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THE COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM: A  
VERSATILE STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEM REQUIRING AN  
AZIMUTH ADJUSTMENT

by

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## **Introduction**

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the versatility of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) and to provide insights that will improve its effectiveness and credibility. The program's versatility is established by presenting its utility to serve as a vital non-kinetic tool during each facet of a regime change campaign. A regime change campaign, where U.S. forces forcibly topple an existing government and seek to replace it with a new administration, is arguably the most complex, multifaceted mission that can be asked of the military. Thus, if CERP is applicable across the full spectrum of operations inherent in this most ambitious of undertakings, it signifies its relevance to prospective military missions as well. The benefit accrued from demonstrating the program's universal applicability coupled with providing insights to enhance its waning credibility is the preservation of this strategic program.

CERP has proven to be extremely popular and is deemed critical to the prosecution of the fight. In October 2003, the Joint Staff described the program as, "a stabilization 'tool' no less essential to victory than the world's finest tanks, weapons, ships, planes, communications, and individual protective gear."<sup>1</sup> In early 2004, General Myers, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "described the CERP as the 'most effective means we have of persuading ordinary Iraqis that we are there to help them and their families.'"<sup>2</sup> CERP's criticality has not waned over time as evidenced by Secretary Gates referring to the program as a "key wartime authority" in a memorandum intended to influence fiscal year (FY) 2010 congressional budget deliberations.<sup>3</sup>

Money, which CERP employs, serves as valuable ammunition that "enables commanders to respond with nonlethal means."<sup>4</sup> The Army's counterinsurgency manual states "some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot."<sup>5</sup> Experience has taught commanders that in

order to properly respond to the complexities faced on the battlefield, they must have the requisite tools; kinetic means alone are inadequate. Colonel Steven Bullimore, a former commander in Iraq, describes this inadequacy, “My biggest challenge was that the one thing I always had to offer was bullets. It’s all negative.”<sup>6</sup> Money provides a powerful alternative as expressed by John Nagl, the acclaimed author of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*:

*Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, “Dollars are bullets in this fight [Iraq]. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which provides field commanders funds to perform essential projects, wins hearts and minds twice over—once by repairing infrastructure and again by employing local citizens who are otherwise ready recruits for the insurgents.”<sup>7</sup>

Unfortunately, the program is not without controversy and is susceptible to criticism when commanders pursue projects that fall outside its purpose and scope. The Washington Post provided a scathing review of the program in its article entitled “Money as a Weapon.” The article describes how CERP money has been used to buy \$500,000 worth of Iraqi soldier action figures, to purchase \$14,250 worth of “I Love Iraq” T-shirts, to build two pools worth \$12,800 meant for cooling bears and tigers at the Zawra Park Zoo in Baghdad, and to commission the painting of a \$900,000 mural depicting the progression of Iraq from fishing villages to a major oil producer.<sup>8</sup> One of the most egregious abuses was the construction of the \$33 million hotel complex built at the Baghdad International Airport which far exceeded CERP’s scope and purpose.<sup>9</sup> The units that initiated these projects failed to understand the strategic consequences of potentially losing the support of congress, the source of the program’s authorization and funding.

There are many examples where congress has voiced its concern with the execution of the program. In August 2008, Senators Levin and Warner expressed their concern about the \$33

million spent for the “Economic Zone” and “expressed great additional concern that CERP funds were being used inappropriately for large scale infrastructure development” which is outside the scope of the program’s intended purpose of “addressing small scale humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects for the benefit of the Iraqi people.”<sup>10</sup> In May 2009, the House Committee on Appropriations reported, “the committee is disappointed that poor management and oversight continue to permit waste and abuse of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program.”<sup>11</sup> In July 2009, Representative Murtha, chairman of the House Appropriations Defense Committee stated, “The Pentagon has failed to fully explain how it is using CERP” and added that “the military is taking on too many large-scale projects that should be handled by civilian agencies with reconstruction expertise.”<sup>12</sup> Even more recently, the House Appropriations Committee report on the FY2010 Defense appropriations voiced concern “that the CERP is growing into an alternative development program ‘with few limits and little management.’”<sup>13</sup>

Given CERP’s strategic importance it is imperative commanders strive to improve the standing of the program in the eyes of congress by using it for its intended purpose; failure to do so puts the program at risk. This paper provides a brief explanation of how the unique origins of the program led to its exceptional flexibility, delineates CERP’s appropriate application during each stage of a regime change campaign to demonstrate its versatility, and concludes by outlining recommendations that will improve its effectiveness and trustworthiness.

## **Brief History**

The Coalition Provisional Authority initiated the program on 16 June 2003.<sup>14</sup> CERP’s function was to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements with the purpose of immediately assisting the Iraqi people and supporting the reconstruction of Iraq.<sup>15</sup>

On 19 June 2003, CJTF-7 published FRAGO 89 that outlined rules governing the newly created CERP program and identified the source of funding as seized Iraqi assets.<sup>16</sup>

The rules governing the expenditure of CERP were notably relaxed as compared to procedures applicable to spending appropriated money. For example, FRAGO 89 permitted ordering officers to contract CERP purchases forty times the value allowed with appropriated money.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, brigade commanders were allocated \$200,000 and division commanders \$500,000 that could be replenished after each allocation was spent.<sup>18</sup> The relaxed rules coupled with the large spending authorities resulted in commanders spending so aggressively that by September 2003 it became apparent the seized assets would be exhausted before the end of the year requiring congress to authorize and appropriate money if the program were to continue.<sup>19</sup>

On 6 November 2003, the president signed into law the authority to use appropriated money to fund CERP.<sup>20</sup> What makes this bill remarkable is the inclusion of the language “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” This statement was inserted because “[Mr. Zakheim] the Under Secretary [of Defense] expressed the Department’s intent that appropriated CERP funding ‘preserve the same flexibility and responsiveness...maintained with the original CERP that was funded with seized Iraqi assets.’”<sup>21</sup> This statement demonstrated congress’ trust by providing commanders an extraordinary level of flexibility in executing the program.

### **CERP’s Applicability across the Full Spectrum of Operations**

CERP is versatile enough to meet the needs of commanders across the full spectrum of operations. A regime change campaign is used as an example because its scope and changing nature facilitate demonstrating how the application of CERP can be adapted as the campaign

evolves. This concept not only signifies shifting the focus of the program when conditions dictate, but reveals budget implications as well.

These campaigns generally evolve through three stages that for the purpose of this paper will be assumed to occur in sequence to isolate CERP's application:

**“Power Vacuum Stage”** – represents the period when major combat operations have concluded and commanders become the de facto government within their respective battle spaces and are forced to confront issues ranging from providing humanitarian assistance to reestablishing essential services.

**“Nascent Government Stage”** – represents the time period when the newly established government stands up and begins to build its capacity to govern. This stage can encompass years and is dependent on many factors ranging from the security environment to the amount of government resources available to run the state.

**“Counterinsurgency Stage”** – there is no guarantee the environment will devolve into an insurgency, but it is highly probable that at least some disenfranchised groups will exist and will be motivated to utilize insurgent techniques to undermine the new government. The roots of the insurgency are often formed during the Power Vacuum Stage, but insurgent activities will become increasingly apparent as the government takes shape and furthers its agenda.

Since the innate conditions differ for each stage, the strategy for employing CERP within each stage differs as well. The primary focus of CERP during the **Power Vacuum Stage** should be to ease the suffering of the population. CERP is a valuable tool for accomplishing this task because it is specifically designed to enable local commanders to “immediately assist the indigenous population” and to address “any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or service.”<sup>22</sup> The goal should be to materially demonstrate to the people concern for their welfare. Since there is no established government, the U.S. should make it abundantly clear that it is the

source of the aid to improve the standing of the U.S. during this critical impression-setting period. CERP funding authority, availability of cash, and contracting capacity must be robust due to the magnitude of requirements anticipated during this stage.

The Department of Defense's implementing regulation delineates twenty representative CERP areas which provide a broad array of uses for CERP monies.<sup>23</sup> During this stage, commanders should predominantly target five of these areas: water and sanitation, electricity, civic cleanup activities, battle damage/repair, and other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects. Applying CERP money to these categories addresses the most pressing needs of the population. The people will be in a state of shock and will have deep reservations about what to expect from an occupying force, so not only will these types of projects improve their personal circumstances they also provide immediate employment opportunities and mitigate initial fears. Employing the indigenous population, versus using outside contractors, improves buy-in and enhances the sense of community as the people work together to improve their living conditions.

Speed of delivery is decisive in this stage. "Rapid, comprehensive employment of economic power contributes to societal order and stability while offering the local populace positive incentives to support the United States."<sup>24</sup> The U.S. failed to capitalize on the lull following Saddam's defeat which contributed significantly to the difficulty in gaining traction as the campaign progressed.<sup>25</sup> Speed of delivery results from comprehensive Phase IV (Stabilize) joint operation planning that provides commanders the necessary understanding of where to prioritize their efforts.

To facilitate speed and enhance the effectiveness of the program, commanders must establish relationships with local leaders as soon as possible. LTC Troy Perry, who deployed to



Iraq in April 2003 as the operations officer for 1-68 Armor Battalion, describes the value of leveraging local leaders early on, “to have local officials in control of their people with the faith of their people, then the power of us helping them take care of their own I don’t think can be overstated. It is phenomenal! They see that we’re not just there to kill people. We’re there to make their lives better.”<sup>26</sup> Commanders must also leverage these relationships to quickly identify people that have the required skill sets to facilitate the execution of initial CERP projects.

The primary focus in the **Nascent Government Stage** changes to *assisting* the government in addressing the needs of the population. CERP monies should be spent with the intent of empowering and legitimizing the host nation government. The goal is to achieve a sense of normalcy through consistency in the delivery of services and improved employment. There exists a correlation between delivery of essential services and the level of violence. For example, after investigating the root causes of attacks, a unit found there was a “strong inverse correlation between functioning civil infrastructure such as electrical power, sewer, and water service and the number of attacks.”<sup>27</sup> Dampened levels of violence lead to improved security conditions which facilitate economic advancement and eventual job growth.

CERP’s principal focus areas during this stage should be healthcare; education; economic, financial, and management improvements; transportation; food production and distribution; rule of law and governance, and repair of civic and cultural facilities.<sup>28</sup> Targeting these areas improves the nascent government’s financial and governance capacity. Of the aforementioned areas, rule of law should not be discounted given it serves as the foundation for healthy economic activity. CERP can also be applied to compliment large scale reconstruction activities that should begin in earnest during this stage. This requires interagency coordination that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted has been problematic.<sup>29</sup> The

expectation should be a continued requirement for robust CERP budgets given the magnitude of requirements inherent in establishing and legitimizing a new government.

Building governmental capacity is a time consuming, Herculean effort that can lead to frustration when the host-nation government fails to exhibit the desired sense of urgency in solving its internal problems. This requires commanders to exercise tactical patience and understand a government's "good enough" solution is better than our "perfect" solution. "General Creighton Abrams, the U.S. commander in Vietnam in 1971, understood this dynamic when he said, 'There's very clear evidence...in some things, that we helped too much. And we *retarded* the Vietnamese by doing it...*We* can't run this thing...*They've* got to run it. The nearer we get to that the better off *they* are and the better off *we* are.'"<sup>30</sup>

The primary purpose for CERP expenditures during the **Counterinsurgency Stage** is to enhance the legitimacy of the government to convince the people to side with it instead of the insurgents. The expectation is that by this stage the government has built the capacity to pay for the majority of its people's needs. The situation will vary greatly depending on the government's capability and the resources at its disposal, but a major goal should be to begin weaning the government off of U.S. funding wherever practicable. Relative to the other two regime change stages, the overall CERP budget should decline during this stage.

If the U.S. continues to bear the full cost of governing the country, there is no incentive for the government to build its own capability to pay for its operating costs. This was apparent in Iraq when between 2005 and 2007 the country generated \$96 billion in revenue but only spent 11% of its 2007 capital budget.<sup>31</sup> Senator Levin stated, "It is inexcusable for U.S. taxpayers to continue to foot the bill for projects the Iraqis are fully capable of funding themselves."<sup>32</sup> David

Kilcullen, a renowned counterinsurgency strategist, claimed that easy development money undercuts a government's ability to improve its financial governance.<sup>33</sup> This also applies to smaller scale projects as well. Senator Levin recalled a visit to Iraq where a senior U.S. officer related a story of how they set up a successful garbage-collection project and an Iraqi official provided his thanks by saying, "As long as you are willing to pay for the cleanup, why should we?"<sup>34</sup>

The focus of the military during this stage will be counterinsurgency operations. From the author's experiences in Iraq, CERP played a major role in enhancing the counterinsurgency fight as the 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division (TF Iron) applied the clear, hold, and build strategy in contested areas throughout Multinational Division North. For example, units procured CERP funded humanitarian assistance items, like food stuffs and cooking oil, and prepositioned them to make them immediately available following clearing operations. In addition to providing humanitarian assistance, units used CERP monies to promptly pay condolence and battle damage payments to foster goodwill within the population. Once security is established, the key is to push the government to immediately initiate programs, which CERP can be used to compliment, to garner support within a population that has typically been isolated and underserved while under the control of the insurgents.

CERP reconstruction projects should not be started in unsecure areas; it is imperative security be established prior to initiating projects and there must be a reasonable level of assurance it can be maintained over time. "In southern Afghanistan, construction projects supported by foreign aid, such as schools and medical clinics, stand as empty shells because Taliban militants have frightened students and patients away."<sup>35</sup> Lack of security in Iraq has resulted in similar problems. For example, in Ramadi a "health-care clinic became an al-Qaeda

weapons cache” and in Baghdad Soldiers hired Iraqis to rebuild a school three times due to repeated attacks.<sup>36</sup> Security must take primacy over development projects as supported by this Afghani shopkeeper’s statement: “I don’t want any foreigners building roads or big buildings for me when I am cleaning blood from my home.”<sup>37</sup>

Understanding the significance of security, TF Iron commanders leveraged CERP by using it to employ Sons of Iraq (SoI) to protect the population following clearing operations where the task force lacked sufficient forces to maintain a permanent presence. This program kept young Sunni men employed and yielded valuable intelligence which furthered security gains.<sup>38</sup> A second order economic effect was that for every CERP dollar paid to a SoI it was spent at least two additional times and market places increased tenfold in areas where there were large concentrations of SoIs.<sup>39</sup> TF Iron leveraged CERP to employ over 33,000 SoIs that protected the local population, improved economic conditions, and decreased attacks against U.S. forces saving countless lives and millions of dollars in otherwise damaged or destroyed equipment.

## **Key Fundamentals for the Successful Employment of CERP**

This section provides recommendations that serve as key fundamentals for successfully employing CERP. Adherence to these principles will improve the program’s effectiveness, buttress its credibility, and conserve resources.

*Exploit Information Operations (IO).* Once commanders gain the required situational awareness they can begin devising what effects they desire to achieve through the employment of CERP within the context of the IO plan. COL Baker, a former BCT commander, articulated the importance of IO to operations in Iraq, “I quickly discovered that IO was going to be one of

the two most vital tools (along with human intelligence) I would need to be successful.”<sup>40</sup> In order to exploit the effects of CERP, the program must be fully integrated into the IO concept of operations and used to target specific IO themes and messages. Units must wrap all CERP activities into IO. For example, during the nascent government and counterinsurgency stages the intent is to buttress the government’s legitimacy, so the IO plan should emphasize government officials officiating ribbon-cutting ceremonies for CERP funded projects with U.S. forces remaining on the sidelines.

CERP can also be used to counter the enemy’s IO campaign. For example, Major Stuart Farris, Commander ODA 341 of 3rd Special Forces Group, provides an excellent example of how he targeted CERP to counter the enemy’s message that U.S. forces were in Afghanistan to convert them to Christianity: “One thing that we did, which gave us some great credibility right off the bat, was to rebuild the mosque in the middle of the village...what better way to counter that message than through rebuilding that mosque?”<sup>41</sup>

***Obtain Government Buy-In.*** Government buy-in is essential for all construction related CERP projects. Buy-in includes much more than just obtaining the government’s concurrence with the project. It includes ensuring the government pledges to budget for and provide the maintenance required to sustain the project, that it will provide trained and skilled employees to work at the facility (e.g., medical workers, teachers, technicians, etc.), that it will secure the project, and that it will provide reasonable assurances to guard against corruption. The project turnover plan should address each of these areas and must be created and agreed upon prior to initiating the project.

If these conditions are not met, the project will have a low probability of success. “Several CERP-funded projects, such as neighborhood parks, civic centers and swimming pools, have not been successfully adopted by local or national government entities because they either don’t have the capacity or interest to keep them running.”<sup>42</sup> Specific examples of where buy-in broke down include an outdoor performance hall in Sadr City costing hundreds of thousands of CERP dollars not being used and the looting of the multimillion dollar Baghdad hotel shortly after U.S. forces turned over control to the Iraqis.<sup>43</sup> Another example is how an \$8 million CERP funded water treatment project failed because there was no operations and maintenance budget for maintaining the pipes and because officials sold the chlorine treatment on the black market.<sup>44</sup>

Even schools, highly popular CERP projects, can exceed the capacity of the government to maintain. Mr. Rick Gohde, a member of a provincial reconstruction team in Iraq stated, “I’ve heard of schools being built with no furniture or teachers.”<sup>45</sup> SSG Aric Schwab related similar experiences while serving as a CERP manager in Afghanistan. He said, “Many times the projects broke down because the government could not provide adequate security or pay the teachers even though it stated at the onset it could.”<sup>46</sup> His experience also highlights the importance of assessing the government’s ability to follow through with its commitments prior to initiating a project. Commanders should not initiate a project if they have reservations about the government’s capacity to follow through on its commitment.

***Target Small-Scale Projects.*** Focus on highly visible, small-scale projects that can be completed within one to three months and no more than six months. This includes ensuring the complexity of the project is within the abilities of the unit to manage. The CERP is not intended for building multimillion dollar hotels and outdoor performance halls. These types of projects

are well outside the scope for a battalion or brigade to supervise and they can take years to complete.

Moreover, the indigenous population often does not have the technical know-how to operate sophisticated equipment. For example, in interviews conducted by the GAO with Iraqi power plant officials operating plants throughout Iraq, “the officials stated that their training did not adequately prepare them to operate and maintain the new U.S.-provided gas turbine engines.”<sup>47</sup> As a result, some managers used low-grade oil as a fuel source cutting the power output in half, increasing maintenance requirements, and reducing the life of the engines significantly.<sup>48</sup>

***Limit/Monitor Ongoing Projects.*** The GAO found that CERP “faces significant challenges in providing adequate management and oversight” and noted that unit site visits “to monitor project status and contractor performance were either not performed or inconsistently performed.”<sup>49</sup> At times units take on more projects than they can adequately manage resulting in unit CERP managers literally becoming overwhelmed trying to oversee all the ongoing projects. This becomes apparent when units transition and incoming units are expected to take ownership of ongoing projects. During TF Iron’s deployment to Iraq in 2007/2008 there were numerous instances where brigades had great difficulty identifying which projects required transition. Given the trouble units had in just identifying transitioning projects, it is reasonable to assume there was inadequate monitoring of these projects.

***Assess Completed Projects.*** Given the strain of just trying to manage active projects, units are unable to devote time to monitor the thousands of completed projects scattered across Afghanistan and Iraq. At the conclusion of its tour in Iraq in the fall of 2007, the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry

Division (ID) conducted a sample of CERP projects that completed during its tenure and found the following: “49% of the completed projects were fully functional, 10% were partially functional, 20% were non-functional, and there was no information on 21% of the completed projects.”<sup>50</sup> This sample included projects that *completed* during the division’s tour but did not include the hundreds if not thousands of projects that concluded during the tours of predecessor units.

This systematic lack of follow-up on completed projects is a serious deficiency of the program because many projects are left to languish as found during the 25<sup>th</sup> ID’s assessment. This results in a loss of taxpayer money and a commensurate degradation of the program’s credibility not only in congress but within the indigenous population as well. “For example, during one of MG Mark Hertling’s [TF Iron Commander] battlefield circulations a provincial governor told him that coalition forces had spent over \$400 million in his province with nothing to show for it.”<sup>51</sup> Regardless of the accuracy of this governor’s statement, it is telling in terms of the perception of the success of U.S. spending throughout his province. Sustained follow up of completed projects provides lessons learned for future projects and holds the government accountable for maintaining the projects in accordance with the terms outlined in the mutually agreed upon turnover plans.

***Avoid Project Creep.*** Commanders must be aware of and remain vigilant in combating project creep. This occurs when priority projects have been completed and units seek to fund novel projects like the T-shirts and the mural highlighted earlier. LTC Daryle Hernandez, who served as the executive officer for 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry in Baghdad, describes this tendency, “At times, there was a lot of pressure to commit the money we got to more projects and to get them going. The danger with that is focusing those projects to achieve a particular



effect, not just going out there to do a project to say, ‘I’ve done another project.’”<sup>52</sup> As he correctly points out, the key is to achieve a desired effect, not complete another project. Success is not measured by the amount of money spent or the number of projects initiated.

***Avoid Increasing Scale.*** Commanders must also guard against the phenomenon of increasing scale, a major source of congressional angst, where the scope and cost of the projects swell significantly. For example, GAO noted that the number of projects exceeding \$500,000 “increased from 13 in FY2004 to 276 in FY2007 and in FY2007 accounted for about 46% of the reported obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan.”<sup>53</sup> This equates to spending approximately \$440 million on large scale projects using a program intended “for small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects.”<sup>54</sup> One technique for combating overspending is for senior commanders to periodically ratchet down CERP approval dollar thresholds. This not only constrains spending within subordinate units but pressures the host government to spend its own resources.

## **Conclusion**

This paper demonstrates that CERP is widely regarded as being an indispensable, versatile non-kinetic weapon system and recommends methods for improving its employment. Commanders became enamored with the program during its embryonic period because of its tremendous flexibility, unprecedented ease of use, and universal applicability. Congress recognized the importance of maintaining the program’s flexibility by including the “notwithstanding any other provision of law” statement in the legislation authorizing the use of appropriated money to pay for CERP. This provides significant freedom of maneuver for employing CERP and displays the high degree of trust and confidence congress has in commanders. The program’s strength stems from this flexibility and its utility during an

undertaking as dynamic as a regime change campaign serves as a testimony to its versatility and adaptability.

The language in the CERP legislation was intentionally crafted to empower commanders by providing them a multifaceted tool with broad discretion for its application. Inherent in this empowerment is the responsibility for commanders to execute the program as congress intended. Documented abuses such as using CERP to build multimillion dollar hotel complexes, to commission the drawing of elaborate murals, and to cool bears at the zoo erode congress' trust. This erosion, if left unchecked will lead to increased restrictions and congressional oversight that will constrain freedom of maneuver or, worst case, could possibly result in the program's demise.

The insights provided during the regime change discussion and the delineation of the key fundamentals are intended to enhance the probability for successfully employing CERP, improve its credibility, and conserve resources. Accurately targeting CERP, ensuring adequate security, exploiting IO, obtaining government buy-in, focusing on small-scale projects, limiting and monitoring ongoing projects, and assessing completed projects are essential to properly executing and managing the program. The most pressing concerns are for commanders to guard against the phenomenon of increasing scale by focusing CERP's use on small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects and to suitably monitor completed projects. Improved effectiveness coupled with decreased program costs will result in less scrutiny and less congressional discontent. Disciplined use of CERP will ensure this vital, strategic weapon system is available to commanders in the future.

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(All notes appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entry in the bibliography.)

<sup>1</sup> Martins, "No Small Change of," 10.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>3</sup> Gates, to The Honorable Carl Levin.

<sup>4</sup> Army Handbook, *Commander's Guide to Money*, 13.

<sup>5</sup> Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-153.

<sup>6</sup> Bullimore, interview.

<sup>7</sup> Nagl, interview.

<sup>8</sup> Hedgpeth and Cohen, "Money as a Weapon."

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> "Levin, Warner Announce Release."

<sup>11</sup> "Making Supplemental Appropriations," 14-15.

<sup>12</sup> Londono, "U.S. 'Money Weapon' Yields."

<sup>13</sup> Tarnoff, "Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance," 18-19.

<sup>14</sup> Army Lawyer, "Legally Funding Military Support."

<sup>15</sup> Martins, "No Small Change of," 6.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Martins, "Commander's Emergency Response Program," 49.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 49-50.

<sup>21</sup> Martins, "No Small Change of," 12.

<sup>22</sup> DODFMR 12, 27-3.

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- <sup>23</sup> Chapter 27, Volume 12 of the DoD Financial Management Regulation provides a listing of representative areas where the CERP may be used to assist the Iraqi and Afhan people. The representative areas are as follows: water and sanitation; food production and distribution; agriculture/irrigation (including canal clean-up); electricity; healthcare; education; telecommunications; economic, financial, and management improvements; transportation; rule of law and governance; civic cleanup activities; civic support vehicles; repair of civic and cultural facilities; battle damage/repair; condolence payments; hero payments; former detainee payments; protective measures; other urgent humanitarian or reconstruction projects; and temporary contract guards for critical infrastructure.
- <sup>24</sup> Widmann, "Commander's Emergency Response Program."
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> Perry, interview.
- <sup>27</sup> Gerras, "Thinking Critically About Critical."
- <sup>28</sup> See note 23.
- <sup>29</sup> GAO, *Iraq and Afghanistan: Availability*, 5.
- <sup>30</sup> Army Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 1-28.
- <sup>31</sup> "Levin, Warner Announce Release."
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>33</sup> Hedgpeth and Cohen, "Money as a Weapon."
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup> Robson, "Iraq Reconstruction Funds May."
- <sup>36</sup> Hedgpeth and Cohen, "Money as a Weapon."
- <sup>37</sup> Green and Fazel, "Afghans Divided Over Foreign."
- <sup>38</sup> Odierno, *The Surge in Iraq*.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>40</sup> Baker, "Decisive Weapon: A Brigade," 33.
- <sup>41</sup> Farris, interview.
- <sup>42</sup> Londono, "U.S. 'Money Weapon' Yields."
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>44</sup> Weaver, "Saab al Bor's Experience."
- <sup>45</sup> Robson, "Iraq Reconstruction Funds May."
- <sup>46</sup> Schwab, interview.
- <sup>47</sup> GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security*, 19-20.
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid, 20.
- <sup>49</sup> GAO, *Military Operations: Actions Needed*, 0 (Executive Summary).
- <sup>50</sup> Tillotson and Pindell, "Resourcing the Fight in," 39.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>52</sup> Hernandez, interview.
- <sup>53</sup> GAO, *Actions Needed to Better*, 1.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.