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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
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EL RÍO DE GENTE: U.S. MILITARY ROLE IN JOINT, INTERAGENCY,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL, AND MULTI-NATIONAL (JIIM) OPERATIONS TO
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

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Abstract

This research merges complex issues and concepts and offers several recommendations for integrating the U.S. military into solutions to address the challenges to national security posed by illegal immigration. The complex issue of immigration, and migration more generally consumes volumes of literature and is represented using a push-pull model, which describes migration as a function of positive and negative factors at the point of departure and the point of destination. Positive factors pull people to a location. Negative factors push people to emigrate. Obstacles exist between the points of origin and destination. Distance is the omnipresent obstacle. The broad overview of global migration was covered as background to develop the idea that migration through Central America is a leading U.S. national security issue. As a national security issue, there is a military component naturally associated with immigration. The U.S. military alone is not the solution to difficult global security issues including immigration. Consistent with U.S. national strategy represented in the CCJO 2020 makes it clear that early engagement is imperative to successful partnerships, interagency cooperation, and multi-national operations. Overall, building partnership capacity through increased joint operations and cooperation with partner nations is a necessity from an economic perspective as well as politically and logistically. The U.S. and U.S. military cannot maintain global security alone. Similarly, the migration facet as a threat to global and national security is also best managed through cooperation and partnerships.

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I. Introduction

A. Background

Migrations involve the movement of people over distance from a point of origin to a destination. Migrations generally persevere over established routes. Terminology describing migrations often relates them to rivers and currents. Blocking regular migration routes often results in migrants establishing new routes to their destination, just as a river flows around obstacles to create new paths. Extensive literature expounds on immigration issues affecting the world and the United States. The literature also addresses causes and effects of immigration as well as associated interagency operations and coordination.

The problem is that there is relatively little literature detailing the U.S. military's role, or potential role, within the interagency spectrum of operations as it pertains to illegal immigration management. While this project will focus predominantly on Central America, it is important to first understand the military's role as a national power, planned phased operations, Security Force Assistance (SFA), Building Partnership Capacity (BPC), and the larger global immigration issues as background. A migration framework will help structure the problem.

The global migration issue is enormous and includes thousands of examples from the beginning of recorded history, but current events are flush with migration issues between Africa and the European Union as well as throughout the Middle East. Immigration from Central America into the U.S. provides a topic for heated debate within the U.S. political arena. Illegal immigration poses a serious national security threat that

needs to be managed at the source rather than the destination. The military can play an important role in stemming the flow of immigrants by assisting and advising in Central American countries to improve government stability, legitimacy, and reduce Trans-national Criminal Organization (TCO) activity.

The U.S. is a country of immigrants. Whether by force or by favor, immigrants compelled to leave their homeland find opportunities in the U.S. largely unavailable in any other country. However, a new life in the U.S. is not necessarily easy if immigrants have little or nothing to begin with and nobody asked them to come. In most cases, Americans are not particularly excited about the influx of illegal immigrants, and cost U.S. tax-payers an estimated \$100 billion per year in public schools, medical care, incarceration costs, and other government services. Most immigrants find the language, food, customs and social norms another challenge to conquer and more than half of the illegal immigrants work for cash under the table. Unlike most countries, immigrants become “American” by assimilation.

The TCO networks are associated with a laundry list of criminal activity such as trafficking drugs and people, identity theft, fraud, gang violence, and black-markets to name a few. Many of the people smuggled through these networks originate in Central America. Similarly, the drugs transported through these networks originate in Latin America. Illegal immigration and associated crime constitute a national security threat to the U.S. Efforts to alleviate the flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. must focus on the points of origin and systemic causes of emigration. This will also serve to reduce the stress on border enforcement. Increased funding to support military involvement in JIIM

can be offset through cost savings realized by reduced costs associated with illegal immigrants.

1. Global issue of displaced people and immigration

There are 60 million refugees in the world including a 44% increase of asylum claims from Central America to the U.S.¹ Globally, this means 42,500 families are displaced every day. The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Martin Dempsey's concern is twofold:² First, it is a humanitarian disaster. Suleiman Al-Khalidi describes humanitarian disaster as a condition of failed human services, loss of drinking water, chronic malnutrition, and the general failure of people's ability to cope, predominantly associated with prolonged violence.³ It encourages those affected to turn to violent extremist groups, or groups ideologically motivated to achieve political ends through violent means.⁴ "When family units break down, then education breaks down. This creates not just a near-term problem but also a generational problem."⁵ Second, violent extremism is on the rise, and when combined with humanitarian refugee crisis, it is a decades long problem requiring long-term solutions.

¹ United Nations, *Worldwide Displacement Hits All-time High as War and Persecution Increase*, UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, June 18, 2015, <http://www.unhcr.org/print/558193896.html> (Accessed September 23, 2015).

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Dempsey Worried About Refugee, Immigration Crisis in Europe*, by Jim Garamone, DoD, August 18, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/613982/dempsey-worried-about-refugee-immigration-crisis-in-europe> (Accessed September 23, 2015).

³ Al-Khalidi, Suleiman, "Iraq's Humanitarian Crisis Worsens: U.N. Official," *Reuters - World*. April 7, 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/04/07/us-iraq-hardships-un-idUSL0640244020080407#aEVDpkDJpykLA4ut.97> (Accessed November 18, 2015).

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Countering Violent Extremism*. October 14, 2015, <http://www.dhs.gov/topic/countering-violent-extremism> (Accessed November 19, 2015).

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Dempsey Worried About Refugee, Immigration Crisis in Europe*, by Jim Garamone, DoD, August 18, 2015, <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/613982/dempsey-worried-about-refugee-immigration-crisis-in-europe> (Accessed September 23, 2015).

The scope and magnitude of displaced people and human migration is massive. A quick look at current events reveals a plethora of articles and stories on migration issues around the world. For example, *Foreign Policy* discusses migration issues in areas such as Germany, Afghanistan, Hungary, Europe, Haiti, Mexico, Cuba, Sweden, the Mediterranean, South Africa, Iraq, Russia, Australia, China, Southeast Asia, Belgium, the Sinai, France, Croatia, and the U.S., to name a few.⁶ A similar search on *CNN* offers more than 1400 stories on migration around Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Central America, and the U.S.⁷ Human migration is occurring on such a large scale that it is rarely discussed as a singular issue, but rather locally or regionally isolated, much like this thesis intends to focus on illegal immigration from Central America to the U.S.

2. Central and Latin America

Regionally, Central and Latin America influence U.S. immigration, which remains an important political issue. Recently, illegal immigration was discussed as a national security issue. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) increasingly link terrorist organizations with TCO networks that use the U.S.-Mexico border.⁸ TCOs are in business to make money; smuggling people and drugs are their primary profit commodities.⁹ CBP moved from a resource-based strategy to a risk-based strategy in 2012 in an effort to better tackle TCO.¹⁰ CBP included

⁶ "Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, <http://foreignpolicy.com/?s=migration> (Accessed November 28, 2015).

⁷ Cable Network News, "CNN," *CNN*, <http://www.cnn.com/search/?text=migration> (Accessed November 23, 2015).

⁸ Robert D. Schroeder, "Measuring Security: Risk Indicators Along the U.S. Border," *Holding the Line in the 21st Century* (November 25, 2014): 29-42.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

counter-network concepts similar to those touted by retired Army General Stanley McChrystal into the agency's new strategy to counter TCOs.

3. Military Integration into the Immigration Interagency Network

General McChrystal's concept of networks to counter networks helps improve military and interagency cooperation and integration. The counter-network concept is based in relationships and information sharing, especially between agencies. General McChrystal was determined to change the military paradigm about information sharing from who needs to know to who does not know, but needs to. General McChrystal contended that information was only valuable when it is given to people with the ability to do something with it. Geographic Combat Commands such as U.S. Southern Command work closely within interagency theaters of responsibility to facilitate appropriate multi-national and intergovernmental responses to current and emergent security challenges associated with emigration. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM) operations are critical to successful phase IV operations yet difficult to coordinate.¹¹ The Department of Defense (DoD), National Guard, and CBP combined in 2006 to conduct Operation Jumpstart. This marked the largest scale coordination of active and Guard troops along the U.S-Mexico border in U.S. history. This is an excellent example of interagency cooperation and networking that benefitted

¹¹ Alexander L. Carter, "Improving Joint Interagency Coordination: Changing Mindsets," *Joint Force Quarterly* No. 79 (2015): 19-26.

both participating agencies by advancing situational awareness, techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) for future operations.¹²

Getting the military involved with JIIM operations at the source of immigration issues is likely to pay huge dividends, just as in the old adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Employing the military in JIIM operations to help abate the systemic causes of emigration will alleviate some of the pressure caused by illegal immigration to the U.S while simultaneously improving the governance, economy, and social environment at the points of origin.

4. Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economics - (DIME)

The acronym DIME covers four major elements of national power. These elements are diplomacy, information, military, and economics. Also common is the acronym DIME(FIL) adding finance, intelligence, and law enforcement. DIME recently resurged as a common term in the military and political arenas as financial resources diminished. The use of the military almost exclusively over and above the other elements of national power forced the DoD to the increased use of the term DIME as a reminder that the U.S. has other non-military options with which to affect its nation's business as a "whole-of-government" approach to national security.¹³

The Department of State retains the responsibility for diplomacy. However, as a function of funding and manpower capacity, the DoS was simply not prepared for nation

¹² Robert D. Schroeder, "Measuring Security: Risk Indicators Along the U.S. Border," *Holding the Line in the 21st Century* (November 25, 2014): 29-42.

¹³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Putting the "D" and "I" Back in DIME*, by Brett Shehadey, (October 27, 2013), <http://inohomelandsecurity.com/putting-the-d-and-i-back-in-dime/> (Accessed December 22, 2015).

building and stability operations required in places like Afghanistan or Iraq.¹⁴ Building partnership capacity requires understanding, power, and influence.¹⁵ The U.S. military role in BPC greatly enhances the diplomatic efforts of the DoS through power and influence. In countries like El Salvador, the U.S. supported a fledging democratic government in the 1990s, but withdrew necessary train, advise, and assist efforts too early. The Salvadorian government and supporting agencies quickly succumbed to corruption, crime, violent, and economic inequality. Just recently, the U.S again made significant gains in politically engaging El Salvador. The 2011 Plan For Growth (PFG) provides economic assistance, training in many disciplines, and military support for counter-narcotics and law enforcement. The PFG incorporates a good balance of national power and JIIM operations. Progress has been made and prospects are promising, but nation building is a long-term effort, PFG is relatively new, and El Salvador has a long way to go.

The national power concept works both ways. DIME represents U.S. national powers to influence other nations, but also describes those powers possessed by other nations to keep themselves strong. In Central America, drugs represent the driving economic factor despite the illegality. Cocaine is the economic engine in Colombia. Plan Colombia is a cooperative engagement between the U.S. and Colombia over the past 15-years. Great efforts have been made to legitimize the Colombian central government. This was primarily accomplished through diplomacy and military bilateral cooperation allowing the Colombian government to operate openly within the rule of law, provide

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Harry R. Yarger, "Building Partner Capacity," *JSOU: Joint Special Operations University* Vol. 15, No. 1 (2015): 1-125.

civilian leadership to a capable military and separately distinct law enforcement agency. However, without external money supporting small businesses and trade, the economy quickly resorts to the commodity, which provides the greatest financial input into the system. The “Economy” must be a long-term and integrated part of a strong nation and stable legitimate government. U.S. foreign aid can alleviate much of the pressure from TCOs when properly incorporated with JIIM operations that include the military, law enforcement, and other SFA and BPC capabilities.

The U.S. political machine bogged down during 15 years of Plan Colombia. The cocaine-growing problem culminated in too much “Military” and “Law Enforcement” and a reduction in “Diplomacy” despite billions of U.S. dollars invested in Colombia. In hindsight DIMEFIL lacked a U.S. strategic process at the highest levels.¹⁶ The imbalance of national powers use in Colombia produced mixed results. There must be a long-term balance of national power not just in Colombia, but also in other Central American nations to help reduce TCOs and the exploitation of the indigenous population by corrupt governments. Predominantly non-kinetic and advisory operations such as Plan Colombia, there was some significant de-forestation, allowed the Colombian government to resist the power and influence of the drug cartels and over time establish legitimacy with the citizens and provide law enforcement under the rule of law within the population centers of the country.

When diplomacy is used as a national resource, it plays a backseat role to “Military”, “Intelligence”, “Economy” or “Finance.” Too often these elements of national

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, *Putting the “D” and “I” Back in DIME*, by Brett Shehadey, (October 27, 2013), <http://inohomelandsecurity.com/putting-the-d-and-i-back-in-dime/> (Accessed December 22, 2015).

power substitute for the necessary “Diplomacy”. Plan Colombia had a strong military aspect early, but later the DoD provided a supporting role as trainers and advisors to the greater diplomatic effort. The DoD has more funding, manpower, and equipment readily available to deal with a broad spectrum of events and issues than other U.S. government agencies. As a function of capacity, the military naturally gets pushed to the front of many diplomatic issues.

The DoD has greater access to transportation and other logistic capacity. U.S. military capabilities and capacity are demonstrated during global humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) efforts such as the earthquake in Haiti or tsunamis in Indonesia and Japan. Since 2001, the entire U.S. special operations forces (SOF) has nearly doubled in size from about 33,000 to about 66,000 personnel. This includes an increased capacity in such specialties as civil affairs. These Special Operations Forces (SOF) are crucial to a wide variety of stability operations and bridging the gap between civilians in countries such as Colombia and El Salvador as U.S. SOF provide much of the advise, train, and assist expertise needed to support a weak government long enough to gain legitimacy as well as help corrupt governments shift towards operating under a rule of law. In conjunction with the volume of manpower, the military also has a well-organized and functional hierarchical structure. This lends well to managing a diverse portfolio of issues and multiple events simultaneously. The military can engage in large numbers or employ in adaptive force packages as desired to best manage problems.

The DoD also is well funded compared to other government agencies. The DoD accounts for more than 50% of the discretionary budget, dwarfing OGA funding. Compared to OGA, the military is relatively well-suited to fund deployment and

sustainment of personnel. In addition to military finances, the government is backed by a strong economy and relative wealth. As such, the U.S. uses the “economy” element of national power to develop incentive programs and grants directing financial resources to target specific problems. While some diplomacy is required to coordinate this, the U.S. military is often the face associated with such funds. In the long-term, putting associating programmatic and financial assistance should be associated with the U.S. in general rather than the military specifically. This might require a transition period of close interagency operations where aid and support is delivered by U.S. military personnel not in uniform and also in coordination with DoS. Ideally, the use of “Diplomacy” should increase and be the predominant national power used to help manage issues associated with migration. There should be a good distribution of national powers to support U.S. national interests associated with migration. The phased operations of the military are key to how the military plans and integrates forces.

5. Phased Operations

Notional operation plan phases versus levels of military effort are established in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations.¹⁷ The basic concept of plan phases is that it is easier and costs less in lives and dollars to operate in phase-0 and phase-I. This re-iterates the idea that prevention is better than cure and the military has an important role in the reducing systemic causes of emigration from our partner nations.

¹⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations," Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), March 22, 2010.

Phase-0 operations include shaping missions, tasks and actions. Shape operations are designed to discourage adversaries and assure allies. JIIM activities occur regularly throughout Phase-0 operations. Overall, phase-0 activities shape “perceptions and influenc[e] adversaries’ and allies’ behavior; develop[e] allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; improve[e] information exchange and intelligence sharing; provid[e] US forces with peacetime and contingency access; and mitigate[e] conditions that could lead to a crisis.”¹⁸ Military roles in Phase-0 operations typically include security cooperation and building partnership capacity activities. Ideally, this is where the military wants to operate within the JIIM and agreements like PFG and Plan Colombia.

Phase-I operations incorporate deterrence activities designed to discourage adversaries from engaging in unfavorable activities. Phase-I favors security related activities that protect allies and demonstrate the intent to escalate force if necessary. This includes SFA and flexible deterrent options. Phase-I operations include “mobilization, tailoring of forces, and other pre-deployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of ISR assets; and development of mission-tailored command and control (C2), intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS.”¹⁹

Beyond phase-I operations, the military is the lead agency and seeks to seize the initiative and break the enemy’s will. In non-combat situations, the focus is on environmental domination. “In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

operations...setting the conditions for decisive operations.”²⁰ The objective is to keep these activities as effective and short as possible. Then, advance to phase-IV quickly. Phase-V operations mark the transition to legitimate civil authority, control, and governance. Ending wars is often difficult because there is a profit to be made through the economy of war, and the general fight for control of resources, power, and real estate.²¹ The goal is to return to phase-0 JIIM operations as it is estimated to cost 60 times more to fight a war than it is to prevent one.

B. Integrating the Force

1. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national (JIIM)

This study will focus on collaboration between other nations, militaries, and U.S interagency efforts to examine the feasibility of using JIIM to help control the causes of emigration from Central American countries into the U.S. Other important considerations affecting interagency operations include state of nations, causes of emigration and current U.S. doctrine and approaches for addressing migration issues. This thesis will use the literature to identify potential positive changes associated with Government Interagency Operations (GIO) and JIIM as a function of Joint Force employment.

2. Scope and Limitations

a. Scope

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Feargal Cochrane, “Resistance to Peace,” In *War and Conflict in the Modern World: Ending Wars*, 1-228. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008.

The scope of this research is to study the processes of immigration and the potential of U.S. military integration with GIO and JIIM. With limited literature espousing U.S. military interoperability with other agencies, this research suggests a need for further and more comprehensive studies. By examining illegal immigration and the potential for U.S. military cooperation with GIO and JIIM, this study analyzes opportunities to engage in a critical global issue. While the lessons expressed in this report are germane to the global issues of migration, the primary focus of this study is on illegal immigration to the U.S. from Central America and how the military can help reduce migration from the source through JIIM.

b. Limitations

The limitations of this research are: (1) the study is focused on Central America. Immigration issues are increasingly more serious across the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Asia as well, which adversely affect U.S. allies, interests, and national security. The enormity and complexity of global migration issues forces this paper to focus on a particular aspect of the larger problem. (2) “Standardization in the interest of interoperability could lead to homogeneity throughout the force, which threatens the very idea of jointness as the complementary employment of diverse Service capabilities.”²² The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO 2020) and some recommendations in this paper support the JIIM concept, which may through standardization threaten Service diversity. (3) The applicable timeline is long-term. Despite current trends and efforts, the long-term process of training, educating, and changing the culture of the U.S. military and other JIIM partners is optimistically a

²² Ibid.

decade hence. The pace at which technology and cultures change likely means current plans must change similarly to remain germane. Much as the military focused on Irregular Warfare in 2006, less than a decade later the focus is Globally Integrated Operations.

C. Framework: Push-Friction-Pull Model

Everett S. Lee describes a human migration model. This simple model uses three distinct sections to describe factors that influence migration. These factors either ‘push’ populations away from, or ‘pull’ people toward an area. Every place has factors that define it and act as agents, which either entice people to remain locally, attract people to the area, or compel people to leave. These factors are not precisely understood by social scientists or the people directly influenced. Migration results in positive and negative influences on both ends of the route. Finally, between any origin and destination, there is distance and any number of obstacles.

Ravenstein’s law indicates that most people migrate a relatively short distance, in that there is an inverse relationship between the number of migrants and the distance of migration.²³ Ravenstein’s other contributions to the push-pull migration model include: economics as the primary factor influencing migration, rural living increases the likelihood of migration, migrants travelling long distances tend to migrate to large cities, most migrants are adults, the processes of dispersion and absorption affect migration,

²³ Ernst G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* Vol. 48, No. 2 (1885): 167-235, https://cla.umn.edu/sites/cla.umn.edu/files/the_laws_of_migration.pdf (Accessed December 1, 2015).

females comprise the majority of intra-country migrants while males comprise the majority of inter-country migrants.²⁴

1. Push

The first section of the push-pull model describes factors at the point of origin. These factors influence a person's decision to remain or emigrate. Factors affect individuals differently. A positive factor for one person is a neutral or negative factor for another.²⁵ For example, a good school system is a positive factor for a family with children. However, this same factor is a negative factor for a homeowner with no children excessively burdened by the high property taxes. The issue is neutral to a renter without children. Positive factors entice a person to stay. Neutral factors exist, but do not influence a person's decision to emigrate. Negative factors encourage a person to emigrate, or 'push' that person out of their locale. Too often, 'push' factors involve some personal risk.²⁶

Some major 'push' factors encompass four distinct categories: economics, environment, socio-politics, and culture. More specifically, some 'push' factors include: religion, discriminating culture, political intolerance, job opportunities, crime, natural disasters, persecution, and environmental concerns such as drought, flooding, or contamination.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Lee, Everett S, "A Theory of Migration," *Demography* 3, no. 1 (1966): 47-57, Accessed November 1, 2015, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2060063>.

²⁶ Ibid.

While the Todaro Migration model focuses on migration between rural and urban regions, the migration concepts apply more broadly and support Ravenstein's insistence that economic factors are the most influential push-pull migration factors.²⁷ The costs versus benefits associated with leaving one's residence and starting over in a new location require careful consideration. This is largely an independent analysis as each individual case is unique and people are affected differently by various factors.

2. Pull

Similarly, the second section of the push-pull model associates factors at the point of destination. Positive factors 'pull' immigrants into the area. Neutral factors exist, but do not influence a person's decision to immigrate into an area. Negative factors discourage immigration.

The 'pull' factors generally fall into the same four broad categories as 'push' factors: economics, environment, socio-politics, and culture. Some 'pull' factors are similar to 'push' factors, but work to entice migrants into an area rather than repel them from their current local. Again, Todaro insists that economic factors are the most influential 'pull' factors.²⁸ Some 'pull' factors include: economy, job opportunities, environment, religion, culture, and low crime rate. Job opportunities and the opportunity for a much-improved lifestyle pulls many migrants from Latin American into the United States. Additionally, with the large and growing Latino population in the U.S., there are

²⁷ John R. Harris, and Michael P. Todaro, "Migration, Unemployment & Development: A Two-Sector Analysis," *American Economic Review* Vol. 60, No. 1 (1970): 129-42, <https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/top20/60.1.126-142.pdf> (Accessed December 1, 2015).

²⁸ Ibid.

areas in the U.S. culturally accommodating to immigrants from Latin America. In these areas, immigrants can find support linguistically and culturally through immigrant networks. Beyond economic pulls, many who immigrate to the U.S. from Latin and Central America do so to escape violent crime in their place of origin.

3. Intervening Obstacles/Opportunities

The third section of the push-pull model encompasses intervening obstacles and opportunities a migrant encounters and must overcome between the point of origin and the destination. Distance is the omnipresent obstacle in all migrations. Obvious in conjunction with distance are many physical obstacles such as rivers, mountains, fences, deserts, and other assorted natural and man-made barriers. Some obstacles occur as opportunities along the way. Migrants sometimes find it easier and fruitful to make due in places along the way between their original point of departure and intended destination. Many migrants from Guatemala and Honduras find opportunities in Mexico and never make it to the U.S. In fact, Mexico has become a net immigrant country. Cost of travel and logistics prevents many from reaching their desired destination. This is especially true for those who pay to be smuggled into a country. Smugglers are profit driven and generally demonstrate little concern for the safety and well being of those being smuggled. Smugglers do not provide money-back guarantees when plans need to change, or routes need to be altered. Politics in the form of immigration policies create or reduce immigration obstacles. Technology, border patrol, and law enforcement provide more examples of migration obstacles. This list is illustrative, but not exhaustive.

While the push-pull model over simplifies the complex issue of migration, it provides valuable context for addressing a variety of immigration issues. When viewed with elements of national power (DIME) and phased plan operations, the push-pull model works well since the focus is not on the model per se, but rather on ways of incorporating the U.S. military into Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multi-national operations pertaining to migration issues. JIIM cooperation fundamentally frames partnership building capacity, security assistance operations, and serves as the backbone to Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020²⁹.

D. Consequence: Why Does It Matter?

1. Capstone concept for joint operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO 2020)

The CCJO 2020 discusses new concepts of GIO as the future format for Joint Operations and as part of JIIM operations. The projected austere military fiscal environment drives this concept. The CCJO 2020 answers the question “how will future Joint Forces with constrained resources protect U.S. national interests against increasingly capable enemies in an uncertain, complex, rapidly changing, and increasingly transparent world?”³⁰

CCJO 2020 relies on the integration of emerging technologies and shared capabilities across the U.S. military, U.S. agencies, non-governmental organizations, and allied forces. A shared approach to combating threats with technology and partnerships is designed to achieve improved efficiencies and effectiveness through several fundamental

²⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept of Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, Joint Electronic Library. September 10, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/ccjo_jointforce2020.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2015).

³⁰ Ibid.

elements. First, mission command is the decentralization of the decision making chain empowering junior a commander to execute the senior commander's intent in the field. Developing leaders capable of understanding "the environment, visualize operational solutions, and provide decisive direction will be essential to"³¹ successful mission command. Additionally, global agility supporting JIIM is best achieved through globally integrated Joint Forces. Partnerships with allies, other government agencies, and NGOs form the foundation of agile, globally integrated operations. "This allows expertise and resources existing outside the U.S. military to be better integrated in a variety of operational contexts."³² As noted in the phase planning section, future operations must include more than just the military arm of national power to adequately address complex security. Furthermore, "globally integrated operations provide for more flexibility in how Joint Forces are established and employed."³³ Joint Forces presently operate under geographic or functional commanders. The changing geo-political landscape makes future conflicts unlikely to conform to existing geographical boundaries, including networks of TCOs and the flow of smuggled commodities. Current Goldwater-Nichols debates in congress may include organizational changes to the DoD to address this issue. Fourth, future Joint Force shaping requirements will require smaller and more agile tactical units deployed globally similar to current U.S. Special Operations Command. JIIM operations will exploit skills and expertise across divergent domains to capitalize on the capabilities that reside outside the U.S. military. Eventually, JIIM operations will evolve into core competencies across divergent agencies and partner nations. The goal is

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

to move away from these critical capabilities as adjunct forces. Finally, JIIM operations occur in an environment finely tuned with mass media and potential for unintended consequences. “The increased transparency of the future security environment, where digital devices will be everywhere, heightens the need for force to be used precisely when possible.”³⁴ This will remain particularly true of Joint Forces working phase-0 and phase-V operations. Clearly, JIIM operations finely attuned to the ramifications of collateral damage, misfires, and other imprecise violence requires a professional, trained, and well-orchestrated Joint Force. The reputation of the U.S. and our partners rely on it.

2. Summary

JIIM coordination is increasingly important as opportunities and requirements for the U.S. military to work in concert with other U.S. and allied government institutions and NGOs also increases. These partnerships with the U.S. military “have never been more relevant and timely.”³⁵

The fundamental calculus of CCJO 2020 is known as “globally integrated operations”, which leverages current U.S. military force structure and the skills, assets, and functional capabilities of other JIIM partners. The keys are to be globally integrated with smaller forces operating within the mission command concept. Cooperation with JIIM partners will maximize the collaborative effort and allow the Joint Forces the best opportunity for success, especially in phase-0 and phase-V operations. “Finally, by

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Alexander L. Carter, "Improving Joint Interagency Coordination: Changing Mindsets," *Joint Force Quarterly* No. 79 (2015): 19-26.

enhancing military effectiveness even as U.S. forces grow smaller, it will allow us to be better stewards of fiscal resources as we defend the nation and its interests.”³⁶

³⁶ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Capstone Concept of Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, Joint Electronic Library. September 10, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/ccjo_jointforce2020.pdf (Accessed September 19, 2015).

II. Immigration and U.S. Military Government Involvement

A. Department of Homeland Security Leads on Immigration Issues

While the Department of State and Department of Health and Human Services manage some aspects of immigration, the primary responsibility for immigration issues resides with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Many offices in DHS are involved with immigration, and each office is responsible for specific duties associated with immigration. Some of those office duties overlap. Components of DHS working immigration issues include: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS); the Office for Refugee, Asylum and International Operations (RAIO), a branch within USCIS; Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); Transportation Security Administration (TSA); and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). According to Joseph Langlois, Associate Director for Refugee, Asylum and International Operations,

“USCIS works in close partnership with other components within DHS and with colleagues at the Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and at the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to meet the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) mission of offering resettlement opportunities to eligible refugees while safeguarding the integrity of the program and our national security.”¹

Additionally, law enforcement, intelligence, national security agencies, and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) are involved in immigration issues as well.

¹ U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, *The National Interest Hearing*, Lanham, United States: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc., 2015, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1676104465?accountid=12686> (Accessed November 27, 2015).

B. Factors Leading to Emigration

Globally, there is an estimated 191 million intra-state immigrants; 20% (~38 million) live in the United States.² Emigration results from many factors typically associated with fragile states. There are currently 20 nation states rated by the Foreign Policy's Fund for Peace with Fragility Score Index (FSI) greater than 100, indicating a high potential for failure, or currently operating as a failed state.³ Haiti is the only Latin American country in the top-twenty on this list. All the other most fragile states are in Africa and the Middle East. Most fragile and failed states arrive at such a station over time through unsustainable economic policies and by subjecting citizens to long-term poverty through exploitation and corruption, which ultimately doom the system to failure.⁴ Corruption, greed, lack of a central government, poor public services, lack of property rights, failed rule of law, forced labor, restriction on technologies, failed policing and law enforcement, political exploitation, and war often result in fragile statehood. The more severe the situation and the longer people remain subjected to these system-imposed problems, the more likely they are to emigrate.

In Latin America, common reasons for emigration usually associated with criminal drug operations establishing control over areas and exploiting the local and state governments through extortion and violence. Kilcullen and Mills note that, "governments

² Anup Shah, "Immigration," *Global Issues*, May 26, 2008.

<http://www.globalissues.org/article/537/immigration> (Accessed November 27, 2015).

³ "Fragile State Index (FSI)," *Fund for Peace*, Fund for Peace, <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org> (Accessed October 12, 2015).

⁴ Daron Acemoglu, and James A. Robinson, "FAILED STATES: 10 Reasons Countries Fall Apart," *Foreign Policy*, June 18, 2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/18/10-reasons-countries-fall-apart/> (Accessed October 12, 2015).

don't fight wars just to fight – they fight to build a better reality for their people. By contrast, conflict entrepreneurs fight to perpetuate conflict, since its existence creates wealth, power and status for them.”⁵

“People emigrate from one country to another for a variety of complex reasons.”⁶ Some people emigrate to escape conflict, prejudices, and persecution. Other people emigrate voluntarily attempting to improve their lives. Either way, emigration is a traumatic and often challenging event.⁷ Just of few of the challenges include moving to a different country that has different cultural norms, values, and laws. Additionally, the people probably speak a different language. There may be no place established to live and no job to work. The cost of living is likely greater than from where the immigrant originated in addition to the obligation of sending money home to support the family left behind.

C. Effects of Emigration

Guerillas exploiting and suppressing a population create a “double brain drain” as conditions in predominantly poor, rural villages become unbearable; those with money, intelligence, and jobs leave for safer environments that are more hospitable and remain unlikely to return.⁸ When the job creators, businessmen, and most capable people leave a village with their wealth and talents, the entire village is weakened and incrementally

⁵ David Kilcullen, and Greg Mills, "Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace," *Prism* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2015): 107-21.

⁶ Anup Shah, "Immigration," *Global Issues*, May 26, 2008.

<http://www.globalissues.org/article/537/immigration> (Accessed November 27, 2015).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ David Kilcullen, and Greg Mills, "Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace," *Prism* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2015): 107-21.

impoverished. While the influence at the point of destination are serious and vary in degree, the effects at the point of departure produce even more dramatic and long-term consequences. As discussed earlier, most emigrants are adults and those leaving the country are mostly adult males. This results in broken families with children left fatherless. Absentee fathers result in great family dysfunction and troubled youth involvement in gang activity. This is a major problem in many countries with a large emigration population. Additionally, many of the young adults who emigrate are also educated. This exodus of doctors, engineers, nurses, bankers, computer technicians, and other professionals is a 'brain drain' on countries, which need these critical skills the most. Compiled onto this problem is the idea that a mass migration of the younger generation leaves the future of a country in jeopardy. This is true in the educational sense as well as the genetic sense. Businesses, markets and opportunities grow best in thriving and vibrant communities. Low birth rates and the loss of virile youth decrease the chances for these vibrant communities to develop.

Alternatively, many emigrants send remittance home from wherever they found work. According to the World Bank, the U.S. is the top migrant destination and Mexico is the fourth largest recipient of remittance.⁹ The global 2014 remittance is estimated at \$583 billion with another \$497 billion estimated in savings held by immigrants in their destination countries.¹⁰ Seasonal migrants potentially return with valuable knowledge and

⁹ The World Bank-Press Release, "Remittances Growth to Slow Sharply in 2015, as Europe and Russia Stay Weak; Pick up Expected next Year," <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/04/13/remittances-growth-to-slow-sharply-in-2015-as-europe-and-russia-stay-weak-pick-up-expected-next-year> (Accessed December 22, 2015).

¹⁰ Ibid.

skills that improve their home villages and communities with improved techniques, shared ideas, and better practices for business and farming.

D. Effects of Immigration

Immigrants tend to possess four strong personality characteristics often associated with success and leadership. First, immigrants tend to be restless people by nature, seeking improvement and desire for self-improvement and the betterment of others. Second, they also tend to be risk takers. They gamble for great rewards. Third, they tend to be hard and conscientious workers. Finally, they are also innovators, creative and adaptive.

People with these strong characteristics are stereotypically considered successful in America. American concepts of rugged individualism, self-determination, and Manifest Destiny were founded on such personal character traits. Many immigrants share these personality traits with successful business owners and other wealth creators. Migration produces positive and negative effects at the destination. Immigrants may be skilled and educated workers seeking greater opportunity for career advancement, better pay, benefits, and educational opportunities. They might also be low-skilled laborers willing to work for relatively low wages. The U.S. often prides itself on being a country of immigrants and a known melting pot of cultural diversity. Greater diversity generally broadens perspectives and awareness of the larger human race.

On the other hand, migrants possibly act as vectors for diseases, reduce job opportunities for natives, and breakdown social culture and cultural norms. This often leads to prejudice and in extreme cases social unrest. Sometimes immigrants resort to

crime as a survival mechanism. Illegal immigrants in large numbers can strain local healthcare and education systems and generally create social and political tension.¹¹ Negative perceptions can be further exacerbated by whether immigrants pay taxes. Finally, the language barrier often forces immigrants to co-locate and otherwise acts as a local discriminator. Immigrants who do not speak the language of the country to which they emigrated often tend to seek others who speak their own native language. This leads to population sub-cultures within communities that may discriminate against those immigrants, which further exacerbates the tension between cultures.

E. Nation Building

Through decades of work, the U.S. helped steadily build democratic nations in poverty stricken third-world countries. Subsequently, by the end of the Cold War, the preponderance of Latin America distanced itself from socialist and statist positions. The region largely sprouted fledgling democracies under a changing political landscape with improving economies, rule of law, and an eye toward human rights.¹² However, since the turn of the 21st Century, populist governments have sprung up like weeds. Venezuela's financial support for socialist and populist reforms from then president Hugo Chavez, influenced the new political landscape across Latin America. The Chinese and Russians recently contributed economically with loans and debt forgiveness. Additionally, Cuba

¹¹ Anup Shah, "Immigration," *Global Issues*, May 26, 2008.

<http://www.globalissues.org/article/537/immigration> (Accessed November 27, 2015).

¹² Douglas Farah, "The Advance of Radical Populist Doctrine in Latin America: How the Bolivian Alliance is Remaking Militaries, Dismantling Democracy and Combatting the Empire," *Prism* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2015): 91-105.

exported vast intellectual capital across the region. The populist propaganda war makes any U.S. involvement look like imperialist nation building, viewed locally as a negative.

The U.S. has spent decades working to establish democracies and the rule of law throughout Latin America.¹³ Colombia and Chile demonstrate the greatest improvements in the form of democracy, rule of law and economic development over the past two decades.¹⁴ A common theme throughout the literature on developing democracies is time and a long-term approach to establishing stable governments. The Western world spent centuries molding the current system of democratic states. It stands to reason that a few decades are reasonable, if not optimistic, for transitioning from an impoverished state of revolution into an effective democracy. Colombia progressed over nearly two decades decreasing homicides by 50%, kidnappings by 90%, car theft by 50%, poverty rate by 38%, and unemployment by 46% while improving public services such as roads, bridges, water, sewer, community centers, and public health services.¹⁵ Improved democratic security also brings other benefits associated with democracy such as economic development, rule of law, stable governance, growth, stability, and foreign investment.

Ironically, an impatient citizenry in fledgling democracies such as Colombia left the government vulnerable to guerilla movements. For example, the Colombian people wanted more support, service, and law enforcement from the government than the leaders were able to provide as the country transitioned from an autocracy toward democracy.

¹³ Douglas Farah, "The Advance of Radical Populist Doctrine in Latin America: How the Bolivian Alliance is Remaking Militaries, Dismantling Democracy and Combatting the Empire," *Prism* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2015): 91-105.

¹⁴ David Kilcullen, and Greg Mills, "Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace," *Prism* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2015): 107-21.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

The people's expectations were high using the U.S. as a baseline, but such large change does not occur over night. As the Colombian government progressed and strengthened, the criminal threat receded, and a war weary population felt more secure. Without the threat of an autocratic, cartel led government, the citizens felt comfortable opposing their newly democratic leaders. One of the major issues was the cost associated with fighting guerilla militants and keeping them out of the densely populated areas. While the majority of Colombians enjoyed the security of city life without the threat of cartels, keeping the TCOs at bay consumed valuable resources of money and man-power. Economic, and advise and assist operations coordinated with the DoS and DoD strengthened the Colombian government's position and legitimacy.

III. Recommendations

The complex and challenging issues and concepts discussed throughout this paper are prevalent in literature. Professional civilian and military personnel deal with migration issues every day. The recommendations offered in this paper are feasible, but would require a top down implementation, and coordination across agencies and services.

A. Align Active Duty Components with SFA and BPC Operational Concepts

It is clear that the demand for Security Force Assistance (SFA) and Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) exceeds current SOF capacity. It is also clear that SFA type operations and BPC are necessary to help overcome the social-political issues plaguing weak and unstable nations encouraging their citizens to emigrate. Stemming the flow of migrants at the source not only helps the host nation, but also improves U.S. and global security. Expanding efforts similar to Plan Colombia and the Army's 162nd Training Brigade will increase U.S. military capacity to engage these specialized missions. Like any organizational change, resources and top-down implementation will be necessary. Similar to the individual augmentation concept in support of our nation's most recent war efforts, the resources for building greater SFA and BPC skill sets are likely going to be a forced function.

Parallel to joint requirements, including a pipeline of SFA training and employment into the standard career path for not only military service members, but also other government agents will eventually lead to a cultural change that supports and embraces the opportunities as a means for advancement and promotion. In fact, these SFA commitments must inherently be joint qualifying. In the resource constrained

environment and the deeply bureaucratic nature of U.S. governmental agencies, changes and implementation is likely incremental and slow. However, force shaping now and engaging in preventative phase-0 operations seems more reasonable than extreme cutbacks under the strategy of hope that the military will not need to deploy in mass again to fight another major conflict soon.

Sharing the burden of BPC and SFA across many U.S. government agencies and partner nations, the U.S. can remain actively engaged globally in phase-0 operations through JIIM operation in a strategy to prevent future major conflicts. Learning from history, the U.S. could have done more during the Cold War along these lines. The U.S. military understands BPC is a long-term proposition and requires broad and diverse skills. It is also understood that engaging early delivers better results. It seems reasonable to conclude then that making progress toward increasing the capacity of this joint capability must be a priority.

There are countries resistant to U.S. assistance. As the U.S. builds capacity and puts effort into Central and Latin American countries, the focus needs to be on countries with which the U.S. already has relatively good political and economic relationships. Some of these countries include Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia.

B. Develop JIIM Operation and the Opportunity for Civilian Governance

Relationships between countries, governments, agencies, and the military are complex and challenging. The U.S. military is a small piece of the overall picture. The military should consider long-term professional military liaisons, or military diplomats as

career options. Increasing JIIM operations will include many civilians across U.S. government agencies. When integrated with military relationships, partner nations will get more than just a military perspective. Shared governance ideas and ideals can help legitimize partner governments. Improved government legitimization and reduced corruption are key emigration factors.

Getting the proper and diversified skills applied to the whole of government concept can lend U.S. credibility to weak and developing governments. While the U.S. model may not be perfect for a given country, accounting for cultural, religious, and other personal differences, the U.S. model is a starting point that is at least widely respected. Since the U.S. is the top destination for Central American migrants, engaging the military into work with partner nations to help shape their governments and economies will serve several purposes. One, a cooperation with the U.S. will help lend the local government legitimacy. Train and advise operations will bolster law enforcement, military training, and rule of law. The expectation is that TCOs will have significantly less influence in the populated regions. The reduction in crime and improved local economy backed by a legitimate government will encourage potential emigrants to remain and prosper within their indigenous homeland. While success requires skills from DOJ, engineers, bankers, and a long list of others, the military is uniquely capable and brings certain credibility to all operations in which it is involved.

C. Align Performance Measures Across Agencies

Increasing JIIM operations means greater jointness and interagency integration. Managing and evaluating personal and professional performance must also change

accordingly. Even the military services have different forms of performance measures. That would be a good place to start. Develop a common performance rating system across the military service. Then, attack the performance system between agencies. At a minimum, a common format will help senior raters evaluate subordinates across services and agencies.

A common performance grading system will allow for improved communication across services and agencies by developing a common language. This is similar to working toward common goals. Ultimately, speaking the same professional language, seeking the same mission goals, and a clear understanding between senior and subordinates increases mission effectiveness.

In the case of SFA operations and BPC, the argument has been made that increased JIIM involvement is necessary to effectively address the demand for such assistance. As increasingly diverse personnel interact and cooperate toward common strategic goals, it makes sense that these professional civilians and military alike are evaluated by their seniors on a known, established, and common set of performance measures. The expected outcome is improved efficiency and effectiveness. As it applies to BPC, SFA, and phase-0 operations, improvements across the spectrum likely reduce the negative and increase the positive factors affecting emigration.

D. Enhance the Foreign Service Officer Program

Another consideration is to enhance the Foreign Service Officer (FSO) program from the civilian perspective. Incorporate and enhance Foreign Affairs Officer (FAO) program within the military. Develop an agency responsible for SFA operations and BPC

in coordination with DoS, military Combatant Commanders, and other JIIM partners. The right pieces of the puzzle exist. Merging them all together at the right place, right time, and under the appropriate leadership will be an ongoing challenge.

Largely the U.S. military has been the driver for SFA. Greater JIIM coordination is required for BPC. The shift needs to be toward the DoS as BPC is inherently a political issue directly tied to economic agreements between the USG and other countries.

Increasing non-military national powers into partnerships will serve to improve overall relationships between countries as well as reassure the citizens as to the legitimacy of the partnership. Again, stability and security result from the trust and confidence of a legitimate government. The expectation is that increasing and improving agencies in the profession of foreign assistance will result in strengthening democratic and legitimate governments in partner countries. The additional benefit is improved global security.

IV. Conclusion

Merging complex issues and concepts into simplified recommended solutions is challenging and designed to generally support U.S. grand strategy. The complex issue of immigration specifically, and migration more generally, fills volumes. Migration was represented using a push-pull model, which describes migration as a function of positive and negative factors at the point of departure and the point of destination. Positive factors pull people to a location, or encourage them to remain. Negative factors push people to emigrate away from those factors. Between the points of origin and destination are obstacles. Distance is the omnipresent obstacle. Physical obstacles such as fences, mountains, rivers, and deserts challenge the migration process. Law enforcement, laws, smugglers, transportation, and other logistic issues are considered obstacles to migration as well. The broad overview of global migration was covered as background to develop the idea that migration through Central America is a leading U.S. national security issue. As a national security issue, there is a military component naturally associated with immigration.

Much of the literature agrees that the U.S. military alone is not the solution to difficult global security issues of which immigration (migration) is just a small part. The military is only one element of U.S. national power and the DIME concept. The way forward detailing the U.S. military's role as it pertains to immigration management is clearly through JIIM operations expressed throughout this paper. JIIM operations are realistically the only way to share the costs of global security and deliver the necessary spectrum of skill sets when and where they are needed based on common strategic focus.

JIIM operations lend themselves well to immigration control through shared information, knowledge, and skills across DHS, DoJ, DoS, and a variety of military components all in concert with partner nations. The goal is to shift from capturing and prosecuting illegal immigrants to conducting BPC throughout Central America. The strategic goal is to resolve internal conflicts, government corruption, TCO extortion, and other negative factors causing emigration. Prevention is better than the clean-up.

U.S. national strategy represented in the CCJO 2020 makes it clear that early engagement is imperative to successful BCP and SFA operations. Maximizing phase-0 JIIM operations rather than engaging in violent conflicts will improve migration factors in partner nations. Fewer negative factors and more positive factors will encourage people to remain in their homelands, prosper, and develop. This is ultimately good for global security.

Overall, BPC through increased JIIM operations and cooperation with partner nations is a necessity from an economic perspective as well as politically and logistically. The U.S. and U.S. military cannot maintain global security alone. Similarly, the migration facet as a threat to global and national security is also best managed through JIIM and partnership.

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Vita

Command Brett Baker was commissioned into the United States Navy from NOTRC in 1992. His operational tours include Electrical Division Officer, First Division Officer and Assistant First Lieutenant in USS NIMITZ (CVN-68), Navigator and Administration Officer in USS GERMANTOWN (LSD-42), Operations Officer in USS PAUL F. FOSTER (DD-964), Operations Officer in USS CORONADO (AGF-11), Navigator in USS WASP (LHD-1) and Damage Control Assistant in USS IWO JIMA (LHD-7).

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