

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

MANAGING THE 21ST CENTURY AIR FORCE RESERVE

by

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Biography

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Introduction

“Since September 11, 2001...more than 32,000 reserve airmen, representing nearly every Air Force mission area, have volunteered or been mobilized for active duty to fill critical worldwide combat and support requirements.”¹ John Winkler noted in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, during Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM it became clear that reliance on reserve forces in the operational environment would continue as far as could be envisioned. The Reserve Component had fundamentally changed, and approaches to managing reserve forces would also have to be changed to meet the new demands.² The new reality of the “long war” requires an optimized force management process to better serve our airmen.

In an effort to achieve optimization, Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) has chosen to modernize its processes through a program called “AFR 2012”. This program, involved the three major staffs of Headquarters AFRC (HQ/AFRC), the Office of the Air Force Reserve (AF/RE) and Air Reserve Personnel Center (ARPC) working together to establish a unity of effort across the command to manage, mobilize and generate its forces.³ Lt Gen Stenner, Commander AFRC, stated, “We are revising our management structures and practices to make it easier for our Reservists to volunteer, mobilize, and deploy.”⁴ This modernization is critical to the Total Force because, “as our Air Force prepares for the future, streamlining how we bring highly capable and cost-effective Reservists on active duty is vital to our nation’s defense.”⁵

Today’s Air Force will be facing tighter budgets during the sustained operations of the long war, and must find efficiencies within the current system to preserve the unique capabilities of the Reserve Component (RC). An efficient, cost effective, capable, and flexible force is

¹ Directorate of Strategic Communication. *The Official Website of Citizen Airmen Magazine*. July 27, 2010.

² Winkler, John D. “Developing an Operational Reserve...,” JFQ, issue 59, 4th Quarter 2010, 15.

³ Terry Orner, *FGC Concept of Operations*, (Version 8.2), 4.

⁴ Ibid, Citizen Airmen.

⁵ Ibid, Citizen Airmen.

available to the nation in AFRC, but senior leaders must preserve the balance of a strategic reserve and operational capability while employing this force. Current processes for managing Reserve force mobilization and generation are tied to Cold War era policies that will not preserve or sustain both strategic and operational capability into the 21st Century.⁶

AFRC is taking steps to improve its business practices and force management processes to extract the maximum sustainable operational force capability, without “breaking” the strategic reserve.⁷ One way to support this effort is for the Air Force to rethink the Gaining MAJCOM (G-MAJCOM) construct. The G-MAJCOM construct predates 1960 and was implemented by Air Force policy, not by statute; “The MAJCOM gaining a [RC] unit was responsible for training that unit during peacetime and absorbing that unit during wartime.”⁸ Today’s modern readiness construct has changed in a way that requires AFRC to perform many of the roles once performed by the G-MAJCOMs.⁹

The Air Force must also modernize the mobilization process by synchronizing Global Force Management and Air Expeditionary Force policy to comply with the tenets of mobilization.¹⁰ The four tenets of successful mobilization doctrine are; “objective, unity of effort, flexibility, and timeliness.”¹¹ Current AF practices are plagued by the competing interests of G-MAJCOMs and redundancies that violate doctrine, and reduce efficiency within the system. AFRC’s proposal to improve mobilization will allow the command to work in its established MAJCOM role in parallel with other MAJCOMs to present and provide forces to the combatant commander while coordinating with the Component MAJCOMs.

⁶ Terry Orner, *Concept of Operations for the FGC*, Version 8.2, (AFRC/FOC, Robins AFB, GA, 25 July, 2010), 5.

⁷ Terry Orner, Editing Comments through E-mail correspondence, draft review.

⁸ Headquarters United States Air Force (HQ USAF), (Program Action Directive PAD 10-01, DRAFT), BP-2.

⁹ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-01, DRAFT, BP-3. Note: PAD 10-01 is no longer a working document.

¹⁰ LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, *AFR Recommendation on Streamlining Mobilization* (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 1.

¹¹ AFI 10-402 Volume 1, *Mobilization Planning and Readiness*, (AF/A5XW, August 9, 2007), 6.

Maintaining a strategic reserve while simultaneously providing operational capability requires a new force management structure that has the tools and understanding to achieve sustainable balance through 100% visibility of AFRC forces.¹² The AF can achieve this visibility by embracing a single point of entry and exit for all Air Force Reserve personnel. AFRC's Force Generation Center (FGC) will support this unity of effort and provide for the centralized management, mobilization and presentation of AFR forces to the combatant commander, MAJCOMs, agencies, and other staffs.¹³ The FGC, upon reaching full operational capability, will provide AFRC total visibility of its forces and the ability to efficiently provide those forces to its customers for both strategic surge and sustainable operational capability.¹⁴

Strategic and Operational Reserve Capability

Jacob Klerman in a RAND study noted, the United States is engaged in a war characterized by long term conflict in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world, during which the Department of Defense (DoD) has made unprecedented use of its Reserve Component.¹⁵ Reserve forces previously viewed as strategic in nature were called upon less than once in a generation. These forces are now used as a regular operational force, often referred to as the "operational reserve," with an expectation of reserve call-up as much as one in six years, and recently even more frequently.¹⁶

The Reserves have continuously supported the military from the earliest American colonies through the current wars.¹⁷ Throughout this history of selfless service, the roles have changed with regard to how the RCs are employed. "In 1970, the President's Commission on an All-

¹² Concepts derived from research of AFR 2012 Enterprise Value Stream Analysis (EVSA) Outbrief, editing by Terry Orner.

¹³ Concepts derived from research of Terry Orner, *FGC Concept of Operations*, Version 8.2, Pre-Decisional, 4, with editing comments.

¹⁴ Concepts derived from research of Terry Orner, *FGC Concept of Operations*, 4, with editing comments.

¹⁵ Jacob A. Klerman, *Rethinking the Reserves*, (RAND, 2008), xi. with editing comments from Terry Orner.

¹⁶ Ibid, Klerman, RAND, *Rethinking the Reserves*, xi.

¹⁷ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, E-1.

Volunteer Armed Force [Gates Commission] recommended to President Nixon that the U.S. military transition from the mixed force of volunteers and draftees that had existed since 1948 to an all-volunteer force.”¹⁸ The active components transformed from a collection of volunteers and draftees into a permanent full-time force. This force was augmented by a “strategic reserve” providing surge capability, when needed, through “tiered readiness.”¹⁹

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) describes RC evolution. Throughout the 1980’s the Reserves remained a strategic force, keeping to a tiered readiness framework, according to which reservists were funded, equipped, and trained to a lesser readiness level than the active duty.²⁰ The “strategic reserve” would respond to call-up by first mobilizing, then training to a higher readiness level and finally deploying with their active duty counterpart, known as the “mobilize-train-deploy” construct.²¹ This construct changed significantly in the 1990’s due to operational demands placed on the all-volunteer force. As a result, the Reserve Component matured from “tiered readiness” to a force that trained and maintained readiness in peace time, then mobilized when called upon for deployment, known as the “train-mobilize-deploy” readiness construct.²²

AFRC has attempted to define the modern “strategic reserve,” as currently no official Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or Joint definition is codified.²³ AFRC defines the strategic reserve as, “all additional capacity available with varying levels of readiness and availability, above what the regular component provides.”²⁴ Senior leaders must recognize that the strategic

¹⁸ Ibid, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, E-7.

¹⁹ Ibid, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, E-8.

²⁰ Ibid, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, E-8.

²¹ Ibid, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, E-8, with editing comments from Terry Orner.

²² Ibid, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, E-8, with editing comments from Terry Orner, “Mobilize-Train-Deploy to Train-Mobilize-Deploy” as the force matured.

²³ AFR 2012 EVSA Outbrief, 11 Dec 09.

²⁴ AFR 2012 EVSA Outbrief, 11 Dec 09.

reserve offers a critical surge capability to the combatant commander and is a vital aspect of the Total Force.


Figure 1 demonstrates how the strategic reserve has offered “surge” capability during times of increased operations tempo. Surge capability, however, is not the only advantage of the strategic reserve. When not

mobilized, the strategic reserve presents a significant cost savings to the tax payer, with estimates ranging from one-third to one-fifth

the cost of their active duty counterparts.²⁵ Retaining strategic aspects not only provides surge capability and cost savings, but also provides balance to the reserve triad, offering stability to our citizen airmen, their civilian employers, and their families.

Preserving the strategic reserve is critical, but operational demands are straining the force. AFRC recently defined the operational reserve as, “that portion of the strategic reserve that provides capability to an external customer.”²⁶ Christine Wormuth of the Center for Strategic and International Studies explains current demand, “Employing the Reserve Component as part of the operational force is mandatory, not a choice. [Department of Defense], DoD cannot meet today’s operational requirements without drawing significantly on the Reserve Component.”²⁷

Additionally, in their report to Congress, the CNGR concluded, “given the threats the US faces, the looming fiscal challenges the nation confronts, the demand for forces, the unique



²⁵ Ibid, Klerman, RAND, *Rethinking the Reserves*, xiii.

²⁶ AFR 2012 EVSA Outbrief, 11 Dec 09.

²⁷ Christine E. Wormuth, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, July 2006), p. IX.

capabilities resident in the RC, and their cost effectiveness, the Commission sees no alternative to an increased use of and reliance on the Reserve Component.”²⁸ This recognition was endorsed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which stated, “Prevailing in today’s wars requires a Reserve Component that can serve in an operational capacity-available, trained, and equipped for predictable routine deployment.”²⁹ Use of the Reserve Component as an operational force is now engrained in our DoD culture, but beware, this capability is not sustainable into the 21st century and beyond without sacrificing strategic aspects unless force management reform is undertaken.³⁰

With an explicit recognition of the evolution from providing a purely strategic role (aka, mobilize-train-deploy), to a reserve force that provides sustainable operational capability, there must be a balance in how that force is managed and utilized. In a letter to Secretary Gates, the CNGR wrote, the new “operational reserve must be available for emergencies at home and abroad, and must fully integrate with the active component. Simultaneously, this force must retain its strategic elements and capabilities.”³¹ The CNGR concluded that the future of the all-volunteer force depends on “policymakers undertaking needed reforms to ensure the Reserve Components are ready, capable, and available for both operational and strategic purposes.”³²

DoD Directive [DoDD] 1200.17 codified nine principles in policy for managing the Reserve Components as an operational force. This Landmark directive recognized that the Reserve Components provide both operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.³³

Both the CNGR as well as Secretary Gates in DoDD 1200.17 recognized the critical need to maintain both strategic and operational reserve capability.

²⁸ Ibid, Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, E-9 and p 7.

²⁹ Winkler, John D. JFQ, issue 59, 4th Quarter 2010, 15.


³⁰ Editing comments by Terry Orner.

³¹ Ibid, CNGR Letter to the Honorable Robert Gates, preface. Editing comments by Terry Orner.

³² Ibid, CNGR Letter to the Honorable Robert Gates, preface.

³³ Winkler, John D. JFQ, issue 59, 4th Quarter 2010, 16.

The challenge for strategic leaders is recognizing the max sustainable balance or “break point,” in reserve force utilization. Figure 2 illustrates and AFRC defines the “break point” as “the amount of operational force the reserves can provide indefinitely, using both volunteers and non-volunteers. If utilization exceeds this level, it will break a particular portion of the force (strategic or operational) for a certain amount of time.”³⁴ Senior leaders must meet the challenges of balancing reserve force utilization to prevent breaking one capability at the expense of the other.



The Gaining MAJCOM

One way the Air Force can achieve strategic and operational balance is to rethink the Gaining MAJCOM (G-MAJCOM) construct. In 1997, the National Defense Authorization Act directed that AFRC be operated as a separate command of the Air Force. This new MAJCOM subsequently reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 1998.³⁵ But as AFRC stood up, it brought forward management structures and business processes developed during the Cold War, and not necessarily suited to meet current and future reserve force requirements.³⁶ Recently, the Chief, Air Force Reserve (CAFR), suggested solutions through a Program Action Directive (PAD) effort, (previously PAD 10-01) to improve force management through G-MAJCOM

³⁴ AFR 2012 EVSA Outbrief, 11 Dec 09, Pre-Decisional.

³⁵ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-2, editing comments by Terry Orner.

³⁶ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-2.

reform.³⁷ The current G-MAJCOM concept has “not kept pace with how forces are presented and provided under more advanced constructs prescribed by law and policy, such as Goldwater-Nichols and Global Force Management (GFM).”³⁸

The Air Force can improve upon the G-MAJCOM construct by allowing AFRC to perform its role as a Lead MAJCOM (L-MAJCOM). This needed reform will streamline how the Air Force manages, mobilizes and presents AFR forces to the Joint Force Providers (JFPs), Combatant Commands as well as MAJCOMs and other requesting organizations. Successful reform will redefine the roles of “G-MAJCOMs and L-MAJCOMs to reflect [current] policy direction for HQ AFRC to [perform] responsibilities associated with activating and presenting AFR forces [to its customers].”³⁹

This AFR reform (PAD effort) suggests the term G-MAJCOM be replaced by L-MAJCOM, allowing complete oversight, while also transferring activation and presentation authority to HQ AFRC for its assigned forces.⁴⁰ Lead MAJCOMs have already been defined by PAD 07-13: L-MAJCOMs are management headquarters and have the full range of functional staff; Air Combat Command (ACC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Air Education and Training Command (AETC)...etc, and AFRC are all L-MAJCOMs.⁴¹ “The intent of a Lead MAJCOM...is to consolidate responsibilities for a particular function [into] a single MAJCOM, supporting the entire Air Force as applicable.”⁴²

Under the PAD, HQ AFRC would be designated as the L-MAJCOM for all AFR forces and assume responsibilities and coordination activities, working with pertinent Service Components

³⁷ Terry Orner, Lt Gen Stenner briefed G-MAJCOM PAD at CORONA in Nov 09 and began coordination in Dec 09.

³⁸ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-2.

³⁹ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-3.

⁴⁰ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-3, 4.

⁴¹ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, C-2.

⁴² Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, C-2.

for assigned AFRC personnel.⁴³ Two previous directives PAD 06-09 and 07-13; suggest strategic guidance for process improvement. A specific example can be seen in PAD 07-13 Section 6.2.2: Phase 1 Assessment, involving analysis of core AF functions across all echelons of management headquarters. The assessment included determining not only where work is done currently, but also where it could be more appropriately and efficiently done.⁴⁴ PAD 07-13 suggests:

AFRC consolidate reserve management functions consistent with overall AF guidance and adapt command structures as required to best support AF transformation. HQ AFRC will be designated L-MAJCOM for Air Force Reserve issues. AFRC will be responsible for planning, organizing, training, equipping and managing Air Force Reserve personnel, equipment and funds. As Lead MAJCOM for Air Force Reserve, AFRC organizes trains, equips, maintains and provides forces to fulfill specific roles. AFRC maintains control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in operational missions.⁴⁵

The draft PAD (Previously 10-01) therefore suggested AFRC respond to this assessment and develop coordinated staff organization structures and business processes to exercise this L-MAJCOM role.⁴⁶

This full spectrum approach focuses on “force validation and generation activities including: functional capability management; personnel sourcing and activation; presentation of forces to joint force providers, C-MAJCOMs and other requesting organizations; ADCON support to deployed forces; and inactivation of forces upon release from operational duty.”⁴⁷

Implementation of G-MAJCOM reform (according to PAD efforts) offers the AF an enterprise-wide solution to consolidate reserve-unique roles, into a single organization for presenting forces (through ACC/AMC/AFSOC) to support commander requirements. This sourcing solution will

⁴³ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-01, DRAFT, C-3.

⁴⁴ Terry Orner, Provided a review of PAD 07-13, Summary Page1.

⁴⁵ Ibid, Terry Orner. Provided a review of PAD 07-13, Summary Page 2.

⁴⁶ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-01, DRAFT, BP-5.

⁴⁷ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-01, DRAFT, BP-5.

provide complete oversight and 100% visibility of Air Force Reserve forces to improve Reserve Component “capability balance” for the Total Force.⁴⁸


Streamlining Mobilization

In addition to rethinking the G-MAJCOM construct, the Air Force can improve reserve force management by streamlining mobilization. John Tirpak wrote, “The AF is revamping its expeditionary air system to cope with a stark reality: The service has too few airmen and too little equipment to meet the desired rotational goals.”⁴⁹ Col James Horton, Director of Air and

Space Expeditionary Force and Personnel Operations stated, “We’re doing three big rotations a year that number about 35,000 folks per cycle, or 115,000 a

year.”⁵⁰ ANG and AFR forces are coordinated through Horton’s organization and the majority of the RC individual deployment requirements are met through volunteerism (Figure 3).⁵¹ The Chief of the Air Force Reserve (CAFR), in his dual-hatted role as the AFRC/CC, coordinates with Horton’s organization and G-MAJCOMs to source AFRC forces for mobilization.⁵²

PAD 10-01 (Draft) recognized that the G-MAJCOM role is largely administrative due to the fact that the “G-MAJCOMs do not exercise control over reserve forces, nor do they have any direct role in reserve force employment.”⁵³ Currently, AFR forces are sourced in increments



⁴⁸ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-5.

⁴⁹ John A. Tirpak, *Struggling to Cover Commitments*, Air Force Magazine (Vol. 93, No. 9, Sept 2010), 43.

⁵⁰ Ibid, John A. Tirpak, *Struggling to Cover Commitments*, Air Force Magazine, 46.

⁵¹ Ibid, John A. Tirpak, *Struggling to Cover Commitments*, Air Force Magazine, 46.

⁵² Ibid, AFI10-402V1, p 12.

⁵³ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-2.

allocated to each G-MAJCOM, resulting in multiple staffs performing similar sourcing tasks under varying business rules, creating redundancy and inefficiencies within the mobilization (MOB) process.⁵⁴ As a result, “small slices of AFR capability are visible through each individual G-MAJCOM [and] multiple mobilization authorities and processes exist to source AFR assets.”⁵⁵

Lt Col Bill Woodard, Chief of War and Mobilization Plans (AFRC), proposes streamlining Air Force mobilization by incorporating and consolidating Global Force Management (GFM) and Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) policy into the MOB process. GFM policy and the AEF concept have resulted in the steady state rotational deployment cycles seen in today’s operational environment. The process also created the AEF Tempo Bands which are functionally aligned and then deployed. Reserve force managers must have a good understanding of the process as well as the MOB trigger points and defined dwell periods between mobilizations, all of which are contained within the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG).⁵⁶

According to Woodard, the GFMIG identifies Air Force capabilities that are assigned in the “Forces For” tables, which for the AF consists primarily of aviation assets and some combat support capability. The sourcing for these forces is usually managed by one Component MAJCOM supporting the combatant commander.⁵⁷ But, “one very important aspect of the GFMIG is the majority of AF combat support and combat service support forces are unassigned in the document, and therefore, are assigned directly to the Secretary of the Air Force.”⁵⁸ Lt Col Woodard’s proclaimed challenge to RC mobilization lies in the management of these “unassigned forces” that are embedded throughout all of the different AF MAJCOMs.

⁵⁴ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-2.

⁵⁵ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, BP-2.

⁵⁶ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 1.


⁵⁷ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 1.

⁵⁸ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 1.

Complicating this issue is the fact that these forces are then subdivided within each MAJCOM into a mix of Regular Air Force (RegAF), Air National Guard (ANG), and AF Reserve (AFR) forces.⁵⁹

Figure 4 Source: Lt Col Woodard Draft Concept Pre-Decisional.

Lt Col Woodard explains the current process which focuses on each G-MAJCOM requesting mobilization authority for their portion of the total AF requirement. Figure 4 illustrates how this process can incorporate



up to eight separate MAJCOMs within a single MOB package. Each MAJCOM coordinates and develops ANG and AFR packages for submission to AF/A5XW for HAF and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approval. Once the Partial Mobilization (PM) request is approved, AF/A5XW releases a PM authorization message to each MAJCOM, who then publishes the execution message for their portion of the requirement. Only then, can the separate MAJCOMS manage and oversee their respective unit activation, deployment, redeployment and demobilization.⁶⁰

The current process of separately managing small portions of the total mobilization package for the RC forces reveals gross inefficiencies.⁶¹ Woodard lists the many problems associated with managing forces across multiple MAJCOMs to include: "Poor coordination between RegAF Functional Area Managers (FAMs) and ARC FAMs, differing experience levels within each MAJCOM impacting the understanding of the process, [increased] lag time between

⁵⁹ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 1.

⁶⁰ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 2.


⁶¹ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 2.

MAJCOMs submitting their portion of the MOB request to AF/A5XW, and MAJCOMs having a different process for releasing PM execution messages.”⁶² The key, he says, is to streamline the mobilization process by reducing redundancy and inefficiency.⁶³

In his paper, Woodard explains how, “Under the AEF construct, force alignment is first grouped by functional area, and then subdivided into the three component forces – RegAF, ANG and AFR.”⁶⁴ Total Force oversight will be improved by focusing mobilization management and process control at these component levels; “The ANG and AFR have the authority, capability and experience to manage their respective mobilization processes.”⁶⁵ This is where he recognizes the efficiencies that will be gained by allowing ARC headquarters to work with Component MAJCOMs (ACC, AMC, and AFSOC) to coordinate MOB requests in support of commander requirements.⁶⁶

Clearly, Lt Col Woodard has recognized how GFM and AEF policies have drastically changed, while the mobilization process has remained unchanged since before Operation DESERT STORM. The Air Force can synchronize the system by streamlining mobilization to match the efficiencies realized by GFM and AEF policy.⁶⁷ Woodard’s work illustrates (Figure 5) that by restructuring and incorporating these procedures into the MOB process, the Air Force can better align the

Figure 5 Source: Lt Col Woodard Draft Concept Pre-Decisional.



⁶² Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 2.

⁶³ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 2.

⁶⁴ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 2.

⁶⁵ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 2.

⁶⁶ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 2.

⁶⁷ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 3.


Reserve Component to work in parallel with Active Component MAJCOMs to achieve a more efficient Total Force Enterprise (TFE) solution.⁶⁸

The Force Generation Center

In 2009 the AFRC/CC initiated a program to bring the AFR to Full Operational Capability (FOC). The creation of the Force Generation Center (FGC) is one of the primary projects under “AFR 2012” that seeks to centralize force management.⁶⁹ The design of the FGC was enacted through an Enterprise Value Stream Analysis (EVSA) performed by HQ AFRC personnel at the direction of the commander.⁷⁰ One critical task identified by the EVSA was to “design & build a single point of entry/exit organization to provide oversight of all AFR forces.”⁷¹

The FGC enabling concept outlines how this organization provides “the ability to optimize force management and accountability of AFR forces by defining a standardized and streamlined coordination process for [force activation].”⁷² The FGC mission statement reads:

The HQ AFRC Force Generation Center is the single agency responsible for generating Air Force Reserve forces by leveraging AFR strategic capability to meet operational needs in support of Global Force Management internal and



⁶⁸ Ibid, LtCol Bill Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional), 3.

⁶⁹ Ibid, Terry Orner, FGC Concept of Operations, (Version 8.2), 4.

⁷⁰ Ibid, Terry Orner, FGC Concept of Operations, (Version 8.2), 6.

⁷¹ Ibid, Terry Orner, FGC Concept of Operations, (Version 8.2), 6.

⁷² LtCol Michael Phan, *Force Generation Enabling Concept*, (AF/REX, 9 Aug 2010 DRAFT), 2.

external requirements. The FGC performs all aspects of force generation to include oversight, visibility, and accountability of all AFR forces. Its span of control extends from the Individual Reservist to entire Combat Capable Units, supporting a broad array of organizations from Air Force units to Combatant Commands, through all stages of activation from Volunteerism up to and including Full Mobilization.⁷³

Terry Orner a Project Manager at HQ AFRC explains how the FGC will manage all “transactional operations” for AFR forces. Transactional operations include the execution level of force providing to support Emergent, Rotational, and Individual Augmentee requirements through volunteerism and mobilized forces.⁷⁴ Managing transactional operations allows the FGC to support a reservist throughout the mobilization process and ensure the member is tracked from pre-deployment through mobilization and demobilization; ensuring each member’s needs are accounted for.⁷⁵ If one compares the process to better business practices, the capability for AFRC to have complete visibility and oversight of its forces throughout the process is simply good supply chain management, and affords the command the best ability to take care of its most valuable asset, the citizen airmen.⁷⁶

The FGCs transactional operations management and greater force visibility will enable the command to better perform its L-MAJCOM role. By having a single point of entry and exit for all AFR forces, AFRC will be able to work in conjunction with the other MAJCOMs to coordinate mobilization sourcing solutions. In an interview the FGC Commander, Brig Gen William Binger gave an example of a command request for 100 Security Forces (SF) personnel. If, say for example, AMC has visibility of only 30 SF personnel available in their MAJCOM, they may require partial mobilization, but the FGC will have visibility of all reserve SF personnel across all the MAJCOMs and may be able to provide the 100 SF personnel for the task

⁷³ Ibid, Terry Orner, FGC Concept of Operations, (Version 8.2), 8.

⁷⁴ Ibid, Terry Orner, FGC Concept of Operations, (Version 8.2), 18.

⁷⁵ Terry Orner, Editing Comments.

⁷⁶ Terry Orner, FGC, Discussion and Interview on FGC Concepts, Terry mentioned WalMart or Kroger supply chain management. Following your product or inventory with good supply chain management.

on an all-volunteer basis, rather than through mobilization.⁷⁷ Greater visibility is good supply chain management, which enables the AFR to care for its airmen and its customers with more efficiency, simultaneously serving the needs of the commander.

The Counter Argument

Not everyone, however, agrees that the empowerment of AFRC and the adoption of the personnel policies described previously are required. This analysis researched “staff comments” from action officers across different commands to include AMC, ACC, and the ANG. The following discussion will provide insight into some of the different concerns related to AFRC’s process solutions, as well as provide critical analysis of the counter arguments.

First, there is some concern that AFRC would be interfacing directly with the combatant commands with regard to sourcing solutions for AFR personnel.⁷⁸ The reality is that AFRC would only give sourcing solutions to the Air Components (AMC/ACC/AFSOC), who would then provide the entire AC/AFR/ANG solution to the Joint Force Providers.⁷⁹ AFRC will still coordinate through the Component MAJCOMs to the customer.

Action officers also did not want to see AFR policy efforts create two different mobilization processes, one for the Guard and one for the Reserves.⁸⁰ While these concerns are valid, the ANG has acknowledged great benefit in these initiatives.⁸¹ In addition, the FGC will have organizational parity with the National Guard Bureau’s Readiness Center.⁸² The only major difference regarding AFRCs proposed mobilization process is that AFRC (exercising its L-MAJCOM authority) would coordinate sourcing solutions through the C-MAJCOMs to the

⁷⁷ Interview with Brig Gen William Binger, FGC Commander, 29 Nov 10.

⁷⁸ 2nd Letter Staff Comments Provided by LtCol Michael Phan, AF/REX.

⁷⁹ 2nd Letter Staff Comments Provided by LtCol Michael Phan, AF/REX.

⁸⁰ 2nd Letter Staff Comments Provided by LtCol Michael Phan, AF/REX.

⁸¹ 2nd Letter Staff Comments Provided by LtCol Michael Phan, AF/REX.

⁸² Ibid, Terry Orner, FGC Concept of Operations, (Version 8.2), 8.

customer.⁸³ AFRC and the FGC will continue to work with the ANG to develop an overall coordinated ARC effort.⁸⁴

Another concern among various organizations is the idea that Gaining MAJCOMs will be “relinquishing control” of their assigned AFR forces.⁸⁵ With regard to control of ARC forces, it is important to understand the administrative control (ADCON) implications of different mobilization statuses. ADCON under full mobilization (10 U.S.C. 12301 (a)) does in fact transfer to the Active Component (AC) and as such the AC assumes authority over fully mobilized ARC forces.⁸⁶ However, under any status less than full mobilization the ARC retains control over its forces. In her research paper Maj Leslie Long, AF Judge Advocate states, “In all cases short of full mobilization, primary ADCON of AFRES [AFRC] forces remains with the Air Force Reserve Command or Air Reserve Personnel Center, and the [Commander Air Force Forces] COMAFFOR exercises specified ADCON over the attached Reserve forces.”⁸⁷ Contrary to the popular belief that G-MAJCOMs will be “relinquishing control” of AFR forces, the reality is that under any status less than full mobilization, AFRC retains ADCON of its forces unless it transfers or provides the using command varying levels of specified ADCON, depending on the mobilization scenario.⁸⁸

Recognizing these action officer concerns, AFRC has worked with each command to allow these initiatives to move forward for process improvement. Most of the remaining resistance to change seems to be due to organizational or cross-cultural barriers, either amongst the Active and Reserve Components or among differing MAJCOMS. The reality is that these organizations

⁸³ 2nd Letter Comments Provided by LtCol Michael Phan, AF/REX, editing comments derived from Terry Orner.

⁸⁴ 2nd Letter Comments Provided by LtCol Michael Phan, AF/REX.

⁸⁵ Line Comments provided by LtCol Michael Phan, AF/REX.

⁸⁶ Ibid, HQ USAF PAD 10-1, DRAFT, V-1.

⁸⁷ Maj Leslie D. Long, *The Total Force Concept, Asserting Jurisdiction Over Air Reserve Component Forces*, viii.

⁸⁸ Editing comments by Terry Orner in consultation with AFRC/JAG, Mr. Joe Schmitz.

need to move beyond these barriers and recognize AFRC as a Major Command working in parallel to benefit the Total Air Force Enterprise.

Recommendations

Secretary of the Air Force, Michael B. Donley, in a speech to senior leaders of the ANG, on 16 November 2010, stated, “As we continue to depend on the Guard and Reserve in the future, and the distance between the concepts of a strategic reserve and an operational reserve continues to shrink, we must strive for even more commonality in the way we operate. The same commonality will also help us to establish a more seamless Continuum of Service.”⁸⁹ The challenge for our Air Force senior leaders is to understand the need to balance the strategic reserve and the operational capability it provides the Total Force, and to protect against the break point of either capability. “It is not an overstatement to say that as goes the health of the Reserve Component, so goes the health of the all-volunteer force.”⁹⁰

To preserve this balance, the Air Force must modernize the G-MAJCOM construct. AFRC has been a MAJCOM for over 12 years since reaching IOC in 1998. It is time to allow this MAJCOM to execute its Lead MAJCOM authority and present forces through the Component MAJCOMs to the combatant commander. Headquarters Air Force must implement PAD efforts to streamline how the Air Force manages, mobilizes and presents AFR forces.

The current mobilization process needs to incorporate advantages and efficiencies inherent within Global Force Management as well as Air Expeditionary Force policy.⁹¹ AFRC has the experience, knowledge and expertise to ensure the four tenets of mobilization are met by providing a unity of effort across all MAJCOMs, with complete oversight of AFR forces that

⁸⁹ Michael B. Donley, Speech at 2010 Air National Guard Senior Leader Conference, 16 Nov 2010.

⁹⁰ Christine E. Wormuth, *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves, The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report*, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, July 2006), viii.

⁹¹ Transition concepts derived from research of Lt Col Woodard Draft Position Paper.

allows for flexibility, direct access that ensures timeliness, and capabilities knowledge that guarantees AFRC forces will meet customer objectives.⁹² DoDD 1235.10 states, “Mobilization and demobilization processes shall be standardized within the Services to facilitate ready access to the RCs.”⁹³ The Air Force can improve the mobilization process by allowing AFRC to execute its MAJCOM role in parallel with the other MAJCOMs to present its forces through a coordinated effort that supports the commander.⁹⁴

To achieve these synergistic efficiencies AFRC has created the Force Generation Center to act as the single entry and exit point for all AFR forces. Col Vitalis of HQ AFRC stated, “We need to make sure we have oversight of everything...”⁹⁵ DoDD 1235.10, states, “Predictability of the RC forces is maximized through the use of defined operational cycles and utilizing force generation plans to provide advanced notification that allows the implementation of the train-mobilize-deploy model.”⁹⁶ AFRC’s Force Generation Center will comply with DoD Directives by managing reserve forces with 100% visibility and complete oversight of the force.

Conclusion

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen wrote, “We could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard Forces.”⁹⁷ One of the challenges for Air Force leaders is described by John Nagl & Travis Sharp; after a decade of war where Active and Reserve Components have trusted one another in battle, the time has come to dispose of tired cross-component rivalries and get serious about building a seamlessly integrated Total Force.⁹⁸ Gen Billy Mitchell said, “In the development of

⁹² Concluding concepts derived from Lt Col Woodard Draft Position Paper, and AFI 10-402.

⁹³ DoDD 1235.10, November 26, 2008, 7.

⁹⁴ Concluding concepts derived from Lt Col Woodard Draft Position Paper.

⁹⁵ Michelle Tan, *Reserve Command plans single entity for support requests*, (Air Force Times, May 31, 2010), 1.

⁹⁶ DoDD 1235.10, November 26, 2008, 2.

⁹⁷ Winkler, John D. JFQ, issue 59, 4th Quarter 2010, 22.

⁹⁸ Nagl, Sharp, *Operational for What? The Future of the Guard and Reserves*, issue 59, 4th Quarter 2010, 27.

air power, one has to look ahead and not backward and figure out what is going to happen, not too much [of] what has happened.” The days of the G-MAJCOM construct are behind us; leaders must look to the future and embrace the reform that will benefit the entire Air Force Enterprise.⁹⁹

Senior leaders must rise above cultural barriers and be open minded to process improvement. The founding concepts of this analysis are also described in the FGC *Concept of Operations* as taking root from the strategic vision of “AFR 2012” and align with current Air Force Strategic Plan Goal 3.2 (Sustain Quality of Service) and 4.4 (Achieve Total Force Integration), as well as DoD Directives 1200.17 and DoD Directives 1235.10/1235.12, and institutionalizes the reform guidance from both the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews.¹⁰⁰ Ultimately, our leaders must implement change that will benefit both the Total Force and the Reserve citizen airmen.

To protect our airmen’s future and ensure our continued success as a global power, the Air Force must allow AFRC to balance the strategic reserve and operational force capability it provides to prevent a “break point.”¹⁰¹ Implementation of PAD efforts to reform the Gaining MAJCOM construct will allow the command to better perform its Lead MAJCOM role to achieve capability balance. The Air Force must also modernize the mobilization process to capitalize on GFM and AEF policy. The Reserve Component can leverage its experience and the visibility of its forces to work in parallel with the other MAJCOMs for requirement solutions.¹⁰² Finally and perhaps most importantly, the Total Air Force Enterprise must embrace the enabling concept that will bring AFRC’s Force Generation Center to full operational capability allowing the Air Force Reserve to present and provide forces to its customers; Government Agencies, MAJCOMs, Joint Force Providers and the Combatant Commanders.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Terry Orner provided editing comments and suggested Billy Mitchell quote, in E-mail editing consultations.

¹⁰⁰ Terry Orner, FGC *Concept of Operations*, (Version 8.2), 4.

¹⁰¹ Concluding concept derived from research of AFR 2012 EVSA Outbrief.

¹⁰² Concluding concept derived from research of Woodard, Position Paper, (DRAFT – Pre-Decisional).

¹⁰³ Concluding concept derived from research of Terry Orner, FGC *Concept of Operations*, (Version 8.2).

List of Abbreviations/Acronyms

AC – Active Component

ACC – Air Combat Command

ADCON – Administrative Control

AEF – Air Expeditionary Force

AETC – Air Education and Training Command

AF – Air Force

AFR – Air Force Reserve

AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command

AF/RE – Office of the Air Force Reserve

AFSOC – Air Force Special Operations Command

ANG – Air National Guard

AMC – Air Mobility Command

ARC – Air Reserve Component

ARPC – Air Reserve Personnel Center

CAFR – Chief of the Air Force Reserve

C-MAJCOM – Component Major Command

CNGR – Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

COMAFFOR – Commander Air Force Forces

DoD – Department of Defense

DoDD – Department of Defense Directive

EVSA – Enterprise Value Stream Analysis

FAM – Functional Area Manager

FGC – Force Generation Center

FOC – Full Operational Capability

GFM – Global Force Management

GF MIG – Global Force Management Implementation Guide

G-MAJCOM – Gaining Major Command

HQ – Headquarters

HQ/AFRC – Headquarters Air Force Reserve Command

IOC – Initial Operational Capability

JFP – Joint Force Provider

MOB – Mobilization

OSD – Office of the Secretary of Defense

PAD – Program Action Directive

PM – Partial Mobilization

QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review

RegAF – Regular Air Force

RC – Reserve Component

SF – Security Forces

TFE – Total Force Enterprise

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