⁴ Steven Pifer, "What does Russia want? How do we respond?," *Brookings Institute*, September 11, 2015, accessed April 20, 2016, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/speeches/2008/09/11-russia-pifer>.

¹²⁵ Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 108.

unilateral bases only occupied by US military personnel or on foreign soil as a multi-national occupied lily pad base is alarming. The bases can be relatively small to dispel the unflattering image of US occupation that has perpetuated since the initial push into Iraq, the continued US military troop presence on the Korean Peninsula and stationing of military personnel in Germany since after World War II. A primary benefit of a lily pad base is the possibility to grow as needed to accommodate additional forces and equipment then quickly scale down in size as operations conclude.

Prepositioned equipment stocks are insufficient for any long term mission. The stocks could easily be leveraged for immediate action, but not a long sustained fight. Considerable equipment assets would need to be built up to provide the depth necessary to support a fighting force large enough to defend and attack against Russia. The availability of military equipment needed would require a similar amount of time to build the equipment density used during Operation Iraqi Freedom during the early phases of the war. The quantity of the equipment would need to be congruent with the amount of available military personnel. With Russia currently being rated as the 5th largest standing army in the world, greater preparation through multi-national rotational training exercises, and more robust planning and equipment availability will be required to act as a deterrence.¹²⁶

RAFs would need considerable time to build sufficiently large enough forces of approximately 300,000k troops, before they could mount any substantial deterrence force against Russia. Bringing reinforcements from CONUS takes time, money and national will, all of which are currently in short supply. Utilizing forces that currently share territorial boundaries with Russia or are involved with NATO also takes time. These partner nations would first be

¹²⁶ 29 *Largest Armies in the World*, World Atlas, February 3, 2016, accessed February 5, 2016, <http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/29-largest-armies-in-the-world.html>.

concerned with protecting their sovereign borders before they would send additional or surplus troops to fight Russia. With the United States not sharing a continent with Russia, the US could send troops immediately, but would lack the infrastructure to self-sustain. Partner and host nation support would be vital and a possible COG for the United States.

LTG Frederick “Ben” Hodges, current commander of US Army Europe, constantly speaks about turning a physical force of 30k troops into 300K troops with all the accompanying equipment. The idea LTG Hodges directly speaks about, takes a considerable amount of time. Time that would not be available if Russia truly wanted to expand their boundaries and demonstrate their true military capabilities. There are many skeptical opinions on Russian military power and their ability to be offensive as needed.¹²⁷ A slight demonstration of their military capabilities was clearly shown by the relatively quick call to military action in Syria and the Crimean Peninsula. Russia was able to start their portion of Syrian interdiction via deep strikes with their Air Force before moving large concentrations of troops into the Syrian border region.¹²⁸ Russia has the capability and can project force without other nations’ support or availability.

The lack of a credible and sizeable force coupled with limited prepositioned stocks contributes to the inability of the United States to project any amount of actual deterrence force that is recognized as legitimate by Russia. Due to the limited capabilities of the US and allied nations, Russia could move quickly westward and annex additional territory in the Baltic region uncontested. Russia could also apply pressure to proxy countries that are reliant on Russian

¹²⁷ LTG Frederick “Ben” Hodges cited in, Maria Snytkova, "Slowly but surely, Russia recovers its military power," *Pravda Russian News*, January 23, 2015.

¹²⁸ Andrew Roth, "After four months, Russia’s campaign in Syria is proving successful for Moscow," *Washington Post*, February 3, 2016, 9-11.

natural resources through reduced output. Reduction of Russian natural resources exports would cause proxy countries to quickly capitulate. Without the proxy countries territorial availability for lily pad bases, any measurable offensive operations would be significantly hampered.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The United States military's force posture and projection of forces in the EUCOM AOR will continually adapt and change to meet new challenges and opportunities. Evolution of unilateral action forces to multi-national action forces is needed for the security requirements within the EUCOM AOR. The evolution of forces must be about the emerging strategic priorities that the US faces globally, yet still provides sufficient deterrence and supportive effort to the US allies in Europe. The US global presence must deter aggression, and the US military will need to work in close cooperation with allies to enhance coalition operations.¹²⁹ Repositioning of pre-positioned stocks from their current Western Germany location to locations that are closer to known hostile nation state actors is paramount to effective deterrence. RAF can use the closer positioned equipment on multi-national lily-pad bases to act as a deterrence as part of a multi-lateral military force. The US military has seemingly not moved propositioned stocks to countries where multi-national bases are available, instead, kept stocks in Germany, away from the threat presented by Russia. Moving the prepositioned stocks to proxy country lily pad bases and increasing multinational cooperation with RAF would force a reaction from Russia due to the risk perceived by Russia to their sovereignty. The US military will need to further examine courses of action to counter the reactions from Russia.

The 4th Infantry Division is the lead RAF assigned to Germany for rotational training. The RAF also is responsible to helping build multi-national support to quickly build a force that

¹²⁹ 2017 Posture Statement of the United States Army, 12-13.

can act as a deterrence where needed in the EUCOM AOR. The RAF uses the prepositioned stocks of equipment in Western Germany as a means to train with and provide assurances to coalition allies. Through the RAF mission, extended training missions can be accomplished with Russian proxy countries and the development of lily pad bases for follow on deterrence missions is possible.

Prepositioned stocks are currently located in Western Germany and their primary function is to be used as training sets for the 4th ID who is the assigned RAF in Germany.¹³⁰ For the equipment to be used effectively as a set of equipment for deterrence purposes directly, the equipment needs to be moved closer to the regional threat of Russia and maintained on lily pad bases operated by multi-national allied partners. RAF can utilize the prepositioned stocks on forward positioned lily pad bases to quickly grow the RAF capabilities to be an effective deterrent force with assistance from multi-national allies. The prepositioned stocks, moved to a forward stationed location, would enable the RAF to quickly become a deterrence force.

In conjunction with properly placed prepositioned equipment as far forward as possible to act as part of a deterrence for a cooperative multinational force, the need for lily pad bases becomes apparent. Lily pad bases need to be established in proxy countries as close to Russia as allowed by proxy countries. With lily pad bases, the host country must engage with organic military support allowing for the rapid expansion of forces at the lily pad bases to act as a deterrence force. A coalition that could quickly expand from the 30K to the needed 300K as proposed by LTG Hodges.¹³¹ The multi-national coalition would be able to use pre-positioned stocks that were moved from Western Germany as the initial equipment source while follow on

¹³⁰ Theis, "Army Prepositioned Stocks Ready for Action," July 3, 2008, 4.

¹³¹ LTG Frederick "Ben" Hodges, "Army Europe: Making 30,000 troops look like 300,000," *ARMY Magazine*, Vol. 63, no. 5, April 19, 2013, 52-53.

forces moved to the lily pad bases.¹³² The lily pad bases provide multi-national coalitions with the opportunity to expand as needed for additional allies to support the deterrence mission against Russia.

The preponderance of the large scale military threats presented by Russia and emerging threats elsewhere, require multi-national allied nation support.¹³³ For the ever-present threat to US interests and allied nation interests to be defeated, there is a need for military readiness to be at an all-time high as well as properly equipped troops stationed as close to the threat as possible. Without having properly, correctly stationed military forces, the US military possibly runs the risk of being ineffective initially until additional forces and equipment is able to arrive to reinforce the initial forces. Prepositioned stocks, RAF and lily pad bases with multi-national allied support, provide the answers needed for deterrence. Washington no longer can afford to permanently garrison the globe as a unilateral actor.¹³⁴ Multinational forces afford the US military to perform their intended military function in greater depth and capabilities on foreign soil.

Regardless of where the US Army currently is regarding troop levels and equipment statuses, the US Army must be prepared to defend the nation's interests as well as those of its allied nation partners. The re-emergence of the use of lily-pads, stronger multi-national coalition partnerships with RAF, as well as prepositioning of equipment, have all led to a more adaptive and reactive force.¹³⁵ To make the US military a deterrence that is credible once again in the EUCOM AOR, the location of prepositioned stocks must be moved to a location that is closer to

¹³² Theis, "Army Prepositioned Stocks Ready for Action," July 3, 2008, 6.

¹³³ Coffey, "Keeping America Safe: Why U.S. Bases in Europe Remain Vital."

¹³⁴ Bandow, "Obama Wants U.S. to Spend More on Europe's Defense," 2016.

¹³⁵ TRADOC Pam 528-8-2: *The Army Learning Concept for 2015*, 1.0 ed., (Fort Monroe, VA: Government Printing Office, October, 2010), 21-23.

the belligerent nation state of Russia, the RAFs must be larger and incorporate a greater diversity of multi-national partner nations and the availability of lily pad bases must be increased. The limitations on all the before mentioned parts, degrades the credible military deterrence posture the US military must have in the EUCOM AOR.

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