


AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

LEADERSHIP AND LOGISTICS MEETING THE ARMY'S
EXPEDITIONARY REQUIREMENTS OF TODAY AND 2025



By

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Biography

Mr. Robert J. Thurston is assigned to the Air War College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His 30 years of experience include leading Army organizations in supply chain management, system design and development, business process improvement, and Lean Six Sigma. Mr. Thurston served as the lead for United States Army Europe (USAREUR) Site Improvement Team (SIT) for stockage determination under the Army Velocity Management program and as a principle USAREUR change agent for the Army's Single Stock Fund program. While serving as a senior project officer at the Department of the Army G-4, Mr. Thurston wrote and led change to implement centralized inventory planning through the Army's Expert Authorized Stockage List (EXASL) team. Prior to the Air War College, Mr. Thurston served as the Chief of the Logistics Enterprise Systems Support Division at the United States Army Combined Arms Support Command. Mr. Thurston is currently in the Defense Senior Leader Development Program.

Abstract

Strategic inflection points challenge organizations in both the public and private sector. The point and time when your business changes so much that the old ways of doing things no longer applies can create havoc and turmoil. The challenge with a strategic inflection point is often times the organization's institutional culture prevents change and innovation.

The business of the U.S. Army is to prevent, shape, and win ground combat operations.¹ That aspect will not change; however, the manner in which the Army conducts its business is changing. To put this into perspective, in men's college basketball the objective is still to have more points at the end of the game than your opponent does. That objective remains; however, once the rules changed with an introduction of a shot clock and a three-point line, the game changed. Smart leaders and coaches had to change to be successful.

The introduction of Enterprise Resource Planning Systems, specifically, Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army) changes the rules of the game. The objective remains the same yet the manner in which the Army will go about meeting its objective will change. Unlike the basketball example, this strategic inflection point is not as easy to recognize. The Army's ability to recognize this strategic inflection point and change its institutional culture will go a long way in determining how soon the Army will adapt to this change and improve its sustainment capability in support of Unified Land Operations.²

This paper challenges the assumption that the Army is just replacing one system for another. It is not a question of software but rather a question of leadership and the Army's ability to change its culture to maximize sustainment operations in a fiscally constrained and complex environment. In examining this challenge, the paper looks at how the Army supported major operations in the past and how it changed its logistics operations. The paper also looks at the

potential roadblocks to change and business transformation. In the cases where the Army changed, the paper looks at what provided the catalyst for change and how it managed the change. Five recommendations emerge from this paper on how the Army can lead change and transform its business so the new way of doing business becomes part of the Army's culture and becomes the way the Army conducts business.

“In the final analysis, change sticks only when it becomes “the way we do things around here,” when it seeps into the very bloodstream of the work unit or corporate body. Until new behaviors are rooted in social norms and shared values, they are always subject to degradation as soon as the pressures associated with a change effort are removed.”³

John P. Kotter



Introduction

The United States Army is at a strategic inflection point. The end of the Cold War did not bring a reduced role for the Army. Since December 20, 1989 with the invasion of Panama, the Army has been engaged in 25 years of deployments.⁴ In his initial message to the Army, the new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark A. Milley stressed readiness today, the future Army, and the future fight.⁵ In terms of readiness, General Milley discussed the importance of having the best equipment.⁶ Implied in having the best equipment is the ability to account for and maintain the equipment to ensure commanders have the maximum combat power to execute their missions. Simply defined, readiness is the unit's ability to execute its mission. Included in that mission are logistics and the unit's ability to deploy and sustain operations. General Milley stressed the future Army and the future fight. He emphasized the need to listen and learn. General Milley stated learning should come from both inside the Army, other services, inter-agency organizations, and the importance of learning from private sector.⁷

A strategic inflection point is when an organization's business environment changes in such a manner that the old strategic blueprint no longer applies and gives way to a new strategic blueprint.⁸ The challenge with a strategic inflection point is often times the organization does not recognize it. In the private sector, it can lead to a company's failure. In the Army, it can lead to the Army not being able to meet its key imperatives of an expeditionary force. The implementation of Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system in the Army to plan and execute sustainment operations in an expeditionary environment is a strategic inflection point. The Army's ability to recognize it and change its institutional culture will determine its success in supporting the doctrine of Unified Land Operations.⁹

Thesis

This paper argues that to meet expeditionary requirements of today and 2025, the Army must recognize the implementation of an ERP as a strategic inflection point, evolve its institutional culture, and develop a change strategy to transform sustainment operations.

The Current Environment

The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) set three strategic pillars in support of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. They were to defend the homeland; build security globally by projecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression; and remaining prepared to win decisively if deterrence should fail.¹⁰ In support of these objectives, the Army must be prepared to prevent, shape, and win ground combat operations.¹¹

Strategy is the balance between objectives, resources, and concepts to meet our national security objectives. If the Army is going to meet its objectives (ends) in support of the strategy put forth in the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012 and supported by the 2014 QDR, the Army will do so with fewer resources (means).¹² If the ends are constant and the means are less, then the Army must look to change the concept (ways) it conducts business. The Army will need to take a hard look at its institutional culture in order to effectively and efficiently use all its resources.

Organizations have their own culture. It is often difficult to put your finger on it because it is intangible; however, it defines how the organization will react to change and innovation. The shared set of values, beliefs, norms, and assumptions shape how successful an organization will be when faced with the need to change their ways.¹³ An organization's culture can prevent a company from taking advantage of a strategic inflection point. The Army can and has changed in

the past. The logistics doctrine that served the Army well from World War II to Operation Desert Storm was effective but not efficient.

Operation Desert Storm

Logistics is a key element of strategy. It has influenced battles and wars throughout history. Clausewitz understood the importance of logistics and the ability to move and sustain armies. He states that the second crisis that normally occurs and can turn what would be a victorious campaign into a defeat is when the lines of communication become overstretched and the supply line cannot meet the requirements of the force. “Often times the finest victory has been robbed of its glory as a consequence of this problem. Strength ebbs away, retreat becomes unavoidable, and gradually the signs of defeat appear”¹⁴

In World War II (WWII), the United States used mass resources to provide an advantage. In the Pacific Theater, compared to the Japanese soldier who had 2 pounds of supplies per soldier, the American soldiers had an estimated 4 tons of supplies per soldier.¹⁵ Similar to WWII, the approach to logistics in Operation Desert Storm was to build an “Iron Mountain”. In his book, *Moving Mountains*, LTG Pagonis, the logistics commander for Operation Desert Storm states that unlike the profit model in private sector, the military focuses on life and death. LTG Pagonis states, “We in the military must sacrifice some sense of efficiency to maintain a higher margin of safety. We stockpile a little or a lot extra, just in case”¹⁶

The “Iron Mountains” were somewhat effective but they were not very efficient. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states the decision to push large amounts of supplies to the desert created a problem of poor visibility and accountability of equipment.¹⁷ Large amount of supplies were hard to move and when operations ended, it created a lot of

waste. Units requiring critical supplies to maintain readiness for weapon systems could not find them even though national level managers sent sufficient quantities to theater.¹⁸

The Army recognized the need to change. The Department of Defense estimated that by December 2001, units returning from Southwest Asia had about \$3.4 billion worth of excess materiel.¹⁹ The Army worked to improve its doctrine and business practices. In examining the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army did a better job in attempting to reduce the mountains of materiel.

Afghanistan and Iraq

The Army transformed its supply chain to be leaner and more responsive. The Army traded mass for a distribution-based logistics (DBL) system they worked hard to improve. While a DBL system appeared to work early on there were still challenges with Army War Reserve stock, visibility, and national level funding that created shortages in some critical spares at the national level.²⁰

Three examples that cut across these challenges were batteries, tires, and vehicle track shoes.²¹ A 2005 GAO report cites problems with inaccurate war reserve requirements, inaccurate forecasts, and insufficient funding or delayed funding.²² In addition, the Army had problems linking its financial systems with its logistics systems due to the need to build new Department of Defense Activity Address Codes (DODAACs) for all deploying units. In Operation Iraqi Freedom alone, there were 10,000 new DODAACs built for the operation.²³ This process caused delays in orders and contributed to the \$1.2 billion discrepancy of supplies shipped compared to supplies received.²⁴ The Army transformed the “Iron Mountains” in Operation Desert Storm to a DBL model in Afghanistan and Iraq but there was still much work left to improve readiness, life cycle management, and financial auditability in order to maximize resources to make better

decisions to sustain and affect combat operations. In order to understand the changes and improvements required, a better understanding of Enterprise Resource Planning systems is valuable.

Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)

Enterprise Resource Planning systems touch the institutional culture and want to change it. Many companies struggle with ERP systems because of their culture. ERP systems want to do everything and standardize it. Ironically, this standardization is why most companies move to an ERP system. As the landscape changes with the fielding of a new ERP system, there is a tipping point where the old business model of vertical systems of supply, maintenance, property accountability, and finance no longer apply. For the Army, this model will change from a systems perspective once fielding is complete in 2017. From a business transformation perspective, the transition from the old model to the new model will not be as quick or easy. Organizations and individuals successful with the old model will feel threatened and less adaptive when it comes to change. Leaders at all levels within the Army must recognize this strategic inflection point and seize the opportunity to move the Army forward. It is critical commanders and leaders understand while ERP systems are new technology and software, employing its capability is not a technology issue. It is a leadership issue. Commanders do not need to be the technical experts but they need to understand what capability it provides, set the environment for its use, and how to leverage it.

Doctrine in ADP 4-0 Sustainment states “Logistics is planning and executing of the movement and support of forces.”²⁵ An ERP system changes the business environment in such a manner that the old blueprint no longer applies. It is one integrated system to plan, execute, and sustain operations. Operational planners and support planners must work in close coordination.

This planning is critical to enable task force creation, reorganization, deployment, and re-deployment operations.

Commanders who fight this change will not be successful in spite of their best efforts. An expeditionary mission will suffer if there is not up front planning and continuous interactions between the staff offices to make sure all elements support the mission. This is vitally important in an ERP environment where all business functions are horizontal and integrated. Commanders need to learn and understand the dependencies of people, equipment, resources, and process. The commander must learn, shape, and define what items need to be part of their Commander's Critical Information Report. The sooner leaders recognize and adapt to this change will determine the length of time required for the Army to improve and deliver greater capability with an ERP system.

The three main ERP systems for logistics and finance in the Army are the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP), the General Funds Enterprise Business System (GFEBS), and the Global Combat Support System – Army (GCSS-Army). GCSS-Army provides three capabilities that set this system apart from other Army logistics systems of the past. First, Defense Forces and Public Security (DFPS) provide capability for operations planning and execution. Second, a single equipment master record provides capability for life cycle management, maintenance operations, property accountability, and readiness reporting. Third, it provides an integrated capability of critical logistics and financial information to facilitate commanders.

The DFPS force structure within GCSS-Army resembles the Army force structure. The Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and the Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) serve as the authoritative documents. Master data and the integrity of data

become critical. DFPS supports sustainment mission command through support for planning for operations, sustaining operations, and enabling commanders to have an operational awareness. It has the capability to transform the Army's business processes in three main areas, 1) planning and operations, 2) supply chain, 3) Life cycle management. The Army's ability to manage this change will go a long way in defining the Army's success. The challenge in front of the Army is whether its institutional culture will permit the integration across organizational boundaries to allow the dramatic change required.

The second new capability links the organizational structure within DFPS with a single equipment master record. The equipment master record is the "Carfax" not only for the end item but also for the critical components of the end item. Business operations dealing with property book, maintenance and readiness leverage the equipment master record. Maintenance operations and property book operations track and account for the same end item. This capability will improve life cycle management by maintaining accurate historical records on equipment. Equipment on hand and readiness reporting will be integrated and improved. As General Milley stated, the Army's ability to learn and adapt will ensure readiness today and for the future fight.

Learning and adapting will not be easy. The reporting of true readiness numbers could be a culture shock. Units will no longer be able to fudge readiness numbers or property accountability that sometimes occurs today.²⁶ In some cases, the Army culture today sees the fudging of numbers as an acceptable way to check a block during a logistics readiness meeting.²⁷ The capability to view true numbers may serve as a reason for users to pushback. Many will blame the new system if they see a drop in readiness numbers. Leader involvement in this process will be critical. They will need to make an honest assessment and explore what critical

factors are driving their readiness numbers. Doing so will improve their overall readiness to meet their mission.

The third capability is the integration of information to portray the operational readiness of a unit or task force to support mission command. This information as part of sustainment mission command will provide sustainment commanders the capability to execute better sustainment plans in support of maneuver commanders. The Army will need to fuse sustainment data and sustainment mission command. A collapse strategy between ERP sustainment data and Sustainment Mission Command will greatly improve the common operating picture and maximize one of the benefits of an ERP system. By doing so, the Army will realize a major benefit. One of the top five reasons companies either fail or fail to realize the total benefits of an ERP system is the failure to recognize, understand, and manage the organizational change.²⁸

Change Management and the Army Culture

The institutional culture within the Army can be a barrier to change. Three main challenges in changing the institutional culture are the bureaucratic culture and top-down management style, the individual and organizational reluctance to change, and lastly the organizational structure and domains. First, the old style of command and control leadership may challenge business transformation. Leaders can stifle the creative and innovative ideas that normally come from users and middle managers. In his book, *Only the Paranoid Survive: How to Exploit the Crisis Points That Challenge Every Company*, Andrew S. Grove explains how companies often fail to make the required changes because many times senior leaders are the last to know.²⁹ He states their existence in a fortified place surrounded by like thinking people often make it difficult for them to understand the changing landscape.³⁰ If senior leaders do not

recognize, understand, and set the conditions for the changing landscape, the culture and change required will not occur quickly.

Change is hard. People often like to discuss the concept of change until it is time for them to change. Spencer Johnson, the author of *Who Moved My Cheese*, correctly states the following: “Change happens when the pain of holding on becomes greater than the fear of letting go.”³¹ There will be personnel that attempt to transform and change business operations; however, others will resist this change. This is not a problem unique to the Army. Figure 1, the law of diffusion of innovation shows the normal bell curve when attempting to innovate or change.³²




Figure 1 – Law of diffusion of innovation

The Army will encounter a similar bell curve as it transforms operations with an ERP system. In some cases, commanders of organizations from the company commander, to the brigade commander, will be reluctant to accept change in business operations. In an 18-24 month command, a commander will be risk adverse to accept new challenges. Many commanders will play it safe to ensure they do nothing that will reflect negatively on their Officer Evaluation Report (OER). Their OER will be the measurement of whether they are successful or not during their command time. An additional risk, such as business transformation, only complicates their life. The future of the officer’s career hinges on two people, the rater and the senior rater. If the idea of business transformation is not important to the rater, or the senior rater, it is unlikely the rated officer will be interested.³³ The current “up or out” system can stymie innovation.

The personnel system for officers is an “up or out” performance criteria. The requirement for officers to compete for command at all levels to remain competitive often results in leaders leaving the military or ending their career sooner.³⁴ In today’s environment, this type of personnel system may not be the best system to build the future force. In conjunction with the Department of Defense, the Army should reevaluate the personnel system for officers to determine if the “up or out” system makes sense today. If a young officer today knew that by becoming an expert in a certain career field would enhance their career, they would be more likely to adapt to changing systems.

In some cases, middle managers will challenge the Army’s ability to transform. They will see the new system as a threat to their relevance. Middle managers that were comfortable with the old systems and their role as a subject matter expert will be reluctant to accept the new system. They will have become complacent and will not buy-in to the change. Where these managers should serve as change agents, they will have the opposite effect. They will stall and limit change and innovation.³⁵ The middle managers that are innovators will be critical in moving the Army forward and breaking down barriers to change.

Separate staff sections exist throughout Army organizations. These staff sections are an inherent part of the Army’s bureaucratic culture. U. S. Army planners reside in the G-3/5/7 operations section; resource managers are in the G-8 resource and budget section and logisticians are in the G-4 logistics section. All of the personnel are extremely dedicated and work hard to ensure success; however, they do so within their own domain and through their own individual lens. There are also vertical barriers when looking at the supply chain from the national level and below. For instance, communications across these barriers are not quick and responsive.

One example is in the early days of OIF, national providers managed their portion of the supply chain from the depots. They desired to move supplies as quickly as possible from the national distribution centers. The result was catastrophic. Instead of pure packing shipments into boxes going into theater, they combined shipments destined for distinct warehouses into the same box. The breakdown of boxes in theater to separate the shipments created longer ship times for the customer and often times resulted in the supplies never getting to the correct place.³⁶ Communication in deployment operations is vital for success. A unit deploying with GCSS-Army DFPS capability requires early identification of the task force, the equipment, and the resources. It is a structured and deliberate process requiring communication across the silos both horizontally and vertically.

Over the last 15 months, Army units deployed to the Army National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California employing GCSS-Army Wave I. While units performed well with GCSS-Army during the training exercises at NTC, it quickly became apparent the upfront planning and coordination required across the organization was lacking. Army staffs from the division level to the battalion level had difficulty defining the task force, linking it to the concept of support tied to the correct resources. United States Forces Command (FORSCOM) recognized this challenge and created policy to stress the importance of upfront planning for rotational exercises at NTC.³⁷ It will depend on the leaders' ability to change the culture within the organization to implement the policy.

The landscape is changing in terms of both systems and processes. Leaders must recognize this change, address the culture, and set the environment to work across the organizational silos to develop well-planned and executed deployment plans. Included in this business process change, the Army should look to develop a centralized enterprise deployment

capability to enable the force structure and data management required to enable expeditionary operations. Building 10,000 DODAACs in an ad hoc manner as the Army did when going into Iraq is something the Army should look to avoid in an ERP system.³⁸ In order to leverage DFPS the Army should develop a change strategy to develop force structure and master data up front for garrison and deployment operations. Addressing the Army's culture and recognizing DFPS, as a strategic inflection point will determine how quickly the Army will change this business process. Confronting this change will enable expeditionary capability and sustainment operations to create conditions for a favorable conflict resolution.³⁹

Confronting the Change Problem

The Army can learn from previous attempts at business process change. Mid-level managers cannot lead the change required to gain the benefits of an ERP system. It is too large and complex for bottoms up change driven by mid-level managers. Managers manage the process; leaders and leadership at multiple levels must define the future and align the organization through a clear vision to make the change occur.⁴⁰

There are two business cases worth studying. First, the Army's transition to distribution based logistics after Operation Desert Storm and second, the change from a decentralized inventory planning process for the Authorized Stockage Lists (ASLs) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Both cases involved changes that encountered pushback. In the first business case, the Army turned to a "Just in Time" approach to logistics by attempting to swap the large "Iron Mountains" for a distribution based logistics concept. The Army named the effort "Velocity Management". In collaboration with the Rand Arroyo center, the Army G-4 formed the Logistics Triad in January 1995.⁴¹ The Army G-4, the Deputy Commanding General of the Army Materiel Command, and the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Support

Command made up the governing board.⁴² The Army established the correct vision and story to transform business operations using principles similar to the Lean Six Sigma efforts of today. The Army set a process to Define, Measure, and Improve (DMI) business operations from the national level to the tactical level. The ultimate goal was to replace mass with velocity. Figure 2 shows the structure used to implement the change.⁴³




Figure 2 – U.S. Army Velocity Management Structure

The changes were top down driven set by leadership and vision but executed from the bottoms up with leadership and expertise within the Process Improvement Teams (PITs) and Site Improvements Teams. Each PIT established a senior change management agent at the General Officer or Senior Executive Service level. The buy-in for the program grew and leaders at all levels bought into the change. The old metric of Order Ship Time (OST) saw a dramatic improvement. From the period of July 1995 to July 1998, the average OST for CONUS based shipments dropped from 22 days to 10.6 days.⁴⁴

In the second business case, the Army wanted to improve fill rates for OIF units for class IX and readiness drivers to improve readiness and reduce stress on the supply chain. In collaboration with the Rand Arroyo Center, the Army G-4, Combined Arms Support Command

(CASCOM) and Army Materiel Command (AMC) worked to develop a business process change to enable ASLs to perform closer to the levels predicted by analytical modeling.

Using a process similar to the D-M-I in VM, the Army concluded the tools were available but the culture of conducting decentralized ASL review boards was not working. With a defined vision, the Army G-4 changed the ASL policy for Iraq to a centralized process working in collaboration with units.⁴⁵ The policy change alone did not guarantee success; senior leaders served as the change agents leading change. They worked closely with local leadership and process improvement teams to lead the change. It was both a tops down and bottoms up approach.

The Army immediately saw improvement and continued to work over the next several years to transform the Army's culture in conducting Authorized Stockage List (ASL) reviews. As the senior project officer in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G-4, I witnessed pushback to the policy each time a new unit would rotate into Iraq. The unit would pushback and leaders would need to reinforce the change process. A top down vision with innovators from below enabled the change.⁴⁶ By 2008, units in Iraq met or exceeded goals for both readiness driver fill rate and class IX fill rate.⁴⁷ In 2008, the Army made an organizational change. The Army created the expert ASL team at the Logistics Support Agency (LOGSA) and extended the change throughout the Army to include a national-level coordinated ASL review.⁴⁸ It is now the way the Army does its business, it is part of its culture.

The Army can learn a great deal from both cases. First, neither change was easy nor did it happen on its own. Second, it involved changing the business process and the culture that had become so accustomed to doing things in a certain way. Third, the Army started small but with a sense of urgency worked quickly to gain buy-in and expand on its success. In both cases, the

Army appeared to follow the eight-stage process of creating major change as advocated by John P. Kotter in *Leading Change*.⁴⁹ The Army created a sense of urgency and formed a guiding coalition of senior leaders. They created and communicated a vision and then empowered others to act on that vision. They started small and looked for immediate areas where they could improve. Once gaining momentum, they looked to expand on early success and expand the change ultimately by institutionalizing the change through policy, doctrine, education, training, and organizational change.⁵⁰

Recommendations

The Army has made outstanding progress in deploying ERPs through the current governance structure of the Logistics Business Process Council (BPC) headed by the Army G-4. The BPC is a decision-making forum that supports the deployment and sustainment of the ERP systems. The Army needs to shift quickly from a fielding mindset to an operational mindset. All of these recommendations should come with a sense of urgency.

- **First Recommendation:** The Army should develop a change strategy forum. The forum should follow the model of the Army Velocity Management Logistics Triad. The change strategy forum should also include the Office of Business Transformation, the Army G-3, Army G-8, USTRANSCOM, and DLA. The forum should establish a clear vision for leaders to follow. It should serve to lead change and transform the culture in order to break the organizational silos across all levels of the enterprise. The forum should work in both a top down and bottoms up approach leveraging process improvement teams following the Kotter model on leading change. The forum should focus on all business areas but initially look at deployment planning and operations, inventory forecasting and retrograde operations to meet expeditionary requirements.

- **Second Recommendation:** The Army should work with the Department of Defense to evaluate the current personnel system to ensure it provides the greatest opportunity for building the most competent future force. The evaluation should look at the current “up or out” personnel system. In addition, they should study the need to look at a command track and a technical track for officers. As the Army becomes more dependent on technology, it will require leaders and technology experts to make the force more effective.

- **Third Recommendation:** The Army should continue to study all aspects of DOTMLPF-P to evaluate required changes to manage force structure and data management in support of garrison and deployment operations leveraging an ERP system with DFPS. This study should look at the need to assign this capability to an organization that would become specialized in providing this capability to execute new business tasks such as Enterprise Deployment Operations and Master Data Management. In addition, it should look at training, education, doctrine, and policy to support the business process change.

- **Fourth Recommendation:** The Army should quickly develop a strategy to educate and train leaders at all levels on the current business intelligence capability within GCSS-Army. This would allow the Army to start small and get a quick win. It will help leaders and soldiers embrace change and gain their buy-in when moving to an ERP. It is common nature for people to ask what they are receiving for the change you are asking them to undertake. Training personnel to leverage this capability up front will make the transition easier. In addition, the Army must look at how it currently conducts readiness reviews and create a plan to transform from today’s current static reviews to a dynamic forward-looking capability. The Army needs to develop readiness reviews that look at the real time status of readiness and look forward to

develop strategies on how to maintain or improve readiness in a proactive manner instead of its current reactive manner.

- **Fifth Recommendation:** The Army should work on a collapse strategy between ERP business intelligence and Sustainment Mission Command. Prior to the capability of an ERP, organizations at multiple levels collected data from multiple databases in an attempt to provide information. Organizations moved collected and staged data from one major database to another in an attempt to share information. The result was old information that portrayed different information depending on which database a user accessed. In the end, moving to an ERP must provide current and accurate information to leaders so they can make better decisions to influence combat operations.

Conclusion

There is risk if Army leaders and personnel take the mindset the Army is just trading one system for another. This type of mindset will not permit the true type of change required. At all levels, leaders must recognize the strategic inflection point an Enterprise Resource Planning system introduces and address it with a sense of urgency. Changing the Army culture is a long and slow process. Addressing change within the culture with a sense of urgency will allow the Army to transform operations sooner and reap the benefits of implementing ERP systems. The Army has the opportunity to meet the current fight in terms of readiness and shape the environment that will allow the Army to meet the demands of the future fight as outlined by General Milley. The cultural change will be hard and will require leadership and buy-in at all levels.

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
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