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**U.S.-BRAZIL SECURITY COOPERATION
AND THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM**

by

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Preface

The research for this paper began as a question of basically why Brazil does not have a State Partnership Program with the National Guard and that being the case, how could it benefit. The answer to these questions came in part from time the author spent with the U.S. Military Liaison Office (MLO) at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia, Brazil. During this trip to the embassy, the author was informed of an ongoing initiative between Brazil and the U.S. (led by the Air Force) to begin a modified SPP. As it turns out, Brazil is interested in the SPP and the U.S. is willing to establish it, but Brazil does not want the standard state-to-country partnership. Rather, they want a Brazil-to-National Guard partnership. Many of the reasons why Brazil seeks a special relationship will become apparent after reading this paper, but it boils down to Brazil seeing itself as more of a peer-to-peer partner versus one requiring support.

Partnership versus support is a key concept when dealing with Brazil. Another issue complicating the potential for partnership is the reality of differing views even within the U.S. military. For example, even though the Air Force (AF) component may see value in the SPP, it may not be as high a priority for the other services or even U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). In this manner, the U.S. must recognize that Brazil has valuable information and experience to offer as well. As a result of the developments related to this topic, the author will divert to some extent from the original question to one focusing on areas where the proposed partnership could be most valuable and in the broader topic of U.S.-Brazil security cooperation.

Abstract

This research paper explores the current security cooperation between the United States and Brazil and seeks to determine why Brazil is not involved in the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). The author suggests that establishing a SPP with Brazil is the sort of confidence building measure needed to bridge the current challenges and to put the countries on the path to greater cooperation. At the same time, the author is trying to evaluate how both sides could benefit from the program. While not comprehensive, the author looks at pertinent history, foreign policy, and previous or existing cooperation initiatives as well as challenges existing between the two countries. Brazil is an important country in today's multipolar world. Not only is it one of the "BRIC" countries, but it leads the world in some areas of development as well such as peacekeeping operations and energy development. It is a regional power, and does not rely on the U.S. for self-defense. Recognizing Brazil's importance, the U.S. should respect and partner with Brazil in mutually beneficial areas such as security cooperation, which it could do to an even greater extent.

Chapter I. Introduction

The relationship between the U.S. and Brazil is long-standing and important for both countries. Over the years, however, this relationship has had its ups and downs, and currently there is a valley to get through to get back on track with a positive trend of cooperation. Much of the issue seems to stem from Brazil's mistrust of the U.S. since it came to light that the U.S. had been eavesdropping on Brazilian government officials including Dilma Rousseff, the Brazilian president. Prior to this revelation, the countries had been building stronger ties than ever before. In 2008, Brazil published a National Defense Strategy, which showed what areas of defense they planned to improve, and there was clearly a role for the U.S. to play in providing advanced technological weapons and capabilities. The FX-2 fighter competition is one example of a foreign military sales (FMS) case the U.S. had expected to win. The competition ended up going to Sweden, most likely because of the revelation of the spying activity allegations.¹ Several key government-to-government initiatives were just getting started when this took place in 2013, and they appear to have been derailed. This includes the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). Also, President Rousseff and Brazil are dealing with their own questionable activities as the story unfolds about corruption in the state-run Petrobras oil company amid a host of other corruption issues and domestic problems. When considering the tensions of the past and the opportunities in the future, it becomes clear that establishing a SPP with Brazil is the sort of confidence building measure needed to bridge the current hard feelings and to put the countries on the path to greater cooperation.

Although the relationship has been strained, it is not destined to failure. Both countries want to reap the benefits of bilateral relations; however, since the starting and end points for each

partner are different each side must be realistic and understanding with the other. As the facts demonstrate, Brazil and the U.S. are natural partners because they share many of the same democratic values. At the same time, the U.S. naturally wants to maintain its relative power and position in the world. Meanwhile, Brazil is a rapidly developing country whose growth could actually reduce the power difference. Consequently, the U.S. faces a decision of who to partner with and to what extent. At this point in time, the door is open for Brazil to be a valued partner. However, the day could come when the opportunity changes. Brazil's own actions such as partner choices could impact this situation. Each country should aim to leverage the maximum benefit from the partnership and be transparent in its dealings with the other to prevent potential setback such as those of the recent past.

After conducting significant research, it is clear that trust and confidence need to be rebuilt. At the operational level or military-to-military, the relationship has been and remains strong. Therefore, as the political situation needs to be mended, one of the best and most logical ways for doing so is through security cooperation programs and more of them.² There are clear links between Brazil's military development and its national-strategic goals. A key area of importance is that of technology transfer and system development, which are discussed in greater detail below. In order for Brazil to develop its own industrial base, it requires and seeks technology transfer in several sectors of its economy. It will seek partners based on their willingness to transfer the technological know-how. Currently, the U.S. is limited in its ability to transfer certain technologies to Brazil because the legal agreements are not yet in place. Specifically, this refers to the DCA and the GSOMIA, most importantly. Since the beginning of 2015, the opportunity for cooperation is once again appearing, and both sides are making commitments at the executive level to move these strategic agreements forward. Even in the past

couple of years, the derailment of relations has hurt both countries. Brazil chose to demonstrate its political discontent by stagnating the agreements. The negative trend that began in 2013, however, is finally beginning to turn positive again as high level interaction between country leaders seem to have set aside hurt feelings for a more constructive relationship. This renewed relationship and current opportunities may represent an opportune time to build a new level of cooperation such as through the National Guard's SPP.

Chapter II. Background Information

Brazil and the U.S. have cooperated militarily since WWII. Monica Hirst and Andrew Hurrell describe four different periods of their relationship as follows: Alliance, the First Republic to the early 1940s; Alignment, 1942-1977; Autonomy, 1977-1990; and Adjustment, 1990-2003.³ One could consider the time since 2003 also part of the Adjustment phase, since the move to something else, like "cooperation," has not yet arrived. The first period established a "brotherhood of arms"⁴ in the words of General Estevao Leitao de Carvalho in 1942. This seemed to lead to unique relationship leading into the Cold War. Both sides recognized the value of mutual support, but over time Brazil showed discontent with simply following U.S.-led initiatives when the U.S. would not allow Brazil to take a greater role in the western hemisphere.⁵ Furthermore, Brazil expected financial and military assistance in response for supporting the Korean War, but it didn't materialize. In 1964, a military junta took over in Brazil, and it was initially supported by the U.S. The junta originally backed U.S. economic and liberalization initiatives, until the Carter Administration began to increase pressure on their human rights and nuclear development programs.⁶ This eventually led to the cancellation of the 1952 military accord and the strained relations led into the autonomous phase.

Many observers believe Brazil's independent and autonomous ambitions are "embedded in the psyche of Brazilian elite,"⁷ and remain a dominant factor in Brazil's foreign relations particularly with respect to the U.S. Impressive economic growth during the late 1960s and early 1970s promoted the idea of Brazil as an independent world power and at the same time tended to marginalize the "unwritten alliance" with the U.S.⁸ During the 1970s and 1980s, Brazil focused foreign policy on good relations with its neighbors in Latin America. As such, its focus was on the promotion of regional integration and the development of a southern common market through Mercosur.⁹ During the 1990s, Brazil not only sought to become the regional leader but also recognized the need to foster intercontinental relations.¹⁰ This it has done through expansion of its economic and political ties throughout the world, fostering greater south-south relations, promoting multilateralism and greater representation of all nations within existing world regimes, etc. Some of its initiatives naturally clash with the priorities and interests of the U.S. Although relations between Brazil and the U.S. over the past quarter century have at times been chilly, there have also been new opportunities for cooperation.

Relations today between Brazil and the U.S. are "characterized by basic shared values, mutual respect, and increasing political and economic interaction."¹¹ Many commentators on U.S.-Brazil relations have noted the conflictual relationship between the two countries. For its part, Brazil wants to be a near peer and accepted on the same level as other leading world powers. The U.S., on the other hand, recognizes the development in Brazil as well as its leading position within the South American region, but it continually seems surprised when Brazil fails to support a U.S. position but instead seeks to be an activist of its own based on its own agenda and position in the world.¹² Brazil's activism is seen through many examples. In 2010, Brazil showed disapproval for a U.S.-Colombia security pact, which led to its being invalidated and put

on hold. Brazil's position did not break the U.S. cooperation, but it sent a clear message of discontent.¹³ Clearly, Brazil seeks to be involved in decisions made in the hemisphere. Another example is Brazil's position regarding Iran. Brazil has held that Iran is acting within its rights to develop and use nuclear generation for civilian purposes. This position helped Brazil and Turkey secure a tentative nuclear deal with Iran in 2010 after the U.S. attempts had failed. The U.S., however, was not interested in such help and rejected the effort.¹⁴ Brazil has also been at odds with the U.S. regarding commodity imports and exports. These sorts of differences are common and not likely to go away. The U.S. sees Brazil's actions as (1) a sign of impatience to be an actor on the world stage, (2) a sign of naiveté about the complexities of geopolitics and international security, and (3) a deliberate effort to demonstrate independence.¹⁵

As a fast developing and globally-minded country, Brazil has made significant strides toward establishing a permanent, democratic structure. Logically, after the period of military rule ending in the mid-1980s, civilian and military relations were subject to distrust. Since the late 1990s, however, structural reforms have been made to strengthen the relationship. It was only in 1999 when the Ministry of Defense (MOD) was stood up, but at first it was run by professionals from outside the defense regime. In 2007, former President Lula ordered the establishment of a national defense strategy (written in 2008), which was formally implemented in 2010 as the "Projecto Nacional" but not approved by Congress until September 2013.¹⁶ Under this strategy, the MOD became staffed by defense professionals including the military services, and a Joint Staff military hierarchy was established. Each of the armed services was also reorganized and given new missions and focus areas. The differences stemmed from the belief that the military and government must work together on national defense and security matters.¹⁷

The national defense strategy centered on three principle areas: advanced technology, a space program, and a peaceful nuclear capacity.¹⁸

The national defense strategy was revised in 2012, and in 2013 another major development came with the publishing of the National Defense White Book (LBDN). The White Book is a core document that clarifies Brazil's defense activities and provides an update to the National Defense Strategy. It also prioritizes defense projects and sets out a future development plan but is subject to adequate funding. The recent economic downturn within the country is already taking a toll on this plan as Brazil seeks to balance strategic priorities with domestic economic and political challenges. What becomes apparent from reading these documents is that Brazil need to partner with countries like the U.S. in order to gain the technology and information they need to boost their own capabilities.

Chapter III. Current Foreign Policy

Brazil and the U.S. don't necessarily have convergent foreign policies. In fact, in many ways their cooperation or terms of cooperation and their objectives are different. One author may be correct in identifying that "The central problem for Brazil-U.S. relations has not been their disagreements. It has been their inability to find areas of agreement."¹⁹ Hal Brands recognizes that Brazil faces many strategic challenges, which create an "increasingly competitive nature" with respect to the U.S. Hal analyzed Brazil's grand strategy up to 2008 under the presidency of Lula. He says that Lula had three diplomatic strategies: first, balancing soft power against the U.S.; second, building coalitions to magnify Brazil's negotiation power; and third, seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a unified South American region.²⁰

A. Brazilian Foreign Policy

Within its own region, Brazil is a natural leader. Its size, resources, growth, and development are all factors that contribute to this position. In terms of foreign policy, Brazil is on a quest for international recognition and believes that it should have a larger role in international affairs like other big countries.²¹ In many ways, Brazil is the leading voice for the third world agenda. It seeks to grow South-South coalitions and promotes multilateralism, it often takes a position contrary to other leading countries like the U.S., and it seeks independence from other countries.

During the 1990s and into the 2000s, Brazil recognized the need to become a member of international regimes in order to wield more influence and credibility. This has been an important step. As a participant in world affairs, Brazil can be seen from two perspectives. Externally, Brazil is a regional power, rich in resources, a contributor to the world stage through peacekeeping, but also not a world power militarily.²² Brazil is also seen as struggling to deal with internal development and a range of domestic unbalances. Internally, despite its domestic challenges, Brazil seeks to be a leader of a new world order based on multilateralism. Initiatives such as the “IBSA” initiative, which is between India, Brazil, and South Africa, aims to build South-South cooperation as a new model for development. As a leader among southern-hemisphere countries, Brazil is seeking greater strategic influence.²³ Brazil’s interest in multilateralism is not new. After its participation in WWI, Brazil was present at the 1919 Paris peace conference urging for a security system inclusive of great and small powers alike. Its role was mediator between the vastly different parties.²⁴ Brazil went on to be a founding member of the United Nations, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the International

Trade Organization (ITO). This background established Brazil's credibility even among other wealthy, developing countries and could potentially give them a stronger voice in world politics.

Brazil is characterized by its "peaceful foreign policy."²⁵ In fact, the introduction to its National Defense Strategy states, "This pacifist trait is part of the national identity, and a value that should be preserved by the Brazilian people."²⁶ Its desire for and promotion of peace, however, comes through influence on the world stage and through the ability to protect one's own interests. As the former Minister of Defense, Celso Amorim, said, "By deterring threats to national sovereignty, military power supports peace."²⁷

Another of Brazil's characteristics is its desire for independence. It wants to be self-sufficient in terms of development and production and to be at least an equal partner in relations with others. While it seeks to achieve this status, it has to secure partnerships that will promote technological advances. In very simple terms, Brazil is interested in the transfer of technology to be able to build its own organic support and development without having to rely on others. At the present time, Brazil is in a catch-up mode, but it has clear plans to mature beyond the current restraints.

B. U.S. Foreign Policy

The U.S. has long recognized the potential and relative strength of Brazil. As the largest democracy in South America, Brazil shares many of the same values and has been a staunch promoter of peace in the region as well as in the world. Brazil is a country full of natural resources which of course it wants to protect, and its leaders feel plenty capable of meeting any challenges. As natural partners, Brazil and the U.S. are also natural rivals in various ways. While Brazil seeks to be a dominant influence in South America, it sees intervention by the U.S. as meddling in other country's affairs. Brazil has in the past sought to thwart specific efforts by

the U.S. in the region such as with Colombia. Furthermore, there are many differences of opinion between the two countries with respect to world affairs. All of these issues give the U.S. greater difficulty when forging the relationship with its southern partner. The policy challenge became all the more difficult in recent years, as the U.S. was accused of spying on Brazil.

One of the primary reasons the U.S. has trouble in its relations with Brazil is because for most of the past century the U.S. has had unilateral influence in South American affairs and this notion remains today.²⁸ Lawrence Brown, who wrote an article for *Joint Forces Quarterly* entitled, "Restoring the 'Unwritten Alliance': Brazil-U.S. Relations," says that the U.S. has difficulty establishing a long term strategy for the region in terms of diplomacy. Consequently, countries like Brazil, who should be seen as important strategic partners do not receive the recognition they deserve, and the U.S. ultimately risks losing its influence.²⁹ As the former Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton believed, the most important aspect of U.S. foreign policy is in the realm of economics.³⁰ The single mention of Brazil in the 2015 *National Security Strategy* of the U.S. says that "We seek to advance our economic partnership with Brazil, as it works to preserve gains in reducing poverty and deliver the higher standards of public services expected by the middle class."³¹ There is nothing particularly flattering about this brief mention, and it certainly doesn't place Brazil on any sort of pedestal. However, it is a reflection of the consistent, foreign policy the U.S. has had with the country. If economic ties are really the linchpin to the relationship, then Brazil is all the more important considering its wealth of resources and the recent discovery of offshore oil reserves that are estimated to be one of the largest in the world. It would be worthwhile for U.S. policy makers to support Brazil as the regional leader, and to acknowledge that meddling through the Monroe Doctrine and Rio Treaty are policies of the past. Brazil is capable and wants to manage the region.³² Brown suggests the

U.S. “should actively support Brazil’s ongoing objective of [establishing] a continental Peace Zone.”³³ Instead of taking these positions, the U.S. more often finds itself criticized for interfering in South American affairs, often times because real intentions are misunderstood.

The U.S. has had opportunities in the past to develop a stronger relationship with Brazil, but seems to have chosen against forming a special bond. Now, when the U.S. wishes for Brazil to select her as the partner of choice, it is really no surprise that Brazil avoids such a relationship. The U.S. appears to be less concerned with Brazil and its neighbors and more involved with countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and partners like Colombia who welcome greater U.S. intervention. Perhaps now is the best time for the U.S. to rethink its strategy with respect to Brazil and consider being more of a true partner and less self-interested.

C. Security Cooperation with Brazil

The U.S. and Brazil have a long and productive history of security cooperation. This appeared to be reaching new heights when between 2010 and 2012, the administrations of both countries made significant effort to increase cooperation. Three important initiatives began. First, the presidents signed a DCA. Then came establishing a GSOMIA. Finally, they initiated a Defense Cooperation Dialogue (DCD) based on the DCA. Despite clear intentions on both sides for cooperation, unfortunate circumstances and lack of trust on both sides led to a derailment to of these initiatives in 2013 due to allegations of U.S. spying. This, along with numerous other impediments have recently hurt the relationship. Many of these are discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter IV. Challenges to Cooperation

There are several issues that create tension in the relationship between the U.S. and Brazil. Some have been mentioned already. In general, one sees the relationship on two

different levels. First is the political level. Here is where the cooperation tends to break down when issues come to light. The second level is operational or military-to-military. Again, generally speaking, this is the stronger and more consistent of the two, where significant cooperation continues, although is impacted by political affairs. The two levels cannot be entirely separated though, and as in the case of the DCA and GSOMIA, since Brazilian Congress must ratify the agreements, the military is subject to the limitations of existing agreements. Whereas the status of these agreements can prevent increased scientific and technical cooperation, there already is healthy participation on both sides in bilateral and multilateral exercises, subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE), military personal exchange programs (MPEP), and security assistance through FMS.

A. Recent History: Mistrust

Without going into great detail, the author believes it is worth mentioning some issues that have arisen over the past several years that strain the bilateral relationship. These issues range greatly from trade to international security. One major issue that has gone on for some time is the unwillingness of the U.S. to support Brazil's having a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).³⁴ Doing so could be a way to strengthen ties in other areas as well, and at least on the surface, Brazil has a strong resume for having such a position considering its size, economy, commitments to peace and neutrality, etc. Compared to even India, which the U.S. backed for a permanent seat, Brazil would be a logical candidate. Many other countries including France, the UK, and Russia have all shown support for Brazil; but probably for geopolitical reasons, the U.S. has yet to lend support.³⁵

Another area of contention is the concern Brazil has that the U.S. is too involved in regional affairs. For example, in 2008 the U.S. chose to reactivate the 4th Fleet as a way of

providing theater security operations. The fleet would fully respect the sovereignty of nations in the area, and it could be used as an instrument of cooperation in disaster assistance, humanitarian relief, counter terrorism and counter narcotic operations, etc. Brazil, however, was not consulted on this matter, and felt that the presence of U.S. naval forces could constitute a threat to Brazil's offshore oil reserves.³⁶ Similar concerns of the U.S. overextending its influence have been countered by Brazil in the past. Most likely, Brazil feels that it wants to be the regional power broker and does not need the U.S.

Other significant issues were mentioned previously including allegations of spying, differences on global trade agendas, Brazil's attempts to negotiate in the Iran nuclear deal, etc. Although the U.S. claims that it welcomes Brazilian leadership to a greater extent, it seems unwilling to provide the space needed for Brazil to succeed. This ultimately leads to the observed trend of cooperation but divergence and causes tension and at times mistrust.

B. Technology Transfer

Almost any writing that addresses the relationship between Brazil and the U.S. discusses the issue of technology transfer. As simply stated in his master's thesis written for the Naval Post-Graduate School, Robert Storer describes the problem as, "[H]istorical events in its relations with Washington make it difficult for Brasília to accept more recent U.S. efforts to enhance security cooperation and facilitate technology transfer on their face, while these same efforts cause U.S. policymakers to discount the importance of past indifference towards or overt efforts to block Brazil in obtaining certain technologies."³⁷ In other words, Brazil perceives that the U.S. is holding back on the transfer of technology; however, evidence shows that (1) there is no U.S. policy against Brazil preventing a transfer from being approved, and (2) in the vast majority of requests made by Brazil for defense articles, the sales were approved. According to

statistics between 2007 to 2012, the U.S. approved nearly 90 percent of requests, and most of the other 10 percent were returned without action because no export license was required.³⁸

Therefore, the reality is that U.S. policy generally favors greater cooperation with Brazil, and the perception in Brazil of a “technological embargo”³⁹ is not supported by data from U.S. FMS that indicates a robust security assistance program.

C. DCA and GSOMIA

Before relations between the U.S. and Brazil took a turn for the worse in 2013, much progress had been made between the presidents and defense leaders of both sides toward establishing important defense and cooperation agreements. Specifically DCA and GSOMIA, which had been in negotiation since 2010, were nearing approval. Everything was on track and there were incentives to complete the agreements. For Brazil, the World Cup was less than a year away, and they could have benefitted from greater security cooperation from the U.S. without having to make short-term arrangements. Additionally, President Rousseff had been invited to the White House for a state dinner in September 2013. On the U.S. side, as noted previously, the deal to provide F-18 Super Hornets to Brazil as their next generation fighter was a much-wanted sale. This was the status just prior to the Snowden revelation, which put a quick end to much of the progress. Following the spying accusation, President Dilma cancelled her state visit, and the DCD between Brazil’s Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense was cancelled indefinitely.

The DCA and GSOMIA were seen as a major step forward in the bilateral relationship, and represented greater cooperation than had been seen in 35 years.⁴⁰ These agreements would facilitate both defense and economic matters, and the DCD would be a forum for high-level discussions. The DCA was an umbrella agreement providing a framework for bilateral defense

cooperation in the areas of defense research and development, logistics support, technology security, acquisition of defense products and services, and officer exchanges.⁴¹ Although many of these areas have had cooperation previously, they could now go to a deeper level, and they could also establish new sub-agreements without having to go through the ratification process again. Similarly, GSOMIA was an agreement that would ease the sharing of classified military information and technology between the countries.⁴² Without it, U.S. law requires any requests for such sharing to seek an Exception to National Defense Policy (ENDP), which is an interagency review that is tedious and time consuming.

Considering Brazil's stated goal to develop their defense and industry bases in high-tech areas, the final ratification of these agreements is in the interest of both sides. Despite the setback from 2013, there has been recent progress for getting the relationship back on track. In May 2014, the commander of SOUTHCOM, made a visit to Brazil, and then both in June 2014, during the World Cup, and again in January 2015 for President Rousseff's reelection, Vice President Biden came to seek improved relations. In the last meeting with Biden, Rousseff stated that the Snowden incident is now in the past. Another important development for this relationship is the appointment of Jaques Wagner as the new Brazilian Minister of Defense (MOD). Wagner is consider more friendly toward the U.S. and has expressed a desire for greater cooperation in science and technology. As recently as April 2015, during the Latin America Aerospace and Defense Exposition (LAAD), MOD Wagner met with the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil along with seven other defense authorities from all services of the U.S. military, and he again stated his desire to move DCA and GSOMIA forward to obtain the necessary ratification required from the Brazilian Congress. With President Rousseff now scheduled for a state visit to

the White House at the end of June this year, there is significant push to complete these agreements.

Chapter V. Opportunities for Cooperation

Despite the differences and multiple points of contention, it remains true that Brazil and the U.S. are natural partners in many respects. Furthermore, as one looks to the future of the two countries, it is clear that there are many opportunities for greater cooperation. The U.S. is willing to provide technology and defense systems to Brazil, and Brazil needs them to meet its goals for future independence and security. Additionally, both countries share many of the same concerns such as with preventing transnational crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism, etc. They both also have shared environmental objectives and seek to develop renewable energy sources. In this last area, Brazil is a world-leader when it comes to providing energy through environmentally-friendly means like hydroelectric plants and alternative fuels.

A. Advanced Technology

With Brazil's new defense strategy and the strategic development goals outlined in documents like the White Paper and their *Defense Articulation and Equipment Plan*, many high technology projects are envisioned for the future and this impacts their entire military as well as their research and industrial sectors. Planned for implementation by 2035, the plan calls for seven priority projects for the Navy, including a nuclear powered submarine program. The Army plans to modernize its equipment and build a cyber-defense capability, among other projects, expected to cost \$26 billion dollars. The Air Force has nine high priority projects. One is the new fighter jet program already under way worth \$57 billion alone. There is also a new tanker program planned and development of space capabilities. This description barely touches

the surface of the projects planned. Whether or not they succeed in achieving these goals is to be determined, but clearly they will need partners who are willing to share technology in order to achieve their aims. This is a gold-mine of an opportunity for the U.S. economically speaking, and helping Brazil achieve its goals could lead to a strong southern partner who is more on par with other leading nations.⁴³

B. Regional Issues: Trafficking and Transnational Crime

Many of the issues of greatest concern to the U.S. are also problems faced by Brazil. This includes problems such as transnational crime and trafficking of arms, humans, and drugs. Logically, as two powerful countries, there should be an incentive to work together. Even though transnational crime is recognized by Brazil as one of the most serious security threats, there is no “comprehensive national strategy to address it.”⁴⁴ Brazil’s defense strategy certainly recognizes the need to protect its borders, both maritime and on land, but “lack of interagency coordination” represents an “ad hoc approach to the management of borders” despite a program put in place in 2011 by President Rousseff.⁴⁵ Considering the border challenges faced by the U.S. in the south, clearly this is an area with potential for cooperation. The issue of trafficking, especially drugs, is similar. Next to the U.S., Brazil ranks second in terms of cocaine consumption in the world.⁴⁶ Drug trafficking not only represents crime, but it also brings with it trafficking of arms and raises problems of concern to public health. In a country as large as Brazil, these are complex and costly problems to deal with. Yet, it’s a fight that the U.S. and other countries have been struggling with for years, so it seems wise to share the experiences if not the burden as well. Brazil has come to learn that development is dependent on security and vice versa.⁴⁷ Many of the challenges faced extend beyond borders and are international problems that would best be solved by global cooperation with willing partners.

Chapter VI. Model Opportunity: The State Partnership Program

Alas, attention can finally be given to the idea suggested at the beginning of this research paper, which is that the National Guard (NG) State Partnership Program (SPP) would be an excellent opportunity for increased cooperation between the U.S. and Brazil. This is based on many observations that have been discussed throughout this paper. Before highlighting why this form of cooperation would be ideal, first consider the history and purpose of the SPP.

In 2014, the National Guard Bureau published a document summarizing the history and transformation of the SPP. Even in the preface to the publication are the words written, “SPP evolving over time.”⁴⁸ This is reflective of the nature of the program itself. It began in response to an immediate need in the aftermath of the breakup of the former Soviet bloc and has continued changing ever since. Initially, it was to be used as a “tool of foreign policy” and “to assist in the formation of U.S.-Style National Guard military structures.”⁴⁹ Another interesting point is that the presence of the NG was likely to appear less intrusive than active duty troops.

The SPP started in 1992 to assist the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltics.⁵⁰ Today, it consists of 68 partnerships with 74 countries. The concept for the program is simple. A NG state organization partners with a foreign country’s defense ministry and armed forces and cooperates in areas such as skills exchanges, military exercises, planning drills, information sharing, crisis management collaboration, defense reform, military modernization, and professional development. The Western Hemisphere has 22 SPP countries that are also part of the Organization of American States (OAS) and share in security responsibilities. DOD Strategic Guidance and the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices for Fiscal Year 2014 both recognize the importance and value of building partnership capacity at the

strategic level. From the beginning of the SPP, “military engagements strengthened the capabilities of the local military forces, demonstrated the importance of civilian control of the military, and laid the foundation for closer cooperation and interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces.”⁵¹ “In 2009, the SPP became a DOD Program of Record and was formally recognized as a funded program that could compete in the 2010 budget process.”⁵²

The SPP offers an opportunity for Brazil to partner with the U.S. in a wide range of efforts and knowledge areas. For the U.S., it is one of the best methods of gaining influence into a country where other doors may be closed. Brazil as much as any country is skeptical of U.S. involvement on the continent, but if the invitation is from Brazil, then there may be an opportunity to build trust and demonstrate true intentions. This influence could result in the U.S. being selected as the partner of choice in other opportunities. The greatest challenge the U.S. faces in Brazil is not being selected as this partner; therefore, opportunities should be seized whenever possible to influence Brazil’s strategic direction.

The structure and purpose of the NG is not familiar to Brazil. Brazil has nothing similar to compare it to and may wonder why it’s necessary or how it can be of benefit. Helping them understand the role of these citizen-soldiers and their duties at both the state and federal levels is an important point for distinguishing them from other military forces.

The SPPs must be closely in sync with the geographic combatant commands (CDMD) responsible for the countries in a particular region. This is necessary in order to prevent duplication of efforts and to ensure alignment with existing country campaign plans. The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) provided the initial model for how this could work. EUCOM “provided the authority, funding, and direction for SPP engagement.”⁵³ One of the advantages of this cooperation with the NG was the cost advantages. It was as much as 80 percent cheaper to

use reserve forces for security cooperation compared to maintaining standing deployed forces. At the same time, the NG relied on the CCMDs for Title 10 authority, required to operate in federal status.⁵⁴

Given the transformational nature of the SPP over the years, it should not seem too surprising to expect it to adapt again to partner with a country like Brazil. Dialogue has begun at senior U.S. military levels and with the Brazilian MOD for how Brazil would like this partnership to look. Because of the vast size of Brazil and its relatively large military, the MOD would like to partner directly with the central NG headquarters. While this is different than the typical partnership with a state NG organization, it offers a great range of opportunities for Brazil. At the same time, Brazil should recognize that some of the benefits that come with partnering with a single state, such as personal, long term relationship, may be harder to develop. In order to make this work, the U.S. parties involved all must agree on the approach. While there is clear support from the AF and the NG, questions seem to remain for SOUTHCOM and the Army as well.

Establishing the SPP for Brazil would provide an additional mechanism to cooperate in the areas mentioned previously as well as others. The Guard's citizen-soldiers bring to the table military experience as well as a wide range of civilian experiences. Considering some of the social and developmental struggles Brazil is facing, this partnership could address more areas than the existing exchanges already taking place. On the flip-side, Brazil too has knowledge and experience to share with the U.S. Several areas come to mind immediately such as with peacekeeping operations and energy sector development. Ultimately, if Brazil wants it, it would be much more difficult to try to say why the partnership should not be established than why it should!

Chapter VII. Conclusion and Recommendations

The relationship between the U.S. and Brazil is complicated and over time it has only become more complex with the U.S. not wanting to cede control and Brazil seeking to gain it. Nevertheless, the two countries have continued on in peace and general cooperation with occasional issues to work through. Only as recently as 2015, having been through a period of mistrust and falling out, are the countries getting back on a cooperative track that once again offers hope for significantly greater cooperation in the future. If the countries complete the DCA and GSOMIA, a new level of cooperation is likely to begin that will have impacts on defense cooperation and economically as U.S. companies compete for valuable contracts. In the meantime, President Rousseff must also survive political trials at home as the country continues along a path of development.

There is tremendous opportunity for cooperation in this relationship, and greater cooperation can help both countries. The U.S. has limits to its power and span of control and needs to share power and security responsibilities with willing and able partners like Brazil. On the other hand, Brazil needs to continue to develop and become completely self-sufficient. Considering the areas of potential cooperation, it makes complete sense for Brazil to partner with the U.S. through the NG SPP. The unique ability of this program to foster and build relationships may be exactly the sort of confidence and trust building measure desired by each side. The history of the program has demonstrated its value in terms of cost, and it makes conducting future operations between the countries much easier because of the relationships already built. The U.S. should take advantage of Brazil's seeming willingness to begin this cooperation.

ENDNOTES

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- ¹ Storer, "U.S.-Brazil Security Cooperation and the Challenge of Technology Transfer," 66.
 - ² *Ibid.*, 2.
 - ³ Hirst and Hurrell, *The United States and Brazil*, 67.
 - ⁴ *Ibid.*, 1-5.
 - ⁵ Storer, "U.S.-Brazil Security Cooperation and the Challenge of Technology Transfer," 9.
 - ⁶ *Ibid.*, 9-10.
 - ⁷ Bandeira, "Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States," 21.
 - ⁸ *Ibid.*, 18 and 21.
 - ⁹ Soares De Lima and Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities," 29.
 - ¹⁰ Bandeira, "Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States," 21.
 - ¹¹ *Ibid.*, 21.
 - ¹² Hakim, "Brazil and the U.S. Security Agenda," 1.
 - ¹³ *Ibid.*, 3.
 - ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.
 - ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.
 - ¹⁶ Fishman and Manwaring, "Brazil's Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine," 1.
 - ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.
 - ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.
 - ¹⁹ Hakim, "Brazil and the U.S. Security Agenda," 98.
 - ²⁰ Brands, *Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy*, iii.
 - ²¹ Soares De Lima and Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities," 21.
 - ²² *Ibid.*, 24.
 - ²³ *Ibid.*, 25 and 36.
 - ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.
 - ²⁵ Amorim, "Hardening Brazil's Soft Power," 1-2.
 - ²⁶ Brazil Ministry of Defense, "National Strategy of Defense," 8.
 - ²⁷ Amorim, "Hardening Brazil's Soft Power," 1-2.
 - ²⁸ Brown, "Restoring the "Unwritten Alliance," 42.
 - ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 42.
 - ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.
 - ³¹ White House, *National Security Strategy (2015)*, 27.
 - ³² Brown, "Restoring the "Unwritten Alliance," 42.
 - ³³ *Ibid.*, 42.
 - ³⁴ *Ibid.*, 45.
 - ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.
 - ³⁶ Brands, *Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy*, 51.
 - ³⁷ Storer, "U.S.-Brazil Security Cooperation and the Challenge of Technology Transfer," 69.
 - ³⁸ Brazil-U.S. Business Council, "The U.S.-Brazil Defense Partnership: Moving Toward Closer Cooperation," 4-5.
 - ³⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴⁰ Brazil-U.S. Business Council, “The U.S.-Brazil Defense Partnership: Moving Toward Closer Cooperation,” 1.

⁴¹ Downes, “Trust, Engagement, and Technology Transfer: Underpinnings for U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation,” 1.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴³ Brazilian Ministry of Defense, www.defesa.gov.br.

⁴⁴ Forman, Finlay, and McKeon, *Beyond Boundaries in Brazil: Innovating for Proliferation Prevention*,” 11.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁴⁸ Boehm, *The National Guard State Partnership Program: Forging and Maintaining Effective Security Cooperation Partnerships for the 21st Century*, vii.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, vi.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 55.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.



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