

MARINES IN THE BOXER REBELLION AS A MODEL FOR CURRENT
MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS

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Military History

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

MARINES IN THE BOXER REBELLION AS A MODEL FOR CURRENT MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS, by Major Ralph Edward Lemaster, 96 pages.

Since 1775, the United States Marine Corps has conducted operations all over the world. From early roles of naval gunnery, guarding ships, and conducting early amphibious assaults, to its present day role as an amphibious force in readiness, many engagements have shaped the Marine Corps. In between the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, the Marine Corps' role expanded significantly. From the Spanish-American War and continuing through the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the Marine Corps continued to adapt towards its current role as America's force in readiness. Specifically, the Boxer Rebellion was the first major conflict in which the Marine Corps participated that employed large-scale forward units operating overseas to a different conflict in another country. The expeditionary mindset of the Marine Corps during the Boxer Rebellion is strikingly similar to today's global employment of Marines: forward-deployed and forward-based and operating throughout the world in 146 countries, ready to support United States interests and protect Americans abroad.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Since 1775, the United States Marine Corps has conducted operations all over the world. From early roles of naval gunnery, guarding ships, and conducting early amphibious assaults, to its present day role as an amphibious force in readiness, there have been many engagements that have shaped what the Marine Corps is today. Between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the Marine Corps' role expanded significantly. Beginning with the Spanish-American War and continuing with the Boxer Rebellion, the Marine Corps continued to adapt towards its current role as America's force in readiness.

The following research expounds on the path that the Marine Corps has taken since the Spanish-American War and Boxer Rebellion. The Marine Corps before the twentieth century will be examined; with emphasis on the Spanish-American War and other key deployments. The role of the Marine Corps' participation in the defense of the Beijing Legations and the Tianjin multinational force campaign will be analyzed. The aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion and the current construct and operations of the Marine Corps in the twenty-first century are discussed and compared.

Research Questions

In what manner is Marine Corps participation in the Boxer Rebellion a model for current Marine operations? Was the Boxer Rebellion the catalyst for permanent Marine Corps support to United States embassies? Did the Spanish-American War aid in the

decision to utilize the Marine Corps as part of the expeditionary force during the Boxer Rebellion? Did the multinational effort during the Boxer Rebellion aid the Marine Corps in understanding how to operate in future joint and multinational environments? Was there a dramatic shift in Marine Corps participation with other instruments of national power because of the Boxer Rebellion? Did the Boxer Rebellion spur change in future Marine Corps doctrine, or in the conduct of operations?

Assumptions

The hypothesis for this work is that the Marine Corps operations during the Boxer Rebellion are a model for current Marine operations. As a prelude to detailed research, additional assumptions were determined and validated or refuted throughout this work. It is assumed that the Boxer Rebellion assured the United States Department of State that the United States Marine Corps was their preferred legation defense asset. Marines' participation in the Boxer Rebellion revalidated the need for a ship-based contingent of Marines aboard United States Navy vessels, specifically serving as a landing force. The Spanish-American War allowed the Marine Corps to maintain a larger presence in the multinational force campaign in China. The forward based and stationed Marines at eastern outposts created a contingency readiness force for the evolving United States foreign policy.

Methodology

The majority of this work has been completed at Fort Leavenworth through individual research or assisted through the Combined Arms Research Library. Multiple primary sources were accessed through the Marine Corps History Division and the

National Archives in Kansas City. Military and civilians authors aiding immensely during this work, their published works provide several firsthand accounts of their experiences in China during the Boxer Rebellion. The Boxer Rebellion also has no shortage of secondary sources due to the impact the uprising had on the global landscape. Marine history also has an extensive coverage, with most of the historical series of the Marine Corps written as official documents under the History Division as part of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. Finally, during March 2016, a staff ride to Tianjin, Dagu, and Beijing, China was executed in order to visit key sites during the 1900 Boxer Rebellion.

Chapter 2 of this work covers the Marine Corps' key milestones from 1775 to 1900, including the Spanish-American War. Chapter 3 focuses on the background of the Boxers and a synopsis of the legation defenses in Beijing during the summer of 1900. Chapter 4 provides information on the first and second relief forces in China 1900. Chapter 5 covers Marine Corps activities from after the Boxer Rebellion to the present day. Chapter 6 relates the internal and external factors that have affected the Marine Corps from 1900 to the present day. Chapter 7 provides conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

FROM THE AMERICAS TO THE PACIFIC: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE CORPS

Overview

The United States Marine Corps has served as an expeditionary force¹ for the United States since Marine Captain John Trevett and his detachment of twenty-eight Marines and Sailors landed in New Providence, Bahamas in 1778, raising the American flag for the first time on foreign soil.² Years later, First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon led his Marines and mercenaries towards the shores of Tripoli.³ From serving aboard United States naval vessels to conducting large-scale amphibious and land-based operations, the Marine Corps has continued to adapt to the problem at hand. Innovative leaders and staff planners within the Marine Corps have looked towards future problems, answering the call in support of national strategy and objectives. The appeal of the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps is not lost on the United States Department of State, and a strong relationship has lasted between Marines and the State Department.

The nexus of the following chapter briefly follows the Marine Corps' expeditionary role from 1775 to 1900. A specific focus is placed upon the deployments of

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff J-7, 2011), GL-9. The terms expeditionary naval force or expeditionary force are used extensively throughout this work. Using current terminology, an expeditionary force is defined as: "An armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a foreign country."

² William D. Parker, *A Concise History of the United States Marine Corps: 1775-1969* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Division, 1970), 3.

³ Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 44-45.

Marines in support of United States efforts in the Spanish-American War and subsequent occupation of the Philippines. This chapter will stop short of events in China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but address the forward operating posture of Marine forces leading up to the Boxer uprising.

The Early Days of the Marine Corps

Established in 1775, the Continental Marine Corps was necessary to complement the Continental Navy in the fight for independence from England.⁴ The Soldiers of the Sea would conduct numerous important missions during the Revolutionary War, and into the next century. Between 1775 and 1900, the Marine Corps would conduct seventy-eight landings throughout the world, from Central and South America to Africa and Asia.⁵ Until the 1898 Spanish-American War began, the Navy and Marine Corps were the only elements of the United States military that conducted expeditionary operations outside

⁴ Continental Congress, *Resolution Establishing the Continental Marines*, Philadelphia, PA, 1775. The establishment of Marines by the Continental Congress decreed on 10 November 1775 is as follows: “Resolved, That two Battalions of marines be raised, consisting of one Colonel, two Lieutenant Colonels, two Majors, and other officers as usual in other regiments; and that they consist of an equal number of privates with other battalions; that particular care be taken, that no persons be appointed to office, or enlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required; that they be enlisted and commissioned to serve for and during the present war between Great Britain and the colonies, unless dismissed by order of Congress: that they be distinguished by the names of the first and second battalions of American Marines, and that they be considered as part of the number which the continental Army before Boston is ordered to consist of. Ordered, That a copy of the above be transmitted to the General.”

⁵ Harry A. Ellsworth, *One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States Marines: 1800-1934* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1974), II-III.

North America. The United States Army fought battles throughout the North American landscape including Mexico leading up to their 1898 deployment to the Philippines.

Defense of United States diplomatic personnel and citizens abroad became a key mission for the Marines as early as 1799. As the United States began to conduct international diplomacy abroad, the Marines would be used in many cases to aid diplomats when facing hostile local agents. The first such event in which the Marines supported the State Department was during 1799 when a Marine detachment aided the American Consul in establishing diplomatic relations in Haiti. The Marines assisted the Consul, while at the same time aiding the rebels the United States desired as the future government of Haiti.⁶

As the Marines participating in Haiti concluded operations, First Lieutenant Presley O'Bannon and his detachment of Marines became immortalized in Marine Corps lore. As early as 1801, Marines were deployed throughout the Mediterranean in reaction to tense relations with the Bashaw of Tripoli and other countries that desired to exploit the new American nation. Between 1801 and 1804, the United States Government paid large sums of money to the Bashaw of Tripoli, even as the Bashaw imprisoned Marines and Sailors.⁷ In 1805, an expedition of both naval and land forces would attack to re-install the previous leader of Tripoli and free imprisoned Americans. First Lieutenant

⁶ Leo J. Daugherty III, *The Marine Corps and the State Department: Enduring Partners in United States Foreign Policy, 1798-2007* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2009), 7.

⁷ Ellsworth, 157-158.

O'Bannon, along with a small contingent of seven Marines and one Naval officer, set out to Cairo to coordinate a desert trek towards Derna, Tripoli.⁸

In coordination with United States emissary, William Eaton, First Lieutenant O'Bannon organized a force of approximately five hundred mercenaries and those loyal to the former leader of Tripoli, Prince Hamut. The expedition conducted a six hundred mile road march, coordinating with several United States Naval ships for re-supply, and arrived at Derna. Despite harsh conditions, the Marines held the force together, subsequently routing the Tripolitans after several hours of combat, with assistance from naval surface fires. The United States flag was raised over Derna temporarily and Hamut was re-installed as the leader of Tripoli. Because of the victory at Derna, the State Department gained the release of the imprisoned Americans with payment of a ransom. First Lieutenant O'Bannon received the Mameluke sword as a gift from Hamut, the same style sword Marine officers carry to this day.⁹

While the Barbary Wars would ultimately continue until 1817, the Marines focused in many directions despite an end strength of only a little over one thousand personnel. The War of 1812 consumed most of the Marine Corps' efforts from 1812 to 1815, as Marines were required to guard shipyards and perform flotilla duties in support of the naval force. The Marines used what forces they could to become involved in the land campaign, most notably in the battles at Bladensburg and New Orleans. The Marines' expert marksmanship and bravery in battles at sea against the British Royal

⁸ Ellsworth, 157-159.

⁹ Ibid. William Eaton was a former Army officer and Consul General in Tunisia prior to participating in the Tripoli campaign.

Navy were key in United States Navy continued usage of Marines afloat. The War of 1812 showed that Marines were crucial to the naval establishment afloat and ashore, and could perform just as well during engagements ashore as part of the larger land force.¹⁰

Because of the War of 1812, the United States was able to expand its global maritime reach. Having successfully fought two wars with one of the great powers of the time, the United States was in 1815 ready to expand relations across the globe. The Navy grew over the next decade with more capable ships, and expeditions into the Caribbean and throughout Asia began. During the early and mid-1800s, Marines continued to fight to be part of the ship's crew, best championed by the "Grand Old Man of the Marine Corps," Commandant Archibald Henderson. In the 1820s, the Marines fought off pirates and defended Americans in the Caribbean as part of the United States Navy's West India Squadron, conducting landings in Puerto Rico, Peru, the Falkland Islands, and Argentina. In many cases, no violent actions occurred, however the Marine presence allowed the consular activities in these countries to continue relatively unimpeded.¹¹

The Marine Corps was primarily focused on conducting operations in and around Mexico in the 1840s in coordination with and under the command of the United States Army. Operations in Tabasco, Vera Cruz, and California as part of the Pacific Squadron defined this time-period for the Marines. Naval leaders were hesitant to release Marines to support the Army, as the value of Marine presence aboard ship and around the littorals

¹⁰ Millett, 48-51. The Marines augmented larger Army commands throughout the east coast and in Florida and New Orleans.

¹¹ Millett, 56-59; Ellsworth, 9, 76, 137-138. Most of the Navy and Marine Corps interventions during this time were small landing parties conducting general security of American interests, or in the case of the Falklands in 1832, a non-combatant evacuation of American citizens under threat from the local governor.

was evident in each engagement. The war with Mexico expanded the Marine Corps' operational resume and kept the force relevant on the international stage and in support of national strategic objectives.¹²

As the United States continued maritime commerce ventures and expanded diplomatic relations, a great emphasis was placed on influence in Asia. By the mid-1800s, the United States had already ventured into China, with regular visits to Shanghai. However, Japan was isolated, despite multiple attempts to open it to foreign trade and relations. In 1854, Commodore Matthew Perry landed at Yokohama with a detachment of five hundred Marines and Sailors, and began consultation with Japanese leadership. A Marine private had died aboard ship, and the Japanese reluctantly allowed him to be buried in Yokohama, an unlikely icebreaker for relations. At the end of the meetings in 1854, the United States had its first ever commerce treaty with Japan. In 1860, the Marines served as escorts from Japan to the United States, in support of the first Japanese Ambassador to a foreign country.¹³

While the United States began relations with Japan in 1854, China required a landing of Marines in 1854 to assist in protecting Americans ashore at both the consulate in Shanghai and other locations. In 1855, because of pirates disrupting commercial maritime operations in the waters off of Hong Kong, Marines were once again brought in to fight the pirates and enable maritime commerce. One year later, Marines and Sailors

¹² Millett, 72-81. The most memorable battle for the Marines during the Mexican-American War was at Chapultepec, the castle guarding the entrance to Mexico City. A force of over 300 Marines fought under U.S. Army Brigadier General John A. Quitman's Volunteer Division during the siege of Chapultepec and into Mexico City.

¹³ Ellsworth, 100-102.

would come to the aid of the American Consulate at Canton, where tensions had mounted between the British and Chinese. The events in China during the 1856 Second Opium War culminated with the United States Marines and Sailors, in reaction to an unarmed United States ship being fired upon, conducting assaults on several Chinese forts. Once tensions had simmered, the American forces returned to the ships.¹⁴

At the same time halfway across the globe, Marines were responding to a crisis in Uruguay. The American Consul in Uruguay, along with the consuls from other foreign countries, determined that the revolution was reaching a culminating point. The various consuls tasked their respective military forces to execute a combined landing and protect foreign interests and property. After the Uruguayan Government had regained control over the revolutionary forces, the Marines withdrew from support of the consulates and foreign delegations, and returned to ship. Additional landings in support of the American Consulate in Uruguay took place in 1858 and 1868.¹⁵

The death of Commandant Archibald Henderson in 1859 changed the direction of the Marine Corps. Commandant Henderson commanded the Marines for nearly forty years and helped mold the reputation of the Marine Corps as an expeditionary force for the nation. However, Commandant Henderson was not a visionary; he was more focused on maintaining status quo. Despite successfully operating under United States Army Colonel Robert E. Lee at Harper's Ferry in 1859 against abolitionists,¹⁶ the Marine Corps

¹⁴ Ellsworth, 25-27. Although the United States did not ally with any other foreign powers during the Second Opium War, it did attack several Chinese forts, before and after signing a treaty to stay out of the conflict.

¹⁵ Ibid., 160-162.

¹⁶ Millett, 89.

was unable to capitalize on their actions in preparations for the coming conflict. When the Civil War broke out, the Marine Corps lost many personnel to the Confederacy and did not maintain a large enough force to conduct major offensives beyond battalion strength. The Marines served key tasks such as ships guards and as naval gun crews in most of the major naval battles of the war.¹⁷

After the Civil War, the Marine Corps returned to Asia in support of national interests in the region. Multiple landings in Japan, China, Formosa, and Korea highlighted the 1860s and 1870s. In 1868, Marines protected American diplomatic and economic interests in the Japanese cities of Osaka, Hyogo, and Nagasaki. On several occasions, the American Consul called for support, and each time the American Marines and Sailors answered the call, quelling each uprising and protecting Americans. The use of American forces was caused primarily by the anti-foreign sentiment of Japanese locals. Similar events took place in China and Korea during this timeframe and over the next several decades, causing American diplomats to request Marine and Naval assistance.¹⁸

In the years leading up to the Spanish-American War, the Marines conducted landings (and in some cases multiple landings) in support of American interests in the Hawaiian Islands, Egypt, Colombia, Haiti, Samoa, Argentina, Chile, Nicaragua, Colombia, and Trinidad. Most instances centered on insurgent forces unwilling to accept

¹⁷ Millett, 90-100. The Marines manned the naval guns that sunk the CSS *Alabama* and CSS *Virginia* in 1864.

¹⁸ Ellsworth, 28-29, 57-59, 83-84, 103-104. The Marines in Japan in the late 19th century served as a reactionary force during anti-foreigner uprisings, engagements with Japanese shore batteries, and during the Japanese Civil War. The United States had invested in Japan, and desired to maintain economic and political ties.

a foreign presence. The Marines would land; guard the American envoys, citizens, and property, then return to ship. In some cases, Marines would remain for weeks or months in support of an American Consul.¹⁹

Marines in the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection

The Marine Corps in the latter portion of the nineteenth century looked for a more expansive mission than they had during the Civil War. Despite participation in notable battles such as Manassas and Mobile Bay, the Marines began searching for a more predominant place in the military. Although small Marine detachments were dispatched around the world to protect interests in support of the American Consulates, in addition to the responsibilities on ship and in Navy yard duties, the Marines would soon find themselves participating in larger roles than ever.

For the Marine Corps, the Spanish-American War began with a Marine battalion conducting combat operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, against Spanish forces. Although the battle was not as significant as the major United States Army battles in the war, the Marines were the “first to fight” and were lauded for bravery by journalists. The United States flag that flies over Marine Barracks Guantanamo Bay to this day is at the 1898 site of the Marine battalion command post.²⁰ As events in Cuba unfolded, American Naval and Marine fleet forces in Hong Kong received orders to prevent the Spanish fleet

¹⁹ Ellsworth, 16-17.

²⁰ Jack Shulimson, Wanda J. Renfrow, David E. Kelly, and Evelyn A. Englander, *Marines in the Spanish-American War, 1895-1899: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1998), 147.

in Asia from departing and to “conduct offensive operations” in the Philippines.²¹ The American Consul from Manila and Navy ships from Hawaii arrived in Hong Kong to coordinate actions. The Naval force then sailed towards the Philippines to execute the president’s orders, with valuable intelligence from the consul.²²

As the American fleet surrounded Manila and subsequently Cavite, there were sporadic battles that took place before the Spanish fleet was destroyed. A Marine detachment was ordered to land at Cavite Arsenal, planting the first ever United States flag on Spanish territory.²³ By August 1898, following the larger United States Army led land campaign in the Philippines, Spain would ultimately end the war with the United States with the Treaty of Paris. The United States would ultimately annex Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico.²⁴

The war with Spain produced several of the most notable leaders in Marine Corps history. Future commandants George F. Elliott, John A. Lejeune, and Wendell C. Neville successfully commanded forces during the war. Additionally, First Lieutenant John T. Myers fought on Guam during the war and served in Subic Bay, Philippines after the war. First Lieutenant Myers would then go on to lead the Marine Legation defense during the Boxer Rebellion.²⁵

²¹ Bernard C. Nalty, *The United States Marines in the War with Spain* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Historical Branch, 1967), 4.

²² Shulimson et al., 8-9.

²³ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 152.

²⁵ Shulimson et al, 144-146.

The United States maintained a large presence in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War. A Philippino insurrection followed, and the American forces were thrust into an insurgent fight for the next several years. By the end of 1899, the Marine contingent grew to a regimental-sized force in the Philippines to counter the insurgency. By the end of 1900, a brigade-sized element was established and the Marines took on the role of governing areas from Cavite to Subic to Olongopo, as delegated to them by the Navy. Primarily, the Marines guarded key installations, prisons, and local villages. Previously, the Marine Corps had never been larger than two battalions, but now had a brigade overseas. The forward based unit now protected and governed American territory outside the continental United States. However, other events in the Asia-Pacific region caused the Marines to deploy forces to aid in quelling the unrest in China.²⁶

²⁶ Parker, 33-34.

CHAPTER 3

MARINE CORPS DEFENSE OF THE BEIJING LEGATION

Status of the Legation Prior to the Uprising

As previously mentioned, the Marine Corps' first involvement in China did not begin in 1900. The detachment sent in 1900 was the tenth such detachment since 1854.²⁷ The American Consul to China frequently communicated with Department of State officials at the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries about the tense security environment and the state of relations with China. Secretary of State John Hay authored his open door note in 1899, paving the way for United States interests in China in conjunction with the other nations already conducting international business and political affairs there. The Department of State wanted to maintain an "open door policy." Any deviations from the Department of State guidance, which became national policy, could require American military intervention.²⁸

²⁷ Ellsworth, II-III.

²⁸ Trevor K. Plante, "U.S. Marines in the Boxer Rebellion," *Prologue* 31, no. 4 (1999): 284. Secretary of State John Hay referred to an "open door policy" in correspondence in 1899, as a result of U.S. interests in China and the intention to maintain those interests; Correspondence from U.S. Secretary of State John Hay to foreign offices in China, "Open Door Note of 6 September 1899" (Washington, DC: Department of State). The origin of foreign policy in China, as established in part by Secretary of State John Hay, outlined arrangements and understandings between the foreign powers and with China. An excerpt from the document specifies some of the provisions, "Earnestly desirous to remove any cause of irritation and to insure at the same time to the commerce of all nations in China the undoubted benefits which should accrue from a formal recognition by the various powers claiming 'spheres of interest' that they shall enjoy perfect equality of treatment for their commerce and navigation within such 'spheres,' the Government of the United States would be pleased to see His German Majesty's Government give formal assurances, and lend its cooperation in securing like assurances from the other interested powers, that each, within its respective sphere of whatever influence—First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested

As the United States desired open relations, several treaties established during the latter portion of the nineteenth century between China and other nations provoked hostilities and stirred discontent with the Chinese people. The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki that concluded the Sino-Japan War angered the Chinese people over the concessions to Japan because of losing the war.²⁹ A treaty established between China and the Russians in 1896 for an eighty-year railroad agreement angered primarily the British and Japanese, but also threatened the balance of powers in Europe.³⁰

Because of civil unrest, the Chinese Emperor, Guangxu, moved China towards reforms aimed at modernizing the Chinese Government and removing some of the ancient systems still in place.³¹ Attempts at reform in 1898 by Emperor Guangxu were not received well with China's elite and would ultimately lead towards his exile and imprisonment at the hands of his aunt, the Empress Dowager, Cixi.³² Empress Dowager had ruled China in the stead of the emperor for many years and maintained a great deal of

interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory it may have in China. Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as are within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they be 'free ports'), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government. Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its 'sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances."

²⁹ Frederick Wakeman, Jr., *The Fall of Imperial China* (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 199.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 206-207.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 212-214.

³² *Ibid.*, 215.

power. However, Cixi had to balance all factions of Chinese society in order to maintain domestic stability and prevent the Qing Dynasty from losing power.

A secret organization known as “Yi-he quan,” or “Righteous Fists of Harmony,” would be one of the most difficult factions of Chinese society for Cixi to control.

Referred to by Westerners as “Boxers,” the anti-foreigner organization began to wreak havoc around eastern China in the hopes of both maintaining the dynasty and removing the foreigners.³³ The Boxers were a loosely organized group with no single leader.

Although the Chinese Imperial Army would usually crush such an organization, some of the elites in China realized the potential to turn the Boxers into an informal state militia to battle foreign intervention. Cixi, using the Boxer’s rhetoric as an example of the will of the people, allowed the Boxers to move into Beijing in June of 1900. The foreign powers desired the re-installation of Emperor Guangxu, and ensuring foreign economic interests in China would remain prosperous. Cixi would not allow her nephew to return to power, and thus forced China into a war with every foreign nation operating in China.³⁴

A Chinese declaration of war on all the foreign governments operating in China caused the semi-conscription of the Boxers into the Chinese Army on 18 June 1900. Some of the Boxers had limited rudimentary training, but lacked the discipline needed to operate as a competent military force. Chinese Army control of the untrained and

³³ David J. Silbey, *The Boxer Rebellion and the Great Game in China* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 34-36. The slogan of the Boxers was “Protect the Ch’ing Dynasty. Exterminate the foreigners.”

³⁴ Wakeman, 218-221.

fractioned Boxers was nearly impossible.³⁵ The lack of training and organization of the Boxers allowed the foreigners to have a chance at survival. The Boxers soon began looting homes of the foreign elite and causing strife in the foreign community, an escalation from standard practices of persecuting Chinese Christians.³⁶ Those foreigners under the most immediate threats were the missionaries and the residents of the legation in Beijing. Approximately five hundred foreign civilians and several thousand Chinese Christians lived in Beijing, many of them with the eleven legations. Half of the five hundred foreigners were missionaries.³⁷ The legation detachments would have to work together to survive until further reinforcements could arrive by sea, and deployment from the coast, through Tianjin to Beijing.

Marines Deployed in Support of the Legation

Since the United States Department of State was established in 1789, the Marine Corps has maintained a close relationship.³⁸ The Marines' flexibility to conduct many

³⁵ Peter Fleming, *The Siege at Peking* (New York: Dorset Press, 1959), 48-49. Jung Lu, the Peking Commander-in Chief corresponded in early July 1900 to a Chinese elite with regards to the Boxers, "One might profitably use them to inspire, by their fanaticism, the martial ardour of our regular troops. As a fighting force they are quite useless, but their claims to supernatural arts and magic might possibly be valuable for the purpose of disheartening the enemy."

³⁶ Oliver P. Smith, "We Will Do Our Best," *Proceedings* 54, no. 11 (1928): 310.

³⁷ Fleming, 15-17. The eleven legations consisted of Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, and the United States of America. Much of the human intelligence on the Boxers came by way of the foreign missionaries. Unfortunately, the missionaries, most of which had spent many years in China amongst the locals, were constantly inaccurate in their assessments of the Chinese intent and actions while the missionaries were under siege with the legation.

³⁸ Daugherty, 7.

types of operations and global reach aboard naval vessels allowed a natural relationship to develop with United States Foreign Service personnel. Several deployments of Marines added to the security of the United States Legation in Beijing over the span of the last decade of the nineteenth century, with the last reinforcing detachment departing in 1899.³⁹ The following year in the spring of 1900, the United States Consul to China, Edwin H. Conger, along with his fellow foreign legation counterparts, came to the realization that military force would be required to maintain their survival in China.⁴⁰

Previous dispatches of Marines in support of the American Legation came from the United States Asiatic Fleet and this would be the case during the Boxer uprising. In response to the siege of the legations in Beijing, an international force was assembled near the port city of Dagu, made up of the eight countries with legations and interests in China.

A detachment of forty-eight United States Marines and six United States Navy Sailors joined the international force at Dagu. The American Marines and Sailors were approved by the Chinese Government to transit from Dagu to Beijing.⁴¹ The forty-eight Marines and six Sailors came from the USS *Newark* and USS *Oregon*, and were led by Captains Newton K. Hall and John T. Myers, with Myers in overall command of the United States detachment.⁴² The USS *Newark* had departed the Philippines with double

³⁹ Daugherty, 39.

⁴⁰ Fleming, 71.

⁴¹ Daugherty, 41, 43.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 41.

the usual amount of Marines.⁴³ Following a brief stop at the United States Consulate at Tianjin, the Marine detachment boarded rail for Beijing. On this journey, the Marines were joined by small detachments from six other nations, all with the intent to protect their respective legations.⁴⁴

The Marines arrived at Beijing on 31 May 1900, following a transit via rail from Tianjin. They quickly made their way inside the legation compound and began to confer with Consul Conger. Plans were established for both the protection of the legation and protection of the American mission. Tensions were very high in the city, with violence spreading daily. The legation detachment would have to hold off any Chinese aggressions until the larger relief force from Dagu could be assembled and maneuver from the port city to Beijing.⁴⁵

Legation Defense

The Marines that came to assist the legation were veterans of the Spanish-American War and ships' detachments. The two ships' detachments both came from duty in the Philippines. Captain Hall's Marines served in northern Luzon and Captain Myers' Marines were the first Americans to occupy Olongapo. Many had also served in the

⁴³ Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991), 127.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 42. Initially, the Chinese did not authorize the Marines to ride the rails from Tienstin to Peking, although they were ultimately able to transit before the rails were destroyed by the Boxers. Unfortunately, the Marines left their equipment consisting of food, extra ammunition and machine guns, and other supplies behind believing it would follow. The equipment never arrived.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

Caribbean and on other global deployments. While the ships were staged in Nagasaki, Japan, prior to arrival at Dagu, the Marines received very little time to ready for deployment to China.⁴⁶

Arriving in Beijing with only personal weapons, a Colt gun, and twenty-seven thousand rounds of ammunition, the American detachment had to make do with what it had. The rest of the Americans' equipment was scheduled to arrive by train, but the Boxer destruction of the rails prevented this. Linking up with the other nation's detachments of sailors and marines would soon occur, and the overall force in Beijing would become twenty-one officers and 429 enlisted personnel.⁴⁷ The only artillery would come from the Italians, a one-pound gun with limited ammunition. The Russians had brought a large amount of three-inch gun ammunition, but had forgotten the gun itself. United States Navy personnel assigned to the Marines created a gun out of a bronze cannon to use the Russian ammunition. This gun was known as the "International Gun"

⁴⁶ Smith, 310. The order to sail came so rapidly that the USS *Newark's* captain almost missed the deployment and was required to cross-deck from the *Oregon* while both ships proceeded towards Dagu.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 311. The Colt Gun was an automatic wheeled weapon and key towards the survival of the legation. Despite the Chinese onslaught during the 55-day siege, the Marines only used 20,000 out of their 27,000 rounds. The large amount of saved rounds was primarily due to the Marines' high marksmanship standards and the fact that the other legation countries weapons were not compatible with American ammunition; Peter Harrington, *Peking 1900: The Boxer Rebellion* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2001), 58-59. Numbers for the detachments vary based on different sources by one or two personnel, but generally there were 82 British and 81 Russians defending the legations, along with the 51 Germans, 45 French, 35 Austrians, 29 Italians, 25 Japanese, and the 54 American defenders.

and caused the Chinese to be more cautious in believing that there was significant artillery in the legation compounds.⁴⁸

On 7 June 1900, all commanders met at the British Compound to formulate the strategy for the defense of the legations. The legations would be held as long as possible while awaiting reinforcements from Dagu. The Tartar Wall would need to be held, as it influenced all legations and was the sole means of communication outside the legations through the wall's water gate.⁴⁹ Additionally, streets outside the legation would be barricaded and each legation would need to maintain communications. Due to its large size, all non-combatants were sent to the British Compound quarters.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ John T. Myers, "Military Operations and the Defenses of the Siege of Peking," *Proceedings* 28, no. 3 (1902): 109-110. U.S. Navy Gunner's Mate Mitchell and American Legation Secretary Squires were responsible for the "International Gun" to be fashioned from the old bronze cannon. The gun was tested on a wall of a legation home, and went through several interior walls. While the power of the gun was crucial, the psychological effect it had on the attacking Chinese was key. Chinese forces did not believe the foreign legation to have artillery, and were likely also cautious and curious as to what other capabilities the legation detachments maintained that the Chinese were unaware of.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 105. The legation compounds, a series of buildings recently reinforced by the local legations had several major choke points, but the legations saw the Tartar Wall as being the most vital. Captain Myers explained, "A rectangular compound bounded on the north and east by Chinese shops and houses, on the west by Legation street and on the south by Imbek's stores, low, rambling buildings." "The general plan was to hold all the legations as long as possible, to hold the Tartar wall in the rear of the United States and German Legations, to send all non-combatants into the English Legation, as it was the largest with the most commodious quarters; to stock this legation with all available food and live stock; to barricade all streets and to keep open the communications between the various legations. The reason for holding this Tartar Wall was obvious; first, because it directly controlled all the legations, and second, because the water gate through it gave us means of communicating with the outer world. It was through this gate that the British Indian troops entered to the relief."

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 105-107.

From 9 June 1900, a detachment of Marines was sent to defend the Methodist mission, however on 20 June, Marines brought all civilians into the British Compound as planned. Amidst fires throughout the city and massive looting by Boxers, small parties were sent out to rescue as many Chinese Christians as possible from almost certain death. The Boxers were angered even more by the foreign intervention, and began to attack the foreigners. In support of the Boxers, Cixi declared war on 18 June, and China gave ultimatums for all foreigners to leave. The final act prior to the all-out Chinese assault on the legations was the assassination of the German Minister, Baron Von Kettler on 20 June.⁵¹

Starting on 20 June and over the next fifty-five days, the legation forces defended against numerous assaults from Boxer and Chinese Army forces. By this point, direct communications with the forces at Dagu were impossible. The legations continued to hold off Chinese forces while waiting for reinforcement. Eleven different nations came together to choose Sir Claude McDonald as the senior military representative. McDonald, serving in Beijing as the British Ambassador, was previously a major in the British Highland Regiment.⁵²

A lack of provisions during the long siege, in addition to piles of bodies outside the legation walls made the situation almost unbearable. However, the skilled leadership of McDonald, key leaders of other legation forces, Captain Myers, Captain Hall, and the non-commissioned officers led to the successful defense. Individual acts of heroism

⁵¹ Myers, 107. Although China declared war, the United States never recognized that a state of war existed, but as an intervention towards ensuring the safety of American citizens and security of American interests.

⁵² Smith, 312.

happened on a daily basis and helped boost the morale of those trapped in the British Compound. The first reinforcements of the international force formed at Dagu arrived on 14 August, in the form of Sikhs of the British Indian Army. Soon after, the remaining forces that had fought their way through Tianjin to Beijing relieved the legation.⁵³

Captain Myers, the officer in charge of the United States Legation detachment viewed the defense of the legation as a matter of “sitting tight behind a barricade, constant vigilance night and day, and firing promptly at such of the Chinese as had the temerity to expose themselves.”⁵⁴ Captain Myers believed the Chinese attacks were lacking for two key reasons. First, the Chinese officers did not lead their men. Secondly, the Chinese believed that the foreigners had some kind of spirit watching over them, causing the Chinese to be hesitant in their advances.⁵⁵ Marine Private Oscar Upham, a member of the legation defense, noted that the Chinese were in awe of the marksmanship skills of the Marines.⁵⁶

The Marines defending the legation played a key role in defending United States interests in China. Despite the fifty-five-day siege, only eight Marines were killed and

⁵³ Smith, 315.

⁵⁴ Myers, 107.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Frederic A. Sharf and Peter Harrington, *China, 1900: The Eyewitnesses Speak* (London: Greenhill Books, 2000), 76. In his journal entry of 31 July 1900, Private Upham notes: “A large number of Chinese troops came in through the Chien Men this afternoon. There seems to be something in the wind: we are keeping a sharp lookout. They keep up their sniping all day but we have taught them to respect us (during the truce a Chinese Colonel in command on the wall was holding conversations with our officers; he eagerly asked who those men were that wore the big hats? On being told that they were American Marines, he shook his head and said, ‘I don’t understand them at all; they don’t shoot very often, but when they do I lose a man; my men are afraid of them.’)”

eleven wounded. Consul Conger and the relieved missionaries wrote of the bravery of the Legation Marines throughout the defense.⁵⁷ Thirty-three enlisted Marines received the Medal of Honor and the officers received brevet rank. Most of the Marines would continue on in the Marine Corps, such as Private Dan Daly, a two-time Medal of Honor recipient, and Captain Myers, who retired as a major general. Both would use their experiences in China to lead the next generation of Marines in expeditionary operations across the world.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Edwin H. Conger, "Message 395," Cable from Consul Conger to John Hay, Secretary of State (Pekin: Legation of the United States of America, Peking, China, 17 August 1900). Consul Conger wrote, "I cannot close this dispatch without gratefully mentioning the splendid service performed by the United States Marines who arrived here on May 31st under the command of Captain Myers, with slight exceptions their conduct won the admiration and gratitude of all and I beg you to kindly communicate this fact to the Navy Department. I enclose copy of resolutions passed by the American missionaries expressing their high appreciation of the loyalty, fidelity and heroic courage of these men." It is interesting to note that in the American missionaries letters attached as part of this message, it was written that their "salvation" was due to the Marines actions at the Legations.

⁵⁸ Daugherty, 46.

CHAPTER 4

CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE MARINES

Deployment of Forces from the Philippines

The American War with Spain at the end of the nineteenth century led to a continued American military presence in the Philippines. Leading up to the Boxer Rebellion, forces in the Philippines were involved in a counterinsurgency fight lasting four years.⁵⁹ The United States Marine Corps, Navy, and Army maintained a significant footprint in the Philippines from 1898 to World War II. The forward basing of forces in the Philippines, including a regiment of Marines, proved to be crucial to the defense of United States interests in China in 1900. The immediate ability of Marines to deploy to Dagu was especially important in the initial response in China.

The arrival of two ship detachments of Marines under Captain John T. Myers began the defense of American citizens and interests in Beijing in 1900.⁶⁰ Arriving aboard the USS *Oregon* and USS *Newark*, the Marine detachment quickly deployed to their final destination at the legations in Beijing. Over the next two months, the small detachment helped defend the legations from attacks by Chinese Imperial Army and Boxer forces. Despite this valiant effort, a larger force was needed to relieve the isolated multinational force in Beijing.

⁵⁹ Millett, 151.

⁶⁰ John Hay, "Message of 6 June 1900," Cable from Secretary of State John Hay to Consul Edwin H. Conger (Washington, DC: State Department, 6 June 1900). Secretary Hay wrote to Consul Conger that, "In concert with naval authorities you are authorized to take all measures which may be practicable and discreet for protection of Legation and American interests generally."

Just as the Marines arrived from the Philippines via Nagasaki forward-based units as part of ship detachments, a follow-on relief force of Marines prepared to follow. The Philippines deployment was the first time in Marine Corps history that a true regimental-sized unit was formed, and positioned overseas. However, Rear Admiral George Remy, commander of the Asiatic Station in the Philippines, was hesitant to commit large-scale maritime forces in China. For Rear Admiral Remy, the priority was control of the Philippines. However, Rear Admiral Louis Kempff, Remy's deputy, was in control of maritime operations in northern Asia. Aboard the USS *Newark*, Rear Admiral Kempff maintained communications with Consul Conger, and sailed his ships from Japan to China on 27 May 1900.⁶¹

The First Relief Force

Consul Conger became significantly concerned about the situation in China in the months leading up to the Boxer Rebellion. His concerns were valid, as American interests in China had reached an all-time high, with an increase in trade of 57 percent between 1898 and 1899 to a total of over thirty-two million dollars.⁶² Cables to the State Department were occasionally delayed leading up to and during the conflict in 1900. As

⁶¹ William R. Braisted, *The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 80-82.

⁶² Edwin H. Conger, "Message 352," Cable from Consul Conger to John Hay, Secretary of State (Pekin: Legation of the United States of America, Peking, China, 5 April 1900).

early as March 1900, Consul Conger believed that there was a requirement for naval demonstrations and potentially Marine guard forces.⁶³

Every legation detachment in China was preparing for the defense of their people and interests because of the Boxer problem. As the legations became besieged, the international force assembling realized that working together would provide a more potent response. Initially, British Vice Admiral Edward Seymour commanded the international force as the fleets remained anchored off Dagou. Vice Admiral Seymour was the senior officer present, and insistent that he command the effort to relieve the legations. The Imperial Chinese Government did not approve the transit of the initial relief force, in contrast to the legation forces that had departed previously, and caused significant issues up front for Seymour's forces.⁶⁴

On 10 June 1900, Vice Admiral Seymour's column comprising of over two thousand personnel departed Dagou towards Tianjin. Vice Admiral Seymour had no orders from his leadership in London to conduct operations, although he was backed by American Navy Captain Bowman McCalla. Out of the twenty-one hundred multinational personnel, 112 were American Sailors and Marines. The Americans fell under Captain

⁶³ Edwin H. Conger, "Message 391," Cable from Consul Conger to John Hay, Secretary of State (Pekin: Legation of the United States of America, Peking, China, 10 March 1900). Consul Conger wrote in part that, "a naval demonstration made by two or three ships of each Government, in the Bay of Chili would make them comply quickly. But in case this should fail, if, as a last resort, a marine guard was landed by each power, to be brought to Peking, on the plea of protecting the foreign Legations, there would be little doubt of ready compliance, because nothing could chagrin or grieve them more than for the word to go forth that they could not preserve order or protect at their Imperial capital, and they would do almost anything rather than have this happen again."

⁶⁴ Diana Preston, *The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story of China's War on Foreigners that Shook the World in the Summer of 1900* (New York: Berkley Books, 2000), 89-91.

McCalla, Captain of the USS *Newark*, now serving as the overall relief force deputy to Admiral Seymour. The British were nearly half the size of the first relief force, with additional participants from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Russia.⁶⁵

Three days into the advance to Beijing, Boxers attacked Admiral Seymour's force. The initial relief force made it within twenty-five miles of Beijing before it could go further. Attacks from Boxers and Chinese Imperial Army soldiers were too much for the relatively small international force. Telegraph cables were cut and Admiral Seymour's lines of communication between Tianjin and Dagu were now blocked. Additionally, the rail in between Tianjin and Beijing was severed by the Chinese.⁶⁶ Beginning on 18 June, the international force started to retreat to Tianjin to avoid annihilation. Unable to make it all the way to Tianjin, Seymour's force found relief in a

⁶⁵ Preston, 90-91. Captain McCalla escorted the Marines dispatched to Beijing in May and was familiar with the route; Henry I. Shaw, Jr. *The United States Marines in North China 1945-1949* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1968), 34-35; Harrington, 29. As in the numbers for the legation defense and second relief force, there are discrepancies between different sources on specific numbers of the foreign fighters. The British maintained 921 of the approximately 2,100 total personnel. The French totaled 158 personnel, 450 Germans, 54 Japanese, 305 Russians, 112 Americans, 40 Italians, and 25 Austrians.

⁶⁶ Sharf and Harrington, 76. Japanese Navy Commander Gitaro Mori, a senior member of the initial relief force wrote on 18 June 1900: "At noon on the 18th, the commanding officer, who was in No. 1 train, sent word that the injury done to the railway to the south of Yang-tsung seemed to be the work of imperial troops, not of the Boxers. He therefore desired us to return for purposes of consultation. We thus understood that the situation had undergone a complete change, and we would have returned immediately, but the engine of the No. 2 train was without water, and while this deficiency was being remedied, our patrols brought news, at 2.20 pm, that a body of cavalry numbering 100 were advancing against us."

fortified arsenal north of the city. Admiral Seymour's relief force was now isolated six miles from where it started, and the legations in Beijing were still in need of support.⁶⁷

The initial assault towards Beijing met with many issues and was an embarrassment to the multinational force, especially for Admiral Seymour, commonly referred to after the initial assault as "Admiral See-no-more."⁶⁸ The ineptitude of the leadership, rash plan, and lack of respect for the Chinese opponents led to a victory for China. Admiral Seymour's expedition to Beijing was supposed to relieve the legations under siege, but soon became as vulnerable as those trapped in Beijing.⁶⁹ The second force to relieve Beijing needed more combat power, more capable leaders, and have the required operational tempo to reach the legations before it was too late.

The Second Relief Force

On 5 June, the railroads between Tianjin and Beijing were cut, isolating the foreigners in Beijing, unbeknownst to the first relief force. By 20 June, Admiral Seymour's expedition had failed in rescuing those trapped at the legations in Beijing. As the forces assembled, new leadership for a second assault was required. The follow-on forces needed to relieve Admiral Seymour's force isolated in the Xigu Arsenal, before

⁶⁷ Silbey, 86-90.

⁶⁸ Preston, 89.

⁶⁹ Admiral Seymour was a naval officer, and although he was familiar with the Asia-Pacific region, he was not a competent land force commander. He did not send out advance forces to check on the rails, there were no tactical formations for the forces on trains, nor did he ensure that his lines of communication to and from the sea remained intact.

continuing on to Beijing to aid the legations. Luckily, for Admiral Seymour and his rescuers, the Xigu Arsenal was stockpiled with ammunition and provisions.⁷⁰

On 10 June, additional Marine reinforcements came in from the Philippines. One hundred and eight Marines under command of Major Littleton Waller arrived at Dagu aboard the USS *Solace* along with thirty additional Marines from the USS *Nashville*. Five hours after landing, the Marines were decisively engaged with Boxers and Chinese Imperial Army forces close to Tianjin. Unable to continue the fight with its current strength, the Marine battalion under Major Waller withdrew twelve miles south of Tianjin. Over the course of the next several days, over two thousand additional forces from Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom assembled to prepare for another assault. As in the first relief force, the senior officer present who assumed the general command was British, General Sir Alfred Gaselee.⁷¹

Seymour's force was rescued on 25 June by the newly assembled force. Major Waller relieved Captain McCalla as the senior American on the ground in China following the breakout of the force at the arsenal. The force would return south to Tianjin, and on 27 June attack and seize the Tianjin East Arsenal. Additional Marines and Soldiers were on the way from the Philippines, including the 1st Marine Regiment headquarters, aboard the USS *Brooklyn* and USS *Monocacy*. By 10 July, the 1st Marine Regiment commanded two Marine battalions and the 9th Infantry with two battalions.

⁷⁰ Silbey, 109-111.

⁷¹ Heintz, 131-134.

Marine Colonel Robert Meade commanded the force of over one thousand Americans as part of the overall British-led force to clear Tianjin.⁷²

On 13 July, Marines assumed the position of the far left flank of the assault force and the 9th Infantry on the right flank. The first day of the fight to retake Tianjin stalled with numerous casualties, including the death of the United States Army 9th Infantry commanding officer, Colonel Emerson H. Liscum. Early on 14 July, the Japanese troops attacked and broke through the walled entrance at Tianjin. This breakthrough allowed the entire international force to enter the city and rout the combined force of Boxers and Chinese Imperial Army units. The Marines guarded key economic institutions in Tianjin immediately following the removal of the Chinese forces, even as America's impromptu allies looted the city.⁷³

United States Army Major General Adna R. Chaffee ultimately led the 2,200-man American contingent of the second relief force upon his arrival on 30 July. Along with Major General Chaffee, arriving on the USS *Grant*, was an additional battalion of Marines, two Army battalions, one cavalry squadron, and an artillery battery.⁷⁴ By 3 August, Major General Chaffee and the multinational contingent of nearly nineteen thousand attacked towards Beijing. Later that evening, the besieged legations received word from a messenger of the relief force and their control of Dagu and Tianjin.⁷⁵ From 5

⁷² Heidl, 133-136; Aaron Simon Daggett, *America in the China Relief Expedition* (Kansas City, MO: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1906), 26-27.

⁷³ Heidl, 135-137.

⁷⁴ Daggett, 55-57.

⁷⁵ Sharf and Harrington, 76. Private Oscar Upham, a U.S. Marine assigned to the legation defense wrote in his journal on 3 August 1900, "Received some letters from the

to 14 August, the Marine regiment participated in the attack on Beijing. Major General Chaffee kept one Marine battalion in the rear to guard supply trains, a task that was not fulfilled by the first relief force.⁷⁶

On 14 August, the expeditionary relief force⁷⁷ reached the legations. Within several days, the entire city of Beijing was occupied. The Empress Dowager and the Imperial Court fled the city.⁷⁸ The foreign militaries paraded in Beijing, an insult to the displaced Imperial family.⁷⁹ After the main hostilities had concluded, an occupation force of over fifty thousand foreign power forces occupied China until 1901 under the

troops, among them one from Major Waller USM to Captain Myers, who is too sick with typhoid fever to receive it. It stated that Tientsin and the Dagu Forts have been taken, and that a flying column of 10,000 would leave on the first of August to go to our relief, a larger force to follow on the third. There are 5000 Americans in China and that McKinley and Roosevelt had been nominated on the Republican ticket.”

⁷⁶ Heinl, 144-145. Marine leaders saw the placement of the 9th Infantry as the new American Legation guard force as an insult. Commandant Heywood complained to no avail to the Secretary of the Navy: “It has always been the custom to furnish guards for the legations in a foreign country from Marines, and this custom has not been departed from until the present guard at the legation in China was established, which was furnished by the Army. Army troops are never supposed to be sent to a foreign country except in time of war, and, for this reason, legation guards and other guards required in foreign countries have always been furnished by the Marine Corps. It is respectfully submitted that it is eminently proper that the guard to be kept at the legation in Peking should be furnished by the Marine Corps.”

⁷⁷ Harrington, 28. Approximately 18,000 personnel were part of the second relief, 9,000 of which were Japanese. Only 2,900 British and 2,900 Russians, 2,200 Americans, and 1,200 French. Despite having the preponderance of forces, the Japanese were not awarded overall command.

⁷⁸ Edwin H. Conger, “Cipher Message of 22 August 1900,” Cable from Consul Conger to John Hay, Secretary of State (Pekin: Legation of the United States of America, Peking, China, 22 August 1900).

⁷⁹ Edwin H. Conger, “Cipher Message of 6 September 1900,” Cable from Consul Conger to John Hay, Secretary of State (Pekin: Legation of the United States of America, Peking, China, 6 September 1900). Consul Conger wrote, “Peking first. Military parade through Imperial Palace today. Only occupants 200 eunuchs and servants.”

command of German Field Marshal Alfred von Waldersee.⁸⁰ Despite troops needed for foreign occupation in China, the Marines from the Philippines re-embarked aboard ship and returned for security and counterinsurgency operations around Luzon and on Samar.⁸¹

The Army and the Marines worked well together as part of the second relief force. There was no time for the services to bicker, as the legations were under siege and in threat of total destruction. The same level of cooperation can be said for the multinational force, especially the 500-man force defending the legations. Without synchronized efforts, a break in the wall could have spelled disaster for the besieged foreigners. As part of a naval expeditionary force, the Marines had become accustomed to interactions with foreign forces in their travels to global ports, and understood the need to compromise at times to ensure the mission was successful.

The Marine Corps played an important role in the protection of American lives and national interests in Beijing in 1900. As the Legation Marine detachment carried on for fifty-five days of bombardment and attacks, the others as part of the China Relief Expedition Force, conducted offensive operations from the coast to Beijing. Working in an unprecedented multinational and joint force,⁸² the Marines were comfortable in

⁸⁰ Preston, 208, 305.

⁸¹ Heintz, 123-125. Notable figures from the Marines in China would go on to lead Marines during the Philippine insurrections from 1900-1901. Major Waller, Lieutenant Butler, and several others that had served during the Boxer Rebellion would serve under Major General Chaffee again in the Philippines.

⁸² Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff J-7, 2000), B-1. The Boxer Rebellion is one of several vignettes mentioned in the 2000 version of Joint Publication 3-16, "1900. International Relief Force in China, Boxer Rebellion. Eight nation force, led by a British

shifting from counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines to full-spectrum conflict in China. Existing relationships with the United States Navy and Army allowed for the Marines to rapidly maneuver forces from Luzon to an entirely different operational area and mission. By the conclusion of hostilities in China in 1900, the Marine Corps proved it could fight as a ground combat force inland and around the littorals, as a landing party from warships and forward-based stations, and as a quick reaction force for the State Department. The evolution from ship detachments to regiments in Asia by 1900 played a role in the evolution of the Marine Corps for future brigade, division, and corps-level formations. The China operations of 1900 set the stage for the expansion of the Marine Corps over the next one hundred plus years.

general and later a German, included 2,000 US soldiers and Marines. Loose coordination of operations was achieved through meetings of a Council of Generals.”

CHAPTER 5
OPERATIONS DURING THE TWENTIETH AND
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The China Marines

Despite achieving success over the Chinese Army and Boxers, the Marine Corps was not finished operating in China. In September of 1900, a United States Army company relieved the Marines from the legation defense mission. This relief was very unusual as Marines had always executed the legation defense. In 1905, a detachment of Marines was once again brought in from the Philippines, this time from the 1st Marine Brigade, to again assume the legation mission. Two officers and one hundred enlisted Marines took over the legation defense, a role the Marines would maintain until World War II. The term “China Marines” has come to signify the Marines stationed in China from 1905 until their 1941 retrograde during World War II, and again for a brief period after World War II.⁸³ Over the span of more than thirty years, the Marines successfully defended the American Legation despite a tense security environment.⁸⁴

The American “open door” policy⁸⁵ in China required the United States to protect American interests while at the same time ensuring the sovereignty of China. In 1911, when Chinese revolutionaries struck, the United States supported industry and

⁸³ Millett, 261.

⁸⁴ Ellsworth, 39-40. Of the two officers assigned to Legation defense, First Lieutenant Holcomb would later become Commandant of the Marine Corps during the interwar years and during the first years of World War II.

⁸⁵ Correspondence from U.S. Secretary of State John Hay to foreign offices in China, “Open Door Note of 6 September 1899” (Washington, DC, Department of State).

commercial ventures operating in China, in addition to the protection of United States citizens. The Marines, chosen for their defense of the legation and their ability to operate efficiently without taking many casualties, were to keep Americans safe, commerce intact, and peacefully influence foreign nations from injecting themselves in the Chinese revolution.⁸⁶

Despite the significant presence of Marines in China from 1905, and the United States Army 15th Infantry Regiment from 1912 to 1938, several incidents warranted additional Marines to be deployed in support of United States interests in China. From 1911 to 1913, Marines stationed aboard Asiatic Fleet ships USS *Albany* and USS *Rainbow*, conducted several landings at Shanghai. These landings were in response to Chinese revolutionary forces threatening American commercial interests. The Marines deployed to Shanghai came ashore for no more than two months at a time, and did not have any significant engagements with the Chinese revolutionaries.⁸⁷

In 1922, the landscape of China had come to a point in which the Marines stationed there required augmentation. While the previous decade's Marine involvement included ship detachments of Marines, many cases in the 1920s required battalion-sized and larger formations of Marine reinforcements. Despite the tendency to dispatch Marines from service in the Philippines, or those stationed aboard ships of the Asiatic Fleet, the additional requirements called for stateside Marines and Soldiers to be

⁸⁶ Millett, 216-226.

⁸⁷ Ellsworth, 40-41.

deployed. By 1927, the 4th Marine Regiment based in San Diego, California, was dispatched to conduct operations in China.⁸⁸

From 1927, the legation defense, the 15th Infantry Regiment, and the 4th Marine Regiment were not a large enough force to defend the American interests in China. The Asiatic Fleet commander, Admiral Clarence S. Williams, requested that a Marine Brigade Headquarters be established. Despite the Consul in Beijing initially erroneously asking for an additional Army brigade, the Commandant of the Marine Corps prepared a Marine brigade for service, deploying his force well before the Army brigade would be ready to deploy.⁸⁹ Brigadier General Smedley Butler, hero of the Boxer Rebellion American Expeditionary Force and during the Banana Wars, traveled with his 3rd Marine Brigade from San Francisco to China, placing his command element in Tianjin. While the 4th Marine Regiment remained in Shanghai, the 6th Marine Regiment, 12th Marine Regiment, two flying squadrons, and additional enablers deployed to Tianjin.⁹⁰ The Marines deployed in China did not fall under the Boxer Protocol, unlike the Army units, thus not requiring them to defend assets other than those specifically impacting American interests.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 43-44.

⁸⁹ Millett, 224. Brigadier General Butler, commander of Marines in China, pleaded to Admiral Williams and to the Commandant of the Marine Corps to prepare more forces for China. Brigadier General Butler worried that if the Marines were replaced in China that would be the end of the Marine Corps.

⁹⁰ Ellsworth, 44. Brigadier General Smedley Butler is one of only two Marines to be awarded the Medal of Honor twice. The other Marine awarded two Medals of Honor was Dan Daly, who received his first Medal of Honor as a private, defending the Legation at Beijing in 1900.

The 4th Marine Regiment remained in China, but the additional forces departed in 1929, only to return in 1937 as a result of the outbreak of war between Japan and China. The 2nd Marine Brigade and 6th Marine Regiment briefly returned to defend the American settlements. By the end of 1937, the Japanese intervention was such that any force the United States could maintain was insignificant in comparison, thus the Marine reinforcements departed completely by 1938 to avoid a potential provocation of the Japanese forces by Americans stationed overseas. The Army's 15th Regiment also departed in 1938, leaving only the legation defense and 4th Marine Regiment. For the next three years, the 4th Marine Regiment negotiated with the Japanese on the rights of Americans in China. In November 1941, the Marines finally departed China, the last foreign military force to do so before war between the United States and Japan began following Pearl Harbor.⁹¹

As the war in the Pacific ended with the atomic bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the Marines were no longer required to conduct an invasion of mainland Japan. Marine forces deployed back into China in September 1945. The Marines focused on northern China and initially deployed the III Amphibious Corps, made up of the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The forces of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-Tung both vied for control of China during the second half of the 1940s, and the Marines were caught in the middle. Between 1945 and 1949, twelve Marines were killed and forty-three wounded while protecting American interests and

⁹¹ Millett, 230-235. One of the most beneficial aspects of the Marines remaining in China leading up to World War II was the firsthand witnessing of the Japanese military, and patriotism of the Chinese.

transitioning China from Imperial Japanese rule.⁹² Ultimately, the Marines departed in 1949, when it was evident the Communists would gain complete control of China. The Marine Corps would not have to wait long to interact with Communist Chinese forces, as the Marines would fight them during the Korean War one year later.⁹³

Banana Wars

While the Marine Corps' span of influence in Asia during the first several decades of the twentieth century revolved primarily around China and the Philippines, there was no lack of involvement closer to the Continental United States. The Banana Wars came to signify American involvement in Central America and the Caribbean. The Spanish-American War set off a wave of American interventions in numerous countries, resulting in long-term deployments in support of American interests. The Marine Corps, even after significant involvement in the Spanish-American War, Boxer Rebellion, and a continued presence in China, were chosen to execute the preponderance of the Banana Wars missions.

From 1901 to 1903, Marines came ashore in support of American interests and citizens in Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. Most notably, the large force of Marines that landed in Panama helped thwart Colombian efforts to exert control over Panama. President Roosevelt was so serious about the safety and independence of Panama, that the commander of the Marine forces was Marine Commandant George F.

⁹² Shaw, 34-36.

⁹³ Ibid., 1-26.

Elliott. The resulting independence of Panama allowed the Roosevelt Administration to sign a treaty with them, and construct the Panama Canal.⁹⁴

Cuba suffered from a revolt in 1906, leading to Marine Corps deployment of two battalions in support of the Cuban Government. After initial fighting, the Marines reinforced their presence to a brigade-sized element. Over the next three years, Marines remained in Cuba as part of the United States Army Detachment. In 1912, Marines returned from a three-year hiatus, again fighting as a brigade, restoring order to numerous revolting towns.⁹⁵

President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 969 in 1908 to outline the Marine Corps roles and missions, because of internal friction between the Marine Corps and the Navy. The executive order led to an update of Navy regulations the following year, but not without more angst, specifically over maintaining Marines afloat with the Navy. Ultimately, the Marines remained on ship, along with shore-based prescribed duties. The Marine Corps' missions as listed in 1909 Navy Regulations included: serving on armed vessels, intervention in foreign countries in support of national interests, training foreign militaries, operations supporting other services, as security forces, defending advanced naval bases including the Panama Canal, and conducting amphibious operations.⁹⁶ The Marine Corps had finally received more detailed roles and responsibilities. Despite the concern among Marine leaders that presenting more roles off ship could mean the end of

⁹⁴ Parker, 37.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Navy Department, *Regulations for the Government of the Navy of the United States: 1909* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 347. Article 1390 details the roles and responsibilities of the Marine Corps as of 1909.

the Marine Corps, the additional mission sets actually aided the Marines in force structure additions and remaining a viable option in protecting United States interests abroad.⁹⁷

After 1909, the Marine Corps continued to operate in Central America. In 1910 and again in 1912, Marines would fight in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan Civil War threatened American interests in the country, and Marines were called upon to defend the pro-United States government. One of the heroes of the American Expeditionary Force during the Boxer Rebellion, now Major Smedley Butler, commanded the Marine forces. One year later, with the exception of a legation detachment, Marines departed. There were several additional reinforcements to the Legation Marines over the next several years because of more unrest in Nicaragua.⁹⁸

Major American Conflicts of the Twentieth Century

The Marine Corps benefitted from the regional engagements in Asia and similar experiences in the Caribbean by fielding competent, combat-experienced leaders at the onset of World War I. The exploits of the 5th and 6th Marine Regiments in World War I helped prevent German forces from invading Paris and highlighted the Marines in the

⁹⁷ Thomas G. Roe, Ernest H. Giusti, John H. Johnstone, and Benis M. Frank, *A History of Marine Corps Roles and Missions: 1775-1962* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1962), 7-8; U.S. President Executive Order 969, Washington, DC, 1908. Executive Order 969 defined five roles for the Marine Corps: “(1) To garrison the different navy-yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States. (2) To furnish the first line of mobile defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States. (3) To man such defenses, and to aid in manning, if necessary, such other defenses as may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States. (4) To garrison the Isthmian Canal Zone, Panama. (5) To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace.”

⁹⁸ Parker, 38.

world press. Major General John A. Lejeune, future Commandant of the Marine Corps, commanded the 2nd United States Army Division, the first opportunity for Marine generals to serve at higher levels of command and staff responsibilities. The Marine Corps leadership also saw the requirement to have a major role in World War I for survival as an organization. The Marines proved their worth in World War I, gaining global praise while at the same time sustaining over eleven thousand casualties out of an entire force that peaked at nearly seventy-five thousand in 1918.⁹⁹

Following an interwar period of reorganization and classifying themselves as an amphibious force, the Marines served a prominent role in World War II. Years of interactions with the Japanese in the Pacific gave the Marines insights as to how their enemy fought. The island hopping campaigns of the Pacific War put the Marine Corps amphibious doctrine developed in the interwar period to the test. Despite the bloody assaults, the Marines were victorious in each campaign and prepared for the final assault on the Japanese home islands before the atomic bombs put an end to the war.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ Millett, 292-318. Witnessing and initially participating in the trench warfare, Marines soon found themselves unwilling to participate in the mass attrition. When the Marines scaled the walls of the trenches, they did not intend to return. Boxer Rebellion veteran Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly, stated during the Battle of Belleau Wood, "Come on you sons of bitches! Do you want to live forever?" That day at Belleau Wood, the Marines suffered more casualties than they had in the entire existence of the Marine Corps. U.S. Marine Corps History Division, "Marine Corps Casualties," U.S. Marine Corps, accessed 5 May 2016, http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/pages/frequently_requested/Casualties.aspx. There were 2,461 killed and 9,520 wounded in operations during World War I for the Marine Corps. U.S. Marine Corps History Division, "Marine Corps Fiscal Year Ends Strengths: 1798-2015," U.S. Marine Corps, accessed 20 April 2016, http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/pages/frequently_requested/EndStrength.aspx.

¹⁰⁰ Millett, 331-332, 386-387, 438-440. There are countless records of the Marine Corps' participation in World War II. The role the Marines took as the amphibious force for the United States created the doctrine and innovations that paved the way to assaults

In Europe and Africa during World War II, the Marine Corps' role was not as well publicized as that of the Pacific Theater. Marines served on ships of the Atlantic Fleet and several ships of other Allied nations. The Marine Corps also trained the United States Army in amphibious warfare prior to their landings in Africa and Europe. Marine forces conducted the first large-scale deployment of combat forces across the Atlantic Ocean, six months before the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade deployed to Iceland to slow any advance of Nazi Germany in Northern Europe. The Iceland brigade would remain for only one year, departing when Nazi Germany declared war with Russia.¹⁰¹

The Marines in London during World War II were tasked primarily with the security mission of guarding the American Consul or Embassy. London also served as the initial hub for Marines assigned in support of the Office of Strategic Services. Marine counter-intelligence operators conducted clandestine missions in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The Marines' counter-intelligence and clandestine missions included secret meetings with exiled leaders, preparations for Allied landings in Africa, and rescuing downed pilots behind enemy lines.¹⁰²

After World War II, Marines began to downsize as in previous major conflicts. However, the late 1940s and early 1950s saw the Marine Corps established by legislation

in the Pacific, Europe, and Africa. The size of the Marine Corps in World War II was larger than ever, and the Marines served with valor in all operations of the war.

¹⁰¹ Harry W. Edwards, *A Different War: Marines in Europe and North Africa* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1994), 1-3.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 5-13.

defining their roles, missions, and stature. The National Security Act of 1947 defined the Marine Corps' posture amongst the services. Going into the second half of the twentieth century, the Marine Corps had a minimum force structure, defined roles and relationships, and the Commandant would sit as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹⁰³

Marine Corps Embassy Security Group

Following World War II, the Marine Corps, along with the other branches of the military, were fighting to establish relevance. Despite well-publicized successes in the Pacific and little-known successes in the African and European theaters, the roles and responsibilities of the Marine Corps were still in question until the 1947 and 1952 congressional legislation on national security. One mission that the Marine Corps would assume officially, although having done this since the existence of the United States, was

¹⁰³ U.S. Congress, *National Security Act of 1947*, Washington, DC, 1947. Section 203c of the National Security Act of 1947 states that “The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: Provided, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war;” U.S. Congress, *National Security Act of 1947*, Washington, DC, 1947, amended 1952. Public Law 416 stated that the Marine Corps “shall be so organized to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.”

to provide forces in support of the State Department. Despite State Department coordinating initially with the War Department, Section 562 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 limited such missions to the Department of the Navy.¹⁰⁴

The Memorandum of Agreement of 1948 provided the foundation for the Marine Corps' responsibilities as agreed to by the State Department and the Department of the Navy.¹⁰⁵ For those visiting embassies or consulates around the world, the first American face seen is predominantly that of a United States Marine in dress uniform. Throughout the current and previous centuries, the Marine Corps has guarded and reinforced embassies and consulates in support of the State Department and United States interests. The duties of Marines working at embassies and consulates around the world have been modified over the years; however, the current mission reflects the overall original intent

¹⁰⁴ Daugherty, 85-86. "The Secretary of the Navy is authorized, upon request of the Secretary of State, to assign enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps to serve as custodians under the supervision of the principal officer at an embassy, legation, or consulate."

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 88-92. While the Memorandum of Agreement has been modified numerous times since 1948, the main tenants of the agreement still are applicable. The Marine Embassy Security Group personnel are tasked to protect classified material and defend U.S. embassies and consulates.

by the State Department.¹⁰⁶ The Marine Corps currently has Marines serving embassy security positions in 173 embassies and consulates in 146 different countries.¹⁰⁷

Marine Corps Operations during the Cold War

In 1950, conflict in Korea, resulted in another chapter of Marine Corps combat overseas. The Korean War justified the diverse training the Marine Corps prepared itself for, as the United States was thrust into the first major conflict of the Cold War. The Marine Corps volunteered enthusiastically to provide forces for the war, even though post World War II numbers put the Marine Corps down to seventy-five thousand active duty and ninety thousand reserves. General Douglas MacArthur, commander of United States forces in the Far East, enthusiastically welcomed another opportunity to employ the Marine Corps in combat.¹⁰⁸

Marine Corps involvement in Korea began in June 1950 with the 1st Provisional Brigade in defensive positions in the Pusan Perimeter. Successes against the North Korean assault led planning for an amphibious assault into the North Korean controlled territories. Despite Marine and Navy apprehensions for General MacArthur's plan, the

¹⁰⁶ Marines Corps Embassy Security Group, "Mission Statement," U.S. Marine Corps, accessed 6 February 2016, <http://www.mcesg.marines.mil/UnitHome.aspx>. The mission statement of the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group reads as follows: "Provide protection to mission personnel and prevent the compromise of national security information and equipment at designated diplomatic and consular facilities. Be prepared to execute plans for the protection of the mission and its personnel as directed by the chief of mission or principal officer through the regional security officer."

¹⁰⁷ Current Operations Division, *Marine Corps 101 Brief* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2015), Slide 8.

¹⁰⁸ Norman W. Hicks, *A Brief History of the United States Marine Corps* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1961), 40-41.

Marine Corps hurried the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to Korea and conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon on 15 September 1950 as part of the United States Army X Corps. By 27 September 1950, the United States Army and Marine Corps had secured the Korean capital of Seoul, and the Marine forces were preparing for follow-on missions.¹⁰⁹

In 1950, United Nations forces experienced the reinforcement by Chinese Communist forces in support of the North Koreans. Although the Marine Corps would be one of the first American forces to face Chinese forces in the bitter cold at the Chosin Reservoir, the massing and successful attacks of over three hundred thousand troops by the Chinese required United Nations forces to perform a strategic withdrawal south of the 38th Parallel. Over the next several years through 1953, the 1st Marine Division participated as part of the United Nations ground force; and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing received the majority of aviation tasking from the United States Air Force in Korea.¹¹⁰

As the Marine Corps' participation in the Korean War ended, Marine missions overseas continued at a regular pace. During the 1950s, Marines conducted operations from afloat platforms and deployed from both overseas and stateside-based units. Operations in the 1950s included disaster relief missions in Greece, Haiti, Mexico, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Morocco. Marines helped conduct a noncombatant evacuation of the Tachen Islands in 1955 as the Chinese Communist forces attacked on the island chain, and the Marines also supported the 1956 evacuation of noncombatants in Egypt and

¹⁰⁹ Millett, 477-480.

¹¹⁰ Hicks, 42-44.

Israel. For four months in 1958, the Marines conducted stability operations in Lebanon because of political and religious tensions in the country.¹¹¹

Operations in the 1960s and 1970s began with disaster relief operations and a noncombatant evacuation in the Congo. Turkey, British Honduras, Guam, Haiti, and Vietnam received disaster relief from deployed Marine forces in the 1960s. Disaster relief operations in the 1970s included support to Peru, multiple missions in the Philippines, and Tunisia. Marines continued to conduct stability operations and noncombatant evacuations across the globe in Thailand, Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Cyprus, Cambodia, and Vietnam.¹¹²

While the majority of the 1950s and 1960s consisted of low-intensity conflicts and disaster relief missions, the Vietnam War would serve as the next major conflict for the United States after the Korean War. Between 1965 and 1971, more Marines served in Vietnam than had served in World War II. The veterans of the frozen Chosin in Korea now fought in rice paddies and unbearable heat of South Vietnam. Out of Okinawa, Japan, the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade served as the first large-scale Marine force, tasked to secure Da Nang airfield. By late 1965, the Marine forces in Vietnam reached twenty-five thousand, and were re-designated as the III Marine Amphibious Force.

Complete with the 3rd Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and the 3rd Marine

¹¹¹ Annette D. Amerman, *The Marines Have Landed: Eighty Years of Marine Corps Landings, 1935-2015* (Quantico, VA: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2016), 2-5.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 5-13. Prior to the beginning of U.S. involvement in combat in Vietnam, the Marine Corps conducted a humanitarian aid mission in 1964 that evacuated over 1,000 people from affected areas and delivered supplies to affected persons.

Amphibious Brigade, III Marine Amphibious Force began to conduct operations and civic action programs to defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces.¹¹³

Operating against unconventional forces and attempting to influence a population takes an extended period of time. The Combined Action Program developed by the Marine Corps during the Vietnam War was based on nearly two hundred years of fighting insurgencies and unconventional forces across the globe. However, the American military and civilian leadership did not have the patience for such programs. Combat operations, including seek and destroy missions continued until 1971, up to the withdrawal of Marine combat forces from Vietnam. Marine Corps casualties in Vietnam exceeded that of World War II by several thousand.¹¹⁴

Marine Corps operations in the 1980s consisted of numerous low-intensity operations. Marine units participated in disaster relief in Algeria in 1980. Continued tensions in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 resulted in Marines conducting noncombatant evacuations and peacekeeping operations to stabilize the region and protect American interests. Marines sustained two hundred forty personnel killed and over one hundred wounded as a result of terrorist bombings on the Beirut barracks.¹¹⁵ Operation Urgent Fury in 1983 began with the 22d Marine Amphibious Unit fighting alongside the United States Army 82nd Airborne Division, restoring order and protecting Americans following an attempted coup in Grenada. The Marines closed 1989 and opened 1990 with Operation

¹¹³ Millett, 559-571.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 559, 571-604.

¹¹⁵ U.S. Marine Corps History Division, "Marine Corps Fiscal Year Ends Strengths: 1798-2015."

Just Cause, a 18th Airborne Corps operation supported by the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade to protect lives and ensure the newly elected government maintained legitimacy and control of Panama.¹¹⁶

In part because of their influence with the United States Congress, the Marine Corps of the 1980s would receive significant modernization support by way of new United States Navy operated L-Class ships, maritime pre-positioning ships, and ship-to-shore connectors such as the Landing Craft Air Cushion, extending the reach and capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force. Modernization of Marine Aviation also took center stage, as aircraft such as the vertical short take-off and landing AV-8B Harrier and numerous assault support and attack aviation platforms. However, with all equipment upgrades, the Marine Corps focused on improving personnel quality and doctrinal foundations. Marine Amphibious Units, later known as Marine Expeditionary Units, provided immediate responses to global crises by maintaining a forward-deployed presence afloat.¹¹⁷

Post-Cold War Operations

When Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United States military began to mobilize in preparations for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereign borders. United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorized all forces necessary to restore the sovereign borders of Kuwait. The United States military would be able to put to the test the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and operate as part of a true joint force under

¹¹⁶ Amerman, 13-17.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 608-632.

geographic combatant commands. The Marine Corps' participation in the Gulf War was significant, led by the I Marine Expeditionary Force. Lieutenant General Walter Boomer commanded the I Marine Expeditionary Force/Marine Forces Central Command, which consisted of the 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigades, the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions, the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing and elements of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, 1st Force Service Support Group, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and the 1st Brigade of the 2nd United States Army Armored Division.¹¹⁸

On 17 January 1991, the Iraqi Government did not meet United Nations resolution requirements, and Operation Desert Storm began the liberation of Kuwait. Marine aviation began combat operations as part of the Joint Force Air Component Command and I Marine Expeditionary Force, attacking strategic, operational, and tactical targets. The Marine Corps participated in the first battle of the war, at al Khafji in northeast Saudi Arabia. Marine and naval deception operations led the Iraqi Army to believe a major amphibious assault would be conducted north of Kuwait City, causing the Iraqi III and IV Corps to defend against the attacks that did not come. Marine deception operations also made the Iraqi military believe that a Marine battalion was a division-sized unit. The Iraqi III Corps that was oriented towards an amphibious assault, found their defensive lines breached by the 2nd Marine Division. Marine Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company personnel assisted Saudi forces with Marine and Navy support, including fires from Navy battleships. The I Marine Expeditionary Force units took control of the Kuwait Airport and forced the withdrawal of the Iraqi III Corps from

¹¹⁸ Paul W. Westermeyer, *U.S. Marines in the Gulf War, 1990-1991: Liberating Kuwait* (Quantico, VA: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2014), 260-261.

Kuwait. On 28 February 1991, less than two months after operations began, Operation Desert Storm concluded with a cease-fire and the restoration of the borders of Kuwait.¹¹⁹

As the Marine Corps concluded participation in one of the most successful wars in history, the 1990s remained busy for America's expeditionary force. The Marine Corps conducted noncombatant evacuations in Liberia, Somalia, Central African Republic, Albania, Zaire, Sierra Leone, and Eritrea. Marines also participated in disaster relief operations in the Philippines, Turkey, Bangladesh, Italy, Somalia, and Rwanda. Tensions in Somalia from 1991 to 1993 resulted in peacekeeping and stability Operation Restore Hope and Operation Continue Hope. Marines also conducted show of force and stability operations in Haiti and peacekeeping operations in East Timor. Operations in the 1990s consisted of deployed Marine Expeditionary Forces, Marine Expeditionary Brigades, Marine Expeditionary Units, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, and unit detachments.¹²⁰

The Global War on Terrorism began with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center Buildings on 11 September 2001. The United States faced an unconventional adversary supported by Afghanistan and non-state actors. The first venture into combat operations by the United States was in Afghanistan, a hub for al-Qaeda activity, and home to the Taliban government. United States military special operations forces and Central Intelligence Agency para-military elements were the first to conduct operations in Afghanistan. The Marine Corps would be the first conventional force to arrive. Task Force 58, named in homage to Admiral Spruance's World War II force, brought together

¹¹⁹ Westermeyer, 261-264.

¹²⁰ Amerman, 17-26.

two Marine Expeditionary Units under the command of Brigadier General James Mattis, and conducted the longest-distance amphibious assault in history.¹²¹ The Marine Corps presence at its peak consisted of a Marine Expeditionary Force with its command element also serving as North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Security Assistance Force Regional Command Southwest Headquarters, another first for the Marine Corps. In 2011, Marine General John Allen served as the International Security Assistance Force Commander. The operation, known as Operation Enduring Freedom, was another foray for the Marine Corps in conducting both stability operations and counter-insurgency operations.¹²² The Marine Corps modified the *Small Wars Manual* because of operations in Afghanistan and again in 2004 during operations in Iraq.

Operation Iraqi Freedom continued where the Gulf War ended. This time, Saddam Hussein and his government was ousted from power and a new government established. The Marine Corps had a major role in the ground and air war that began in 2003, conducting successful battles at Al Kut, An Nassiryah, Tikrit, Bassarah, and onward to

¹²¹ David W. Kummer, *U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2009: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Quantico, VA: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2014), xi-xiii, 2-3. The Marine Corps amphibious assault to Forward Operating Base Rhino in Afghanistan spanned over 400 miles.

¹²² Kummer, xi-xiii. General James Mattis would serve as Commander, U.S. Central Command during the final years of the war in Afghanistan. Marine operations in the latter years in Afghanistan earned the Marine Corps area of operations to be referred to in many cases as “Marinistan,” due to the Marine Corps’ unique take at the time on how to combat insurgency and enable restoration of a functioning society. Marines in Afghanistan were early to employ women in search teams and engaged mullahs to a much greater extent than their counterparts at the time. U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry, was quoted as saying, “U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry said at the time that “the international security force in Afghanistan feels as if it comprises 42 nations instead of 41 because the Marines act so independently from other U.S. forces.”

Baghdad. The 1st Marine Division conducted combat operations for seventeen days over a distance of eight hundred kilometers, the longest distance offensive in Marine Corps history.¹²³ Despite successes on the battlefield, stability operations were not adequately accounted for in the strategic goals for Iraq, and the country reverted into sectarian violence. After the initial assault on Baghdad, the Marines departed in 2003. Marines returned in 2004 and conducted several more years of counter-insurgency and nation building operations. Urban battles in Al Fallujah and Ar Ramadi achieved varied levels of success for the Marines who sustained significant casualties. As the Marine Corps departed Iraq, Anbar Province became one of the success stories of the war, enabling a functioning society even amidst continuing tensions in the country.

The twenty-first century began with two major conflicts in which the Marine Corps provided a large-scale forces. Global instabilities in this century have required Marine Corps participation in numerous other operations such as Odyssey Dawn in Libya and Enduring Freedom in the Philippines. The Marine Corps in the first fifteen years of the twenty-first century have participated in noncombatant evacuation and peacekeeping operations in Liberia, stability operations in Haiti, and Lebanon and South Sudan noncombatant evacuations. From 2005 to 2015, Marine forces have also executed disaster response operations in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Burma, Philippines, Haiti, Pakistan, Japan, Liberia, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, and Thailand.¹²⁴ Marine forces have participated from small elements to command staff of joint task forces.

¹²³ Christopher M. Kennedy, Wanda J. Renfrow, Evelyn A. Englander, and Nathan S. Lowrey, *U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, DC: History Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 2006), 1-12.

¹²⁴ Amerman, 26-33.

Marines are now operating Crisis Response Marine Air-Ground Task Forces and rotational forces supporting combatant commanders in Africa, Europe, South America, and the Asia-Pacific. As a result of global requirements, one-third of the Marine Corps' operating forces are currently deployed overseas.¹²⁵

Future of the Expeditionary Force

The Marine Corps of the twenty-first century faces numerous challenges. Although the threats of non-state actors and belligerent governments are nothing new, globalization has caused the Marine Corps to focus efforts on additional forms of warfare. Cyber-attacks are present in today's society, and the establishment of the Marine Corps Cyber Command is reflective on how much effect cyber security has on today's operating forces.

Littoral access remains as important today as ever. Anti-access, area denial platforms and integrated air defense systems pose significant threats to the Marine Corps and the conduct of forcible entry operations. Initiatives by the Marine Corps, such as *Expeditionary Force 21*,¹²⁶ address the complexities of the conduct of operations and in

¹²⁵ Current Operations Division, *Unclassified Current Operations Brief 4 April 2016* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2016), Slide 4.

¹²⁶ Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2014), 4. "*Expeditionary Force 21* provides guidance for how the Marine Corps Total Force—as an integral part of the larger naval and joint team—will be postured, organized, trained, and equipped to fulfill assigned public law and national policy responsibilities. *Expeditionary Force 21* does not change what Marines do, but how they will do it. *Expeditionary Force 21* draws guidance from national security direction and naval strategy as described by *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. *Expeditionary Force 21* will be integrated with the *Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan 2014-2022* and *Marine Corps Strategic Health Assessment*."

the coming years. Although the drawdown of forces following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have decreased the size of the Marine Corps, the missions have not decreased. The United States Marine Corps continues to call itself the force that is “most ready when the nation is least ready.”¹²⁷

¹²⁷ Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2011), 110. The quote is also a direct quote from the Douglas-Mansfield Act of 1952.

CHAPTER 6

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FACTORS

Threads of Continuity

The Marine Corps' participation in the Boxer Rebellion has drawn several parallels with today's expeditionary operations. While technological advances have increased the efficiency and operational reach of the Marine Corps, the true success is based on the Marine mindset. The Marine Corps' posture leading up to and during the Boxer Rebellion offers many linkages to how the Marine Corps operates today. The remainder of this work focuses on how the Marine Corps' participation in the Boxer Rebellion is a model for current operations. The previous chapters focused on the Marines' early beginnings in 1775 to 1900, the events of the Boxer Rebellion, and operations in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

This chapter examines the linkages between the Boxer Rebellion Marine Corps and the force as it stands in 2016. To complete the analysis of the Marine Corps' current operations with regards to those in 1900, the threads that link the past and the present are reviewed. First, internal threads of professionalism, tactics, strategy, logistics and administration, theory and doctrine, technology, and leadership are examined. Second, the external threads affecting Marine Corps operations are considered, focusing on political factors, social factors, economic factors, and geography.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ John E. Jessup, Jr. and Robert W. Coakley, *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1982), 48-49. Jessup and Coakley view the ten "threads of continuity" as: military theory and doctrine, military professionalism, generalship, strategy, tactics, logistics and administration, technology, political factors, social factors, and economic factors. This paper rewords generalship as leadership and adds geography as an eleventh thread.

Internal Factors

In the nineteenth century, the Marine Corps placed more emphasis on the professionalism of the officer corps. New officers were more likely to attend the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland in the latter portion of the 1800s, vice previous commissioning appointments from high-level government officials. The professional ties to Naval Academy classmates was helpful to many of the officers, and the training received at the Naval Academy prepared the Marines to operate from the sea and advanced naval bases. The level of professionalism exhibited by graduates of the Naval Academy was viewed by Marine Corps leadership as an improvement over previous commissioning practices.¹²⁹

Professionalism is linked to training and leadership. The officer and enlisted Marine embodied the positives of these activities during the Boxer Rebellion. Although outnumbered and outgunned, the Marines in defense of the legations and during the first and second expeditions of the Boxer Rebellion acquitted themselves with the utmost regard from their counterparts and those the Marines were protecting. Several Marines even stowed away on ship from the Philippines to China so as to not miss out on the action.¹³⁰ The Marines' unwavering spirit during the Boxer Rebellion were akin to the professional attitude they maintained at sea and ashore.

¹²⁹ Jack Shulimson, *The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission, 1880-1898* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 49-50. During the 1880s and 1890s, the Marine Corps desired an increase in the very small number of officers the Marine Corps maintained. Additionally, the Marine Corps wanted officer commissioning to originate from the Naval Academy.

¹³⁰ Heinl, 131.

Today's Marines have sought to maintain and improve upon early twentieth century professionalism. More opportunities exist now for commissioning in different competitive settings, no longer relying on congressional appointees as in the nineteenth century. The Marine Corps has, and will likely, always rely on the non-commissioned officer corps as its backbone. Consistently throughout its history, the Marine Corps has maintained the smallest number of officers to enlisted ratio,¹³¹ thus relying on enlisted leaders to be the standard bearers for the Marine Corps.¹³² Entering the Marine Corps, new recruits and candidates are told repeatedly the expeditionary nature of the Marines will mean hard living is ahead, and those that eventually earn the title of Marine embrace this fact.

The education of Marines has improved dramatically since the late nineteenth century. The founding of the School of Application in 1891, for both officer and enlisted, brought forward an additional degree of professional military education for the Marine Corps institution. The School of Application led to specialty schools and eventually to the Basic School for officers. A shared understanding of all duties of the Marine Corps, to include gunnery, tactical maneuver, and drill became familiar for all Marines, regardless

¹³¹ Current Operations Division, *Unclassified Current Operations Brief 4 April 2016*, Slide 3. Currently, the Marine officer to enlisted ratio is approximately one officer to every nine enlisted.

¹³² The ability for the Marine Corps to maintain a smaller officer to enlisted ratio is reliant upon their role as an expeditionary force afloat and initial assault force. All the other services provide key roles that allow for the Marine Corps' small officer footprint. Afloat, the U.S. Navy supports ship-to-shore movement and sustainment personnel as part of the amphibious team. The U.S. Air Force provides strategic lift for all services as required for the Marine Corps when self-transport or maritime means are not sufficient. The U.S. Army provides the bulk of theater opening and logistics capabilities and theater-level missile capabilities in their typical role as land component commander.

of specialty.¹³³ Currently, the Marine Combat Training and Basic School educates all Marines on the fundamentals of being a rifleman, and teaches the tactics and employment of the Marine weapons systems.

The Marines in the Boxer Rebellion were deployed from both the United States, and from conducting counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines.¹³⁴ Life aboard ship and constant overseas basing provided the Marine Corps with a flexible adaptable force. Because of its mission sets, the Marine Corps developed and maintains an ethos to accommodate a rapid shift from one operation to an entirely different operation in a very different setting. This is resonant with today's force, rapidly deploying from the sea or land-based units forward-based or forward-deployed. In recent years, the Marines have used personnel already conducting operations in Iraq and shifted them to Afghanistan. Marines stationed overseas in Japan have responded to numerous contingencies across the range of military operations from combat operations in the Middle East to disaster relief missions across the Asia-Pacific. There are numerous examples throughout the past several years that highlight the Marine Corps in its role as the "expeditionary force in readiness."¹³⁵

The American relief forces during the Boxer Rebellion operated with United States Army leadership. As there was no requirement to assault beachheads at Dagou, the

¹³³ Shulimson, 102-3.

¹³⁴ Parker, 33-34. The Marine Corps operated primarily in Cavite and Olongapo in the year leading up to the Boxer Rebellion. In addition to combatting the 'Insurrectos,' the Marines also conducted advanced base security, managed the military prison, and administered their respective areas.

¹³⁵ Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Expeditionary Force 21*, 5.

Marines in the relief forces joined the international forces in company, battalion, and regimental formations. The Boxer Rebellion highlighted the ability for Marine forces to function effectively as part of a joint United States and multinational coalition effort, one of the first such major operations in the modern world, and Marine Colonel Robert Meade took initial command of the American element of the second relief force.¹³⁶ The Boxer Rebellion is an example of early use of Marine Corps leadership commanding regimental-sized forces. This paved the way for future large-scale commands of land forces, such as Second Division during World War I and as multinational force commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Marine Corps is a strategic asset that conducts tactical mission sets. Supported by the Navy, the ability to strike from the sea and advance inland provides the United States options in the conduct of expeditionary amphibious operations. As the Marine Corps operates its own aircraft, it does not always require Navy support for transportation, but prefers to work together in the execution of operations. As noted by the small size of the Marine Corps in comparison to the other services, announcing the deployment of Marines to global hotspots has come to signify the United States' intent for a crisis to be averted or contained as fast as possible. In the earlier years of the Marine Corps, there was limited publicity on overseas exploits. However, following news of the defense of the legations in Beijing, just like in the Philippines, the Marines are highlighted for their bravery and brought into the national spotlight for positive

¹³⁶ Braisted, 108.

reasons.¹³⁷ The battles of World War I, in which General Pershing wanted little publicity, saw the Marines utilizing an imbedded reporter providing the only front-line action stories, which gave the impression that the Marines were single-handedly winning the war.¹³⁸

The initial ship-to-shore movement¹³⁹ of Marines to deploy to defend the American Legation was followed by commercial rail. The second relief force had a much more difficult trek to Beijing. The use of rail and animals was commonplace in 1900, the twenty-first century forces have a reliance on aviation to deliver supplies and forces in hard to reach areas. The longest amphibious operation took place in Afghanistan, much of which executed by air from ships in the Persian Gulf.¹⁴⁰ While the Marines landing in Afghanistan traveled much farther inland than their counterparts in 1900 Beijing, they conceptually executed very similar movements. The Marines coming ashore in both China and Afghanistan came ashore off naval platforms, proceeded deep inland with only the provisions that were carried, and proceeded to conduct operations upon assuming their respective areas of responsibility.

Logistical support during the Boxer Rebellion Legation defense was non-existent. Other than the equipment and provisions brought with them, the Marines in defense of

¹³⁷ Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 10.

¹³⁸ Millett, 302.

¹³⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-02, *Amphibious Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff J-7, 2014), GL-17. Ship-to-shore movement is defined as, “That portion of the action phase of an amphibious operation that includes the deployment of the landing force from ships to designated landing areas.”

¹⁴⁰ Kummer, 2-3.

the legations relied upon only limited provisions shared among all the besieged people in Beijing. The first relief force of Marines similarly found themselves besieged along with their international partners on their stalled mission to rescue the legation. The second relief force maintained interior lines that extended from Dagu, to Tianjin, and on to Beijing. Much of the lack of initial logistical support lies with reliance on commercial rails and in the case of the first relief force, an overzealous ambitious plan.

Less than a decade following the Boxer Rebellion, the Marine Corps established the advanced base force concept, comprised of companies, battalions, and regiments in defense of forward operating bases. A formal school for advanced base operations was created in 1910, educating Marines in amphibious expeditionary operations employment. As the Marine Corps began to operate aircraft, aviation became a key part of the school and subsequent exercises.¹⁴¹ Despite a break in the school programs and development of doctrine during World War I, the interwar years saw the reinvigoration of amphibious operations by the Marines, creating the concepts that would be adopted and refined during World War II and the Korean War.

As the Marine Corps' expeditionary experiences in Asia, Europe, and in the Americas continued throughout the twentieth century, the experiences were codified by several key doctrinal publications. Lieutenant Colonel Ellis spearheaded the 1921 *Operations Plan 712: Operations in Micronesia*, documenting how the Japanese would attack the United States and plans to counter the attack.¹⁴² In 1934, the Marine Corps

¹⁴¹ Heinl, 161-162.

¹⁴² Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication 12-46, *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1992), vi.

developed the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, refined several times leading up to and during World War II, as the definitive manual the United States would use to conduct amphibious operations.¹⁴³ The Marine Corps remains the authority for landing operations, as it is the principle author and lead agent of Joint Publication 3-02.1, *Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation*.¹⁴⁴

The Spanish-American War and Boxer Rebellion were key in establishing the framework for Marines operating before World War II and subsequent counterinsurgency operations in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. While operations in the Philippines were closely identified in the latter years as a counterinsurgency fight, the Boxer Rebellion provided a unique instance in fighting regular forces and loosely aligned irregulars. Coupled with experiences in Latin American and the Caribbean, the doctrine in 1940, labeled the *Small Wars Manual*,¹⁴⁵ was the Marine Corps' bible on counterinsurgency and irregular operations until Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* was released initially in 2006.¹⁴⁶ Currently, the Marine

¹⁴³ U.S. Navy, Fleet Technical Publication 167, *Landing Operations Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Operations, 1938), ii. The Marine Corps' original *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* was replaced by Fleet Technical Publication 167, *Landing Operations Doctrine*. Upon creation of the latter publication, the Chief of Naval Operations ordered all outdated landing publications to be burned.

¹⁴⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-02.1, *Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff J-7, 2014), L-1.

¹⁴⁵ Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 11-16.

¹⁴⁶ Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2014), v.

Corps is also the lead joint agency for creating joint publications on urban operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and close air support.

Technology has never been the focus of the Marine Corps, a warrior culture with sound application of flexible employment. Technology is complementary to the Marine Corps. Despite the advances in equipment, the Marine Corps relies on the individual Marine as its most important weapon. Ingenuity has been a hallmark of the Marine Corps, as it is the service with the smallest budget and population. Identified for many years as a force receiving hand-me-downs from the Army, there still exist issues in equipping with the necessary items needed for certain missions. The Navy's amphibious force has limited L-class ships for the Marine's use, there is no current replacement for the aging amphibious assault vehicle, and the aviation fleet is overworked and overstressed.

The heavy weapons, artillery, and aviation the Marine Corps utilizes creates a combined arms effect that more efficiently engage an adversary in kinetic operations. Captain Myers and Captain Hall likely would have enjoyed close air support or more advanced weaponry in defense of the legations, but had to rely on an improvised cannon and rifles in the defense at Beijing. Today, the Marines are able to mass fires on an enemy and attack from ship to shore with a rapid advance. Although aging, the amphibious assault vehicles bring Marines ashore from the sea and can transverse inland at rapid speeds. The MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft is a revolutionary airframe that can fly as fast as a C-130 when in airplane mode, but can also land in a football field and drop off detachments of Marines. Marine aviation is equipping with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, an aircraft in which the full potential is not yet realized.

Marines take pride in their combat leaders. Captain Myers in Beijing was no exception to the expected bravery and competence of Marine officers. Despite his lack of academic ability at the Naval Academy, he became an officer and was soon deployed to the Philippines to lead Marines in the Spanish-American War and counterinsurgency operations. Although wounded at Beijing, Captain Myers remained in the Marine Corps to serve until mandatory retirement at age 64. Captain Myers conducted operations afloat and ashore in Mexico, Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Haiti after the Boxer Rebellion, ultimately retiring and earning the rank of lieutenant general.¹⁴⁷

The Boxer Rebellion produced many leaders that would shape the Marine Corps during the Banana Wars, World War I, the interwar years, and World War II. Smedley Butler, of the second relief force, would later earn two Medals of Honor during the Banana Wars, command a regiment in World War I, and lead Marines in China as a brigade commander. Private Dan Daly at the besieged legation in Beijing earned his first Medal of Honor in China, and his second leading Marines in combat operations in Haiti. Sergeant Major Daly went on to lead Marines in France in combat during World War I. Although sustaining several wounds, he remained as part of the occupation force in Germany after the war.¹⁴⁸

The lineage of today's leaders is very similar to that of those over a century ago. Lieutenant General Lewis "Chesty" Puller commanded Marines in the Banana Wars, a

¹⁴⁷ U.S. Marine Corps History Division, "Lieutenant General John T. Myers, USMC (Deceased)," U.S. Marine Corps, accessed 20 April 2016, http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Who's%20Who/M-O/myers_jt.aspx.

¹⁴⁸ U.S. Marine Corps History Division, "Sergeant Major Daniel 'Dan' Joseph Daly, USMC (Deceased)," U.S. Marine Corps, accessed 20 April 2016, http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Who%27s%20Who/D-F/Daly_DJ.aspx.

battalion and regiment in World War II, and a regiment and briefly a division in the Korean War. General James Mattis commanded a battalion in the Gulf War, a brigade in Afghanistan, a division and Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq, and subsequently United States Central Command. Many other senior leaders have similar experiences, all revolving around expeditionary operations. Sea duty and deployments are key for promotions in the Marine Corps. Overall, those that do not deploy are not looked upon favorably for key future assignments. As the Marine Corps maintains the smallest officer corps in the military, those entrusted a commission participate in numerous campaigns and must provide the continuity to the constant influx of young entry-level Marines likely to only serve one period of enlistment.

A key reason for the reliance on a small cadre of officers and senior enlisted to provide continuity are the personnel ratios the Marine Corps maintains. The Marine Corps continues to delegate authority to the lowest level possible, purposely and by default. As previously mentioned, the Marine Corps maintains the lowest officer to enlisted ratio in the military. The effects of the low numbers allow for a younger force that can maintain the speed and efficiency required of the Marine Corps' physically demanding expeditionary roles. Even in 1900, only 3 percent of the Marine Corps population were officers, while today's officers make up just over 11 percent.¹⁴⁹ The rise in percentages over 1900 numbers is largely due to the use of officers as aviators and the joint requirements for Marines today.

¹⁴⁹ U.S. Marine Corps History Division, "Marine Corps Fiscal Year Ends Strengths: 1798-2015."

External Factors

War as an extension of policy has benefitted the Marine Corps. When the United States has been attacked or the need to initiate military operations was required, the Marine Corps has been ready to answer the call. Although the Marines have not always been the first choice for every mission or operation, providing employment options to senior civilian leaders has been key to Marine utilization. For Marines, each operation is treated with the utmost diligence, as if the fate of the Marine Corps relies upon the results. Fortunately, depictions of Marines at Belleau Wood, the flag raising at Iwo Jima, and being first to deploy globally in support of disaster relief efforts have aided in the Marine Corps being the United States Government's instrument of choice for military employment in numerous cases since the founding of the Marine Corps.

The protection of United States interests require a military that is trained, available, and ready. In 1900, the policy of the United States was intended to be "open door" with China.¹⁵⁰ When the Chinese rose up against foreign powers including the United States, Marines were dispatched to protect American interests. There are many parallels with 1900 China and deployment of Marines today. Protection of citizens of the United States, such as non-combatant evacuations, or support to a treaty partner or allied nation happen on a near continuous basis. Because of the rapid deployment capability of the Marines, forward-deployed units, and reputation for measured use of force, the Marines have remained at the forefront of response.

¹⁵⁰ Correspondence from U.S. Secretary of State John Hay to foreign offices in China, "Open Door Note of 6 September 1899."

The Marine Corps has always maintained close relations with key members of the political establishment of the United States. Although no President of the United States has served as a Marine, numerous politicians from congressional representatives to governors have earned the title of Marine. Notwithstanding those that were in the Marine Corps, the record of Marine exploits in the history of the United States helps to garner support from influential leaders throughout the country. However, there have been many instances throughout the history of the Marine Corps politicians and other services questioned the need to maintain the organization. Marine leadership has always seen the need to foster close relationships with key decision makers and legislators to prevent the Marine Corps from being relegated or disbanded all together.¹⁵¹

As the Marine Corps became larger because of global events requiring more forcible entry and expeditionary operations, the Marine's ability to influence key policymakers continued to grow. Some cases were complimentary, such as a young Herbert Hoover and his wife living in Tianjin, China in 1900, viewing the Marines as part of the international force that helped defeat the Boxers and Imperial Army.¹⁵² Another example of lasting relationships with the Marines was that of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, close friend and colleague of Marine Captain Thomas Holcomb. Roosevelt would eventually be President of the United States and one of his sons a Marine colonel. Holcomb would become the Commandant of the Marine

¹⁵¹ Gordon W. Keiser, *The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification 1944-47: The Politics of Survival* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), 50.

¹⁵² Preston, 47-48, 325. Future U.S. President Herbert Hoover and his wife Lou were newly married when they moved to Tianjin. Despite the escalating violence, the Hoovers decided to stay in Tianjin to watch over their Chinese staff. The Hoovers remained in China until September 1901.

Corps during the interwar period and in the first years of the United States participation in World War II. Holcomb would also become the first Marine to achieve the rank of general.¹⁵³

The political landscape in America has always been vital to the Marines. During post-war periods, the Marine Corps shrank at times to less than ten thousand personnel. Garnering support with Congress and the White House was key in keeping the organization. Whether it was an indirect approach, such as a very skilled use of public affairs that occasionally bordered on propaganda, or a direct approach of lobbying with Congress, the Marines were able to maintain the organization even in the direst years. Actions such as the relief of the legations in Beijing, the assault across France in World War I, and the island hopping campaign of World War II set in motion powerful displays of the Marines successfully supporting United States interests. Actions such as Executive Order Number 969,¹⁵⁴ the 1909 Rider to Appropriations Bill,¹⁵⁵ and the National Security

¹⁵³ David J. Ulbrich, *Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936-1943* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 177-185.

¹⁵⁴ U.S. President, Executive Order 969. "In accordance with the power vested in me by section 1619, Revised Statutes of the United States, the following duties are assigned to the United States Marine Corps: (1) To garrison the different navy yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States. (2) To furnish the first line of the mobile defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States. (3) To man such naval defenses, and to aid in manning, if necessary, such other defenses, as may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States. (4) To garrison the Isthmian Canal Zone, Panama. (5) To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace."

¹⁵⁵ U.S. Congress, *1909 Rider to Appropriations Bill*, Washington, DC, 1909. This bill placed Marines back of Navy ships.

Act of 1947,¹⁵⁶ were significant in that the Marines Corps was recognized as being vital to the security of the United States. Despite such successes, unofficial organizations such as the “Chowder Society” formed to aid the Marine Corps in maintaining its relevance and relationship with the policymakers of the United States until the 1952 update of the National Security Act of 1947.¹⁵⁷

Ironically, the greatest threat to the existence of the Marine Corps has been the Army, and at times the Navy and Air Force. Notable examples between the late 1800s and until the 1952 update of the National Security Act, illustrate cases that the Army attempted to diminish responsibilities or remove the Marine Corps from existence.¹⁵⁸ Immediately following the Boxer Rebellion, Army forces became the legation defense force in Beijing for four years, despite the fact it had always been a Marine duty.¹⁵⁹ The Navy and Marine Corps relationship has been strong but tenuous throughout the years.

¹⁵⁶ U.S. Congress, *National Security Act of 1947*.

¹⁵⁷ Roe et al., 25.

¹⁵⁸ Keiser, 50, 103. The JCS 1478 papers of 1946 were drafted by the Army and prepared to be sent to Congress. General Eisenhower, the chief architect of the documents made several recommendations, “The Marine Corps be maintained solely as an adjunct of the fleet and participate “only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested.” It be recognized that “the land aspect of major amphibious operations” would be undertaken by the Army; consequently, “the Marine forces will not be appreciably expanded in time of war.” It be agreed that the Navy would not develop a land Army or a so-called amphibious Army. Marine units should be limited in size to “the equivalent of the regiment” and the total size of the Corps “therefore limited to some 50,000 or 60,000 men.”” During testimony at the 1947 House Expenditures Committee Meeting, General Eisenhower was questioned at length on the proposals of JCS 1478, to which he replied to members of Congress, “Let me tell you Mr. Congressman, the ground forces are not entirely stupid. When you put us in the same family with the glamor boys, the Navy and the Air Forces, where are we going to come out? We take the losses and win the war.”

¹⁵⁹ Heinl, 144-145.

There were several instances of removing Marines from ships, causing worry amongst the Marine Corps leadership that they would be relegated to non-existence. Even following World War II, then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Omar Bradley, noted that amphibious operations were outdated, a direct affront to the Marine Corps that had just defeated the Japanese from Guadalcanal to Okinawa and designed the doctrine that brought the Army ashore in Africa and Europe.¹⁶⁰ Although a contested landing has not taken place since the Korean War, the Marine Corps maintains the amphibious force as an option for combatant commanders. As the Marine Corps became a true combined-arms force with the application of military airpower, a constant struggle exists in retaining Marine aviation in joint operations due to cases of a lack of understanding of how a Marine Air-Ground Task Force operates and adherence to joint doctrine.¹⁶¹

There has always been a correlation with service in the Marine Corps and adventure overseas. As the Marines have maintained ship detachments and expeditionary units throughout its history, the interest of potential recruits has been drawn to this service. Travel to foreign, and potentially unknown lands has been a staple of Marine Corps recruiting, especially in years before and after major wars when it was not fashionable to join the military. Traveling to Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in the first two hundred years of the United States was much more limited than it is today for the

¹⁶⁰ Krulak, 71. Less than one year before the Inchon landings in Korea, General Bradley stated: "I am wondering whether we shall ever have another large-scale amphibious operation." General Eisenhower made similar comments in 1950 referring to the simplicity of amphibious operations.

¹⁶¹ The author has witnessed first-hand lack of knowledge of air component members that do not understand the tenants of how the Marine Corps is organized to fight and in what manner Marine air supports the overall air component in a campaign.

average citizen. Marines as part of ship detachments on United States Navy vessels were able, and are still able to conduct port calls to the far reaches of the globe. Coupled by the small size of the Marine Corps in comparison to the rest of the military, recruiting for overseas service was never difficult.

Marines have come from all walks of life since the history of the Marine Corps. However, the inclusion of minority and female Marines did not take place until well into the twentieth century.¹⁶² As segregation and women's rights were not yet realized to the extent that equal rights exist today, there was a hesitation upon the part of the Marine Corps to implement a force that truly depicts the fabric of the American society. Notable pioneers in the Marine Corps concerning inclusion of all people include the Montford Point Marines and the Navajo Code Talkers of World War II.

Much of the segregation and lack of diversity in the Marine Corps was indicative of an officer corps made up of predominantly southerners. Many Marine officers were from Virginia, some attending The Citadel and Virginia Military Institute. Parents and grandparents of Marine officers in the first half of the twentieth century were at times veterans of the Confederacy, and many heroes of Marine leaders were the likes of Robert E. Lee or "Stonewall" Jackson.¹⁶³ Commandant Holcomb, like many before him, were not immune to the racial discrimination in and outside the Marine Corps. It was not until

¹⁶² Millett, 468. *The Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1948* introduced Women and African-American Marines for the first time to active duty. The small numbers made it easier for the Marine Corps to integrate than their service counterparts.

¹⁶³ U.S. Marine Corps History Division, "LtGen Twiggs." Captain Myers was born in Germany in 1897. His father, a West Point graduate, served as Quartermaster General for the Confederacy during the U.S. Civil War; Jon T. Hoffman, *Chesty: The Story of Lieutenant General Lewis B. Puller, USMC* (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2002), 13.

after retirement from the Marine Corps when General Holcomb became the United States Ambassador to South Africa that he saw the errors in his ways upon viewing rampant apartheid.¹⁶⁴

Diversity has significantly improved across the United States and within the Marine Corps and all of the services. Currently, all specialties in the Marine Corps are in the process of opening to women, including combat arms positions previously open only to men. The Marine Corps has personnel from all walks of life and orientations and openly recruits those qualified to serve based on abilities and desire to enlist. The ability to maintain a small force in comparison to the remainder of the armed forces is a key element to the Marine sense of elitism, especially as the Marines can be more selective on those chosen to join in the smallest branch of the military.

Recruit training and officer candidate's schools are the vital element for instilling the Marine Corps' values into personnel. While entry-level training has evolved since 1900, the most important aspect of this initial training is indoctrination to the Marine culture.¹⁶⁵ The emphasis of recruit training is the understanding and an embracing of the warrior ethos and importance of working together. At the end of ten to twelve weeks of training, the basic Marine has transformed from civilian to understanding that they are heirs to a long tradition of an elite family of warriors. The creation of a separate sub-culture of Marines is more pronounced than all the other services, and echoes with the adage, "Once a Marine, Always a Marine." This sense of duty to the nation and the Marine Corps was vital in ensuring standards and regulations. As Marines were tasked

¹⁶⁴ Ulbrich, 177-185.

¹⁶⁵ Thomas E. Ricks, *Making the Corps* (New York: Scribner, 2007), 20-21.

with ensuring discipline of Sailors on ship in addition to other duties, the Marines afloat had to maintain a higher level of discipline than their Naval counterparts did.

For the Marine Corps to operate, it must do so at a lesser cost than the other services. The largest costs associated with the Marine Corps is that of personnel.¹⁶⁶ Annual actual strengths of the services is reliant upon the funding appropriated by the United States Congress. The Marine Corps is the only service whose post Global War on Terror personnel numbers are greater than before 11 September 2001.¹⁶⁷ As the Marine Corps has expanded roles and missions, the economic factor it has on the overall Department of Defense budget is minimal. While only utilizing 8 percent of the military's budget, the Marine Corps is able to field the world's eighth-largest air force, 15 percent of the military's infantry battalions, 11 percent of the military's artillery batteries, seven Marine Expeditionary units, and numerous global crisis response forces. The Marine Air-Ground Task Forces are complementary in part to the larger government expenditures of naval vessels, aircraft, nuclear weapons, and reserve personnel.¹⁶⁸

Maintaining the Marine Corps as an amphibious force implies the requirement of the Marines to reside near the littorals or on ship. The Marines of the 1900s understood this as does the Marine Corps of the twenty-first century. Basing Marine forces along the coasts of California, Virginia, and North and South Carolina provided necessary to link rapidly and maintain close relationships with the Navy. Assuming such key missions as

¹⁶⁶ Current Operations Division, *Marine Corps 101 Brief*, Slide 22.

¹⁶⁷ U.S. Marine Corps History Division, "Marine Corps Fiscal Year Ends Strengths: 1798-2015."

¹⁶⁸ Current Operations Division, *Marine Corps 101 Brief*, Slide 22.

advanced base operations enabled the Marines to maintain a forward presence in event of crises. The placement of Marines at legations and embassies ensure Marines are at all reaches of the globe, ready to respond in defense of American foreign service personnel and facilities. While Marines have remained along the littorals and stationed at forward-based embassies and posts, ship to objective maneuver that requires distant transverse of the land has maintained logistically difficult. As the Marines that defended the legation in Beijing found out, there are likely no supplies available past what the detachment brings.

Similarly, as the Marines pride themselves in operating in any clime and place, units have found themselves unprepared at times due to an accelerated deployment, but have learned from their mistakes. While the detachment supporting the American in Beijing did not bring all the required provisions, the Marines at Chosin in 1950 were expecting a drawn-out fight in freezing conditions.¹⁶⁹ However, it is commonplace for a Marine unit to conduct an engagement in the sub-tropics then proceed to mountainous or winter training immediately afterwards.¹⁷⁰ Pacific and Atlantic fleets, due to areas of responsibility, each maintain diverse landscapes and climates that may require a forward-deployed Marine unit to come ashore in any condition.

In conducting operations around the world, the Marine Corps has earned many monikers from their adversaries. During the Boxer Rebellion, although not limited to the Marines, the Boxers were at times mortified by supposed supernatural abilities some of

¹⁶⁹ Heintz, 557.

¹⁷⁰ It is the experience of this author that one week an engagement may take place in freezing conditions in South Korea, then the following week engagements occur in Luzon, Philippines.

the foreign powers possessed.¹⁷¹ The German Army fighting the Marines in France during World War I questionably coined the term *Teufelheunden*, loosely translated into the familiar term “devil dog.”¹⁷² Communist Chinese and North Korean forces fighting the United Nations forces purportedly were told not to engage the “yellow legs” if possible, referring to the leggings the Marines still wore from World War II.¹⁷³ Even most recently in Afghanistan, Taliban fighters have been advised to not fight the Marines due to their ferocity on the battlefield.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 212-213.

¹⁷² Aaron B. O’Connell, *Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 10-11.

¹⁷³ Wesley L. Fox, *Courage and Fear: A Primer* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 109-110. Intercepted radio communications and captured North Korean and Chinese forces produced several striking moments of how the communist forces viewed the United States Marines. Colonel Wesley Fox, Medal of Honor recipient, notes several examples from his experiences in the Korean War. “Do not attack the 1st Marine Division. Leave the yellow legs alone.” “Panic sweeps my men when they are facing the American Marines.”

¹⁷⁴ Bing West, “Meanwhile, in the War in Afghanistan,” *Wall Street Journal*, updated 2 April 2011, accessed 8 April 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703712504576232542899743046>.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The Boxer Rebellion serves as a model for current Marine Corps operations. Rapid deployment from the sea, coupled with forward-based and forward-deployed units is a trademark of the Marine Corps now and in 1900. Even in 1900, China was not a completely strange environment for the Marines, as ten previous deployments had given the Marines knowledge of the operational environment. The Marine Corps has proven throughout the years that they are very adaptive, a necessary quality for an expeditionary force. Maintaining a habitual relationship with the Navy, and a complementary relationship with the larger land Army, the Marine Corps' role has been modified throughout the years to fit the defense priorities of the United States. The small composition of the Marine Corps, coupled with the relatively young force, has been able to maintain their relevancy by establishing an ethos as an elite, expeditionary force that also maintains a special role at America's embassies worldwide.

The Marine Corps and Department of State have been each other's beneficiaries since the early days of the United States. As the Department of State began their foreign service to expand interests and political relationships abroad, the Marine Corps was alongside, supporting global diplomacy. When diplomacy failed, the Marine Corps would be used to calm the situation until peaceful relations could commence. Today, the first American one sees at an embassy abroad is likely a United States Marine. During the Boxer Rebellion, the protection of the legation in Beijing serves as the most notable defense of Department of State activities abroad.

The Spanish-American War and the subsequent occupation of the Philippines enabled the Marines to rapidly deploy in support of American interests in China in 1900. The requirement to conduct combat and stability operations had led to the Marine Corps growing to be able to field regimental sized units for the first time. The Philippines operations also brought the Marine Corps into the limelight significantly for the first time, and the Boxer Rebellion built upon the growing public knowledge on how the Marines were enabling American interests abroad.

Maintaining combat forces aboard ship was not novel to the Marine Corps in the 1900s. The habitual relationship with the United States Navy is key to the Marine Corps' existence and success. Marines give the amphibious force commander options other than an air or surface fire strike from the sea. Marines on ship can project combat power ashore, tailored to fight as an organic or composite unit. Landing on foreign soil, perhaps for the first time for an American, the Marine realizes that he is on uncharted and likely unfriendly territory.

As a result of their actions in the Philippines and China, the Marines became a more vocal player in Washington, DC, and were able to lobby for more relevance and status amongst the services. Increases in personnel led to more missions after the Boxer Rebellion, including permanent overseas stationing and policing during the Banana Wars. Eventually, the Marine Corps would become an equal branch of the military, maintain general officer representation, and remain at the forefront of United States presence overseas.

Events from 1898 to 1900 gave Marine Corps planners their early operational insights for combat in Asia. The counterinsurgency fight in the Philippines and

conventional battles in China gave the Marines much needed large-scale engagements that they had previously lacked. The Marine Corps saw the need to maintain forces overseas and keep the habitual relationship with the State Department. Marine leaders saw the need to maintain ship detachments as a ready force for any contingency, and worked diligently to maintain an afloat posturing.

Throughout a Marine's short tenure of four years in the Marine Corps in the twenty-first century, it is not uncommon to have deployed on several ships, executed combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, conducted disaster relief operations abroad, and participated in numerous exercises and theater security cooperation events. While the Marine Corps of today has technologically advanced weapons and equipment to support such operations, there is still nothing more vital to mission success than the highly trained and capable Marine.

A staff ride to Beijing, Tianjin, and Dagu, the key hotspots during the Boxer Rebellion, are vital in truly understanding the battleground of 1900 China. As a Marine coming ashore for the first time, this must have been a daunting task for Captain Myers and his Marines in 1900. China is immense, and the trip from Tianjin to Beijing is a significant distance to travel, even by an advanced high-speed rail. While China's population in 1900 was not as large as it is today, the hostile Boxers, population, and Chinese Imperial Army of the time kept the small contingent of Marines on guard for their journey towards Beijing through Dagu and Tianjin.

Equally as impressive in Beijing is the fact that once the legations were relieved, the foreign militaries occupied and marched upon the Forbidden City. A massive walled city of nearly one thousand buildings, the Forbidden City is an intimidating structure that

served as the image of Imperial China. Just blocks away, the foreign legations were besieged for fifty-five days in 1900. The importance of the Forbidden City is not lost with the post-imperial Chinese. The current Chinese Government appreciates its history and maintains this iconic fortress of red buildings for all to see. As the foreign militaries marched in to the Forbidden City, China would never be the same. Today, the United States Embassy sits in a high-end district of Beijing, approximately twenty minutes by car from the Forbidden City.

Recommendations

Military history is a vital element in the development of military professionals. Understanding the past of the military profession in relation to strategic and human factors is key in the development of future military leaders. As a military leader develops, it is important to continually refresh and enhance foundations in history, creating a mindset that can appreciate the lessons of thousands of years of warfare. The inclusion of military history by appropriate-level schools, unit-led military education events, and individual progression are key in development of a military professional.

Entry-level military education in history is vital in sustaining the desire to maintain interest in history. However, it is the experience of the author that entry-level training in history ends up being focused only on facts and dates, and not why certain historical events are contextually important. When studying military history, there needs to be a focus on the diplomatic, information, military, economic, weather and terrain, and social paradigms. As the conduct of most modern warfare is by elements of the state, it is important to know why the state is waging battle and what the strategic end states are. Studying and understanding why the state is using the military provides even the most

junior of professionals the means in which to contextualize the importance of historical military events.

Military professionals must study military history. In the profession of arms, the past battles, campaigns, and wars must be analyzed and studied. Professional military institutions at all levels must focus periods of education towards the study of military history. It is key to enable every opportunity for open dialogue discussions on the study of military history. Opportunities in which to conduct staff rides to walk the grounds of a previous conflict are ideal. Just as a commander must gain an appreciation of the battlefield in preparation and execution of operations, the military historian should take every chance to do the same.

From military professionalism and the study of military history comes the enhanced ability for commanders to conduct operational art. Utilizing the past as ways to envision current and future problems are key towards operational art. While historical examples may have different and outdated formations and technologies, the human and strategic aspects remain key. To this date, many basic formations and fundamentals exist in the conduct of conflict. The Marines fighting in the Banana Wars in the early twentieth century would not be surprised to find current forces utilizing many concepts from the *Small Wars Manual* in the conduct of counter-insurgency operations in the Global War on Terror.

The study of military history in appropriate-level schools, unit-led military education events, and individual progression are key in development of a military professional. Using examples from history broadens the mind of the military professional and presents the opportunity of a seasoned mind for even the youngest of professionals.

Units and individuals able to conduct staff rides and fully dissect past military operations through diplomatic, information, military, economic, weather and terrain, and social paradigms may gain the appropriate understanding of the complexities and linkage between the tactical fight and national strategy. While technology continually aids the evolution of warfare, the underlying human factors and strategic aims will always be present to influence the battlefield. The future of the military must study from those that have gone before, in order to design military operations of tomorrow.

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