

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

US GRAND STRATEGY:  
AN ASSESSMENT OF STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

15 February 2012

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## **Biography**

Lieutenant Colonel Darren Cole is a US Air Force pilot assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL. He graduated from the University of Illinois in 1992 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Geography and Troy State University in 2002 with a Master of Science degree in International Relations. He is a command pilot with over 4,500 flying hours in the T-37, T-1, C-141B, and C-17. He has served in Air Mobility Command, US Southern Command, Pacific Air Forces, and commanded an Operations Support Squadron. He attended intermediate developmental education at the US Army's Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation at Fort Benning, GA and is currently a student at the US Air Force Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL.



## **Abstract**

The demands on US grand strategy have increased dramatically since the current framework for national security was established in 1947. Resultant grand strategies focused on compartmented departmental strategies which did not encourage interagency cooperation. The United States now confronts a security environment defined by its lack of definition: multiple and simultaneous threats from state and non-state actors using indirect approaches including economic and/or energy destabilization, nuclear proliferation and surrogate forces. These factors raise the serious issue of whether the current statutory requirements for US national security strategic guidance are sufficient to promulgate the President's grand strategy to the executive agencies responsible for its execution.

To analyze this issue, this paper conducts an analysis of the *elements* of grand strategy, national *interests* and *objectives* outlined in the *US National Security Strategy 2010* to compare how they are reflected in the strategy documents of the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community and Department of State.

The study finds that although grand strategy statutory requirements developed in piecemeal fashion, clear consensus executive agency strategic planning guidance is now captured in US Code. There is also a very high degree of coherence between the National Security Strategy and the strategy documents of the four main national security departments. It does however recommend amending 5 USC to specifically link executive agency strategies with the National Security Strategy. Finally, it recommends aligning the periodicity of the National Security Strategy and executive agency strategies at either two or four years.

## Introduction

*But for all the improvements of recent years, the United States' interagency toolkit is still a hodgepodge of jury-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.*

*-former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates*

The demands on US grand strategy have increased dramatically since the current framework for national security was established. In 1947, the US national security environment was largely defined by a single-state military threat. Resultant grand strategies focused on compartmented departmental strategies which did not encourage interagency cooperation. This legacy structure performed well enough to achieve the desired outcome in the Cold War; however, it did not produce optimized approaches to more complex and simultaneous threats requiring integrated whole-of-government solutions like Vietnam and terrorism in the 1970's and 80's.<sup>1</sup> The dissolution of the Soviet Union marked a tipping point.

Since then, the United States has confronted a security environment defined by its very lack of definition. It faces multiple and simultaneous threats from state actors and malevolent non-state actors.<sup>2</sup> Some state actors, like China, may threaten with symmetric force-on-force military capabilities. But the relative military superiority of the United States has forced many other actors like Iran and Al Qaeda to threaten the United States via indirect approaches including economic and/or energy destabilization, nuclear proliferation and surrogate forces.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, non-traditional security risks now merit serious attention in the national security

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<sup>1</sup> Often the Department of Defense sequentially shaped the strategy and then the State Department negotiated and managed political outcomes to contingencies. See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, Report to the President (Washington DC: Project on National Security Reform, 2008), ii-vii.

<sup>2</sup> North Korea, Iran and a rising China pose risks to the United States. Malevolent non-state actors like Al Qaeda, its subsidiaries, and transnational criminal organizations have multiplied as well.

<sup>3</sup> Even when more traditional military conflict occurs, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, many different types of security problems overlay each other to form what is now called hybrid warfare. See David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 4-6.

environment.<sup>4</sup> These environments require a centrally authorized grand strategy implemented by executive departments leading interagency, whole-of-government approaches for which the legacy national security structure is not well organized and bureaucratic politics tend to muddle.<sup>5</sup> Adding to the complexity, all of this occurs in a context of global economic interdependence and social connectivity that heightens the stakes of grand strategy outcomes.<sup>6</sup>

Efforts to improve interagency involvement in National Security Strategy planning and execution are not new. For example, the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act attempted to rectify barriers to military inter-service coordination within DoD. In 1993, the Government Performance and Results Act was instituted across the federal government in order to “help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they plan for meeting program objectives and by providing them with information about program results and service quality” and “improve internal management of the Federal Government.” The Homeland Security Act of 2002 combined a number of disparate federal agencies to improve response to internal security issues and natural disasters in the homeland, minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act became law in 2007 and facilitated information sharing across the US

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<sup>4</sup> Climate change, pandemics, and weak governance all have the potential to destabilize vital regions of the world.

<sup>5</sup> For more information on the poor organization of the national security structure, see Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 136 – 191. The bureaucratic politics of executive agencies and presidential transition are ever-present impediments. In the months before Operation Iraqi Freedom in March of 2003, many executive agencies including the Department of State, US Agency for International Development (USAID) the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute completed weeks of research and war-gaming to plan for post-conflict stabilization of Iraq. The Department of Defense limited the integration of those efforts in to post conflict stabilization plans due to lack of trust or turf protection. The bureaucratic tendency is not just present in the DoD. R. W. Kromer found during Vietnam that other executive agencies, “focused primarily on that with which they were most familiar...Especially significant has been institutional inertia, the built-in reluctance of organizations to change preferred ways of functioning.”, see R. W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam*, RAND Report R-967-ARPA (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972), 37-63. Presidential transition has also been an extremely challenging time for US national security. One only need recall the difficulty new administrations had in managing the Bay of Pigs conflict in Cuba, the decision on how to manage the Vietnam conflict, and how to respond to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. in September, 2001. See Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, 130-131.

<sup>6</sup> Project on National Security Reform, *Forging a New Shield*, ii-iii.

intelligence community. However, each of these actions dealing with US national security was piecemeal and largely addressed single departments or threats.

These critiques of the national security structure raise the serious issue of whether the current statutory requirements for US national security strategic guidance are sufficient to promulgate the President's grand strategy to the executive agencies responsible for its execution.<sup>7</sup> Obviously, this is an essential question not only for national security professionals, but for senior leaders across the government.

To analyze this issue, this paper begins by establishing a common understanding of what grand strategy is and what it seeks to accomplish. With this explanation in mind, it then defines the current process for promulgating the President's vision of grand strategy as defined in US code. Given these legal requirements, it conducts an analysis of the *elements* of grand strategy, national *interests* and national *objectives* outlined in the US National Security Strategy 2010 (NSS 2010). It then assesses how well these *elements, interests, and objectives* promulgate or nest into guidance published in the the strategy documents of the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community and Department of State. Building on this analysis, the paper provides specific recommendations to improve the promulgation of grand strategy from the President to the executive agencies.

The study finds that although statutory requirements for executive agency strategic planning developed in a piecemeal fashion, today's US Code provides relatively clear guidance on the need to conduct it. There is also a high degree of coherence between the NSS 2010 and the strategy documents of the four main national security departments. It recommends amending

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<sup>7</sup> This paper defines "executive agencies" in the same manner as the 5 U.S. Code, § 105: "'Executive agency" means "an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment." It includes any one of the fourteen executive branch departments and their subordinate organizations such as US AID. The author uses executive agency and department interchangeably.

5 USC to specifically link executive agency strategies with the National Security Strategy. Moreover, it recommends aligning the periodicity of the National Security Strategy and executive agency strategies at either two or four years. With a preview of these recommendations in mind, the analysis begins with an exploration of what a grand strategy like the US National Security Strategy seeks to accomplish.

### **What is Grand Strategy?**

Definitions of grand strategy vary broadly in the academic literature. Some define it narrowly with the constraints of the power of the state. For example, the "purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community"<sup>8</sup> or "the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state's deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools together to advance that state's national interest."<sup>9</sup> Others articulated broader definitions of the term to encompass the intangible dimensions of power such as moral power and consider future consequences of current policies.<sup>10</sup>

No matter their scope, grand strategies are used not only to coordinate policy internally, but to signal the directions of those policies externally as well. Tufts University's Daniel Drezner argues that a grand strategy requires a clear statement of national interests aligned with various operational plans to advance those interests. He adds that a coherent grand strategy can offer a framework to all on how to understand an administration's behavior.<sup>11</sup> These

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<sup>8</sup>Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations - An Introduction to Strategic History*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 283.

<sup>9</sup>Peter Feaver, "What is Grand Strategy and Why Do We Need It", *Foreign Policy*, [http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what\\_is\\_grand\\_strategy\\_and\\_why\\_do\\_we\\_need\\_it](http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it).

<sup>10</sup>B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), 322.

<sup>11</sup>Daniel W. Drezner, "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?", *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 4 (July/August 2011): 57-68.



frameworks are important, since different tools will be used differently depending on the strategic situation.<sup>12</sup>

No matter the definition, the premise of this paper is that a good grand strategy is a well-articulated and succinct national security policy which blends and weights instruments of national power to achieve the interests of the state. Once formulated, an administration must precisely communicate its grand strategy to the international community, across government agencies, to the private sector, and to the public.<sup>13</sup> The most logical place to look for US grand strategic guidance is within the nation's laws.

### **Statutory Requirements for US National Security Strategic Guidance**

The National Security Act of 1947 was the first to address the need to integrate national security across the executive agencies in order to “provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security.”<sup>14</sup>

The only requirement for strategic guidance within the original enabling legislation was that the National Security Council “shall, from time to time, make such recommendations and such other reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require.”<sup>15</sup> As many scholars have noted, this legal structure proved to be fairly successful in its original form,

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<sup>12</sup>Gray also points out that the lead instrument: economic, political, or “subversive instruments”, may change depending on the particular conflict. Yet, as a general rule, every instrument available will have a role in the strategy mixture for policy. See Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (New York: Oxford University, 1999), 162-163.

<sup>13</sup> Understanding the US grand strategy positions the private sector and citizens to gain mutual benefit. Additionally, governments with capitalist economies need private sector and individual cooperation to achieve certain objectives such as Appendix A *objective* 2.3.2.5 “Double US exports by 2014.”

<sup>14</sup> It established the National Security Council system that exists largely today in order to “advise the President with respect to the integration of: domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security; to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith.” *National Security Act of 1947*. Public Law 235, 80<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., (26 July 1947) and *National Security Council*, 50 U.S. Code § 402.

<sup>15</sup> *National Security Act of 1947* and *National Security Council*, 50 U.S. Code § 402d.

particularly in the development the ideas of containment in National Security Council Report-68.<sup>16</sup> A review by the House and Senate Armed Service Committees conducted during the early 1980s determined that strategic planning in the DoD was “underemphasized and ineffective,” however.<sup>17</sup>

To address this deficiency, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which amended 50 USC. Since then, US Presidents are required to submit an annual comprehensive national security report to Congress.<sup>18</sup> The report must address five main points:

- The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States vital to the national security of the United States.
- The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
- The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1) [see first bullet above].
- The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
- Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.<sup>19</sup>

When one compares the required components of the US Code with the essential components of a grand strategy, it becomes clear that the National Security Strategy is the grand

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<sup>16</sup> Catherine Dale, *National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 3.

<sup>17</sup> James R. Locher III, *Victory on the Potomac: the Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon*, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 441.

<sup>18</sup> *National Security Act of 1947* §108 and *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, Public Law 433, 99<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess., (1 October 1986), §603 amended 50 U.S.Code § 404a.

<sup>19</sup> *Annual National Security Strategy Report*, 50 U.S.Code § 404a as amended by *Goldwater-Nichols Department Act*, §603.

strategy of the United States. As summarized in Figure 1, the “foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States” are at least the external portion of a well-articulated yet succinct national security policy that communicates broad grand strategy intentions both internally and externally. By publishing “the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States,” the President focuses the collective efforts of the nation. The “short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power” are the blend of instruments of power necessary to achieve the national objectives. Finally, the “evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy” signals that the instruments of

<b>Essential Components of Grand Strategy</b>	<b>National Security Strategy Required Components</b>
Well-articulated and succinct national security policy	The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the US needed to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the US
Focus on achieving interests of the state	worldwide interests, goals, and objectives vital to the national security of the United States
Blend of instruments of power focused on national interests	Proposed short-term and long-term uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of US national power to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives
Intentionally weighted blend of IOPs	Adequacy of capabilities of US to carry out the national security strategy, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of national power to support the implementation of the national security strategy

**Figure 1. US National Security Strategy as US Grand Strategy**

power must be weighted properly, in a lead role at times and in a support role in others, to achieve diverse national objectives.<sup>20</sup> But what are the legal requirements of the executive

<sup>20</sup> *Annual National Security Strategy Report, 50 U.S.Code § 404a.*

agencies to take that vision, analyze it, and ensure that each agency's strategy is nested, or aligned to achieve national objectives? The answer depends on the agency.

### **Department of Defense**

Of all the executive agencies, the Department of Defense has the most clearly delineated legislative requirement to produce an agency strategy consistent with the National Security Strategy. Goldwater-Nichols established position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the President and Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces including preparing strategic plans.<sup>21</sup> The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (NDAA) required the submission of a military strategy report to Congress from 1992 through 1994 by the Secretary of Defense. The law required the Secretary of Defense to articulate how the DoD would contribute to the accomplishment of national objectives.<sup>22</sup>

The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2004 amended 10 USC §153 and now permanently requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a biennial review of the national military strategy that is consistent with the most recent National Security Strategy and the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The National Military Strategy (NMS) identifies the US national military objectives, the strategy, underlying concepts, and component elements that contribute to the achievement of the national military objectives. The Chairman submits the plan to the Secretary of Defense and Congress no later than the 15<sup>th</sup> of February of even-numbered years.<sup>23</sup> This aligns submission of the NMS closely with other executive agency strategy submissions.

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<sup>21</sup> *Annual National Security Strategy Report*, 50 U.S. Code § 404a as amended by *Goldwater-Nichols Act*, §603.

<sup>22</sup> *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991*, Public Law 510, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess. (5 November 1990), § 1032. Catherine Dale provides a more thorough history on the progression of National Military Strategy, Homeland Defense and Intelligence strategies submitted and the statutory requirements for them in *National Security Strategy*, 3-15.

<sup>23</sup> 10 U.S. Code § 153, as amended by the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004*, Public Law 136, 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (24 November 2003), § 903.

## **Department of Homeland Security**

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security, the Homeland Security Council, and codified their responsibilities but did not establish an explicit requirement for a homeland security strategy nested within the US's grand strategy.<sup>24</sup> In 2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 amended 6 USC § 347 to require the Secretary of the DHS to produce the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) which includes the national homeland security strategy. The QHSR is a “comprehensive examination of the homeland security strategy...including recommendations regarding the long-term strategy and priorities of the Nation” and is coordinated with Congress, specific executive agencies, state, local and tribal authorities. The QHSR specifically will “delineate and update, as appropriate, the national homeland security strategy, consistent with appropriate national and Departmental strategies, strategic plans” as a part of its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR).<sup>25</sup> The QHSR is conducted every four years and submitted to Congress by the 31<sup>st</sup> of December every fourth year after 2009.<sup>26</sup>

So with specifically codified language, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security know where to look for strategic plan guidance in order to achieve national objectives or where affected executive agencies need to synchronize their strategic plans. The guidance to the Intelligence Community is less clear.

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<sup>24</sup> *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, Public Law 296, 107<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess. (25 November 2002).

<sup>25</sup> The QHSR also includes: a prioritized list of critical homeland security missions; a description of the interagency cooperation required to execute the national homeland security strategy; the threats and national interests used to conduct the review. *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007*, Public Law 53, 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., (3 August 2007), § 2401 amended the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, Public Law 296, 107<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess. (25 November 2002) by adding § 707. The guidance can now be found in 6 U.S. Code § 347. It specifically directs interagency consultation with “the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Director of National Intelligence.”

<sup>26</sup> The law and subsequent U.S. Code are confusing as they state that the QHSR is to produce a “national homeland security strategy” consistent with the “National Strategy for Homeland Security”. The National Strategy for Homeland Security is the first homeland security strategy established in 2002. After many reviews, it is clear to the author that the intent of U.S. Code is to combine all subsequent homeland security strategies within the QHSR document.

## **Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Intelligence Community)**

There is no specific requirement for the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to submit an Intelligence Community strategy linked with US grand strategy. 50 USC §403-1 directs the DNI to establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the intelligence community. In practice, former DNI John Negroponte submitted a National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) in 2005 as “a facet of his responsibility” required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 which established his position.<sup>27</sup> Per the IRTPA law, the report is not an enduring requirement nor does it require periodic review.<sup>28</sup>

In 2009, DNI Dennis Blair also completed an NIS. The purpose of the 2009 NIS was very similar to other executive agencies strategies: lay out the strategic environment, set priorities and objectives, and guide current and future decisions on budgets, acquisitions, and operations. He did not refer to a legislative requirement that motivated the action. Interestingly, the NIS was coordinated and release in advance of the NSS 2010.<sup>29</sup>

There are problems with the current legislation for National Intelligence Strategy. The requirement for an NIS is weakly defined and the linkage of an NIS with the National Security Strategy is only loosely established. Additionally, there is no statutory requirement for periodic review. There is, at least, some legal requirement for participation of the intelligence community

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<sup>27</sup> This is a proactive interpretation of a broadly written requirement: “the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the progress made in the implementation of this title, including the amendments made by this title”. The report includes a comprehensive description of the progress made, and may include such recommendations for additional legislative or administrative action as the Director considers appropriate, see *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, [Public.Law. 458](#), 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> sess. (17 December, 2004), § 1095.

<sup>28</sup> *Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004*, § 1095 and *50 U.S. Code* § 403-1.

<sup>29</sup> Blair did so because he felt it important to quickly draw out a roadmap for the 16 organizations of the Intelligence Community. However, the DNI took measures to ensure consistency with the administration’s national security efforts and the 2009 NIS was coordinated with the National Security principals, staff and subjected to interagency reviews. The office of the DNI also coordinated with other executive agencies as they worked on parallel long-term strategies, see Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *2009 National Intelligence Strategy Frequently Asked Questions*, (Washington DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, September 2009),1 and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Media Conference Call with the Director of National Intelligence Mr. Dennis C. Blair*, (Washington DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, September 2009), 2.



in the formal strategy process. What legislation exists for those executive agencies without specific strategic planning guidance like the Department of State?

### **Department of State**

Like the Intelligence Community, there is no specific requirement that the Department of State (DoS) link its agency strategic plan to the National Security Strategy. Instead, the State Department cites the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) as the foundational law for its high-level strategic framework planning.

GPRA requires all executive agencies to conduct strategic planning. No later than the first Monday in February, one year after a Presidential term commences, each agency must submit a strategic plan for its program activities to the President and Congress.<sup>30</sup> The Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010 updated the periodicity of the agency plans, added a requirement to show how the agencies' goals nest within Federal Government priority goals, and how the agency is working with other executive agencies to accomplish their objectives. The plan must cover at least a four-year period and the head of the agency may adjust the strategic plan at any time based on changes to the operating environment.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> The plan is to contain: a comprehensive mission statement; general goals and objectives for the major functions and operations of the agency; a description of how any goals and objectives contribute to the Federal Government priority goals; a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved including a description of how the agency is working with other agencies to achieve its goals and objectives and relevant Federal Government priority goals; a description of how the goals and objectives incorporate views and suggestions obtained through the required congressional consultations a description of how the performance goals in a subsequently required agency performance plan contribute to the general goals and objectives of the strategic plan; and a description of the program evaluations used in establishing or revising general goals and objectives, with a schedule for future program evaluations. The plan is to be developed with periodic consultation with Congress and those entities affected by or interested in such a plan, see 5 U.S. Code § 306 as modified by *Government Performance and Results Act of 1993*, Public Law 62, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (3 August 1993), § 3.

<sup>31</sup> *GPRA Modernization Act of 2010*, Public Law 352, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., (4 January 2011), § 2. Since the most recent changes regarding strategic planning added by GPRAMA took effect on 4 January, 2011 it is difficult to ascertain their impact through analysis of existing executive agencies strategies. The alignment of agency strategy timing to follow a year after the Presidential term combined with the need to consult with effected entities and show how agency goals link to Federal Government objectives do provide strong basis for motivating efficient grand strategy coordination.

The Department of State satisfied the requirements of GPRAMA through its Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) process begun in 2010. To ensure it achieves relevant Federal priority goals, the QDDR and State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) take direction from the National Security Strategy, along with other national-level strategies and guidance into account as they are created. The JSP contains key priorities, strategies for achieving those priorities, and serves as the overarching approach that guides regional and functional bureaus planning and resourcing for the Department of State and USAID.<sup>32</sup> The Secretary submits that plan to the President and Congress.

As Figure 2 highlights, the current statutory requirements for an integrated US grand strategy are complicated and often opaque. The Department of Defense has specific guidance for strategic planning explicitly linked to the National Security Strategy. Meanwhile, the Departments of Homeland Security and State as well as the Intelligence Community have no statutory requirement to link their departmental strategies to the National Security Strategy. On the other hand, all executive agencies must coordinate their agency strategy through the interagency process and articulate how they will achieve relevant national *objectives*. These complexities notwithstanding, the most important question is to what degree is the grand strategy of the United States being implemented by agencies involved in delivering national security? The next section explores this question by measuring the coherence between the National Security Strategy 2010 and the strategic documents of the Intelligence community and the Departments of Defense, State and Homeland Security.

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<sup>32</sup> Due to DoS's 2010 QDDR process producing a similar outcome to the JSP, DoS is using the QDDR to serve as the JSP through 2013. See Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading Through Civilian Power*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 15 December 2010), 190.



## Methodology<sup>33</sup>

While there are many ways one could characterize the degree to which the US grand strategy is being implemented by the agencies, one objective way is to measure the degree of coherence between the NSS 2010 and the strategy documents of the Intelligence Community and the Departments of Defense, State and Homeland Security.

Agency	President	Dept of Defense	Dept of Homeland Security	Intelligence Community	Dept of State/US AID	All Exec Agencies
<b>Strategic Planning Document</b>	National Security Strategy	National Military Strategy	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review	National Intelligence Strategy	Joint Strategic Plan*	various
<b>Statutory Basis</b>	50 USC § 404a from Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986	10 USC § 153 from Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act	6 USC § 347 from Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 2007	Possibly 50 USC § 403-1 from Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004	5 USC § 306 from The Government Performance and Results Act, 1993 and GPRAMA, 2010	5 USC § 306 from The Government Performance and Results Act, 1993 and GPRAMA, 2010
<b>Statutory Timing</b>	Annually when Pres presents budget, New Pres NLT 150 days in office	NLT 15th of February of even years	NLT 31st of December, 2009 and every 4 years thereafter	None	NLT 1st Monday in February of any year following the year in which the term of the President commences	NLT 1st Monday in February of any year following the year in which the term of the President commences
<b>Periodicity</b>	Annual	Biennial	Quadrennial	None	Quadrennial	Quadrennial
<b>Submit to</b>	Congress	Secretary of Defense & Congress	Congress	Congress	President & Congress	President & Congress
<b>Most recent version</b>	May-10	Feb-11	Dec-10	Aug-09	10-Dec	various

\*DoS is using its Dec 2010 QDDR to serve as the JSP through 2016.

**Figure 2. US Government Grand Strategy Statutory Requirements**

<sup>33</sup> By no means a complete whole-of-government analysis, the author analyzed the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community and the Department of State/USAID strategies since they are most closely associated with national security strategy.

Using this approach, the analysis begins by breaking down the NSS 2010 into three categories: *elements* of grand strategy, *interests* and *objectives*. *Elements* of grand strategy are brief overarching statements of what the US President seeks to accomplish with his grand strategy and how he intends to do it. *Interests* are the broad national-level ends, or desired outcomes, of the grand strategy. *Objectives* are aligned with the *interests* and form smaller ends which, if accomplished, will additively achieve the *interests*, or desired outcomes of the grand strategy. Appendix A shows the five *elements* of grand strategy, four *interests* and 558 *objectives* developed for this study from the NSS 2010.

Next, the analysis performs a measure of *coherence* of four executive departments. *Coherence* occurs when the executive agency strategies are explicitly or implicitly consistent with the guidance in the *NSS 2010*. Not all *elements*, *interests* and *objectives* are relevant to each executive agency. Therefore, the paper only measures coherence for those that are relevant. Relevant is defined as an item aligned with the stated mission or purpose of each individual executive agency.<sup>34</sup>

Subordinate agency's strategies should derive their *elements* of grand strategy, *interests* and *objectives* from the *NSS 2010*. Those *elements*, *interests* and *objectives* that are derived from the higher strategy and are written in both strategies are considered to be nested. The total coherence is a percentage computed by giving one point to each relevant *NSS 2010 element*, *interest*, or *objective* that nests within the respective executive agency strategy. That number is

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<sup>34</sup> For example, Appendix A *objective* 1.2.5.4 "In Afghanistan, strengthen capacity of Afghani security forces & government" is relevant to the Department of Defense and Department of State but not to the Department of Homeland Defense. Therefore, the DoD and DoS strategies are analyzed for coherence with that objective, but the DHS strategy is not. In Appendix A, relevant nested *National Security Strategy 2010 elements*, *interests* and *objectives* are represented by a "Y". Any relevant *National Security Strategy element*, *interest* or *objective* that is not nested but should be is represented by an "N".

then divided by the total number of *elements*, *interests* and *objectives* that logically should be nested.<sup>35</sup>

## Analysis

### The National Military Strategy (NMS)

The NMS has a coherence score of 99.1% indicating a very high degree of coherence throughout the relevant *elements* of grand strategy, *interests*, and *objectives*.<sup>36</sup> The *elements* of shaping the international order to meet challenges and strengthening international institutions and standards may not be wholly relevant for the DoD. However, the DoD's willingness to work internationally by "pursuing wider and more constructive partnerships" is evident.<sup>37</sup>

Recognizing that US interest is interwoven with the security and stability of the international system, the DoD also willingly states that it will use its capacity to "lead efforts that strengthen security across all regions."<sup>38</sup> Direct linkage of *interests* in the NMS to those in the NSS 2010 is shown by their quotation in the NMS.<sup>39</sup> There was also a high degree of coherence between the NMS and the NSS 2010 in relevant *objectives*. Coherence was found in 100 of the 101 relevant *objectives*.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Total coherence percentage is relevant nested *elements* plus relevant nested *interests* plus relevant nested *objectives* divided by relevant *elements* plus relevant *interests* plus relevant *objectives*.

<sup>36</sup> Each of the five grand strategy elements in the *National Security Strategy 2010* are recognized explicitly or implicitly. The need to lead globally is communicated very strongly throughout the NMS: "Leadership is how we exercise the full spectrum of power to defend our national interests and advance security and stability." It is also clear the Department of Defense (DoD) understands the need to work in the lead but also supporting roles in an integrated fashion with other instruments of American power: "we must play a supporting role in facilitating US government agencies and other organizations' efforts to advance our Nation's interests." The quote "military power and our Nation's other instruments of statecraft are more effective when applied in concert" clearly demonstrates the DoD willingness to integrate with other executive agencies.

<sup>37</sup> Admiral Michael G. Mullen, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America's Military Leadership*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 8 February, 2011), 1.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>40</sup> The only incoherence discovered was that the *NMS* did not address objective 1.7.1.4 "Build a digital workforce." See Obama, *National Security Strategy 2010*, 28. Though not explicitly written in the *NSS 2010*, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did include the specific objectives addressing Afghanistan and Pakistan from page 21 of the *NSS 2010* as a broader *NMS* objective of disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaida and its violent extremist affiliates. Objectives regarding Iraq were not addressed in the *NMS* because they were considered accomplished by the time of publishing. Lt

## **Quadrennial Homeland Security Review**

The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report (QHSRR) received a coherence score of 95.0% indicating a very high degree of coherence with the NSS 2010.<sup>41</sup> The three *elements* of grand strategy relevant to the DHS are referenced directly in the introduction of the QHSRR.<sup>42</sup> As required by law, DHS coordinated its QHSRR with the aforementioned executive agencies. It also worked extensively with the National Security Staff so it is clear that the DHS understands the need to integrate the elements of American power.<sup>43</sup> The four *interests* from the NSS 2010 are also directly listed in DHS' security environment serving as the basis for the QHSRR.<sup>44</sup> The QHSRR contains 107 of the 113 NSS 2010 relevant *objectives*. Most were explicitly shared and many shared exact wording.<sup>45</sup>

## **The National Intelligence Strategy**

The NIS received a coherence score of 95.8% indicating very high coherence with the NSS 2010, although the degree of explicit coherence is not as high as other executive agency strategies. Only one of the five *elements* of grand strategy appears explicitly in the NIS.<sup>46</sup> Other

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Col William J. Bowers, interview by the author, *Interview of Member of Joint Chiefs of Staff J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Staff* (23 November 2011).

<sup>41</sup> Though not specifically required by law, Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano listed the *NSS 2010* as one of the major strategies that it reviewed as a part of DHS's QHSR process along with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the QDDR.

<sup>42</sup> "Consistent with the President's vision, the United States will advance [its] interests by strengthening our domestic foundation and integrating all elements of national power...and promoting an international order that reinforces the rights and responsibilities of all nations." Janet Napolitano, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland*, (Washington DC: US Department of Homeland Security, 2 February 2010), 5.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, iii-iv. The National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council were combined in May 2009 and renamed the National Security Staff. See Kelly Lunney, "Obama Merges Homeland, National Security Staff," *Government Executive*, 26 May 2009, <http://www.govexec.com/defense/2009/05/obama-merges-homeland-national-security-staff/29231/> (accessed 1 February 2012).

<sup>44</sup> Napolitano, *Quadrennial Homeland Security Review*, 5.

<sup>45</sup> One notable incoherence was the failure to nest *objective* 1.1.4.2 "Ensure redundant systems where necessary." See Obama, *National Security Strategy 2010*, 19.

<sup>46</sup> The commitment to integrating the elements of American power is apparent: "the Intelligence Community supports the whole-of-US Government efforts" to achieve many specific National Security Strategy objectives, see Dennis C. Blair, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America: Transformation Through Integration and Innovation*. (Washington DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, August 2009), 6.

*elements* are implicitly acknowledged.<sup>47</sup> The *interests* of the NSS 2010 are never explicitly acknowledged, however the objectives listed in the NIS are constructed to achieve each of the four NSS 2010 *interests*. The degree of coherence in relevant *objectives* is very high between the NSS 2010 and the NIS. The NIS addressed 85 tasks of 89 relevant *objectives*.<sup>48</sup> However, it is difficult to determine number of relevant *objectives* is because of the nature of the mission of the Intelligence Community.<sup>49</sup>

### **Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review**

A coherence score of 97.3% indicates there is a very high degree of coherence between the NSS 2010 and the QDDR. The Department of State's reliance on the NSS 2010 as one of the two foundational documents for the QDDR is obvious as it is referenced a total of 22 times throughout the QDDR.<sup>50</sup> Each of the five *elements* of grand strategy is directly reflected right from the beginning of the QDDR.<sup>51</sup> Likewise, the four national *interests* expressed in the

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<sup>47</sup> For example, the *NIS*'s efforts to "use taxpayers' dollars more efficiently and effectively" and to achieve accountability for personnel to meet performance objectives implicitly acknowledge the *element* of national renewal required to rebuild America's strength. In addition, the *NIS*'s articulation of the need to expand partnerships and information sharing, within the IC and also with allies and international partners, demonstrates that the IC understands the need to shape the international order to meet 21st century challenges, see Blair, *National Intelligence Strategy*, 13.

<sup>48</sup> One very specific incoherence noted was the absence of objective 1.2.3.1 "Secure all vulnerable nuclear materials by end of 2013." See Obama, *National Security Strategy 2010*, 20.

<sup>49</sup> The IC inherently informs policy and objectives across the spectrum of governmental issues. This is explicitly expressed in many areas of the *NIS*. First, the second strategic goal, "support effective national security action" applies across the range of national security objectives. *NIS*'s mission objectives number three "provide strategic intelligence and warning" and number six "support current operations". Since these objectives are so broad and potentially all encompassing, the number of shared relevant tasks may be significantly lower than in other executive agency strategies. Additionally, the need to restrict some information from the larger public may likely cause the *NIS* to only acknowledge certain tasks in an unclassified *NIS*. The *NIS*'s second strategic goal fully acknowledges that the IC will execute covert actions when so directed by the President. For all these reasons, the coherence of the *NIS* to the NSS may not fully indicate the actual measure of grand strategy consistency from the President to the Intelligence Community.

<sup>50</sup> To ensure complete alignment of purpose, the State Department/US AID's QDDR guidance is clear that they "are called upon to lead and advance US foreign policy objectives through diplomacy and development." These objectives are set forth in the President's *National Security Strategy 2010*. See Clinton, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 9 and 1-219.

<sup>51</sup> The key grand strategy element, "rebuilding strength via national renewal and global leadership" is the opening sentence in the State/USAID strategy. State proved its understanding of the need to shape the international order to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges by reviewing its internal structure. The internal review was meant to eliminate duplication and "get the most out of the American taxpayer's dollar." As evidence of this emphasis, the Department realigned its personnel and organizational structure adapt to the new century by creating many new offices to execute key ends lined out by the NSS. Examples include the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment, an Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, expansion of the capacities of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and

National Security Strategy are directly quoted in the QDDR.<sup>52</sup> There was also a high degree of coherence in relevant *objectives*. Coherence was found in 240 of the 247 relevant *objectives*.<sup>53</sup>

Overall, the analysis of the four departmental strategies reveals that all agencies’ strategies show a very high degree of coherence with the NSS 2010 in terms all three categories analyzed: *elements* of grand strategy, *interests*, and *objectives*. Each agency directly referred to the NSS 2010 during formulation of their respective agency strategy and let it drive their strategy objectives. This demonstrates a very high degree of grand strategy coherence from the President to the executive agencies.

Agency	Dept of Defense	Dept of Homeland Security	Intelligence Community	Dept of State/US AID
Strategic Planning Document	National Military Strategy	Quadrennial Homeland Security Review	National Intelligence Strategy	Quadrennial Diplomacy & Development Review
Total Coherence with NSS	99.1%	95.0%	95.8%	97.3%

**Figure 3. Coherence Scores**

International Security Affairs, addition of a Bureau for Counterterrorism, addition of an Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues, and the addition of a Chief Economist. Those changes will better align the department to “lead in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.” The shared State/USAID strategy acknowledges that it is not enough to reshape internally, but they also need to reshape the international order to meet the same challenges. The DoS will execute the element of “strengthening international institutions” by ensuring its personnel have the appropriate training to do just that. State’s understanding of the grand strategy element of leading globally is demonstrated by its goal of undertaking its first quadrennial review, “to keep the State Department, USAID, and every element of our civilian power at the cutting edge of global leadership.” Finally, the NSS’s message that executive agencies must integrate all instruments of American power comes through perfectly. State intends to make its Ambassadors the key point of integrating all US instruments of power at the country level. It is also committed to extending its personnel into geographic combatant commands to continue enabling synchronization at the regional level. Finally it has committed to national strategic level interagency cooperation in strategic planning as it included the full spectrum of executive agencies in its QDDR process. State even plans to promote and place its best using interagency experience as a key indicator of higher potential. See Clinton, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*, 1-46.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 9.

<sup>53</sup> See Condoleeza Rice, *Joint Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 7 May 2007), 43-58. An apparent incoherence is that many objectives dealing with regional issues from the *NSS 2010* are not included in the *QDDR*. In previous years, a regional objective like objective 1.2.9.3 “Work to resolve Arab-Israeli conflict” would have been included in the JSP. With the decision to use the *QDDR* in place of the JSP through 2016, the State Department decided that regional and country-specific objectives aligned better with the purpose of regional bureau strategies, thus they were placed there, Peter E. Harrell, interview by the author, *Interview of Mr. Peter Harrell, Member Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff* (3 February 2012).



## Conclusions<sup>54</sup>

The review of statutory requirements for national security strategic guidance reveals that the requirement for and the specifics to be delineated by the National Security Strategy are well defined. The legal specifics positively articulate the requirements to formulate a US grand strategy. The requirement to delineate the uses of political, economic, military and other elements of power in a balance of capabilities enables the President to coordinate interagency solutions required by the current complex security environment. The timing of the submission of the National Security Strategy, within 150 days of a new President beginning his or her term, ensures that the executive agencies have strategic guidance relatively quickly. The President is then required to resubmit the strategy annually to Congress upon submission of the budget. This allows Congressional oversight to the means. Once approved, the Presidentially-submitted ways and ends are matched with means and the grand strategy is viable.

Executive agency strategy legislation development was piecemeal. Only two departments, defense and homeland security, are specifically named by law to have departmental strategies. Of those, only the DoD is explicitly required, by name, to ensure its departmental strategy is consistent with the National Security Strategy. The DHS departmental strategy must be consistent with “appropriate national and departmental strategies” allowing an opportunity for misinterpretation or willful avoidance. DHS and DoD are required to submit their strategies in late December and February respectively. The submission dates align well with the Presidential budget submissions. The DoD is required to complete its strategy biennially, whereas the DHS

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<sup>54</sup> This analysis only examined the four executive departments most closely associated with national security. However, each of the other executive departments have significant roles as well. Both the definition of grand strategy and the analysis of the National Security Strategy tasks make this clear. For example, *objective 2.2.1* “Transform our energy economy” lies outside the missions of the four departments analyzed. See Obama, *National Security Strategy 2010*, 30. Further study of those department’s strategies and their coherence with the National Security Strategy are merited.

requirement is quadrennial. Though at differing intervals, the legislation does at least force periodic strategic reassessment. See Figure 4.

Recent statutory requirements for other executive departments have produced needed clarity. Title 5 US Code § 306 requires all executive departments to have strategies. It does not specifically direct departments to use the most recent National Security Strategy as starting guidance. But as of January 2011, it does require that departments indicate how they will achieve relevant *national objectives* and to describe how they are working with other agencies to

<b>2012</b>		NSS Budget NMS										
<b>2013*</b>		Budget				NSS						QHSR
<b>2014</b>		Budget NMS All Exec Agency Strategies: NIS, JSP, etc.										
<b>2015</b>		NSS Budget										
<b>2016</b>		NSS Budget NMS										
<b>2017*</b>		Budget				NSS						QHSR
<b>*</b> Presidential Term begins	<b>Jan</b>	<b>Feb</b>	<b>Mar</b>	<b>Apr</b>	<b>May</b>	<b>Jun</b>	<b>Jul</b>	<b>Aug</b>	<b>Sep</b>	<b>Oct</b>	<b>Nov</b>	<b>Dec</b>

**Figure 4. Executive Branch Strategy Cycle**

accomplish their goals. Periodicity is based on the start of a President’s term. Additionally, the timing of submission coincides with submission of the Presidential budget. Since 5 US Code now applies to all executive agencies, it should align the executive departments with Presidential



grand strategy in the future. Given the piecemeal legislative guidance of the past, how effective were executive agencies at aligning with the NSS 2010?

Surprisingly, coherence analysis between the NSS 2010 and the key national security departments reveals a very high degree of coherence amongst all four. All displayed adherence to the *elements* of grand strategy, *interests*, and most *objectives* written in the NSS 2010. Most strategies shared some exact wording with the president's grand strategy.<sup>55</sup> There were some important relevant *objectives* that were not explicitly included by any of the reviewed departments but they seemed to be outliers.<sup>56</sup>

The results of the legal requirements and coherence analysis surprisingly indicate that though development of grand strategy legislation has been piecemeal, a strategic planning consensus developed and has now been written into 5 US Code § 306. This legal update was the result of the GPRAMA of 2010. The act, whose purpose was to improve US government performance and make it more effective, provides coherent strategic planning guidance across the whole-of-government. By so doing, it better positions the US government to coordinate effective interdepartmental responses. One weakness is that it is a broadly written law leaving room for misinterpretation and, however unlikely, willful avoidance motivated by bureaucratic politics or organizational culture.<sup>57</sup>

## Recommendations

Legislation for US grand strategy needs only slight improvements to address the new security environment, the new world position of the United States, and to clarify guidance to an

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<sup>55</sup> The QDDR went so far as to describe organizational restructuring and personnel system changes to better achieve national security objectives.

<sup>56</sup> Two examples are objective 1.2.3.1 "Secure all vulnerable nuclear materials by the end of 2013" and objective 1.1.4.2 "Ensure redundant systems where necessary." See Obama, *National Security Strategy 2010*, 19-20.

<sup>57</sup> For an explanation of barriers to coordinating and executing national security policy including explanations and examples of bureaucratic politics and organizational culture, see Jonathan Monten and Andrew Bennett, "Models of Crisis Decision Making and the 1990-1991 Gulf War" *Security Studies* 19, no. 3 (July 2010), 486-520.

increasingly complex national security enterprise moving forward. Accounting for these factors, Congress should consider implementing the following:

- Amend 5 USC to require that departmental strategies link directly to the most recent National Security Strategy by name. The NSS comprehensively addresses the global security environment and provides ways guidance to all the executive agencies. It would clarify nebulous IC guidance. Finally, amending Title 5 will powerfully link achievement of the President's national security goals with departmental performance since 5 USC requires departmental strategies to serve as departmental performance plans.
- Align a portion of each department's strategy to reflect the required content of the National Security Strategy. This is a requirement of the DoD's NMS already and would ensure all executive agencies' strategies continue to reflect the structure and intent of the National Security Strategy.
- Align the periodicity of the National Security Strategy and departmental strategies to be required every two or four years. This would allow the President and executive agencies to plan their respective strategies in parallel to each other on the same rhythm creating synergy and eliminating low value, unsynchronized efforts.

These minor changes will unequivocally designate the central role of the National Security Strategy as the primary source of guidance to all executive agencies and clarify its place as the foundational grand strategy document of the US government. The changes will establish a predictable strategic planning process for the executive branch, and increase compliance with Presidential strategy. It is not a guarantee of compliance; however, it is a necessary step to clarify, codify and stabilize a nebulous process. Most importantly, it should further enable coordinated whole-of-government approaches necessary to secure a nation in an ever-changing world.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Similar recommendations have been made by the Department of State in Clinton, *Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 200-204*, and the Project for National Security Reform in *Turning Ideas into Action*, Report to the US President, (Washington DC: Project on National Security Reform, 2009), 37-45. Their recommendations informed mine and are much more specific any many cases. However, their analyses and recommendations are not based on any analysis of the strategic planning documents used as the basis for my analysis.

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## Appendix A

### Coherence of Analysis Executive Agency Strategies to the 2010 National Security Strategy<sup>59</sup>

2010 National Security Strategy	Dept of Defense	Dept of Homeland Security	Intelligence Community	Dept of State/US AID
<b>Elements of Grand Strategy</b>				
Rebuild strength via national renewal & global leadership	Y	Y	Y	Y
Shape the international order to meet challenges of our time	Y	Y	Y	Y
Strengthen international standards & institutions	Y			Y
Pursue interests via existing international system	Y			Y
Integrate the elements of American power	Y	Y	Y	Y
<b>Interests</b>				
Security of the United States, its citizens, & US allies & partners	Y	Y	Y	Y
Strong, innovative, growing US economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity & prosperity	Y	Y	Y	Y
Respect for universal values at home & around the world	Y	Y	Y	Y
International order advanced by US leadership that promotes peace, security, & opportunity through stronger cooperation	Y	Y	Y	Y
<b>Objectives</b>				
1. SECURITY				
1.0.1 Rebalance instruments of statecraft				Y
1.1 Strengthen security & resilience at home		Y		
1.1.1 Enhance security at home		Y		
1.1.1.1 Prevent & deter attacks	Y	Y		
1.1.1.2 Identify & interdict threats		Y		
1.1.1.3 Deny hostile actors within borders		Y		
1.1.1.4 Protect nation's critical infrastructure/resources		Y		
1.1.1.4.1 Borders, ports, airports		Y		
1.1.1.4.2 Enhance air, maritime, transportation, space/cyber security		Y		
1.1.1.5 Secure cyberspace		Y		Y
1.1.1.6 Secure & Interdict transportation & transaction key nodes		Y		
1.1.1.6.1 Abroad				
1.1.1.6.2 Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, NGO, public-private		Y		

<sup>59</sup> Elements, interests and objectives derived from Barack H. Obama, *National Security Strategy 2010*, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, May 2010), introduction letter, 1-2, and 17-50.



<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
1.1.2 Effectively manage emergencies		Y		
1.1.2.1 Build capacity to prepare for disasters		Y		
1.1.2.1.1 Integrate domestic all hazard planning thru all levels government		Y		
1.1.2.1.2 Collaborate w/communities to integrate preparedness at all levels w/private & nonprofit sectors		Y		
1.1.2.1.3 Encourage domestic regional planning/integrated preparedness programs		Y		
1.1.2.1.4 Encourage all levels government to start long-term recovery planning		Y		
1.1.2.2 Build capacity to respond to/recover from major incidents		Y		
1.1.2.2.1 Invest in capabilities & equipment		Y		
1.1.2.2.2 Improve reliability & interoperability of communication systems of 1st responders		Y		
1.1.2.2.3 Continually test & improve plans thru realistic exercises		Y		
1.1.3 Empower communities to counter radicalization		Y	Y	Y
1.1.3.1 Invest in intelligence to understand threat		Y	Y	
1.1.3.2 Expand community engagement & development programs		Y		Y
1.1.3.3 Clearly communicate policies & intentions		Y		Y
1.1.3.4 Tailor policies to address regional concerns		N		Y
1.1.4 Improve resilience through increased Public-Private Partnerships (critical infrastructure)		Y	Y	Y
1.1.4.1 Develop incentives to design resilient structures & systems		N		
1.1.4.2 Ensure redundant systems where necessary		N	Y	
1.1.4.3 Decentralize critical operations to reduce vulnerability		Y	Y	
1.1.4.4 Develop & test continuity plans to restore critical capabilities		Y		
1.1.4.5 Invest in improvements & maintenance to existing structure		Y		
1.1.5 Engage with Communities & Citizens		Y		Y
1.1.5.1 Provide clear & reliable risk & emergency information		Y		
1.1.5.1.1 Provide practical steps to all Americans to protect self, families, & neighborhoods		Y		
1.1.5.1.2 Transmit via multiple pathways		Y		

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
1.1.5.1.3 Transmit to those with special needs		Y		
1.1.5.2 Supports development of nationwide public safety broadband network		Y		
1.2 Disrupt, Dismantle, & Defeat Al-Qaida & Violent Extremist Affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, & the world	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.2.1 Prevent terrorist attacks on & in the homeland	Y	Y		
1.2.1.1 Integrate & leverage state/urban fusion centers to share classified information		Y	Y	
1.2.1.2 Establish nationwide suspicious activity reporting network		N		
1.2.1.3 Implement integrated approach to CT information systems (multi-level government intelligence sharing)		Y	Y	
1.2.1.3.1 Improve info sharing/cooperation by linking levels of networks		Y		
1.2.1.3.2 Improve coordination with foreign partners		Y	Y	Y
1.2.1.4 Collaborate bilaterally, regionally, & internationally to prevent terrorist attacks	Y		Y	Y
1.2.2 Strengthen aviation security		Y		
1.2.2.1 Increase info collection & sharing		Y		
1.2.2.2 Strengthen passenger vetting & screening measures		Y		
1.2.2.3 Develop advanced screening technologies		Y		
1.2.2.4 Strengthen international community aviation security standards		N		
1.2.3 Deny terrorists weapons of mass destruction		Y	Y	Y
1.2.3.1 Secure all vulnerable nuclear materials by end of 2013			N	
1.2.3.2 Prevent the spread of nuclear weapons			Y	Y
1.2.3.3 Safeguard vulnerable knowledge & capabilities in life & chemical sciences		Y	Y	
1.2.4 Deny Al Qaida & affiliates ability to threaten US, allies, partners & those interests overseas	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.2.4.1 Deny AQ & affiliates ability to operationally plot in any locale	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.2.4.2 Deny AQ & affiliates ability to recruit, train & position operatives	Y		Y	Y
1.2.5 In Afghanistan & Pakistan, work w/others to keep pressure on AQ	Y		Y	Y
1.2.5.1 In Afghanistan & Pakistan, increase security & capacity of regional partners	Y			Y



<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
1.2.5.2 In Afghanistan, deny AQ safe haven	Y		Y	Y
1.2.5.3 In Afghanistan, deny Taliban ability to overthrow the government			Y	Y
1.2.5.4 In Afghanistan, strengthen capacity of Afghani security forces & government	Y		Y	Y
1.2.5.5 In Pakistan, work with government to address threat from violent extremists	Y		Y	Y
1.2.5.6 Specific 3 component strategy for AfPak				
1.2.6 Deny safe havens & strengthen at-risk states	Y		Y	Y
1.2.6.0.1 Info sharing, law enforcement cooperation, establish new practices		Y	Y	Y
1.2.6.0.2 Help states build responsible government & security sector	Y			Y
1.2.6.1 Pressure AQ & affiliates wherever they attempt to establish safe haven: Yemen, Somalia, Maghreb, Sahel	Y		Y	Y
1.2.6.2 Strengthen partner network to disable AQ financial, human, & planning networks	Y		Y	Y
1.2.6.3 Disrupt terrorist operations before they mature	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.2.6.4 Address potential safe-havens before AQ & affiliates take root	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.2.7 Deliver swift & sure justice				
1.2.7.1 Leverage information/intelligence to disrupt AQ & affiliates				
1.2.7.2 Bring terrorists to justice				
1.2.7.3 Act in line with rule of law & due process				
1.2.7.4 Submit decisions to checks, balances, & accountability				
1.2.7.5 Ensure detention & secrecy are consistent with US Constitution & laws				
1.2.7.6 Close Guantanamo Bay prison				
1.2.8 Resist fear & overreaction				
1.2.9 Contrast AQ's intent to destroy with our constructive vision				
1.2.9.1 Make clear our intent to build				
1.2.9.2 Build bridges among people of different faiths & religions				Y
1.2.9.3 Work to resolve Arab-Israeli conflict				
1.2.9.4 Stand for universal rights of all people, even those with whom we disagree				Y
1.2.9.5 Develop new partnerships in Muslim communities				Y
1.2.9.6 Communicate commitment to support security & opportunity for all people				Y

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
1.3 Use of Force				
1.3.1 Draw on diplomacy, development, & international norms/institutions to resolve disagreements				Y
1.3.10 Outline a clear mandate, specific objectives, thoroughly consider consequences of US actions				
1.3.11 Ensure Armed Forces have leadership, training, & equipment required to accomplish their mission	Y			
1.3.2.1 Underwrite US defense commitments with tailored deterrence	Y		Y	
1.3.2.2 Ensure US military has necessary capabilities across all domains (land, air, sea, space & cyber)	Y			
1.3.3 Help allies & partners build capacity	Y			Y
1.3.4 Exhaust all options prior to war when possible				Y
1.3.5 Weigh costs & risks of action & inaction	Y			
1.3.6 Use force in a way that reflects US values & strengthens legitimacy	Y			Y
1.3.7 Seek broad international support via NATO, UN Security Council, etc.	Y			Y
1.3.8 Act unilaterally if necessary	Y			Y
1.3.9 Adhere to standards governing use of force	Y			Y
1.4 Reverse the spread of nuclear & biological weapons & secure nuclear materials	Y		Y	Y
1.4.1 Pursue goal of world without nuclear weapons				N
1.4.1.1 Sustain a safe, secure, & effective nuclear arsenal	Y			
1.4.1.2 Ratify New START Treaty with Russia				
1.4.1.3 Reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security approach	Y			
1.4.1.4 Extend assurance of no use nor threat of use v. nonnuclear states ICW NPT				
1.4.1.5 Invest in modernizing safe, secure, & effective stockpile w/no new production				
1.4.1.6 Pursue ratification of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty				
1.4.1.7 Seek treaty that verifiably ends production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons				
1.4.2 Strengthen nuclear nonproliferation treaty				Y
1.4.2.1 Seek more resources & authority for international inspections			Y	

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
1.4.2.2 Develop a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation				
1.4.2.3 Pursue broad, international consensus to insist nations meet GNEP obligations				
1.4.2.4 Pursue consequences v. countries failing to meet NPT obligations				N
1.4.3 Present a clear choice to Iran & North Korea				
1.4.3.1 Pursue denuclearization of Korean peninsula				
1.4.3.2 Work to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon			Y	
1.4.3.3 Integrate those countries into IC if they comply				
1.4.3.4 Increase their isolation & bring into compliance if they do not comply				
1.4.4 Secure vulnerable nuclear weapons & materials	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.4.4.1 Enhance protection, accounting, & expand cooperation with international institutions & new partnerships	Y		Y	
1.4.4.2 Work to turn Proliferation Security Initiative & Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into durable international efforts				N
1.4.4.3 Sustain broad-based cooperation with other nations & institutions to protect nuclear materials	Y	Y	Y	
1.4.5 Support peaceful nuclear energy				
1.4.5.1 Promote safety through regulatory bodies & training of operators				
1.4.5.2 Promote physical security to prevent terrorist acts		Y		
1.4.5.3 Assure safe, secure handling of nuclear fuel in front & back ends of fuel cycle		Y		
1.4.6 Counter biological threats	Y	Y	Y	
1.4.6.1.1 At home, Work with first responders & health officials to reduce risk of unintentional outbreak		Y		
1.4.6.1.2 At home, strengthen our resilience across the spectrum of high-consequence biological threats	Y	Y		
1.4.6.2.1 At home & abroad, promote global health security	Y			
1.4.6.2.2 At home & abroad, reinforce norms of safe & responsible conduct		Y		

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
1.4.6.2.3 At home & abroad, obtain insight on current & emerging risks		Y	Y	
1.4.6.2.4 At home & abroad, take reasonable steps to reduce potential for exploitation		Y		
1.4.6.2.5 At home & abroad, expand capability to prevent, attribute, & apprehend attackers	Y	Y	Y	
1.4.6.2.6 At home & abroad, communicate effectively with all stakeholders		Y		
1.4.6.2.7 At home & abroad, help transform the international dialogue on biological threats			Y	N
1.5 Advance peace, security, & opportunity in the Middle East				
1.5.1 Complete a responsible transition as war ends in Iraq				
1.5.1.1 Promote a just, responsible, & accountable Iraqi government				
1.5.1.2 Pursue 3-pronged strategy				
1.5.1.2.1 Security: Train, advise, equip Iraqi security forces				
1.5.1.2.2 Security: conduct targeted CT missions				
1.5.1.2.3 Security: protect ongoing civilian & military efforts				
1.5.1.2.4 Security: remove all troops by end of 2011				
1.5.1.2.5 Civilian support: sustain capable political, diplomatic & civilian effort to Iraqi people				
1.5.1.2.6 Civilian support: implement Strategic Framework Agreement w/DOS lead				
1.5.1.2.7 Regional Diplomacy & development: pursue comprehensive engagement across the region				
1.5.2 Pursue Arab-Israeli peace				
1.5.2.1 Seek two-state solution (Jewish Israel & contiguous Palestine 1967 borders)				
1.5.2.2 Work regionally with like-minded partners				
1.5.2.3 Seek international support to build Palestinian institutions				
1.5.2.4 Pursue peace between Israel & Lebanon, Syria & other neighbors				
1.5.2.5 Pursue these initiatives regionally both bi & multilaterally				
1.5.3 Promote a responsible Iran				
1.5.3.1 Pursue engagement without illusion				

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
1.5.3.2 Further isolate if Iran does act responsibly				
1.6 Invest in the capacity of strong & capable partners				Y
1.6.1 Foster security & reconstruction in the aftermath of conflict				Y
1.6.1.1 Build the capacity for security, economic growth, & good governance in Iraq & Afghanistan				
1.6.1.2 Design appropriate assistance strategies & facilitate collaboration				Y
1.6.2 Pursue sustainable & responsible security systems in at-risk states				
1.6.2.1 Improve US capability to strengthen security of at-risk states	Y			Y
1.6.2.2 Undertake long-term, sustained efforts to strengthen the capacity of security forces	Y			
1.6.2.3 Strengthen administrative & oversight capabilities of civilian security sector institutions				Y
1.6.2.4 Strengthen effectiveness of criminal justice institutions				Y
1.6.3 Prevent the emergence of conflict				Y
1.6.3.1 Invest in capable partners of the future				Y
1.6.3.2 Strengthen the foundations of our common security				Y
1.6.3.3 Modernize our capabilities				Y
1.6.3.4 Reorient & strengthen our development agenda				Y
1.6.3.5 Enhance our capabilities				Y
1.6.3.6 Forge new & more effective means of applying skills of military, diplomats, & development experts				Y
1.7 Secure Cyberspace	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.7.0.1 Deter, prevent, detect, defend against, & quickly recover from intrusions & attacks	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.7.1 Invest in people & technology	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.7.1.1 Design more secure technology for critical government & industry systems & networks		Y	Y	Y
1.7.1.2 Continue to invest in cutting-edge research & development		Y	Y	Y
1.7.1.3 Continue comprehensive national campaign promoting cyber security awareness & digital literacy		Y		
1.7.1.4 Build a digital workforce	N	Y	Y	Y
1.7.2 Strengthen partnerships	Y	Y	Y	Y

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
1.7.2.1 Strengthen international partnerships on: norms of acceptable cyberspace conduct	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.7.2.2 Strengthen international partnerships on: laws concerning cybercrime	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.7.2.3 Strengthen international partnerships on: data preservation, protection, & privacy	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.7.2.4 Strengthen international partnerships on: approaches for network defense & response to cyber attacks	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.7.2.5 Work with key players to ensure organized & unified response to future cyber incidents	Y	Y	Y	Y
1.7.2.6 Have plans & resources in place beforehand	Y	Y	Y	Y
<b>2. PROSPERITY</b>				
<b>2.1 Strengthen education &amp; human capital</b>				Y
<b>2.1.1 Improve education at all levels</b>				
2.1.1.1 Provide complete & competitive education for all Americans				
2.1.1.2 Support high standards for early learning				
2.1.1.3 Support high standards for reforming public schools				
2.1.1.4 Support high standards for increasing access to higher education & job training				
2.1.1.5 Promote high-demand skills & education for emerging industries				
2.1.1.6 Lead the world in proportion of college graduates by 2020				
<b>2.1.2 Invest in science, technology, engineering, &amp; math ed. (STEM)</b>				
2.1.2.1 Invest more in STEM education				
2.1.2.2 Improve the quality of math & science teaching (not outperformed by other nations)				
2.1.2.3 Expand STEM education & career opportunities for underrepresented groups				
2.1.2.4 Work with partners to promote education & careers in science & technology				
<b>2.1.3 Increase international education &amp; exchange</b>				Y
2.1.3.1. Support programs that cultivate interest & scholarship in foreign languages, intercultural affairs, including exchange programs				Y
2.1.3.2 Welcome more foreign students to our shores				N
<b>2.1.4 Pursue comprehensive immigration reform</b>		Y		
2.1.4.1 Effectively secure our borders		Y		

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
2.1.4.2 Repair a broken immigration system		Y		
2.2 Enhance science, technology, & innovation				
2.2.1 Transform our energy economy				
2.2.1.1 Ensure security & free flow of global energy resources				
2.2.1.2 Leverage private capital to accelerate deployment of clean energy technologies				
2.2.1.3 Invest in research & next generation technology				
2.2.1.4 Modernize the way we distribute electricity				
2.2.1.5 Encourage the use of transitional fuels				
2.2.1.6 Move toward clean energy produced at home				
2.2.2 Invest in research				
2.2.2.1 Reverse the decades-long decline in federal funding for research				
2.2.2.2 Create incentives to encourage private initiatives				Y
2.2.3 Expand international science partnerships				Y
2.2.3.1 Expand cooperation & partnership in science & technology				Y
2.2.3.2 Promote stronger relationships between American scientists, universities, researchers & their counterparts				
2.2.3.3 Reestablish a commitment to S&T in foreign assistance efforts				Y
2.2.3.4 Develop a strategy for international science & national security				
2.2.4 Employ technology to protect our Nation				
2.2.4.1 Protecting US & allied forces from asymmetric attacks				
2.2.4.2 Supporting arms control & nonproliferation agreements	Y			
2.2.4.3 Preventing terrorist attack against the homeland		Y		
2.2.4.4 Preventing & managing widespread disease outbreaks				
2.2.4.5 Securing the supply chain		Y		
2.2.4.6 Detecting weapons of mass destruction	Y	Y		
2.2.4.7 Protecting our information, communication, & transportation infrastructure		Y		
2.2.5 Leverage & grow our space capabilities				
2.2.5.1 Pursue interests consistent with self-defense				
2.2.5.2 Deepen cooperation with friends & allies				



<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
2.2.5.3 Work with all nations toward responsible, peaceful use of space				
2.2.5.4 Invest in people & industry that develops cutting-edge space technology				
2.2.5.5 Invest in research & development of next-generation space technology & capabilities				
2.2.5.6 Strengthen space industrial base				
2.2.5.7 Work with universities to encourage students to pursue space careers				
2.3 Achieve balanced & sustainable growth				Y
2.3.0.1 Lead the international community to expand the inclusive growth of the integrated, global economy				Y
2.3.0.2 Lead international efforts to prevent recurrence of economic imbalances & financial excesses				Y
2.3.1 Prevent renewed instability in the global economy				
2.3.1.1 Pursue reform of the US financial system to strengthen health of economy				
2.3.1.2 Encourage Americans to save more				
2.3.1.3 Prevent reemergence of excesses based on irresponsible lending, & lax & uncoordinated regulation				
2.3.2 Save more & export more				
2.3.2.1 Save more				
2.3.2.2 Spend less				
2.3.2.3 Reform US financial system				
2.3.2.4 Reduce US long-term budget deficit				
2.3.2.5 Double US exports by 2014				
2.3.2.6 Reform US export controls consistent with national security imperatives				
2.3.3 Shift to greater domestic demand abroad (especially in emerging market & developing countries)				
2.3.3.1 Place greater emphasis on increasing domestic demands to drive growth & open markets				
2.3.3.2 Accelerate process of convergence of living standards				
2.3.4 Open foreign markets to US products & services				Y
2.3.4.1 Maintain our open investment environment, consistent with national security goals				Y

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
2.3.4.2 Pursue trade agenda including the Doha multilateral trade agreement				
2.3.4.3 Pursue bilateral & multilateral trade agreements reflecting our values & interests				
2.3.4.4 Pursue engage with transpacific partnership countries to shape a regional agreement				
2.3.4.5 Restore Americans confidence in trade agreements with realistic programs dealing with transition costs				
2.3.4.6 Promote innovation, infrastructure, healthcare reform & education				
2.3.4.7 Ensure agreements contain achievable enforcement mechanisms & reflect US interests, esp. on labor & environment				
2.3.5 Build cooperation with our international partners				Y
2.3.5.1 Via G-20, secure sustainable & balanced growth				Y
2.3.5.2 " coordinate reform of financial sector regulation				
2.3.5.3 " foster global economic development				Y
2.3.5.4 " promote energy security				Y
2.3.5.5 " pursue governance reform at the IMF & World Bank				
2.3.5.6 Broaden US leadership in other international financial institutions to ensure rapidly growing countries are represented appropriately & invest in the authority of those institutions				
2.3.6 Deter threats to the international financial system				
2.3.6.1 Target abusive actors illicit resources & access to the global financial system via financial measures				
2.3.6.2 " via administration & enforcement of regulatory authorities				
2.3.6.3 " via outreach to the private sector & foreign partners				
2.3.6.4 " via collaboration on international standards & information sharing				
2.4 Accelerate sustainable development				Y
2.4.1 Increase investments in development				Y
2.4.1.1 Work with allies to grow world's poorest countries grow into productive & prosperous economies				Y

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
2.4.1.2 Ensure greater, deliberate focus on global development agenda across the US government				Y
2.4.1.3 Increase foreign assistance via expanded investments in effective multilateral development institutions				Y
2.4.1.4 " via engaging with others to share the burden				Y
2.4.2 Invest in the foundations of long-term development				Y
2.4.2.1 Initiate long-term investments to recognize & reward governments with capacity & will to pursue sustainable development strategies				Y
2.4.2.2 Ensure all policy instruments are harnessed to the above ends				Y
2.4.2.3 Strengthen the ability of governments & communities to manage development challenges				Y
2.4.2.4 Invest in strong institutions that foster democratic accountability that sustains development				Y
2.4.3 Exercise leadership in the provision of global public good				Y
2.4.3.1 Shape the international architecture to address global challenges				Y
2.4.3.2 Increase US investments & engagement to transition to a low-carbon growth trajectory				Y
2.4.3.3 " to support the resilience of the poorest nations to the effects of climate change				Y
2.4.3.4 " to strengthen food security				Y
2.4.3.5 Pursue potential development "game-changers" like new vaccines, weather-resistant seed varieties, & green energy technologies				Y
2.5 Spend taxpayer dollars wisely		N	Y	Y
2.5.0.1 Make tough choices to live within our means				Y
2.5.0.2 Hold departments & agencies accountable for spending & performance		Y	Y	Y
2.5.0.3 Harness technology to improve government performance		Y	Y	Y
2.5.0.4 Being open & honest with the American people				
2.5.0.5 Work with global partners & institutions to share burdens	Y			Y
2.5.0.6 Leverage US investments to achieve global goals		Y		Y
2.5.1 Reduce the deficit				

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
2.5.1.1 Freeze non-security spending for 3 years				
2.5.1.2 Recoup taxpayer losses from TARP via a new fee on the largest financial services companies				
2.5.1.3 Close tax loopholes & cease unnecessary subsidies				
2.5.1.4 Work for financially responsible health insurance reform				
2.5.2 Reform acquisition & contracting processes				
2.5.2.1 Scrutinize our programs				Y
2.5.2.2 Terminate or restructure outdated, duplicative, ineffective or wasteful programs				Y
2.5.2.3 Reform federal contracting				
2.5.2.4 Strengthen contracting practices & management oversight with goal of saving \$40 billion per year				
2.5.3 Increase transparency				
2.5.3.1 Require same justification for base budget & overseas contingency operations costs				
3. VALUES				
3.0.1 Promote universal values worldwide: freedom of speech, assembly without fear, worship as they please, choose own leaders, dignity, tolerance, equality among people, fair & equitable justice				Y
3.0.2 Engage nations, institutions, & peoples in pursuit of these values abroad				Y
3.0.3 Recognize that different cultures & traditions give life to these values in distinct ways				Y
3.0.4 Speak out for universal rights				Y
3.0.5 Support fragile democracies & civil society				Y
3.0.6 Support dignity that comes with development				Y
3.1 Strengthen the power of US example			Y	Y
3.1.1 Prohibit torture without exception or equivocation				
3.1.2 Legal aspects of countering terrorism				
3.1.2.1 Prosecute terrorists in federal courts or in reformed military commissions that are fair, legitimate, & effective				
3.1.2.2 Have clear, defensible, & lawful standards for detainees who cannot be prosecuted				
3.1.2.3 Have fair procedures & a process of periodic review for prolonged detentions with checks & balances				

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
3.1.3 Balance the imperatives of secrecy & transparency			N	
3.1.3.1 Make information available, where possible, to the American people to ensure government accountability			N	
3.1.3.2 Only invoke State Secrets privilege when necessary & in the narrowest way possible			N	
3.1.4 Protect civil liberties, privacy, & oversight			Y	
3.1.4.1 Vigorous oversight of national security activities by all three branches of government			Y	
3.1.4.2 Vigilant compliance with the rule of law			Y	
3.1.5 Uphold the rule of law, at home & around the globe			Y	Y
3.1.6 Draw strength from diversity			Y	
3.1.6.1 Draw a contrast with those who try to drive people apart				
3.1.6.2 Counter attempts to enlist individuals in ideological, religious, or ethnic extremism			Y	
3.2 Promote democracy & human rights abroad				Y
3.2.1 Ensure that new & fragile democracies deliver tangible improvements for their citizens				Y
3.2.1.1 Support democracy, human rights, & development together				Y
3.2.1.2 Strengthen key institutions of democratic accountability: free & fair electoral processes, strong legislatures, civilian control of militaries, honest police forces, independent & fair judiciaries, free & independent press, a vibrant private sector, & a robust civil society				Y
3.2.1.3 Harness bilateral & multilateral capabilities to help nascent democracies deliver services				Y
3.2.2 Practicing principled engagement with non-democratic regimes				Y
3.2.2.1 Improve government-to-government relations to advance human rights				Y
3.2.2.2 Engage civil society & peaceful political opposition				Y
3.2.2.3 When rebuffed, lead international community in using public & private diplomacy				Y
3.2.2.4 When rebuffed, draw on incentives & disincentives to change behavior				Y
3.2.3 Recognize the legitimacy of all peaceful democratic movements				N

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
3.2.3.1 Welcome all legitimately elected, peaceful governments, provided they govern with respect for the rights & dignity of all their people & consistent with their international obligations				N
3.2.4 Supporting the rights of women & girls				Y
3.2.4.1 Prevent violence against women & girls, especially in conflict zones				Y
3.2.4.2 Supporting women's equal access to justice & their participation in the political process				Y
3.2.4.3 Promoting child & maternal health				Y
3.2.4.4 Combating human trafficking, especially in women & girls				Y
3.2.4.5 Supporting education, impoyment, & micro-finance to empower women				Y
3.2.5 Strengthening international norms against corruption				Y
3.2.5.1 Promote recognition that pervasive corruption is a violation of basic human rights & a severe impediment to development & global security				Y
3.2.5.2 Bring greater transparency & accountability to government budgets, expenditures, & the assets of public officials				Y
3.2.5.3 Institutionalize transparent practices in international aid flows, international banking & tax policy, & private sector engagement around natural resources				Y
3.2.6 Building a broader coalition of actors to advance universal values				Y
3.2.6.1 Shape & strengthen existing institutions that are not delivering on their potential, like the UNHRC				Y
3.2.6.2 Strengthen human rights monitoring & enforcement mechanisms				Y
3.2.6.3 Actively support the leadership of emerging democracies to assume a more active role in advancing basic human rights & democratic values				Y
3.2.7 Marshaling new technologies & promoting the right to access information			Y	Y
3.2.7.1 Support the dissemination & use of technologies to facilitate freedom of expression, Expand access to information, increase governmental transparency & accountability				Y

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
3.2.7.2 Counter restrictions on their use				Y
3.2.7.3 Better utilize such technologies to effectively communicate our own messages to the world				Y
3.3 Promote dignity by meeting basic needs				Y
3.3.0.1 Work with others in pursuit of the eradication of extreme poverty				Y
3.3.1 Pursuing a comprehensive global health strategy				Y
3.3.1.1 Continue to invest in the fight against AIDS				Y
3.3.1.2 Strengthen health systems & invest in interventions to address areas where progress has lagged via the Global Health Initiative				Y
3.3.1.3 Pursue the goal of reducing the burden of malaria & tuberculosis				Y
3.3.1.4 Seeking the elimination of important neglected tropical diseases				Y
3.3.2 Promoting food security				Y
3.3.2.1 Advance a food security initiative that combats hunger & builds the capacity of countries to feed their people				Y
3.3.2.2 Focus on new methods & technologies for agricultural development				Y
3.3.2.3 Create the conditions where foreign assistance is no longer needed				Y
3.3.3 Leading efforts to address humanitarian crises				Y
3.3.3.1 Continue to respond to humanitarian crises				Y
3.3.3.2 Place a greater emphasis on fostering long-term recovery				Y
3.3.3.3 Prepare to exercise robust leadership to help meet human needs in the distant future				
<b>4. INTERNATIONAL ORDER</b>				
4.0.1 Strengthen bilateral & multilateral cooperation			Y	Y
4.0.2 Sustain outreach to foreign governments, political leaderships, & other critical constituencies				Y
4.0.3 Build upon our traditional alliances			Y	Y
4.0.4 Cultivate partnerships with new centers of influence				Y
4.1 Ensure strong alliances				Y
4.1.0.1 Constantly cultivate relations with our allies	Y			Y



<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.1.0.2 Maintain capacity to defend our allies against old & new threats	Y			Y
4.1.0.3 Closely consult with our allies as well as newly emerging partners to achieve common objectives				Y
4.1.0.4 Act based upon mutual respect & in a manner that continues to strengthen an international order that benefits all responsible international actors				Y
4.1.1 Strengthen security relationships	Y			Y
4.1.1.1 Ensure we can prevail against a wide range of potential adversaries while broadly shaping the strategic environment using all tools to advance common security	Y		Y	Y
4.1.1.2 Retain our ability to bring precise, sustained, & effective capabilities to bear against a wide range of military threats & decisively defeat the forces of hostile regional powers	Y		Y	Y
4.1.1.3 Work with our allies & partners to enhance the resilience of US forward posture & facilities against potential attacks	Y		Y	
4.1.1.4 Strengthen our regional deterrence postures to ensure no regional adversary gains advantage through acquisition of new, offensive military capabilities			Y	
4.1.2 European allies				
4.1.2.1 Engage with our allies bilaterally, & pursue close consultation on a broad range of security & economic issues				
4.1.2.2 Strengthen our collective ability to promote security, deter vital threats, and defend our people	Y			Y
4.1.2.3 Ensure that NATO is able to address the full range of 21st century challenges	Y			Y
4.1.2.4 Continue to anchor our commitment to Article V				Y
4.1.2.5 Partner with a stronger EU to advance our shared goals, especially promoting democracy & prosperity in Eastern European countries				Y
4.1.2.6 Remain dedicated to advancing stability & democracy in the Balkans & to resolving conflicts in the Caucasus & in Cyprus				Y
4.1.2.7 Engage with Turkey on a broad range of mutual goals, especially with regard to pursuit of stability in its region				Y

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.1.2.8 Strengthen existing European institutions so that they are more inclusive & more effective				Y
4.1.3 Asian allies				
4.1.3.1 Deepen & update Asian alliances to reflect the dynamism of the region & strategic trends of the 21st century				Y
4.1.3.2 Modernize security relationships with Japan & S. Korea to face evolving challenges, to reflect equal partnership with the US, & to ensure a sustainable foundation for US presence there	Y			Y
4.1.3.3 Develop a positive security agenda for the region focused on: regional security, combating proliferation of WMD, terrorism, climate change, piracy, epidemics, & cyber security while achieving balanced growth & human rights	y			Y
4.1.3.4 Offer a future of security & integration to all Asian nations				Y
4.1.3.5 Uphold & extend fundamental rights & dignity to all of its people				Y
4.1.4 North America				
4.1.4.1 Secure & expedite the lawful & legitimate flow of goods while interdicting transnational threats	Y			
4.1.4.2 With Mexico, work together to identify & interdict threats at the earliest opportunity		Y		
4.1.4.3 Establish stability & security to build a strong economic partnership, fight illicit drug & arms trade & promote sound immigration policy	y	Y		
4.2 Build cooperation with other 21st century centers of influence				Y
4.2.0.1 Expand spheres of cooperation around the world				Y
4.2.1 Asia				
4.2.1.1 Enhance ties to advance balanced & sustainable growth				
4.2.1.2 Double US exports				
4.2.1.3 Increase security cooperation on issues such as violent extremism & nuclear proliferation	Y			
4.2.1.4 Work to advance mutual interests through alliances	Y			
4.2.1.5 Deepen relationships with emerging powers				Y

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.2.1.6 Pursue a stronger role in the region's multilateral architecture including ASEAN, APEC, Trans-Pacific Partnership & the East Asia Summit	Y			Y
4.2.1.7.1 China: pursue a positive, constructive, & comprehensive relationship				Y
4.2.1.7.2 China: welcome a responsible leadership role working with the US & international community to advance priorities like economic recovery, climate change, & nonproliferation				Y
4.2.1.7.3 Monitor China's military modernization program & prepare accordingly to ensure US & allies interests are not negatively affected	Y			
4.2.1.7.4 Encourage China to make choices that contribute to peace, security, & prosperity as its influence rises				Y
4.2.1.7.5 Use the newly established Strategic & Economic Dialogue to address a broader range of issues & improve communication between our militaries to reduce mistrust				Y
4.2.1.7.6 Encourage reduced tension between the PRC & Taiwan				Y
4.2.1.7.7 Be candid on human rights concerns & areas of difference				Y
4.2.1.8.1 India: through Strategic Dialogue & high-level visits, seek a broad-based relationship in which India contributes to global counterterrorism efforts, nonproliferation & helps promote poverty-reduction, education, health, & sustainable agriculture	Y			Y
4.2.1.8.2 Welcome India's growing leadership on a wide array of global issues through groups such as the G-20				Y
4.2.1.8.3 Work with India to promote stability in South Asia & elsewhere in the world	Y			Y
4.2.2 Russia				
4.2.2.1 Build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests				
4.2.2.2 Work to advance nonproliferation by reducing arsenals & cooperating to ensure other countries meet their international commitments	Y			
4.2.2.3 Seek greater partnership in confronting violent extremism, especially in Afghanistan	Y			

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.2.2.4 Seek new trade & investment arrangements to increase prosperity of our peoples				
4.2.2.5 Support efforts within Russia to promote the rule of law, accountable government, & universal values				
4.2.2.6 Seeking Russia's cooperation to act as a responsible partner in Europe & Asia while supporting the sovereignty & territorial integrity of Russia's neighbors				
4.2.3 Emerging centers of influence				Y
4.2.3.0.1 Deepen partnerships with emerging powers & encouraging them to play a greater role in strengthening international norms & advancing shared interests				Y
4.2.3.1 The Americas				
4.2.3.1.1 In the Americas, work in equal partnership to advance economic & social inclusion				
4.2.3.1.2 Safeguard citizen safety & security				
4.2.3.1.3 Promote clean energy				Y
4.2.3.1.4 Defend universal values of the people of the hemisphere				
4.2.3.2 Brazil				
4.2.3.2.1 Welcome Brazil's leadership	Y			
4.2.3.2.2 Pursue progress on bilateral, hemispheric, & global issues				
4.2.3.2.3 Encourage Brazilian efforts against illicit transnational networks	Y			
4.2.3.2.4 Partner in confronting global climate change & promoting energy security				
4.2.3.2.5 Work to ensure the economic development & prosperity is broadly shared in the context of the G-20 & the Doha round				
4.2.3.3 Middle East				
4.2.3.3.1 Support Israel's lasting integration into the region				
4.2.3.3.2 Develop our key security relationships in the region with Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia & other GCC countries to enable more effective militaries & defense systems	Y			
4.2.3.3.3 Press governments in the region to undertake political reforms, & to loosen restrictions on speech, assembly & media				

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.2.3.3.4 Maintain strong support for civil society groups & those who stand up for universal rights				
4.2.3.3.5 Foster partnerships in areas like education, economic growth, science, & health to expand opportunity				
4.2.3.3.6 Multilaterally, seek to advance shared security interests, such as NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with the GCC				
4.2.3.3.7 Multilaterally seek to advance common interests in promoting governance & institutional reform through participating in the Forum for the Future & other dialogues				
4.2.3.4 Africa				
4.2.3.4.1 Continue to embrace effective partnerships	Y			
4.2.3.4.2 Refocus on strategic interventions that can promote job creation & economic growth				
4.2.3.4.3 Combat corruption while strengthening good governance & accountability				
4.2.3.4.4 Responsibly improve the capacity of African security & rule of law sectors	Y			
4.2.3.4.5 Work through diplomatic dialogue to mitigate local & regional tensions before they become crises				
4.2.3.4.6 Reinforce sustainable stability in key states like Nigeria & Kenya that are essential sub regional linchpins				
4.2.3.4.7 Work to remain an attractive & influential partner by ensuring African priorities (infrastructure, reliable access to power, & increased trade & investment) remain high on the US agenda				
4.2.3.4.8 Work to pursue shared interests in Africa's security, growth, & the development of Africa's human capital				
4.3 Strengthen institutions & mechanisms for cooperation				Y
4.3.0.1 Lead global efforts to modernize the infrastructure for international cooperation in the 21st century				Y
4.3.0.2 Pursue modes of cooperation that reflect evolving distributions of power & responsibility				Y
4.3.0.3 Assist existing institutions to perform effectively				Y

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.3.0.4 When those institutions come up short, seek meaningful changes & develop alternative mechanisms				Y
4.3.1 Enhance cooperation with & strengthen the UN				
4.3.1.1 Intensify efforts to ensure timely, robust, & credible Council action to address threats to peace & security				
4.3.1.2 Favor Security Council reform that enhances the UN's overall performance, credibility, & legitimacy				
4.3.1.3 Support reforms that promote effective & efficient leadership & management of the UN's international civil service				
4.3.1.4 Continue working with UN personnel & member states to strengthen the UN's leadership & operational capacity in peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, post-disaster recovery, development assistance, & the promotion of human rights				
4.3.1.5 Support new UN frameworks & capacities for combating transnational threats like proliferations of WMD, infectious disease, drug-trafficking, & counterterrorism				
4.3.2 Pursue decisions through a wide range of frameworks & coalitions				Y
4.3.2.1 Spur & harness a new diversity of instruments, alliances, & institutions in which a division of labor emerges on the basis of effectiveness, competency, & long-term reliability				
4.3.2.2 Forge new agreement on common global challenges among the world's leading & emerging powers				
4.3.2.3 Pursue G-8 initiatives with proven & long-standing partners				
4.3.2.4 Focus on economic coordination with the G-20				
4.3.2.5 Renew US leadership in the multilateral development banks & the IMF				Y
4.3.2.6 Leverage US investments & engagements those organizations to strengthen the global economy, lift people from poverty, advance food security, address climate & pandemics, & secure fragile states like Afghanistan & Haiti				Y
4.3.3 Invest in regional capabilities				

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.3.3.1 Encourage continued innovation & development of enhanced regional capabilities				Y
4.3.3.2 Use training & related programs to strengthen regional capacities for peacekeeping & conflict management				Y
4.3.3.3 Encourage a more comprehensive approach to regional security that brings balanced focus to issues such as food security, global health, & education				Y
4.3.3.4 Access to more affordable & greener forms of energy				Y
4.3.3.5 Access to fair & efficient justice				Y
4.3.3.6 Concerted effort to promote transparency at all levels & to fight the corrosive effect of corruption				Y
4.4 Sustain broad cooperation on key global challenges				Y
4.4.1 Climate change				Y
4.4.1.1 Confront climate change based upon clear guidance from the science, & in cooperation with all nations				Y
4.4.1.2.1 Home: stimulate our energy economy				
4.4.1.2.2 Enable deep cuts in emissions-in the range of 17 percent by 2020 & more than 80 percent by 2050				
4.4.1.2.2 Reinventoriate the US domestic nuclear industry				
4.4.1.2.3 Increase US energy standards				
4.4.1.2.4 Invest in renewable energy				
4.4.1.2.5 Provide incentives that make clean energy the profitable energy				
4.4.1.3.1 Abroad: Build on efforts in Asia, the Americas, & Africa to forge new clean energy partnerships				Y
4.4.1.3.2 Globally, seek to implement & build on the Copenhagen Accord				Y
4.4.1.3.3 Ensure a response to climate change that draws upon decisive action by all nations				
4.4.1.3.4 Achieve an effective, international effort in which all major economies commit to ambitious national action to reduce their emissions, nations meet their commitments in a transparent manner, & mitigate its impacts, conserve forests, & invest in clean energy technologies				



<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.4.1.3.5 Insist that any approach draws upon each nation taking responsibility for its own actions				
4.4.2 Peacekeeping & armed conflict				
4.4.2.0.1 Place renewed emphasis on deterrence & prevention by mobilizing diplomatic action	Y			Y
4.4.2.0.2 Use development & security sector assistance to build the capacity of at-risk nations & reduce the appeal of violent extremism	Y			Y
4.4.2.0.3 Work with international partners to ensure they are ready, able, & willing to respond to threats & keep the peace	Y			Y
4.4.2.0.4 Build support in other countries to contribute to sustaining global peace & stability operations, through UN peacekeeping & regional organizations	Y			Y
4.4.2.0.5 Continue to broaden the pool of troop & police contributors, working to ensure that they are properly trained & equipped, their mandates are matched to means, & that their missions are backed by the political action necessary to build & sustain peace				Y
4.4.2.1 In Sudan, remain committed to implement outstanding elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement & ensure the referendum on the future of Southern Sudan happens on time & that its results are respected				
4.4.2.2 Continue to work to secure peace, dignity, & accountability in Darfur				
4.4.3.1 Prevent Genocide & Mass Atrocities: strengthen our capacities to ensure the US & international community are proactively engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities & genocide				
4.4.3.2 ": work unilaterally & bilaterally to mobilize diplomatic, humanitarian, financial, & - in certain instances- military means to prevent & respond to genocide & mass atrocities				
4.4.4.1 International justice: work to strengthen national justice systems				Y
4.4.4.2 Maintain support for ad hoc international tribunals & hybrid courts				
4.4.4.3 Continue to support institutions & prosecutions that intentionally target innocent civilians				

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.4.4.4 Support the ICC's prosecution of those cases that advance the US's interests & values, consistent with the requirements of US law				
4.4.5 Pandemics & infectious disease	Y			Y
4.4.5.1 Improve US public health & medical capabilities on the front lines				
4.4.5.1.1 Including domestic & international surveillance			Y	
4.4.5.1.2 " situational awareness			Y	
4.4.5.1.3 " rapid & reliable development of medical countermeasures to respond to public health threats				
4.4.5.1.4 " preparedness education & training	Y			
4.4.5.1.5 " surge capacity of the domestic health care system to respond to an influx of patients due to disaster or emergency				
4.4.5.2.1 Enhance international collaboration & strengthening multilateral institutions to improve global surveillance & early warning capabilities & quickly enact control & containment measures	Y			Y
4.4.5.2.2 Improve our understanding of emerging diseases				
4.4.5.2.3 Help develop environments that are less conducive to epidemic emergence				
4.4.5.2.4 Continue to work to overcome the lack of openness & general reluctance to share health information due to overseas interconnectivity				Y
4.4.5.2.5 Mitigate other problem areas including limited global vaccine production capacity, & the threat of emergent & reemergent disease in poorly governed states				Y
4.4.6 Transnational criminal threats & threats to governance: devise & execute a collective strategy with other nations that will:				Y
4.4.6.1 Safeguard citizens		Y		Y
4.4.6.2 Break the financial strength of criminal & terrorist networks		Y	Y	
4.4.6.3 Disrupt illicit trafficking networks	Y	Y	Y	
4.4.6.4 Defeat transnational criminal organizations		Y	Y	Y
4.4.6.5 Fight government corruption, strengthen the rule of law, bolster judicial systems & improve transparency		Y		Y
4.4.7 Safeguarding the global commons: work in concert with allies & partners to optimize the use of shared sea, air, & space domains	Y	Y	Y	

<b>Objectives (cont.)</b>	<b>Dept of Defense</b>	<b>Dept of Homeland Security</b>	<b>Intelligence Community</b>	<b>Dept of State/US AID</b>
4.4.7.1 Continue to help safeguard access, promote security, & ensure the sustainable use of resources in these domains	Y	Y	Y	
4.4.7.2 Enhance domain awareness & monitoring		Y	Y	
4.4.7.3 Strengthen international norms & standards	Y	Y		Y
4.4.7.4 Work together to ensure constant flow of commerce	Y	Y	Y	Y
4.4.7.5 Facilitate safe & secure air travel		Y		
4.4.7.6 Prevent disruptions to critical communications	Y	Y	Y	
4.4.7.7 Safeguard the sea, air, & space domains from those who would deny access or use them for hostile purposes	Y		Y	
4.4.7.7.1 Keep strategic straights & vital sea lanes open	Y		Y	
4.4.7.7.2 Improve the early detection of emerging maritime threats		Y	Y	
4.4.7.7.3 Deny adversaries hostile use of the air domain	Y			
4.4.7.7.4 Ensure responsible use of space	Y		Y	
4.4.7.7.5 Pursue ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea				Y
4.4.7.8 Cyberspace: many of the above goals equally apply to cyberspace		Y	Y	Y
4.4.7.8.1 Push for the recognition of norms of behavior in cyberspace	Y	Y		Y
4.4.7.8.2 Work with global partners to ensure protection of the free flow of information & our continued access	Y	Y	Y	Y
4.4.7.8.3 At all times, continue to defend our digital networks from intrusion & harmful disruption	Y	Y	Y	Y
4.4.8 Arctic interests	Y			
4.4.8.1 Seek to meet our national security needs	Y			
4.4.8.2 Protect the environment				
4.4.8.3 Responsibly manage resources				
4.4.8.4 Account for indigenous communities				
4.4.8.5 Support scientific research				
4.4.8.6 Strengthen international cooperation on a wide range of issues	Y			

Y =NSS relevant task explicitly or implicitly acknowledged in agency strategy

N = NSS relevant task NOT explicitly or implicitly acknowledged in agency strategy

Blank = not within scope of the agency's mission