Deficiencies in Indian Joint Operations

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

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India's influence as a global power is increasing and this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. For all of its great potential, India faces serious impediments to its military modernization and joint operations capabilities because of the way its military is structured. Evaluation of India's doctrine and recent operational experience assessed with respect to their adherence to the Indian principles of war illustrates India's limited capability to conduct joint operations. Specifically, India demonstrated critical planning deficiencies in joint operations during the 1987-90 Indian Peacekeeping Operation in Sri Lanka and the 1999 Kargil War because it failed to adhere to the Indian principles of cooperation, flexibility, security, and intelligence in both case studies. These deficiencies limited India's military effectiveness during the joint operations analyzed; further, evidence indicates that the Indian military has not taken appropriate steps to resolve these deficiencies. The study concludes with identification of means by which India's government could improve its military's joint warfare capability. These findings offer insight to future planners responsible for monitoring India's regional posture and developing campaign plans to deal with potential contingencies involving the Indian military.

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Acronyms

BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CCS	Cabinet Committee on Security
DGMI	Director-General of Military Intelligence
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
COSC	Chief of Staff Committee
IB	Intelligence Bureau
IDS	Integrated Defence Staff
IPKF	Indian Peace Keeping Force
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MARCOS	Marine Commando Force
OFC	Overall Force Commander
ORBAT	Order of Battle
R & AW	Research and Analysis Wing
TULF	Tamil United Liberation Front

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Introduction

Failure comes only when we forget our ideals and objectives and principles.

—*Jawaharlal Nehru*

India's influence as a global power is increasing and this trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Analysts predict that India's population will exceed China's by 2022, and studies reveal that India's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased each year for the last three years, during which time China's GDP steadily decreased. India consistently ranks as the world's largest arms importer in its quest to modernize its military and exert its influence as a regional hegemon in South Asia. It conducts joint military exercises with the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Australia, and many of its Asian neighbors. India remains relatively stable despite external threats from Pakistan and China, both of which possess nuclear weapons, and internal threats from Muslim and Marxist insurgent groups.[1]

For all of its great potential, India faces serious impediments to its military modernization and joint warfighting capabilities. The Indian security establishment remains hampered by its past, while its greatest rival, Pakistan, receives substantial military assistance from China and the United States. Necessary reforms identified after military operations in Sri Lanka and in the Kargil District remain mired in political indifference, military compartmentalization, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Indian regional hegemony in South Asia faces significant risks without critically needed reforms to enable effective joint warfare capabilities.[2]

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[1] Charles Riley, "This Country Will Have More People Than China by 2022," CNN Money, July 30, 2015, accessed August 17, 2015, http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/30/news/economy/india-china-population; World Bank, "GDP Growth (Annual %)," accessed August 17, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG; Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), 96; Sumit Ganguly and Paul Kapur, *India, Pakistan, and the Bomb* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 27-28.

[2] Air Marshal Narayan Menon, "Downhill from Kargil," Indian Defence Review, July 25, 2013, accessed March 5, 2016, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/print/?print_post_id=1745.

Upon gaining its independence, India struggled to create a strong military capable of conducting joint operations. A martial legacy existed in ancient India before the arrival of Alexander the Great, and continued with Hindu empires until the nomadic Muslim warriors, the Mughals, conquered most of ancient India. The Mughal invasions gave birth to the Sikh faith, which formed to defend against the Muslim invaders. India's modern military force traces its heritage to the religious and ethnically divided colonial Indian forces that served the British crown. British India's military forces during the Second World War consisted of over two million personnel of all ranks that participated in significant joint operations, led only by British senior officers. The British military returned home, leaving behind an Indian Army that had only one major general in its ranks, and only one brigadier per twenty brigades. The departure of the British officers left the Indian Army severely weakened from lack of leaders. The Indian Air Force and Navy faced similar gaps in senior leadership. India's political class perceived the military with suspicion due to its past role as the means of enforcing British rule and established strong civilian oversight of the military with no joint command structure.[3]

Despite these issues, the Indian military conducted operations against Pakistan during three major conflicts before the 1999 Kargil War. The rivalry began with the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-48, also known as the First Kashmir War, which ended with a cease-fire and Pakistan gaining two-fifths of Kashmir. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, which saw the largest tank-battle since the Second World War, was a strategic win for India because its military forces not only successfully defended the nation's pre-conflict boundary in Kashmir, but also gained additional

[3] Steven I. Wilkinson, *Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 86; S. Paul Kapur, *Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 67; B. M. Jain, *India in the New South Asia: Strategic, Military and Economic Concerns in the Age of Nuclear Diplomacy* (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2010), 91.

territory before the cease-fire. The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War lasted only 13 days and resulted in Pakistan's loss of East Pakistan, which led to the creation of the new nation of Bangladesh. This enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan continued through 1998 with crises, skirmishes, and the testing of nuclear weapons.[4]

Despite some successes, the Indian military during the last thirty years suffered from various operational deficiencies, particularly in its joint warfare capability.[5] This leads one to question how, and to what degree the Indian military has developed a modern joint warfighting capability. The following examination of India's past and current methods of joint operations reveals its military's preparedness to act as an effective joint warfighting force in support of national security goals within a complex regional environment. Further, it highlights the means the Indian government continues to pursue in its effort to create a military force capable of conducting effective joint operations.

Background

India's military exists in its current state because of the limitations imposed by what Indian society considers permissible. Like all armies, the Indian military acts as an extension of Indian society, and this has influenced its understanding of theory and concepts, and its application of those ideas in the development of its own joint operations doctrine. The British, during domination of India through the East India Company and later under the British Raj, used the ethnic, religious, and caste divisions in Indian society to create an Indian colonial army made

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[4] Saira Kahn, "Nuclear weapons and the prolongation of the India-Pakistan rivalry," in *The India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Conflict*, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 161; Stephen M. Saideman, "At the heart of the conflict: irredentism and Kashmir," in *The India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Conflict*, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 217.

[5] V. P. Malik, *Kargil*: *From Surprise to Victory* (New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2006), 120-121; Rajesh Kadian, *India's Sri Lanka Fiasco: Peace Keepers at War* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1990), 137.

up of segregated regiments. The caste system was a traditional form of Indian social class hierarchy, amplified and institutionalized by the British Raj in its administration of India. The segregated regiments worked under British officers and alongside the British military to defeat any threats to British power in India, and not in the service of the Indian people. This colonial history and the struggle for independence, successfully accomplished by the political party called the Indian National Congress or simply Congress, made the Indian elites very suspicious of military power, which resulted in a subservient and disjointed military.[6]

India inherited a weak military from the British after Partition and the creation of Pakistan by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, but one that evolved to be more representative of the population. The loss of Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province, and the most populous part of Bengal removed populations that dominated the ranks of the Indian military. After Independence, the Indian elites of the Congress party desired a military incapable of threatening the civilian government, but fully capable of ensuring India's territorial integrity. A tight-knit officer corps posed a serious threat to the young nation and the elites, who wanted a politically excluded officer corps. However, this was difficult to achieve because of threats from Pakistan, the coercion of the princely states to enter into union with India, resistance from the officer corps, and the reduction in the size of the military by Jawaharlal Nehru, first Prime Minister of India, in order to fund infrastructure development. Nehru and the diverse Congress party also sought to include more of the non-martial classes into the military and to limit its use in domestic disturbances.[7]

Nehru tremendously weakened the military when he removed the Commander in Chief of the Indian Armed Forces from the cabinet in September 1946. Nehru accepted the

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[6] Wilkinson, 4-5; Jaswant Singh, *Defending India* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 64-65.

[7] Wilkinson, 20-21; Singh, 96-97.

recommendations of his British advisors, Lord Ismay and Lord Mountbatten, who wanted to protect the military from the political apparatus and for the military to function in a decentralized manner, as they had witnessed during the Second World War. Thereafter, the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense developed an inefficient military decision-making apparatus that reduced the influence of military officers. With this change implemented, Nehru's Congress Party downgraded the official order of precedence of military officers in the class system to a position below that of elected officials and civil servants. This reduction in class status came with a cut of 40 percent in military salaries, which resulted in less recruitment from members of elite families. Nehru also discouraged public speeches by senior military officers and retired officers.[8]

The reduction in the influence of the military did not stop there. Nehru next created rifts in the unified armed forces structure. Formerly dominated by the army, this new structure gave each service—army, navy, and air force—its own separate command structure. This accomplished Nehru's goal of laying a foundation for rivalries and coordination problems among the formerly tight knit officer corps. Instead of utilizing the military to divide and conquer the people, the civilian leadership decided to divide and conquer the military. While these changes had the desired effect of weakening military influence in India, it also negatively affected the military's ability to conduct joint operations effectively for the rest of the twentieth century. This problem revealed itself in a prolonged Sri Lankan peace keeping operation in the late 1980s, and continued to create difficulties during the 1999 Kargil War, which exposed India's difficulties in conducting joint operations and resulted in the formation of the Kargil Review Committee. This committee recommended integrating the Chiefs of Staff into the top echelons of national security management and decision-making, even though this recommendation ran counter to the policies that had emasculated the military throughout the twentieth century. As of 2016, the Indian

[8] Wilkinson, 103.

military remains deficient in its joint operational warfighting capability—placing the nuclear powered nation in a precarious position, particularly given the complex geopolitical situation and powerful neighbors (see Figure 1) that form the context within which it must seek to modernize.[9]

Figure 1: India's Neighbors

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: India," 2013, accessed March 19, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html.

Methodology

The principles of war according to Indian joint doctrine, particularly intelligence, security, flexibility, and cooperation, enabled a normative and empirical analysis of two case studies on past Indian military operations involving two or more services. The Sri Lankan case study also highlights additional deficiencies in the Indian principle of selection and maintenance of an aim, as well as in the principles of war according to US joint doctrine, particularly restraint

[9] Ibid., 104; Kargil Review Committee, *From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), 258.

and legitimacy. This study tests India's adherence to its own principles of war relevant to this analysis and demonstrates how particular principles of war found only in US joint doctrine reveal additional issues in the conduct of Indian joint warfare.[10]

India has struggled since independence to develop a modern joint warfare capability. Analysis of post-independence Indian civil-military relations, two distinct examples of its modern military operations, and current programs to improve its military capabilities reveals what progress the Indian military has made, and what work remains unfinished. For purpose of clarity and commonality of terms, this study relies on a definition of joint operations drawn from US joint doctrine, which enables the identification of any differences in meaning between the US definition and Indian understanding of joint operations.

As defined in the US Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Operations*, "joint operations is a general term that describes military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces."[11] The synergy created by forces tailored to the mission maximizes the capabilities of the force. "The strength of any Joint Force has always been the combining of unique Service capabilities into a coherent operational whole."[12] According to Indian Army doctrine, "joint operations encompass all actions required to successfully achieve a designated joint objective and involves activities relating to marshaling, deploying, and employing the allotted forces."[13] Indian

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[10] Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), I-1; *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 10 September 2012), 16; Indian Army Doctrine, *Part II Conduct of Operations*, 1st ed., October 2004, 15, accessed September 12, 2015, http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm. See the Appendix for a complete list of the Indian principles of war and the US principles of joint operations.

[11] JP 3-0, I-1.

[12] *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, 16.

[13] Indian Army Doctrine, *Part II Conduct of Operations*, 15.

Air Force doctrine contains a different but complementary definition: "joint operations imply an amalgamation of the strengths of each service to produce a singular synergistic effect, which is greater than the sum of the single service parts."[14] This analysis will primarily rely on Indian Army and Air Force definitions of joint warfare, and the principles of war outlined by Indian Army doctrine, but will also introduce criteria from the principles of war and the common operating precepts from US joint doctrine to evaluate India's joint warfare capability.[15]

The principles of war according to Indian joint and Army doctrine, influenced primarily by British Defence doctrine, consist of selection of and maintenance of aim, maintenance of morale, offensive action, surprise, concentration of force, economy of effort, security, flexibility, cooperation, simplicity, administration, and intelligence. In 2004, The Indian Army added intelligence to principles of war because Indian military leaders anticipated an increase in the importance of intelligence in future warfare. The principles of selection and maintenance of an aim, flexibility, cooperation, security, and intelligence provided the criteria that most effectively highlighted the deficiencies in the Indian military operations studied in this analysis. According to Indian Army doctrine, aim is expressed as an intention, purpose or end state. The aim should be carefully selected, clearly defined, stated simply and directly, and always maintained once selected, unless the understanding of the situation has changed. Flexibility is the capability to act in response to changing situations with an appropriate response. Security prevents the enemy from acquiring an unexpected advantage. Cooperation is critical to achieve success in war and requires that all agencies involved work jointly to achieve the overall aim.[16]

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[14] Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force, 2012, 114, accessed September 12, 2015, http://indianairforce.nic.in/pdf/Basic%20Doctrine%20of%20the%20Indian%20Air%20Force.pdf.

[15] JP 3-0, I-3.

[16] Indian Army Doctrine, *Indian Army Doctrine Part I*, 1st ed., October 2004, 23, accessed September 12, 2015, http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm.

There are significant differences between the Indian and US militaries' principles of war. India's selection and maintenance of aim is practically identical to the American principle of objective, and India's cooperation is similar to America's unity of command. US doctrine does not include intelligence in the principles of joint operations. The Indian doctrine does not include the principles of restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy, but the US military added these principles of war in order to recognize their significance in military operations other than war. Restraint and legitimacy played an important role as criteria in this analysis of the deficiencies in Indian joint operations. Restraint limits collateral damage and prevents the unnecessary use of force. This principle of restraint and the Indian principle of flexibility both emphasize appropriate action. The US doctrine in JP 3-0 states that the purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations based on the various perceptions of interested audiences.[17] These US-specific principles serve as important evaluation criteria in the case study analysis below, because they reveal that Indian military operations in both case studies were deficient by both US and Indian military doctrine on joint operations.

The two case studies for this analysis consist of India's peacekeeping operations during the Sri Lankan Civil War from 1987 to 1990 and the Kargil War of 1999. These case studies provide examples of the Indian military's experience employing air, ground, and naval capabilities to achieve strategic objectives across the range of military operations. The cross-case analysis identifies the consistencies and inconsistencies in India's use of joint warfare principles.

This study reveals deficiencies in India's past efforts at joint warfare operations, and demonstrates that the Indian military has not taken steps to resolve these deficiencies effectively. The conclusion highlights the major findings of this paper and identifies means by which India's government could improve its military's joint warfare capability. These findings will serve as

[17] JP 3-0, Appendix A.

useful insight to future planners responsible for monitoring India's regional posture and developing campaign plans to deal with potential contingencies involving the Indian military.

1987-90 Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka

Background

Sri Lanka is strategically important to India because of its proximity (see Figure 2) and its native minority population of Tamils, a people culturally linked to the Indian province of Tamil Nadu. Sri Lanka also has ports with the potential utilization by other powers to contest Indian regional hegemony of the Indian Ocean. The conflict between the Muslim majority Sinhalese and the Tamils originated with independence from British rule in 1948. The Sinhalese majority government immediately initiated legislation deemed discriminatory by the Tamils.[18]



Figure 2. Sri Lanka's Proximity to India

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: Sri Lanka," 2013, accessed March 19, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html.

[18] Alan Bullion, *India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis 1976-1994: An International Perspective* (New York: Pinter, 1995), 14; Ahmed S. Hashem, *When Counterinsurgency Wins: Sri Lanka's Defeat of the Tamil Tigers* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, May 2013), 20; Kadian, 55-56.

In the 1970s, the Tamil political parties united to form the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) to seek greater autonomy within the Sri Lankan federal system, through the creation of a separate state called Tamil Eelam. Its success in becoming the main opposition party and winning 18 of 168 seats in Parliament led to riots by Sinhalese mobs resulting in the murder of Tamils. In 1983, the Sri Lankan government passed the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka, which made it illegal to advocate for a separate state. The TULF members of parliament resigned after refusing to swear an oath denouncing the formation of a separate state. This led to the formation of youthful militant groups, like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), who received support from the Indian government of Indira Gandhi, and the later government under Rajiv Gandhi. The Indians in Tamil Nadu also smuggled weapons and resources to the militant Tamil groups in Sri Lanka.[19]

The 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord aimed at ending the Sri Lankan Civil War. Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene feared an Indian intervention after the Indian Navy failed to supply the Tamils during the Siege of Jaffna, followed immediately by the Indian Air Force's successful airdrop of supplies in early June 1987. The Sri Lankan government agreed to a future devolution of power in the provinces and the removal of the military from contested areas in the North to deal with Buddhist and Sinhalese opposition groups in the South. The armed Tamil groups, to include the LTTE, agreed to disarm to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) that deployed to Sri Lanka. However, once the IPKF deployed, the LTTE and other Tamil groups refused to disarm. In a strange twist, India now fought the Sri Lankan government's conflict against the

[19] Kadian, 63-82; G.H. Peiris, *Twilight of the Tigers: Peace Efforts and Power Struggles in Sri Lanka* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), 12-14; A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, *The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), 134-37.

LTTE and other Tamil militants that they once supported to achieve their interests of preventing Sri Lanka from aligning with the United States and its allies.[20]

Narrative

India's initial military means to enforce peace in Sri Lanka consisted of four infantry brigades under the 54th Infantry Division, totaling three thousand troops. The division deployed on June 30, a day after the signature of the 1987 Accord. By the end of the year, it grew to four infantry divisions and other units, totaling over eighty thousand troops. The Indian Navy stationed a destroyer in the Sri Lankan capital, Colombo, and patrolled the Bay of Bengal and Palk Bay, which separates the two countries. The Indian Air Force transported Sri Lankan troops to the South to deal with the Sinhalese unrest created by the Accord with India. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi predicted that the LTTE would be quickly disarmed and Indian forces redeployed. Gandhi also believed that the LTTE lacked the ability to sustain itself after three days against the IPKF. The LTTE surrendered only a token amount of three hundred old weapons and retained a sizable arsenal that would later plaque India after their attempt to establish a representative Provincial Council failed.[21]

By September 1987, the LTTE created a political impasse and anarchy in the North and East. The LTTE battled other Tamil factions, demanded its militant leaders hold office, pushed for the removal of Sinhalese settlements from Tamil dominated areas, required the release of political prisoners, and fired on the IPKF, which conducted joint patrols with Sri Lankan forces.

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[20] Bullion, 33-34; William Clarance, *Ethnic Warfare in Sri Lanka and the UN Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 48-52; Chris Smith, "South Asia's Enduring War," in *Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 19-25; Somasundaram Vanniasingham, *Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within* (London: Sangam Books, 1989), 5-9.

[21] Edgar O'Balance, *The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88* (London: Brassey's, 1989), 93; Bullion, 122-23.

In October 1987, the Indian Army lost the support of the Tamil population, which initially welcomed its forces, but withdrew support after the Indian Army failed to demonstrate restraint by attacking Jaffna during Operation Pawan.[22]

The Indians conducted this operation to seize the LTTE headquarters at Jaffna University and destroy LTTE operational capability in the Jaffna Peninsula. Indian policy had changed, causing the Army to switch from a peacekeeping role to the more aggressive goal of defeating the LTTE. The Indian Army underestimated the LTTE's ability to resist, based largely on its superior intelligence and local support. The Indian Army needed more resources and intelligence to achieve parity with the LTTE, ultimately defeating the organization three weeks after the operation began.[23]

The Indian Army transported additional forces from the homeland to Jaffna over the three week operation with the aid of its sister services. The Navy patrolled the waters near Jaffna harbor and the Marine Commando Force (MARCOS) infiltrated Jaffna Harbor and destroyed LTTE speedboats. The Air Force committed helicopter gunship support to Indian Army operations in Jaffna. The Indian Army used the complementary capabilities of its sister services to support its objective of defeating the LTTE in the city of Jaffna. However, its objective failed to support the strategic aim of achieving broad and enduring results for India because a policy that understood the characteristics of the conflict failed to develop from the Gandhi administration, due to a lack of unity of effort between it and the military. This illustrated a deficiency in the principle of cooperation. Most of the LTTE hierarchy escaped into the jungle to

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[22] Kadian, 29-31; David Little, *Sri Lanka: The Invention of Enmity* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1994), 90-92.

[23] Dagmar-Hellmann Rajanayagam, "The 'Groups' and the Rise of Militant Secessionism," in *The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity*, ed. Chelvadurai Manogaran and Peter Pfaffenberger (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 193-95.

continue their struggle for an independent Tamil homeland, India lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Tamil population, and more Tamil youth supported and joined the ranks of the LTTE.[24]

On November 21 of 1987, India declared a unilateral ceasefire, but the LTTE rejected it, which led to an insurgency against the Indian military occupation, until their withdrawal back to India in March of 1990. The Indian High Commissioner for Sri Lanka, J.N. Dixit, administered the conflict, aided by three-star flag officers of all three services, posted in the capital of Tamil Nadu, Chennai, also known as Madras, India. Lieutenant General Depinder Singh served as the Overall Force Commander of the IPKF, with tactical subordinate commanders serving in Sri Lanka. Division Commanders in Sri Lanka often consulted directly with Delhi for direction instead of from Chennai. In the end, the Indian government failed to get an effective devolution of power representative of all Tamils in the newly combined North and East Provinces, the IPFK failed to defeat the LTTE, and the government of Sri Lanka demanded its withdrawal.[25]

The IPKF lacked adherence to the principle of cooperation throughout the Sri Lankan campaign. The Field Marshal of the Indian Army communicated directly with the subordinate commanders in Sri Lanka, and undermined the IPKF leadership in Chennai, India. The IPKF commander should have mitigated this by moving his headquarters into Sri Lanka, closer to his subordinate commanders. An Overall Force Commander (OFC) in the rank of Lieutenant General led the IPKF from the Army, but the Indian Navy and Air Force Lieutenant Generals present near IPKF headquarters affected the discourse between the OFC and Indian High Commissioner for Sri Lanka, J. N. Dixit. A lack of unity of command had a clear impact on the IPKF, but it was not the only issue.[26]

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[24] Bullion, 127-129; O'Balance, 107-110; Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 550-96, *Sri Lanka: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), 296.

[25] Bullion, 134-35; Kadian, 135-36; S.C. Sardeshpande, *Assignment Jaffna* (New Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 1992), 142-43.

[26] Kadian, 118-19; Sardeshpande, 142-43.

Operation Pawan, the attack on Jaffna, demonstrated a lack of attention to the principles of restraint and flexibility by the Indian government and IPKF. Jaffna contained half the population of Tamils in the North and East Provinces. The civilian population severely felt the impact of the IPKF incursion into Jaffna for the three-week offensive and the two-and-a-half-year military occupation that followed. Members of the LTTE had attacked IPKF members leading up to the offensive, but changing the aim or objective of the military to defeating the LTTE changed the entire dynamic of the original political aim of securing the political rights of the Tamil community. This lack of restraint and flexibility caused the IPKF to lose legitimacy with the Tamil community in Sri Lanka and India.[27]

The IPKF lost legitimacy because the LTTE and Tamils perceived them as representing the interests of the Sri Lankan regime. The IPKF started conducting joint patrols with elements of the Sri Lankan military and initiated the reopening of police stations shortly after arriving. The message this sent to the Tamil community was alarming and the IPKF started to see resistance to their operations. The Sri Lankan regime gladly received IPKF attack on Jaffna in Operation Pawan. This led to a severe loss of legitimacy for the Indians from the Tamil community. The LTTE removed their uniforms and blended into the populace. The majority of the LTTE leadership escaped and continued the struggle through insurgency operations. The Indian loss of legitimacy resulted in recruitment success for the LTTE from the disaffected Tamil population. The security of IPKF operations faced significant difficulties with the loss of Tamil support, and this provided the LTTE with advantages to conduct a counterinsurgency against the IPKF, illustrating the importance of the principle of security.[28]

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[27] Bullion, 127-28; O'Balance, 106-7; Smith, 24-25.

[28] Bullion, 128-29; Kadian, 51-52; O'Balance, 97; Sardeshpande, 65.

As the insurgency continued, the Indian effort demonstrated a lack of unity of command and cooperation within the Indian government, the military, and between the Sri Lankan government and the Indians. Indian military officers did not wish to be associated with the suffering IPKF. Senior military officers in Delhi communicated directly with their subordinate commanders, bypassing IPKF headquarters. Compartmentalized intelligence within the Indian government and military also reduced situational awareness, creating obstacles to India's ability to share information in accordance with the principle of intelligence. The Indian government suffered politically at home and in Sri Lanka, and the Indian public and Sri Lankan regime wanted the IPKF withdrawn. Two years into the campaign, the LTTE and Sri Lankan regime were in direct communications, and demanding the withdrawal of the IPKF. The Indian military's internal and external lack of cooperation or unity of effort, as well as lack of intelligence sharing, contributed to mission failure.[29]

Lastly, the lack of focus on the selection and maintenance of an aim or operational objectives that would produce broad and enduring results beneficial to Indian interests was due to a failed visualization and understanding of the operating environment. India believed that supporting various Tamil factions benefited its efforts to influence the Sri Lankan regime. However, once the IPKF arrived and perceived as representing the interests of the Sri Lankan regime, the LTTE directed its resistance efforts against the IPKF. The Indian troops contended with a complex situation and with the difficult objectives to disarm the Tamil militants, maintain law and order, and create the conditions for the devolution of political power to the northeast. The increased use of military coercion resulted in less Tamil empowerment, which had been India's original political aim, along with maintaining Sri Lanka's non-aligned posture toward the West.

[29] Bullion, 137-38; Kadian, 143-44; Sardeshpande, 46; DA Pam 550-96, 213.

IPKF operations mandated by India's civilian masters resulted in a loss of influence with the Tamil community and Sri Lankan government.[30]

Analysis

The Indian government and IPKF faced difficulties throughout the Sri Lankan campaign because of a failure in planning to incorporate the principles of war as defined in Indian doctrine, as well as by the US doctrine for joint operations. These included deficiencies in the principles of restraint, legitimacy, intelligence, flexibility, security, and cooperation both within the military, and between the military and the governments of India and Sri Lanka. They also indicated a lack of focus on the selection and maintenance of an aim or choice of objectives, the achievement of which increases the likelihood of attaining enduring results. This combined with a failed effort to accurately understand, visualize, and describe the true political aims of the LTTE and Sri Lankan government, resulted in not meeting the Indian political and military aims initially set.[31]

The violation of any particular principle of war severely degraded IPKF operations, but the neglect of so many of them resulted in negative independent effects for the Indian government and military. Unity of command or cooperation, flexibility, security, intelligence, restraint, legitimacy, and selection and maintenance of an aim or objective with enduring results were absent in the Sri Lankan campaign. India's longest war in Sri Lanka demonstrated the importance of understanding the characteristics of the conflict, where a joint force operates, and applying the joint principles of war effectively to ensure the achievement of political aims and military objectives.

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[30] Bullion, 135; Kadian, 134-135; Peiris, 35; Singh, 203-204.

[31] Bullion, 162-63; Kadian, 136-37; O'Balance, 107-8; Sardeshpande, 62-65.

1999 Kargil War

Background

The Kargil War or Indo-Pakistani War of 1999, between India and Pakistan, known in the Indian military as Operation Vijay, occurred when Pakistani troops and Kashmiri militants occupied positions on the Indian side of the Line of Control, near the strategically located Kargil District, in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (see Figure 3). Both nations possessed nuclear weapons capability during this conflict, which worried the international community. The Indian government utilized capabilities from each of its military services to expel the intruders and put pressure on Pakistan during the short conflict. Pakistan claimed that "Kashmiri freedom fighters" were responsible, but the international community blamed Pakistan because the high-altitude terrain restricted operations to well trained and resourced soldiers. The Indians celebrated the success of Operation Vijay, but conducted investigations under the Kargil Committee, due to perceived intelligence failures that caught the Indian military by surprise at the start of the war.[32]



Figure 3. Kargil's Strategic Location Near the Line of Control

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, "The World Factbook: India," 2013, accessed March 19, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ce.html.

[32] Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 141.

The state of Jammu and Kashmir came into existence in 1846 upon the signing of the Second Treaty of Amritsar, between Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu and the British East India Company. Singh accepted British sovereignty and added Kashmir to his princely state of Jammu and Ladakh, after he made a payment on behalf of Sikhs, who could not afford to pay the British demand. The Indian Rebellion of 1857, known in India as the First War of Indian Independence, resulted in the fracturing of the Indian subcontinent under the British East India Company into multiple smaller states under the British Crown or British Raj. The end of British India created the independent nations of Pakistan and India, with the former British territory divided between the two in more than five hundred princely subordinate states. Kashmir and Jammu created significant tension because of the Muslim majority population and its Hindu monarch. The founder of Pakistan, Mohamed Ali Jinnah, made the moral claim that this region belonged in his Muslim union. The first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, came from the region, and supported a Muslim secular movement under Sheik Mohammed Abdullah, ensuring union with a secular and democratic India.[33]

The Kargil War continued the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan for control of the Kashmir Valley, a predominately Muslim and Urdu speaking area. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1947-1948 resulted in the establishment of Line of Control between newly independent India and Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 started when Pakistan infiltrated forces into Jammu and Kashmir in order to initiate an insurgency that would result in Pakistani control of Kashmir. The Soviet Union and United States intervened in the conflict, with both India and Pakistan proclaiming victory and signing the Tashkent Agreement the following year. The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 or Bangladesh Liberation War ended with a negotiated settlement, the Simla

[33] Sumit Ganguly, *The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 8-9.

Agreement, which included a respect for boundaries in accordance with the existing Line of Control.[34]

After 1971, no major conflict occurred between India and Pakistan until the Kargil War, even though India and Pakistan continued a buildup of conventional forces along the border. Minor skirmishes erupted briefly and then deescalated as India established military positions in an attempt to gain control of the Saichen Glacier, which would give them the advantage of a superior position for a future conflict in Kashmir. Pakistani military planners presented a Kargil War plan to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto after the Indian Army gained control of the Saichen glacier, but neither civilian nor military leaders wanted to commit to a war at that time. Both nations had a different priority during this period – acquisition of nuclear weapons. India conducted nuclear tests in 1974 and again in 1998, followed immediately by a Pakistani nuclear test. In the 1980s, support from the US, China, and Saudi Arabia enabled Pakistan to put pressure on India—at the time, a Soviet ally—from assisting Moscow during the Cold War. They maintained this pressure on India after the Cold War in order to gain an advantage in international negotiations regarding arms control, Kashmir, and other South Asian issues.[35]

In 1988, insurgency and mass uprisings exploded in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, at a scale not seen since attempts in 1965 by Pakistan to create unrest. The Indian government blamed Pakistani influence for the renewed unrest. Some accused Pakistan of rigging recent elections, which, along with high unemployment in Jammu and Kashmir, acted as the main factors that caused the rise of the secessionist movement. However, others have argued that a rise

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[34] Praveen Swami, *The Kargil War* (New Delhi: LeftWord Books, 1999), 2-4; Peter R. Lavoy, "Introduction: the importance of the Kargil conflict," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict,* ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16-17.

[35] Ashok Kapur, "Major Powers and the Persistence of the India-Pakistan Conflict," in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, ed. T.V. Paul (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 152-53.

in anti-Muslim violence and Hindu nationalism across India instigated a response from already disaffected Muslim communities. Muslims in India have feared the establishment of a religious state dominated by Hindus since Partition and all actions in society that they perceived as a threat have fed that fear. The demise of socialism and secularism permitted the Hindu right to weaken the long-governing Congress party and further inflame the sectarian tensions in India. The combination of Pakistani interference and internal factors within India likely created the enmity that fueled the unrest across Kashmir.[36]

Military conditions near the Line of Control also played a role in the decision by General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's Chief of the General Staff, to conduct their next incursion into Kargil. In the lead-up to the Kargil War, India occupied the high ground in the Neelum Valley, which overlooked Pakistan's Muzaffarabad-Kel road, adjacent to the Neelem River. Pakistan used this road as a line of communications to their positions near the Line of Control. India used their position in the Neelum Valley to conduct artillery attacks that disrupted the Pakistan Army's line of communications, in retaliation for alleged Pakistani infiltration into the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan then retaliated by supporting insurgent attacks in Kashmir. With no clear means of disrupting this cycle of retaliation in the Neelum Valley, Pakistan looked at the strategic advantages that the recent nuclear tests afforded them. Pakistan considered India's ability to retaliate for a covert operation into the Kashmir Valley limited because of the likely intervention of the United States and the international community to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan wanted international involvement in mediating the issue of control of Kashmir, an issue that had gone unsolved since Partition.[37]

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[36] Swami, 5.

[37] Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "The Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia; The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict,* ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 56-57.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, and General Musharraf attempted to make sense of the environment after the nuclear tests of 1998 and sought to exploit emerging opportunities, but Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India failed to alter his understanding of the situation in Kashmir after the nuclear tests. The nuclear tests provided India a false sense of security about the offensive options available to Pakistan. In the February 1999 Lahore Declaration, the nuclear-capable rivals agreed to increased efforts in resolving all issues, as well as refraining from interference in each other's internal affairs. Prior to the start of the conflict in 1999, the Indian Army abandoned high-altitude military positions near Kargil, where winter temperatures went as low as negative fifty-four degrees Celsius. This miscalculation by the Indian Army influenced decisions taken by Pakistan's ground elements as they discovered previously unknown vulnerabilities to exploit in the upcoming conflict.[38]

Narrative

On May 3, 1999, the first phase of the Kargil War began as three shepherds made their way up the mountains of Kargil with their flock and, using their high-powered hunting binoculars, spotted men in Pakistani tribal clothing building hasty bunkers. They reported their findings to officers of 3 Punjab Regiment who sent small patrols to investigate over the next few days. The patrols expected little resistance from the Jihadist militants assumed to be present when ambushed on May 7 by the formidable intruders, resulting in the death of one Soldier, and two more on May 10. On May 15, the intruders captured, tortured, and on June 7 killed Lieutenant Saurabh Kalia and five of his fellow Indian soldiers. The Pakistan army claimed that the first

[38] Charlotte P. Nicholson, *The Kashmir Powder Keg* (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), 3-5; C. Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 150-51.

ambush of an Indian patrol occurred on April 30. This demonstrated issues adhering to the principle of security.[39]

Indian army chief, General V. P. Malik, claimed no knowledge of the action near Kargil when he traveled on a planned trip to Poland and the Czech Republic on May 10. The Unified Headquarters, the main coordinating body in the region for all security agencies in Jammu and Kashmir, met on May 19 under Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah to discuss the intrusion. The commander of 15 Corps, Lieutenant-General Kishan Pal, and his staff reported that no battle indicators of war or even limited skirmishes existed. General Pal and the Indian Army displayed a lack of awareness about the crisis emerging in the Kargil district due to insufficient unity of effort within the Indian security establishment and ineffective intelligence capabilities, resulting in a lack of security along the Line of Control. This demonstrated a deficiency in the Indian principle of cooperation.[40]

By May 22, the Army discovered that Pakistani paramilitary soldiers, not Jihadi militants, occupied positions across one hundred thirty to two hundred kilometers of the Kargil Mountains. Alarmed by this unusual disturbance in a normally tranquil area of Kashmir, General Pal ordered his squadron of Cheetah helicopters engaged in surveillance operations to fly lower in order to locate the Pakistani elements. The Pakistanis engaged these surveillance helicopters with machine gun fire and two aircraft sustained damage, prompting the Indian Army to send armed helicopters—but these improvised aircraft with machine guns mounted on their skids achieved little success. The fully equipped Pakistani soldiers later identified as elements of the Northern

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[39] Peter R. Lavoy, "Crisis-management Strategies," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia; The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 191; Swami, 10-12.

[40] Kargil Review Committee, 104; Swami, 23-24.

Light Infantry and the Special Forces, occupied well-entrenched bunkers, and suffered no damage from the armed helicopters firing from too far a distance.[41]

Brigades conducting counterinsurgency operations in other areas of Kashmir, from 3 Infantry Division and 8 Mountain Division, eventually totaling more than twenty thousand soldiers, arrived to support 121 (Independent) Infantry Brigade, permanently assigned to the four sub-sectors consisting of Drass, Kaksar, Channigund, and Batalik in the Kargil district. With no time to acclimate to the mountain terrain and lacking sufficient artillery support, the newly arrived troops pushed into the mountains to conduct battalion level operations in their assigned sectors. The five hundred soldiers of the Northern Light Infantry and artillery elements below on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control pinned down the Indian troops throughout the mountain range. Casualties continued to accumulate on both sides as the first phase of the war concluded. This illustrated India's lack of adherence to the principle of flexibility because the Army failed to react appropriately to a new environment and problem.[42]

The Indian Army provided its first briefing on the situation in Kargil to the Central Government of India on May 17. The Defense and External Affairs Ministers took the briefing, with the Chiefs of Staff Committee in attendance. General Malik, Chief of the Indian Army, returned from Poland and the Czech Republic on May 20. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), chaired by Prime Minister Vajpayee, received briefings on May 18 and 24, and met formally on May 25 to authorize the use of air strikes, naval operations, and military

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[41] Colonel Gurmeet Kanwal, *Heroes of Kargil* (New Delhi: Indian Army Headquarters, 2002), 3-4.

[42] Swami, 10-11; Kargil Review Committee, 100; John H. Gill, "Military operations in the Kargil conflict," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia; The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 122. While available sources do not contain casualty figures by phase, the Indian Army lost 527 dead and 1,363 wounded by the end of the war, and the Pakistanis likely suffered 400 to 500 killed and an unknown number wounded.

mobilization. The CCS approved the mobilization of up to two hundred thousand soldiers, but selected a limited objective of clearing the intruders without escalating the conflict. This limited objective guided the operations of all the service branches. The first phase of the war ended with Vajpayee's realization that Sharif deceived him in February at Lahore, and that he must evict the intruders without escalating the war into a nuclear conflict.[43]

The second phase of the Kargil War commenced with air strikes by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Operation Safed Sagar, the day after the CCS meeting. For the first time in twenty years, air strikes complemented ground operations in Indian-administered Kashmir. The Indian Army claimed that joint coordination and cooperation under the Chiefs of Staff Committee facilitated the rapid coordinated action between the three Services. Yet, Indian military planners failed to anticipate the threat of heat-seeking Stinger missiles by Pakistani air defense, resulting in the loss of a Mig-21 on May 27, the same day that a Mig-27 crashed near the Line of Control due to engine trouble. The following day, the Pakistanis destroyed an MI-17 helicopter with rocket pods, causing four additional casualties. Both armies responded by flying their combat aircraft at higher altitudes and drastically restricting the use of helicopters as weapon platforms. While this severely limited the effect of air power, the morale of the Indian soldiers exerting themselves in the mountains improved and Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry elements on the Indian side of the Line of Control realized the extent of their enemy's commitment to this conflict. The Pakistan Air Force and conventional elements of the Pakistan Army never directly participated in the conflict and this allowed India to maintain air superiority.[44]

Indian and global media played a significant role during the second phase of the Kargil War. Live reports of the conflict reached Indian televisions at the start of the air campaign, and

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[43] Kanwal, 3-4; Swami, 11-12; Kargil Review Committee, 249-250.

[44] Ahmad Faruqui, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2003), 14-16; Swami, 12-13; Kanwal, 14;

citizens observed scenes from the Army's battle for the Tololing ridgeline, which overlooked the vital Drass-Kargil highway or National Highway 1A. By 1 June, 8 Mountain Division pushed to the front of the high-altitude terrain near the critical highway. The majority of Indians saw the use of force as legitimate and necessary to expel the Pakistanis. As the media reports flowed in, concern grew in the international community because of the possibility of severe escalation by two nuclear-capable nations. Pakistan's political leaders claimed during the conflict that the fighting involved "freedom fighters" and not their military. The international community chastised the Pakistan military and the Indians enjoyed the pressure brought to bear on their rival by the United States and other nations. India's military operations in Kargil gained substantial legitimacy within India and in the international community due to skillful use of the media and diplomatic efforts with G8 nations.[45]

In June, the Indian Navy deployed to the North Arabian Sea in support of Operation Talwar, conducted to support the conflict in Kargil. India last used its silent service in a coercive naval diplomacy effort during the peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka. Indian naval operations operated under similar constraints as the operations on land and sea, and the Indian military never violated Pakistani sovereignty. The Indian Navy nearly blockaded the port of Karachi in an act of coercive diplomacy, and the Pakistan Navy escorted its oil tankers along the Makran Coast to avoid a naval engagement. The key tasks for Operation Talwar included preventing attacks along the Gujarat Coast, ensuring security of offshore assets, countering pre-emptive attacks, and monitoring Pakistani naval operations in the North Arabian Sea. The fleet lacked air defense missiles, but Pakistan held back from engaging the Indian Navy. A sizable contingent of Coast

[45] Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "The Lessons of Kargil as Learned by Pakistan," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia; The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict,* ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 58-59; Lavoy; 191.

Guard air and ship assets temporarily operated under the Navy in order to protect sensitive areas and conduct surveillance. The Indian Navy succeeded in responding quickly, maintaining restraint, and preventing the escalation of conflict in the maritime domain.[46]

The second phase of the operations near Kargil ended in early July, with Indian victory in the battle for Tiger Hill. This key battle witnessed three infantry battalions of 18 Grenadiers, with artillery support and a diversion from 8 Sikh Regiment, defeated a Pakistani force of unknown size, resulting in the death of ten Pakistani Rangers and five Indian soldiers. Indian Air Force strikes on Pakistani bunkers prevented the elements of the Northern Light Infantry from threatening the towns of Drass or Kargil. Elsewhere, 3 Infantry Division and 8 Mountain Division remained incapable of dislodging the Pakistani soldiers and the critical National Highway 1A sustained constant enemy bombardment. In some areas, such as Yaldor Langpa, the Indian Army faced dire predicaments due to open Pakistani supply lines and superior positions along the key heights of the Kargil area. However, General Malik's staff resolved significant logistical challenges in order to support the two divisions in preparation for the final phase of Operation Vijay.[47]

India, under Prime Minister Vajpayee, entered the final phase of the conflict with General Musharraf's threats of nuclear retaliation, but General Malik's operations continued to expel the Northern Light Infantry troops on the Indian side of the Line of Control. Vajpayee understood that Sharif sought mediation on the Kashmir issue from the United States and continued to use military force in order to prevent Sharif from gaining any advantages in future negotiations. The US President, Bill Clinton, pressured Pakistan to withdraw and on July 11, the Pakistani Prime

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[46] GM Hiranandani, *Transition to Guardianship: The Indian Navy 1991-2000* (Atlanta, GA: Lancer Publishers, 2013), 66-67; C. Uday Bhaskar, "The Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The Indian Experience," in *The Rise of the Indian Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges*, ed. Harsh V. Pant (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2012), 48.

[47] Swami, 15; Kanwal, 147-48.

Minister announced the unconditional withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kargil. India continued to push out remaining Pakistani elements for weeks after the announcement declaring the military operations a success on July 14, 1999. While India claimed victory after the Pakistani withdrawal, the resolution of the Kashmir issue arose as a matter of concern for the United States because of the conflict between nuclear-capable nations in Kargil. It also created the conditions for the planner of the Kargil conflict, General Musharraf, to oust the Pakistani Prime Minister in October of the same year.[48]

In the aftermath of the conflict, the government under the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), holding the majority against the Congress party in the Indian Parliament, created the Kargil Review Committee to investigate the causes of the incursion, and issued a scathing report on February 23, 2000. The report included a detailed assessment of gross inadequacies in intelligence and surveillance at all levels, and highlighted the entrenched bureaucracy that separated the military's senior uniformed personnel from national security management and decision-making. The report addressed other issues including problems with the staffing of the newly established National Security Council, the poor quality of the paramilitary forces engaged in counter-terrorist operations, border management deficiencies, and a lack of preparation for dealing with the media during the conflict—a shortcoming that negatively affected the morale of the force.[49]

The Kargil Committee, under the Chairmanship of Sri Krishnaswami Subrahmanyam, a prominent international affairs and defense analyst, reviewed overwhelming evidence that

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[48] Amir Mir, "The Ill-Fated Kargil Episode of 1999 Continues to Haunt Pakistan," *NoticiasFinancieras*, June 6, 2008, accessed March 10, 2016, https://lumen.cgsccarl.com/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/466992864?accountid=28992; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and international relations theory," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia; The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 377-81; Hiranandani, 67; Swami, 23-25.

[49] Swami, 24-25; V.P. Malik, 119; Kargil Review Committee, 25-26.

demonstrated the utter surprise of the Indian Government. The deficiencies in India's intelligence apparatus led to the 15 Corps Commander's lack of situational understanding for weeks after the detection of the intrusion on May 3, 1999. The primary responsibility for foreign intelligence analysis of likely attacks to Indian interests rested with the Research and Analysis Wing (R & AW). This inadequately resourced agency lacked suitable assets in the Kargil area to conduct collection, coordination, and assessments. The R & AW never included the Pakistani units that participated in the Kargil intrusion in the Order of Battle (ORBAT) produced in April 1998, and it issued another ORBAT in June 1999, during the conflict, that still demonstrated a gross lack of awareness of the reality in Kargil. This revealed the danger in deficiencies regarding the Indian principle of intelligence.[50]

The Indian Army and other government agencies neglected the cooperation needed on the ground prior to and during the early stage of the conflict. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) collected intelligence within the country and in June 1998 reported unusual military activity on Pakistan's side of the Line of Control. The IB shared the information with the Prime Minister, Cabinet Secretary, Home Secretary, Home Minister, and Director-General Military Operations (DGMI), but never with the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) for assessments, the Secretary of the R & AW for follow-up, or with the Director-General for Military Intelligence to coordinate with other military intelligence assets. The Director of the IB told the Committee that he expected his reports to reach those agencies through the hierarchy channels of those officials that obtained the report. The Indian civilian and military leadership and their intelligence assets

[50] Pravin Sawhney, *The Defense Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape India's Image* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), 319; Kargil Review Committee, 93-94; Nuclear Weapon Archive, "Kargil Review Committee Report," accessed March 5, 2016, http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/KargilRCB.html.

exhibited the characteristics of complacency and lack of cooperation that challenged the entire Indian government bureaucracy.[51]

Analysis

The Indian military overcame tremendous obstacles in obtaining its victory in Kargil; including many deficiencies in its conceptual planning for joint warfare—deficiencies that created significant problems for Indian military operations. While India, under Vajpayee, carefully selected and maintained its political aim and military objective of removing the intruders from the Kargil area, it lacked suitable intelligence before and during the early stages of the conflict. A lack of cooperation between military and civilian defense and intelligence organizations hampered the ability to develop effective plans to defend contested Indian terrain. The Indian Army's focus on counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir led to issues adapting to operations against Pakistani military forces, demonstrating the importance of the principle of flexibility. Deficiencies in the principles of intelligence and cooperation created difficulties adhering to the principle of security because General Musharraf gained an unexpected advantage by placing the Northern Light Infantry in the Kargil Mountains. The Kargil Review Committee Report issued after the war made it clear that India suffered a spectacular surprise due to these deficiencies in intelligence and cooperation. This resulted in the Indian military adding intelligence to its doctrinal principles of war, alongside cooperation, five years after the war.

The Indian military fought its first truly televised war in Kargil and met the criteria for success in the areas of restraint and legitimacy, two principles of joint warfare in US doctrine. India's careful selection and maintenance of its political aim and military objectives included clear restraint, by not crossing the Line of Control on the ground or in the air, and by not escalating the conflict at sea. Despite applying restraint, the success of the Indian Air Force and

[51] Kargil Review Committee, 253-55; Swami, 26-27.

Army at Tololing and Tiger Hill created the legitimacy that India needed at home and abroad. This led to the pressure that forced Pakistan to abandon its incursion.

By neglecting the principles of cooperation, security, flexibility, and intelligence, individuals and organizations in Kargil and New Delhi created vulnerabilities that Pakistan exploited in its quest to gain advantages in Kashmir. India's government also learned a great deal about the limitations of nuclear deterrence in preventing conventional conflict with its enduring rival. The Kargil Review Committee made clear, but politically and institutionally difficult, recommendations on improvements necessary in intelligence and cooperation within the military and in civil-military discourse.[52]

[52] Rajesh M. Basrur, "The Lessons of Kargil as Learned by India," in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia; The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict,* ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 315.

Cross-Case Analysis

A comparison of Indian joint warfare during operations in Sri Lanka and during the Kargil War demonstrates consistent deficiencies in planning due to a neglect of particular Indian principles of war. In both conflicts, the Indian security establishment displayed poor cooperation, lapses in security, limited flexibility, and a dysfunctional application of intelligence. The three-year counterinsurgency operation in Sri Lanka suffered from more contradictions with the Indian principles of war. The shorter Kargil War revealed improvements only in the Indian principles of selection and maintenance of aim or objective, and in the US principles of restraint and legitimacy.

Cooperation between civilian and military partners is essential to achieve the overall aim. Even before Partition, the British East India Company and the British Raj prevented cooperation between elements of the military to diminish threats to their power. This legacy continued after Partition with Nehru's decision to accept Lord Mountbatten's recommendation for the exclusion of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces from the Cabinet. In Sri Lanka, the IPKF operated under the command of the Overall Force Commander (OFC), but the Indian Air Force and Indian Navy commanders held the same rank as the OFC. The Field Marshal of the Army also communicated directly with subordinate commanders in the IPKF, further undermining cooperation in the IPKF. The Sri Lankan government under President Jayawarene also placed limits on cooperation with IPKF because of pressure from the Sinhalese majority. During the Kargil War, the various intelligence agencies in the Indian government followed a hierarchal reporting structure that inhibited cooperation. This led to a lack of awareness by the military and other intelligence agencies of changes in Pakistan's order of battle on their side of the Line of Control, prior to the intrusion by the elements of the Northern Light Infantry disguised as Jihadist militants. By violating the principle of cooperation, the Indian security establishment also set the conditions for the violation of the principle of intelligence.

The addition of intelligence as an Indian principle of war came about five years after the Kargil War because of the recognition of its importance in warfare at all times. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE enjoyed the support of the Tamil population and the IPKF found it difficult to collect actionable battlefield intelligence against the LTTE. The IPKF compartmentalized intelligence, which diminished its value to future military operations. The LTTE also practiced the tactics of avoidance through ambushes and the use of land mines that made it difficult for the Indian Army to gather intelligence. During the Kargil War, the IB issued a report to the Prime Minister and Cabinet about unusual activity on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control near the Kargil district. This critical intelligence never found its way to the Chairman of the JIC for assessments of the situation, the Secretary of the R & AW for follow-up, or to the DGMI for coordination with other military intelligence assets. The Kargil Review Committee Report demonstrated that the intelligence reports from the various intelligence agencies remained limited in distribution and rarely reached all the other pertinent intelligence agencies. These violations of the principle of intelligence created severe repercussions for the IPKF in Sri Lanka and 15 Corps in the Kargil district

The violation of the principle of intelligence led to the issues with the principle of security. Security prevents the enemy from acquiring an unexpected advantage. The LTTE gained advantages over the IPKF because of its relationship with the Tamil population, who saw the Indians as oppressors working with the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka. The Indian Army, represented by 15 Corps in Jammu and Kashmir, violated the principle of security because of the complacency created by twenty-eight years of tranquility in the Kargil district and a lack of adequate intelligence analysis about the changes to conditions on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control. In both case studies, a rival enjoyed the advantage of surprise because of the Indian military's violations of the principle of security.

Selection and maintenance of an aim or objective is essential in joint operations. The IPKF in Sri Lanka violated this principle by taking actions that increased violence toward the Tamil population they intended to protect. The Kargil War exhibited improved adherence to this principle because each of the service branches prevented the escalation of the conflict with Pakistan, and the Indian Army and Indian Air Force compelled Prime Minister Sharif to succumb to pressure from President Clinton and pull the North Light Infantry elements from the Kargil Mountains. The IPKF dealt with a long counterinsurgency in Sri Lanka, while the Indian Armed Forces in the Kargil War contended with less than five thousand soldiers fixed in their mountain bunkers. The complex nature of counterinsurgency operations makes selection and maintenance of an aim or objective much more difficult for a military organization than a complicated, yet conventional, military operation.

The IPKF displayed a lack of flexibility in Sri Lanka, and this continued for the Indian military during the Kargil War. The IPKF failed to initiate the appropriate responses to the changing situation after arriving in Sri Lanka and observing the escalation of violence by the LTTE. The Battle of Jaffna resulted in a tactical victory, but the IPKF loss the support of the Tamil population. During the Kargil War, all of the service branches made due with the capabilities available to force the expulsion of the Northern Light Infantry from the Kargil Mountains. General Malik and Lieutenant-General Pal demonstrated a measure of flexibility by massing overwhelming combat power in the Kargil district, while maintaining vigilance in other areas of Kashmir and not crossing the Line of Control into Pakistan. The Indian Army's focus prior to Kargil consisted of counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir and the Indian military discovered that it lacked the flexibility to conduct conventional joint operations in rapid manner. Flexibility appeared more difficult to execute for the IPKF because of the complexity presented in Sri Lanka with the various stakeholders involved.

The IPKF in Sri Lanka faced difficulties with the US principles of restraint and legitimacy because the LTTE blended into the Tamil population it aimed to protect. In the Kargil War, the Indian military demonstrated restraint by not crossing the Line of Control or escalating the conflict with Pakistan at sea. This display of restraint by the Indian military contributed to the legitimacy of the operation in the Kargil district as perceived within India and the international community. Prime Minister Vajpayee presented India as a victim of aggression by Pakistan and as a responsible nation that prevented escalation by limiting its objective to the expulsion of the intruders. Once again, the principles of war, as demonstrated by restraint and legitimacy, became increasingly difficult to uphold in a counterinsurgency operation.[53]

The IPKF in Sri Lanka and the Indian military during the Kargil War faced problems in adhering to the Indian principles of war, particularly the principles of cooperation, intelligence, and security, because of the structural and cultural legacy embedded in the Indian military that inhibited the unity of effort required for all these principles. As noted in the Kargil Review Committee Report, "The present obsolete system has perpetuated the continuation of the culture of the British Imperial theatre system of an India Command whereas what is required is a National Defence Headquarters."[54] Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi and Vajpayee lacked the expertise possessed by their senior military commanders of each service. This resulted in problems with national security management that affected operational and tactical commanders during the operations in Sri Lanka and the Kargil district. The Indian military failed to conduct long-term strategic planning because they lacked a National Defense Headquarters, which resulted in poor conceptual planning at the start of their military operations.[55]

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[53] Bullion, 162-63; Kadian, 136-37; Rizvi, 58-59; Lavoy, 191.

[54] Kargil Review Committee, 258.

[55] Malik, 358-359.

Conclusion

Adhering to the principles of joint operations, Indian or US, requires the presence of a commander-centric organization. The US model of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the highest-ranking officer in the military and the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense, enables strategic and contingency planning. A joint force commander for a military operation the cooperation or unity of effort required in joint operations. According to JP 3-0, "Operational art is the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations, and organize and employ military forces." Adhering to the principles of joint operations and exercising operational art flounders in the absence of a fully empowered joint force commander. This also occurs in contingency planning at the strategic level when the senior military officer for a nation's armed forces fails to participate in a productive dialogue with policymakers, as demonstrated in this study by the peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka and prior to the Kargil War.[56]

The IPKF in Sri Lanka and the Indian military during the Kargil War demonstrated conceptual planning deficiencies in Indian joint operations because of gaps in the national security management structure of India, as asserted by the Kargil Review Committee. After Kargil, the Ministry of Defence created the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) to enable the joint capabilities of the services, but the creation of a permanent Chief of Defence Staff to serve as the highest military officer in India failed. This continued the impediments to improved civil-military relationships that are critical to shared understanding. Today, India still faces challenges in creating a truly joint force because of parochial interests inside and outside of the uniformed services. The Indian military will continue to struggle to rise to the level of operational art

[56] JP 3-0, I-13

because it lacks the mechanisms to empower a joint force commander under a Chief of Defence Staff.[57]

[57] Lt Gen Harwant Singh, "Chief of Defense Staff: An Elusive Concept," Indian Defence Review 30, no. 2 (April-June 2015), accessed March 20, 2016, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/chief-of-defense-staff-an-elusive-concept/.

Appendix

The Indian Principles of War[58]

1. Selection and Maintenance of Aim. The aim is expressed as an intention, purpose, or end state. It is selected carefully, defined clearly, and stated simply and directly.
2. Maintenance of Moral. High morale fosters the offensive spirit and the will to win.
3. Offensive Action. Offensive action is the chief means of achieving victory. It results from offensive spirit and helps in the seizure and maintenance of initiative.
4. Surprise. Surprise implies catching the enemy off balance thereby forcing him to give battle in circumstances unfavorable to him.
5. Concentration of Force. Concentration of superior forces at the chosen place and time ensures success in battle.
6. Economy of Effort. Economy of effort connotes balanced deployment and judicious employment of forces to ensure success with minimum casualties.
7. Security. Security relates to the physical protection of ground, troops, equipment, material, and documents. It also involves denial of information.
8. Flexibility. Flexibility is the capability to react appropriately to changing situations.
9. Cooperation. All agencies involved have to work jointly towards achievement of the overall aim to achieve success in war. Jointmanship leads to cooperation; cooperation produces synergy.
10. Simplicity. A clear and uncomplicated plan and concise orders avoids confusion.
11. Administration. Placing the resources required at the right place and time to help commanders at all levels to achieve their respective objectives is the function of administration.

[58] *Indian Army Doctrine Part I*, 23-24.

12. Intelligence. This is an addition to the widely accepted principles of war because of its pre-eminence in any future conflict. Military Intelligence involves acquisition and exploitation of information about the enemy. Informatics plays a major role in ensuring that intelligence is available in time and in the desired form.

The US Principles of Joint Operations[59]

1. Objective. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.
2. Offensive. The purpose of the offensive is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
3. Mass. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.
4. Maneuver. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.
5. Economy of Force. The purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate maximum combat power on primary efforts.
6. Unity of Command. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.
7. Security. The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage.
8. Surprise. The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

[59] JP 3-0, A-1-A-4.

9. Simplicity. The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.
10. Restraint. The purpose of restraint is to limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.
11. Perseverance. The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.
12. Legitimacy. The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations.

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