IS THE CULTURE OF THE BRITISH ARMY CONDUCIVE TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF MISSION COMMAND?

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MASTERS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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# Is the Culture of the British Army Conducive to the Successful Execution of Mission Command?

The British Army formally adopted Mission Command into doctrine in 1989. This command philosophy espouses centralized intent and decentralized execution, encouraging freedom of action and initiative, elements vital to the successful employment of the Manoeuvrist Approach. To guide commanders in the pursuit of Mission Command, doctrine prescribes one guiding principle, four enduring tenets and five essential elements. Moreover, trust and mutual understanding are also fundamentally important for Mission Command enactment. Such requirements necessitate an organizational culture which facilitates the successful execution of Mission Command and therefore maximizes operational effectiveness.

A literature review identified a British culture supportive of Mission Command, yet a British Army culture unsupportive of Mission Command. Nationally, Hofstede’s dimensions identified Britain’s culture as individualist, masculine, and indulgent, with weak uncertainty avoidance, low power distance and intermediate short- versus long-term orientation. The associated cultural traits generally supported Mission Command. Organizationally, using Schein’s model, analysis of Army culture identified a core of espoused values that, with the exception of heroes, supported Mission Command. However, identified obstructive artifacts and some misalignments between espoused values and exhibited behaviors undermined Mission Command. These included a propensity for oversized headquarters, prevalence of a management culture, risk-aversion, micromanagement and a zero-defect mentality.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The British Army formally adopted Mission Command into doctrine in 1989. This command philosophy espouses centralized intent and decentralized execution, encouraging freedom of action and initiative, elements vital to the successful employment of the Manoeuvrist Approach. To guide commanders in the pursuit of Mission Command, doctrine prescribes one guiding principle, four enduring tenets and five essential elements. Moreover, trust and mutual understanding are also fundamentally important for Mission Command enactment. Such requirements necessitate an organizational culture which facilitates the successful execution of Mission Command and therefore maximizes operational effectiveness.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .......... iii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................... v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................... vi
ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................... ix
ILLUSTRATIONS .............................................................................................................. x
TABLES ............................................................................................................................ xi

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................1

Background ..................................................................................................................... 1
Problem Statement .......................................................................................................... 3
Primary and Secondary Research Questions ............................................................... 4
Key Definitions ............................................................................................................... 4
  Mission Command ...................................................................................................... 4
  Culture ......................................................................................................................... 6
  Success ........................................................................................................................ 7
  Espoused Values ......................................................................................................... 8
Limitations and Delimitations of the Investigation ......................................................... 8
Assumptions .................................................................................................................. 10
Methodology ................................................................................................................. 11
Thesis Structure ............................................................................................................ 13
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 14

CHAPTER 2 AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MISSION COMMAND IN THE
BRITISH ARMY ...............................................................................................................15

The Origin and Development of Mission Command—Frederick the Great
to 1945 ....................................................................................................................... 16
Adoption and Adaptation of Mission Command by the British Army—1945
to Present .................................................................................................................... 22
CHAPTER 3 WHAT IS CULTURE? ...............................................................................34

Culture Defined............................................................................................................. 34
What Constitutes Culture? (Elements and Dimensions)........................................ 37
Levels of Culture ......................................................................................................... 40

CHAPTER 4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURE AND MISSION COMMAND ..................................................50

CHAPTER 5 BRITAIN’S CULTURE AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR MISSION COMMAND .................................................................60

Power-Distance ............................................................................................................. 63
Collectivism versus Individualism................................................................................ 68
Femininity versus Masculinity...................................................................................... 78
Uncertainty Avoidance ................................................................................................. 81
Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation .............................................................. 89
Indulgence versus Restraint ......................................................................................... 90
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 92

CHAPTER 6 THE BRITISH ARMY’S CULTURE AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR MISSION COMMAND ..................................................94

Espoused British Army Culture .................................................................................... 96
British Army Values and Standards .............................................................................. 97
British Army Ethos ..................................................................................................... 101
Regimental System ..................................................................................................... 101
Comradeship ............................................................................................................. 103
Pride ........................................................................................................................ 104
Leadership ............................................................................................................... 105
Example .................................................................................................................. 112
Warrior Spirit .......................................................................................................... 115
National Attitudes to Conflict and Warfare ............................................................ 117
Management Culture ................................................................................................... 120
Disciplinary System .................................................................................................... 121
Army Headquarters Size ............................................................................................. 124
Language ..................................................................................................................... 126
Career Management System ....................................................................................... 128
Living-In and Socialization ........................................................................................ 131
Summary ..................................................................................................................... 134

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION..........................................................................................136

The Research Questions Answered ............................................................................ 136
What is the Origin of Mission Command Philosophy? ............................................ 136
Why did the British Army Introduce Mission Command? ......................................... 137
How has the Concept of Mission Command Developed in the British Army? ...... 137
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGAI</td>
<td>Army General Administrative Instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDP</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1. Numbers of Summary Hearings and Courts Martial as a Percentage of Army Strength Between 2009 and 2015........................................................124
TABLES

Table 1. A Comparison of British Army and Mission Command Cultures ...............53
Table 2. Requirements for the Successful Enactment of Mission Command ..........62
Table 3. Key Differences Between Small and Large Power-Distance Societies: The Workplace ..................................................................................................................64
Table 4. Key Differences Between Individualist and Collectivist Societies: The Workplace, School, General Norms, and Ideas .................................................................70
Table 5. Key Differences Between Feminine and Masculine Societies: Gender, and Sex, and Leadership ........................................................................................................79
Table 6. Key Differences Between Feminine and Masculine Societies: Gender, and Sex, and Leadership ........................................................................................................82
Table 7. Key Differences Between Indulgent and Restrained Societies: Personal Feelings and Sex ................................................................................................................90
Table 8. The Effects of Hofstede’s Dimensions on the Successful Enactment of Mission Command in Great Britain .................................................................................92
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Background

Formally adopted into British Army doctrine in 1989, Mission Command and the Manoeuvrist Approach are two of the three tenets of the British Army.\(^1\) Introduced following the Bagnall reforms of the 1970s and 1980s as an answer to the threat posed by the Soviet Union in Europe, the new concepts sought to reinvigorate the British Army’s defensive plan.\(^2\) The theories of *Blitzkrieg* and *Auftragstaktik*, used by the German Army during World War II to generate notable tactical successes, formed the framework for these doctrinal concepts, and were adapted for the purposes of the British Army. Although slightly reworded since their introduction to British doctrine, the concepts remain as pertinent now as they did in 1989. In essence, the Manoeuvrist Approach is an indirect approach to warfare that seeks to pit strength against weakness by using both violent and non-violent means to seize the initiative.\(^3\) Mission Command is a command


\(^3\) DCDC, *ADP Operations*, 5-2.
philosophy based upon “centralised intent and decentralised execution that promotes freedom of action and initiative,” and underpins the Manoeuvrist Approach.4

Given these philosophical tenets are at the heart of modern British Army doctrine, their successful enactment is fundamental to how the Army operates, and to operational effectiveness. In other words, the British Army’s approach to operations relies upon the successful execution of Mission Command to enable the Manoeuvrist Approach. In order to codify the requirements inherent in the execution of Mission Command, doctrine details one guiding principle, four enduring tenets, and five essential elements.5 By abiding by these guidelines, leaders and their subordinates should be able to enact Mission Command successfully.

Although simple in principle, it seems logical that the organizational culture of the Army must support the requirements of Mission Command doctrine if it is to be successful. If an Army culture exists, perpetuating centralized command, then Mission Command is unlikely to be the norm and this, in turn, would undermine the Army’s ability to execute the Manoeuvrist Approach. A number of studies support this line of thought and, although predominantly focused on the United States (U.S.) Army, acknowledge organizational cultures can be misaligned with the requirements of Mission Command.6 The fact few studies focus on the propensity of the British Army’s culture to

4 DCDC, ADP Operations, 5-3.

5 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6-8; Director Concepts and Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, United Kingdom Joint Operations Doctrine (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, November 2014), 103-104.

6 Examples of studies that consider the relationship between Mission Command and culture are: Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British and Israeli Armies (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
support Mission Command emphasizes the requirement for such an analysis. The British Army must understand whether its culture is supportive of Mission Command and, if not, the senior leaders can implement a plan for change.

**Problem Statement**

Despite Mission Command philosophy comprising one of the three tenets of British Army doctrine, minimal literature examines whether the British Army’s culture supports the execution of Mission Command. Any misalignment between the culture of the British Army and the requirements of Mission Command will impede the Army’s efforts to enact the Manoeuvrist Approach. Ultimately, such a disconnect will undermine the Army’s approach to conducting operations and diminish its operational effectiveness. This highlights the relevance of the topic from the perspective of the British Army and emphasizes the requirement for research on the topic. Relevant research will enable the British Army to make an informed decision on whether to retain the *status quo*, or to initiate change.

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question for this thesis is: “Is the culture of the British Army conducive to the successful execution of Mission Command?” From this, answers to the following secondary questions formulate a comprehensive analysis:

1. What is the origin of Mission Command philosophy?
2. Why did the British Army introduce Mission Command?
3. How has the concept of Mission Command developed in the British Army?
4. What is the culture of the British Army?
5. What misalignments exist between espoused values and exhibited behaviors with regard to Mission Command? What are the implications of any misalignments?
6. What misalignments exist between Mission Command doctrine and culture? What are the implications of any misalignments?

Key Definitions

Mission Command

The British Army and, more generally, the British military, have a number of current publications that describe and explain its Mission Command philosophy. At times, the definitions used to explain Mission Command, and the underpinning principles they describe, differ between publications. This variation in terminology often derives from the different age of respective publications, and so it is important to limit this study to the doctrinal publication that has current primacy. With this in mind, this the author

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considers Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01\(^8\) as the primary doctrinal publication governing Mission Command in accordance with Doctrine Note 15/04, which explains how the text from JDP 01 supersedes that of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Operations and the Army Doctrine Primer.\(^9\) Given primacy for Mission Command interpretation resides with joint doctrine, Mission Command must be defined as, “a style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources.”\(^10\)

Given the predominantly U.S. audience for this thesis, a brief comparison of the British and U.S. armies’ concepts of Mission Command is required at this point. British Army Mission Command is described in Doctrine Note 15/04 as “the command philosophy of the Army” in which commanders “delegate authority [to their subordinates, yet] . . . retain responsibility for their actions.”\(^11\) It is about centralized intent and decentralized execution to support rapid decision making by empowering subordinates.\(^12\) This philosophy is broadly consistent with the U.S. Army’s assertion that Mission Command philosophy is “essentially a human endeavor . . . [in which] . . . commanders

\(^{8}\) Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01.

\(^{9}\) Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.

\(^{10}\) Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01.1, United Kingdom Supplement to the NATO Terminology Database (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, September 2011), M-3.

\(^{11}\) Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.

\(^{12}\) DCDC, ADP Operations, 5-3.
provide a clear intent to their forces that guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative.”

Where the U.S. and British armies’ opinions of Mission Command diverge is that the British consider Mission Command to be only a philosophy. The British Army does not use the term Mission Command to denote a warfighting function in the way the U.S. Army does. The analysis in chapter 2 reviews the British Army’s concept of Mission Command more comprehensively.

Culture

A second key definition to make in framing this thesis is that of culture. The review in chapter 3, What is Culture?, further investigates this topic, but it is worth addressing briefly at this juncture. Psychologist Edgar Schein offers the definition as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration. . . . A product of joint learning.” Other researchers have further conceptualized organizational culture as “the shared beliefs of a group used to solve problems and manage internal anxiety,” delineating shared beliefs as “the collective norms and values of an organization.” These definitions are by no means

13 Headquarters Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March 2014), 1-4.

14 Ibid.

15 Schein, 18.

the only ones in existence, but both these definitions add clarity to the concept of culture in an organizational context. Many definitions of culture are mutually supporting, but Schein’s was considered the most comprehensive single definition for the purpose of this research.

Success

The final point to consider from the primary research question is how “successful execution of Mission Command” will be recognizable. In other words, what constitutes success? The reality is some subjectivity is inherent in the analysis. One individual’s thoughts on what may facilitate success in this area will likely differ from another’s. A number of the espoused principles, tenets and essentials in doctrine do not have absolute values that denote success. Instead, commanders’ and subordinates’ individual personalities and command styles will determine exactly how they enact the doctrinal guidelines of Mission Command. Given this variance, when assessing whether the culture enables the successful execution of Mission Command, the author considered whether it is reasonable to expect that the culture could give rise to behaviors coincident with the principles, tenets and essentials of doctrine. Successful execution was, therefore, defined as an expectation that the cultural conditions allow commanders to use Mission Command to direct subordinates, and those subordinates will fulfil their commander’s intent.
Espoused Values

Edgar Schein defines espoused values as “the articulated publicly announced principles and values that the group claims to be trying to achieve.”\textsuperscript{17} The analysis of chapter 3 expands upon this concept further, but this definition adds clarity to its use in the secondary research questions.

Limitations and Delimitations of the Investigation

The scope of this investigation is limited to the British Army. It does not consider other services, agencies, departments or nations. Furthermore, it focuses on Mission Command within the Army chain of command alone, and does not stray into the command interactions that feed in to the senior Army leadership from politicians. The doctrine publication deemed most relevant to Mission Command in this context is JDP 01. As already alluded to, Doctrine Note 15/04 describes the primacy of this document, and so this will form the cornerstone of doctrinal tenets for the analysis. Other documents also bear relevance to the subject and so wider literature was also considered where applicable.

The review in chapter 3 compares the many conceptual studies of organizational culture, refining the best models to use as frameworks for the analysis of chapters 5 and 6. In spite of the large numbers of studies considering organizational cultures, few specifically investigate British Army culture. Every effort was made to use relevant studies written during the past five years (2010 onwards) to ensure cultural traits are relevant to the modern Army, with older literature used in the absence of recent

\textsuperscript{17} Schein, 15.
documentation. Army-wide surveys and studies validate the assertions made wherever possible.

When considering the impact of culture on Mission Command, it was unrealistic to analyze every aspect of culture. For example, Hofstede identifies more than 200 cultural traits related to the different cultural dimensions, many of which bear no apparent relationship to a tendency for Mission Command enactment. To refine this aspect, traits were only included where identified literature related them to Mission Command.

Another limitation is the analysis in chapter 5 does not consider the precise adoption of different cultural traits by Great Britain. Instead, it focuses on the cultural predisposition associated with broader cultural dimensions. Cultural dimensions, explained more fully in chapter 3, are “aspect[s] of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures.” Dimensions group together specific traits based on statistical analysis and so describe generalized cultural tendencies. They afford a useful tool by which to examine national culture, but do not consider predilections of societies for more specific traits that compose each dimension.

Although this investigation considers whether the British Army culture is conducive to the successful execution of Mission Command, it does not consider a solution to resolving any deficiencies. It seems logical that, where culture is misaligned

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19 Ibid., 31.

20 Ibid.
with Mission Command doctrine, a solution may come in one of three forms: changing the culture, changing the doctrine, or changing both the culture and the doctrine. It was not within the purview of this study to determine which of these is advisable or how to enact such change.

Finally, in terms of delimitations, this study does not consider the impact of specific subcultures on Mission Command within the Army. With a long history and well-developed Regimental system, significant subcultures are likely to exist across the Army, but the focus is on the organizational culture of the Army as a whole. This study considers the impact of the Regimental system, but not the subcultures of the system.

Assumptions

Some key assumptions, pertinent to this research project are:

1. The predicted operational environments used to formulate Mission Command doctrine in its current guise are valid. My research does not look to discredit or validate the operational environment or the utility of Mission Command.

2. The British Army seeks to enact Mission Command by applying the existing British Army doctrine.

3. The selected cultural studies of the British Army used in this thesis provide an accurate, representative analysis of current Army culture.

4. Different organizational cultures can either enable or obstruct the successful execution of Mission Command.
Methodology

The research for this paper was qualitative in nature. It investigated the relationship between two elements, Mission Command and British Army culture, seeking to understand whether one element, culture, supports the other element, Mission Command. A literature review provides the method of analysis, synthesizing and comparing existing literature of both elements in forming an assessment as to whether the relationship is supportive or not. Although the nature of research has an ethnographical slant in that it seeks to understand culture, no observational or interview-based data collection took place.

The first element of the literature review established the requirements of Mission Command philosophy. This sets the historical context for the formulation of the theory, and the reasons why the British Army adopted it. This historical context establishes the background for Mission Command in its current guise, as dictated by modern doctrine. There was an abundance of literature considering Mission Command’s historical development and therefore supporting this aspect of the review.

As the review turned to the current relevance of Mission Command, doctrine became the guiding literature on which the review focused. Such doctrine explicitly describes the expectations of Mission Command in its current guise by dictating tenets.

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21 Ethnography is “a qualitative strategy in which the researcher studies an intact cultural group in a natural setting over a prolonged period of time.” This research often uses observational and interview-based data collection methods. John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, 2014), 14, 242.

22 The author uses the word “tenets” to account for the guiding principle, enduring tenets and essential elements described in JDP 01.
for the successful application of theory. These tenets provided a handrail by which to consider whether culture supports Mission Command. An assessment as to whether the identified cultural traits support or hinder each of these required, tangible elements forms the basis for analysis in chapters 5 and 6. As well as these tenets, doctrine also identifies “trust” and “mutual understanding” as “essential conditions for Mission Command,” and so they are considered alongside the tenets.

The other aspect on which the literature review focuses is culture. As well as considering what comprises culture, it establishes the national culture within which British Army exists as well as the organizational culture of the Army itself. Identification of the national culture identifies predispositions of the Army’s recruitment base, which, ultimately, the Army will need to either overcome or reinforce. Hofstede’s analysis of national culture formed the foundation of this part of the review.

The works available to review the current British Army culture in the context of Mission Command were more than sufficient for analysis. An important aspect of this cultural examination was a comparison of espoused values held by the British Army, with the exhibited behaviors of its members, identifying misalignments between the two and considering their implications for Mission Command. Empirical data helped identify

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23 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6-8.

24 Ibid., 4.


26 Espoused values are one of the three levels of culture described by Edgar Schein; the other two being basic underlying assumptions and artifacts. Schein, 24.
the behavioral realities of the Army, and originated from various sources including Army-wide surveys and analytical papers.

Each identified relevant cultural trait was methodically considered against the determined requirements for Mission Command uncovered by the literature review. Such an analysis inevitably involved some subjectivity given the requirement to assert whether the cultural trait has a positive or negative impact on the enactment of Mission Command. Some instances were readily apparent. For example, a cultural trait that undermines trust is easily determined as undermining Mission Command. However, not every cultural trait has such obvious implications. In all instances the author used literature to support inferences in an effort to diminish his bias.27 Furthermore, new ideas were discussed with others to ensure the author considered multiple viewpoints.

This methodology set the conditions for three broad possibilities for the results. Firstly, the culture of the British Army may support the successful execution of Mission Command in all respects. Secondly, the culture of the British Army may not support the successful execution of Mission Command in any respects. Thirdly, the culture of the British Army may support the successful execution of Mission Command in some respects. It was not for the author to determine the relative importance of these outcomes, simply to identify whether the Army requires change in some manner.

Thesis Structure

With this context in mind, in chapter 2 the author considers the historical context of Mission Command, examining the roots of the concept. Initially this reviews the

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27 As a serving British Army Major, the author undoubtedly has a bias within this topic, developed through experiences of Mission Command during his career.
period from the time of Frederick the Great until 1945, before focusing more specifically on the conditions that led to Mission Command’s adoption by the British Army in its current guise. With this review of Mission Command theory complete, in chapter 3 the author considers different theories of culture, before, in chapter 4, establishing a link between the theory of Mission Command and culture. This consideration of the interaction between culture and Mission Command sets the framework for chapters 5 and 6, the analysis of which examines the cultural persuasions of both Great Britain and the British Army, considering the implications that each cultural manifestation has for the enactment of Mission Command, and whether or not it is supportive of the theory. Finally, in chapter 7 the author summarizes the key findings of the previous chapters, reviewing the relevance of this thesis against other literature, and proposing areas for future research relevant to the subject.

**Summary**

In order to maximize operational effectiveness, it is critical the British Army understands whether its organizational culture supports or hinders the enactment of its command philosophy, Mission Command. By means of a literature review, this thesis analyzes both the national culture within which the Army exists, and the Army’s organizational culture, to establish whether prevalent cultural traits are conducive to the successful execution of Mission Command.
CHAPTER 2
AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MISSION COMMAND IN THE BRITISH ARMY

The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.

— Ecclesiastes 1:1

Although only officially adopted into British doctrine in 1989, the concept of Mission Command has existed for far longer. In his book, *Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies*, Eitan Shamir dedicates a chapter to a comprehensive review of the development of Mission Command from the unwitting seeds of its conception in the time of Frederick the Great through to the Germans’ application of *Blitzkrieg* in World War II.\(^2\) He also addresses the adoption of Mission Command by the British Army following the end of World War II. His summary affords a useful handrail for this review, which will follow his chronology and supplement the key themes with other sources. The purpose of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of the relevance of Mission Command, by reviewing its historical precedence.

Broken into two subsections, the analysis under the first subheading studies the philosophy’s development through the ages by key protagonists, including Frederick the Great, Napoleon and Wellington. The analysis under the second subheading then looks at why, following World War II, the British adopted Mission Command in its doctrine and...
whether it was, in fact, a new concept for the Army. Finally, the author examines Mission Command philosophy as espoused in current British Army doctrine.

The Origin and Development of Mission Command
—Frederick the Great to 1945

In many respects, it may seem counterintuitive to look to the time of Frederick the Great to begin consideration of a topic that, by modern connotations, is synonymous with such ideas as trust and mutual understanding. In fact, in some respects Frederick’s command was almost the antithesis of modern Mission Command where “the thinking is done centrally, in the mind of the king” and “the principal aim was to turn the army into an instrument of a single mind and will.” His insistence on “exact discipline” ran contrary to any thoughts of trust for his soldiers yet, as Peter Paret observes, Frederick’s invasion of Silesia in 1740 “gave Europe a taste of what was later to be called Blitzkrieg” where he sought a quick, decisive war. This is not the only early seed of change, and the value of independent formations of light infantry and cavalry began to be recognized, although their use in this manner was the exception rather than the rule.

Despite these early indications of change, command in war during Frederick’s time was still a long way from resembling anything close to a modern understanding of

29 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 4.
31 Ibid., 98.
32 Ibid., 96.
33 Ibid., 102.
34 Shamir, 31.
Mission Command. Napoleon built upon Frederick’s foundations during his rule and, although his command was still unequivocally centralized, two key developments made advances towards Mission Command. The first of these, the creation of the revolutionary army, was not directly of Napoleon’s doing, but was certainly something from which he benefitted. In particular, the virtues bestowed by this army included a “dedicated soldiery, an officer corps based on talent, generals proven in battle, and a flexible tactical system.” This, to some extent, alleviated the reliance upon strict discipline, which had been characteristic of Frederick’s rule, in a way that was not possible in other armies. The second significant development of Napoleon’s rule was the introduction of the corps as a formation by combining divisions. The large numbers of soldiers Napoleon committed to battle were simply “too large to be controlled effectively by one man, and by subdividing his army into corps, Napoleon enhanced command and control.” To oversee this level of decentralization Napoleon “imposed much firmer central control on the dispersed commands,” and also created a staff system which, although devoid of decision-making power, was larger than any previously seen and enabled him to enact his

35 Paret, 133.


37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., 198.

39 Ibid.

40 Paret, 127.
control of the subordinate units.\textsuperscript{41} The success of these independent corps was dependent upon Napoleon’s intent being clearly understood by his subordinates,\textsuperscript{42} an aspect which translates directly to modern Mission Command.

The success that Napoleon enjoyed between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries forced his adversaries to reconsider the manner in which they waged war. Without doing so, they were unable to compete against Napoleon’s armies. At the forefront of such reforms were the Prussians who capitalized on the concepts developed by such influential theorists as Scharnhorst and Clausewitz.\textsuperscript{43} Clausewitz, a student of Scharnhorst, was particularly influential in the concepts used in developing \textit{Auftragstaktik}, now adopted in English as Mission Command.\textsuperscript{44} He envisioned that, to combat the “uncertainty” and “chance” inherent in war, “during an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be no time to review the situation or even to think it through.”\textsuperscript{45} Such reasoning infers the necessity for commanders to be innovative


\textsuperscript{42} Shamir, 32.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 33-34.

\textsuperscript{44} The adoption of \textit{Auftragstaktik} into the English language caused debate over how best it should be interpreted. Stephen Bungay, in his article “The Road to Mission Command,” describes how “\textit{Auftragstaktik} slipped into English as ‘mission command.’” However, an alternative translation, “directive control,” was offered by Richard Simpkin in \textit{Race to the Swift}. Shamir apparently regards such debates of the time as “endless (and, probably, at least some pointless) semantic debates.” Stephen Bungay, “The Road to Mission Command: The Genesis of Command Philosophy,” \textit{British Army Review}, 137 (Summer 2005): 22-29; Richard Simpkin, \textit{Race to the Swift} (Brassey: 1985), 227-240 quoted in Bungay, 29; Shamir, 118.

and decisive, but the Prussian Army required reform in order to inculcate such requirements.

Such reforms in Prussia occurred “within a wider social and political context,” and in many ways resembled the aforementioned Napoleonic system. That said, the introduction of a general staff and the emphasis on education, particularly at the Berlin academy, took the system to a new level, in which initiative of junior commanders was encouraged and authority was delegated down the chain of command. Prussian Army success in the Battle of the Nations (1813) and at Waterloo (1815) was, Shamir suggests, in part due to the “earliest version of Auftragstaktik and the cultural changes it has brought,” enabled by this reform.

If the makings of Auftragstaktik were now present in the Prussian army, they were yet to be institutionalized. Such efforts took place under the direction of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who commanded the Prussian Army commencing in 1857. Unlike Napoleon and Frederick the Great, Moltke commanded at a time when industrialization had started to affect the way in which war was waged. Of particular note was the influence of the railway and the introduction of the needle-gun, which served to contribute to a revolution of military affairs. With a backdrop of such technological innovation, Moltke was able to move his armies large distances by rail, an infrastructure

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46 Shamir, 34.
47 Ibid., 35-36.
48 Ibid., 36.
49 Knox and Murray, 102.
50 Ibid., 104.
which he used to pursue “short, decisive conflicts” against his adversaries.\textsuperscript{51} The separation and inevitable decentralization of forces caused by this practice necessitated supporting decentralized command to enable the Prussians to “[seize] the initiative and [force] opponents to react to Prussian moves.”\textsuperscript{52} In doing so, Moltke “refrained from issuing anything but the most essential orders” to his subordinates and was even “ready to condone deviations from his plan of operations if the subordinate general could gain important tactical success.”\textsuperscript{53} Such an emphasis on delegation runs entirely counter to the systems operated by Napoleon and Frederick, and relied upon Moltke issuing clear tasks (\textit{Auftrage}) to his subordinates rather than telling them how to conduct their missions.\textsuperscript{54}

With decentralized command now imbued in the Prussian Army, it should have set the tone for the next major conflict, World War I. However, where empowerment of subordinates, application of mission orders, and initiative at all levels characterized the German army in training, it did not translate to the application of \textit{Auftragstaktik} during the early parts of the Great War, despite its inclusion in both the 1888 and 1906 infantry drill regulations.\textsuperscript{55} The “deadlock and resulting industrialised attrition of the Western Front in the First World War was not a scenario in which \textit{Auftragstaktik} was able to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 105.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Paret, 291.
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Shamir, 40.
  \item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 41-46.
\end{itemize}
triumph” but, unlike the Allies, the Germans adapted their tactics as the war progressed. They began instead to seek victory through “a daring new approach to command and control” in which “superior skills, tactics, and leadership at the junior officer and NCO level” were features. The resultant new infantry unit, the Stosstrup (shock troops), enjoyed significant successes, acting independently and relying upon the initiative of junior commanders, although ultimately the war was lost.

The resurgence of *Auftragstaktik* by the Germans towards the end of the Great War formed the command and control basis for their subsequent development of *Blitzkrieg* (Lightning War) maneuver tactics, employed during World War II. *Blitzkrieg* relied upon “speed and surprise . . . on a different order of magnitude” to that seen previously, and so *Auftragstaktik* complemented it. It was a “fast-paced decentralized nature of mobile armoured warfare” that required responsive command and control to enable it. This was provided by the development of the radio which was an “example of technology employed in the service of doctrine,” supporting *Auftragstaktik* by expediting decision-making cycles and enhancing the situational awareness of low-level commanders.

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57 Shamir, 47.

58 Ibid., 47-48.

59 Ibid., 48-49.

60 Ibid., 50.

61 Ibid.
commanders. A debate over the importance of technology in Mission Command, discussed in chapter 6, continues to today. Senior commanders employing Blitzkrieg had to strike a balance between leading from the front and micromanaging, but the new doctrine afforded notable successes at the tactical and operational levels early in the war. Ultimately, however, diminishing application of Auftragstaktik at the strategic and operational levels, and a reduction in levels of training for combat casualty replacements degraded Auftragstaktik at the tactical level, which limited its success.

It is clear from this short look at the historical origins of Mission Command that there was no single catalyst for the creation of a new command theory. Instead, key military protagonists throughout history slowly, and cumulatively, changed the approach to command in war. Changes reflected other shifts in the manner of waging war, such as a change in the nature of army recruits and the technology available to commanders, and these set the conditions for how military leaders could enact their command. Another aspect of this review which is worthy of note is the evidence suggests adoption of such a style of command is not, in itself, a guarantee of success. Despite this, we will see in the next chapter how the British saw sufficient virtues in the German’s application of Auftragstaktik to institute a similar theory in the British Army.

Adoption and Adaptation of Mission Command by the British Army–1945 to Present

Following World War II, any hopes that Britain held of a period without significant military threat were short-lived as the Cold War began, dominating much of 

62 Ibid., 50-51.
63 Ibid., 51.
the next four decades. The emergence of a nuclear threat, and resulting theories of nuclear deterrence, saw Britain prepare for a “global war with the Soviet Union.”\textsuperscript{64} Such strategies of nuclear deterrence did not negate the requirement to have troops prepared to face the conventional Soviet threat in Europe,\textsuperscript{65} and this became the job of the British Army of the Rhine.\textsuperscript{66} The British Army of the Rhine, and more specifically 1 British Corps, constituted the British contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s defense planning.\textsuperscript{67} 1 British Corps was employed under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Northern Army Group, with its area of responsibility in the northern two-thirds of the Federal Republic of Germany.\textsuperscript{68}

The British conducted a substantial amount of military planning against this backdrop, although the fact that the “BAOR [British Army of the Rhine] had yet to formulate a plausible operational concept,” meant that “its dispositions were suitable neither for a cohesive positional defence, nor a mobile one.”\textsuperscript{69} To add further complexity to the dilemma faced by the British, diminishing defense spending and the end of conscription were significant factors in reducing Army numbers.\textsuperscript{70} In spite of these issues, the Army’s leadership sought to improve the situation, but the results were

\textsuperscript{64} Pugsley, “After the War,” 125.

\textsuperscript{65} Lee, 92-96.

\textsuperscript{66} Shamir, 80.

\textsuperscript{67} Pugsley, “After the War,” 121.

\textsuperscript{68} Lee, 43.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 44.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 40-42.
“mostly cosmetic and designed to accommodate a fall in defence spending,” and were further hampered from improving anything above the tactical level due to the Army’s ingrained traditions.\textsuperscript{71}

Although this Cold War threat provided a significant focus for the British Army, it was not the only commitment of British military forces at the time. British and Commonwealth forces conducted campaigns during the 1950s and 1960s in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Aden and Oman.\textsuperscript{72} These campaigns were invariably counterinsurgencies and so were of a different nature to the anticipated war on the continent. This resulted in theatre-specific doctrine that emphasized the need for decentralized command, in which “the skills and initiative of junior officers and NCOs were of critical importance.”\textsuperscript{73} This “counter-balanced” the broader Army doctrine\textsuperscript{74} that had emerged after World War II, under which the British Army of the Rhine operated, which sought to ensure that the commander maintained tight control of the battle. This led to a disparity between the British forces that operated on the continent and those that operated elsewhere, to the extent that, by the time the Falklands campaign was fought in 1982, the requirement to

\textsuperscript{71} Sangho Lee believes “deep-seated traditions, such as the regimental system, proved to be an additional barrier which hindered the formulation of a plausible concept of operations above the tactical level, because regimental officers were reluctant to develop a broader perspective of the battlefield.” Lee, 31.

\textsuperscript{72} Pugsley, “After the War,” 121.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
bring all Army units up “to a higher standard of agility and flexibility” with a lesser
degree of centralized control was apparent.\textsuperscript{75}

The divergent roles of the Army hitherto described, characterized on the one side
by a defensive posture on the continent and on the other by an expeditionary
counterinsurgency mind-set, set the stage for significant reforms in the British Army.
These reforms are largely attributed to Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall and became
known as the Bagnall reforms.\textsuperscript{76} Undertaken under the Conservative Government of the
Thatcher years, a period of significant fiscal restraint, Bagnall’s adage became “do more
with less.”\textsuperscript{77} That said, the Government facilitated an environment in which the Army
was able to implement the changes required by Bagnall, the 1981 defence review sparing
the Army further cuts and enabling continued weapon procurement.\textsuperscript{78} Bagnall, who had
commanded 1 British Corps and the Northern Army Group before becoming the Chief of
the General Staff saw the need to “transform the Army from a defensive and passive-
minded institution to an active one which would actually be capable of undertaking
defence without heavy reliance on the use of nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{79} He recognized that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{75} Shamir, 80-81.
\item \textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 114.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Lee, 17.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 144.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 16.
\end{itemize}
such reform would require a cultural change in the Army\textsuperscript{80} and, over a period of 18 years, set about driving forward the required changes.\textsuperscript{81}

Bagnall was not the only one driving change during this period but he was the most influential.\textsuperscript{82} As Commander of the Northern Army Group he organized a think tank called the Tactical Doctrine Committee, later known as the Ginger Group, which developed and tested new concepts.\textsuperscript{83} The Tactical Doctrine Committee results were significant and, in 1987, the British military introduced the Higher Command and Staff Course followed, in 1989, by the production of the first British operational-level doctrine, \textit{Design for Military Operations}.

Central to this new doctrine was the concept of a “manoeuvre-oriented offensive approach at the operational level,”\textsuperscript{85} an approach based upon Bagnall’s study of the German’s successes against numerically superior Soviet opposition during World War II.\textsuperscript{86} This “manoeuvrist approach” to war, which remains the first tenet of today’s British Army capstone doctrine,\textsuperscript{87} sought to attack the enemy’s weakness in high-tempo operations enabled by exploiting the same flexibility the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{80} Shamir, 111. \\
\textsuperscript{81} Lee, 33. \\
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 216. \\
\textsuperscript{83} Shamir, 113. \\
\textsuperscript{84} Lee, 224. \\
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 74. \\
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 81. \\
\textsuperscript{87} DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 5-2.
\end{flushright}
Germans had created with \textit{Auftragstaktik}. Bagnall sought to use both “positional” and “mobile” defense, combined with firepower, to initially deny Soviet penetration. He then looked to “rapidly exploit the successes by counter attack, or counterstroke, throughout the front during the early hours of the conflict to create an opportunity for an operational counter offensive to defeat the enemy’s main force.” In a period of diminishing resources in which his motto was “do more with less,” Bagnall looked to exploit the human element of the British Army to engender success.

The introduction of the Bagnall reforms in terms of Mission Command was of great significance to the British Army. As aforementioned, operations that exploited decentralized command had already been prevalent, but only in very specific theaters, and generally in counterinsurgencies. Bagnall’s reforms created a common doctrine across the Army that espoused decentralized command. The human element was central to this new doctrine because the flexibility created by “directive control,” or Mission Command, facilitated the tempo of operations necessary to execute the Manoeuvrist Approach. By allowing subordinates to use their initiative within the bounds of the commander’s intent, forces were able to react more quickly to a rapidly changing situation and exploit fleeting opportunities for success.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\footnote{Lee, 81; Shamir 115.}
\footnote{Lee, 84; Shamir 115.}
\footnote{Lee, 84.}
\footnote{Ibid., 17.}
\footnote{Shamir, 115.}
\footnote{Lee, 81.}
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The influence of the Bagnall reforms on current military doctrine has undoubtedly been significant, and the current capstone doctrine, *ADP Operations*, retains the core tenets of the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command that the doctrine of 1989 espoused. It was not, however, the first doctrine of the British Army, nor was it the first time that the Army’s doctrine had advocated “centralised intent with decentralised execution.”

In fact, 1905 saw the first doctrine publication in the British Army and it stated:

> It will often happen that local circumstances, impossible to foresee, may render the precise execution of the orders given to subordinate leaders not only unsuitable but impracticable. Moreover, when it is impossible, as must often be the case, to issue more than very general instructions, the attainment of the object aimed at must be left to the initiative and intelligence of these leaders.

> Decentralisation of command, and a full recognition of the responsibilities of subordinates in action, are thus absolutely necessary; and leaders must train their subordinates not only to work intelligently and resolutely in accordance with brief and very general instructions, but also to take upon themselves, whenever it may be necessary, the responsibility of departing from, or from varying, the orders they may have received.

The fact that the essence of Mission Command was clearly articulated in the earliest British Army doctrine has led Pugsley to conclude that the publication of *Design for Military Operations* in 1989 was only revolutionary in that it introduced the operational-level of war, whereas in all other areas it “simply added to the existing doctrine.”

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96 Pugsley, “After the War,” 125.
influence following World War II, British doctrine strayed from its notion of centralized intent and decentralized execution, towards tighter centralized control, but this does not take away from the fact that decentralized execution was a pre-existing concept.

No matter how revolutionary the introduction of the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command to doctrine, the fact is that the concepts have remained central to the way in which the Army operates ever since their inclusion. According to Gary Sheffield, “from the 1990s onwards . . . doctrine was taken seriously and internalized by Army officers,” a situation that had historically not been the case. During this period, in spite of continual changes in the operating environment, the change in British Army doctrine has been “evolutionary rather than revolutionary.” This development has resulted in updates to the way doctrine describes Mission Command, but the essence of Mission Command remains centralized intent and decentralized execution.

The modern predilection for doctrine introduces further complexities given that different publications often describe concepts such as Mission Command differently. Such a situation occurs because the Army is subject to various types of doctrine, including Army, Joint, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Allied publications. The release of Doctrine Note 15/04–Mission Command in 2015 decreed that, for Mission Command, the wording of JDP 01 should supersede that of ADP Operations and the

97 Ibid., 121.


99 Ibid., E-21.
Both JDP 01 and ADP Operations have common origins in the now outdated Army Doctrine Publication Command 1995. Doctrine Note 15/04 tracks the most recent amendments in Mission Command doctrine. The changes introduced in this publication emphasize “greater effort needed by commanders to confirm understanding” of their subordinates, and “freedom to decide how to achieve intent rather than simply ‘mission.'” They also introduce the idea of flexing the level of control commanders exert over subordinates dependent upon the subordinate’s competence. With the adoption of JDP 01 as the presiding Mission Command doctrine, the philosophy is now described as consisting of “one guiding principle, four enduring tenets and five essential elements.”

The guiding principle is “the absolute responsibility to act, or to decide not to act, within the framework of a superior commander’s intent.” This principle requires commanders to always remember the “primacy of intent,” never deviating from their superior’s intent; they must apply “vigorous initiative,” acting quickly and without awaiting further instructions; and they can choose not to act, although this must be a conscious decision rather than inactivity through laziness or complacency.

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100 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.
101 Ibid., 3.
102 Ibid., 5.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., 6.
105 Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 103.
106 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 9.
The four enduring tenets of Mission Command that support this guiding principle are:

1. “Timely decision-making”—which emphasizes acting more quickly than the adversary to enhance the chance of victory because the enemy is less likely to be prepared. This requires a willingness to act on incomplete information and an ability to strike a balance between acting too soon or too late.\(^{107}\) Inherent in acting quickly on limited information is an acceptance of, and comfort with taking, prudent risk.

2. “Thorough understanding of superior commander’s intent”—responsibility is placed on both the commander, who must ensure he communicates his intent clearly and confirm the subordinate understands it, and the subordinate, who has “a duty to ensure they understand the intent.”\(^{108}\)

3. “Clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil intent”—this requires comprehension of the immediate commander’s intent and the intent two ranks up. In the event of conflicting intents, the superior commander’s has primacy.\(^{109}\)

4. “Determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion”—requires that “operations are commanded and executed with determination, drive, vigour and initiative” to counter the chaos and friction that is inherent in war.\(^{110}\)

Finally, the five essential elements of Mission Command are:

\(^{107}\) Ibid.

\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., 10.

\(^{110}\) Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 103.
[1] Commanders must ensure that their subordinates understand their intent, their own contributions and the context within which they are to act.

[2] Commanders should exercise a minimum of control over their subordinates, consistent with their experience and ability, while retaining responsibility for their actions.

[3] Subordinates are told what effect they are to realise and why.

[4] Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.

[5] Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent.\[111\]

Of note is the realization from these elements that a commander can legitimately intervene in the subordinate’s actions in order to achieve his superior’s intent. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that doctrinally pure language is an important aspect of clearly articulating tasks to subordinates and should be used wherever possible.\[112\]

It is noticeable that the revised interpretation of Mission Command in JDP 01 omits some apparently key tenets. Two of these are trust and mutual understanding.\[113\] Doctrine Note 15/04 explains this difference, stating that although these are essential to the execution of Mission Command, they are equally applicable to a centralized command philosophy.\[114\] As such, they remain critical components for successful execution of Mission Command in spite of their omission.

Although the theory of centralized intent and decentralized execution may not have been entirely new to British Army doctrine at the introduction of Mission Command, the revised interpretation in JDP 01 omits these key elements.\[111\] Directive Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.

\[112\] Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 4.

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\[111\] Ibid., 104.

\[112\] Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.

\[113\] DCDC, ADP Operations, 6-14 – 6-15.

\[114\] Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 4.
Command, it seems reasonable to say that it brought renewed vigor to its application. Mission Command provided a unified command concept for the entire Army, rather than being the preserve of counterinsurgency conflicts outside Europe. This historical conflict between different command approaches raises the question of whether the Army’s historical variation in command approaches has translated into a modern culture favoring a centralized or decentralized approach. Bagnall’s efforts were undoubtedly instrumental in this process of reform. Since the publication of *Design for Military Operations*, the concept of Mission Command has remained relatively constant, with minor changes ensuring its continued relevance for current operations. Such changes have resulted in the current preeminent Mission Command doctrine for the British Army as described in JDP 01.
CHAPTER 3

WHAT IS CULTURE?

Culture is deep, pervasive, complex, patterned, and morally neutral.\textsuperscript{115}
— Schein, \textit{Organizational Culture and Leadership}

\textbf{Culture Defined}

Much literature seeks to define culture and confer a common understanding of the phenomenon, yet a standard definition is seemingly illusive. The different frames with which laymen, anthropologists, organizational researchers and managers have viewed the topic have led to some confusion over what culture really means.\textsuperscript{116} Therefore, the first thing to address in this review of cultural studies is how some of the seminal works conceive of, and define, culture.

A glance at dictionary definitions for the word “culture” immediately attests to the plethora of definitions that exist. The Collins Concise Dictionary, for example, provides 11 definitions for culture, five of which are in some way related to the context of this study.\textsuperscript{117} Of these, the most relevant definition states that culture is “the total of inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which constitute the shared bases of social action.”\textsuperscript{118} This definition highlights some key components, namely that the

\textsuperscript{115} Schein, 53.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 13.


\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
manifestations of culture, in this instance ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, will be passed from one generation to another and together they constitute some form of group action. The Cambridge Dictionaries Online definition further emphasizes this group dynamic as it considers culture to be “the way of life, especially the general customs and beliefs, of a particular group of people at a particular time.”\textsuperscript{119} As well as raising the question of what group of people a particular culture might encompass, this also highlights time as an aspect of culture that was not present in the earlier definition. Although not included in many definitions on the subject it is often implicit in studies, which observe that culture can change through time, and so any study of it is therefore something of a snapshot in time.\textsuperscript{120}

Although these dictionary definitions begin to give us a sense for what culture might be, we must look at the ideas put forward by more comprehensive and analytical studies by the likes of Geert Hofstede and Edgar Schein. Hofstede considers culture to be “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others.”\textsuperscript{121} This definition furthers the understanding of culture by emphasizing that culture differentiates groups of people from one another, an element not explicit in previous versions. It also serves to reinforce the fact that it will transcend generations given that the mind is programmed to function in a particular manner.


\textsuperscript{120} Schein, 3; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 13.

\textsuperscript{121} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 6.
A final slant on cultural definition that is worth considering in formulating our understanding of the topic, is that of Schein, who believes that:

The culture of a group . . . [is] . . . a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.122

Such a definition is certainly more comprehensive than those considered so far, but still bestows some of the same aspects, in particular that culture in some way defines a group and that the manifestations of that culture will be passed on to new generations. What Schein introduces, however, is the concept that culture is learned by problem solving and is adopted when a successful solution has been discovered. He deliberately avoids using the word “behavior” in his definition because he believes that, although culture affects behavior, “behavioral regularities can occur for reasons other than culture.”123 Such a detailed definition conforms to Schein’s opinion that “culture is a multidimensional, multifaceted phenomenon,” but he also more simplistically distils his concept down by saying “culture ultimately reflects the group’s effort to cope and learn; it is the residue of that learning process.”124

The definitions considered here highlight various themes that are central to the concept of culture. All infer, at least to some extent, it is the ideas, beliefs, values, and shared assumptions that differentiate one group from another, and which subsequent generations learn and adopt. Although the Cambridge Dictionary Online is the only

122 Schein, 18.
123 Ibid., 20.
124 Ibid., 91.
definition to mention time, time is an aspect that is implicit because culture is changeable. Overall, the definition considered the most useful for this thesis is that of Schein, which consists of an extra level of complexity when compared to the others and acknowledges that culture is learned in response to problems faced by a group.

What Constitutes Culture? (Elements and Dimensions)

One thing the definitions do not necessarily clarify is how culture actually manifests itself. The various definitions have postulated that ideas, beliefs, values, knowledge, customs, programming of the mind, and shared basic assumptions are all significant aspects of culture, but this warrants further investigation to decipher how these aspects interact as tangible manifestations. As might be expected in a “soft, holistic concept” such as culture, the various researchers represent the ideas in different ways. They do, however, tend to agree that there are different levels at which groups characterize that culture, with some aspects being relatively superficial whilst others are more deep-seated. Indeed, many of the definitions of, and approaches to, studying culture are not mutually exclusive, with common factors witnessed between many studies.

Hofstede’s model envisages four levels of cultural manifestation, with the most deep-rooted element being values, and then increasingly superficial manifestations of rituals, heroes and finally symbols. Rituals, heroes and symbols comprise cultural

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125 Hofstede and Hofstede, 35.
127 Hofstede and Hofstede, 7.
practices, which are observable elements of that culture, the basis of which is rooted in the group’s values. One cannot grasp the meaning of these observable practices without understanding the underlying values that the group holds. Hofstede considers that values “are broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others,”\textsuperscript{128} which are acquired early in our lives and tend to be subconscious and therefore difficult to determine in a group.\textsuperscript{129} Because they are learned through the formative years they become very deep-rooted and difficult to change, forming the “stable element in culture.”\textsuperscript{130}

What this model does not address is how prevalent a value or practice must be to consider it culturally relevant to a particular group. As Hofstede observes, everybody belongs to multiple different groups at any one time,\textsuperscript{131} and so it becomes unclear what cultural traits are deemed to contribute to defining each of those group’s cultures. The term he uses to address this issue is “norms,” which is defined as the “standards of behavior that exist within a group or category of people.”\textsuperscript{132} He believes, in a “desirable environment,” such norms will be absolute, but in a “desired” environment, norms “indicate the choices made by the majority.”\textsuperscript{133} This delineation in-fers that not everyone in a group needs to bestow the same values all the time, or enact the same practices, but if the majority does so, then it becomes culturally defining of that group.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 8. \\
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 10. \\
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 21. \\
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 10. \\
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 21. \\
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid.}
Schein also envisions this concept of norms and describes “group norms” as “the implicit standards and values that evolve in working groups.”\(^{134}\) It is notable that this definition avoids referring to behavior in groups, instead referring to “standards and values,” in alignment with Schein’s opinion that behavior does not accurately describe culture. In terms of the Army, Alastair Finlan, who considers “the process by which norms influence behaviour in military institutions has yet to be satisfactorily identified in a concrete and sustainable manner,”\(^{135}\) seemingly supports this viewpoint. Further analysis identifies Schein does not consider values alone to be as deeply entrenched in culture as Hofstede.

Instead, Schein’s cultural model holds that “basic assumptions” are the most fundamental level of culture because, as he sees it, “values are open to discussion, and people can agree to disagree about them [, whereas] basic assumptions are so taken for granted that someone who does not hold them is treated as a “foreigner” or as “crazy” and is automatically dismissed.”\(^{136}\) When Schein refers to values, he tends to do so at a more superficial level, talking of “espoused values,”\(^{137}\) which he sees as a shallower element of culture than basic assumptions. A group can embed such espoused values and beliefs as assumptions through repeated validation, but such proof of success may not

\(^{134}\) Schein, 14.

\(^{135}\) Finlan, 8.

\(^{136}\) Schein, 23.

\(^{137}\) Schein defines espoused values as “the articulated publicly announced principles and values that the group claims to be trying to achieve.” Schein, 15.
always be possible. Finally, Schein identifies the most superficial level as “artifacts,” which are those tangible elements that are immediately visible in a culture.

Although Hofstede and Schein each frame the various elements of culture slightly differently, the basic premise is the same. They consider cultural manifestations to represent different depths of culture. The most deep-rooted of these manifestations are subconscious, slow changing and difficult to observe—values and basic assumptions respectively—and these inform the more superficial, observable manifestations. Both Hofstede and Schein insist it is easy to misinterpret the observable layers of culture if they are analyzed in isolation, and so one must understand values or basic assumptions to understand a culture fully.

What these models provide is a framework to help visualize different cultures. Such a structure will be a key component for analysis in this thesis, covered in more detail in chapters 5 and 6. The next section will examine the different levels of culture to which these theories relate.

Levels of Culture

Given the definitions reviewed earlier do not specify any particular type of group to which culture pertains, it seems logical that it can occur at many different levels. Literature on the subject supports this hypothesis with, for example, Schein describing four basic levels of culture, which are, from large to small, macrocultures, organizational

138 Ibid., 28.

139 Schein, 32; Hofstede and Hofstede, 21.
cultures, subcultures (including occupational cultures) and microcultures.\textsuperscript{140} Hofstede, on the other hand, is more specific about the different levels of cultures, listing specific levels rather than the categories that Schein describes; namely: national, regional, ethnic, religious, linguistic affiliation, gender, generation, social class, organizational, departmental and corporate levels.\textsuperscript{141} It could reasonably be expected that these levels each fit under the broader categories considered by Schein.

Despite this broad agreement between these authors, there is apparent disagreement in one specific area, the validity of the theory of organizational culture. The basis of Schein’s book, \textit{Organizational Culture and Leadership}, is founded upon his belief in the concept. He views it as an integral element of the broad notion of culture, and considers that “organizational cultures will vary in strength and stability as a function of the length and emotional intensity of their actual history from the moment they were founded.”\textsuperscript{142} By contrast, Hofstede does not consider organizational culture as comparable to macroculture, to the extent he believes “the same term culture for both nations and organizations is slightly misleading.”\textsuperscript{143} His insistence on a different definition for organizational culture from his broad definition of culture reinforces this point.\textsuperscript{144} The crux of his conceived misalignment between national and organizational

\textsuperscript{140} Schein, 2.
\textsuperscript{141} Hofstede and Hofstede, 11.
\textsuperscript{142} Schein, 3.
\textsuperscript{143} Hofstede and Hofstede, 365.
\textsuperscript{144} Hofstede defines organizational culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one organization from another.” Hofstede and Hofstede, 282-3. Although very similar to their broader definition of culture, “the
culture is that he believes individuals join an organization with their values already determined by their upbringing,\textsuperscript{145} and so practices contribute to an organizational culture much more than values.\textsuperscript{146} This viewpoint is at odds with Schein who sees culture as pervading all levels in a single guise. It is also worthy of note that Hofstede’s opinion is based upon the assumption that members of an organization are only involved in their organization during working hours.\textsuperscript{147} Such an assumption could be considered invalid for an organization like the British Army, which is vocational rather than occupational in nature and where members often live in Army accommodation surrounded by other soldiers and officers, are expected to work long hours, and are governed by the Army’s Values and Standards at all times.\textsuperscript{148}

One aspect that both authors agree on is that the different levels of culture influence the other levels, wherein “the national culture impact on organizations is collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others,” it seems significant that they feel a requirement to define this differently. Hofstede and Hofstede, 4.

\textsuperscript{145} Hofstede and Hofstede, 35.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., 286.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., 35.

\textsuperscript{148} Soldiers and officers are expected to abide by the service values of respect for others, loyalty, courage, selfless commitment, integrity and discipline at all times. Failure to do so will result in assessing the results of a soldier’s behavior against the Army’s standards (lawful, appropriate and totally professional) by application of the Service Test, which asks the question: “has the behavior enhanced or undermined operational effectiveness?” Behavior that fails the Service Test is liable for punishment regardless of whether the behavior took place in work or after working hours. DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-25.
The premise for this line of thought is an organization that exists within a particular macroculture, for example a nation, is inherently influenced by that national culture, and may be predisposed to certain cultural norms. Robert House supports this belief, stating, “organizational cultures reflect the societies in which they are embedded.” Furthermore, Hofstede even goes as far as to suggest “unawareness of national limits causes management and organization ideas and theories to be exported without regard for the values context in which they were developed.” Such a level of influence might limit the cultural proclivities of an organization to such an extent that an imported practice, like Mission Command, might not be possible in its adopted environment, a concept further supported by Eitan Shamir’s theory of interpretation and praxis gaps. That said, although Schein agrees that macroculture influences organizations, his view of organizations as more culturally malleable than in Hofstede’s model would suggest that this influence is not as absolute. This line of thought seems further supported by Finlan, who considers the all-volunteer recruits of

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149 Hofstede and Hofstede, 365.


151 Hofstede and Hofstede, 276.

152 Shamir asserts that, in adopting a borrowed concept such as Mission Command philosophy from another culture, there are two points, referred to as gaps, at which the theory can be misinterpreted. The first gap is “interpretation,” wherein a country adopts a subtly different doctrinal form of Mission Command because of cultural misinterpretation of the concept. The second gap is “praxis,” which refers to the unique cultural interpretation of the adopted doctrine. These gaps ultimately create two points of transformation, leading to a different form of adopted Mission Command when compared to the original. Shamir, 6-7.

153 Schein, 54.
today’s British Army are “psychologically attuned or predisposed to accepting the military way of life” which assists the Army as they seek to overcome the socialization of civilian life. Using Hofstede’s dimensions, Joseph Soeters adds further credence to this idea, identifying how army recruits hold cultural values better aligned to military life than do society at large. Furthermore, also using Hofstede’s dimensions, Page observed that “career officers” possessed the same divergent cultural traits to society as the recruits in Soeters’ study, thereby indicating that such a propensity for military culture has longevity.

In trying to understand the cultural alignment of nations, Hofstede developed five dimensions by which to compare national tendencies, wherein a dimension is “an aspect of culture that can be measured relative to other cultures.” These dimensions are power-distance, collectivism versus individualism, femininity versus masculinity, 

154 Finlan, 11.


157 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 31.

158 Hofstede and Hofstede, Chapter 2.

159 Ibid., Chapter 3.

160 Ibid., Chapter 4.
uncertainty avoidance,\textsuperscript{161} and long-term versus short-term orientation.\textsuperscript{162} Later, Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov added a sixth dimension, indulgence versus restraint,\textsuperscript{163} to this list. They categorized many countries from around the world according to these dimensions and their cultural inclinations were determined from this analysis. Their research showed Great Britain to be strongly individualist,\textsuperscript{164} masculine,\textsuperscript{165} and indulgent,\textsuperscript{166} with a very low power-distance index,\textsuperscript{167} a small uncertainty avoidance score,\textsuperscript{168} and an intermediate score for long-term versus short-term orientation.\textsuperscript{169} Britain’s classifications in these dimensions indicates the cultural predispositions of the society in which the British Army exists, and are therefore likely incline the Army towards particular cultural traits.

Although Schein considers that culture is “not easily reduced to a few dimensions,”\textsuperscript{170} he still explores macrocultural dimensions that affect organizational culture. Schein describes these “deeper cultural assumptions” as “what is reality and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., Chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., Chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{163} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, Chapter 8.
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., 141.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 282.
\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 59.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 194.
\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 256.
\textsuperscript{170} Schein, 91.
\end{flushright}
truth,” 171 “the nature of time and space,” 172 and “human nature, activity, and relationships,” 173 and, largely, they are broad categorizations that often encompass the dimensions proposed by Hofstede. In fact, Schein repeatedly cites Hofstede and explicitly mentions individualism versus collectivism and power-distance as elements of human nature. 174 Such overlap of theories adds weight to their applicability but, of the two theorists, Hofstede’s dimensions lend themselves more towards examining the impact of national culture on the British Army given that they examine the specific traits that exist in Great Britain’s culture.

A final point that is worthy of note regarding the different levels of cultures is that of the influence of subcultures. Schein acknowledges that “much of what goes on inside an organization that has existed for some time can best be understood as a set of interactions of subcultures operating within the larger context of the organizational culture.” 175 He goes on to explain how subcultures will, to some extent, differ from that of the organization given that members of these subcultures “hold assumptions beyond those of the total organization.” 176 This phenomenon is likely to be particularly prevalent in the British Army given its composition of a plethora of different arms, regiments, subunits and trades to name but a few. Indeed, authors have historically noted the strong,

171 Ibid., Chapter 7.
172 Ibid., Chapter 8.
173 Ibid., Chapter 9.
174 Ibid., 150-152.
175 Ibid., 55.
176 Ibid.
and at times divisive, strength of the traditional Regimental system in influencing culture and stifling change.\textsuperscript{177} Some cultural analysts have even gone as far as to suggest that “the British Army does not possess an overarching military culture” given the “tribal” nature of the Regimental system.\textsuperscript{178} Both Hofstede\textsuperscript{179} and Schein\textsuperscript{180} seek to classify different subcultures of organizations, with Schein specifically considering the generic cultural traits they may each contribute.\textsuperscript{181} That said, the reality is a long-established organization, such as the Army, will have evolved many subcultures beyond those proposed by Schein, and he acknowledges this possibility.\textsuperscript{182}

Also of note is Hofstede’s belief that, within subcultures, occupational cultures manifest themselves through practices and values in equal measure.\textsuperscript{183} This potentially becomes relevant for the British Army when considered in conjunction with Schein’s

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{178} Finlan, 138.
  \item \textsuperscript{179} Hofstede uses Henry Mintzberg’s classification of five distinct parts to organizations although he does not explicitly discuss subcultures between them. The five parts are: (1) The operating core (2) The strategic apex (3) The middle line (4) The technostructure, and (5) The support staff. Henry Mintzberg, \textit{Mintzberg on Management: Inside our Strange World of Organizations} (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1983), quoted in Hofstede and Hofstede, 252-253.
  \item \textsuperscript{180} Schein reviews the operator, engineering/design and executive subcultures. Schein, 57-67.
  \item \textsuperscript{181} Schein, 57-67.
  \item \textsuperscript{182} Ibid., 66.
  \item \textsuperscript{183} Hofstede and Hofstede, 285.
\end{itemize}
assertion about occupational cultures, where “if there is strong socialization during the education and training period and if the beliefs and values learned during this time remain stable as taken-for-granted assumptions even though the person may not be in a group of occupational peers, then clearly those occupations have cultures.”184 This being the case, the intensive basic training that Army recruits undertake could potentially create what is effectively a larger scale occupational culture that pervades the entire Army and would therefore mean that, in accordance with Hofstede’s analysis, values would play a more important role than in standard organizations.185 This theory seems further supported by Hofstede’s belief that members of organizations are only involved in them during working hours, an element that does not correspond to the Army. Furthermore, Soeters et al. identified that “military organizations represent a specific occupational culture which is relatively isolated from society.” They believe this trend towards an occupational culture results from, amongst other things, the “communal character of military life,” common training in schools and academies emphasizing uniqueness, strong identity encouraged by wearing a distinctive uniform, and long, irregular and anti-social working hours.186 Such an observation highlights both the prevalence of occupational cultures in

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184 Schein, 21.

185 This is not to say there is no variation within those that go through basic training, merely that many aspects of a common syllabus exist through the different training establishments. As such, there is a common thread of intensive training that links all members of the British Army.

uniformed services like the Army, and the influence of national cultures on occupational, and presumably organizational cultures given their interrelated nature.

This review of Schein’s and Hofstede’s cultural theories outlines the reasons for selecting the frameworks for analysis in chapters 5 and 6. Hofstede’s analysis focuses predominantly on national culture, and so serves as a useful tool for the examination of British culture and its implications for Mission Command in chapter 5. Schein focuses more on organizational culture and so his model affords a useful tool for the examination of the British Army’s culture and its implications for Mission Command in chapter 6.
CHAPTER 4
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CULTURE AND MISSION COMMAND

Command approach is based on a variety of attitudes and beliefs shared between organisational members and inculcated in new members.187
— Keith G Stewart, “The Evolution of Command Approaches”

With the theories of Mission Command and culture now independently established, the analysis of this chapter establishes the relationship existing between them. The author reviews existing literature to examine how culture can affect the efficacy of Mission Command, and what cultural traits are conducive for the successful application of Mission Command. This review does not focus on the specifics of the British Army, as the actual culture of the Army is established in chapter 6. Instead, it explores how Mission Command does not exist in a cultural vacuum.

Eitan Shamir’s book, *Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies*,188 provides a comparative analysis of the efforts of the U.S., British, and Israeli armies’ efforts to implement Mission Command. His analysis pays particular attention to the role of culture in these change efforts, acknowledging the different cultures that each of these armies possess when compared to the culture of the Prussian-German Army; the army that practiced *Auftragstaktik* which is the precursor for Mission Command. In his conclusion, Shamir acknowledges that, when


188 Shamir.
compared to the U.S. and Israel, the British have “probably been the most successful in implementing Mission Command,”\textsuperscript{189} but this is not to say that they have implemented it completely. In fact, he suggests that the British Army’s ability to use Mission Command successfully actually “regressed” between Operation Granby, the British military contribution to the 1991 Gulf War, and Operation Telic, the British campaign in Iraq between 2003 and 2009.\textsuperscript{190} Structural norms that had previously plagued the U.S.’s attempts at Mission Command now affected the British, as headquarters grew in size and orders grew in length.\textsuperscript{191}

What makes Shamir’s analysis so relevant to this investigation is the manner in which it considers Mission Command in light of culture. Indeed, when reviewing the historical development of Mission Command he remarks on how the success of the Prussian military in the early nineteenth century was “likely due to the earliest version of Auftragstaktik and the cultural changes it has brought.”\textsuperscript{192} Shamir comments on this influential relationship between Mission Command and culture a number of times, asserting Mission Command is a “cultural phenomenon”\textsuperscript{193} and “the question of cause

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 197.

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., 156.

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid., 145.

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 36.

and effect in regards to culture [and Mission Command] remains unsolved.”¹⁹⁴ With this foundation of interdependence between culture and Mission Command, Shamir offers the following summary of cultural requirements for Mission Command:

1. Understanding of and adherence to higher intent and the potential tension with the local mission.

2. Mutual trust based on professional competence (and not necessarily on acquaintance or relationship).

3. Excellent communication based on shared understanding of doctrine.

4. High value on learning as expressed and emphasized in training and education.

5. Tolerance for well-intended mistakes.

6. A propensity for action and initiatives.

7. Responsibility link to authority.

8. Belief in the ability of individuals to make sound judgement calls.¹⁹⁵


¹⁹⁵ Shamir, 26-7.
Table 1. A Comparison of British Army and Mission Command Cultures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>British Army</th>
<th>Mission Command Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Basic Assumptions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward war</td>
<td>A sport or game for the aristocracy</td>
<td>A social phenomenon, clash of wills produces friction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward the army</td>
<td>Limited basis, to secure and police the empire</td>
<td>Central institution, “an army that has a state”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward risk</td>
<td>Should be well calculated if taken</td>
<td>Necessary in all levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude toward the military profession</td>
<td>A lifestyle rather than a profession</td>
<td>A distinct profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main inspiration for military education</td>
<td>Tradition and practical experience</td>
<td>A balance of theory and practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Espoused Values</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social source of military elite</td>
<td>British serving aristocracy</td>
<td>A blend of aristocracy and professional elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command doctrine</td>
<td>Umpiring</td>
<td>Friction, chance and uncertainty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniquely emphasized principles of war</td>
<td>Maintenance of aim, moral, surprise, flexibility</td>
<td>Reciprocal and dialectic principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspiring figures</td>
<td>Marlborough, Wellington, Slim, Montgomery</td>
<td>Frederick the Great, Moltke the Elder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artifacts</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher military academies</td>
<td>Focus on staff administration</td>
<td>Produces military professionals elite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General staff corps</td>
<td>Medium status and influence</td>
<td>“Brain of an army,” high influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ’s staff organization</td>
<td>Similar to German structure, operations are “first among equals”</td>
<td>All staff functions revolve around operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>Conservative and suspicious</td>
<td>A tool to serve doctrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resources policies</td>
<td>The regimental system</td>
<td>Maintenance of unit cohesion and tactical flexibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Refining this list further, Shamir uses Schein’s Three Levels of Culture model (basic assumptions, espoused values, and artifacts)\(^{196}\) as a lens through which to reflect

\(^{196}\) Schein, 24.
upon what the organizational culture of the British Army was in the early 1980s, and what cultural features Mission Command required. Table 1 summarizes the results of his analysis. Although distinct differences between required and espoused cultures are noticeable, it is important to note that this analysis was compiled reflecting upon the British Army culture in approximately 1990, only a short time after the introduction of Mission Command as the primary command philosophy.

The disparity between the required and espoused cultures speaks to the central thesis of Shamir’s book, that “a borrowed concept such as Mission Command . . . will be interpreted and practiced differently by the adopting party due to the impact of particular strategic settings and organizational cultures.” To expand on this, he believes that two gaps exist for a party who seeks to adopt such a concept and, at each gap there is scope for mutation of the original concept. The first gap is “interpretation” which, in this instance, sees the output change because of the British Army’s “different cultural settings and diverse interpretations” when compared to the Prussian-German Army. The second gap, or “praxis, develops during the implementation of the adapted doctrine . . . as a result of an interplay between external and internal factors governing the organizational culture of each army and their unique modus operandi.” Given these gaps it is unsurprising to find the misalignment present in table 1 so soon after the concept’s introduction.

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197 Shamir, 96.
198 Ibid., 5.
199 Ibid., 6.
200 Ibid., 7.
Notably, Shamir observes that the British Army have in fact “developed a more subtle variant of Mission Command, better suited to [low intensity conflict] and counterinsurgency than to maneuver warfare” as a result of their recent and historic experiences of war.\textsuperscript{201} Given this potential shift away from the original version of Mission Command, it seems plausible that the required cultural standards of this distinctly British version may vary from those purported by Shamir and exhibited in table 1. Instead, the principles, tenets and essentials of JDP 01\textsuperscript{202} likely best describe the requirements of Mission Command.

When considering the more recent cultural influences that have affected Mission Command in the British Army, Shamir delves further into the contributing factors to the aforementioned praxis gap. Under the broad headings of civil-military, war amongst the people, education, training, and human resource policies, and technology, he reviews what may be contributing to this gap.\textsuperscript{203} One aspect that stands out in his analysis is the influence of modern societal culture on that of the British Army, which, ultimately, leads to a propensity for risk aversion.\textsuperscript{204} Specific contributors to this include an increasingly litigious society, increasing political correctness, and reduced tolerance for casualties.\textsuperscript{205} Such factors are relevant when considering modern army culture, underlining the importance of understanding the national, as well as organizational, culture.

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 198.
\textsuperscript{202} Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 103-4.
\textsuperscript{203} Shamir, 168-177.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 168-170.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
Although Shamir’s review of the relationship between culture and Mission Command is one of the most comprehensive, it is not the only study to make the link between the two concepts. Others, however, tend to focus on the U.S. Army’s culture, often comparing it to that of the Prussian and German armies, applying the assumption that, to enact Mission Command successfully, the U.S. Army culture should match that of the Germans.\textsuperscript{206} Many of these studies also fail to consider culture in its broadest sense. For example, although Scott Shaw states that, “in order to achieve a Mission Command culture, a leader . . . must pursue the six principles of Mission Command,”\textsuperscript{207} he believes that the most practical route to achieving such a culture is by means of a directed reading list.\textsuperscript{208} Such a reading list might be a useful tool in contributing to a common understanding of Mission Command, but it seems disingenuous to believe that reading alone can change a culture, especially when considered in light of models that seek to facilitate cultural change in organizations, such as Schein’s three Stages of Learning—Change\textsuperscript{209} and Kotter’s Eight Stage Model.\textsuperscript{210} Other authors seem to limit their purview

\textsuperscript{206} Heyward, Blanton, and Case.

\textsuperscript{207} Shaw, 20.

\textsuperscript{208} Shaw believes that the best method to instill a culture of Mission Command is “hard training, coupled with the supervision and evaluation of commanders,” but concedes that resource constraints make such training an irregular event. As such, he considers directed reading as the best alternative.

\textsuperscript{209} Schein, 300.

by considering culture only in the sense of “command culture,” which, although an important element, once again misses the broader cultural context.  

The apparent disparity in context between this thesis and the subject of these wider studies is not to say that they bear no relevance. In fact, many of them approach the topic from a slightly different angle and, as a result, offer varied perspectives on the influence of culture on Mission Command. These findings must be considered with caution given their predominant relevance to the U.S. Army, but it seems likely some should be equally applicable to the British Army. A case in point is Colonel Richard Heyward’s study, in which he considers that “the Army’s ability to embed Mission Command as an underlying assumption into organizational culture is imperative given the current and future operating environment.”  

In reviewing the likely future operational environment in which Mission Command will hold relevance, he envisages increasing uncertainty, diminishing resources, and a return to garrison-centric soldiering. Given the recent British drawdown of operations in Afghanistan, these assertions about the future environment seem equally pertinent. Furthermore, Heyward’s fears about toxic leadership, a failure to punish senior leaders’ indiscretions, a misalignment between “espoused theory” and “theory in use” in the job selection process, the size of headquarters, and a zero-defect mentality that breeds risk aversion all have the potential for equal relevance in the British Army given the common operational

211 One such author that considers command culture in isolation is John Case.

212 Heyward, Abstract.

213 Ibid., 4-7.
commitments of the past decade. The analysis in chapter 6 considers such cultural artifacts as they pertain to the British Army.

Colonel Tom Guthrie further highlights parallel issues faced by the U.S. and British armies in his paper, “Mission Command: Do We Have the Stomach For What Is Really Required?” In it, he questions the U.S. Army’s cultural predisposition for Mission Command resulting from generations-worth of “conditioning our institutional commanders and leaders to respond to mandates, go by the book, and stick to the checklist.”214 He specifically cites regularly used phrases, including “here’s what right looks like,” and “that’s not in the lesson plan,”215 which run counter to Mission Command and which, to the initiated, may seem equally prevalent in the British Army as in the U.S. Army.

The outcome of many of these studies is identification of a cultural deficiency for the encouragement of Mission Command. As such, many authors seek to identify practical steps to take in order to foster a culture that is conducive to Mission Command. These recommendations are wide ranging and varying in their specificity. Heyward suggests as many as 17 recommendations,216 whereas John Case identifies five217 and Blanton just three.218 The wide variety of recommendations by different authors reflects


215 Ibid.

216 Heyward, 20-22.

217 Case, 8-9.

218 Blanton, 23.
the broad, encompassing nature of culture. Each recommendation could conceivably contribute to changing different cultural traits and, cumulatively, create a culture that is conducive to Mission Command.

A common theme running through the literature linking Mission Command and culture is that the two often seem misaligned. This observation does not determine the specific assessment of this thesis given that, as previously explained, much of the literature pertains to the U.S. Army rather than British Army. What it does, however, is emphasize the link between the two concepts and underlines the fact that an army cannot expect universal enactment of Mission Command simply by decreeing it in doctrine. Instead, it must foster a culture that supports the doctrine and philosophy. Furthermore, this realization of a frequently identified misalignment between the culture of armies and Mission Command philosophy reinforces the requirement for a comprehensive analysis of the British Army’s culture, to confirm whether it supports Mission Command.
CHAPTER 5
BRITAIN’S CULTURE AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR MISSION COMMAND

Unawareness of national limits causes management and organization ideas and theories to be exported without regard for the values context in which they were developed.219
— Hofstede and Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind

In chapter 3, What is Culture?, the author established that national cultures inherently influence the culture of organizations that exist within them. This influence suggests the British Army will possess cultural predispositions consistent with those of Great Britain, given that Great Britain provides both its predominant recruiting base and the home station for the vast majority of British Army personnel. Given this relationship between national and organizational cultures, it is critical the British Army understands the broader cultural context within which it exists. In doing so, it will be possible to identify misalignments between the desired Army culture and the national cultural predilections, and either reinforce tendencies or initiate change accordingly. In the context of this thesis, this recognition of national cultural proclivities focuses on the society of Great Britain and their predisposition for enacting Mission Command.

The analysis of this chapter expands upon Hofstede’s assertion that Great Britain is strongly individualist,220 masculine,221 and indulgent,222 with a very low power-

219 Hofstede and Hofstede, 276.
220 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 95.
221 Ibid., 141.
distance index, a small uncertainty avoidance score, and an intermediate long-term versus short-term orientation score. It reviews the cultural traits associated with each of these predispositions, assessing whether they can reasonably be expected to support or hinder the successful execution of Mission Command. Some analysis of the relevance of Hofstede’s dimensions to Mission Command already exists. For example, Angela Febbraro considers cultures with low power-distance and high uncertainty avoidance to be better suited to enacting Mission Command. In this review however, the author seeks to understand the specific traits of each dimension as they relate to the requirements of Mission Command in the British Army.

Prior to the ensuing analysis of this chapter, and that of chapter 6, it is worth consolidating the requirements for successful enactment of Mission Command philosophy. This will provide a readily available list of required elements for comparison against the identified cultural predispositions, as they are unearthed. With this in mind, table 2 lists the key traits identified from the previous chapters, as well as an abridged title for use in the subsequent analysis where applicable. The purpose of the abridged titles is for ease of reference. It is not intended to change the meaning of the requirements, or to ignore any aspect of them.

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222 Ibid., 282.
223 Ibid., 59.
224 Ibid., 194.
225 Ibid., 256.
226 Febbraro, McKee, and Riedel, 3-11 – 3-12.
Table 2. Requirements for the Successful Enactment of Mission Command

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement</th>
<th>Abridged Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Guiding Principle</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The absolute responsibility to act, or to decide not to act, within the</td>
<td>Responsibility to act within the commander’s intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>framework of a superior commander’s intent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Enduring Tenets</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely Decision Making</td>
<td>Timely decision making.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Thorough Understanding of a Superior Commander’s Intent.</td>
<td>Understand the commander’s intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Responsibility on the Part of Subordinates to Fulfil Intent.</td>
<td>Responsibility to fulfil intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination to Take the Plan Through to a Successful Conclusion.</td>
<td>Determination for success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Essential Elements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders must ensure that their subordinates understand their intent,</td>
<td>Commanders ensure subordinates understand their intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their own contributions and the context within which they are to act.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders should exercise a minimum of control over their subordinates,</td>
<td>Commanders exercise minimum control while retaining responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consistent with their experience and ability, while retaining responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for their actions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates are told what effect they are to realise and why.</td>
<td>Subordinates are given an effect and purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.</td>
<td>Subordinates are allocated resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s</td>
<td>Subordinates decide how to achieve commander’s intent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Requirements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust.</td>
<td>Trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Understanding.</td>
<td>Mutual Understanding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Director Concepts and Doctrine, Joint Doctrine Publication 01, *United Kingdom Joint Operations Doctrine* (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defence, September 2011), 103-104.
Power-Distance

Hofstede observes that inequality is prevalent in all societies, and yet societies are distinguishable by the different manners in which they handle this inequality.²²⁷ In considering this relationship with inequality within countries, Hofstede identifies the cultural dimension of power-distance, which he defines as, “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.”²²⁸ In essence, Hofstede considers power-distance index scores to describe “dependence relationships” in a country between those in positions of power and their subordinates.²²⁹

This index classifies Great Britain as having a low power-distance index score, indicating, “there is limited dependence of subordinates on bosses, and there is a preference for consultation (that is, interdependence among boss and subordinate). The emotional distance between them is relatively small: subordinates will rather easily approach and contradict their bosses.”²³⁰ In an effort to distil this summary into distinct elements relevant in the workplace, Hofstede proposes a number of traits. Table 3 lists those traits for which existing literature highlights their relevance to Mission Command. They are: popularity of decentralization, fewer supervisory personnel, reliance by

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²²⁷ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 54-55.

²²⁸ Ibid., 61.

²²⁹ Ibid.

²³⁰ Ibid.
managers on their own experience and that of their subordinates, and expectation
superiors will consult with subordinates.\textsuperscript{231}

Table 3. Key Differences Between Small and Large Power-Distance Societies:
The Workplace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Small Power-distance</th>
<th>Large Power-distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decentralization is popular.</td>
<td>Centralization is popular.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are fewer supervisory personnel.</td>
<td>There are more supervisory personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers rely on their own experience and</td>
<td>Managers rely on superiors and on formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on subordinates.</td>
<td>rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates expect to be consulted.</td>
<td>Subordinates expect to be told what to do.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The popularity of decentralization is a fundamentally important cultural trait for supporting Mission Command. \textit{ADP Operations} explicitly describes how Mission Command philosophy is, at its heart, about “centralised intent and decentralised execution [to promote] freedom of action and initiative."\textsuperscript{232} Moreover, Doctrine Note 15/04 describes how Mission Command’s guiding principle necessitates “a style of command that promotes decentralised command."\textsuperscript{233} By decentralizing execution in this manner the subordinate commanders who, as a rule, will have better situational

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid., 76.

\textsuperscript{232} DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 5-3.

\textsuperscript{233} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.
awareness of the “lower tactical problems,” are empowered to select an appropriate
course of action themselves, thereby increasing tempo.234

Inherent within this propensity for decentralization is a desire for “flat
hierarchical pyramids.”235 The link between hierarchical structures and Mission
Command is apparent when considering how “tall organizations” create “slower
decision-making, cycles,”236 a situation which runs counter to the desire for high tempo
operations.237 As such, effective Mission Command necessitates a flat hierarchical
structure, a situation encouraged in low power-distance index societies like Britain.
General Sir Nicholas Carter, the Chief of the General Staff, observes, “flatter staff
structures encourage greater delegation and empowerment,”238 which emphasizes the
continued relevance of flat structures to modern Mission Command.

The lack of supervisory personnel associated with a small power-distance score
reinforces the ability to decentralize activities effectively. It encourages freedom of
action, which is inherent in a commander exercising minimum control over their
subordinates.239 Although the requirement exists for commanders to provide tailored
oversight of subordinate execution, large numbers of supervisory personnel would likely

234 Ibid., 3.

235 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 74.

236 Shamir, 16.

237 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 3.

238 Nicholas Carter, “Army Command Review–Next Steps,” GS/02/01/13
(January 26, 2015), 1.

239 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/05, 7.
have the effect of reducing the “speed of action” required of the guiding principle. As such, fewer supervisory personnel should enable relatively quicker execution, an important element of successfully enacting the Manoeuvrist Approach.

The affinity for managers to rely on their own experience and on their subordinates reinforces decentralized execution, and supports a number of the tenets and essential elements of Mission Command. Mission Command requires subordinates at all levels to “act quickly without waiting for further orders,” compelling subordinates to rely upon their own experience, rather than relying upon their commander to provide a solution. This supports commanders’ willingness to exercise minimum control over subordinates, thereby encouraging the level of delegation required for subordinate freedom of action. Desiring to act quickly, by making decisions without further orders highlights the support for enacting timely decision making.

Hofstede postulates small power-distance cultures may be good at “tasks demanding subordinate initiative.” He does not explicitly note this as a trait, but

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241 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 3.

242 Ibid., 6.

243 Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 104.

244 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.

245 Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 103.

246 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 75.
considers it likely given the effects of the other elements pertinent to a small power-distance culture. This inference would again be of fundamental importance to Mission Command enactment where “the need for vigorous initiative” is inherent in achieving the guiding principle,247 is required by commanders determined to see a plan through to successful conclusion,248 and is crucial where subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and why rather than how to achieve their mission.249

It is noteworthy that not all of these aspects of a small power-distance encourage Mission Command in its modern guise. For example, a risk associated with a propensity for decentralizing in the workplace is that superiors may be too willing to delegate responsibility to their subordinates, whilst not monitoring their actions closely enough. Mission Command advocates delegation of authority, but the commander retains ultimate responsibility for the actions of their subordinates.250 Commanders must treat individuals differently, tailoring the level of oversight they apply to the “commanders’ and subordinates’ abilities, training, personalities and experience”251 in order to successfully implement and succeed at Mission Command. Extreme decentralization in the workplace would make no allowance for such a tailored response.

247 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 9.

248 Ibid., 10.

249 Ibid., 7-8.

250 Ibid., 10.

251 Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 104.
The fact “subordinates expect to be consulted before a decision is made that affects their work”\textsuperscript{252} may also have negative implications for Mission Command. There cannot be an expectation of consultation before each decision is made given Mission Command’s reliance on timely decision making, enabled by subordinate commanders making decisions “quickly . . . [and] . . . on the spot.”\textsuperscript{253} Consultation at all times would, therefore, slow decision making. The fact that subordinates in small power-distance index countries “accept that the boss is the one who finally decides” may alleviate this friction to some extent.\textsuperscript{254}

**Collectivism versus Individualism**

Hofstede’s collectivism versus individualism dimension relates to the level to which the interest of the group prevails over the interest of the individual.\textsuperscript{255} He defines this dimension as follows:

> Individualism pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him-or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.\textsuperscript{256}

It is important to note the difference between considering this dimension at the societal level against a comparison of individuals. Hofstede believes, although this is a single dimension at the societal level, individualism and collectivism become distinct

\textsuperscript{252} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 74.

\textsuperscript{253} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.

\textsuperscript{254} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 74.

\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., 90-91.

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., 92.
dimensions when considering individuals.\textsuperscript{257} Individuals may hold strong values associated with each element, whereas “societies in which people on average hold more individualist values, they also on average hold less collectivist values.”\textsuperscript{258} It is, therefore, important to analyze the British culture given that “there is a wide range of types of employer-employee relationships \textit{within} collectivist and individualist societies.”\textsuperscript{259} In other words, individualist societies can contain organizations with collectivist values.

Hofstede’s analysis considers Great Britain strongly individualist, third internationally behind the United States and Australia.\textsuperscript{260} Table 4 lists not only the workplace cultural traits for individualist countries, but also some cultural traits associated with school, general norms, and ideas that conceivably influence Mission Command. “Speaking one’s mind,” “individual ownership of resources,” “low-context communications,” “learning how to learn,” and “individual interests prevail[ing] over collective interests”\textsuperscript{261} are not directly related to the workplace, but all bear relevance to Mission Command. In the workplace, pursuing interests based on self-interest, hiring and promoting “based on skills and rules,” “honest sharing of feelings,” “universalism,” and “tasks prevail[ing] over relationships”\textsuperscript{262} are all relevant in this context. Some of these traits are closely linked and so the ensuing analysis groups these aspects together.

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 102.

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., 121.

\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., 95.

\textsuperscript{261} Ibid., 113, 124, 130.

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid., 124.
Table 4. Key Differences Between Individualist and Collectivist Societies: The Workplace, School, General Norms, and Ideas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Norms</th>
<th>Workplace</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Ideas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individualist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaking one’s mind is a characteristic of an honest person.</td>
<td>Harmony should always be maintained and direct confrontations avoided.</td>
<td>The purpose of education is learning how to learn.</td>
<td>Individual interests prevail over collective interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual ownership of resources.</td>
<td>Resources should be shared with relatives.</td>
<td>The purpose of education is learning how to do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-context communication prevails.</td>
<td>High-context communication prevails.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collectivist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The norm that “speaking one’s mind” is a characteristic of an honest person is similar in nature to the workplace phenomenon of management theory teaching honest sharing of feelings. Both traits will engender trust given the cultural tendency for behaviors extolling honesty. It would be false to suggest that collectivist traits cannot also garner trust merely that, in individualist societies, “telling the truth about how one feels is
characteristic of a sincere and honest person.”\textsuperscript{263} The relevance of this trait to Mission Command is attested to by the assertion that trust “comes from the integrity of individuals [and] integrity requires adherence to a code, based on common values and standards, and honesty.”\textsuperscript{264} In other words, the honesty espoused in individualist countries is a virtue of integrity which, when shared by individuals, generates the trust that is critical to Mission Command.

Moreover, this idea of “speaking one’s mind,” in which “a clash of opinions is believed to lead to a higher truth,”\textsuperscript{265} emphasizes the importance of dialogue. The Army even encourages such dispute to some extent, understanding the value of “loyal dissent.”\textsuperscript{266} Dialogue is critical to “commanders ensuring their subordinates understand their intent, their own contributions and the context within which they are to act,” given the requirement in this essential element to “encourage thinking.”\textsuperscript{267} “Encourage thinking” is a leadership behavior described in the Army Leadership Code, which promotes “giving people the opportunity to think and suggest ideas.”\textsuperscript{268} Furthermore, such behavior generates trust,\textsuperscript{269} which is central to Mission Command.

\textsuperscript{263} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 107.

\textsuperscript{264} DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-21.

\textsuperscript{265} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 107.

\textsuperscript{266} DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-17.

\textsuperscript{267} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.


\textsuperscript{269} Ibid., 16.
The expectation of individual ownership of resources is an important supporting element of Mission Command. Resources are critical to enacting military activities, with sufficient resourcing considered one of the basic requirements of the physical component of fighting power.\textsuperscript{270} This relates to Mission Command through the essential element demanding “subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.”\textsuperscript{271} This requires subordinates to own their allocated resources to use as required,\textsuperscript{272} a situation facilitated by the individualist predisposition for individual ownership of resources. This trait also links to a wider expectation of individual responsibility and independence in individualist societies.\textsuperscript{273} This supports the tenet of Mission Command in which there is a “clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil intent.”\textsuperscript{274} The desired responsibility on the part of subordinates is congruent with the type of independent responsibility fostered in individualist societies.\textsuperscript{275}

Low-context communication is communication “in which the mass of information is vested in the explicit code.”\textsuperscript{276} In other words, individualist cultures often require things to be explicitly stated, where in collectivist cultures, which tend to enact high-

\textsuperscript{270} DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-31.
\textsuperscript{271} Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 104.
\textsuperscript{272} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 8.
\textsuperscript{273} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 108.
\textsuperscript{274} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.
\textsuperscript{275} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 108.
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid., 109.
context communication, the same things would be considered self-evident.\textsuperscript{277} Such a propensity for explicit direction should support the commander in bestowing his intent, given that “commanders have a duty to their subordinates to be clear in the expression of their intent and parameters for action.”\textsuperscript{278} Such clarity ensures “a thorough understanding of a superior commander’s intent,”\textsuperscript{279} and enables the commander to ensure subordinates understand his intent, their own contributions and the context within which they are to act, by giving “clear orders which cover context, intent and clear instructions to subordinates.”\textsuperscript{280} It also supports the requirement that subordinates are told what effect they are to realise and why, which explicitly calls for “clear, mutually understood language.”\textsuperscript{281}

At the same time, however, this desire to convey everything explicitly may lead to commander’s developing long intent paragraphs that are difficult to remember, contrary to the requirements inherent in commanders ensuring subordinates understand their intent.\textsuperscript{282} Hofstede highlights the potential for this to occur with his observation that business contracts in America (an individualist society), tend to be significantly longer.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{278} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{279} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{280} Ibid., 7.
\item \textsuperscript{281} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{282} Doctrine Note 15/04 states, “The intent paragraph of orders must be brief and easy to remember, so that subordinates can know it.” Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.
\end{itemize}
than those in Japan (a collectivist society).\textsuperscript{283} The relevance of such an issue is highlighted by the British Ministry of Defence’s assertion that “excessively long, confusing and hard to understand [orders are] inconsistent with the spirit and principles of Mission Command.”\textsuperscript{284}

The emphasis on “learning how to learn”\textsuperscript{285} is key to fostering the initiative required in an unfamiliar and ever-changing environment. It infers individuals “learning to cope with new, unknown, unforeseen situations” rather than learning how to do something specific.\textsuperscript{286} Mission Command philosophy is designed to best deal with “complex, dynamic and adversarial situations”\textsuperscript{287} in which scenarios are unfamiliar. Given that initiative is “enabled by shared experiences, doctrine, education, and training,”\textsuperscript{288} by emphasizing “how to learn” rather than “how to do,”\textsuperscript{289} individualist societies should be better equipped to apply initiative in an ever-developing environment. Indeed, Stewart considers “decentralised command requires extensive education and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{283} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 109.
\item \textsuperscript{284} United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, “Operations in Iraq: An Analysis from the Land Perspective,” Army Code 71816, 4-12, quoted in Shamir, 146.
\item \textsuperscript{285} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 124.
\item \textsuperscript{286} Ibid., 118.
\item \textsuperscript{287} DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 6-11.
\item \textsuperscript{289} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 119.
\end{itemize}
training of junior personnel.” This prospect supports the guiding principle of Mission Command, which calls for a command approach promoting “decentralised command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative.” It also supports subordinates deciding for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent, which demands operations be “commanded and executed with determination, drive, vigour and initiative.”

The idea that, in the workplace, employees are economic persons who will pursue the employer’s interest if it coincides with their self-interest is closely linked to the concept that individual interests prevail over collective interests. Neither seems conducive to Mission Command, which requires subordinates to enact the intent of superior commanders. This requirement is not predicated upon reflection of the subordinate’s interests in their commander’s intent. “The obligation on the part of subordinate commanders to act to achieve the higher commander’s intent is not negotiable,” regardless of whether the subordinate’s self-interests are met. As such, there is an apparent lack of support in this area for the Mission Command tenet dictating clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil intent given that it is unrealistic for commanders to align subordinate self-interest with the commander’s interest all the

290 Stewart, 6.
291 Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 103.
292 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.
293 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 124.
294 Ibid., 130.
295 Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 103.
296 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.
time. Langford, who believes Mission Command requires both collective and individualist traits to ensure the needs of others and the mission come before self-interest, supports this conclusion.

Hiring and promoting based on skills and rules is a characteristic that should encourage initiative in organizations and develop the trust required for Mission Command. Decentralized command necessitates “that personnel are appointed to positions that suit their talents.” By promoting and appointing people according to their skills rather than, for example, their experience, “the types of leaders [who] are more likely to embrace divergent views, and provide greater opportunities for subordinates to exercise initiative” are able to adopt critical leadership positions to “further [embed] mission command over time.” Such encouragement of initiative supports the guiding principle of Mission Command and supports subordinates deciding for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent. Ivan Yardley identifies a link between the perception of fairness in an organization’s promotions and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{297} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 119.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{298} Dianne Langford, “In what Ways Can Education and Training be Used to ‘Bridge the Gap’ between the Attitudes and Culture of British Army Recruits and the Army’s Organisational Culture?” (Master’s diss., University of Bath, September 2006), 14-15.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{299} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 124.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{300} Stewart, 8.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{301} Heyward, 16.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{302} Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 103.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{303} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.}\]
the development of trust.\textsuperscript{304} Subordinates must perceive promotion systems to be fair to foster trust in their superiors. By hiring and promoting based solely on skills and rules, individualist societies should encourage an honest, transparent system, perceived as fair and therefore engendering trust.\textsuperscript{305}

The concept of “universalism,” where all individuals are treated alike,\textsuperscript{306} seems it might encourage fairness, and therefore trust, in a way that collectivist societies cannot. This, however, is inaccurate, because although individualist societies consider “preferential treatment of one customer over others . . . [to be] . . . bad business practice and unethical,” the opposite is true in collectivist societies.\textsuperscript{307} This means the perception of fairness in this respect is different between individualist and collectivist societies, and so collectivist societies can still develop trust.\textsuperscript{308} In fact, a literal application of Hofstede’s interpretation of universalism, where the norm in individualist societies is “that one should treat everybody alike,”\textsuperscript{309} might actually obstruct Mission Command execution. This is because reality necessitates that “groups of subordinates and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{305} Military Secretary, “Career Management Handbook, Part 1: Career Management in the British Army,” (January 2014), 1, 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{306} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 122.
  \item \textsuperscript{307} Ibid., 122-123.
  \item \textsuperscript{308} Ibid., 123.
  \item \textsuperscript{309} Ibid., 122.
\end{itemize}
individuals are treated differently” ³¹⁰ to facilitate commanders exercising “minimum control over their subordinates consistent with their experience and ability.” ³¹¹

Finally, for individualism, the idea that tasks prevail over relationships supports the execution of Mission Command. In Mission Command, “the obligation on the part of subordinate commanders to act to achieve the higher commander’s intent is not negotiable,” ³¹² and so it is of paramount importance that subordinates pursue their tasks determinedly. The lack of reference to maintaining personal relationships in Mission Command doctrine speaks to the primacy of achieving tasks.

Femininity versus Masculinity

Femininity versus masculinity is a dimension exploring societal attitudes towards gender roles. Hofstede believes:

A society is called masculine when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.

A society is called feminine when emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. ³¹³

Hofstede identifies Great Britain as a masculine society, meaning it should predominantly display the traits of masculine culture. ³¹⁴

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³¹⁰ Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.
³¹¹ Ibid., 7.
³¹² Ibid.
³¹³ Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 140.
³¹⁴ Ibid., 147.
On its surface, it is difficult to see how femininity versus masculinity might relate to Mission Command. That said, Febbraro et al. believe “masculinity-femininity may affect whether the leader (and team members) are more focused on the task/achievement or on harmonious interpersonal relationships.” Furthermore, Hofstede identifies a propensity for sexual harassment in masculine societies. Both of these aspects, listed in table 5, have potential implications for Mission Command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Masculine</th>
<th>Feminine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender and Sex</td>
<td>Gender and Sex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual harassment is a big issue.</td>
<td>Sexual harassment is a minor issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leader and team members more focused on the task/achievement.</td>
<td>Leader and team members more focused on harmonious interpersonal relationships.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Febbraro et al.’s aforementioned statement infers masculine societies focus more on the task—achievement, whereas feminine societies focus on harmonious interpersonal skills. This belief seems to correspond to the individualist trait in which tasks prevail.

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315 Febbraro, McKee, and Riedel, 3-11.

316 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 159.

317 Febbraro McKee, and Riedel, 3-11.
over relationships. Its relevance to Mission Command is also consistent with the individualist trait in that the subordinate is obligated to achieve the commander’s intent, described by the tenet demanding “clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil intent.” Such an obligation makes no reference to a necessity to exercise interpersonal skills of any type. In other words, the “primacy of intent” outlined by the tenets of Mission Command focuses on task—achievement rather than interpersonal skills, and the trait, therefore, seemingly supports Mission Command.

The prevalence of sexual harassment in masculine societies, on the other hand, will obstruct Mission Command. This is because it is likely to undermine trust and diminish the ability to create cohesive teams. The Ministry of Defence identified that “sexual harassment is likely to break . . . trust and respect between colleagues.” Studies by Sabine Koeszegi and Archibald, reinforce the negative impact on trust and cohesion of a masculine culture in the workplace, wherein sexual harassment is rife. As already

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318 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 123.
319 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.
320 Ibid.
322 Ibid., 4.
described, the trust which this behavior undermines is of fundamental importance to the execution of Mission Command.

**Uncertainty Avoidance**

Uncertainty avoidance relates to the level of tolerance a society has for ambiguity, with Hofstede defining it as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations.”\(^{324}\) An amount of uncertainty is inevitable, although extreme ambiguity leads to anxiety, a phenomenon all societies have developed technological, legal and religious mechanisms to avoid.\(^{325}\) Hofstede considers Great Britain to have a low uncertainty avoidance score, meaning it has a relatively high tolerance for uncertainty.\(^{326}\)

Considered, along with power-distance, to be one of two dimensions especially relevant to leadership and command,\(^{327}\) it follows that uncertainty avoidance will have a notable influence on the execution of Mission Command. Table 6 contains the cultural traits associated with uncertainty avoidance deemed relevant to Mission Command by a review of literature. It shows how higher levels of “agreeableness,” “[comfort] in ambiguous situations,” tolerance of “open-ended learning situations,” ready acceptance

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\(^{324}\) Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 191.

\(^{325}\) Ibid., 189.

\(^{326}\) Ibid., 189, 194.

\(^{327}\) Febbraro, McKee, and Riedel, 3-11.
of new technologies, and “tolerance for ambiguity and chaos”\textsuperscript{328} in the workplace all impact the efficacy of Mission Command.

Table 6. Key Differences Between Feminine and Masculine Societies: Gender, and Sex, and Leadership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak Uncertainty Avoidance</th>
<th>Strong Uncertainty Avoidance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender Norm and Family</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In personality tests, higher scores on agreeableness</td>
<td>In personality tests, higher scores on neuroticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfortable in ambiguous situations and with unfamiliar risks</td>
<td>Acceptance of familiar risks; fear of ambiguous situations and of unfamiliar risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Shopping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students are comfortable with open-ended learning situations and concerned with good discussions</td>
<td>Students are comfortable in structured learning situations and concerned with the right answers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a fast acceptance of new features such as mobile phones, e-mail, and the internet</td>
<td>There is a hesitancy toward new products and technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work, Organization, and Motivation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance for ambiguity and chaos</td>
<td>Need for precision and formalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The personality facets associated with “agreeableness,” include “trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-mindedness.”\textsuperscript{329} As such, these traits should be abundant in British society given its weak uncertainty avoidance. Immediately, the tendency for trust in a weak uncertainty avoidance society is apparent,

\textsuperscript{328} Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 203, 208, 217.

\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., 197.
an element already shown to support Mission Command. What is less clear, however, is the amount of support “compliance” will afford Mission Command.

Compliance seems essential to the execution of military orders. As ADP Operations identifies, “at the tactical level, a mission to a subordinate is a direct order which should be followed.” However, the same paragraph identifies the inherent complexity associated with Mission Command, whereby,

[T]he subordinate’s duty to carry out the order is complimented by a responsibility to recognise changes to the circumstances that render the mission no longer appropriate, unlikely to succeed or that make it unlawful. At such time, the subordinate should have the confidence to seize the initiative and act differently.

Stewart makes the same point, identifying the need for “benign non-compliance” in decentralized command if subordinates are to seize the initiative. In other words, although compliance is required, there has to be some acceptance of non-compliance for successful enactment of Mission Command. This means agreeableness has the potential to obstruct those tenets and elements of Mission Command that demand subordinate initiative, yet support the “clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil intent.”

Tolerance for ambiguity and chaos in the workplace is a reflection of the societal comfort in ambiguous situations. The relevance of this aspect to Mission Command is

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330 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 4.
331 DCDC, ADP Operations, 6-21.
332 Ibid.
333 Stewart, 12.
334 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 9-10.
clear when considering, “uncertainty has always been a factor in military operations,” and “warfare is chaotic.” Mission Command “permits decisions to be made swiftly in the confusion and uncertainty of battle, and is increasingly necessary in an environment dominated by ill-structured problems.” This link between ambiguity and chaos and Mission Command leads Febbraro to believe low uncertainty avoidance cultures will be more comfortable with Mission Command. Febbraro cites a willingness to make “decisions in the face of uncertainty,” less formal decision-making procedures and plans allowing reassessment for modification, and a preparedness to adapt to unforeseen developments, as supporting elements of Mission Command. All these elements support the Guiding Principle of Mission Command, which is the absolute


336 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.

337 DCDC, ADP Operations, 6-24.

338 Febbraro, McKee, and Riedel, 3-12.


341 Febbraro, McKee, and Riedel, 3-12.
responsibility to act, or decide not to act, within the framework of a superior commander’s intent. 342

In explaining the relevance of comfort with unfamiliar risks, it is important to first identify that uncertainty avoidance and risk avoidance are not the same. 343 Uncertainty avoidance focuses on reducing ambiguity rather than risk. 344 That said, countries with weaker uncertainty avoidance are more content to accept both familiar and unfamiliar risks, wherein unfamiliar risks might include “a change of jobs or . . . engaging in activities for which there are no rules.” 345 The requirement for timely decision making necessitates taking risk, as decisions are often made “on the basis of incomplete information,” and so must take into account the “risks and benefits of acting too early or too late.” 346 Given that risk is inherent in military activities, it cannot be avoided altogether, and so commanders must learn to take calculated risk, 347 a facet referred to by the U.S. Army as accepting “prudent risk.” 348 A cultural contentment with both unfamiliar and familiar risk therefore supports timely decision making.

Comfort with open-ended learning situations and willingness for good discussions in the learning environment is another cultural trait supportive of Mission Command in

342 Director Concepts and Doctrine, JDP 01, 103.
343 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 197.
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid.
346 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 9.
347 DCDC, ADP Operations, 6-5.
348 Headquarters Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, 2-1.
many respects. When describing this trait, Hofstede explains how, “most British participants . . . despised too much structure. They liked open-ended learning situations with vague objectives, broad assignments, and no timetables at all. The suggestion that there could be only one correct answer was taboo to them. They expected reward for originality.” Although related to the educational environment, this statement correlates closely with a number of Mission Command’s characteristics. The element demanding subordinates are told what effect they are to realize and why, “allows subordinates to use their initiative to achieve the effect,” encouraging freedom of action. It does not require telling subordinates “how” to achieve the desired effect. Also of note, the element dictating commanders should exercise minimum control over their subordinates requires commanders “to accept that the task may not be done exactly as they would have done it,” an acknowledgement that there is usually more than one way to solve a problem. This encourages subordinates to decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent.

Two aspects of favoring open-ended learning that do not appear to support Mission Command are a preference for “vague objectives” and a dislike of timetables. Firstly, Mission Command requires commanders to “communicate intent clearly,” and objectives themselves “should be clear and attainable” at the tactical level. A

349 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 205.
350 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 8.
351 Ibid., 7.
352 Ibid., 8.
353 DCDC, ADP Operations, 5-7.
propensity for vague objectives hampers “a thorough understanding of a superior commander’s intent” and, because of its dependence upon a thorough understanding of commander’s intent, also obstructs the clear responsibility on the part of the subordinate to fulfil intent.\(^{354}\) Secondly, a dislike for timetables runs counter to the requirement for timely decision making, which dictates, “the quicker we act, the more likely we are to win.”\(^{355}\) This places a time constraint on Mission Command activities.

The fast acceptance of new features such as mobile phones, e-mail, and the internet in low uncertainty avoidance cultures is worthy of note at this juncture, although its precise impact on Mission Command is difficult to establish. Mission Command is fundamentally about exploiting the “capability and culture shared by the individuals making up the military organisation.”\(^{356}\) As such, technology can be an enabler of Mission Command, rather than the central requirement.\(^{357}\) Technological development has, historically, shown the potential to enhance Mission Command; for example, the advancement in radios during World War II sped up decision making and improved situational understanding of subordinate commanders.\(^{358}\) To reinforce this, Langford believes the propensity for embracing technological advances in the millennial generation

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\(^{354}\) Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 9-10.

\(^{355}\) Ibid., 9.

\(^{356}\) Stewart, 10.

\(^{357}\) Ibid.

\(^{358}\) Shamir, 51.
“is ideally suited to Mission Command which tells ‘subordinates what to achieve and why, rather than what to do and how.’”

In spite of this, modern doctrine recognizes the potential for technological developments to fuel a desire to adopt centralized command, thereby undermining Mission Command’s Guiding Principle, which promotes decentralization. Indeed, Sir Graeme Lamb believes there has already been a shift away from Mission Command, towards “mission control,” resulting from the high esteem with which technology is held. Other research has postulated, “technology does not always provide a suitable medium for conveying important messages involving statements of intent, such as commander’s intent.” Shamir even goes as far as to say that command and control digital systems have the potential to “kill mission command.” This short summary of technology indicates how, although acceptance of new technology is relevant to Mission Command, it is almost impossible to describe how technology will affect enactment of

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360 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 3.

361 Ibid., 6.


364 Shamir, 188.
Mission Command without looking at specific examples. As such, table 8 does not account for this trait.

**Long-Term versus Short-Term Orientation**

Long-term versus short-term orientation looks at a society’s tendency to focus on long-term results over focusing on the here-and-now. Hofstede defines it as, “the fostering of virtues oriented toward future rewards—in particular, perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, short-term orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present—in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of ‘‘face,’’ and fulfilling social obligations.”

Despite Hofstede initially analyzing Great Britain as having short-term orientation, a conclusion supported by the Chinese Value Survey findings, Hofstede’s most recent and comprehensive analysis shows Great Britain to have an intermediate score in this dimension. This means Great Britain is neither strongly long-termist nor strongly short-termist. In terms of using this data to analyze Great Britain’s predilection for Mission Command, it makes it impossible to identify which cultural traits Great Britain will favor. As such, the analysis of this chapter disregards long-term versus short-term orientation.

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365 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 239.

366 Hofstede and Hofstede, 211.

367 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 240.

368 Ibid., 256.
Indulgence versus Restraint

Indulgence versus restraint is the newest of the dimensions introduced by Hofstede, only added to his work in the third edition of Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. It examines societies’ “gratification of desires,” and is defined as follows: “Indulgence stands for a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun. Its opposite pole, restraint, reflects a conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms.” It is important to “note that the gratification of desires on the indulgence side refers to enjoying life and having fun, not to gratifying human desires in general.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indulgent</th>
<th>Restrained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personal Feelings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Attitude</td>
<td>Cynicism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Optimism</td>
<td>More Pessimism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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369 Ibid., Chapter 8, 277-298.
370 Ibid., 281.
371 Ibid.
Applying this dimension, Hofstede classifies Great Britain as strongly indulgent.\textsuperscript{372} Although it is difficult to see how many of the traits associated with this classification might affect Mission Command, table 7 details the areas that may have relevance. It shows a “positive attitude” and “higher optimism”\textsuperscript{373} will influence the execution of Mission Command.

Good leadership is a critical requirement to engender the trust and mutual understanding required for Mission Command,\textsuperscript{374} and a positive attitude and optimism can help in achieving this. According to \textit{ADP Operations}, “leaders should be realistic optimists. It is not good leadership to take a publicly negative or downbeat view in front of subordinates, particularly one that does not provide context, solutions or the upside. This duty to be positive applies at all levels of command.”\textsuperscript{375} The indulgent predilection for a positive, optimistic attitude will, therefore, support good leadership, encouraging trust and mutual understanding, and therefore support Mission Command. It should be noted the view of good leadership encompassed in \textit{ADP Operations} is based on “a particular attitude to leadership” held by the British Army.\textsuperscript{376} This infers it is culturally specific to the British Army.

\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., 282.

\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 291.

\textsuperscript{374} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 4.

\textsuperscript{375} DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-18.

\textsuperscript{376} Ibid., 2-17.
Summary

Table 8 summarizes the findings from chapter 5. A quick review of the data contained therein identifies that, despite some obstructions, the majority of cultural traits associated with Great Britain being individualist, masculine and indulgent, with small power-distance and uncertainty avoidance support the successful enactment of Mission Command. The effect of Great Britain’s intermediate score for long-term versus short-term orientation could not be assessed.

This information suggests that, overall the national culture positively affects the organizational culture of the British Army to encourage Mission Command. The Army should seek to reinforce those traits shown to support Mission Command, whilst addressing those aspects obstructing it. That said, this analysis shows the extremes of cultural proclivities for societies scoring where Britain does on Hofstede’s dimensions. The reality is that British society, and more specifically the British Army, will likely exhibit characteristics from either end of the spectrum for each cultural dimension. With this in mind, the analysis of chapter 6 identifies specific cultural proclivities present in the British Army, analyzing how they affect Mission Command.

Table 8. The Effects of Hofstede’s Dimensions on the Successful Enactment of Mission Command in Great Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirement of Mission Command</th>
<th>Small Power-Distance</th>
<th>Individualist</th>
<th>Masculine</th>
<th>Small Uncertainty Avoidance</th>
<th>Long- Versus Short-term Orientation</th>
<th>Indulgent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility to act within the</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requirement of Mission Command</td>
<td>Effect of Cultural Dimensions on Mission Command Requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small Power-Distance</td>
<td>Individualist</td>
<td>Masculine</td>
<td>Small Uncertainty Avoidance</td>
<td>Long-Versus Short-term Orientation</td>
<td>Indulgent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commander’s intent.</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timely decision making.</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand the commander’s intent.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility to fulfil intent.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determination for success.</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders ensure subordinates understand their intent.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commanders exercise minimum control while retaining responsibility.</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates are given an effect and purpose.</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates are allocated resources.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates decide how to achieve commander’s intent.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports &amp; Obstructs</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>Obstructs</td>
<td>Supports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Understanding.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Supports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Created by author.

Note: The effect of each cultural dimension on Mission Command requirements are classified as either supports, obstructs or N/A (not applicable). All classifications are based upon the analysis in Chapter V. Where the analysis identified a Mission Command requirement as both supported and obstructed by a cultural trait, this is denoted by Supports and Obstructs.
Despite the established national predisposition of Great Britain for accepting Mission Command, it would be wrong to assume that the Army exactly mirrors broader societal culture. Schein and Hofstede both acknowledge the influence of national cultures on organizations, but also identify that organizations also have cultures of their own. Indeed, Finlan identifies the concerted efforts of western militaries to undo the effects of civilian socialization in new recruits to “dislocate civilian conceptions and overlay them with a new identity rooted in the military institution.” Langford further explores this concept, remarking, “the Army’s sense of needing to ‘be different’ to perform its function effectively has resulted in the deliberate cultivation of a particular culture and ethos based on the Core Values, and an expectation of higher standards of behaviour, integrity, moral and physical courage than in society as a whole.” Langford believes the British Army exhibits greater power-distance than Great Britain to cope with unequal power distribution by rank, has significant collectivist tendencies to develop loyalty, is

377 Schein, 54; Hofstede and Hofstede, 35.
378 Finlan, 11.
379 Langford, 11.
380 Ibid., 12.
381 Ibid.
increasingly feminine to ensure care of its personnel,\textsuperscript{382} and displays higher uncertainty avoidance than the national average because of its efforts “to deal with anticipated but unknown events.”\textsuperscript{383}

Langford also considers the relevance of Hofstede’s dimensions as they relate to Mission Command in the British Army, believing, “the military community displays a mixture of collective and individualist traits, a combination made possible by discipline and trust in subordinates, based on common doctrine, beliefs and values which are central to the effective working of Mission Command.”\textsuperscript{384} This suggests the Army’s organizational culture might already have developed to overcome some of the obstructions to the enactment of Mission Command identified in chapter 5.

The apparent requirement for the Army to adopt a unique culture demands a thorough analysis to understand the implications of the culture on the application of Mission Command. Although Langford’s analysis indicates it may be a supportive culture, it is important to delve beyond generalized cultural dimensions. Instead, analysis must investigate the basic underlying assumptions, espoused beliefs and values, and artifacts\textsuperscript{385} of the Army’s culture and consider the implications of each on the enactment of Mission Command. This will highlight specific cultural aspects the Army should either reinforce or change.

\textsuperscript{382} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{383} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{385} Schein, 24.
The ensuing analysis begins by reviewing what constitutes the espoused culture of the British Army, as described in *ADP Operations*. This review ascertains a number of the espoused values the Army considers central to its culture, and analysis focuses on those for which literature indicates a relevance to Mission Command. Following analysis of the espoused culture, the author examines a series of further cultural elements related to Mission Command revealed by a review of literature and relevant surveys. Throughout the chapter, climatic indicators, such as evidence of specific behaviors and attitudes, are considered to assess whether the Army enacts its espoused values, and whether the actual behaviors, attitudes and values support Mission Command. This highlights misalignments between espoused values and exhibited behaviors, and these are reviewed to establish their impact on the execution of Mission Command.

**Espoused British Army Culture**

*Army Doctrine Publication Operations* addresses the concept of British Army culture, stating,

The British Army derives its culture—the socially transmitted pattern of human behaviour within the organisation—from British morality and ethics and national attitudes to conflict and warfare. The Army’s cultural nature comes also from its distinctive ethos and its own values and standards. Together they form a moral foundation for the conduct of operations.386

This highlights how the British Army perceives culture as more behaviorally focused than Schein, whose definition of culture forms the basis for analysis in this thesis. It also emphasizes the importance of broader national values in affecting the Army’s culture, an aspect reinforcing the relevance of the analysis of chapter 5. Finally, it shows how,

internally, the Army identifies its ethos and its Values and Standards as being of paramount importance to its culture, elements which are described in detail in *ADP Operations*. The ensuing subsections focus initially on the relevance of these aspects to Mission Command, before moving on to broader characterizations of culture.

**British Army Values and Standards**

The British Army’s Values and Standards are some of the most fundamental espoused values of the British Army. The Army’s Values comprise six interdependent “moral qualities” required of soldiers and officers, which, when lived, “provide the essence of operational effectiveness”\(^ {387}\) and are the “guiding principles that remain constant, whatever the situation.”\(^ {388}\) In turn, the Army’s Standards provide the expected level to which the values must be lived.\(^ {389}\) The British Army’s Values are: selfless commitment, courage, discipline, integrity, loyalty and respect for others.\(^ {390}\) The Standards are: appropriate, lawful and totally professional.\(^ {391}\)

Selfless commitment emphasizes the sacrifice service personnel must be prepared to make given their knowledge that “the needs of the mission and the team come before personal interests.”\(^ {392}\) This is consistent with the clear responsibility on the part of the subordinate to fulfil intent, wherein the mission’s primacy is clear given “the obligation

\(^{387}\) Ibid., 2-19.


\(^{390}\) Ibid., 2-19 – 2-22.

\(^{391}\) Ibid., 2-25.

on the part of the subordinate commanders to act to achieve the higher commander’s intent is not negotiable.”

Courage is both physical and moral in nature, the latter of which is most relevant to Mission Command. It engenders respect and trust by proponents doing “what is right, even if it is unpopular.”

Discipline is “the glue that binds soldiers together when threatened” and “requires that orders are obeyed but with resourcefulness, imagination and according to ethical foundations.” The emphasis on resourcefulness and imagination speaks to the initiative required for Mission Command. In addition, trust supports discipline, which is essential in Mission Command. It is noteworthy how discipline is a value Langford identifies as requiring strong power-distance and collectivism, neither of which are innate to Great Britain.

Integrity is of fundamental importance to generating trust, with proponents “being truthful and honest.” “Integrity, and hence trust, is eroded by deceit, selfishness, criminality, and anti-social behaviour.”

393 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.
394 DCDC, ADP Operations, 2-20.
395 Ibid., 2-20 – 2-21.
396 Director Leadership, Army Leadership Code, 8.
397 Langford, 14.
398 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 59, 95.
399 Director Leadership, Army Leadership Code, 9.
400 DCDC, ADP Operations, 2-21.
Loyalty, which is equally applicable up and down the chain of command, creates cohesive teams and fosters trust. Loyalty does not preclude Service personnel of any rank from having the responsibility to highlight transgressions from accepted standards of behavior in others, whether or not they are of superior rank. Kirke believes loyalty has a level of flexibility within the Army, enabling soldiers to flex where their loyalty lies at any given moment. “Behaviour that undermines the reputation of the team, the unit, the Army and the Nation is an act of disloyalty, and a breach of trust.”

Finally, for the Army’s Values, “respect for others” amounts to “treat[ing] everyone we encounter, as we would wish to be treated.” Not only is this synonymous with engendering trust, but its requirement to “embrace diversity, and value each individual for their contribution and viewpoint” supports commanders in exercising minimum control over their subordinates commensurate with their experience and ability, an element requiring commanders to “recognise individual strengths and weaknesses.”

The Army’s Standards ensure embodiment of the Values occurs within the bounds of being appropriate, lawful and totally professional. Failure to abide by the

401 Ibid.
402 Director Leadership, Army Leadership Code, 9.
404 DCDC, ADP Operations, 2-22.
405 Ibid.
406 Director Leadership, Army Leadership Code, 8.
407 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 10.
Standards can undermine the trust inherent in applying the Army Values, thereby undermining the ability to conduct Mission Command effectively. “Appropriate” refers to appropriate behavior, the standard of which must be higher in the Army than in society in general to maintain trust and loyalty amongst the chain of command. Where behavior becomes unacceptable, trust and cohesion are undermined. Maintaining “lawful” behavior ensures legitimacy for the Army and prevents acts of criminality consistent with diminished integrity and resulting degradation of trust. Finally, being “totally professional” protects the Army’s reputation and maintains operational effectiveness.

This review of the Army’s Values and Standards shows how this aspect of the Army’s espoused values supports Mission Command, particularly from the perspective of generating trust. As previously noted, however, soldiers and officers must embody such values if they are to support Mission Command in practice. To minimize digression from the Army’s Values, the Army has a well-developed discipline system through which corrective measures can be taken. This system, an artifact of the Army’s culture, is described under the subheading Disciplinary System.

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409 Ibid.

410 Ibid.


British Army Ethos

_Army Doctrine Publication Operations_ identifies ethos to be the “distinctive character and identity” afforded to a group or organization through “sustained cohesion.” It describes the Army’s ethos as emphasizing the virtues of comradeship, pride, leadership, example, and warrior spirit, all of which are “embodied in [the Army’s] Regimental system.” Such a description warrants consideration of each element of this espoused ethos to understand how it might affect Mission Command enactment.

Regimental System

The Regimental system is a long-standing artifact of the British Army. Although the “modern” British Army’s formation dates back to the seventeenth century, it was the Cardwell-Childers reforms of the late nineteenth century, which shaped the Regimental system into something resembling that of today. In response to economic constraints stemming from the Crimean War, Cardwell created a system whereby regiments recruited locally, increasing recruiting and generating identity and esprit de corps within the units. This short historical precis is worth consideration simply to emphasize the longevity of the system still in place today. _ADP Operations_ highlights its continued relevance, identifying the “tremendous spirit and distinctive identity” of the Regimental system as etched into the fabric of the British Army.

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413 DCDC, _ADP Operations_, 2-16.
414 Ibid., 2-16 – 2-17.
415 Finlan, 73.
417 Finlan, 75.
different units, and describing how soldiers continually return to the same regiments throughout their careers, “resulting in depths of familiarity and comradeship which give a unique edge to the morale and team spirit of the British soldier.”  

It is difficult to determine accurately the affect of the Regimental system on Mission Command. The independent sense of identity and cohesion afforded by the system on one hand promotes the ability for small units to conduct decentralized operations, an aspect supporting the guiding principle of Mission Command. Running counter to this, however, is Finlan’s assertion that the Regimental system constitutes “a remarkably insular tribal institution comprised of a wide variety of competing regiments that dominate the internal power structures and vie for primacy.” Finlan’s analysis identifies how, although the system creates institutional strength at the low level, it creates weakness at the high levels. This is especially prevalent given the “peculiar traditions and beliefs” held by individual regiments, but not shared between them, a fact that seemingly undermines mutual understanding. General Carter, the Chief of the General Staff, reinforced this idea of competing strengths and weaknesses in the Regimental system in a speech in February 2015, stating,

You will have read in the media . . . this idea of creating a modern general staff-. . . giving it a sense of being imbued by something that really matters for the ethos of the Army. It’s the corollary of one of our great strengths, the so-called

418 DCDC, ADP Operations, 2-16.

419 Shamir, 171, 194.

420 Finlan, 138.

421 Ibid.

422 Ibid.
regimental system, which means so much at the unit level and below. One of the great risks of the British Army is how that manifests itself beyond regimental duty.423

This brief analysis of the influence of the Regimental system on Mission Command indicates how it is both supportive and obstructive to the command philosophy depending on the situation. At the regimental level and below, the Regimental system seemingly supports Mission Command. By contrast, above the regimental level it seemingly obstructs Mission Command.

Comradeship

The description of comradeship lists, amongst other things, “an active military social life [and] residential messes organised by rank” as important contributing factors to the “mutual respect and support, familiarity and friendliness” of the Regimental system. A sexual harassment study carried out for the British Army in 2015 confirmed how such an environment can enhance respect amongst colleagues, leading to a sense of family.424 Langford also identifies this trait, stating, “‘team bonding’ and the development of trust and respect are developed through informal learning and social interaction in the workplace and the barrack block.”425 This is particularly pertinent since only 8 percent of


425 Langford, 14.
Army personnel live in their own home.\textsuperscript{426} Comradeship is, therefore, a key element of building trust required for Mission Command.

As well as identifying the association between respect and working and living closely together, the \textit{Speak Out: Sexual Harassment Report} also identified a greater prevalence of alcohol consumption and sexual harassment in such environments.\textsuperscript{427} The subheading Living-in and Socialization, below, considers this topic in more detail to establish whether this constitutes a cultural trait of the British Army.

\textbf{Pride}

Pride “brings people from the widest variety of backgrounds together, giving them a common identity which turns a collection of individuals into a professional team.”\textsuperscript{428} This sense of team is important for Mission Command because, amongst other things, it encourages soldiers “to think and use [their] initiative.”\textsuperscript{429} Initiative is an essential factor in the successful execution of Mission Command, underpinning doctrine’s Guiding Principle, supporting determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion, and enabling commanders to tell subordinates what effect they are

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{427} Ministry of Defence, \textit{Speak Out: Sexual Harassment Report 2015}, 62.
\item \textsuperscript{428} DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-17.
\item \textsuperscript{429} Director Leadership, \textit{The Army Leadership Code}, 2.
\end{itemize}
to realize and why.\footnote{Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6-8.} The fact that over 70 percent of British Army personnel are proud to be in the Army\footnote{Ministry of Defence, \textit{Continuous Attitude Survey 2015}, 4.} indicates that this espoused value is imbued in reality.

\textbf{Leadership}

Leadership is “an area that requires wide study and reflection.”\footnote{DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-27.} As well as providing a fundamental element of the British Army’s ethos,\footnote{Ibid., 2-17.} it is also one of “3 classical constituents of command,”\footnote{Ibid., 6-10 – 6-11.} and so its centrality to the enactment of command is clear. Leadership is also of paramount importance to a culture encouraging Mission Command because not only do cultures influence the types of leadership possible within an organization, but also leaders can change the culture when necessary.\footnote{Schein, xi.} Whilst the type of leadership in the British Army will occupy this section, the author later considers the leader’s role in culture change when considering areas for possible future research in chapter 7.

\textit{Army Doctrine Publication Operations} describes a number of aspects pertinent to leadership in the British Army. It espouses how “the approach to leadership is more decentralised and lower in the British Army than in many other armies,”\footnote{DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-17.} a clear indicator that doctrine seeks to align the practice of leadership with Mission Command.
ADP Operations also offers a number of “fundamental requirements” for leadership in the British Army, including “professional competence,” “intellect,” “decisiveness,” “resolution,” “communication,” and “vision.” These requirements have clear applicability to Mission Command.

Mission Command “requires competent and well informed officers and non-commissioned officers” for its enactment, an aspect addressed by professional competence. This attribute engenders trust in the commander from his subordinates.

Intellect, developed by training and education, “is closely linked to creativity, innovation, initiative, and judgment.” The link between initiative and Mission Command has already been established. Judgment is also important for enacting timely decision making, wherein “good judgement is required to decide when is the right time to act.”

Decisiveness also supports timely decision making, as well as underpinning Mission Command’s Guiding Principle, with doctrine highlighting not only the importance of making decisions, but also the occasional requirement to “decide not to

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437 The exhaustive list of fundamental requirements is: “leadership through motivation,” “professional competence,” “intellect,” “decisiveness,” “resolution,” “confidence,” “communication,” “humility,” “tone,” and “vision.” DCDC, ADP Operations, 2-27 – 2-31.

438 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.

439 DCDC, ADP Operations, 2-27.

440 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.
Decisiveness also encourages subordinates to decide for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent.\footnote{Ibid., 2-29.}

“Resolution helps a leader to remain undaunted by set-back, casualties and hardship,”\footnote{Ibid., 8.} which is critical when ensuring a determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion despite things not going according to plan.\footnote{DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-29.}

Communication calls for a “leader to be able to communicate well,” a facet which ensures subordinates understand their commander’s intent and their part in it,\footnote{Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.} and which complements the use of “clear, mutually understood language” required for telling subordinates what effect they are to realize and why. One aspect of communication, language, is considered in more detail below.

Finally, the relevance of vision for Mission Command is best understood when considering the U.S. approach to Mission Command. In U.S. doctrine, the “operations approach” provides commanders a framework for exercising Mission Command.\footnote{Headquarters Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, 3-3.} Commanders drive the operations approach, in large part by visualizing the operation’s end state and then describing it to their staffs and subordinates.\footnote{Ibid.} This comparison, albeit with a subtly different version of Mission Command, highlights the importance of vision.

\footnote{Ibid., 2-29.}
\footnote{Ibid., 8.}
\footnote{DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 2-29.}
\footnote{Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.}
\footnote{Ibid., 7-8.}
\footnote{Headquarters Department of the Army, ADRP 6-0, 3-3.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
in subordinate commanders deciding for themselves how best to achieve their superior’s intent.\textsuperscript{448} The Army Leadership Code further reinforces the importance of vision, explaining how vision is critical because “leaders must provide clear and unifying purpose, generating a sense of team cohesion and direction,”\textsuperscript{449} a statement commensurate with the provision of intent.

These espoused values associated with good leaders evidently support Mission Command. However, leaders must adopt them as behaviors if they are to support the enactment of Mission Command in reality. To support this endeavor, the Army has introduced the Army Leadership Code, describing the seven leadership behaviors expected of British Army personnel, namely “lead by example,” “encourage thinking,” “apply reward and discipline,” “demand high performance,” “encourage confidence in the team,” “recognise individual strengths and weaknesses,” and “strive for team goals.”\textsuperscript{450} General Carter makes this guide directly relevant to the culture of Mission Command, writing in his intent for the Army Leadership Code:

\begin{quote}
Our war fighting doctrine is based on mission command. This is based on mutual trust between leaders and those they lead. . . . Trust is a two-way process that is guaranteed by every soldier, whether leader or led, living our Values and Standards and setting an appropriate example–it is about doing as you would be done by.

This is a culture that empowers all leaders at every level.\textsuperscript{451}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{448} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 8.

\textsuperscript{449} Director Leadership, \textit{Army Leadership Code}, 14.

\textsuperscript{450} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{451} Ibid., 2.
The leadership behaviors of the Army Leadership Code are an embodiment of the Army’s Values and Standards, combined with principles from both transformational and transactional leadership. The centrality of Values and Standards emphasizes the effort to ensure espoused values permeate the Army at all levels, thereby generating cohesive teams characterized by trust to support Mission Command.

Doctrine Note 15/04 further explores the influence of the Army Leadership Code on Mission Command. It considers trust and mutual understanding to be implicit in the Leadership Code behaviors of “encourage confidence in the team” and “strive for team goals.” Further, it acknowledges how “encourage thinking” and “strive for team goals” facilitate commanders ensuring their subordinates understand their intent, their own contributions and the context within which they are to act. Finally, Doctrine Note 15/04 links the importance of “recognise individual strengths and weaknesses” to commanders exercising a minimum of control over their subordinates, consistent with their experience and ability.

The behavior, recognise individual strengths and weaknesses, does not simply advocate making do with existing strengths and weaknesses; it also encourages development by means of coaching. Coaching seeks to “[unlock] and individual’s or

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452 Ibid., 12-13.
453 Ibid., 12.
454 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 4.
455 Ibid., 10.
456 Ibid.
457 Director Leadership, Army Leadership Code, 18.
team’s potential in order to maximise performance,“458 an idea consistent with the aforementioned development of the intellect. Douglas Pryer links the importance of development to Mission Command explaining how a leader “spending time developing his subordinates is key so that they understand how he thinks and can correctly execute his intent.”459 The Army’s culture appears to support this emphasis on development, with over 60 percent of the Army believing their immediate superior encourages them to improve their skills.460

The Army’s Continuous Attitude Survey affords an opportunity to examine the attitudes of service personnel towards certain leadership behaviors, examining how well soldiers and officers believe the espoused values are being lived. Over 60 percent of survey respondents believed their immediate superior understood and represented their interests, supported them in their jobs, set a positive example and was supportive over their work—life balance.461 Overall, more than 60 percent of respondents were satisfied with the leadership provided by their immediate supervisor.462 The fact that the majority of people are satisfied with their immediate superior’s leadership indicates the values set forth in leadership doctrine are imbued in the leadership culture of the Army. It is possible, however, to be more explicit in linking some of these responses to specific

458 Ibid., 24.


461 Ibid.

462 Ibid.
doctrinal leadership requirements. For example, the majority of respondents felt their immediate superior set a positive example, a behavior demanded by the Army Leadership Code’s call for “lead by example.” This directly supports the development of trust, as does the generally positive attitude towards leadership.

The response showing confidence in immediate superiors to support respondents in their jobs also has further significance for Mission Command. Stewart notes how “in order for personnel to take initiative, they must be confident that they will be supported by their superior officers and will not be punished for making honest mistakes.” This suggests the Army’s Continuous Attitude Survey indicates a culture supportive of initiative.

This trend for a culture of “good leadership” is not as one-sided as it would first appear. Less than 40 percent of respondents thought senior officers understood and represented their interests, and less than 40 percent had confidence in the leadership of the service. These results indicate the confidence held for immediate superiors is not shared for senior leaders. The specific causes of this disconnect are not possible to identify from the survey’s results. Two potential options are, firstly, the large separation in rank and roles of respondents to senior leaders leads to a lack of understanding of their jobs, and secondly, there is a perceived or actual deficit of good leadership behavior in senior leaders. A definitive answer is not possible, but General Carter’s comments appear

463 Director Leadership, Army Leadership Code, 5.
464 Stewart, 10.
465 Director Leadership, Army Leadership Code, 4.
466 Ministry of Defence, Continuous Attitude Survey 2015, 8.
to lend credence to the latter possibility, stating, “we shouldn’t be applying our values and standards as a tool to encourage behaviour at the lower level—we should all be living in that way.” This indicates how there is a perception of a norm in which the senior Army leadership have not been held to account for transgressions from the Values of Standards. Such a perception, whether justified or not, is likely to undermine those elements supportive of Mission Command normally generated by good leadership and the application of the Values and Standards, including trust and mutual understanding. This suggests a level of mistrust towards senior leadership, which has the potential to compound the negative influence for Mission Command at levels above the regiment.

Example

In the context of the Army’s ethos, example relates to the inspiration afforded to soldiers by the “knowledge of past adversities overcome by the unit or formation of which they are a part.” Given the Army’s long history, a thorough analysis of all significant events at the Army-level is inadmissible within the confines of this thesis. However, given the importance of the relationship between leadership and Mission Command, one area of consideration is influential leaders who, in Hofstede’s terminology, are “heroes” in the culture, providing an example of behavior to emulate.

In Schein’s model, heroes correspond to an espoused value in that they promote an

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468 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 4, 10.


470 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 8.
aspirational ideal. Shamir identifies four such inspiring leaders of British Army culture, namely, the Duke of Marlborough, the Duke of Wellington, and Field Marshals Slim and Montgomery. Rather than analyze all possible attributes for each of these commanders, the author compares two of the most recently influential, Slim and Montgomery. Each commanding during World War II, before the advent of Mission Command doctrine, a comparison demonstrates how the Army’s cultural heroes set mixed examples for Mission Command, and thus do not consistently support Mission Command’s application today.

Commanding the British Eighth Army in North Africa and overseeing the D-Day invasion of Normandy, Montgomery was a hugely influential figure during World War II. Although Shamir acknowledges the fact Montgomery was prepared to grant a “degree of latitude” to his subordinates, he did this only on a limited scope with those he trusted. In reality, he was an “autocrat,” who enacted centralized command, “leaving little for chance or subordinate initiative.” Pugsley supports this opinion and, moreover, believes Montgomery’s influence over post-war doctrine to have been

471 Schein, 24.

472 Shamir, 68-79, 96.


474 Shamir, 79.

475 Ibid.
palpable in emphasizing the significant influence divisional commanders should retain over the tactical battle. 476

Commanding at brigade, division, corps and army levels during World War II before eventually rising to become chief of the Imperial General Staff,477 Slim had a very different command approach to Montgomery.478 According to Pugsley, unlike other commanders, Slim mastered “tactical skill and decentralised command” at the army-level.479 Greaves reinforces this idea, surmising how, “from his arrival in Burma in 1942 to the end of World War II, Slim showed a masterful application of mission command.”480 Even the current edition of ADP Operations emphasizes Slim’s Mission Command-like attributes, quoting him to support arguments for the importance of initiative, decentralized command, and commander’s formulating their own intents.481

This short comparison of two heroes of British Army culture demonstrates the conflicting examples set by historical military leaders. Although Montgomery exhibited


478 DCDC, ADP Operations, E-17.


481 DCDC, ADP Operations, 2-24, 6-11, 6-25.
glimpses of subordinate empowerment, he gained his success through enacting detailed, centralized command. By contrast, Slim embodied the attributes of Mission Command long before its doctrinal inception. Given Hofstede’s assertion that heroes “possess characteristics that are highly prized in a culture and thus serve as models of behavior,” the mixed examples of historical leadership in the British Army do not encourage the uniform acceptance of Mission Command.

Warrior Spirit

Warrior spirit requires the British soldier to be, “tough, resilient, innovative, highly-motivated and compassionate. He should have an offensive spirit and a desire to get to grips with adversaries and challenges. He should not hesitate to engage in combat.” This description is coherent with Mission Command’s requirement for soldiers who are able to adapt to an ever-changing situation, retaining a determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion.

Christopher Coker questions the continued prevalence of warrior spirit believing “self-imposed limitations and risk aversion” have replaced the warrior ethos. This shift in values leads to the discouragement of individual judgment and a lack of willingness to take risk, both of which hamper the pursuit of Mission Command.

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482 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 8.


484 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.


486 Shamir, 169.
observes how the “litigation society” exacerbates this situation, presenting another obstacle to the application of Mission Command.487

Ekins et al. reinforce this belief that the ever-increasing web of laws governing the military is denuding the ability to take risk. They observe how, as the result of “judicial imperialism,” there is a surge in litigation cases against the military.488 For example, Ekins et al. identify how:

Judicial developments have paved the way for a ‘spike’ in litigation: at the beginning of 2014, some 190 public law claims had been filed against the Ministry of Defence in relation to British military action in Iraq; by the end of March 2015 this number is likely to have grown to 1,230 public law claims. This is in addition to a further 1000 private law claims—of which more than 700 remain live.489

Their research directly acknowledges the detrimental effect of such extensive judicial oversight of the military, predicting “an excessive degree of caution which is antithetical to the war-fighting ethos that is vital for success on the battlefield.”490 Although the increase of litigation is external to the Army, its impact on the Army’s culture, by undermining warrior spirit, is apparent.

487 Ibid.


489 Ibid., 7.

490 Ibid.
National Attitudes to Conflict and Warfare

The effect of national attitudes to conflict and warfare is the final of the elements which doctrine specifically links to the British Army culture. This corresponds, at least in part, to the more general influence of national cultures on organizational cultures.

The influence of such national attitudes is difficult to ascertain, especially given the findings of Gribble et al., who identify how national attitudes to conflicts change depending upon the particular mission.491 Different conflicts elicit different opinions and attitudes to war, specific to the context and perceptions of the numbers of fatalities and the acceptability of deaths or injuries.492 With this element of specificity to public opinion, it is intuitive that the most recent conflicts will have significant bearing on the culture of the Army. For the British Army, these conflicts are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Shamir notes how “public sensitivity to casualties, shared by Western democracies, forms an additional facet of postmodern heroism,”493 which can lead to risk aversion and micromanagement.494 Although the level of sensitivity to casualties varies by campaign,495 Gribble et al. lend credence to this concept, explaining how, given the


492 Ibid.

493 Shamir, 159.


unpopularity of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns amongst the British public and the public’s perception of the numbers of casualties, there is a resulting public unease over the prospect of using the military in future interventions.\textsuperscript{496} George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, acknowledged this phenomenon in 2013, describing the British public as suffering from “war weariness.”\textsuperscript{497}

If this state of affairs describes the current national attitude towards conflict and warfare, we must examine its impact on the culture of the British Army. The “Operation HERRICK\textsuperscript{498} Campaign Study” addressed this issue directly, noting how, “Operation HERRICK saw public opinion begin to sentimentalise the role and loss of Service personnel while growing increasingly ambivalent of the cause for which they fought. These observations have important implications for the future utility of land power and are worthy of deeper reflection.”\textsuperscript{499} The report identifies a commensurate shift in military risk aversion at the operational level,\textsuperscript{500} stating, “as Operation HERRICK was drawing to


\textsuperscript{497} Gribble et al., 8-12.

\textsuperscript{498} Operation Herrick was the codename under which British forces were deployed in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014.


\textsuperscript{500} Ibid., 1-1_15.
a close, commanders were commenting that they thought risk aversion had permeated the psyche of the Army and the wider national consciousness, possibly irreversibly.” 501 This fear from commanders indicates a possible cultural shift in the British Army, driven by the public’s attitudes to the wars. The report not only acknowledges the possibility that, without intervention, this risk aversion might continue into future campaigns, 502 but also acknowledges the deleterious effect it had on Mission Command, noting, “the Army’s risk appetite changed during Operation HERRICK. As a result, we became predictable, less agile, more defensive in outlook, with constrained mission command and a reduced ability to adopt a Manoeuvreist [sic] Approach.” 503

The “Operation HERRICK Campaign Study” refers to this degradation in Mission Command as “mission submission,” wherein decisions required increasingly higher authority. 504 Shamir and Lamb have used similar terms, “submission command” and “mission control” respectively, to describe related failings in Mission Command within the British Army. 505 The implication of submission command, Shamir asserts, is a culture of risk avoidance and zero defects which, exacerbated by a “business management climate,” discourages the use of initiative, so vital to Mission Command. 506 A zero defect

501 Ibid., 1-1_10.
502 Ibid., 2-1_2.
503 Ibid., 2-1_2.
504 Ibid., xxxiii.
505 Shamir, 169; Lamb, 14.
mentality also reduces the inclination of commanders to accept subordinates completing tasks just “well enough,” required by Mission Command.507

Shamir also uses a study by Colin Cape to conclude strategic and operational risk aversion can cause risk aversion at the tactical and individual levels, leading to micromanagement.508 Such a concept appears to have applicability in the modern British Army given how, in Afghanistan, “the strategic/operational risk appetite lowered as benefits of higher risk tactical activity became less attractive given the strategic impact of losses; the result was a tightening up of oversight and permissions.”509

Management Culture

The aforementioned prevalence of business management climate, described by Shamir, warrants further mention given Commander Task Force Helmand’s concern in 2013 over a tendency towards “management culture.”510 This trend saw a misalignment between the authority, responsibility and accountability afforded to commanders in Afghanistan, creating a situation where the authority for decisions sat with specific staff rather than the commander. Such a situation undermines Mission Command wherein

507 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7; Heyward, 19.


510 Ibid., 1-1_12.
subordinate commanders should have authority and responsibility delegated to them, thus empowering them to support rapid decision making.\textsuperscript{511}

There are also indications of such a management culture pervading Army life in-garrison, with General Carter calling for the realignment of responsibility, accountability and authority to allow “the doctrine of mission command we espouse on operations to be applied in peacetime.”\textsuperscript{512} The Army’s inspection and assurance methodology affords an example supporting the existence of such a management culture. In “Army Command Review—Next Steps,” General Carter called for an end to the existing “centrally controlled and annualized inspection regime.”\textsuperscript{513} He argued instead, for a system that supports commanders “and encourages them to judge the requirement for formal inspection.”\textsuperscript{514} The inference from General Carter’s statements is that the current system does not empower commanders to exercise judgment over inspection and assurance of their units, a situation congruent with management culture rather than Mission Command.

**Disciplinary System**

Because deviation from the behaviors prescribed by the Army’s Values and Standards have the potential to undermine trust and respect between service personnel, and thereby adversely impact operational effectiveness, the Army enforces higher

\textsuperscript{511} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7; DCDC, \textit{ADP Operations}, 5-3.


\textsuperscript{513} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{514} Ibid.
standards of behavior than might be expected in society at large. As well as undermining the trust required for Mission Command, such deviations in behavior also have the potential to undermine Mission Command in other ways, as described above under British Army Values and Standards. In order to enforce high standards of behavior the Army has a well-established disciplinary system. This system comprises two parts, disciplinary action and administrative action, providing complementary means to “[uphold] good order and Service discipline” and “[safeguard or restore] the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the Army” respectively. Notably, this system centers on the delegation of authority and responsibility to subordinate commanders for awarding sanctions, a facet, which itself is consistent with the philosophy of Mission Command.

In order to be effective, the disciplinary system must be fair, a key point when assessing the culture surrounding discipline in the Army. Over 60 percent of Army personnel believe the Service discipline system to be fair, suggesting trust in the existing system.

Given the perceived fairness of the disciplinary system, patterns of sanctions should indicate behavioral trends, showing whether there is a cultural propensity for ill-

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517 Ibid., 67-1-3.


discipline. Such a trend would undermine trust and denude the ability to conduct Mission Command.\textsuperscript{520} The numbers of summary hearings and courts martial held per year provide two elements of data contributing to this understanding. Summary hearings and courts martial are processes related to disciplinary action. Therefore, a high prevalence of these events would indicate a tendency for undermined trust and, therefore, an obstruction to Mission Command. Figure 1 graphically depicts the trend in numbers of summary hearings and courts martial in proportion to the size of the Army between 2009 and 2015. The proportional number of soldiers and officers undergoing such disciplinary proceedings is very low (less than 6 percent at the peak of summary hearings). There is also an apparent trend for reduced numbers of summary hearings over time. Although these results do not account for changes in disciplinary policy, they do suggest an improvement in behavior aligned with the Army’s Values. Data showing a reduction in major administrative action\textsuperscript{521} cases from 875 in 2013 to 411 in 2015,\textsuperscript{522} reinforces this trend of improving behavior. In turn, this suggests a culture supportive of Mission Command.

\textsuperscript{520} British Army, AGAI 67, 67-1-2 – 67-1-3.

\textsuperscript{521} Major administrative action is administrative action taken for more serious indiscretions not amounting to disciplinary action, in accordance with AGAI 67. British Army, AGAI 67, 67-3-1.

\textsuperscript{522} Lisa Oliver, email message to author, May 16, 2016.
Figure 1. Numbers of Summary Hearings and Courts Martial as a Percentage of Army Strength Between 2009 and 2015


Army Headquarters Size

Heyward and Shamir both observe how the increasing size of headquarters provides an indicator of a culture misaligned with the execution of Mission Command.523

As Stewart observes, building a large central staff organization facilitates centralization, rather than the decentralization necessitated by the guiding principle of Mission

523 Heyward, 17; Shamir, 145.
Shamir’s review of the British Army’s attempts at implementing Mission Command in Iraq during Operations Granby (1991) and Telic (specifically at the outbreak of Operation Telic in 2003) shows an increase in the size of the divisional headquarters construct by 25 percent between the campaigns. More recently, the Army again showed a propensity for increasing the size of headquarters on operations during its time in Afghanistan.

A report authored by Captain D. Welford in 2015 shows a trend for Army headquarters to grow even when not deployed on operations. Welford showed how, between 2010 and 2015, despite a reduction in absolute numbers, the British Army Headquarters increased in size proportionately to the size of the Army’s total liability, growing from less than 1.3 percent to over 1.4 percent. Such an increase is counterproductive for Mission Command, and has resulted in General Carter stating, “headquarters must shrink and staff branches will only be as large and as rank heavy as they need to be; flatter staff structures encourage greater delegation and empowerment.”

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524 Stewart, 8-9; Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 6.
Language

Schein considers the way in which groups interpret a common language to be “one of the deepest layers of [a] group’s culture.”\(^{528}\) It enhances common understanding within the group, yet outsiders will consider a group’s specific language to be “jargon.”\(^{529}\) Finlan addresses this point for military recruits, stating how “new language and social and historical points of reference are introduced to provide identification anchors around which people are encouraged to congregate.”\(^{530}\) A significant feature of this military language, and the Army specifically, is a propensity for acronyms, which speeds up communication but which cannot be understood by outsiders.\(^{531}\)

The Mission Command element requiring that subordinates be told what effect they are to realize and why, explicitly addresses the importance of using unambiguous language. It demands that “missions and tasks are framed in terms of what is to be achieved, using clear, mutually understood language.”\(^{532}\) The requirement for the use of “approved doctrinal language” reinforces this point.\(^{533}\) Doctrine elucidates such language, describing precise meanings for single words, used by the commander to

\(^{528}\) Schein, 97.

\(^{529}\) Ibid.

\(^{530}\) Finlan, 12.

\(^{531}\) Finlan, 12; Langford, 8.

\(^{532}\) Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7-8.

\(^{533}\) Ibid., 11.
explain the mission to his subordinates.534 This demonstrates how the cultural artifact of language in the Army supports Mission Command.

That said, it is acknowledged in doctrine how the prescribed language does not always fit the required mission, and so other, less specific, language must be used in these situations to explain the requirement.535 This limit to prescribed language going awry is evident in the case of Private Gavin Williams, a soldier who died after being subjected to unofficial physical punishment.536 Lieutenant Colonel Davis admitted demanding the soldier be brought to him “hot and sweaty,” acknowledging the use of “Army slang and colloquial language” in his orders.537 Although this is an isolated example, in which only Davis knows his true intent, it does highlight the potential for ambiguity when using Army slang.

Such ambiguity is further apparent when addressing the aforementioned Army inclination for using acronyms. Although covering the Ministry of Defence as a whole, rather than just the Army, the document MOD Acronyms and Abbreviations lists accepted Ministry of Defence acronyms. The fact the document is 373 pages long, speaks to the sheer volume of acronyms in circulation,538 making it a significant challenge to learn and

534 DCDC, ADP Operations, 6-20.
535 Ibid.
537 Ibid.
When further studying MOD Acronyms and Abbreviations, it is apparent how many abbreviations are replicated, for example, there are 13 uses of the acronym “AA,” 11 uses of the acronym “AP,” and 10 uses of the acronym “IA.”

Although context will eliminate some confusion, the sheer volume of acronyms means some confusion is inevitable, thereby reducing the clarity required by Mission Command. In 2011, the U.S. Army recognized a similar issue, identifying confusion caused by an abundance of abbreviations and acronyms.

Overall, although a prescribed doctrinal language broadly supports clearly telling subordinates what they are to achieve and why, there are apparent frictions. This does not mean the norm is for confusion caused by the use of non-doctrinal language or overuse of acronyms, simply that these events can and do occur. It is possible that this reliance on unambiguous language relates to Britain’s cultural propensity for low context communication.

Career Management System

The British Army’s career management system is one of the most prominent artifacts of the Army’s culture, inherently affecting every member of the service. Major
General Burley, the previous Military Secretary, described career management as being “about ensuring the Army has the right people, with the right skills, experience and knowledge, in the right place, at the right time to ensure success.”\textsuperscript{543} Given the impact of the career management process on all Army personnel, Burley acknowledges the criticality of the system engendering trust, declaring “trust in a fair, timely, responsive and accountable career management system” his “vital ground.”\textsuperscript{544} Adherence to 10 career management principles\textsuperscript{545} assures this trust, and these principles underpin the Military Secretary’s “binding principle,” which is, “the needs of the Army must come first; those of officers, soldiers and their families must come a close second. But to be worthy of its pre-eminence the Army must be seen to give due consideration to the best interest and preferences of each individual officer and soldier.”\textsuperscript{546}

This principle emphasizes primacy of the mission, given “the needs of the Army must come first,” an aspect reinforcing the primacy of intent in Mission Command where achievement of the superior commander’s intent is “not negotiable.”\textsuperscript{547} Application of this principle also fosters trust in the career management system, a trust that transcends the entire chain of command given the ubiquity of career management to all Army

\textsuperscript{543} Military Secretary, 1.

\textsuperscript{544} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{545} The career management principles are: precedence, consideration, objectivity, basis of evidence, basis of merit, openness and transparency, shared responsibility, flexibility, legally and regulatory compliant, and assurance. Military Secretary, 7.

\textsuperscript{546} Military Secretary, 11.

\textsuperscript{547} Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.
personnel. Without trust in the system, “there can be no faith that merit will bring its own reward and confidence that nepotism and favouritism will not find root.”

Stewart acknowledges the importance of appointing personnel “to positions that suit their talents” when striving for an organization that aspires to enact decentralized command. Moreover, Stewart emphasizes how organizations must be “seen to reward appropriate behaviour and, most importantly, [must be] seen not to punish the mistakes that are an inevitable consequence of personnel exercising new found authority and responsibility.” This underlines the relevance of career management in engendering Mission Command, reinforcing the element calling for commanders to exercise the minimum control over their subordinates, consistent with their experience and ability. This enables decentralization, and stresses how commanders “have to accept that the task may not be done exactly as they would have done it.” The previously described zero defect mentality, encouraged by risk aversion, runs counter to this aspiration.

The described espoused values of the Army’s career management system appear to support Mission Command by engendering trust, emphasizing the primacy of the Army’s interests, and ensuring the Army places the right people in the appropriate jobs. However, the reality does not seem congruent with these values. Although over 80 percent of Army personnel feel they have the knowledge, skill and experience to do their

548 Military Secretary, 10.
549 Stewart, 8.
550 Ibid., 9.
551 Directorate Land Warfare, Doctrine Note 15/04, 7.
552 Ibid.
jobs, and over 70 percent of people feel their knowledge skill and experience are being used, less than 40 percent are satisfied with the career management service. Moreover, less than 40 percent of Army personnel believe the promotion system to be fair, a clear indicator of low levels of trust. These results suggest the career management system is successfully placing people in the right jobs, a facet supporting Mission Command, but there is a lack of trust in the system, thereby undermining Mission Command.

Living-In and Socialization

Over 80 percent of Army personnel live in service accommodation during the working week. This creates a situation where the Army has “clearly defined physical and social boundaries, with members working and living together in barracks that provide a place of residence for large numbers of like-minded individuals.” Langford furthers this idea, considering socializing to be very important because “trust and respect are developed through informal learning and social interaction in the workplace and barrack block.” The analysis of the Army’s Sexual Harassment Report identifies the benefits of Army personnel living and working so closely together, generating close bonds and

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553 Ministry of Defence, Continuous Attitude Survey 2015, 17.
554 Ibid.
555 Ibid., 29.
Development of trust in this manner is a key component in supporting the trust required for Mission Command.

There are, however, risks associated with living and socializing so closely together, which have the ability to undermine such trust, and thereby denude the potential to enact Mission Command effectively. The consumption of alcohol is often a part of socialization in the Army, and the tendency towards its excessive use has led to reports that the Army has a culture of binge drinking. The Army’s Sexual Harassment Report notes how “socialising and consuming alcohol were frequently stated by Servicewomen as situations where sexual harassment was more likely.”

Sexual harassment is a behavior that reduces trust and respect amongst Army personnel. Research suggests, “Servicewomen were likely to view the culture of the Army as facilitating sexual harassment,” albeit they tended to feel this was confined to specific cap badges or units. General Carter reinforced this opinion, suggesting the


561 Ibid., 6.

562 Ibid., 71.
Army needed to address its culture because, “it’s not good enough that we still have significant number [sic] of complaints on bullying, harassment and discrimination.”

The 2014 results of the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey do not indicate an Army-wide culture of bullying, discrimination or harassment, with 15 percent of Army personnel believing they have been subject to such behaviors in the previous 12 months, and 70 percent feeling they are treated fairly at work. When looking more specifically at sexual harassment, the Sexual Harassment Report found “a minority of Service personnel believe that sexual harassment is a problem across the Army, with the majority believing it is only a problem in some parts.” The number of potential service complaints associated with bullying, discrimination, harassment and all forms of improper behavior dropped from 54 percent in 2013 to 38 percent in 2014, suggesting an improvement. That said, “service complaints from women are still disproportionately higher than those from their male colleagues and this differential is even more pronounced in complaints about prescribed behaviour.”

Overall, although these results do not represent an Army-wide culture of bullying, harassment and discrimination, they do indicate potential sub-cultures within which it is


Moreover, the Army environment within which there is significant socialization and consumption of alcohol apparently contributes to instances of sexual harassment.\textsuperscript{568} Any such incidents have the potential to undermine the trust necessary for Mission Command.

\textbf{Summary}

Unlike the effect of Hofstede’s dimensions on Mission Command, the results of this chapter do not lend themselves to simple tabular representation, given the complexities of variations between espoused values and enacted behavior and perceptions in very specific areas. In spite of this, the analysis of this chapter has shown that the majority of espoused values and beliefs of the Army support Mission Command. The only exception to the universal support of espoused values is the phenomenon of heroes, whereby military culture celebrates the success of individuals embodying not only command approaches akin to modern Mission Command, but also past commanders representing the antithesis of current philosophy. This indicates an espoused value with both supportive and obstructive value for Mission Command.

With regards to artifacts, a number appear to support Mission Command to some extent, such as the discipline system, the career management system, the language, and the living-in system. That said, obstructions to Mission Command arise from misalignments between, on the one hand, the espoused values and the intended purposes of artifacts, and on the other hand, the behavioral realities and perceptions of Army


\textsuperscript{568} Ibid., 62.
personnel. Some of these misalignments do not relate to the Army culture as a whole. For example, the prevalence of sexual harassment, which represents deviation from the Army’s Values, appears limited to specific subcultures in which it would be expected the culture hinders Mission Command. Other misalignments appear to be Army-wide, yet limited in scope. For example, although the career management system supports Mission Command by assigning the right people into the appropriate jobs, the limited trust in the system concurrently presents an obstacle to Mission Command.

One significant observation is the Army’s culture seems generally supportive of Mission Command at the regimental level and below, but less so above the regimental level. A lack of regimental tradition, which serves as a cohesive element at the lower echelons, seemingly reduces mutual understanding and trust beyond the regiment. The lack of trust for senior Army officers, in contrast to the trust emplaced in immediate commanders, supports this finding.

Equally concerning is the apparent cultural propensity for risk aversion, micromanagement and a zero-defect mentality, driven by public opinion and judicial developments. Although no empirical evidence was found to support this notion, the implications are significant wherein such a culture denudes commanders’ inclinations to delegate, thus fundamentally undermining the ability to execute Mission Command. This tendency has seemingly created a management culture in an effort to reduce risk, thus seeing a misalignment between the authority, responsibility and accountability afforded to commanders and slowing decision making. Related to this culture of risk aversion and centralization is a cultural proclivity for large headquarters.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

In answering the question: “Is the culture of the British Army conducive to the successful execution of Mission Command?,” this research thesis sought to answer a number of secondary research questions. These questions were:

1. What is the origin of Mission Command philosophy?
2. Why did the British Army introduce Mission Command?
3. How has the concept of Mission Command developed in the British Army?
4. What is the culture of the British Army?
5. What misalignments exist between espoused values and exhibited behaviors with regard to Mission Command? What are the implications of any misalignments?
6. What misalignments exist between Mission Command doctrine and culture? What are the implications of any misalignments?

Answered fully in chapters 2 to 6, a summarized answer for each of these secondary questions begins this chapter, followed by the answer to the primary research question. The author then considers the relationship of the findings to previous studies, before offering suggestions for future research on the topic.

The Research Questions Answered

What is the Origin of Mission Command Philosophy?

In chapter 2, An Historical Review of Mission Command in the British Army, the author reviewed the origin and development of Mission Command from the time of
Frederick the Great to present. Although changes during the eighteenth century paved the way for the development of Mission Command philosophy, the style of command did not resemble that espoused in modern doctrine. Further developments under Napoleon, Scharnhorst and Clausewitz continued to change the system of command, but it was von Moltke who institutionalized Auftragstaktik, a system of decentralized command and the precursor to modern Mission Command. This system of command exploited the advantages afforded by the industrial revolution, including the ability to deploy armies large distances by rail. During World War II the Germans then fully exploited this system of decentralized command, making the most of technological advances to use Auftragstaktik in support of Blitzkrieg with devastating consequences.

Why did the British Army Introduce Mission Command?

In chapter 2, An Historical Review of Mission Command in the British Army, the author revealed how Britain introduced the concept of Mission Command in the 1980s as part of the Bagnall reforms. These reforms were in response to the threat the Soviet Union posed to the British Army in Europe during the Cold War, and mimicked the German concepts of Blitzkrieg and Auftragstaktik. By introducing Mission Command, Bagnall sought to facilitate the Manoeuvrist Approach to war, exploiting operational-level maneuver to deny Soviet penetration before counterattacking.

How has the Concept of Mission Command Developed in the British Army?

In chapter 2, An Historical Review of Mission Command in the British Army, the author explored how the doctrinally described elements of Mission Command developed
with new doctrine publications since its introduction in 1989. Particularly noteworthy was the tendency for different originators of doctrine to describe it differently. For example, the descriptions in Army and Joint publications varied. The most recent prescribed changes emphasized the onus on commanders to ensure subordinates understood their intent, the freedom for subordinates to decide how to achieve the commander’s intent and the importance of the commander adapting the level of supervision over subordinates dependent on their competence and experience.

What is the Culture of the British Army?

Following a description of cultural theories in chapter 3, What is Culture?, the author established a link between culture and Mission Command in chapter 4, The Relationship between Culture and Mission Command. This analysis identified how an organization’s culture must facilitate Mission Command for its successful enactment. Consideration was then given to the implications of the existing culture and its implications for Mission Command enactment during chapters 5 and 6, Britain’s Culture and its Relevance for Mission Command and The British Army’s Culture and its Relevance for Mission Command.

It became clear that the Army’s culture was, at least to some extent, affected by the British culture. Investigation showed that, on the whole, Britain’s individualist, masculine, indulgent, small power-distance, small uncertainty avoidance culture supported Mission Command doctrine.

Although affected by this national culture, the Army’s culture differed from it because of its unique role. It became apparent that it was impossible to qualify the entirety of the British Army’s culture and so the author only evaluated cultural elements
deemed relevant to Mission Command, adjudged by their relevance in literature. This identified a culture characterized by a strong set of espoused values and a number of notable artifacts.

The espoused values included the core values of respect for others, loyalty, courage, selfless commitment, integrity, discipline, which were assessed against the core standards of appropriate, lawful and totally professional. Further values underpinning the Army’s espoused culture were comradeship, example, pride, leadership and warrior spirit. In turn, a number of other values reinforced leadership, described in large part by the Army Leadership Code.

The artifacts assessed were the Regimental system, which engenders identity at the unit level; the disciplinary system, designed to uphold the Army’s Values and Standards; the growing size of the Army headquarters; and prescribed language characterized by abbreviations and acronyms. The career management system, designed to ensure the right people are employed in the appropriate jobs, the ubiquity of Service personnel living-in barracks and the related frequency of socialization were also considered. Further artifacts discovered during the research were the behaviors of risk-aversion, micromanagement, a zero-defect approach, binge drinking, and bullying, discrimination and harassment (albeit the latter was not considered a part of Army-wide culture).569

569 Schein considers “observed behavior” to be an artifact of culture. Schein, 24.
What Misalignments Exist Between Espoused Values and Exhibited Behaviors with Regard to Mission Command?
What are the Implications of any Misalignments?

One key misalignment was identified between espoused values and exhibited behaviors, with a further four potential misalignments warranting further investigation.

The identified misalignment was between the espoused value of warrior spirit and the exhibited behaviors of risk aversion and management culture. Reaction to public opinion and the prominence of litigation fuel this reality. The impact of these behaviors on Mission Command is a reduced willingness to delegate, leading to micromanagement and a zero-defect mentality. Such an approach undermines the decentralization required by Mission Command. Furthermore, such a management culture slows decision making, thus preventing timely decision making required by Mission Command doctrine.

The first potential misalignment was between the core Army Value of respect for others, and the exhibited behavior of sexual harassment. It must be stressed, the frequency of sexual harassment identified was not sufficient to consider it an Army-wide cultural trait, but the prevalence of suspected cases is noteworthy nonetheless. Sexual harassment degrades respect and trust within the chain of command, thereby undermining Mission Command.

The second potential misalignment was between the espoused values of the career management system and the manner in which career management is enacted. Career management calls for “trust in a fair, timely, responsive and accountable career management system,” but the majority of Service personnel do not appear to trust the system. It was not possible to identify the specific behaviors leading to this misalignment.

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570 Military Secretary, 1.
and it is possible that the misalignment is based upon perceptions amongst Service personnel. In spite of this, perception remains important in instilling trust.

The third potential misalignment was between the espoused value of communication, as associated with leadership, and the reality of a language rife with abbreviations and acronyms. Clear communication is vital in describing a clear intent, yet the potential for confusion by using acronyms, abbreviations and slang terms is apparent. This research has shown, unless addressed, there is the potential for unclear and confusing language to become a cultural trait.

The final potential misalignment was between the espoused values associated with good leadership and behaviors exhibited by the Army’s senior leadership. This paper has shown there is an apparent lack of trust in senior leaders across the Army. It may be that perceptions generate this mistrust, but, regardless, the effect denudes trust, which is vital for Mission Command. Further analysis would be pertinent to assess what leads to this mistrust, and whether the culture holds senior officers to different standards over their embodiment of core Values when compared to the wider Army.

What Misalignments Exist Between Mission Command Doctrine and Culture?

What are the Implications of any Misalignments?

Beyond the aforementioned cultural misalignments, stemming from differing exhibited behaviors when compared with espoused values, there are three further misalignments between Mission Command doctrine and Army culture. These are the heroes, the Regimental system and the size of the Army Headquarters.

The espoused value of heroes was seemingly both supportive and obstructive of Mission Command. The heroes compared, Slim and Montgomery, each displayed very
different approaches to command. Despite commanding before the British formally introduced Mission Command philosophy, Slim embodied many aspects of the theory. As such, emulation of his leadership behavior by current leaders encourages Mission Command and supports Mission Command doctrine. On the other hand, Montgomery embodied a command approach resembling the antithesis of Mission Command. As such, efforts to emulate Montgomery’s leadership behavior by current leaders will undermine Mission Command.

The Regimental system is also not entirely obstructive to Mission Command. At the Regimental level and below it imbues familiarity, comradeship, spirit, cohesion and identity, encouraging decentralization within small units. However, above the Regimental level it apparently denudes mutual understanding given its tribal nature, thereby obstructing Mission Command.

Regarding headquarters sizes, British operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated a propensity to increase the size of divisional and brigade headquarters. This trend has continued outside the theatre of operations, with an increase in the size of Army Headquarters relative to the total size of the Army. Large headquarters are a symptom of a cultural predisposition for centralization and so demonstrate an aversion to the decentralization required of Mission Command. They also slow decision making.

Is the Culture of the British Army Conducive to the Successful Execution of Mission Command?

With the secondary questions answered, the primary research question must finally be addressed. The prevalence of cultural obstructions to the successful execution of Mission Command indicates the culture is not conducive to the successful execution of
Mission Command. Although some aspects of the culture do support Mission Command, it is apparent the Army must address the identified cultural obstructions if it is to fully embrace Mission Command philosophy.

Some elements of the national culture seemingly obstruct Mission Command, but the Army has developed its own unique organizational culture through socialization. That said, the national culture’s trend towards supporting Mission Command suggests the Army is recruiting from a population prepared to embody such a philosophy.

The Army’s organizational culture consists of a number of espoused values, which, with the exception of heroes, uniformly support Mission Command. Underpinned by the Army’s Values and Standards, and further enhanced by comradeship, pride, leadership and warrior spirit, the espoused values align neatly with Mission Command. Embodiment of these values will generate trust and mutual understanding, and support a number of the principles, elements and tenets of Mission Command doctrine. The same is true for a number of identified cultural artifacts, albeit their influence is both positive and negative in many instances. The Regimental system encourages decentralization at the lower echelons and the disciplinary system appears effective at upholding the Army’s Values and Standards, thus reinforcing their positive influence on Mission Command, amongst other things generating trust. Distinct Army language to some extent engenders unambiguous, expeditious communication so critical in communicating a clear intent, whilst the career management system ensures employment of those with the right skills in the appropriate jobs, thus encouraging decentralization. High proportions of Service personnel living in barracks and socializing together encourages respect and trust, each important requirements for Mission Command enactment. Finally, there is evidence of
the embodiment of good leadership as preached in the espoused values, with significant levels of trust in immediate commanders.

In spite of these positive cultural aspects, many of these artifacts simultaneously obstruct Mission Command. The Regimental system, Army language, the career management system, living in barracks and socialization, and the enactment of leadership all have negative aspects to offset the aforementioned benefits, at least partially. Beyond these artifacts, a tendency for oversized headquarters, management culture, risk-aversion, micromanagement and a zero-defect approach all are damaging to the prospect of a culture encouraging the successful execution of Mission Command.

Relationships to Previous Studies

There have been very few attempts at analyzing the British Army’s culture, let alone specifically reviewing the culture as it pertains to Mission Command. As such, there is significant practical value in this research. The identified cultural trends provide the Army with a frame of reference to understand why the Army may struggle to enact Mission Command, and what aspects it must address if it is to improve its cultural alignment to Mission Command doctrine. Furthermore, the research has highlighted cultural aspects for sustainment that are supportive of Mission Command.

The only other attempt discovered by the author that analyzes the British Army’s cultural proclivity for Mission Command is Eitan Shamir’s book, *Transforming Command*. He reviews the British, U.S., and Israeli armies’ efforts to adopt Mission Command philosophy, and the impact of their cultures in their attempts at doing

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571 Shamir.
so. Although comprehensive, his research predates the adoption of JDP 01 as the preeminent doctrine for Mission Command in the British Army. Moreover, although his research was published only five years ago, much has changed in the British Army since. For example, the Army completed operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, underwent four tranches of redundancy,\(^5\) and restructured in accordance with the Army 2020 plan.\(^6\) Although culture is deep-rooted and slow to change, it is changeable nonetheless,\(^7\) and so, following a period of such turbulence, re-evaluation of the culture seems valuable.

A number of Shamir’s conclusions are congruent with the findings of this thesis. Although this is no surprise given the influence of his work in the literature review, it is notable that some of the same conclusions were reached using more recent evidence. For example, Ekins et al. supported Shamir’s assertion of an ever-increasingly litigious society and its impact on military risk-aversion.\(^8\) Such consistencies increase confidence in the value of such findings.

A series of short papers and studies, similar in nature to this thesis, have investigated the culture of the U.S. Army as it relates to Mission Command philosophy,\(^9\) one of the most comprehensive being “Embedding Mission Command in


\(^7\) Schein, 289.

\(^8\) Ekins, Morgan, and Tugendhat, 7; Shamir, 168.

\(^9\) Examples include: Pryer, Guthrie, Case, Shaw, and Blanton.
Army Culture,” by Colonel Richard Heyward.\textsuperscript{577} Many of the findings from these works are similar to those discovered in this study. The prevalence of the U.S. Army studies indicates their value as an academic tool for generating thought and dialogue about how best to imbue a culture of Mission Command. In turn, this underlines the value of similar research for the British Army.

Dianne Langford’s 2006 study, “In What Ways Can Education and Training be Used to ‘Bridge the Gap’ Between the Attitudes and Culture of British Army Recruits and the Army’s Organisational Culture,” offered some useful insights to the culture of the British Army using Hofstede’s dimensions as a framework. She even addressed the concept of Mission Command using Hofstede’s framework, as did Febbraro et al.,\textsuperscript{578} albeit from the perspective of outdated doctrine and in relatively scant detail. Detailed evaluation of the Army’s organizational culture warrants a more rigorous approach than simply applying generalized cultural dimensions.

Beyond this, cultural studies of the British Army were difficult to find. Those in existence often dated back to the 1990s,\textsuperscript{579} although Alastair Finlan’s book, \textit{Contemporary Military Culture and Strategic Studies}, afforded some more contemporary analysis.\textsuperscript{580} Strikingly, despite the apparent lack of research into the culture of the modern British Army, General Carter, the Chief of the General Staff, is pursuing

\textsuperscript{577} Heyward.

\textsuperscript{578} Febbraro, McKee, and Riedel, 3-10 – 3-12.

\textsuperscript{579} For example, Paul Killworth, “Culture and Power in the British Army: Hierarchies, Boundaries and Construction” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Cambridge, July 1997), and Soeters.

\textsuperscript{580} Finlan.
organizational culture change.\textsuperscript{581} It is unclear whether there are classified resources to support this endeavor but, if not, this reinforces the requirement for more studies like this one. Analysis of culture affords a valuable frame through which to understand the organization.

\textbf{Suggestions for Further Research}

In investigating whether the culture of the British Army is conducive to Mission Command, a number of potential areas for future studies have become apparent. In some cases, this results from an ambition to follow up the findings of this thesis, and in other instances, it results from an identified void in knowledge. The following recommendations are in priority order, according to the author’s assessment.

Firstly, it would be valuable to research the utility of Mission Command in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment. Recent operations have proven that it is unlikely the British Army will ever deploy unilaterally, and so the adopted command philosophy should have validity outside an Army chain of command. Research could focus on how to achieve Integrated Action\textsuperscript{582} in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment.

Secondly, research could investigate how to resolve the misalignments between the British Army’s culture and the requirements of Mission Command doctrine as identified in this thesis. Such effort could come in one of three forms: change the culture to align with the doctrine, change the doctrine to align with the culture, or change both


\textsuperscript{582} LETC/DLW, \textit{Integrated Action}; Doctrine Note 15/01, January 2015.
the culture and the doctrine. An analysis of which course of action is most suitable, combined with an assessment of how best to implement the chosen course of action would be valuable additions in the effort to align culture and command philosophy.

Thirdly, an ethnographical methodology could be used to answer the same primary research question as this thesis. An ethnographical study would significantly advance the body of knowledge regarding the Army’s culture, would supplement the findings of this thesis, and would increase the validity of conclusions. Furthermore, it would identify basic underlying assumptions, a layer of culture difficult to ascertain by means of a literature review alone.

Fourthly, a study could consider whether Mission Command is the most appropriate command philosophy in the modern British Army. Drastically reduced force numbers in the British Army, combined with ever-advancing technology theoretically sets the stage for responsive, centralized decision making. A comprehensive assessment of the validity of changing the command philosophy in such a manner is worthy of investigation.

Finally, research could investigate the process by which General Carter is pursuing cultural change in the British Army. This could consider the chances of success, possibly comparing the steps taken by General Carter with the steps prescribed by an academic model for implementing cultural change, such as that of Schein.

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583 Brooke-Holland and Thurley, 1.
584 Stewart, 9.
585 Schein, 300.
Summary

Mission Command, the British Army’s command philosophy, is a critical enabler of the Army’s Manoeuvrist Approach to war. These concepts were adopted based upon the Germans’ ideas and tactics of *Auftragstaktik* and *Blitzkrieg* respectively. Seeking to exploit the human dimension, successful execution of Mission Command requires a facilitative culture to maximize the Army’s operational effectiveness. Based on a literature review, this thesis has identified the British Army as existing within a national culture that predominantly supports the execution of Mission Command. The organizational culture of the Army itself, however, in spite of some supportive aspects, does not support the successful execution of Mission Command given the number of cultural obstacles to its pursuit. If the Army is to embody a culture of Mission Command, senior leaders must seek to either change the Army’s culture, change the Army’s doctrine, or change both the Army’s culture and doctrine. In any case, the Army’s culture must align with its command philosophy.
GLOSSARY

Artifacts. According to Edgar Schein’s cultural model, artifacts are the most superficial, visible level of culture and include observed behaviors. See also: basic underlying assumptions and espoused beliefs and values.

Basic Underlying Assumptions. According to Edgar Schein’s cultural model, basic underlying assumptions are the most deep-rooted element of culture. They are unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs and values which determine behavior, perception, thought and feeling. See also: artifacts and espoused beliefs and values.

Chief of the General Staff. The professional head of the British Army.

Collectivism. “The opposite of individualism; together they form one of the dimensions of national cultures. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout people’s lives continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.” See also: dimension and individualism.

Culture. “A pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.” See also: shared basic assumptions.

Dimension. “An aspect of a phenomenon that can be measured (expressed in a number) independently of others.” See also: collectivism, femininity, individualism, indulgence, long-term orientation, masculinity, power-distance, restraint, short-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance.

Espoused Beliefs and Values. According to Edgar Schein’s cultural model, espoused beliefs and values are the intermediate level of culture. They include ideals, goals,
values, aspirations, ideologies and rationalizations. See also: artifacts and basic underlying assumptions.

Femininity. “The opposite of masculinity; together, they form one of the dimensions of national cultures. Femininity stands for a society in which emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.” See also: dimension and masculinity.

Heroes. According to Hofstede’s cultural model, heroes are “persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, assumed to possess characteristics highly prized in a culture and this serving as models for behavior.” See also: practices, rituals symbols and values.

Individualism. “The opposite of collectivism; together, they form one of the dimensions of national cultures. Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after him- or herself and his or her immediate family only.” See also: collectivism and dimension.

Indulgence. “The opposite of restraint; together, they form one of the dimensions of national cultures. Indulgence stands for a society that allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun.” See also: dimension and restraint.

Intent. “Intent is similar to purpose. . . . It represents what the commander wants to achieve and why. . . . It is normally expressed using effects, objectives and desired outcomes.”

Long-Term Orientation. “The opposite of short-term orientation; together, they form a dimension of national cultures. Long-term orientation stands for the fostering of pragmatic virtues oriented toward future rewards, in particular perseverance, thrift, and adapting to changing circumstances.” See also: dimension and short-term orientation.

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591 Schein, 24.
592 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 517.
593 Ibid., 518.
594 Ibid., 519.
595 Ibid.
597 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 519.
Manoeuvrist Approach. “An indirect approach which emphasises understanding and targeting the conceptual and moral components of an adversary’s fighting power as well as attacking the physical component.”598

Masculinity. “The opposite of femininity; together, they form one of the dimensions of national cultures. Masculinity stands for a society in which emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.”599 See also: dimension and femininity.

Military Secretary. The senior officer in charge of personnel and career management for the British Army.

Mission Command. “A philosophy of command, with centralised intent and decentralised execution, that is particularly suitable for complex, dynamic and adversarial situation.”600

Operation Granby. The codename assigned to British military operations in Iraq for the Gulf War in 1991.

Operation HERRICK. The codename assigned to British military operations in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014.

Operation Telic. The codename assigned to British military operations in Iraq between 2003 and 2011.

Power-Distance. “The extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. One of the dimensions of national cultures.”601 See also: dimension and power-distance index.

Power-Distance Index. “A measure for the degree of power-distance in a country’s culture.” See also: power-distance.

Practices. According to Hofstede’s cultural model, practices are “the scope of what people do, including the symbols to which they respond, the heroes they venerate,

598 DCDC, ADP Operations, 5-2.
599 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 519.
600 DCDC, ADP Operations, 6-11.
601 Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 521.
and the rituals in which they take part, but not their values.”602 See also: heroes, rituals, symbols and values.

Restraint. “The opposite of indulgence; together, they form one of the dimensions of national cultures. Restraint stands for a society that suppresses gratification of needs and regulates it by means of strict social norms.”603 See also: dimension and indulgence.

Rituals. According to Hofstede’s cultural model, rituals are “collective activities that are technically superfluous to reach desired ends but that, within a culture, are considered to be socially essential; they are therefore carried out for their own sake.”604 See also: heroes, practices, symbols and values.

Short-Term Orientation. “The opposite of long-term orientation; together, they form a dimension of national cultures. Short-term orientation stands for the fostering of virtues related to the past and present, such as national pride, respect for tradition, preservation of face, and fulling social obligations.”605 See also: dimension and long-term orientation.

Symbols. According to Hofstede’s cultural model, symbols are “words, pictures, gesture, or objects that carry a particular meaning recognized as such only by those who share a culture.”606 See also: heroes, practices, rituals and values.

Uncertainty Avoidance. “The extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations. One of the dimensions of national cultures.”607 See also: dimension.

Values. According to Hofstede’s cultural model, values are “broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others, largely unconscious. To be distinguished from practices.”608 See also: heroes, practices, rituals and symbols.

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602 Ibid.
603 Ibid.
604 Ibid.
605 Ibid., 521-2.
606 Ibid., 522.
607 Ibid.
608 Ibid., 523.


