Closing the Gap:
Force Expansion in an Age of 'Come-As-You-Are' Conflict

A Monograph

by

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This monograph argues that in order to expand the land force to face an existential threat, Australia must be capable of raising, training and sustaining a corps in combat as part of a coalition. The purpose of this study was to add to the body of knowledge relating to how Australia can expand the land force in response to a future existential threat while avoiding military catastrophe, to determine challenges to expansion and what capabilities must exist as part of the foundation force. The study suggests that as a small ally in a coalition of big allies merely avoiding military misfortune is insufficient; to influence allied grand strategy – to pursue national policy objectives in a coalition environment – requires initial and sustained battlefield success. The implication for national strategy is prior to the resorting to war – the military strategy – Australia must have an established national strategy with bipartisan support in order to form coherent war policy and formulation of a war narrative that legitimates a strategy of expansion. The implication for defense planning is the foundation force must be antifragile and have sufficient junior and senior leaders capable of commanding a corps from the outset.

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Abstract

Closing the Gap: Force Expansion in an Age of 'come-as-you-are' Conflict, by MAJ Matthew P. Boxall, 64 Pages.

In a complex interconnected global environment, nonlinearity and powerful contingency reign supreme. Surprise is not merely probable, it is certain. As the Second World War came as a great surprise to the millions of people and hopeful governments that believed the First World War had been the 'war to end all wars' it is probable the next great war will be unpredictable, the signals unmistakable only to future historians. Current Australian defense strategy provides for the provision of capable, agile, and potent military forces to coalition operations in support of Australian interests, and maintenance of a stable indo-pacific region and global order. Uncertainty is managed by military means postured to respond to threats as they arise – to fight 'come-as-you-are' conflicts with the forces at hand, military means that will likely prove insufficient in a great power conflict. During the Second World War, the potential defeat of Britain by Germany and Japan's advance through the Pacific posed an existential threat to Australia's sovereignty and way of life. Great power conflict has the potential to shatter the existing global order Australia relies upon for its security and prosperity and produce a war beyond the scale and duration of current contingency planning. Such an existential threat may necessitate a strategy of expansion to fulfill obligations to allies or defend Australian territory and regional interests.

This monograph argues that in order to expand the land force to face an existential threat, Australia must be capable of raising, training and sustaining a corps in combat as part of a coalition. Through qualitative analysis, this study uses structured focused comparison method to examine the raising, training, sustaining and fighting of the Second Australian Imperial Force from 1939 to 1943 to determine relationships between policy, strategy, and defense planning. The purpose of this study was to add to the body of knowledge relating to how Australia can expand the land force in response to a future existential threat while avoiding military catastrophe, to determine challenges to expansion and what capabilities must exist as part of the foundation force. The study suggests that as a small ally in a coalition of big allies merely avoiding military misfortune is insufficient; to influence allied grand strategy – to pursue national policy objectives in a coalition environment – requires initial and sustained battlefield success. The implication for national strategy is prior to the resorting to war – the military strategy – Australia must have an established national strategy with bipartisan support in order to form coherent war policy and formulation of a war narrative that legitimates a strategy of expansion. The implication for defense planning is the foundation force must be antifragile and have sufficient junior and senior leaders capable of commanding a corps from the outset.

Contents

Acronyms

1st AIF	First Australian Imperial Force
2nd AIF	Second Australian Imperial Force
ADF	Australian Defence Force
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War
SWPA	South West Pacific Area

Introduction

> For our own protection and in the interests of our people we must recognise that we are part of the Empire, and if Britain were confronted with a great disaster we should be involved . . . When nations like Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand all look in one direction and are animated with a desire to promote world's peace, their right of consultation in the foreign policy of Great Britain must exercise a tremendous influence upon the world.
>
> — Stanley Bruce, *Prime Minister of Australia, Melbourne, 1926*

In 1939, a tradition of imperial benevolence inextricably tied Australian security and prosperity to the British Empire. Today they are inextricably tied to a 'stable rules based global' order underpinned by the United States' pre-eminent global military power.[1] Australia's current and future strategic environment is globally interconnected, complex and – due to the intransparent actions of newly powerful nations, non-state actors and rogue states seeking to change the balance of power – uncertain.[2] In a stark similarity to 1938, the contemporary global governance architecture is under pressure and showing signs of fragility.[3] To counter this, a pillar of current Australian defense strategy is the provision of capable, agile and potent military forces to coalition operations in support of Australian interests, and maintenance of a stable indo-pacific region and global order. Uncertainty is managed by an Australian Defence Force (ADF) postured to respond to threats as they arise – to fight 'come-as-you-are' conflicts with the forces at hand.[4]

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[1] Australian Department of Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper* (Canberra: Government Printing Office, 2016), 39, 41.

[2] Ibid, 9, 18, 32, 45-46, 67, 77.

[3] Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 45; Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *Antifragile* (New York: Random House, 2012), 11-12, 268. Anything described as fragile does not like, and is harmed by volatility. Resilient people and organizations are unharmed by volatility, while fragile people and organizations are broken by volatility – harmed in unrecoverable ways.

[4] Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 77-78; Rod Lyon, "The 'Come-As-You-Are' War," *aspistrategist.org.au*, last modified 2016, accessed March 14, 2016,

Since the end of the Second World War (WWII) Australia has emerged as a middle power – a nation with 'sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without help from others' – and pursues national interest through the practice of middle power diplomacy.[5] The characteristic method of middle power diplomacy is coalition building with 'like-minded' countries.[6] Concomitant with middle power status is the requirement for military means to self-reliantly defend sovereign territory and protect regional interests from the threat of attack or coercion.[7] However, a perceived gap between government policy and actual investment in credible military means has made Australia's claim to middle power status questionable.[8]

As argued by Colin Gray, in a complex interconnected global environment nonlinearity and powerful contingency reign supreme. Surprise is not merely probable, it is certain.[9] As WWII came as a great surprise to the millions of people and hopeful governments that believed the First World War (WWI) had been the 'war to end all wars' it is probable the next great war will be unpredictable, the signals unmistakable only to future historians.[10] The military means Australia develops to maintain a rules based global order in conjunction with like-minded allies will likely prove insufficient in a great power conflict. In WWII, the potential defeat of Britain by Germany

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http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-come-as-you-are-war/.

[5] Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, *Power Politics* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1978), 299.

[6] Gareth Evans, "Middle Power Diplomacy,"*gevans.org*, last modified 2016, accessed March 13, 2016, http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech441.html.

[7] Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 33.

[8] Andrew Shearer, 'Australia in the Era of Austerity: Mind the Capability Gap,' in *A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners*, Gary Scmitted, 1st ed. (Washington, DC: United States Army War College Press, 2015), 35-60.

[9] Colin Gray, *Another Bloody Century* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 6257, Kindle.

[10] Ibid, 6257-8262.

and Japan's advance through the Pacific posed an existential threat to Australia's sovereignty and way of life. A great power conflict has the potential to shatter the existing global order Australia relies upon for its security and prosperity and produce a war beyond the scale and duration of current contingency planning.[11] Such an existential threat may necessitate a strategy of expansion to fulfill obligations to allies or defend Australian territory and regional interests.

Michael Howard states the role of the military in times of peace is to prevent doctrine and force structure from being too 'badly wrong,' and then getting it quickly right in times of conflict.[12] Colin Gray argued the challenge is to anticipate the future in ways that minimize the risk of committing errors of prediction that have catastrophic consequences.[13] A military catastrophe is a 'military misfortune' that carries the risk of national collapse resulting from the aggregate effects of failing to learn, anticipate and adapt.[14] The arguments of Howard and Gray suggest success on the battlefield and the path to avoid military catastrophe lies in two key functions; the maintenance of a strong 'foundation force' and with it the ability to anticipate, learn and adapt to the character of the new war, or what Gray calls "a strategy of minimum regret."[15] The challenge then is to maintain the 'right' foundation force and expand it in such a

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[11] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "Preparing for the Next Big War," *War on the Rocks*, last modified 2016, accessed March 22, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/preparing-for-the-next-big-war/.

[12] Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," Lecture, 3 October 1973.

[13] Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, 517-528.

[14] Eliot A Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 26-27, 161. A failure to *learn* is the failure to learn from readily accessible lessons from recent history. A failure to *anticipate* is an inability to foresee and take appropriate measures to deal with an enemy's move, or a likely response to a move of one's own. A failure to adapt is an inability to identify and take full advantage of opportunities offered by enemy actions or by chance combinations of circumstances to win success or to stave off failure.

[15] Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, 527.

way as to avoid military catastrophe. Ian Beckett calls this closing "the yawning gap between means and ends."[16]

The core thesis of this research is in order to expand the land force to face an existential threat Australia must be capable of raising, training and sustaining a corps in combat as part of a coalition. The purpose of this study is to add to the body of knowledge relating to how Australia can expand the land force in response to a future existential threat while avoiding military catastrophe, to determine challenges to expansion and what capabilities must exist as part of the foundation force. This study focuses on raising a corps. A corps is an echelon above the command and control structure currently possessed by the Australian Army and the level of command exercised by the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF) – the expeditionary land force Australia raised in WWII.[17] This study attempts to provide Australian policy makers insight into the challenge of expanding the land force in a politically complex, and time and resource constrained environment. It has the potential to provide an alternate frame to assess risk when forming national and military strategy and making force structure decisions.

Theory of strategy and the concept of defense planning provide the theoretical and conceptual framework for this research. The purpose of strategy is to make war usable by the state, providing a metaphorical bridge between policy and military means to advance political desires.[18] War policy and strategy are concerned with the logic of the use of violence, while

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[16] Ian Beckett, in Peter Dennis and Jeffery Grey, *Raise, Train and Sustain: Delivering Land Combat Power*, 1st ed. (Canberra: Australian Military History Publications, 2010), http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20history/AAHU/Conference%20Papers%20and%20Images/2009/2009-Raise_Train_and_Sustain-Delivering_Land_Combat_Power.pdf., iv.

[17] Australia raised and deployed the First Australian Imperial Force (1st AIF) as an all-volunteer expeditionary force to fight as part of the allied coalition under British strategic direction in WWI.

[18] Colin Gray, *The Future of Strategy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 25.

defense planning provides the material logic for the defense effort.[19] Defense planning links war policy and strategy to the generation of military means to pursue policy aims. National strategy – synonymous with grand strategy – is defined as the direction and use made of any or all instruments of National Power, including its military, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.[20] "Military strategy is the use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics."[21]

Two main questions guide this research. What was required for Australia to raise, train, sustain and fight the 2nd AIF from 1939 to 1943 and what information can that provide policy makers about having to raise, train, sustain and fight a corps sized formation as part of a coalition in the future? The research questions seek to determine; what Australia's policy and strategy was throughout the war; what capacity for expansion did the foundation force provide; who fought as part of the 2nd AIF and why; and how successful was Australia in training, equipping and fighting a corps as part of coalition operations during WWII. The four hypotheses tested to provide insight into growing the land force to face an existential threat are:

Hypothesis 1: Australia must be able to recruit sufficient people with the required physical and mental characteristics to raise and sustain a corps in combat.

Hypothesis 2: Australia must have the infrastructure, personnel, equipment, and a training model capable of preparing a corps to fight as part of a coalition.

Hypothesis 3: Australia must have the personnel, organizational structures, and systems capable of providing command and control of a corps in combat as part of a coalition.

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[19] Stephan Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty: Preparing for the Next Asia-Pacific War* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 19.

[20] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 47; Australian Army, *Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1 The Fundamentals of Land Power 2014* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2014), 26. Australian doctrine defines instruments of National Power as diplomatic, information, military and economic.

[21] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 47.

Hypothesis 4: Australia must have a national industrial base capable of equipping and sustaining a corps in combat.

Conducting the study in the United States has been the primary limitation of this study; physical dislocation has limited access to reference material stored in Australia. The primary delimitation is the use of reference material available in the public domain. The desire to address issues outside recent Australian experience has resulted in additional delimitations. The contemporary Australian Army maintains the capability to deploy a division headquarters and has recent operational experience commanding a brigade level organization in Afghanistan. The force generation cycle's purpose is to raise, train, deploy and simultaneously sustain a brigade and battlegroup in separate theaters of operation. As such, the study has been limited to 2nd AIF operations and campaigns involving a division headquarters or higher. The focus of this research is force expansion, as such this study limits the period under consideration to the end of 1943 to avoid the requirement to discuss the demobilization of the 2nd AIF and return of Australia to a pre-war political, economic and industrial footing.

This research has six underlying assumptions; First, in the face of an existential threat Australia's national strategy will require expansion of the land force; Second, Australia will not face an existential threat alone and will need to conduct coalition operations; Third, the geopolitical environment is interconnected and complex and does not proceed in a predictable linear fashion; Fourth, causes of international conflict and war are enduring; Fifth, Australia will remain a middle power and continue to be a democratic western society; Finally, Australian society no longer considers conscription a legitimate strategy. [22]

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[22] Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 70; Kenneth N Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 159-160; Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, 239, 6248. "History, including strategic history, is often non-linear. Trends come in bunches, interact unpredictably, and may produce a future which, though necessarily built on familiar material

This study is presented in six sections. Section I includes the background to the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, significance of the study, theoretical and conceptual framework, research questions and hypothesis, limitations and delimitations, and the assumptions of the study. Section II provides a review of literature in order to justify the rational for this study. It justifies the position that great war conflict and potential for Australia to face an existential threat remains a viable possibility; further defines strategy and defense planning as the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study; and discusses Australia's contemporary defense policy, strategy and defense debate. Section III describes the structured focused comparison methodology used for the study. Section IV presents the case study, the strategic context of WWII, why and how the 2nd AIF was raised, trained, equipped, sustained and how successful they were in fighting as part of a coalition in defense of national interests from 1939 to 1943. Section V provides the findings and analysis. Section VI concludes the paper and makes recommendations for further research.

Literature Review

This section presents the rationale for the study. It justifies the premise that the potential for Australia to face an existential threat continues to exist and reviews literature in order to define and develop the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this research, strategy and defense planning. Finally, it reviews Australian defense policy, strategy and the current defense debate. The rational for this study is the paucity of literature in the public domain relating to how Australia can expand the land force while avoiding military catastrophe.

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from the past, is so qualitatively different from what went before as to frustrate prediction."

The underpinning premise of this research is that war is a permanent feature of the human condition and the seeds of great power conflict remain.[23] While there exists no consistent, reliable process for reconciling conflicts between states, the use of force to pursue national interests remains an option. As long as separate sovereign states exist, war will be part of human existence.[24] The resilient nature of state interaction and lack of reliable global governance supports the core premise of this study - the potential for Australia to face an existential threat continues to exist.

The theory of strategy provides the theoretical framework for this research. The purpose of strategy is to make war usable by the state, providing a metaphorical bridge between policy and military means to advance political desires.[25] War policy, the product of politics, "is policy under which the political objective(s) is pursued through primarily military means."[26] Military strategy is an iterative process, a continuous dialogue between civilian and military leadership characterized by "compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to achieve them."[27] Strategy can be deliberate, but is most often emergent.[28] National strategy – synonymous with grand strategy – is the direction and use made of any or all instruments of National Power, including its military, for the purposes of policy as decided by politics.[29]

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[23] Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, 6072, 6248.

[24] Waltz, 238.

[25] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 25.

[26] Jeffrey J Kubiak, *War Narratives and the American National Will in War* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), 4.

[27] Strachan, 45; Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 47.

[28] Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning* (New York: Free Press, 1994), 24-25. Emergent strategies are the product of actions "taken, one by one, which converged in time in some sort of consistency or pattern." Arguably, due to the continuous dialogue and compromise between ends and means all strategy is emergent.

[29] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 47.

"Military strategy is the use made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by politics."[30] Australia's success and failures in raising and fighting the 2nd AIF during WWII are the result of policy and strategic decision-making. As such, the theory of strategy provides a suitable framework to analyze the raising, training, fighting and sustaining of the 2nd AIF during WWII.

Stephan Frühling – a primary author of the 2016 Australian Defence White Paper – argues policy is concerned with the logic of the use of violence while defense planning provides "the material logic for the defence effort."[31] Frühling argues the use of conceptual frameworks that address different categories of risk can reduce the probability of getting the 'foundation force' 'too badly wrong.'[32] He presents four defense planning paradigms based on relative probability of who an adversary will be and when a strategic threat will eventuate. Mobilization planning is a defense planning paradigm to address the "risk of conflict in the future, at an uncertain time and from a threat that is yet to develop."[33] Its core concept is to defer capability in time by maintaining a foundation force as a base for expansion that is capable of managing the strategic environment to gain time to increase military means. For this research, defense planning provides a conceptual framework that links policy and strategy to the development of the foundation force – military means in existence when the decision to expand is made. Defense

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[30] Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, 47.

[31] Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 19. In addition to mobilization planning Frühling discusses;"net assessment-based planning to meet the risk of conflict in the present and near future, with one known and understood adversary; portfolio planning, where the defence force must be able to configure itself to meet several different risks, and concurrency judgements are of central importance; and task-based planning, where uncertainty about the circumstances in which the defence force might be used is so great that planning has to focus on the ability to conduct basic military tasks."

[32] Ibid, 24.

[33] Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 3.

planning provides a lens to view "the invisible lines of force that gave coherence to the past and that could be expected, therefore, to shape the future."[34]

Australian defense policy and strategy provides context for the capabilities a future foundation force will possess, and the political and social context for how Australia responds to an existential threat. A corner stone of Australian defense is the self-reliant ability to deter and defeat attacks on Australia and its national interests.[35] A recent trend in Australian strategic guidance has been a growing recognition of the complex interconnected nature of Australia's security environment and of achieving regional security *with* rather than against its neighbors.[36] The 2016 Defence White Paper emphasizes the enduring principle of self-reliance in defense of Australian territory while inextricably tying Australia's security and stability to a rules based global order underpinned by United States leadership and military capability.[37]

Current Australian defense policy is to manage strategic challenges by developing a capable, agile and potent defense force to shape regional affairs and respond to threats while simultaneously strengthening the alliance with the United States and developing partnerships with other countries.[38] In the 2016 Defence White Paper, Australia adopts a joint force expeditionary maritime strategy. Implicit in the assessment "a stable rules-based global order serves to deal with threats before they become existential threats to Australia" and removal of reference to force

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[34] John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 73.

[35] Department of Defence, *Defence Issues Paper: A Discussion Paper to Inform the 2015 White Paper* (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Press, 2014), 6.

[36] Department of Defence, *2013 Defence White Paper* (Canberra: Australian Government Printing Press, 2013), 7-13; Brendan Taylor, "The Defence White Paper 2013 and Australia's Strategic Environment," *Security Challenges* 9, no. 2 (2013), 16.

[37] Defence, *2013 Defence White Paper*, 28-29, 56-57; Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 33, 67, 71, 75-76, 121,

[38] Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 67, 83.

expansion is Australia has adopted a hedging strategy – the force in being is capable of meeting expected and unexpected security challenges, of fighting come-as-you-are conflicts.[39]

Change in the strategic environment has created instability in the ADF's force structure and doctrine, resulting in debate regarding the force structure of the land force and criticism of Australian defense policy and planning.[40] Three broad concepts define the force structure debate. The 'core force', based on an isolationist mobilization planning framework, seeks to leverage strategic geography and a strong navy and air force to achieve sufficient warning time to expand the land force to protect continental Australia.[41] Under this strategy, the land force would be reduced to a core of key capabilities required for expansion. Conversely, the 'focused force' is based on expanding the entire ADF to a force in being capable of independently defeating or deterring a specific threat – currently the threat posed by the rise of China.[42] The 'balance force' argument is for a strong land force with sufficient capability 'in being' to provide the government a range of flexible options.[43]

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[39] Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 70, 78; Lyon, "The 'Come-As-You-Are' War."

[40] Stephan Frühling, *A History of Australian Strategic Policy since 1945* (Canberra, A.C.T.: Australian Deptartment of Defence, 2009), 1, 42-50.

[41] Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, "Australian Defence: Challenges for the New Government," *Security Challenges* 9, no. 4 (2013): 45-64; Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 33. "Warning time is the time that elapses between the decision to react, and the outbreak of hostilities and is the time available to materially increase the strength of the defending side."

[42] Hugh White, "A Middling Power: Why Australia's Defence is all at Sea," *The Monthly*, last modified 2012, accessed September 23, 2015, https://www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2012/september/1346903463/hugh-white/middling-power; Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 19. The 'focused force' concept is an example of the net-based assessment defense planning paradigm.

[43] Michael Clifford, 'ASPI's 2015 Land Conference: 'Army's Future Force Structure Options',' a*spistrategist.org.au*, last modified 2015, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aspi-2015-land-conference-armys-future-force-structure-options/; Peter Leahy, "The Future Land Forces," *Security Challenges* 9, no. 1 (2013), 65.

Arguably, Australia has failed to produce military means concomitant with recognition of Middle Power status. Michael Evans argues a purist theoretical approach and over emphasis of strategic geography in defense planning, has resulted in a decoupling of diplomacy and the use of armed force, resulting in a "tyranny of dissonance between strategic theory and military practice."[44] Hence, Australia has focused on generating military means that do not reflect how the Government has chosen to use armed force throughout Australian history, which is to say, in the face of crisis "Australia has always taken up arms in defence not of its Asia-pacific geography but of its liberal Western values."[45] An alternate position is that Australia has failed to provide sufficient funding to realize capability of meeting policy objectives.[46] A United States commissioned review of 'Hard Power' of key allies and security partners concluded "Australia must make a commitment to boosting its military capabilities to ensure that it can make a credible contribution in the unilateral and multilateral defense roles it has signed up for."[47]

Force expansion had been a continuity of Australian national strategy and continues as a part of the force structure debate, even though the 2016 Defence White Paper has removed all reference to it.[48] Limited literature exists pertaining to the process and challenges involved in

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[44] Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance (Duntroon, A.C.T.: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2004), 69 and Hugh White, 'A Middling Power: Why Australia's Defence is all at Sea.'

[45] Evans, 105.

[46] White; James Brown and Rory Metcalf, *Fixing Australia's Incredible Defence Policy*, ebook, 1st ed. (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013), accessed March 28, 2016, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/brown_and_medcalf_fixing_australias_incredible_defence_policy_web.pdf, 3-6.

[47] Andrew Shearer, 'Australia In The Era of Austerity: Mind The Capability Gap,' in *A Hard Look at Hard Power: Assessing the Defense Capabilities of Key U.S. Allies and Security Partners*, Gary Scmitt ed., 1st ed. (Washington, DC: United States Army War College Press, 2015), 35.

[48] Both proponents of the 'core force' and 'balanced force' acknowledge the requirement for expansion in response to deterioration in the strategic environment.

translating national resources into capability in the public domain. A collection of essays commissioned in 2009, as part of the Australian Army military education program, *Raise, Train and Sustain: Delivering Land Combat Power*, addressed "the difficulties armies face in reconciling limited resources with less than limited commitments."[49] However, it failed to address the current or future issues in mobilizing Australian national resources.

The rational for this monograph is not to address the dissonance between policy, strategy and force structure, or to enter into the debate of what the specific land force structure should be, but to add to the body of knowledge relating to how Australia can expand the land force in response to an existential threat while avoiding military catastrophe. The 2016 Defence White Paper provides a framework that seeks to remove the uncertainty and dissonance that has characterized recent Australian defense policy, by matching strategy and capability plans to appropriate resource to provide a capable, potent and agile balanced joint force.[50] However, the removal of reference to force expansion will serve to reduce the already scant attention paid to the challenges of expanding the land force.

As John Gaddis has observed historian tend to resist making their methodology explicit, preferring that form conceal function. They recoil from the notion that their method should be exposed, like "plumbing, wiring and ductwork on the *outside* of the building, so they're there for all to see."[51] However, to ensure the findings of this research add to the cumulative knowledge regarding Australian defense policy, strategy and defense planning the next section presents the study's methodology, its plumbing, wiring and ductwork.

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[49] Dennis and Grey, *Raise, Train and Sustain*.

[50] Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 9-10, 78.

[51] Gaddis, xi.

Methodology

Hew Strachan and Carl Von Clausewitz argue studying the past provides the best means of 'not being too badly wrong,' when developing theories of action for the future.[52] Heeding their advice, this study employs the structured focused comparison method to analyze a single case study relating to Australian strategy and defense planning in WWII, to yield useful generic knowledge to inform a broader more complex theory of defense policy.[53] As described by George and Bennett in *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, the method is structured in that analysis of the case study is conducted through a set of guiding questions that relate to the theoretical focus of strategy and defense planning, and focused in that only specific aspects, relevant to the hypothesis, are examined.[54] An additional strength of this approach is a single case study provides strong control of background variables and limits the effects of third factors on the study variables.[55]

The case study examined by this research is the raising, training, sustaining and fighting the 2nd AIF from 1939 to 1943. This case study was chosen as it is the last time Australia deployed and fought an organization larger than a brigade and the only time an enemy has been perceived as having the intent, capability and opportunity to pose an existential threat to Australia. Following are the hypothesizes and the structured questions used to test them; their relevance and what answer is expected to be found from examination of the case study. The first set of questions relate to the general hypothesis that in order to expand the land force to face an

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[52] Strachan, 254; Clausewitz, 170-174.

[53] Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 67-72.

[54] George and Bennett, 67-72.

[55] Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 50-53.

existential threat Australia must be capable of raising, training and sustaining a corps in combat as part of a coalition.

The first structured question is what was Australia's national policy and strategy from 1939 to 1945? This question provides the link between national policy, strategy and the mobilization and employment of military means to meet national objectives pre and post the emergence of Japan as an existential threat. To ensure that policy and strategy decisions made throughout the war are viewed in context this question is extended beyond 1943. This research expects that Australian policy and strategy will change to prioritize the defense of Australia with the emergence of Japan as an existential threat.

The second structured question is what capacity did the existing land force provide as a foundation force for raising the 2nd AIF in 1939? The purpose of this question is to understand what capacity the foundation force in existence provided for raising the 2nd AIF in 1939. It is expected Australia's small permanent military and larger militia land forces provided a framework – structural, organizational and conceptual – that facilitated the raising of the 2nd AIF.

The following question seeks to test the first hypothesis that Australia must be able to recruit sufficient people with the required physical and mental characteristics to raise and sustain a corps in combat. The third structured question is, who fought as part of the 2nd AIF and what motivated them to enlist in the 2nd AIF? This question seeks to determine the demographics of who fought as part of the 2nd AIF, if they had prior military experience or not and what motivated them to volunteer to fight as part of an expeditionary land force. It is expected the majority of those who fought had prior military experience and the tradition of part-time military service – as either militia or enlisting for the duration of a conflict – contributed to legitimizing a strategy of sending Australian forces to fight as part of an allied coalition under British strategic direction.

The next two questions relate to the second hypothesis that Australia must have the

infrastructure, personnel, equipment, and a training model capable of preparing a corps to fight. The fourth structured question is what training model did the 2nd AIF use? This question seeks to determine how the 2nd AIF initially produced combat capable forces and what role training had in achieving and maintaining a competitive edge during the war. This study expects the 2nd AIF employed a progressive, continuous training model that leveraged British resources and incorporated lessons learnt to facilitate adaptation.

The fifth structured question is, were 2nd AIF forces ready for combat? This question seeks to determine if the training model combined with existing structural and mobilization readiness was effective in providing Australia with a credible and capable expeditionary land force. It is expected that 2nd AIF forces who trained for open mobile warfare under British doctrine and fought against Italian and German forces where ready for combat, while initially units who fought against the Japanese in close terrain were not. Readiness for combat is assessed against the ability to produce relative fighting force at the division level and allied perception of 2nd AIF battlefield performance.

The following two questions relate to the third hypothesis that Australia must have the personnel, organizational structures, and systems capable of providing command and control of a corps in combat as part of a coalition. The sixth structured question is how was command and control exercised in the 2nd AIF? The purpose of this question is to determine how the 2nd AIF produced leaders, and what organizational structures and method of command was used. It is expected that the 2nd AIF produced leaders from within its ranks and drew experienced senior leaders from the existing land force and employed a decentralized command philosophy based on British doctrine.

The seventh question is what problems did the 2nd AIF experience operating as part of a coalition? The purpose of this question is to identify challenges the 2nd AIF faced in operating as an inexperienced force in a coalition environment. It is expected that the 2nd AIF had few

interoperability issues with commonwealth forces due to common heritage, training, doctrine and education while cultural and doctrinal differences between Australian and United States forces led to communication and command problems.

The last question relates to the hypothesis that Australia must have a national industrial base capable of equipping and sustaining a corps in combat. Therefore, question eight is what was the consequence of equipment and sustainment shortfalls for the 2nd AIF? In 1939, Australia did not have the equipment or industry to field an effective modern military resulting in reliance on allies to equip and sustain the 2nd AIF. This question seeks to understand the effects initial equipment shortfall and reliance on allies for equipment and sustainment had on the effectiveness of the 2nd AIF and Australia's ability to pursue national interests. It is expected that equipment shortfalls materially contributed to the time it took 2nd AIF forces to prepare for combat.

Official government histories, historical texts and government publications provide the data for analysis of this study. Official Australian and United States government histories, derived from primary sources, and government publications provide the main source of data for establishing the facts of the case study. Historical texts assist in qualitative analysis of events.

This section outlined the value of the structured focused method and introduced the standardized questions used to test the hypothesis against the case study. The guiding questions are structured and focused in that they relate to individual hypothesis and only investigate specific aspects of the case study that relate to raising, training, sustaining and commanding the 2nd AIF. This next section introduces the case study, providing an overview of the road to war, why Australia was not ready for war but still chose to declare war on Germany and Australia's role in WWII. It then answers each of the structured focused questions in turn.

Case Study

On 3 September 1939, Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies announced Britain was at war with Germany, and "as a result, Australia is also at war."[56] As Clausewitz has observed "no one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."[57] Australia's failure to do so in 1939 made its influence felt throughout the war, effecting the scale of Australia's war effort, the means available and strategy pursued.

Complexity denies mono-causal explanations, however the failure of the victors of the First World War (WWI) to "construct a solid basis for peace after it ended and work consistently to preserve the flawed peace that existed" played a key role in setting the conditions that lead to WWII.[58] In Europe, the punitive nature of the Treaty of Versailles and instability in the German political system set the conditions for the rise to power of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi regime.[59] To restore "German equality of rights" Hitler pursued an increasingly aggressive foreign policy to secure resources and living space.[60] A foreign policy the League of Nations and Britain's policy of appeasement failed to curtail.[61] Italy, under the leadership of Benito Mussolini's fascist

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[56] From speech made by Prime Minister Robert Gordon Menzies, 3 September 1939: Screensound Australia, National Screen and Sound Collection, Screensound Title No: 387919, accessed at, ww2australia.gov.au, "War Declared," last modified 2016, accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/wardeclared/.

[57] Clausewitz, 579.

[58] Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 413.

[59] Ibid, 415.

[60] Department of State, *Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D, Volume 6* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), 376-378.

[61] Kagan, 415. For further information of the causes of WWII in Europe see Chapter 4 of Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace* (New York: Doubleday, 1995).

regime, motivated by aspirations of imperial expansion, invaded and annexed portions of Abyssinia in 1935. In the Pacific, Japan's rapid industrialization created a hunger for natural resources they could not feed through economic means. Under the leadership of an increasingly militarized government, Japan resorted to an expansionist foreign policy invading Manchuria in 1931 to secure resources. On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland and in response on 3 September, Britain declared war on Germany. WWII had begun. In 1940, Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact.[62]

Misplaced optimism, complacency and political division in the years leading up to 1939 ensured Australia was not prepared for war.[63] Following WWI Australia resumed the interrupted task of national development. In 1939, Australia had a population of seven million and was an industrializing nation; however, the maintenance of a credible military force took a lower priority than the pursuit of domestic development.[64] The abolishment of universal training in 1929 and defense spending cuts necessitated by the global depression ensured Australia was less well armed in 1939 than she had been in 1914.[65]

Defense spending increased from 1935; however, the belief that another major war would not occur or that, if it did, someone else would fight it on Australia's behalf resulted in failure to translate increased budgets into credible military means.[66] In 1923, the Australia government, with political and military opposition, agreed to the principles of collective British imperial

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[62] For a detailed analysis of the events that lead to Japans entry into the war see Part 1: The Road to War of Lionel Wigmore's, *The Japanese Thrust* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957).

[63] Gavin Long, *To Benghazi* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), 31-32.

[64] Gavin Long, *The Six Years War* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1973), 1.

[65] Long, *To Benghazi*, 14, 32; Long, *The Six Years War*, 4.

[66] Jeffery Grey, *A Military History of Australia*, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2602, Kindle.

defense, principles that called for each member to provide for its own local defense, and when required provide forces that could be quickly integrated as part of an imperial coalition under British direction.[67] The Singapore Strategy, conceived in response to Indian and Australian concerns regarding the threat posed by Japan, called for the establishment of a base in Singapore to allow the Royal Navy to operate effectively in the East. A strategy Australia and New Zealand relied upon for defense from Japan.[68]

In 1935, the Government chose to order weapons, aircraft and ships from abroad rather than invest in Australian defense industry, however, as the major nations hurriedly prepared for war, Australia's order was not delivered. In 1938, Menzies rejected a recommendation to increase the size of the permanent land force in favor of increasing the size of the militia force. The result of interwar policy was Australia declared war on Germany with a small navy and air force armed with obsolete ships and aircraft and a land force designed for home defense, with no expeditionary capability. The land force was not an independent institution as the Army of today is, "instead it was but one branch of an imperial association whose members subscribed to common military policies and principles."[69] At the outbreak of war, Australia had a critical shortage of modern weapons and equipment. Australia's defense industry was capable of limited munitions production but lacked the capacity for precision mass production required to produce equipment to support mechanized warfare.[70]

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[67] Long, *The Six Years War*, 1-3; Grey, 2602.

[68] Long, *The Six Years War*, 1-2.

[69] Albert Palazzo, "Organising for Jungle Warfare," in *Foundations of Victory; The Pacific War 1943-1944: The Chief of Army's History Conference 2003*, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey ed. , 1st ed. (Canberra: Australian Army History Unit, Department of Defence, 2004), 87. The land force consisted of 80,000 personnel, a small cadre of permanent military, 42,000 militia and an additional 40,000 untrained militia recruits armed with WW1 vintage equipment.

[70] D. P Mellor, *The Role of Science and Industry* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1958), 321-322.

The raising, training, equipping and initial deployment of the 2nd AIF was an incremental process characterized by political hesitancy and lack of clear direction. On 15 September 1939, Menzies announced the raising of a special expeditionary force of 20,000 personnel.[71] Under command of General Sir Thomas Blamey, the 6th Division was raised between September and December 1939.[72] The government initially approached the war in Europe as a war of limited liability.[73] Government hesitancy – the product of attempting to balance domestic politics and war policy between supporting British forces and local defense of Australia – resulted in policy that made how and where the 2nd AIF would be employed unclear.

Initially, recruiting for the 2nd AIF was slow and far fewer members of the militia enlisted than the Government had planned. The official diary of the 6th Division recorded, absence of "an inspiring lead by the government, a reluctance by the militia to leave well-paid jobs to join a force that may not go overseas, and opposition by commanders of militia formations to their men enlisting in the 2nd AIF as the cause of slow enlistment rates."[74]

On 10 May 1940, Germany began its campaign against France and the 'low' countries. By the start of June Germany had annexed Belgium, Holland and defeated a British Expeditionary Force and French troops in vicinity of Dunkirk. On 10 June, looking to capitalize on Germany's success and secure influence at the peace table, Italy declared war and joined

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[71] Prime Minister Menzies, broadcast, September 15, 1939, in John Robertson and John McCarthy, *Australian War Strategy, 1939-1945* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1985), 29.

[72] For more information of the 2nd AIF's controversial commandeer see John Hetherington, *Blamey, Controversial Soldier* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Pub. Service, 1973) and David Horner, *Blamey* (St. Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1998).

[73] Grey, 3058.

[74] Long, *The Six Years War*, 21. The 6th Division was the first unit of the 2nd AIF raised.

Germany's invasion of France. By the 17 June, France had asked for an armistice.[75] The effect in Australia was immediate.

In May, Menzies stated the situations had completely changed and now there must be an 'all-in war effort' and directed full mobilization of Australian industry to support the Allied war effort.[76] However, the Menzies minority Government's war narrative failed to mobilize the political capital and public will required for a total war effort; trade union strikes continued and the militia was only partially mobilized – 22,000 personnel were called up for three months of training at a time before being released back to the work force.[77]

In February 1940, prior to the invasion of France, enlistment for raising a second division to bring the AIF up to a corps of two infantry division with supporting units had commenced. However, the rate of enlistment was so slow it was expected it would be June 1940 before sufficient numbers enlisted to raise the corps. In May, the rate of enlistment rapidly increased with 8,000 enlistments accepted and in June 48,500. On 11 July, citing lack of equipment, depletion of the militia and loss of men from industry, the War Cabinet suspended recruiting for the 2nd AIF. However, the suspension on recruiting would only come into effect in September and in July and August an additional 53,500 volunteers where recorded.[78] The rate of enlistment for the 2nd AIF was inversely proportional to how poorly the war progressed in France; the worse it got for the allies the more Australians enlisted. By November the 2nd AIF consisted of a corps

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[75] Long, *The Six Years War*, 29.

[76] Ibid, 29, 35.

[77] Ibid, 30-31; Kubiak, 17. "The war narrative constructs the political milieu in which the crisis occurs, places the present in context with the past, and creates expectations about the future. Specially, the war narrative establishes the stakes, places those stakes relative to the costs, and generates the prospects for the success of a war policy. The legitimating role of the war narrative makes it central to the sustainability of war policy once initiated."

[78] Long, *Six Years War*, 31-37.

of four infantry divisions.[79]

British assurances they would provide modern equipment and honor the conditions of the Singapore Strategy were the preconditions for the Australian Government to raise and deploy elements of the 2nd AIF to the Middle East. Throughout WWII Australian military forces – naval, air and land – were equipped and sustained through a combination of Australian, British and US industry. While the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill thought an attempt by Japan to seize Singapore would be a "mad enterprise", he provided the assurance to Australia that Britain would sacrifice her interests in the Mediterranean in order to defend them from "serious attack."[80]

From January 1941 to 1943, elements of the 2nd AIF fought in allied campaigns under British strategic guidance fighting Italians and Germans in North Africa and Greece and Vichy French forces in the Middle East.[81] The 2nd AIF served with distinction and provided the majority of fighting forces in the theater for the critical first year. Battlefield cooperation between Australian and British forces was generally of a high standard; however, the tendency of British commanders to view Australia as a colony and treat 2nd AIF forces as an integral part of an imperial army resulted in tension between military commanders and a break down in trust

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[79] In early 1940, the 6th Division deployed to Palestine to train with, and to be equipped by the British, they were later joined by elements of Headquarters 1st Corps, 2nd AIF. In November 1940, the 7th Division was on route to the Middle East to join the 1st Corps Headquarters and 6th Division for equipping and training, the 8th Division was training in Australia, and the 9th Division was equipping and training in England. 9th Division was raised in England from two Brigades of the 6th who had been diverted from the Middle East in June when Italy declared war, making the Mediterranean Sea line of communication dangerous.

[80] Churchill, memorandum, November 21, 1939, in Robertson and McCarthy, 144-145.

[81] For a full history of Australia's contribution to the allied war effort in the Mediterranean theater see Gavin Long, *To Benghazi* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), Gavin Long, *Greece, Crete, and Syria* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1953), and Barton Maughan, *Tobruk and El Alamein* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1966).

between the two governments.[82] Churchill's view was Britain was "entitled to count on Australia to make every sacrifice necessary for the comradeship of the Empire."[83] A view not shared by the Australian Government. In October 1940, Britain's failure to commit to the defense of Singapore collapsed the established war policy and the Menzies government and brought to power a new Government under leadership of Prime Minister John Curtin.[84] In January 1942, the majority of Australia's 2nd AIF forces returned to Australia to fight the Japanese in the Pacific; however, the 9th Division remained to play an important role in the allied victory at El Alamein in October 1942 before it also left for the Pacific.

Japan entered the war in December 1941 with simultaneous attacks against British imperial forces in Hong Kong and Malaya and United States forces at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines.[85] Japan swiftly achieved a series of victories, resulting in the occupation of most of south-east Asia and large areas of the Pacific by the end of March 1942.[86] In February 1941, Australia had sent elements of 8th Division to Malaya to bolster the defense of Singapore, which Australia assessed as being critical to her local defense from invasion by Japan. Japan's success in Malaya was due to superior tactics, training, combat experience, discipline and Britain's failure

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[82] David Horner, *High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy 1939-1945* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1982), 443.

[83] Churchill to Fadden, cablegram, September 29, 1941, in Robertson and McCarthy, 133.

[84] Long, *The Six Years War*, 117-118; Kubiak, 20-30. For war policy to remain legitimate it must produce the outcomes the war narrative has promised and "actors must act in accordance with the role they are assigned."

[85] For a complete account of Australia's role in defeating Japans initial thrust in WWII see Lionel Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1957), Dudley McCarthy, *South-West Pacific Area-First Year: Kokoda to Wau* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1959).

[86] For a full account of Japanese Army operations in the South Pacific see Steven Bullard, *Japanese Army Operations in the South Pacific Area* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 2007).

to adequately resource the defense with modern aircraft, in effect ceding air superiority to the Japanese.[87] While elements of the 8th Division had local tactical success, at the Battles of Gemas and Muar, the performance of the commanding officer, Major General Gordon Bennet, and other elements of the Division left much to be desired.[88] On 15 February Singapore fell, with 15,365 members of 8th Division going into captivity, Bennet escaped while ordering his soldiers to surrender in good order, later justifying his escape by the need to inform Australia of how best to defeat Japanese tactics.[89] While Bennet's failures as a commander and the acts of cowardice and desertion amongst Australian troops did not cause the fall of Singapore they did much to damage the reputation of the 2nd AIF with Australia's allies – in sharp contrast to the reputation earned by the 2nd AIF in the Middle East.

In response to the perception that Australia was at threat of imminent attack, the Government, enjoying a level of political unity that had eluded them for the first two years of the war called for an overhaul of economic, domestic, and industrial policies to give the Government special authority to mount a total war effort at home. By December 1943, over seventy percent of national manpower was directly involved in war activities and Australian agriculture and munitions production supported much of the allied war effort in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA).[90] Japan, the majority of her armies committed to the war effort in China, did not have the resources to invade Australia, however, at the time the threat of invasion was perceived as being very real.

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[87] Grey, 3068; Robertson and McCarthy, 213.

[88] Grey, 3068-3087.

[89] Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, 378-371.

[90] Curtin to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, memorandum, June 2, 1944, in Horner, *High Command*, 451.

In March 1942, Japan's southward advance began to lose strength, easing fears of an imminent invasion of Australia. In February, following the collapse of the Malay Barrier and fall of the Philippines the United States further committed to the defense of Australia with the established the SWPA of operations under command of General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur assumed responsibility for the country's defense, with the United States providing reinforcements and equipment. In Papua, Japanese forces continued to attempt to secure Port Moresby to gain control of the Coral Sea and 'smash' allied plans for a counter-offensive.[91] The 6th and 7th Division after a brief period of rest returned to duty and, following a period of Jungle training, deployed to assist in the defense of Papua.[92]

The New Guinea Force, formed on the Headquarters of 1st Corps 2nd AIF, was responsible for planning and directing all allied operations within the territory of New Guinea and Papua from April 1942 to October 1944. The allies won a series of decisive battles in the Coral Sea, at Midway, the Kokoda Trail, and at Milne Bay and Buna. The Allied victory at Buna was the first major joint Australian and US land operations and proved to highlight the differences in training, doctrine and culture that would be a source of friction during the SWPA campaigns.[93] The Allied victory at Midway in June meant Japan no longer dominated the sea, MacArthur

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[91] Bullard, 75.

[92] John Moremon, "No 'Black Magic': Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare," in *The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War 1943-1944 The 2003 Chief of Army's Military History Conference*, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey ed. , 1st ed. (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2004), accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20history/AAHU/Conference%20Papers%20and%20Images/2003/2003-The_Pacific_War_1943-1944_Part_1.pdf., 76.

[93] Peter J Dean, *Australia 1942: In the Shadows of War* (Port Melbourne, Vic.: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 217.

considered the safety of Australia assured and conditions had been set for offensive action against Japanese bases in the SWPA.[94]

In 1943, still reliant on Australia for most of his land force, MacArthur commenced his campaign to defeat Japan and regain the United States lost territories in the SWPA. Australian troops, both militia and 2nd AIF engaged in land battles in New Guinea. From lesson learnt in Malaya and Papua, the 2nd AIF and Australian Army developed doctrine, training systems, equipment, organizational structures and logistics that reduced wastage and resulted in battlefield dominance over the Japanese for the remainder of the war.[95] The New Guinea Campaign was Australia's largest and most complex offensive of the war and was not completed until April 1944. By the end of 1944 – no longer reliant of Australian land forces and commanding eighteen American Divisions – MacArthur's campaign to defeat Japan and reclaim lost US territory moved out of the SWPA. While excluded from the thrust north Australian forces would continue to fight its most controversial campaigns in the SWPA.

From 1944 to the end of the war the Australian Army fought campaigns against isolated Japanese garrisons stretching from Borneo to Bougainville, involving more Australian troops than at any other time in the war. These campaigns are contentious, as many believe they were unnecessary and a needless waste of life. However, while it is true that they did not materially contribute to the defeat of Japan they did much to secure Australia's post war national interests in the region, restoring Australian imperium in New Guinea and aiding in the release of Japanese prisoners of war.

The first structured question is what was Australia's national policy and strategy from 1939 to 1945? In 1939, Australia pursued an emergent national strategy – partial mobilization of

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[94] Robertson and McCarthy, 322.

[95] Moremon, 76-85.

instruments of national power; and commitment of naval, air and land forces to a war of limited aims – the military strategy– under the principles of collective imperial defense to ensure the might of the British empire would protect Australia and her interests. By 1941, against the perceived existential threat posed by Japan, Australia's national policy became war itself and her national strategy of full mobilization of all instruments of national power. Her military strategy to concentrate land, naval and air forces in Australia and her mandated territories to defeat Japan's advance and secure mainland Australia as a base to launch an allied offensive to defeat Japan in the Pacific.[96] From 1943 to the end of the war, Australia no longer perceived Japan as an existential threat and reverted to a war of limited means, to concentrate military effort in the SWPA in order to secure influence in the peace settlement and to free her mandated territories of Japanese occupation.[97]

Australian strategic decision making during WWII was constrained by a lack of experience in international politics, tradition that inextricably linked Australian security decisions to British influence, a small population and weak economy that made it difficult to pursue independent foreign policy when faced with powerful enemies.[98] Issues compounded by interwar policy decision that failed to maintain a credible and capable military. However, the land force that existed prior to the war proved critical in enabling Australia to raise, train, fight and sustain the 2nd AIF.

The second structured question is what capacity did the land force provide as a foundation force for raising the 2nd AIF in 1939? The land force in 1939 provided a small, but

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[96] Paper by the Chief of the General Staff of Future Employment of the AIF, February 15, 1942, in Robertson and McCarthy, 227-229.

[97] Curtin to MacArthur, November 22, 1943, in Robertson and McCarthy, 391.

[98] Horner, 435. For a comprehensive analysis of Australian strategic decision making during WWII see D. M Horner, *High Command* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1982).

experienced and talented nucleus of leaders, doctrine, and an organizational framework and plans to transform Australian military potential into military capability. Most importantly, it provided a social structure that legitimized part time soldiering in defense of Australia as a social norm.[99] However, critical shortfalls in number of instructors, base level of training, modern munitions and stockpiles of ammunition undermined structural readiness.[100]

In 1939, the land force consisted of 3,692 permanent military force personnel and 80,000 militia.[101] The permanent force consisted of professional soldiers and officers. The militia provided a number of competent officers and instructors; however, the militia-training model – through lack of equipment, training time and continuity – failed to produce soldiers ready for combat on short notice.[102] Under the principles of collective imperial defense Australian forces adopted British doctrine, training models, equipment and organizational structures in order to "dovetail" into commonwealth forces.[103] Officers attended British Staff Colleges and conducted exchange posting with commonwealth forces creating a common school of thought and relationships that facilitated battlefield cooperation during WWII.[104] Additionally the majority of

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[99] Peter L Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), 52-55.

[100] Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 34. "Structural readiness refers the degree to which the military potential inherent in the population and economy is translated into formed military units."

[101] Carl Jess, *Report on the Activities of the Australian Military Forces 1929-1939*, ebook, 1st ed., n.d., Part III, Appendix 5; Long, *To Benghazi*, 27-29. A recruiting drive commenced in December 1938, raised the militia from 42,895 personnel to 80,000 by September 1939.

[102] Long, *To Benghazi*, 26, 31; Jess, Part II. Militia annual training consisted of 12 days of camp and 6 days home training. Militia soldiers needed six months fulltime training with modern weapons before reaching a comparative standard to permanent force soldiers

[103] Horner, *High Command*, 5.

[104] Ibid, 6.

the senior officers that led the 2nd AIF held senior command and staff appointments during WWI.[105]

The land force not only provided personnel but also plans and a structural framework that facilitated the raising of the 2nd AIF. Prior to the outbreak or war the government and military had developed plans for mobilization in defense of Australia and for raising a division sized expeditionary force.[106] However, equipment and ammunition stock were insufficient to supply the planned forces with modern equipment.[107] Barracks facilities were used to conduct initial mobilization; however they provided insufficient capacity to allow for simultaneous training of militia and AIF forces and required the construction of new facilities.[108] An Australian Command and Staff School was opened in July 1938 in addition to existing officer, non-commissioned officer, soldier and technical training schools that were used to train 2nd AIF officers and soldiers.[109]

The third structured question is who fought as part of the 2nd AIF and what motivated them to enlist in the 2nd AIF? By the end of the war, almost four hundred thousand Australian males – representing approximately twenty percent of those eligible for service – primarily of British descent fought as part of the 2nd AIF.[110] The primary motivation to enlist in the 2nd AIF

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[105] Long, *To Benghazi*, 40. In 1939 all divisional and brigade commanders of 6th Division and most unit commanders had served as regimental officers in the war of 1914-18 and the junior officers had been trained under these experienced leaders. For example, the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Division (militia) was Ivan Mackay who had commanded a brigade in 1918 and his three infantry brigadiers, Lesley Morshead, John Murray and Arthur Allen, had all commanded battalions in action. However, the strength in veteran senior leaders was offset by an extreme shortage of regular officers to fill key staff posts.

[106] Ibid, 25; Jess, Part III, Appendix 20.

[107] Long, *The Six Years War*, 21.

[108] Long, *To Benghazi*, 54.

[109] Jess, Part II, Section 5 'Training developments in 1938.'

[110] "Enlistment Statistics, Second World War | Australian War Memorial," *awm.gov.au*,

was a combination of tradition, culture, adventurism and a sense of duty to their fellow man underpinned by the social norm of volunteer expeditionary forces fighting as part of a British led coalition. For most of the war, eligibility to serve in the 2nd AIF was restricted to men principally of European descent, physically capable of being a soldier, and not employed in a restricted trade, however these standards were not strictly enforced.

At federation in 1901, Australia was founded on principles of egalitarianism, utilitarianism, collectivism, a philosophy of White Australia and an ideology of imperial benevolence; foundations that shaped the development of a military tradition of expeditionary volunteer forces acting within an Imperial framework in support of British forces.[111] Enlistment criteria for a soldier in 1939 required you to be medically fit, taller than 5 feet 6 inches, between the ages of 20 and 35 and not be employed in a restricted trade.[112] In theory, the age restriction barred from service – other than officers – those who had served in WWI. In practice, those who were keen to sign up misstated their age and occupation.[113] As with restriction on age and trade, indigenous Australians who were 'keen to serve' lied to enlist in the 2nd AIF.

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last modified 2016, accessed March 9, 2016, https://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/enlistment/ww2/; Figures taken from Gavin Merrick Long, *The Final Campaigns* (Canberra: Australia War Memorial, 1963), 685; Australian Government, The National Register 1939, Table 1. In 1939 the national register estimated there were 2,208,060 males between the ages of eighteen and sixty five.

[111] Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, 21-22; LWD-1, 26-27, 36. At Australian federation in 1901, the settlement was based on five interconnected pillars. "The first three pillars were socioeconomic in character and were designed to bring prosperity based on social justice. They were state paternalism, industry protection and wage arbitration. The fourth and fifth pillars—the philosophy of White Australia and the ideology of imperial benevolence—were sociopolitical in nature and reinforced the first three domestic foundation pillars."

[112] Long, *To Benghazi*,39, 87. In response to slow enlistment rates, age and height restrictions were relaxed to 40 years and 5 feet respectively in 1940. Age limits for officers allowed for enlistment up to 45.

[113] Long, *The Six Years War*, 22, 58.

In 1940, Australia's population was 7,065,000 and –due to the founding philosophy of White Australia – extremely homogenous, with ninety seven percent of the population of British decent.[114] The number of indigenous Australian who served with the 2nd AIF is unknown. Indigenous enlistment was restricted in the AIF from 1940 until after Japan entered the war to "those of predominantly European origin" and the service of indigenous Australian considered "neither necessary nor desirable."[115] As a result, enlistment records did not record the ethnicity of volunteers. The motivation for indigenous Australians to serve was a combination of patriotism and hope that service would lead to recognition of full citizen rights after the war.[116]

The fourth structured question is what training model did the 2nd AIF use? The 2nd AIF used a progressive and continuous training model that incorporated organizational learning and facilitated adaptation. Australia entered the war using British doctrine, which stated the purpose of training was to produce highly disciplined, self-dependent individual soldiers and controlled and flexible units.[117]

The 2nd AIF used a progressive training model to take recruits through to combat capable soldiers as part of units capable of coalition combined arms operations. Recruits initially conducted individual and small team training at regional training depots.[118] Units progressed

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[114] Long, *The Six Years War*, 480. Data based on 1933 national census. The four largest groups of foreign-born residents at the census of 1933 were Italian, 26,700; German, 16,800; Chinese, 8,500; Greek, 8,300.

[115] Australian Military Board, Aliens and the Australian Military Forces, order, May 6 1940, accessed http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/allin/images/pdf/enlistment.pdf, last modified 2016, accessed March 4, 2016; "Indigenous Australian Servicemen | Australian War Memorial," *awm.gov.au*, last modified 2016, accessed March 4, 2016, https://www.awm.gov.au/encyclopedia/aborigines/indigenous/.

[116] Ibid.

[117] War Office, *Infantry Training, Training and War, 1937* (Melbourne: Commonwealth Government, 1937), 10.

[118] 'AWM52 1/5/12 - 6 Australian Division General Staff Branch (6 Aust Div GS Branch),' War Diary (Canberra, n.d.), AWM52 1/5/12, Australian War Memorial, Appendix 1 to

through platoon, company, brigade and division training to included combined arms and opposed field exercises.[119] Training for headquarters staff included field and map board exercises focused on likely scenarios or lesson learnt from troops in combat.[120] With minor variations, to account for deployment schedules, the initial training for each of the 2nd AIF Divisions and corps units followed this model.

A significant discrepancy between the training of the 8th Division and other 2nd AIF forces was the ability to leverage the experience of professional British soldiers they respected. In the Middle East individual training was conducted in British schools, units conducted brigade, and division level opposed exercise with and against units of the British Regular Army. The men of the 2nd AIF held them in 'great admiration' and were motivated by a desire to prove themselves the equal of the British professionals and of the First AIF (1st AIF)– which many of them believed, "rightly or wrongly, had been the finest force in the world in its day."[121] In Malaya the British forces were not of the same high standard. A garrison mentality in British forces resulted in a lack of focus on training or development on doctrine for jungle warfare that the 8th Division could leverage.[122]

Localized adaptation and continuous training to incorporate lessons learnt from combat was a consistent element of the 2nd AIF training model.[123] However, it was not until 1943 that organizational structures and procedures where put in place to facilitate organizational adaptation

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6th Division War Diary, December 1941; Long, *To Benghazi*, 64.

[119] Ibid 125-126.

[120] 'AWM52 1/5/17 - 8 Australian Division General Staff Branch (8 Aust Div GS Branch),' War Diary (Canberra, n.d.), AWM52 1/5/17, Australian War Memorial, 8th Division War Diary, January 1941.

[121] Long, *To Benghazi*, 204.

[122] Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, 67, 168; Long, *The Six Years War*, 106.

[123] Long, *To Benghazi*, 304.

and ensure soldiers, and units entered combat fully prepared. Jungle training prior to the Papua campaign was informed by lesson learnt in Malaya – one sources was *Notes on Japanese Tactics in Malaya and Elsewhere and Tactics to Counter-Attack and Destroy the Enemy*, a pamphlet written by Bennet on his return to Australia. Lessons learnt resulted in replication of Japanese tactics, rather than adaptation of new tactics to defeat the Japanese.[124] Following Papua, senior leaders of the 2nd AIF, many of whom possessed a pragmatic worldview shaped by education, and experience in two world wars, used history –recent lesson from Japan's war in China and the AIF's experience in Malaya and Papua – and theory to develop new jungle doctrine.[125] In November 1942, a jungle warfare school opened at Cunungra in the Mcpherson Ranges in tropical north Australia and in March 1943 Amphibious Training Command was establish with a number of specialist schools.[126] Both Australian and United States units trained at the schools, leading to improved battlefield cooperation. The new system of training, based on new doctrine, under taken in new facilities replicating as closely as possible battlefield conditions, emphasized realism in training to achieve battlefield inoculation.[127] The introduction of new doctrine supported by realistic training played a significant part in battlefield success for the remainder of

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[124] Moremon, 78.

[125] Ibid, 79.

[126] Edward Drea, "Before Finschhafen: Preparing, Training and Equipping the Forces," in *The Foundations Of Victory: The Pacific 1943-1944 The 2003 Chief of Army's Military History Conference*, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey ed. , 1st ed. (Canberra: The Army History Unit, 2004), 7-23, accessed March 23, 2016, http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20history/AAHU/Conference%20Papers%20and%20Images/2003/2003-The_Pacific_War_1943-1944_Part_1.pdf., 18; Moremon, 81.

[127] "What Is BATTLE INOCULATION? Definition of BATTLE INOCULATION (Psychology Dictionary)", *Psychology Dictionary*, last modified 2016, accessed March 8, 2016, http://psychologydictionary.org/battle-inoculation-2/. Battle inoculation is the process of attempting to desensitize soldiers or personnel who might find themselves in a battle situation, so they are not affected by shock if, and when the time comes. Research has shown the more realistic the practice situation and time spent in situations which emulate the real environment prepare the individual by a greater degree than less accurate practice situations.

the war.

The fifth structured question is was the 2nd AIF ready for combat? The criteria used to determine if 2nd AIF forces were ready from combat was allied perception of battlefield performance and the ability to generate relative fighting power. Relative fighting power – generated by the integration of the physical, moral and intellectual components at both the individual and organizational level – was assessed at the Division and Corps level, and is an assessment of how well units performed during initial engagements against a specific enemy.[128]

2nd AIF units – 1st Corps Headquarters, 6th, 7th, and 9th Divisions – who fought against Germany and Italy in the North African and Mediterranean Campaigns and against the Vichy French in the Middle East were ready for combat. However, the 8th Division who fought its initial engagements in the Pacific against the Japanese failed to retain cohesion under pressure. In 1942, when elements of the 6th and 7th Division first fought the Japanese while they proved to be lacking in 'jungle mindedness' organizational resilience and fighting spirit resulted in battle field success.[129]

Well trained, well lead and fighting under appropriate doctrine 2nd AIF units who fought against Germany, Italy and the Vichy French forces effectively applied fighting power to achieve battlefield success or avoid military misfortune. The 6th Division achieved battlefield success against the Italians during the allied advance to Benghazi in 1941.[130] Likewise, 2nd AIF units who

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[128] LWD-1, 48. "The intellectual component provides the knowledge of war, warfare and cognitive capability – the 'what to think'. The moral component reinforces culture, values and legitimacy –the will to fight. The physical component provides Army's capabilities and functional effects – the means to fight."

[129] Peter Dean, "Anzacs and Yanks: US and Australian Operations at the Beachhead Battles," in *Australia 1942*, Peter Dean ed. , 1st ed. (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 217-239.

[130] For a detailed analysis of the 6th Divisions relative advantage over the Italians during the First Libyan Campaign see Craig Stockings, 'An abundance of riches: Training and Sustaining The Second AIF in First Libyan Campaign, North Africa, 1940-41,' in *Raise, Train and Sustain*,

fought in Syria and Lebanon –7th and 9th Divisions – against the Vichy French and those who resisted German attacks during the siege of Tobruk – elements of 7th and 9th Division –proved capable in combat. While not a success, the ill-fated allied defense of Greece proved the capability of Blamey and the staff of Headquarters 1st Corps when they commanded the allied withdrawal under pressure from overwhelming German military mass.[131] "Headquarters 1st Corps never lost control of the battle; made sound tactical decisions with limited resources and succeeded finally in bringing its troops to the beaches with limited resources and with no loss of cohesion."[132]

The allied defeat in Malaya and the subsequent fall of Singapore was a military catastrophe for the British Empire and almost for Australia – only saved by the intervention of the United States in the Pacific theater of war.[133] During the defense of Malaya, units of the 8th Division had localized tactical success, however the action of the 8th Division during the final days of the siege of Singapore demonstrate they did not have the organizational resilience – the moral component – to be considered ready for combat. The most egregious behavior attributed to the 8th Division – accounts of mass dissertation, rape, theft and use of force to secure passage on civilian evacuation ships – was due to the arrival of 2,000 untrained reinforcements two weeks

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Peter Dennis and Jeffery Grey ed. , 1st ed. (Canberra: Australian Military History Publications, 2010), 74-92. The battle of Bardia was the first major engagement of the war fought by a 2nd AIF unit. 40,000 Italians in prepared defensive positions defended the port city of Bardia. Major General Iven Mackay and his staff planned the attack on Bardia, which commenced 03 January 1941. The 6th Division supported by British tanks executed the attack.[130] At the end of three days of fighting, the 6th Division and allies had secured Bardia and had taken 40,000 Italians prisoner, at a cost of 130 killed and 326 injured for 6th Division.[130]

[131] Long, *Greece, Crete, and Syria,* 191-196; Horner, *High Command*, 68,78; . [British] War Cabinet, Policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Report by the Chiefs of the Staff Committee, February 24, 1941, in Robertson and McCarthy, 87.

[132] Sydney Rowell, in Horner, *Blamey* 199; Horner, *High Command*, 98. Evidence exists that the moral of a single battalion shattered during the withdrawal.

[133] Cohen and Gooch, 161.

prior to the surrender of Singapore. [134] However, miscommunication, poor tactics – both at the battle of Muar and defense of Singapore – complete breakdown in individual discipline and unauthorized unit movements during the final battle of Singapore are indicative of deeper issues and demonstrate individual and organizational fragility rather than resilience. [135] Realistic training and good leadership is essential in developing resilient and battle ready units. [136] The leadership of Bennet – a man considered to 'untactful' to command of the 2nd AIF – failed to build cohesion within the 8th Division and with commonwealth allies. [137] As Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, General Officer Commanding Malaya, observed, "the Australian Government must be held responsible for putting Gordon Bennett in command of their troops." [138]

During the Papua campaign, elements of the 6th and 7th Division fighting alongside Australian militia and the United States 32nd Division proved that though lacking experience in jungle warfare they had the fighting power to achieve success. Lack of knowledge of the terrain, appropriate doctrine, tactics and training resulted in tactical reversals, wasted effort and unnecessary deaths. [139] However, battlefield adaptation and innovation combined with unit resilience and fighting spirit resulted in eventual success. [140] MacArthur proved to be on the

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[134] Wigmore, *The Japanese Thrust*, 470-486; Lindsay Murdoch, 'The Day the Empire Died in Shame,' *The Sydney Morning Herald*, last modified 2012, accessed November 15, 2015, http://www.smh.com.au/national/the-day-the-empire-died-in-shame-20120214-1t462.html; Grey, 3105; Colin Smith, *Singapore Burning* (London: Viking, 2005), 470-486. Kindle; Horner, *High Command*, 173.

[135] Horner, *High Command*, 174.

[136] Michael J Asken, Loren W Christensen and Dave Grossman, *Warrior Mindset* (Millstadt, Ill.: Human Factor Research Group, 2010), i-xviii.

[137] Long, *To Benghazi*, 44; Horner, *High Command*, 168-172.

[138] Horner, *High Command*, 174.

[139] Dudley McCarthy, *South-West Pacific Area-First Year: Kokoda to Wau*, 591.

[140] Ibid, 591. While Australian resilience blunted the Japanese advance, eventual allied victory during the Papua campaign was due to Japanese strategic overreach and the naval defeat

wrong side of history when he reported in September 1942, "the Australians have proven themselves unable to match the enemy in jungle fighting. Aggressive leadership is lacking" later admitting that "Australian success in Papua had 'turned the tide' in the South West Pacific and had been the basis for all future success'."[141] As observed by Field Marshall Viscount William Slim, the Australians "at Milne Bay… inflicted on the Japanese their first undoubted defeat on land…Some of us may forget that of all the Allies it was Australian soldiers who first broke the spell of the invincibility of the Japanese Army."[142]

The sixth structured question is how was command and control exercised in the 2nd AIF? Tracking the structure of the 2nd AIF is difficult as at no time during WWII did the 2nd AIF fight as a formed corps; rarely was headquarters 1st Corps, 2nd AIF in direct command of more than one 2nd AIF division.[143] 2nd AIF forces came under operational control of allied theater commanders; however they remained under command of an Australian officer who had the ability to deny their use to the theater commander if they deemed the operation was not in the interest of Australia – to make decision on "policy regarding the employment of the Force."[144] For much of the war this authority was the only way Australia could influence allied strategy.

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at Guadalcanal forcing them into a strategic defensive.

[141] Karl James, "On Australia's Doorstep: Kokoda and Milne Bay," in *Australia 1942 In The Shadow of War*, Peter Dean ed., 1st ed. (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 213.

[142] William Joseph Slim, *Defeat Into Victory* (New York: D. McKay, 1961), 187-188.

[143] In Greece 1st Corps commanded an allied force of both British and dominion forces including the 6th Division. Likewise, Divisions rarely fought as a complete unit with brigades either committed to campaigns piecemeal – brigades from both 7th and 9th division fought through the siege of Tobruk- or detached as part of allied task forces. This trend continued in the SWPA, further complicated by the inclusion of militia units into command structures.

[144] Horner, *High Command*, 45; Commonwealth Government to [Eden], *Cablegram*, Canberra, 9 March 1940, in Robertson and MacCarthy, 75; Appendix 12, Principles Governing the Control and Administration of the AIF, order, April 19, 1941, 'AWM52 1/4/1 - 1 Australian Corps General Branch (1 Aust Corps 'G' Branch)', Official War Diary (Canberra, n.d.), AWM52 1/4/1, Australian War Memorial; Wigmore, 65.

Within 2nd AIF command and control was exercised through a hierarchal chain of command by commanders at corps, division and brigade level supported by a staff of specialist officers – both specialist staff and technical officers. Officers who had command and staff experience during WWI predominantly filled senior command and staff positions.[145] Junior command positions were filled by promotion from within the ranks or from militia officers. Junior leaders and staff officer underwent continuous training, delivered in both Australian and British schools.[146] While discipline and the chain of command were key elements of achieving command and control, the 2nd AIF used staff procedures and a leadership philosophy designed to allow disciplined initiative from subordinates – decentralized execution.

Staff planning was conducted using a decentralized – 'bottom up' – approach and command was exercised using a commitment based leadership philosophy through leading by example.[147] The 'bottom up' planning procedure was based on giving general guidance to subordinate units, allowing them to do detailed planning and then progressively coordinate up the line.[148] Doctrine stated, "In modern war, with its more powerful weapons and greater decentralization, the responsibility of the individual has been increased and he therefore requires a far higher degree of individual initiative than was formerly necessary. Commanders must do all that they can to encourage initiative and individuality, remembering always that these must be

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[145] Long, *To Benghazi*, 46-50.

[146] Ibid, 72, 127.

[147] Commitment based leadership focuses on influencing subordinates thoughts by having them understand why they are carrying out a task, with the end state being willing obedience and freedom to demonstrate disciplined initiative. Compliance, on the other hand, describes an outcome in which the subordinate will do what they are told but without passion or internal motivation.

[148] John Coates, "The War in New Guinea 1943-44: Operations and Tactics," in *Foundations of Victory; The Pacific War 1943-1944: The Chief of Army's History Conference 2003*, Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey ed. , 1st ed. (Canberra: Australian Army History Unit, 2004), 45,57; Horner, *High Command*, 296.

disciplined."[149] The 2nd AIF leadership philosophy was a product of doctrine, experience in WWI and Australia's egalitarian society and inculcated into junior leaders during training and the example set by experienced senior commanders.[150]

The seventh structured question is what problems did the 2nd AIF experience operating as part of a coalition? The 2nd AIF experienced a number of problems while operating as part of a coalition, an example being a failure to develop effective logistics during the first two years of war– the unintended consequence of reliance on British sustainment systems – which resulted in logistic and sustainment issues in the SWPA. Additionally, differences in doctrine, culture and staff practices initially created friction with United States forces – the 2nd AIF 'bottom up' planning process clashed with MacArthur's rigidly centralized 'top down' planning process.[151] However, the issue of greatest concern was Australia's loss of sovereignty and influence over allied strategy.[152]

"The success of attempts by Australian military and political leaders to influence allied strategy was shown to be dependent largely on the nation's military credibility. Military credibility is determined by performance on the battlefield. When a country's soldiers are perceived to be performing poorly, its generals and politicians are in a weak position to bargain

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[149] War Office, *Infantry Training, Training And War, 1937* (Melbourne: Commonwealth Government, 1937). 14.

[150] George Wootten, "Address by Brigadier Wooten, DSO Commander 18th Brigade 2nd AIF," 1942. "Strive at all times for the utmost efficiency in everything; be firm but tactful. Lead by personality and superior knowledge. Be always fair and consistent in your dealings with your men. Treat them as intelligent men. Take them into your confidence, where possible, and let them know not only the order, but the plan or as much of it as they may be told. Tell not only what has to be done; but, if possible, the "why". This applies more to battle; but often assists men to understand why certain things are done during training periods."

[151] Palazzo, 99-100; Coates, 56-57, Horner, *High Command*, 295-297.

[152] Grey, 3195-3205.

with their allies."[153] A product of the British tendency to look at Australia as a colony, rather than a sovereign ally, was to overlook 2nd AIF officers for command of allied formations.[154] However, following British failure Blamey was promoted to Deputy Commander in Chief Middle East Command, gaining influence over allied strategy.[155] MacArthur had more influence over Curtin than Blamey – at the time Australia's senior military commander.[156] Thus, Blamey – shaped by his experience with removal from command of British officers for battlefield failure in the Middle East – was in no position to resist MacArthur's orders to travel to Port Moresby in September 1942.[157] A decision that led to the removal of both General Sydney Rowel as corps commander and the unfair dismissal of Major General Arthur Allen perceived to be moving too slowly on the Kokoda Track.[158] During the battle for Buna the United States 32nd Division failed to perform to the standard claimed for it by its commander prior to combat, as a result Blamey gained relative influence with MacArthur.[159]

The eighth and final question is what was the consequence of equipment and sustainment shortfalls for the 2nd AIF? Lack of equipment, infrastructure and ammunition materially contributed to extending the time required to prepare 2nd AIF units for combat and to inadequate preparation for combat of 2nd AIF forces in Malaya and Papua. Government policy was for 2nd

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[153] Horner, *High Command*, 444.

[154] Blamey to Menzies, March 5, 1941, in Robertson and McCarthy, 94; Maughan, *Tobruk and El Alamein*, 614-615. Blamey was overlooked for command of the Greece Campaign and General Sir Leslie Morsehead, commander 9th Division, while a proven battlefield commander was overlooked for command of the 8th Army in 1943.

[155] Dill to Wavell, cablegram, April 19, 1941, in Robertson and McCarthy, 103.

[156] Bruce on discussion with General R.H. Dewing, notes, June 30, 1943, in Robertson and McCarthy, 335.

[157] Hetherington, *Blamey, Controversial Soldier*, 239; Horner, *High Command*, 444.

[158] Dudley McCarthy, *South-West Pacific Area-First Year: Kokoda to Wau*, 307-309.

[159] Horner, *High Command*, 444.

AIF forces to be raised, trained and equipped to a minimum scale in Australia then sent forward to complete training and equipping under British direction.[160] In 1939, Australia did not have sufficient equipment and infrastructure to simultaneously train the 2nd AIF and militia forces.[161] This resulted in delays in training while the 2nd AIF waited for training infrastructure to be built and equipment from militia units to be transferred, a process the militia was extremely reluctant to do.[162] Once deployed units were equipped and sustained as part of the British system.[163] Britain's need to rearm their own forces following the loss of equipment at Dunkirk and arm all dominion forces resulted in delays in providing training and combat scales of equipment.[164] As a result prior to the Battle of Bardia elements of 6th Division trained with wooden replicas to represent different weapons types and had only a single opportunity to live fire prior to going into combat.[165]

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[160] Cabinet Decision, Dispatch of 6th Division Overseas, November 28, 1939, in Robertson and McCarthy, 38.

[161] Policy in 1939 was to call militia forces up for a month of continuous full time service in two rounds of 40,000 personnel. As a result, there were 40,000 militia and 20,000 2nd AIF undergoing basic training simultaneously. A much smaller number than a general mobilization of 200,000 as planned would entail.

[162] Long, *To Benghazi*, 54, 62-63.

[163] Commonwealth Government to [Eden], cablegram, March 9, 1940, in Robertson and McCarthy, 75. "… the third principle that administration of supply services and such other questions as are amenable to adoption of a common system should be controlled by the Commander-in-Chief of the force in which the Australian Imperial Force is serving subject to a financial adjustment between the respective Governments concerning the cost of such administration incurred by the United Kingdom Government."

[164] The fall of France resulted in Australia committing to equip a greater portion of the 2nd AIF from equipment previously quarantined for defense of Australia and produced by Australian industry. However, lack of capability for precision mass production meant that Britain needed to furnish heavy equipment.

[165] Long, *To Benghazi*, 126, 145-146.

For 2nd AIF forces in the Middle East the provision of combat scale of equipment prior to combat allowed 'more' realistic training.[166] In Papua and Malaya, it was a different story and lack of realistic training, in part due to a lack of equipment and ammunition contributed to individual and organizational fragility and poor battlefield performance. Key lessons learnt from the unnecessary loss of life and tactical reversals of Papua and Malaya resulted in the provision of sufficient ammunition, equipment and infrastructure to conduct realistic training and achieve battlefield inoculation, a process that contributed to battlefield success for the remainder of the war.[167]

Australia's experience of raising, training, sustaining the 2nd AIF from 1939 to 1943 demonstrated that during WWII Australia was a small nation inexperienced in international relations without the means for self-reliant defense of sovereign territory or capability to pursue national policy objectives as part of a coalition. The next section provides the findings and analysis from examination of the case study to provide implications for Australian defense policy, strategy and defense planning.

Findings and Analysis

As previously discussed, strategy is concerned with the logic of the use of violence and defense planning the material logic for the mobilization of national resources to provide the military means employed by strategy in the pursuit of policy objectives. The hypothesis that in order to expand the land force to face an existential threat Australia must be capable of raising, training and sustaining a corps in combat as part of a coalition has been tested against the case

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[166] Long, *To Benghazi*, 125-126.

[167] Moremon, 81-82; 2 Australia Corps Training Directive, No 1 dated 14 April 43, in HQ 9th Division – G Branch War Diary, AWM52 1/5/20 April-May 1943 Appendix 5. "The greatest value will be gained from experiences which must closely approximate to the conditions of actual battle."

study to determine implications for expanding the land force in the future. This section presents analysis for each of the four hypothesizes in turn and the specific implications for Australian defense policy, strategy and defense planning.

The first hypothesis states Australia must be able to recruit sufficient people with the required physical and mental characteristics to raise and sustain a corps in combat. The evidence suggests that the first hypothesis is supported. The 2nd AIF remained an all-volunteer force for the duration of WWII by recruiting people with the required physical and mental attributes from the general population, existing permanent military and militia forces to raise and sustain a corps in combat. Recruitment for the 2nd AIF was primarily concerned with racial conformity, physical capability to an infantry soldier and gaining sufficient leadership potential to fill junior command positions. Societal norms underpinned the 2nd AIF's ability to recruit the right people – the perception of war and warfare in 1939 was of part-time soldiers, as militia or force enlistment for the duration of a particular conflict fought within a coalition framework under British direction.[168] Inconsistent government policy and messaging produced a war narrative that struggled to gain legitimacy resulting in a failure to recruit the initial target audience – young single men with previous military experience. Those who did enlist early where the most motivated by a sense of duty to their fellow man and to prove themselves equal to the Australian New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) legend created by their fathers in the 1st AIF.[169] They provided the core of the 2nd AIF forces who achieved battlefield success in the Middle East and SWPA; those who enlisted later, predominantly the 8th Division, proved to have less moral fortitude.

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[168] LWD-1, 36.

[169] Long, *To Benghazi*, 204.

As Clausewitz observes while the nature of war is enduring, every age will have its own 'kind of war' with its own unique character.[170] The 2016 Defence White Paper states, as "defence capabilities become more technologically complex, recruiting Australians with the right skills mix for these capabilities will be even more important."[171] A future war that poses an existential threat to Australia will have its own character and will require soldiers to have their own unique capabilities – capabilities more complex than leadership potential and physical endurance. As Brigadier Mick Ryan, former commander of the 1st Brigade, has argued, the complexity of the modern land force makes the mobilization model employed during WWII – the practice of "giving citizens a rifle, a tin hat and minimal training"– irrelevant for future expansion.[172] If, as this research suggests, war is a permanent feature of the human condition, then to expand the land force Australia will need to recruit the right people for the specific conflict to do so.[173]

The post WWII Australian national culture has evolved significantly; the national policy of multiculturalism has subsumed the doctrine of White Australia; and state paternalism by a "neo-liberal ideology emphasizing the proper role of the state is to provide opportunity for the individual."[174] However, adventurism, trust in government authority, egalitarianism, collectivism and the willingness to commit military means to defend western democratic ideals – human rights, defense of democracy and respect for international law – remains.[175] Like many western democratic nations, for the majority of society, war is a spectator sport and warfare is something

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[170] Clausewitz, 593.

[171] Defence, *2016 Defence White Paper*, 150.

[172] Mick Ryan, "After Afghanistan: A small Army and the Strategic employment of Land Power," *Security Challenges* 10, no. 3 (2014), 66.

[173] Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, 6072.

[174] Evans, *The Tyranny of Dissonance*, 59-60.

[175] Ibid, 2.

military professionals fight on their behalf.[176] As such, the future challenge is how to recruit the target audience – the people with the capabilities required for the specific conflict – from a post-heroic society, whose social norms make it unlikely they will perceive raising a volunteer force for the duration of a conflict as a legitimate strategy.[177]

The second hypothesis states Australia must have the infrastructure, personnel, equipment, and training model capable of preparing a corps to fight. The evidence suggests that the second hypothesis is supported. "Reaction time is the time it would take, given the current state of readiness to attain the capability to reduce a risk or advert an attack and is determined by three factors: the level of capability required after warning, the present level of readiness and the speed that readiness can be raised."[178] In 1939, Australia had insufficient infrastructure, trainers or equipment to train both the AIF and militia simultaneously – the course of action pursued by the Government. Lack of means contributed to a continuation of the WWI policy of deploying partially trained and equipped forces forward to leverage British equipment, experience and training facilities and to sending poorly trained reinforcement to active theaters to be 'brought up to speed – a policy that accepted a level of wastage unacceptable by today's societal norms.

A progressive and continuous training model that produced resilient forces, incorporated organizational learning, and facilitated adaptation contributed to the 2nd AIF achieving battlefield success. The 2nd AIF initially trained and fought in accordance with British doctrine – doctrine developed during the interwar period designed to avoid the stalemate of WWI. Doctrine that proved 'close enough' to right to be effective fighting in open terrain against Italian and German forces in the Middle East, however, less effective for jungle warfare in Malaya and Papua against

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[176] Colin Gray, 6177; LWD-1, 36.

[177] Strachan, 274. "…post-heroic societies, which does not see military service in as honourable or patriotic terms as did their more nationalistic predecessors…"

[178] Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 33.

Japanese forces. Resilient forces are the product of good leadership and realistic training conducted as close as possible to battlefield conditions. Prior to 1942, critical shortages of equipment and ammunition resulted in a lack of realistic training and contributed to fragility in 8th Division. Localized adaptation of tactics, training, and equipment achieved tactical success during the early years of the war. However, it was 1942 before organizational adaptation – facilitated by development of Australia's first independent doctrine, new organizational structures, training systems and facilities – assured battlefield superiority. The resultant 'jungle division' and realistic training system minimized wastage and resulted in battlefield dominance over the Japanese – Australian land forces were never again pushed back in the SWPA after September 1942.

Implicit in the concept of mobilization planning is the need for the foundation force to manage the security environment to provide time to gain the capability to advert or defeat an attack. The implication for defense planning is the future foundation force must maintain the capacity – personnel, infrastructure, equipment and ammunition stocks – to sustain forces in combat while simultaneously increasing the operational readiness of force reserves, and training newly raised forces.[179] The training model must produce resilient forces and facilitate organizational adaptation – a system that incorporates learning and anticipation to develop and inculcate new doctrine into existing and newly raised forces.

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[179] Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 33. "Operational readiness is the difference between current and full combat potential of existing military units." LWD-1, 53. "The outputs of the Army are the deployed force, the force reserve, the enabling component and the support base. The deployed force contains the Army elements that are deployed…The force reserve provides an expansion and sustainability base for the deployed force through individual reinforcement, individual replacement, force element rotation and equipment cross-levelling. The enabling component includes individual training and base logistic support elements from Army and the wider Defence organisation. It provides the support required to expand and sustain the deployed force and the combat force reserve, as well as the means to generate new capabilities."

The third hypothesis states Australia must have the personnel, organizational structures, and systems capable of providing command and control of a corps in combat. The evidence suggests that the third hypothesis is supported. The 2nd AIF used a centralized command and control structure supported by staff procedures and a leadership philosophy designed to support decentralized execution – to allow subordinates to exercise the discipline initiative consider necessary in 'modern war.'[180] Senior leadership – provided by officers drawn from the militia and permanent military forces, educated and trained in British doctrine and most with command and staff experience during WWI – was generally of a high standard. Senior leaders inculcated in junior leaders the principles of commitment based leadership, of leading by example, to allow disciplined initiative by subordinates. The policy of promoting junior leaders from the ranks, both with and without prior military service produced good results; however, the requirement for individual and on the job training resulted in extending initial training time and reduced initial combat effectiveness. This was most apparent in the SWPA where combat was decentralized – predominantly battalion or smaller size engagements.

While not the sole determining factor, command and control played a significant part in 2nd AIF battlefield success and failure. Command and control provided by Blamey and the staff of Headquarters 1st Corps prevented a rout in Greece. Bennett's leadership contributed to the 8th Division military misfortune in Malaya. Bennett, sharing the British ethnocentric view of the Japanese, failed to anticipate how the 8th Division would perform against the Japanese.[181] Additionally his abrasive nature, poor organizational communication and relationship with subordinates, contributed to producing a fragile organization unable to adapt.[182] In the brutal

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[180] War Office, *Infantry Training, Training and War,* 14.

[181] Cohen and Gooch, 336. "…effective anticipation involves not only estimating likely enemy actions but comparing them to one's own way of warfare."

[182] Ibid, 161. To self-organize in the face of the unexpected requires superior unit cohesion, decision making and communication.

attritional battles of the Papua campaign leadership at the brigade, battalion and small unit level contributed to the resilience that eventually led to battlefield success – a resilience lacking in the poorly trained and led Australian militia and United States 32nd Division. Additionally, strategic and organizational leadership provided by senior 2nd AIF commanders in 1942 facilitated organizational adaption that led to battlefield dominance for the reminder of the war.

Edgar Schein argues, "Culture is pervasive and influences all aspects of how an organization deals with its primary tasks, its various environments, and its internal operations" and that leadership is responsible for the culture an organization develops.[183] Likewise, the culture of the organization influence the type of leaders it produces. There is a significant difference between the resilience, the willingness to "get back into the fight and win it," between well-trained and well lead soldiers and poorly trained and led troops.[184]

Under the Australian Army's current training model it takes approximately eighteen months to train a platoon commander and six years to produce a competent captain. As the militia and permanent military land forces did in 1939, the future foundation force will provide a source of leaders, however due to the probability that future war will continue to be complex and require decentralized operations, competent junior and senior leaders will be required from the start of the conflict. The implication is the foundation force must have the culture and capacity to provide sufficient leaders – junior and senior – to command and control a corps and inculcate within the expanded force a culture of learning, anticipation and adaption.

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[183] Edgar H Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2010), 2. 17. "…culture begins with leaders who impose their values and assumptions on a group. If that group is successful and the assumptions come to be taken for granted, we have then a culture that will define for later generations of members what kinds of leadership are acceptable."

[184] Dean, 232.

The forth hypothesis states Australia must have a national industrial base capable of equipping and sustaining a corps in combat. The evidence suggests that the fourth hypothesis is supported. At the outbreak of WWII, Australia had a critical shortage of modern equipment, ammunition stocks and a defense industry lacking the capability for precision mass production required to support modern warfare. Throughout WWII, Australia remained reliant of allied industry and battlefield capabilities to achieve combined arms effects, supply forces in combat and provide strategic and operational mobility. Australia's lack of self-reliance and limited means contributed to her limited ability to influence allied strategy and friction with allies when respective national interest diverged.

Initially lack of equipment and munitions played a significant role in detracting from forces ability to achieve battle inoculation and build resilience through realistic training prior to combat. However, by 1942 mobilization of national instruments of power produced, from a small prewar nucleus, a munitions industry capable of supplying ammunition and equipment to support realistic training and allied operation in the SWPA. Additionally, by 1942 industry innovation and adaption provided weapons and equipment 'immensely superior' to that of the Japanese forces, giving the 2nd AIF a marked advantage in the final years of the war.[185] It was expected lack of equipment would have played a significant role in detracting from combat capability – the ability to defeat the enemy at the tactical level – in practice it did not. As Blamey observed "operations were adjusted, in accordance with the force, its equipment and armament."[186] In effect, the 2nd AIF adjusted its ways to account for reduced means in order to achieve directed ends.[187] The implication for national strategy is that Australia must maintain as part of the national industrial base a defense industry capable of innovation and expansion to provide

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[185] Blarney to Chifley, May 18, 1945, in Horner, *High Command*, Appendix 5.

[186] Ibid.

[187] Stockings, 102.

equipment and munitions to facilitate realistic training, and capabilities that facilitate organizational adaption and provide technological advantage over adversaries.

The research suggests to effectively expand the land force Australia needs to maintain a strong foundation force, with sufficient size and capacity to provide junior and senior leaders to an expanded force, and sustain forces in combat while simultaneously increasing the readiness of reserve forces and train newly raised units. Additionally, Australia must maintain a national industrial base with the capacity to provide equipment and munitions for training and equipping new units and capacity for innovation and production of capabilities that support in war adaption to achieve technological superiority over enemies.

Conclusion

This research explored a single case study from WWII in order to analyze the challenges associated with rapidly expanding the land force to defeat an existential threat as part of a coalition. Through qualitative analysis, it used structured focused comparison method to examine the raising, training, sustaining and fighting of the 2nd AIF from 1939 to 1943 to determine relationships between policy, strategy and defense planning. The primary thesis tested was that in order to expand the land force to face an existential threat Australia must be capable of raising, training and sustaining a corps in combat as part of a coalition. This research suggests that the primary thesis is supported. However, it emerged during the research that as a small ally in a coalition of big allies merely avoiding military misfortune is insufficient; to influence allied grand strategy – to pursue national policy objectives in a coalition environment – requires initial and sustained allied perception of military credibility.

Strachan argues one of the functions of strategy is "to provide a context within which shocks and surprises can be set; strategy has the capacity to allow governments to regain

control."[188] Australia's lack of national strategy prior to the outbreak of war resulted in a failure to develop coherent domestic and bipartisan war policy and a legitimate war narrative in pursuit of national interests. This resulted in failures and delays in strategic decision-making and a war narrative that struggled to resonate with the target recruiting audience – both prior to the entry of Japan into the war and once Japan was no longer perceived as an existential threat – and lack of means to achieve self-reliant defense of her sovereign territory.

The implication for national strategy is prior to the resorting to war – the military strategy – Australia must have an established national strategy with bipartisan support to form coherent war policy. Bipartisan war policy enables the formulation of a war narrative with a greater probability of resonating with the target audience and legitimates a national strategy requiring expansion of the land force. Additionally, it increases the probability policy makers will not adopt a war narrative that constrains their ability to maneuver once war starts.[189] The implicit challenge is in balancing the war narrative between creating a sense of crisis to mobilize popular and political support against a perception that the government and military has failed to provide for national defense. The concept of warning time becomes irrelevant if the government cannot make the decision to mobilize or take the actions required to start mobilization.[190]

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[188] Strachan, 281.

[189] Kubiak, 163. "…the war narrative shapes the domestic political context for in-war strategy and policy decisions, as well as how wars end. Failure to critically examine the war narrative in terms of its role in balancing reason, chance, and passion can easily result in reducing or eliminating policy makers' freedom to maneuver once war starts. Building a war narrative from unexamined national myths, which are powerful for generating political support, presents real danger as the war unfolds."

[190] Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 33. "Warning time is the time that elapses between the decision to react, and the outbreak of hostilities and is the time available to materially increase the strength of the defending side."

For defense planning, the implication is to support a war narrative and strategy requiring recruitment from the general population, the general population and political elites must perceive the foundation force as trustworthy and representational of the wider Australian community and values. "Warfare is social and cultural, as well as political and strategic behavior. As such it must reflect the characteristics of the communities that wage it."[191] National institutions are reflective of national values and national institutions influence national values.[192] It is unlikely the population and government will support a strategy, or join an organization; they do not trust and does not conform to their individual and collective values.

The perception of 2nd AIF battlefield failure contributed to the Curtin government ceding sovereignty – control of national policy and strategy – to MacArthur in 1942. When a "coalition includes a great and a minor power, the great power can afford failures and retain its dominant position. The minor power, if its forces do not perform well, suffers an immediate loss of influence."[193] The implication is if Australia wishes to retain influence over allied strategy then the foundation force and expanded force must have the capability to achieve initial and sustained battlefield success. Merely avoiding military misfortune becomes insufficient. As Clausewitz argues, defense is the strongest form of war when it has an active purpose, "A sudden powerful transition to the offense – the flashing sword of vengeance – is the greatest moment for the defense."[194]

Military credibility is based on perception of battlefield success, which is in turn dependent on generating the 'right combat power' – consisting of physical, intellectual and moral

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[191] Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, 6195

[192] Berger and Lackman, 55-62.

[193] Horner, xxii.

[194] Clausewitz, 370.

components. Adaptation of existing doctrine to achieve the right combat power quickly is the product of organizational structure and culture. The structure and culture of a rapidly expanded land force is dependent on its leadership; the values leaders develop are a product of their nation's values and the organization they are a raised within.[195] The research suggests Australia requires civilian and military leadership possessed of a 'radically undogmatic' worldview capable of engaging in the even civil-military dialogue required for good strategy formulation in a complex world – the product of training, education, real world experience and institutionalized structures and behaviors.[196] Leaders and institutional structures Australia lacked in WWII due to faith in imperial benevolence and inexperience operating as part of the global order.

The dominant motif running through the strategic assessment underlying the 2016 Defence White Paper is uncertainty – "about the resilience of the current regional order; about the magnitude, scope and timing of possible challenges to that order; and about the ease with which strategic competition might spiral more easily into conflict in coming decades."[197] The challenge then is to have a foundation force capable of learning, anticipation and adaption in an environment of uncertainty. Structurally decentralized organizations – starfish – are best able to

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[195] Edgar H Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 4th ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2010), 2. "…culture begins with leaders who impose their values and assumptions on a group. If that group is successful and the assumptions come to be taken for granted, we have then a culture that will define for later generations of members what kinds of leadership are acceptable."

[196] Strachan, 78, 83-84, 97; Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 34-35. "Experience stands in an ineluctable opposition to knowledge and to the kind of instruction that follows from general theoretical or technical knowledge … Rather, the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them. The dialectic of experience has its proper fulfillment not in definitive knowledge but in the openness to experience that is made possible by experience itself."

[197] Lyon, "The 'Come-As-You-Are' War."

take advantage of uncertainty, while rigidly hierarchal organizations – spiders – are least capable of dealing with uncertainty.[198] The organizational 'sweet spot' is a hybrid 'spider-starfish,' sufficiently decentralization for creativity – innovation at the edge of chaos– but "with sufficient structure and control for consistency."[199] Likewise, in an uncertain world resilience is not good enough, organizations need to be antifragile – "antifragility is beyond resilience or robustness. The resilient resists shocks and stays the same; the antifragile gets better."[200] The development of antifragility and a hybrid spider-starfish foundation force is an evolutionary process – of learning from mistakes, of coevolution and coadaptation requiring exposure to volatility.[201] It took the 2nd AIF three years and the experiences of WWI, conflict in the Middle East, Malaya and Papua to develop the structures and systems to take advantage of the learning and innovation at the edge of the organization and develop doctrine and training systems to consistently achieve battlefield success.

As Cohen and Gooch observe "in war there is nothing like the hard school of experience, and many lessons can only be learned on the job-even by units that have devoted much care and attention in peacetime to thinking out their particular combat problems."[202] The ability to achieve initial and enduring battlefield success is the product of a strong foundation force and the ability

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[198] Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom, *The Starfish and The Spider* (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 3-7.

[199] Ibid, 191, 206.

[200] Taleb, 3, 8.

[201] Taleb, 71; Robert M Axelrod and Michael D Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity* (New York: Free Press, 1999), 8; Neil E Harrison, Complexity in World Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 34. "Selection means that agents adapt or are eliminated; coadaptation implies dynamic recursive adaptive responses between multiple agents. Agent learning is the cognitive adjustment that increases behavioral survivability in a selective environment."

[202] Cohen and Gooch, 236.

adapt faster than the enemy – to achieve sustained relative advantage.[203] In an uncertain environment, where changes in warfare do not progress in an evolutionary manner and surprise is certain then antifragility and leaders with radically undogmatic worldviews provide the greatest probability of gaining and maintaining relative advantage over the enemy.

The implication is national strategy must allow the foundation force to be part of the system, to provide exposure to volatility.[204] Conversely, pursuing a strategy that isolates the foundation force from the operating environment and conflict will lead to fragility.[205] The 2016 Defence White Paper emphasizes 'skin in the game' – of working with regional and global allies to uphold a stable rules based global order and realize a stable and secure Indo-Pacifc region – a strategy that has the potential to develop the civilian and military leaders and antifragile forces suggested by this study. The danger of adopting a 'core force' approach to defense planning – based on isolationist inclinations and faith in strategic geography – is to insulate the foundation force from opportunities for evolution; to produce a glass-spider, a fragile foundation force unable to adapt to the unique character of a future great power conflict. Likewise, adopting a 'focused force' approach – forces designed to defeat or contain aggression associated with a specific threat, such as the rise of China – runs the risk of developing a culture of civil-military relations unable to anticipate and adjust to unexpected threats – a condition that exposes Australia to the risk of repeating Britain's failure of anticipation in the Pacific.

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[203] Everett C Dolman, *Pure Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 6. Strategy is "a plan for achieving continuing advantage."

[204] 'Part of the system' is not intended to imply a requirement to keep the land force involved in conflict, but to have a land force capable of providing the government options to respond to contingency; for disaster relief, humanitarian operations, support to United Nations operations and use of force to uphold western liberal ideals. Additionally, it implies the ongoing and continual military to military engagement in the local and wider security community to provide exposure to different doctrine, ideology, culture and operating environments.

[205] Taleb, 5.

This research has focused on the 'what' and 'why' of force expansion. However, military professionalization and evolution of Australian society has significantly altered the civil-military relationship and society's perception of military service since the end of WWII suggesting the need for additional areas of research. Professionalization of the Australian military has created a chasm between the society and politicians it serves, while the ANZAC Legend has created a myth of heroic sacrifice in the service of interventions not in the service of Australia's interests.[206] The result has been a dangerous mix of uncritical assessment of military performance by Government, a habituated casualty aversion within society and institutional hubris within the ADF, a belief that the Australian soldier 'punches above his weight.'[207] Two areas suggested for additional research is how in a post-heroic society the Government can 'plant a seed' in the national psyche to be used to legitimate a realistic strategy of expansion, countering the myth of the natural born soldier perpetuated by the ritualized war commemoration of ANZAC Day.[208] Likewise, additional research is required into how the foundation force can develop antifragility, given Government does not critically assess ADF performance, political risk aversion results in restrictive national caveats isolating conventional ground forces from risk, and institutional hubris tends to limit the motivation for evolution. As Nassim Taleb observes, antifragilty comes in layers, that "what kills me makes others stronger," a heretical view for an Australian civilian or military leader to espouse, but as history has repeatedly shown a reality of war.[209] Exposer to non-systemic risks

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[206] James Brown, *Anzac's Long Shadow: The Cost of our National Obsession* (Collingwood: Redback, 2014), 76, 580, Kindle.

[207] Ibid, 1043-1063. "An extraordinary hubris often surrounds the operations of the ADF. Much of the official reporting from the Department of Defence is laudatory and optimistic when compared to that of peer militaries…the hyperbole surrounding the contribution of Australian soldiers in Afghanistan makes soldier feel entitled to be treated almost as Roman Gladiators…an army that believes its own press… sets itself up for failure in the future."

[208] Brown, 786-821.

[209] Taleb, 65, Brown, 1098-1106.

will allow the foundation force to gain from volatility and potentially remove an element of uncertainty from defense planning, to assess the capability of the land force and close the gap between myth and reality.[210]

War is the realm of uncertainty birthed in the metaphorical womb of politics.[211] In 1938 Australia was a small power – a state 'that cannot stand by itself, but needs the protection and support of others' – reliant on Britain for her security and prosperity.[212] Australian national memory of WWII is a coming of age story, a narrative that allows "Australians to shift blame for military failure to Britain, the imperial power whose dominance had to be challenged, like the authority of a parent, if Australia were to engage in nation building."[213] Little attention is applied to the fact Australian sovereignty was given up to MacArthur in service of the United States interests rather than her own.[214] The assumption Australia, in cooperation with like-minded allies, will be able to contain emerging existential threats by engaging in 'come-as you are' conflicts may

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[210] Taleb, 10, 71-73. "… the random element in trial and error is not quite random, if it is carried out rationally, using error as a source of information. If every trial provides you with information about what does not work, you start zooming in on a solution—so every attempt becomes more valuable….For the antifragile, harm from errors should be less than the benefits. We are talking about some, not all, errors, of course; those that do not destroy a system help prevent larger calamities."

[211] Clausewitz, 89, 149; Stephen Lauer, "Discontent: Unhappy Military Outcomes in the Era of the Post-World War II Peace Settlement," (n.d.), 1.

[212] Martin, Bull and Holbraad, 298-299.

[213] Joan Beaumont, "The Pacific War, 1943 and Australian National Memory," in *The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War 1943-1944*, Peter Dennis and Jeffery Grey ed., 1st ed. (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2004), 1-7, accessed March 16, 2016, http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20history/AAHU/Conference%20Papers%20and%20Images/2003/2003-The_Pacific_War_1943-1944_Part_1.pdf.

[214] Ian Pfennigwerth, "A Novel Experience: The RAN In 1942, Defending Australian Waters", in *Australian 1942 In The Shadows Of War*, Peter Dean ed., 1st ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 182. "As MacArthur expressed it to Prime Minister Curtin, 'though the American people were animated by a warm friendship for Australia, their purpose in building up forces in the Commonwealth was not so much for the interests of Australia but for its utility as a base from which to hit Japan."

prove to be an attractive but dangerous illusion.[215] As Frühling argues there is no guarantee for policy makers the chosen defense force is capable of delivering the strategic effects they require.[216] Even the United States may resort to a strategy of mobilization to realize the capability and endurance required to fight a large-scale and bloody war.[217] Likewise there is no guarantee a threat to Australia will be considered a threat to Untied States core national interest.[218] As a middle power Australia requires the capability, or to rapidly gain the capability, for self-reliant defence of her national interests. While mobilisation planning is not the dominant paradigm in an environment of uncertainty, a failure to maintain the capability to expand the land force to face an existential threat could prove to not only be misguided but catastrophic

[215] Gray, *Another Bloody Century*, 377.

[216] Frühling, *Defence Planning and Uncertainty*, 24.

[217] Barno and Bensahel, "Preparing for the Next Big War."

[218] Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine", *The Atlantic*, last modified 2016, accessed March 18, 2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/.

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