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**MULTINATIONAL COUNTER-PIRACY OPERATIONS:
HOW STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT IS THE GULF
OF GUINEA TO THE MAJOR MARITIME POWERS?**

by

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December 2015

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MAJOR MARITIME POWERS?**

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ABSTRACT

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea regularly exceeded that of the Gulf of Aden between 2000 and 2007. But the major maritime powers established counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden without replicating the same in the Gulf of Guinea. Since 2004, the United States has closely monitored counter-piracy operations in the Malacca Strait after a failed earlier attempt to materially provide such services. Why are the United States and other maritime powers interested in the Gulf of Aden and Malacca Strait? If the Gulf of Guinea states would allow these powers to establish a counter-piracy task force, does the region have the strategic heft to attract these powers? The search for answers to these questions informs this study. The study, which is essentially comparative, synthesizes and analyzes existing quantitative and qualitative data. It reveals that the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea is minor compared to the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, the thesis urges the Gulf of Guinea states to search for regional solutions that would materialize improvements in maritime regime governance, security, and development.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
CMF	Combined Maritime Forces
CRESMAC	Centre Régional de la Sécurité Maritime de l’Afrique Centrale
CTF	Combined Task Force
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
FPDA	Five Power Defense Arrangement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission
GGMGC	Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command
GNP	Gross National Product
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
IMO	International Maritime Organization
InMarsat	International Maritime Satellite
IRTC	Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
IUU	Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MALSINDO	Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia
MARAD	United States Maritime Administration
MICC	Maritime Inter-Regional Coordination Center
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOWCA	Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa
MSO	Maritime Security Operation
MSSP	Malacca Strait Security Patrol
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OBP	Oceans Beyond Piracy
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

ReCAAP	Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
RMSI	Regional Maritime Security Initiative
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation
SHADE	Shared Awareness and De-Confliction
SLOC	Sea Line of Communication
SUA	Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
TSS	Traffic Separation Scheme
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Piracy and armed robbery against ships are common occurrences in maritime spaces where commercial maritime activities flourish. The debilitating impact of these maritime crimes on the economies, images, and prestige of affected countries has necessitated national counter-piracy efforts. Because piratical activities and armed robbery against ships in one country have international implications, regional and extra-regional efforts to combat piracy are now common. But it appears that these efforts are guided by particular interests because, in reality, examples abound that show that not all piracy-infested maritime spaces benefit from regional and extra-regional counter-piracy efforts.

The Gulf of Guinea is indisputably one of the maritime spaces that portends significant importance to international maritime trade, and by extension, global welfare. This is because of several strategic maritime attributes of the region, including large deposits of offshore and onshore hydrocarbon and other mineral resources. These attributes have occasioned increased commercial maritime activities, but with concomitant incidences of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The scale and scope of these incidences necessitate international intervention. But despite the fact that piracy in the Gulf of Guinea regularly exceeded that of the Gulf of Aden between 2000 and 2007, the major maritime powers established counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, the same period the Gulf of Guinea was notorious for piratical incidents. Although it was possible that stakeholders in the Gulf of Guinea would have rebutted requests for such direct material assistance, what is most disturbing is that the major maritime powers did not consider the possibility or mute the idea of replicating the Gulf of Aden maritime security structure/model in the Gulf of Guinea.

Since 2004, the United States has micromanaged counter-piracy operations in the Malacca Strait after a failed attempt to convince the Malacca Strait regional powers about the genuineness of its Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) proposal. The RMSI was to enable the United States to materially provide security in the Malacca Strait by deploying Special Forces to the region.

Why are the major maritime powers so interested in the Gulf of Aden and Malacca Strait and not as much in other maritime spaces, including the Gulf of Guinea? Given that stakeholders in the Gulf of Guinea would allow the major maritime powers to establish a counter-piracy task force in the Gulf of Guinea, does the region have the strategic heft to attract the material participation of these powers in its security?

The search for answers to the foregoing questions informed this study entitled “Multinational Counter-Piracy Operations: How Strategically Significant is the Gulf of Guinea to the Major Maritime Powers?” The thesis, which is essentially a comparative case study of the Malacca Strait, Gulf of Aden, and Gulf of Guinea, synthesizes and analyzes existing quantitative and qualitative data of these maritime spaces. Based on the comparison of two important parameters of these maritime spaces—strategic maritime significance and the costs of piracy—the study reveals that the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea to international maritime trade and hence, global welfare, is minor when compared to the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden. Consequently, the major maritime powers do not have the requisite interest that could incentivize them to physically partake in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Guinea.

However, the fact that the Gulf of Guinea does not possess the kind of geostrategic maritime credentials possessed by the Malacca Strait or the Gulf of Aden hardly negates the severity of the region’s piracy impact on regional stakeholders. Since the thesis results indicate that the possibility of the major maritime powers to physically assist in counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea does not exist, or is at best remote, it behooves regional stakeholders to search for and proffer indigenous solutions that would materialize significant improvements in maritime regime governance, security, and development. In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that:

1. Any proposed solution to the Gulf of Guinea piracy problem should include a strategy that can bring about significant improvements in maritime regime governance, security, and development. Such a result-oriented strategy would require mutually reinforcing actions at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.
2. Before any meaningful achievements could be made with respect to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea at the strategic level, responsible political leaders in the region must see the importance and necessity of a

regional maritime security community where efforts could be concerted and burden shared to achieve sustainable results. The Gulf of Guinea Commission, as a maritime security community, is far from achieving this desired objective. Therefore, the current leadership of the Commission must commence efforts towards achieving a strengthened, expanded, and focused Gulf of Guinea Commission that is committed to achieving its set objectives.

3. Political leaders in the Gulf of Guinea and regional maritime stakeholders should search for regional solutions to regional maritime security problems that would bring about significant improvements in maritime regime governance, security, safety, and development. This would require more commitment, honesty, and receptiveness to constructive ideas by the political leaders.
4. National governments of the Gulf of Guinea states should embrace good governance and grassroots socio-economic policies that would make piracy unattractive to perpetrators and potential perpetrators in coastal communities as an economic occupational venture.
5. In view of the economic strength the maritime environment provides for the Gulf of Guinea states, political leaders should balance their attention in allocating resources between continental issues and maritime security matters.
6. At the operational level of strategy, the Gulf of Guinea Commission should establish the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command that would focus on collaboration among the maritime security agencies to work together across their territorial and sub-regional boundaries. This organization should have the capacity to properly coordinate effective use of intelligence, personnel, and materiel to deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The current arrangement, which encourages only coordinated patrolling among the zones should be discontinued in favor of a more robust but fluid structure under a single overall command.
7. In setting up the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command, regional leaders should particularly bear in mind that its success would greatly depend on effective organizational structure, integrated logistics, the right number and mix of platforms, repair/maintenance facilities and bases, training and doctrinal integration, sufficient maritime domain awareness infrastructures, equipment interoperability and compatibility, effective motivation and reward systems for law enforcement personnel, adequate funding and, above all, commitment and mutual trust among the political leaders in the region. Also, the proposed arrangement would require developing, streamlining, and operationalizing common agreements, judicial codes, and prison systems for resolving maritime offences.

8. The GGMGC should be headed by an experienced senior naval or coast guard officer from any of the member states for a specified duration. The officer should be assisted administratively by a staff of maritime law enforcement representatives and operationally by a deputy and two strategic commanders. He or she should be directed by a Maritime Security Committee comprising chiefs of defense staff of member countries, which should in turn be guided by the heads of state forum through the Chairman of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. The arrangement should also include a Maritime Security Training Command and a research and development organization.
9. Member states should fund the Maritime Guard Command concurrently through a compulsory common funding based on a predetermined formula and a voluntary asset contribution. Excesses from the common funds after recurrent expenditure could be accumulated to purchase maritime security assets, including vessels to make the Guard Command independent of states as time goes on.
10. The research and development organ of the proposed Guard Command should work out modalities for cooperating with and receiving assistance from extra-regional powers and organizations. But primarily, these resources and capabilities would have to be provided by the Gulf of Guinea states even though some are poor and most, if not all, hardly have enough assets to monitor their respective maritime environments.
11. At the tactical level, commanders should act independently to deploy forces, but this should be consistent with the principle of economy of forces because of the vast extent of the Gulf of Guinea. Since pirates must come out to sea and return to their bases after their operations, deployments should be made in a manner that takes maximum advantage of the knowledge of pirates' movements and the nature of the coastline bordering the Gulf of Guinea. Accordingly, deployments should be made to cover all river inlets that lead to the Atlantic Ocean. Such effective deployment would prevent random patrols and logistical wastages, including personnel stress and loss of alertness.

Although the foregoing recommendations are not by any means exhaustive, they are respectfully offered with a view to achieving a safe, secure, and economically viable Gulf of Guinea maritime space. It is believed that organizing the security structure of the Gulf of Guinea maritime space along these recommendations should serve as a good starting point to achieving a panacea to the region's maritime security predicament.

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Finally, I would like to mention that any errors or omissions, which might be detected in this thesis, are entirely my responsibility.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Nations engage in international trade to realize their full economic potential through globalization and global economic integration. Maritime trade constitutes a preponderance of international trade and is conducted through established international sea lanes of communication (SLOC) or maritime corridors. Piracy has existed since the beginning of seaborne trade,¹ but the scope, scale, and sophistication of modern piracy require international collaboration to combat it. Various factors such as interests, capacity, commitment, and moral obligation have occasioned different degrees of collaboration among sovereign nations to combat piracy. As a maritime thoroughfare, the Gulf of Guinea holds no exception to piracy, and the states abutting it have not shown the requisite capacity to eradicate the piracy scourge. The lack of capacity suggests the possible need for material assistance from extra-regional maritime powers. But does the Gulf of Guinea possess the strategic significance to attract such intervention? Providing answers to this question is the central focus of this study.

A. BACKGROUND

Oceans, seas, and littorals collectively form incontrovertible existential importance to humanity. These components of the world's ecosystem are critical for food security, sustainment of economic prosperity, and well-being of people, both in the industrialized and developing worlds. About 71 percent of the Earth's surface is covered by water, and over 90 percent of world trade by weight and volume is transported over the oceans.² Equally important as the flow of goods is the flow of services, which in today's computer-centric world travels electronically in digital bits and bytes through fiber optic cables laid across the world's ocean floors. The fact that three-quarters of the world's megacities (those of 20 million inhabitants or more) are by the sea and about 80

¹ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2013, "The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation," accessed October 18, 2015, <https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/pirates-of-somalia-main-report-web.pdf>

² UN-Business Action Hub, "International Maritime Organization," accessed January 10, 2015, <https://business.un.org/en/entities/13>. Also see "Interesting Ocean Facts" Save the Sea, accessed February 6, 2015, http://savethesea.org/STS%20ocean_facts.htm.

percent of the world's population lives within 60 miles (about 111 km) of a coast further supports the view that the maritime environment is indispensable to human existence.³ The sea is also home to living and non-living resources such as fish and other marine organisms, important minerals and hydrocarbons.

The foregoing underscores the strategic importance of the sea to the potentialities of littoral states. But to fully realize these potentialities, the oceans and seas must be safe for free movement of commerce. Like the continental environment, the world's maritime system is also threatened by irregular threats and illicit activities such as piracy; armed robbery of ships; maritime terrorism; human and narcotics trafficking; mass illegal migration; smuggling; small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation; illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing; as well as activities that degrade the maritime environment such as pollution and unauthorized resources exploitation.⁴ The complexity and dynamics of these threats necessitates littoral states to cooperate in ensuring safety and stability in the world's maritime system.

The Gulf of Guinea forms a significant strategic component of the world's maritime system. It is conceptualized geographically as the Atlantic coast stretching from Senegal to Angola, including the island countries of Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe (see Figure 1). The region is rich in marine resources such as fish, shrimp, and other aquatic fauna and flora, as well as large quantities of solid minerals and hydrocarbon deposits, amongst other important strategic valuables. But the region contends with a mixed fortune of realities. As political instability, insurgency, militancy, and terrorism assume a disturbing trend ashore, an increase in incidences of illicit

³ Christopher Small and Joel E. Cohen, "Continental Physiography, Climate and the Global Distribution of Human Population," *Current Anthropology* 45, no. 2 (April 2004), accessed February 6, 2015, http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/~small/PDF/ISDE_SmallCohen.pdf. Small and Cohen conducted a study that showed the spatial distribution of the global human population could be considered from the standpoint of the environment's influence on humans. They were able to show that population diminishes with distance from the coastlines and major rivers, and that there are more people per available land area within 100 km of the coastlines. These results further support the indispensability of the sea to human existence.

⁴ Lauren Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa* (CRS Report No. 7-5700), Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 24, 2009, <http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc26147/>

maritime activities—as enumerated earlier—have exposed limitations in maritime regulatory capacity as well as poor regional cooperation on maritime security.

Figure 1. Map Showing the Gulf of Guinea



Source: “Ivory Coast Rebuilds Navy to Fight Growing Piracy in West Africa,” Sea News Turkey, February 5, 2014, <http://www.seanews.com.tr/news/120433/Ivory-Coast-rebuilds-navy-to-fight-growing-piracy-in-West-Africa.html>.

B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

Among the aforementioned illicit activities that currently bedevil the Gulf of Guinea, piracy and armed robbery of ships are most disturbing. Since most of the Gulf of Guinea states have economies that depend mainly on maritime trade with other nations, the economic implications of such piratical activities are significant. Therefore, securing the Gulf of Guinea maritime space from pirates not only requires collaboration among the Gulf of Guinea states, but perhaps also requires significant material participation of maritime powers outside the region, especially the major maritime powers like the United

States of America, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to mention but a few. This leads to the primary question of the research: Are there compelling reasons or incentives for the major maritime powers to materially participate in the security of the Gulf of Guinea as was attempted in the Malacca Strait, or as is currently ongoing in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space?⁵

In the course of providing answers to the primary question, the study pursues a number of secondary questions: What incentivized the major maritime powers to attempt usurping the security of the Malacca Strait from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore (hereinafter referred to as the Malacca Littoral States)? Why does insecurity of the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space draw a coalition of willing nations to form counter-piracy task forces in the Western Indian Ocean? Does the Gulf of Guinea possess similar credentials as the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space and the Malacca Strait as indispensable strategic maritime passages to attract material security presence of major maritime powers? As mentioned earlier, providing answers to these questions forms the central theme of this thesis.

C. IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

Today, over 90 percent of goods and cargo for international trade and commerce are seaborne.⁶ Consequently, all regions and nations, as per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), share the common desire to use the sea safely, securely, fully and wisely; ensure the safe transit of cargoes and people on all waters; and prevent misuse of the oceans. Since the Gulf of Guinea states might not have the capacity to handle the piracy scourge alone considering the near absence of the requisite mix of platforms, modern maintenance facilities, logistics and funding, and

⁵ Increasing spates of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Malacca Strait led user states possessing maritime powers, like the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea, to explore possibilities of physically participating in the security of the Malacca Strait. This intention led to the proposal of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in 2004 by Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, former Commander U.S. Pacific Command. This proposal, however, was regarded by the littoral states (except Singapore) as an attempt to not only internationalize and unnecessarily securitize the safety of the Strait, but also to usurp the right of securing the Strait as provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

⁶ UN-Business Action Hub, "International Maritime Organization."

mutual trust among them, there is perhaps the need for the major maritime powers to go beyond their current level of counter-piracy assistance in the Gulf of Guinea, to more material and practical participation. This thesis attempts to establish if there are compelling incentives that could lead the major maritime powers to form a coalition to actively participate in counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea as was attempted in the Malacca Strait, or as is currently ongoing in Somalia/Gulf of Aden.

The geostrategic importance of select maritime spaces and the costs of piracy are major considerations that should incentivize the formation and sustainment of regional and/or international counter-piracy engagements in piracy-infested waters. Accordingly, these considerations are a benchmark to assess if the Gulf of Guinea possesses similar credentials so as to occasion similar counter-piracy initiatives. Based on the findings, this thesis intends to generate recommendations that could contribute to existing counter-piracy policies in the Gulf of Guinea. However, absence of these credentials would mean that the region does not have the compelling incentives to attract the presence of major maritime powers to the security of the Gulf of Guinea. This would mean that nations abutting the Gulf of Guinea would require operationalization of pragmatic and functional indigenous counter-piracy approaches.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Piracy has been the subject of numerous books, articles, journals, and dissertations, as well as popular movies and plays. However, despite the abundance of literature on piracy, specific literature that discusses the considerations that incentivize the formation of multinational counter-piracy operations is still limited.⁷ What writings are available focus on details of maritime interests of littoral states and regional organizations expressed in their national security strategies. The reasons for establishing

⁷ Although literature on what constitutes considerations for formation and sustainment of multinational counter-piracy operations is not widely available, a few writers and resource fellows on maritime security have suggested ways in which the world's oceans, seas, and other waterways could be responsibly utilized for the common good of humankind. For example, see Susan Page Hocevar, "Building Collaborative Capacity for Maritime Security," in *Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons: A Comprehensive Approach for International Security*, ed. Scott Jasper (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 123; and Jeffrey Kline, "Maritime Security," in *Securing Freedom in the Global Commons*, ed. Scott Jasper (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010) 75.

multinational counter-piracy operations might seem obvious; but if that is the case, one must ask why some pirate-infested waters do not have ongoing multinational counter-piracy operations. The cost of piracy and the strategic significance of maritime spaces are the major considerations for the formation of multinational counter-piracy initiatives. In fact, the greater the costs of piracy and the more the importance of the maritime space, the higher the propensity for multinational counter-piracy initiatives to emerge—either regional or extra-regional. The following sections review works that address multinational counter-piracy collaboration (a dependent variable), and considerations for counter-piracy initiatives (the independent variable).

1. What is Piracy?

Before delving into counter-piracy, it would perhaps be necessary first to understand what piracy is, and to briefly discuss some associated juridical dynamics of the phenomenon. Article 101 of the UNCLOS defines piracy as any of the following acts:

- (a) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
- (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
- (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in (a) or (b).⁸

The UNCLOS definition of piracy is limited. From its definition, piracy cannot occur in waters within states' jurisdiction. This means that attacks in archipelagic waters like the Malacca Strait, maritime bottlenecks such as the Bab el Mandab in the Gulf of Aden, and exclusive economic zones do not constitute piracy, as these are waters within states' jurisdiction.⁹ Pirates often exploit this lacuna by operating within waters under

⁸ *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, part VII, article 101, accessed January 16, 2015, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.

⁹ *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, part VII, article 86.

states' jurisdiction, especially when such states do not have a clear proscription against maritime crimes under their penal code or are not committed to counter-piracy operations.

The limitation imposed by the UNCLOS definition of piracy has restrained nations in combating piracy and has necessitated the use of other instruments when dealing with violent acts against ships in waters within states' jurisdiction. The International Maritime Organization's (IMO) Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships is one of the instruments that fills the gap. It provides a separate definition for piratical activities that take place within the jurisdiction of a state. Referred to as Armed Robbery against Ships, the IMO Code of Practice defines it as:

(a) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;

(b) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described above.¹⁰

Another salient instrument is the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), which was adopted in March 1988 and entered into force four years later. The SUA Convention does not propose a definition for piracy, but lists those acts that constitute an offence and prescribes appropriate actions to be taken against persons who commit such offences. Article 4 of the SUA Convention states:

This Convention applies if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single state, or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent states.¹¹

¹⁰ International Maritime Organization, *Resolution A. 1025(26): Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships*, London: International Maritime Organization, January 18, 2010, <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf>.

¹¹ International Maritime Organization, *SUA Convention and 2005 Protocol Text* (London: International Maritime Organization, 2005), <http://cns.miis.edu/inventory/pdfs/aptmaritime.pdf>.

This means that the Convention does not apply in territorial waters (territorial waters are considered part of the land mass of a state) and so requires states to enforce security of their territorial waters consistent with their penal codes. But the Convention applies in the contiguous zone and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), even though these are within the jurisdiction of states. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the SUA Convention addresses the gap existing in the UNCLOS definition of piracy.

Similarly, the International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau (IMB) annual reports, which provide useful information that helps stakeholders to better understand the trend and typology of piracy, also disregard the limitations imposed by the UNCLOS definition of piracy. The IMB notes that almost all illegal acts in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world occur within territorial waters and thus would not fall under piracy going by the UNCLOS definition. Accordingly, the IMB explains piracy to mean “An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act.”¹² This definition forms the basis of its regular annual reports, but is completely silent on jurisdiction. The IMO also provides similar statistics on attempted and actual pirate attacks, but the IMB reports are more detailed. In addition, the IMB reports provide comprehensive narratives of worldwide analyses of piracy incidents. A review of five annual reports on piracy from 2009 to 2013 provided by each of these organizations indicates that there is a general decline in piratical activities (IMB: from 325 down to 264; IMO: from 406 down to 298). More than 51 percent of these incidents occurred while vessels were at berth or at anchor in waters within states’ jurisdiction, but are all reported as piracy, which shows a departure from the UNCLOS definition of piracy.¹³

¹² “Definitions,” Maritime Terrorism Research Center, accessed September 11, 2015, <http://www.maritimeterrorism.com/definitions/>

¹³ Extracted from IMB Annual Reports 2009–2013. The status of ships during actual and attempted attacks is not contained in the IMO reports and is calculated from IMB reports considering only ships at berth and at anchor. Steaming vessels are not considered because the statistics do not indicate if they are steaming in waters within states’ jurisdiction or otherwise.

2. Why Multinational Counter-Piracy?

Historically, different counter-piracy approaches—unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral—have been adopted in combating piracy, depending on regional politics and the scale and scope of the piratical scourge. Multinational counter-piracy operations at the regional or international levels are usually more expressions of national interests and are usually part of national security strategies or national strategies for maritime security. Accordingly, this subsection reviews the national security/maritime strategies of some of the countries and regional organizations involved in counter-piracy operations to determine if their actions are driven more by interests than by moral obligation. Later, multinational counter-piracy operations in two regions of the world—the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space—are reviewed.

a. *United States*

The *U.S. National Security Strategy 2015* clearly states the unflinching interest of the United States in freedom of navigation, free flow of commerce, and a sustainable maritime environment, including deterrence of aggression and attacks on commercial maritime traffic.¹⁴ This resolve is carried through from the *2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security*, which was based on the conviction that “The safety and economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world’s oceans.”¹⁵ The strategy, which is an outcome of a U.S. security posture review after the 9/11 terrorist attack, calls on the integration and synchronization of all maritime strategies at the department and agency levels into a comprehensive national strategy for effective and efficient implementation.¹⁶

In 2007, the United States approved the *Policy for the Repression of Piracy and Other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea* (Piracy Policy) in reaction “to the emergence of

¹⁴ The White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: The White House, February 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.

¹⁵ White House, “The National Strategy for Maritime Security,” September 20, 2005, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html>.

¹⁶ White House, “The National Strategy for Maritime Security,” September 2005.

high-risk maritime areas that threatened [its] interests.”¹⁷ Included as Annex B in the *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, the policy “advances U.S. commitment to cooperate with other states, regional and international organizations, and maritime industry in order to counter the threat of piracy and to promote and facilitate peaceful international uses of the oceans.”¹⁸ In June 2014, the White House released the *United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan*, which implements the *National Strategy for Maritime Security* and the *Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea*. The plan affirms the United States’ unswerving commitment to international maritime security and recognizes the common interest among littoral states, which is to maximize economic utility of the maritime domain while ensuring its safety and security.¹⁹ As stated by the White House Press Secretary’s Office:

[The Plan] provides clear strategic guidance for counter-piracy efforts and outlines that the United States will use all appropriate instruments of national power to repress piracy and related maritime crimes. [Furthermore, it] focuses on three core areas: Prevention of Attacks, Response to Acts of Maritime Crime, and Enhancing Maritime Security and Governance; and provides specific frameworks for the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea regions. These frameworks establish the tailored and specific methodology for these regions and provide guidance on how the United States will respond to the regional threats associated with the varying geographic, political, and legal environments.²⁰

b. United Kingdom

In its *National Strategy for Maritime Security*, the Government of the United Kingdom recognizes the sea as essential to its economy, but that it is also exploited by other nations and non-state actors. According to the UK Strategy, insecurity in the

¹⁷ George W. Bush, *Memorandum on Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy* (Washington, DC: Office of the Press Secretary, June 13, 2007), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2007-06-18/pdf/WCPD-2007-06-18-Pg803.pdf>

¹⁸ Bush, *Memorandum on Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy*.

¹⁹ The White House, *United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan* (Washington, DC: The White House, June 20, 2014), <http://www.marad.dot.gov/wp-content/uploads/pdf/USCounterPiracyMaritimeSecurityActionPlan2014.pdf>

²⁰ White House, “White House Releases the United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan,” June 20, 2015, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/20/white-house-releases-united-states-counter-piracy-and-maritime-security->

maritime domain “... requires national and international policing and regulation, and strong global partnership to address areas of common interest, striking the appropriate balance between legitimate movements, and monitoring hostile activity.”²¹ The strategy document further states that:

The United Kingdom considers ‘maritime security’ to be the advancement and promotion of the UK’s national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the United Kingdom’s prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world.²²

Accordingly, the Government of the United Kingdom stipulates five maritime security objectives to advance and protect its national interests:

- Promoting a secure international maritime domain and upholding international maritime norms.
- Developing the maritime governance capacity and capabilities of states in areas of strategic maritime importance.
- Protecting the UK, our citizens and our economy by supporting the safety and security of ports and offshore installations and Red Ensign Group (REG) – flagged passenger and cargo ships.
- Assuring the security of vital maritime trade and energy transportation routes within the UK, Marine Area, regionally and internationally.
- Protecting the resources and population of the UK and Overseas Territories from illegal and dangerous activity, including serious organized crime and terrorism.²³

c. European Union and NATO

In the European Union *Maritime Security Strategy* formulated in June 2014, the EU recognizes effective use of the sea as a veritable source of prosperity—both for the entire region and for individual member countries and their citizens.²⁴ To achieve this,

²¹ Ministry of Defence, *The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security* (London: Ministry of Defence, May 2014), p. 9, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310323/National_Strategy_for_Maritime_Security_2014.pdf.

²² Ministry of Defence, *The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security*, p. 9.

²³ Ministry of Defence, *The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security*, p. 9.

²⁴ Council of the European Union, “European Union Maritime Security Strategy,” June 24, 2014, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2011205%202014%20INIT>

the seas and oceans must be accessible, safe, and secure for economic activities to flourish.²⁵ The European Union is thus interested in countering illicit activities in the maritime environment, such as piracy, terrorism, and trafficking of arms, narcotics, and humans. Also, the European Union Maritime Security Operation (MSO) Concept provides for how the European Union maritime forces can contribute to the campaign against unlawful activities at sea.²⁶

NATO recognizes several critical security and economic interests that could be subverted by transnational criminals and non-state actors:

1. Maintenance of freedom of navigation.
2. Safety of maritime trade routes.
3. Security of critical infrastructure.
4. Sustainment of energy flow.
5. Protection of marine resources and environmental safety.²⁷

The increase in scale and scope of piracy and its associated implication for commercial vessels and private sea users is another source of concern for the Alliance. Recognizing that no military organization can achieve security and defense objectives in isolation, the NATO Alliance's Comprehensive Approach Action Plan supports partnership with other organizations, both international and regional, as well as law enforcement agencies, to actualize its interests.²⁸

While the contents of all the maritime strategies of the major maritime powers and regional organizations are voluminous, it suffices to say that the maritime strategies of most countries and regional organizations are aimed at ensuring safe and secure seas and oceans consistent with their national strategic economic and military interests. When the multiplicity of piratical and other maritime crimes and vastness of the maritime domain are taken into consideration, states and regional organizations are compelled to

²⁵ Council of the European Union, "European Union Maritime Security Strategy."

²⁶ Council of the European Union, "European Union Maritime Security Strategy."

²⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Alliance Maritime Strategy* (C-M[2011]0023) (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011), http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110318_alliance_maritime-strategy_CM_2011_23.pdf

²⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Alliance Maritime Strategy*.

opt for partnerships in order to share the burdens of counter-piracy efforts. When the geo-strategic maritime significance and the cost of piracy of a region (e.g., Malacca Strait and Gulf of Aden/Somali waters) are brought into the mix of considerations, the need for multinational counter-piracy partnerships becomes even more overwhelming.

3. Multinational Counter-Piracy Operation: The Malacca Strait

Worldwide terrorist attacks against ships have created increased concern about possible maritime terrorism in the Malacca Strait. These include the terrorist attack on the *USS Cole* in October 2000; the attack on the French supertanker *Limburg* on October 6, 2002; the al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf group's *MV Superferry 14* attack in waters off Manila on October 10, 2004; as well as other failed attempts.²⁹ The adverse socio-economic and political impacts that a terrorist attack in the Malacca Strait could portend for the Southeast Asian nations perhaps created a collective sense of threat perception. Also, the possibility of a terrorist attack in the Malacca Strait was viewed not only as an existential threat, but also as a "common other" to unite against. In addition, the notoriousness of pirates in the Malacca Strait, and external pressure from the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other user nations that depend on the Malacca Strait, may have informed the commitment of the Malacca Littoral States to form a multinational counter-piracy partnership.³⁰

Efforts to secure the Malacca Strait against pirates' attacks galvanized several regional and extra-regional maritime security cooperative initiatives. These included the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP), and the Malacca Strait Security Patrol (MSSP), among others. The most striking among these initiatives is the success of the MSSP, the multinational counter-piracy arrangement put together in 2004 by the Malacca Littoral States. Before

²⁹ Graham Gerard Ong-Webb, "Piracy in Maritime Asia: Current Trends," in *Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism*, ed. Peter Lehr (New York: Taylor and Frances Group, 2007), 84.

³⁰ Yann-huei Song, "Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and Enhancing Security in the Strait of Malacca: Littoral States' and Regional Responses," in *Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation*, ed. Shicum Wu and Keyuan Zou (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009), 110.

2004, the Malacca Littoral States had never in their history adopted a common counter-piracy framework due to lack of trust, concerns for territorial integrity, and regional political dynamics.

The RMSI was the most notable among several American maritime security initiatives. It was designed to create and encourage a maritime security community within the southeast and Pacific regions, especially with respect to securing the Malacca Strait.³¹ The idea to initiate an RMSI was first muted in 2004 by Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, then commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, during a briefing to the U.S. Congress.³² He stated, “The main goal of the RMSI was to develop a partnership of willing nations, working together under international and domestic laws, to identify, monitor and intercept transnational maritime threats, in particular piracy, armed robbery, and terrorist attacks at sea.”³³ However, the initiative was interpreted by Indonesia and Malaysia as an attempt to usurp physical security of the strait by extra-regional powers, which they unequivocally reiterated as primarily the responsibility of the Malacca Littoral States.³⁴ Furthermore, they expressed concerns that U.S. material involvement in the security of the Strait would not only violate their territorial integrity and the sanctity of their sovereignty, but also could attract terrorists ideologically averse to the United States.³⁵ It is in light of the foregoing that Indonesia and Malaysia greatly contested the idea of U.S. forces patrolling the Malacca Strait and opted for a regional solution to regional security problems. Singapore was very much in support of the initiative.

³¹ Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal,” in *International Law Studies Volume 83, Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications, and Natural Disasters*, ed. Michael D. Carsten (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2007), <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/e39d592e-16c1-470b-ae41-db2387a61687/Vol--83---Security-in-the-Strait-of-Malacca-and-th.aspx>

³² Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal.”

³³ Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal.”

³⁴ Yann-huei Song, “Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and Enhancing Security in the Strait of Malacca: Littoral States’ and Regional Responses,” 111–116.

³⁵ Yann-huei Song, “Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and Enhancing Security in the Strait of Malacca: Littoral States’ and Regional Responses,” 111.

Fearing the prospect of foreign intervention in the Strait, the Malacca Littoral States were compelled to enter into a trilateral cooperation. This marked the birth of the MSSP, also known as Operation MALSINDO (Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia) in July 2004. Operation MALSINDO involves the use of a two-pronged attack strategy to combat pirates at sea and on land by denying them safe havens ashore. To operationalize the initiative *ab initio*, 17 ships were assigned—seven from Indonesia and five each from Malaysia and Singapore.³⁶ These ships initially patrolled their respective national territorial waters, but as the operation evolved, national boundaries were deemphasized and patrol vessels were permitted to conduct “hot pursuit” up to five nautical miles³⁷ into the territorial waters of another country to effect arrest.³⁸ Despite the inclusion of “hot pursuit,” the MSSP still is largely a coordinated operation rather than combined, and the possibility of sovereignty infringements is still very much a source of concern.

In 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore acceded to commence joint air patrols over the Malacca Strait to supplement the trilateral sea patrols already started. Called the “Eyes in the Sky” (EiS) initiative, participating countries contribute two patrols a week comprising maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) with military officers from each country embarked (as well as other individuals from neighboring countries, if deemed necessary) who are responsible for alerting their respective law enforcement agencies when suspicious contacts are sighted.³⁹ In the EiS initiative, participating countries’ MPAs are allowed to patrol deep into the twelve miles of territorial waters of other participating countries but not less than three nautical miles from the coast.⁴⁰ The

³⁶ Joshua Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” *Asian Survey* 46, no. 4 (July/August 2006): 558–574.

³⁷ Sheldon W. Simon, “Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of Collaboration,” *Asian Security* 7, no. 1 (2011): 27–43.

³⁸ Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal.”

³⁹ Lynn D. Pullen and Scott C. Truver, “Security in the Pacific Rim: Evolving U.S. Strategies, Doctrines, and Forces for Maritime Cooperation and Regional Collective Action,” In *The Evolving Maritime Balance in the Asia Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea*, ed. Lawrence W. Prabhakar, Joshua H. Ho, and Sam Bateman (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2006), 153.

⁴⁰ Catherine Zara Raymond, “Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved?,” *Naval War College Review* 62, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 37.

success of this initiative is politically significant because the program fosters trust and cooperation among the triumvirate of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore and marks a significant change in flexibility for the three countries, as they put sovereignty issues aside in order to improve maritime security.⁴¹ Raymond and other researchers believe that the introduction of the EiS initiative in 2005 contributed immensely to the reduction of piratical activities in the Malacca Strait.⁴²

Again, in April 2006, the Malacca Littoral States signed an agreement to form a Joint Coordinating Committee on the MSSP and Standard Operational Procedures on Coordinated Patrols.⁴³ This agreement created and operationalized an effective unrestricted intelligence-sharing structure with a preponderance of surface surveillance radars and patrol platforms. These maritime domain awareness (MDA) infrastructures are positioned strategically along the coast consistent with global best practices to provide a total situational picture of the Strait. Accordingly, they provide regional maritime awareness capability by tracking vessels that transit the Strait as well as identifying suspicious vessels outside the traffic separation scheme (TSS).

Another feature of the MSSP is that it allows neighboring states and the United States to contribute to its success. The United States provides financial and technical support as well as training assistance. Since 2006, India has contributed to the multinational collaboration by offering the services of its navy and coast guard, including increased use of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, adjacent to the Malacca Strait, as a counter-piracy springboard.⁴⁴ Japan initiated the creation of ReCAAP in 2006 to further enhance multilateral cooperation at the operational and tactical levels. ReCAAP, in conjunction with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Shipowners' Associations, established an Information Sharing Center (ISC) to serve as a regional

⁴¹ Felipe Umana, *Threat Convergence: Transnational Security Threats in The Strait of Malacca* (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2012), <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/ttcvr1213-threatconvergence-malaccaStrait-08e.pdf>.

⁴² Raymond, "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved?," 37.

⁴³ "Thailand to Join Malacca Strait Security System," Thai Visa Forum, April 22, 2006, <http://www.thaivisa.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=66874&mode=threaded>.

⁴⁴ "Sea Transportation: India Joins Piracy Patrol," Strategy Page, May 2, 2006, <http://www.strategypage.com/htmlw/htseamo/articles/20060302.aspx>.

antipiracy information-sharing mechanism. The database system of the ISC provides updated information on location, type of attacks, and outcomes. When an incidence of piracy occurs, the affected vessel informs the closest coastal state for further necessary action. The information is also sent to the ISC, which in turn is disseminated among member states and other mariners within the vicinity. Furthermore, beginning in 2004, all vessels of 500 gross tons and above are required to install onboard a security alert system that provides near-real-time information on ship movements within the Strait.

The foregoing counter-piracy efforts by the Malacca Littoral States are responsible for the steady fall in piracy since 2004. There were no incidents in 2008, 2009, or 2010, according to IMO annual piracy reports, and two incidents in each of those years according to the *IMB Annual Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report*. The deterrent effect of the initiative could further be seen from the IMO and IMB annual piracy reports. While the IMO reports that there were no attempts in 2009 and 2010 and only two attempts in 2008, the IMB reports that there were two attempted attacks in 2008 and 2010 and none in 2009. However, incidences of piracy began to rise again in 2011, albeit at a relatively low level.⁴⁵ This perhaps is because of too much focus on countering attacks and arresting pirates, and not enough focus on the root causes of piracy.

4. Multinational Counter-Piracy Operation: Gulf of Aden/Somali Maritime Theater

The increasing scope and scale of Somali piracy with its associated dire consequences on global maritime trade necessitated the United States in 2008 to spearhead a coalition of willing nations against piratical activities in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and the Western Indian Ocean south of the coast of India up to the southern tip of

⁴⁵ International Maritime Organization, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships," 2008–2011, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Reports/Pages/Default.aspx?Paged=TRUE&p_SortBehavior=0&p_Adopted2=20101101%2000%3a00%3a00&p_ID=15&PageFirstRow=61&&View={5D335873-3876-4C21-AC57-CF94C848C391}. Also see ICC International Maritime Bureau, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports," 2000–2011, <https://icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre>. Comparing the piracy reports of the two organizations from 2011 shows a wide disparity in the number of incidents. While the IMB reports very low single digits, the IMO reports double digits.

Africa. Currently, there is a Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a multinational coalition comprising U.S. maritime task forces and maritime task forces from other regional organizations. Also participating in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime theater counter-piracy effort are individual maritime forces from countries that do not want to be part of the coalition.

The first task force to enter the theater was Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150). It was a maritime counterterrorism outfit in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to prevent al Qaeda and other terrorist networks in the Middle East from using the maritime domain in furtherance of their nefarious activities.⁴⁶ According to Commodore Per Bigum Christensen, commander of the Danish Task Group in CTF 150 between 2008 and 2009,

The task force is mandated to counter or defeat acts of violent extremism, aggression, and associated terrorist networks in littoral and maritime CTF 150 Area of Responsibility (AOR); work with regional, joint and other partners to improve overall security, stability and regional nations' maritime capabilities; and be ready to respond to a full range of crises, including environmental and humanitarian events until further notice in order to achieve secure and stable maritime environment free from terrorist activities.⁴⁷

To actualize this mandate, CTF 150 was directed to search and interdict in the maritime domain all traces of terrorist activities, such as arms and ammunition, drugs, and persons. Although CTF 150 did not have a definite mandate to conduct counter-piracy operations, it implicitly carried out counter-piracy functions in the course of its operation.

Other countries that deployed warships to the Somali maritime theater were not willing to be associated with CTF 150, perhaps because of the political implication of the counterterrorism emphasis in its mandate. Consequently, in January 2009, CTF 151 was set up with a mandate to conduct a purely counter-piracy operation, and included U.S.

⁴⁶ Combined Maritime Forces, "CTF 150: Maritime Security," accessed September 13, 2015, <http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/ctf-150-maritime-security/>

⁴⁷ Per Bigum Christensen, "Task Force 150 Anti-piracy Operations" (PowerPoint presentation) (Naval Support Activity Bahrain: Combined Maritime Forces, January 25, 2009), <http://slideplayer.com/slide/4615664/>

vessels and those of non-European allied nations.⁴⁸ Accordingly, CTF 151 patrolled the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), a delineated sea area or protection zone recommended for merchant ships when transiting the Gulf of Aden in order to remain within the range of naval protection and assistance.

CTF 151 later became one of the components of the Combined Maritime Forces set up by the United States and European Union. The other component was the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), codenamed Operation ATALANTA, established in December 2008. The European Union mandated that Operation ATALANTA “deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.”⁴⁹ Eventually, participation in the Combined Maritime Forces extended beyond the European Union and United States and included Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.⁵⁰ Command and control of the Command Maritime Forces spans all coalition members, and U.S. forces often operate under non-U.S. leadership.

NATO has also played active roles in enhancing international counter-piracy efforts off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden since 2008.⁵¹ NATO Operations ALLIED PROVIDER (October–December 2008) and ALLIED PROTECTOR (March–August 2009) provided escort services to ships under contract with the World Food Programme (WFP) and other merchant ships transiting the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime theater. Since August 2009, NATO has led Operation OCEAN SHIELD, “which helps to deter and disrupt pirate attack while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region,” as well as “supporting countries in the region to build the capacity to fight piracy themselves.”⁵²

⁴⁸ Roland Marchal, “Somali Piracy: The Local Contexts of an International Obsession,” *Humanity* 2, no. 1 (2011): 46

⁴⁹ European Union External Action, *European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta* (fact sheet) (Brussels: European Union External Action), accessed November 2, 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-navfor-somalia/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_en.pdf

⁵⁰ Marchal, “Somali Piracy: The Local Context of an International Obsession,” 31

⁵¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Counter-Piracy Operations,” last updated March 26, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm.

⁵² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Counter-Piracy Operations.”

China, Russia, Iran, and India also individually send ships to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. Ships from these countries are not organic to the Combined Maritime Forces, NATO, and EUNAVFOR. Coordination is facilitated through coordinating conferences or Shared Awareness and De-confliction meetings (SHADE) to ensure overall theatre operational effectiveness among all participating units.⁵³ The meetings have been regularly held in Bahrain since 2008 and involve military and civilian representatives of stakeholders.⁵⁴

Despite the intervention of the coalition of willing nations, the number of incidences did not decline immediately, but instead rose to an all-time high in 2008.⁵⁵ Part of what gave the pirates this undue leverage was the reluctance of the Coalition to effect arrests because they lacked law enforcement powers, as well as their unwillingness to enter Somali territorial waters without the consent of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG).⁵⁶ Also, trial and conviction of pirates suffered some setbacks because some western European nations of the Coalition worried that arresting and taking pirates to Europe for trial and conviction could end with pirates seeking asylum at the end of their jail terms.⁵⁷

These challenges triggered a series of actions, among them the UN Security Council Resolutions 1846. This, *inter alia*, permitted vessels of participating nations

to enter the territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a manner consistent with such

⁵³ Thomas Kelly, "The U.S. Government's Approach to Countering Somali Piracy," U.S. Department of State, October 25, 2012, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/199929.htm>

⁵⁴ Oceans Beyond Piracy, "Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)," accessed November 2, 2015, <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconfliction-shade>

⁵⁵ IMO, "Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships," 2004–2011;IMB, "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports," 2004–2011.

⁵⁶ Martin N. Murphy, *Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 106.

⁵⁷ Christopher L. Daniels, *Somali Piracy and Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press Inc., 2012), 82.

action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law.⁵⁸

In addition, the United States and United Kingdom signed an agreement with Kenya in 2009 that allows for the extradition of arrested pirates to Kenya for prosecution. On January 29, 2009, the IMO adopted the Djibouti Code of Conduct, a regional agreement among countries around the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime theater to cooperate in “repressing piracy and armed robbery against ships throughout the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.”⁵⁹ By July 2012, a total of twenty of the twenty-one eligible countries had signed the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Although the agreement was not statutorily binding, its adoption set the region on the trajectory for cooperation in countering piratical activities as well as towards a well-functioning maritime security arrangement through regional information-sharing and combined/joint interoperability training.⁶⁰

5. Multinational Counter-Piracy Operation: Gulf of Guinea

According to Rear Admiral Adeniyi Osinowo of the Nigerian Navy, an expert in African maritime security,

An escalation in piracy and other transnational maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea have exposed the limited levels of maritime domain awareness in the region. The highly fungible nature of maritime security threats means that this challenge cannot be addressed solely by individual states but requires cohesive regional security cooperation.⁶¹

His statement depicts the reality of the security situation in the Gulf of Guinea. The disturbing situation, particularly with respect to piracy, has galvanized various regional counter-piracy initiatives with capacity-building support from international

⁵⁸ United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 1846 (2008)* (New York: United Nations, December 2, 2008), <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201846.pdf>

⁵⁹ International Maritime Organization, “Djibouti Code of Conduct,” accessed August 15, 2015, <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx>.

⁶⁰ Oceans Beyond Piracy, “Djibouti Code of Conduct,” accessed September 30, 2015, <http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/djibouti-code-conduct>.

⁶¹ Adeniyi Adejimi Oshinowo, “Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” *Africa Security Brief* no. 30 (February 2015): 1.

partners, especially from the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as the United Nations Security Council:

By terms of [Resolution 2018 of 2011], the [United Nations Security] Council encouraged ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission to develop a comprehensive strategy including through: the development of domestic laws and regulations criminalizing piracy and armed robbery at sea; the development of a regional framework to counter such acts; and the development and strengthening of domestic laws and regulation to implement relevant international agreement on the safety and security of navigation, in accordance with international law.⁶²

Together with the IMO, the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA), as one of such regional collaborative frameworks suggested by the UN,

Developed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Establishment of a Sub-regional Integrated Coast Guard Network in West and Central Africa which was adopted in Senegal in July 2008 ... and provides a framework to promote regional maritime cooperation and a stable maritime environment as well as the peace, good order and prosperity of West and Central Africa.⁶³

Also, in June 2013, the heads of government from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), formally adopted the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The Code, which was voted for and accepted by 25 countries in West and Central Africa complements the security related aspects of the IMO/MOWCA MoU.⁶⁴

The heads of government also agreed to establish a Maritime Inter-Regional Coordination Center (MICC).⁶⁵ Also, as part of the ongoing tripartite arrangement

⁶² United Nations Security Council, *Condemning Acts of Piracy, Armed Robbery off Gulf of Guinea States, Security Council Calls on Regional Bodies for Strong Action against Perpetrators*(SC/10430) (New York: United Nations, October 31, 2011), <http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10430.doc.htm>

⁶³ International Maritime Organization, "Integrated Coast Guard Function Network," accessed September 13, 2015, <http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/Integrated-Coast-Guard-Function-Network-.aspx>

⁶⁴ International Maritime Organization, "Integrated Coast Guard Function Network."

⁶⁵ Oshinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," 4.

(ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC), the Gulf of Guinea states are grouped into zones: Zones A through G. Zones A, B, and D are under ECCAS, while Zones E, F, and G are under ECOWAS. Each zone is to formulate and operationalize strategies for the security of its maritime space with provision for liaison with adjacent zones.⁶⁶

6. Strategic Importance of the Sea

The sea has over time been central to the socio-economic and political power base of serious-minded littoral countries, and its utility and control have sometimes been sources of conflict or cooperation among littoral states. The importance of the sea to the wealth and strength of littoral states is aptly captured by Sir Alfred Thayer Mahan, a renowned American naval strategist, in his seminal work, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783*. According to Mahan,

The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitive regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.⁶⁷

Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Navy between 1956 and 1985, shared Mahan's view of the importance of the sea in *The Sea Power of the State*. According to Gorshkov,

The strength of a maritime state lies in its inherent capacity to place all resources and possibilities offered by the ocean at the services of mankind and make full use of them to develop its economy which ultimately determines all facets of the life of the country including its defense capability.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Africa Union, *Declaration of the Heads of State and Governments of Central and West African States on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime Domain* (Yaounde, Cameroon: African Union, June 25, 2013), <http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/Declaration%20of%20the%20Heads%20of%20State%20and%20Government%20on%20Maritime%20Safety%20and%20Security.pdf>

⁶⁷ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1896), 1.

⁶⁸ Sergei G. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 2.

The foregoing statements corroborate the fact that the sea profoundly portends strategic benefits to littoral countries that put it to effective use. Also, while ‘piracy’ is not explicitly mentioned in the two statements, one could deduce from the statements that piracy reduces the possibilities and potentialities offered by the sea to humankind. To realize such potentialities or possibilities for one’s own use, states should make every effort to exclude others (in this case, pirates) through actions ranging from adequate constabulary presence at sea, through regional and international regulations on safety and security of the sea, to actual kinetic action against pirates and other maritime criminals. These efforts could be undertaken by individual states (single or joint Service) and bilateral and multinational alliances (joint and combined Services).

7. The Costs of Piracy and Geo-Strategic Maritime Importance

In their study, *How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community?*⁶⁹ research fellows Sami Bensassi and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso argued that piracy increased the economic cost of international maritime transport. This is due to increases in the wages of crew members sailing through dangerous waters, costs of insurance, and costs of alternative routes or alternative means of transport, as a result of insecurity. They found that the economic cost of piracy in terms of trade destruction between 1999 and 2008 is estimated at \$28 billion. Using a transport-cost equation, Bensassi and Martinez-Zarzoso showed that piracy significantly reduced the volume of international trade between Europe and Asia by 11 percent per every 10 ships seized by pirates.⁷⁰ They arrived at the costs of piracy purely from an economic perspective, and did not speculate if the colossal economic losses are responsible for the emergence of multinational counter-piracy operations.

In the scholarly article, “The Trade Consequences of Maritime Insecurity: Evidence from Somali Piracy,” Professor Alfredo Burlando et al. of the University of

⁶⁹ Sami Bensassi and Inmaculada Martinez-Zarzoso, *How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community* (Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 27134) (Munich: Munich Personal RePEcArchive, December 2010), <http://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27134/>

⁷⁰ Bensassi and Martinez-Zarzoso, *How Costly is Modern Maritime Piracy for the International Community?*

Oregon compared the volume of commercial shipping passing through pirate-infested waters to those that do not pass through such waters and found that activities of Somali pirates reduced maritime trade by about 4.1 percent over an interval of 11 years (2000–2010), with five countries and the European Union bearing 70 percent of the cost. In monetary terms, they estimate that \$25 billion was lost, on average, to activities of Somali pirates between 2000 and 2010, with the European Union bearing almost half of the total annual cost throughout the period under review.⁷¹ But unlike Bensassi and Martinez-Zarzoso, Burlando et al. did not limit their work only to maritime trade between European and Asian countries separated by pirate-infested waters, but also considered bilateral maritime trade outside such waters. This provided a basis of comparison that makes very clear how trade fluctuated in pirate waters between countries. But again, these researchers did not show any relationship between the cost of piracy and the emergence and sustainment of counter-piracy initiatives. They assessed the costs of piracy purely from an economic perspective, but the costs of piracy have other dimensions.

In a 2008 RAND report entitled, *The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States*, analyst Peter Chalk posits that modern piracy has human, economic, political, and environmental security costs. He categorized the costs into direct and indirect. Under direct costs are human costs such as death of or injury to crew members and trauma occasioned by previous attack or high probability of future attack. Economic costs include fraud, stolen cargoes, ships' security arrangements, delayed trips, higher insurance premiums, and subversion of a country's trading ability due to loss of trust and confidence. Politically, piracy could weaken a regime's legitimacy by encouraging corruption among top government functionaries who aid and abet the illicit crime. Piratical attacks could also cause serious environmental disaster, particularly if such attacks result in the spillage of oil or

⁷¹ Alfredo Burlando, Anca Cristea, and Logan M. Lee, "The Trade Consequences of Maritime Insecurity: Evidence from Somali Piracy," *Review of International Economics* 23, issue 3 (2015): 525–557.

hazardous materials.⁷² Although the report did not suggest if these costs are responsible for the emergence and sustainment of multinational counter-piracy initiatives, what cannot be denied is that the costs have the capacity to cause unprecedented consequences to global socioeconomic and political welfare. The cost becomes particularly onerous when the affected area is of strategic maritime significance.

In summary, none of the sources actually looks at the costs of piracy and strategic maritime significance as considerations for establishing and sustaining a multinational counter-piracy initiative. Also, there is a tendency to define the costs of piracy from only an economic perspective. Apart from economic costs, which are the most obvious, pirates have the potential to cooperate with terrorists, and this has been a source of serious concern. Apart from loss of maritime capacity and tradition within a region, the psychological cost of a possible piracy-terrorism nexus within a region—whether real or imagined—is not readily measurable. Also, the prevalence of piracy incidents is an indication of state failure, as piracy limits state capacity and encourages corruption within the society. It paints affected states in a bad light, bringing down their profile and moving them further up in the failed state/fragility index. The ripple of such a reputation among the comity of nations is more clearly imagined, especially in terms of trade.

E. METHODOLOGY

The pervasiveness and complexity of maritime piracy requires a concerted effort by countries within a region to counter the crime as part of a regional security community framework. Depending on the cost of such piracy incidents to global maritime trade and the strategic significance of the maritime space concerned, this framework could require the physical participation of major maritime powers. In order to address the central theme, two cases are studied: one on a piracy hotspot largely involving collaboration among countries within a region, and another on a piracy hotspot involving the intervention of major maritime powers. Data obtained from the case studies of their costs of piracy and strategic significance are compared to that of the Gulf of Guinea—a

⁷² Peter Chalk, *The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf.

comparative case studies approach. This is to establish why there may or may not be compelling interests for the major maritime powers to physically participate in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Guinea.

The maritime spaces chosen are the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space in the Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa. These geographical regions are selected because they are known high-risk piracy hotspots just like the Gulf of Guinea. Apart from their ‘high risk’ commonality, they typify examples of ongoing multinational counter-piracy efforts. The maritime space off the Horn of Africa is chosen because of its strategic importance and because it presents a typical example of ongoing collaborative counter-piracy efforts involving active participation of major maritime powers. Also, this area is on the east coast of Africa and so lies along the same continent as the Gulf of Guinea. Countries bounding this maritime space are also characterized by similar socio-economic, political, and weak institutional problems as those bounding the Gulf of Guinea. Perhaps the only dissimilarity is that Somalia and Yemen are failed states, while none of the Gulf of Guinea states could be assessed as failed or failing states.

The Strait of Malacca is selected because of certain similarities it shares with the Gulf of Guinea, and also for the fact that it exemplifies a piracy hotspot with a regional counter-piracy arrangement. “As much as one-third of the world’s trade and one-half of its oil may transit through the Strait of Malacca,”⁷³ making it an indispensable strategic asset to the world economy. Therefore, disruption of this sea lane of communication portends significant economic repercussions for most of the world.

The study mostly utilizes data from two major sources: the International Maritime Organization *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships* and the International Maritime Bureau *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports* of the select maritime spaces. According to the IMO website:

⁷³ James E. McGinley and Jonathan P Berliner, *High Noon On the High Seas: A Proximity-Complexity Model of Maritime Piracy Threats; Strategic Insights*, V. 8, Issue 4(April 2009) (Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), p. 1.

The IMO is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Maritime Organization is the global standard-setting authority for the safety, security and environmental performance of international shipping.⁷⁴

The IMB Piracy Reporting Center (IMB PRC) however, is an organ of the International Chamber of Commerce established to independently monitor and report piracy attacks worldwide free of political interferences and biases.⁷⁵ Accordingly, the IMB PRC “is the world’s only manned center receiving and disseminating reports of piracy and armed robbery twenty four hours a day across the globe.”⁷⁶

Between the IMO and IMB annual piracy reports, the latter is assessed as providing more comprehensive, elaborate, and in-depth data and reports on piracy. Consequently, data presented in this thesis are drawn more from the IMB PRC. However, data from these sources suffer some limitations: some attacked vessels might not report incidences of their attacks for fear of raising their insurance premiums, and there are bureaucratic bottlenecks and time delays in the investigation process that follow such reports. The cost implications as a result of these time delays are borne by ship owners and, as such, do not augur well for business. Also, national governments downplay piracy incidents within their jurisdiction to prevent the impact of the bad reputation and negative publicity associated with such incidents to business activities. Nevertheless, data from these sources are still credible, on the one hand because the numbers of vessels that avoid making reports are infinitesimal when compared to the number of vessels that make reports and, on the other hand because of increasing awareness among mariners on the need and advantages to report piracy incidents. The research synthesizes and analyzes existing literature on the topic, rather than producing new data. Accordingly, in addition

⁷⁴ “International Maritime Organization,” *Introduction to IMO*, accessed August 8, 2015, <http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx>.

⁷⁵ International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Service, “Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures,” accessed March 5, 2015, <https://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsfigures>.

⁷⁶ International Chamber of Commerce Commercial Crime Service, “Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures.”

to the IMO and IMB reports on piracy, the research relies on reviewing counter-piracy literature in books, reports, journals, and policy papers.

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II. GEOSTRATEGIC MARITIME IMPORTANCE

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is a case study on the geostrategic maritime importance of the Strait of Malacca, Gulf of Aden, and Gulf of Guinea. The chapter argues that geostrategic maritime significance is an important consideration for the formation and sustainment of multinational counter-piracy operations. Because the Malacca Strait and Gulf of Aden have profoundly significant geo-strategic importance of global dimension, there exist multinational counter-piracy initiatives in these maritime spaces—one undertaken by regional maritime powers but supported by the United States and other extra-regional maritime powers, and the other, a coalition of several willing nations spearheaded and micromanaged by the United States.

The respective salient geographical features of the maritime spaces under review and the economic viability of the regions they give access to are studied. Also, the utility of their geographic peculiarities to international maritime commerce and politics are assessed. A simple comparison of these peculiarities and the economic viability of the regions they give access to are used to show their relative geostrategic maritime significance. Also, efforts are made to show why geostrategic maritime significance forms the core of the maritime powers' interests to astutely encourage security in the Malacca Strait and, in the case of the Gulf of Aden, to the extent of physically micromanaging their security. Finally, by analytically comparing the geostrategic maritime significance of these two maritime assets to that of the Gulf of Guinea, it is proven that, because the Gulf of Guinea does not have the same kind of geographical salience as the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden, it is conceived as being not as strategically significant. Accordingly, there is no overwhelming interest or obligation for the formation and sustainment of a multinational counter-piracy initiative in the Gulf of Guinea that is directly and physically spearheaded and micromanaged by the major maritime powers as obtainable in the Malacca Strait and Gulf of Aden. Regional cooperative solutions must then be found.

B. THE STRAIT OF MALACCA

The Malacca Strait is a 500-mile-long maritime chokepoint between Malaysia and Indonesia.⁷⁷ Traversing the territorial waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, India, and Thailand,⁷⁸ this narrow stretch of water covers an expanse of about 25,000 square miles⁷⁹ with several interconnecting tropical islets and secret coves along the coastlines bounding it. Depths within the navigable channel fluctuate from 27 to 200 meters,⁸⁰ but outside that the Strait is fraught with dangers to safe navigation, such as wrecks, narrow width (about 1.7 miles at the lowest point),⁸¹ and shallow depths. Additionally, navigational aids are often unreliable and the probability of accidents occurring within the Strait is high due to busy commercial shipping traffic and local artisanal fishing. Therefore, deep-draft vessels are required to navigate with particular caution to avoid risk of collision or going aground.⁸²

The Malacca Strait is a maritime artery with global geopolitical and economic importance. From a strategic standpoint, it offers the most cost-effective sea lane of communication that connects the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and the Persian Gulf (see Figure 2). Accordingly, it is the main maritime thoroughfare that connects the booming economies of Asia, the advanced economies of the West, and the oil-exporting economies of the Persian Gulf. With over 280 vessels navigating the Strait every day, excluding “the myriad of smaller, cross-Strait and local trading, fishing, ferry, and

⁷⁷ “Strait of Malacca,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed July 11, 2015, <http://www.britannica.com/place/Strait-of-Malacca>.

⁷⁸ Felipe Umana, “Threat Convergence: Transnational Security Threats in the Strait of Malacca.”

⁷⁹ “Strait of Malacca,” Encyclopedia Britannica.

⁸⁰ “Strait of Malacca,” Encyclopedia Britannica.

⁸¹ “Strait of Malacca (East),” Sea-Seek, accessed April 10, 2015, <http://www.sea-seek.com/?geo=2881>.

⁸² “Strait of Malacca (East),” Sea-Seek.

pleasure craft,” the Malacca Strait is one of the busiest maritime arteries in the world.⁸³ About 70,000 ships traverse the Strait each year.⁸⁴

Figure 2. Map Showing the Strait of Malacca



Source: Google Maps, “Strait of Malacca,” accessed March 5, 2015, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/Strait_of_malacca.jpg.

The strategic importance of the Malacca Strait is further illustrated when one looks at China’s crude oil and natural gas imports. According to Robert Potter, a visiting scholar at Columbia University and a researcher on international security:

The vast majority of China’s oil imports pass through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda. This creates a security issue for China as the

⁸³ Donald B. Freeman, *The Strait of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet?* (Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 43. Also see Ji Guoxing, *Asian Pacific SLOC Security: The China Factor* (Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Center Working Paper No.10) (Canberra, Australia: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Center, April 2002), http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/sites/default/files/publication-documents/Working_Paper_10.pdf.

⁸⁴ James Kraska, *Contemporary Maritime Piracy: International Law, Strategy, and Diplomacy at Sea* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 41.


Straits function as a strategic ‘chokepoint’ through which China’s energy supply must pass. Essentially, whoever controls the Straits of Malacca has the ability to heavily disrupt a vital energy corridor to China.”⁸⁵

While the Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits form alternative navigational routes, they are not as cost-effective as the Malacca Strait (see Figure 3). The Sunda Strait features too many navigational hazards and is therefore not a preferred navigational route, while the Lombok and Makassar Strait, although safe for navigation, involves an additional 1,600 nautical miles or three and a half to four days’ sailing at an average cruising speed of 15 knots.⁸⁶ Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and other maritime-dependent economies in the Far East are equally vulnerable to similar energy insecurity as is China. The political, economic, and military alliances between the United States and these countries, and the expansionist proclivities of China, have morally obligated the United States to seek the protection of its allies. This obligation is one important factor that makes the United States a strategic player in the Malacca Strait political equation.

⁸⁵ Robert Potter, “The Importance of the Strait of Malacca,” *E-International Relations*, September 7, 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/09/07/the-importance-of-the-strait-of-malacca/>.

⁸⁶ Ji Guoxing, “Asian Pacific SLOC Security: The China Factor.” Also see Xiaobo Qu and Qiang Meng, “The Economic Importance of the Strait of Malacca and Singapore: An Extreme Scenario Analysis,” *Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review* 48, issue 1 (January 2012): 261.

Figure 3. Map Showing Major Asia-Pacific Shipping Lanes (Malacca Strait and its Alternatives)



Source: Southchinasea.org, “Major Asia – Pacific Shipping Lanes,” accessed September 25, 2015, <http://www.southchinasea.org/files/2011/08/sealanes.gif>.

Seeking dominance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans without exercising control of the Malacca Strait and its alternatives—real or latent—is a faulty strategy. Accordingly, the United States and other maritime powers are currently doing everything possible to exercise some level of control of the Malacca Strait by applying their military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities to exploit the geo-strategic and economic attributes of the Strait in ways that maximize benefits and minimize risks. For example, the United States has developed the “Air-Sea Battle” doctrine, an anti-access weapons countermeasure against asymmetric threats in the Western Pacific and the Persian Gulf.

This doctrine is the Pentagon's response to possible conflict with China or Iran.⁸⁷ China has developed anti-access capabilities and area denial strategies that focus on the ability of its armed forces to conduct anti-access or area-denial against U.S. military deployments in the event of a crisis.⁸⁸

Politically, the Strait has the potential to provide disproportionate political advantages for the Malacca Littoral States. Closing the Strait or threatening to do so could be used by the Malacca Littoral States as a bargaining chip to gain undue concessions in the international political landscape. The 1967–1975 closure of the Suez Canal by Egypt and the multifarious impact of that action on global politics and economy is a classic example. Blocking the Malacca Strait or threatening to do so could be used by non-state actors such as terrorist groups and other dark networks to score cheap political goals and attract disproportionate attention from the international community. Militarily, the Malacca Strait provides a route for faster deployments of United States, European Union and NATO maritime forces to the South China Sea and some other parts of the Pacific Ocean. Lessons learned from the Battles of the Java Sea and Sunda Strait during WWII vis-a-vis China's current militaristic and expansionist disposition in the South China Sea makes Western security interest in that geographical area understandable. Accordingly, in line with the strategic significance of the Malacca Strait and adjoining areas, the United States and its allies and partner states will need a grand security strategy and concept of operation that would have the efficacy to achieve overwhelming dominance of the area.

From an economic perspective, one quarter of the world's commerce (valued at several hundred billion dollars) passes through the Strait of Malacca annually:⁸⁹

⁸⁷ The nomenclature "Air-Sea Battle" has been dropped and the Air Sea Battle Office (ASBO) subsumed into the DOD Joint Staff as part of the new Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). The modification is intended to increase the scope to include the land component in the overall concept of operation.

⁸⁸ Potter, "The Importance of the Strait of Malacca."

⁸⁹ Tamara Renee Shie, "Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and Progress of Intra-ASEAN cooperation," in *Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Strait*, ed. Graham Gerard Ong-Webb (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006), 164.

It is estimated that two-thirds of the world's liquefied natural gas (LNG); between one-fifth and one-quarter of the world's sea trade; half of the global oil shipments carried by sea; and over 80 per cent of the oil and gas imports of China, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea come through the Strait of Malacca.⁹⁰

As these countries and others within and around the region increasingly record good economic performance, these figures are projected to increase with time.⁹¹ If traffic through the Strait was blocked for any reason—terrorist attack, massive oil spillage and response activities—a detour through the Sunda, Lombok, or Makassar Straits does not only portend a greater risk to safe navigation, but also adds a significant amount of shipping cost and time.⁹²

From the foregoing, one can justifiably posit that the Strait of Malacca is one of the most important shipping lanes and maritime assets of the world, in the same league as the Suez Canal, Panama Canal, the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Strait of Hormuz. In view of the vested interest of the United States, European Union, NATO and other maritime powers in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, any untoward activities in the Strait of Malacca, such as piracy and armed robbery against ships, will attract serious attention and decisive response. This, perhaps, is why the United States and its strategic partners in South-East Asia did everything possible to offer physical security of the Malacca Strait.

C. GULF OF ADEN/SOMALI MARITIME SPACE

The Gulf of Aden forms part of the northeastern portion of the Indian Ocean and is located between Yemen at the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia and Djibouti at the Horn of Africa. Measuring about 900 km (540 nm) long, 20 km (12 nm) wide at its western end, and 500 km (300 nm) wide at its eastern end, the Gulf of Aden connects the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea through the Bab el Mandeb Strait, its narrowest point (see Figure 4). Just like the Malacca Strait, the Gulf of Aden is another very

⁹⁰ Yann-huei Song, "Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal."

⁹¹ Yann-huei Song, "Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal."


⁹² Yann-huei Song, "Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal."

important sea lane of communication with significant strategic political and economic importance. In terms of strategic economic importance, it offers the shortest and most cost-effective route for Persian Gulf oil and gas to reach Western markets and for manufactured goods from the West to reach the Persian Gulf and the Far East as well as the east coast of Africa. Similarly, it offers the shortest route for shipping from the Far East to Europe and the United States. The main ports in the Gulf of Aden are Aden in Yemen, and Berbera and Bosaso in Somalia. Aden is mostly used as a replenishment port when transiting from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, or vice versa. The importance of the Gulf of Aden is further accentuated by the number of ships that cross it annually and the daily global demand of crude oil that passes through it. The foregoing suggests that the Gulf of Aden is an indispensable geo-strategic asset to global maritime commerce and, by implication, the world economy.

The coastline of Somalia is about 3,241 km (1,750 nm) long, with a maritime space rich in significant fish stocks, vast deposits of oil and gas, as well as various other minerals.⁹³ Furthermore, a significant number of vessels transporting oil from the Arabian Gulf countries to the West pass through this maritime corridor as well as vessels from the West carrying relief materials, manufactured goods, and finished products to markets on the east coast of Africa and to Asia. Also, vessels from Asia destined for South America and the west coast of Africa may transit Somali maritime space and sometimes make calls at some of the ports in countries close to or contiguous to Somalia. Therefore, Somali maritime space portends great developmental potential and strategic significance to the socio-economic well-being, security and political stability of Somalia and its neighboring states.

⁹³ “The Somali People are Determined to Protect their Maritime Resources,” Hiiraan Online, March 23, 2015, http://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2015/Mar/98728/the_somali_people_are_determined_to_protect_their_marine_resources.aspx.

Figure 4. Map Showing the Horn of Africa, Surrounding Waters, and Key Locations



Source: “Piracy off the Horn of Africa,” Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed October 21, 2015, <http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/piracy-off-horn-africa-crs.html>.

D. GULF OF GUINEA

Apart from its huge economic potential, the Gulf of Guinea straddles a vital sea lane of communication for the world’s maritime trade and is devoid of any choke points. The region is one of the largest hydrocarbon provinces in the world, with over 42.9 million barrels of total proven oil reserves,⁹⁴ and is potentially the world’s largest reserve of offshore deep water oil. Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea contributes about 70 percent of Africa’s net crude oil output, and with recent discoveries in Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote

⁹⁴ Stuart E. Johnson et al., *Promoting International Energy Security Volume 4, The Gulf of Guinea* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012), xi.

d’ivoire, and Liberia, these numbers are only going to rise.⁹⁵ Additionally, the low Sulphur contents of its crude greatly reduces the cost of refining, and the existence of an appreciable amount of natural gas deposits further increases the strategic significance of the Gulf of Guinea.

As crises in the Middle East and North Africa continue unabated, and as the politics of Russian oil and gas supplies to Europe remain uncertain, the Gulf of Guinea will continue to remain a veritable alternative source of hydrocarbon resources. Tanker transit to refineries on the east and gulf coasts of the United States and to Europe is relatively short and has the added advantage of not passing through vulnerable choke points.⁹⁶ However, lack of a chokepoint, which appears an advantage, is, in reality, a strategic disadvantage as far as international interest in providing multinational counter-piracy response is concerned. This is because the Gulf of Guinea could be accessed from all directions due to its expanse and does not canalize shipping as do the Malacca Strait and the Bab el Mandeb in the Gulf of Aden. Consequently, the Gulf of Guinea, when compared with the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait, portends far lesser risk as far as threat of interruption of global energy supply and other trades are concerned. Also, states and non-state actors cannot obstruct or threaten to obstruct the entire Gulf of Guinea (unless within harbors, and these are not part of the gulf) as a means to garner undue political concessions or to negotiate from a position of geographical advantage or strength.

E. COMPARING GEOSTRATEGIC MARITIME SIGNIFICANCE

One could assess the geostrategic significance of maritime spaces by comparing the economic well-being of countries or regions they service or give access to. This is in view of the axiom or fact that over 90 percent of international trade is conducted through

⁹⁵ Dawit Giorgis, “Why We Should Be Watching the Gulf of Guinea,” *Fareed Zakariah GPS*, March 5, 2013, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/05/why-we-should-be-watching-the-gulf-of-guinea>.

⁹⁶ Stuart E. Johnson et al., *Promoting International Energy Security Volume 4, The Gulf of Guinea*, xi.


the sea.⁹⁷ Therefore, it follows that maritime corridors must undoubtedly contribute similar measure to the economic progress of the countries or regions they serve or service.

Figure 5 illustrates that regional economic well-being is a function of maritime trade and maritime access. Since it is axiomatic that over 90 percent of international trade is conducted by sea,⁹⁸ and since no nation can be great without meaningfully engaging in international trade, it follows that the maritime corridors that give access to these regions are reasonably instrumental to their economic well-being. Commonsensically, anything that contributes immensely to a nation's well-being should be strategically very significant to that nation. Each region comprises four representative countries. The West is represented by the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. Asia is represented by China, India, Japan, and South Korea. The Persian Gulf comprises Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, and the UAE, while Africa is illustrated with Nigeria, Angola, Senegal, and Ghana. The average GDP of the four countries representing each region is computed for five years (2010–2014) to indicate the steady disparity in economic well-being among the regions. Only real GDPs were computed, not GNI (Gross National Income), or compensated for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP).

⁹⁷ Robert D. Kaplan, "Power Play in the Indian Ocean: The Maritime Commons in the 21st Century," In *Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World*, ed. Abraham M. Denmark and Dr. James Mulvenon (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2010), 182, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested%20Commons_1.pdf.

⁹⁸ Kaplan, "Power Play in the Indian Ocean: The Maritime Commons in the 21st Century."

Figure 5. Five Years' GDP Comparison in Dollars of the West, Asia, Persian Gulf, and Gulf of Guinea Using Representative Countries



Source: "GDP (Current US\$) Data," The World Bank, accessed November 18, 2015, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>

Figure 5 shows a clear difference in economic well-being among the West, Asia, Persian Gulf, and Gulf of Guinea. The GDP of the Gulf of Guinea is abysmally low compared to that of the West and the Far East. Although the GDP of the Persian Gulf is also very low, what is going for that region apart from its abundant hydrocarbon deposits is that it is located midway between the rich and technologically advanced economies of the West and the fast growing economies of the Far East. Also, its maritime frontiers lie between the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait. Again, the Strait of Hormuz gives it a strategic strength to be reckoned with as far as global maritime trade and maritime balance of power is concerned.

The Gulf of Guinea bounds the coasts of littoral West and Central African countries and, hence, provides access to some of the world's poorest countries.⁹⁹ The Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait, on the other hand, provide cost-effective maritime access or links between three of the most important and technologically advanced regions of the world—the United States and Europe (West), and Asia. Additionally, these regions, especially Asia, accommodate a greater percentage of the world's population.¹⁰⁰ Coupled with their huge populations, the energy demand of the rapidly industrializing Asian economy is very high. Similarly, the industrialized and highly technologically advanced economies of the West also make very high energy demands. These energy demands, if sourced from the Persian Gulf countries, are serviced by the Malacca Strait for vessels going to the Far East, and the Gulf of Aden for vessels going to the West. This makes these maritime corridors profoundly strategically important, as they guarantee the energy security of most of the world's population.

Furthermore, the economic progress of the Far East Asian countries coupled with their rapidly rising population has correspondingly created a middle class with financial buoyancy and purchasing power. Combined with cheap cost of labor, the net result is a huge market for Western products and a cheap business environment that is mutually exploited by Western and Asian companies. Therefore, a strong nexus and mutualism exist between the Western economy and those of Far East countries. This makes the West

⁹⁹ The Gulf of Guinea countries are all in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa is the world's poorest region in all ramifications considering the 2013 statistics of credible institutions like the World Bank, WHO, UNDP, etc. In the 2015 rankings based on the GDP (PPP) of a country, which compares the generalized differences in the cost of living and standards between countries, Sub-Saharan Africa produced all of the first ten poorest countries in the world and thirty-six among the first fifty countries. Thirteen out of the nineteen Gulf of Guinea countries are considered part of the 50 poorest countries in the world. See Valencia Pasquali, "The Poorest Countries in the World," *Global Finance*, October 23, 2015, <https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/the-poorest-countries-in-the-world?page=12> for details. Even those that escape the list (i.e., Nigeria, The Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Cape Verde) are still very poor countries, as most members of these countries' population are predominantly illiterate, unemployed, and live below \$1.25 per day, which is the international poverty line as defined by the World Bank. See United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 2014* (New York: United Nations Development Program, 2014), <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2014> for details.

¹⁰⁰ Of the ten most populous countries in the world, Asia holds six (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Japan); Americas, two (United States and Brazil); Europe, one (Russia); and Africa, one (Nigeria). See the U.S. Census Bureau, "U.S. Census Bureau Current Population," accessed August 4, 2015," <http://www.census.gov/popclock/print.php?component=counter>

very interested in the security of the Gulf of Aden and Malacca Strait because most of the trade is conducted through them and also because they form the most cost-effective maritime link between the United States, European Union, and Asia. It is therefore not surprising that the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden command great security interests and, hence, are on the front burners of the security agenda of the United States, European Union, China, India, Japan, and South Korea, as well as most East and Southeast Asian countries.

The Gulf of Guinea obviously does not have similar credentials or geographical characteristics as the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden and, therefore, should understandably not attract similar security interests from the major maritime powers. The Gulf of Guinea does not only give access to some of the countries with the lowest per capita income, GDP, and GNP in the world, but also access to economies that are not manufacturing and so mostly dependent on the United States, the European Union, and China for manufactured and finished products, including raw materials. The United States, the European Union, and China all have suitable alternative markets for their products. This is evident from the fact that the Gulf of Guinea states rank very low in their list of trading partners and in the volume of activities in the Gulf of Guinea ports (see Figure 6).

Although some of the Gulf of Guinea states export crude oil, natural gas, and raw materials, there are also ready and equally suitable (if not cheaper) alternative sources for these products. For example, routes are shorter and, hence, cheaper for China and the other fast growing economies of the Far East to buy their oil and gas from the Persian Gulf and Russia. The European Union imports its crude oil requirements from Norway, Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), and OPEC countries (mostly Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Nigeria).¹⁰¹ The United States has seriously scaled down its oil imports from the Gulf of Guinea since the shale oil boom but continues to patronize the Persian Gulf states even though it might be cheaper to buy from the Gulf of Guinea because of the shorter distance and low Sulphur

¹⁰¹ European Commission – Energy, “Supplier Countries,” accessed September 22, 2015, <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies/supplier-countries>

contents of the crude.¹⁰² The foregoing examples are cited to show the multiplicity of alternative sources of crude oil at the disposal of the major maritime powers and the wide array of choices available to them. Commonsensically, this is expected to negate the Gulf of Guinea from occupying any special place or extraordinary position in the maritime security agenda of the major maritime powers to the extent of physically partaking in the region's maritime security.

As crises in the Middle East and the associated political dynamics assumed a disturbing dimension that threatened global security, the need to search for alternative sources of energy became unavoidable for the United States and its strategic partners. Consequently, as part of efforts to prevent al Qaeda and its affiliates from using Africa as a safe haven within the overall global counterterrorism effort, the United States increased its engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa, including trade in oil and gas.¹⁰³ However, the current reality indicates that the Middle East countries have continued to enjoy enough patronage in oil and gas trade from the United States and partner countries as one of the strategic options to diplomatically douse the situation and keep the region within its fold in order to protect and promote its interests in the Middle East. This has meant more maritime traffic through the Gulf of Aden and Malacca Strait.

Also, in order to protect and promote their strategic economic interests, the European Union and United States are obligated to ensure that the Gulf of Aden, its surrounding maritime spaces, and the Malacca Strait are kept secure and open for free

¹⁰² Nigeria became the first country to stop crude oil supplies to the United States as result of the Shale oil revolution. Although it was among the top first five countries that supply crude to the United States as of January, 2011 (see U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Today in Energy" accessed December 4, 2015, <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5570>), there is currently no Gulf of Guinea state among the top five countries that supply crude to the United States. Angola manages a stragglng tenth position, but this might not be a bad record in view of projections that the United States - Africa oil trade might eventually grind to a halt in the next two or three years. But despite the Shale revolution, Middle East producers such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq remain among the United States' top oil suppliers despite pumping crude oil of lower quality with a much higher cost of refining. This trend can be explained only by other strategic considerations—not the Shale oil boom. See Javier Blas, "Victims of Shale Oil, Nigeria stops Exporting Oil to US," *Beyondbrics* (blog), October 2, 2014, <http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/10/02/victim-of-shale-revolution-nigeria-stops-exporting-oil-to-us/>.


¹⁰³ After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland and the chaos that followed, the United States started engaging Sub-Saharan Africa more than it used to and differently from its Cold War/Post-Cold War policies towards the region. Amongst others, Sub-Saharan Africa's oil as an alternative source was topmost on the agenda.

flow of commercial maritime activities. This includes ensuring that piracy and armed robbery against ships do not grind commercial maritime activities to a halt. The formation, strong encouragement (as in the Malacca Strait), and sustainment of multinational counter-piracy initiatives are some of the ways that are being used to ensure that maritime trade routes are open and secure to satisfy the strategic interests of the West and the rapidly developing economies of the Far East. Since the Gulf of Guinea does not share similar credentials, it is most unlikely that the United States, the European Union, and the developing Asian economies would be willing to form a counter-piracy coalition that will physically combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.


Other indicators of strategic maritime significance of a maritime area are the trade volume and port activities it supports. Figure 6 shows the volume of world trade by region in millions of tons for select years. Again, the volume of import and export trade of Europe, America, and Asia regions over and above Africa is evidently clear. These high trade volumes are made possible by a sea lane of communication that connects these regions. Since Gulf of Guinea states rank very low in the list of trading partners with these regions, and since they all rank very high among themselves as trading partners, one can justifiably conclude that the sea lanes of communication linking them are more strategically significant than the Gulf of Guinea. However, this hypothesis is in view of the truism that maritime trade contributes over 90 percent of international trade, and so the maritime corridor that gives access to a region contributes correspondingly to its economic viability.

Figure 6. World Trade by Region (in Million Tons)


Europe Region



America Region




Asia Region



(continued on next page)

Figure 6 (continued from previous page)

Africa Region



Source: “World Trade by Region,” International Association of Ports and Harbors, accessed September 30, 2015, <http://www.iaphworldports.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=HzwY-WnbjJ0%3d&tabid=4879>

Statistics show that the world’s top twenty ports from 2004–2013 are in the United States, Europe, and Asia. Out of the twenty, fifteen are in Asia, and China has ten. Of the five ports outside Asia, two are U.S. ports; and one each is from Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Also, within the same time frame, eight of the top twenty ports experienced over two hundred percent growth, of which seven are Chinese ports. The exception is the Port of Dubai in the UAE.¹⁰⁴ It is doubtful if any port in the Gulf of Guinea has ever made the Lloyd’s list of world top container ports. The forgoing shows the low level of maritime activities in the Gulf of Guinea. Again, this indicates the poor strategic maritime significance of the Gulf of Guinea. If the Gulf of Guinea were as significant as the Malacca Strait or the Gulf of Aden, this would reflect just as bustling container activities in the numerous ports that straddle the length of the Gulf of Guinea coastline.

¹⁰⁴ International Association of Ports and Harbours, “World Top 20 Ports Ranking 10 Years/2004-2013,” <http://www.iaphworldports.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=A7oMk7mR0a4%3d&tabid=4879>.

F. CHAPTER SUMMARY

As a measure to establish that the Gulf of Guinea is not as strategically significant as the Malacca Strait or the Gulf of Aden, this chapter has discussed their respective geographical features as well as the use of some parameters to compare the economic viability of the regions they service. The Gulf of Guinea is a maritime outlet and inlet to the coasts of some of the world's poorest countries, while the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden link the world's most important regions in all ramifications. Further evidences of the superior strategic importance of the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden over and above the Gulf of Guinea are large disparities in the volume of port activities and the Lloyd's ranking of top 100 sea ports. The Port of Durban (South Africa) and Port of Tanger (Morocco) are the only ports in Sub-Saharan Africa that feature in the top 100 ports in the world.¹⁰⁵ While no sea port in the Gulf of Guinea features on the list, the list is awash with Asian, European, and North American sea ports.

It is therefore understandable for the major maritime powers to place a premium on the security of the maritime corridors that service their ports and boom their economies. This includes spearheading, physically participating, and personally micromanaging the security of these maritime corridors. The multinational counter-piracy task forces in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space and Malacca Strait Security Patrol in the Malacca Strait are examples of such direct participations. Contrariwise, even if invited by the political masters of the countries abutting the Gulf of Guinea, the major maritime powers do not have the overwhelming interests to physically participate in the security of the Gulf of Guinea since it does not portend much strategic significance to them.

¹⁰⁵ "Lloyd List of World's Top Container Ports," Turkey Sea News, accessed October 18, 2015, <http://www.seanews.com.tr/news/111139/Little-change-in-this-years-top-100-world-container-port-rankings-.html>.

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III. THE COSTS OF PIRACY

A. INTRODUCTION

Studies have shown that the severity of the costs of piratical activities to the international maritime community is different for each pirate hotspot. Case studies on the Strait of Malacca, Gulf of Aden, and Gulf of Guinea show that the costs of piracy are causal to the formation and sustainment of multinational counter-piracy initiatives. Rather than see the costs of piracy only through an economic prism, these case studies take a wide-spectrum perspective and recognize that there exists a multiplicity of human, psychological, social, and political costs of piracy. However, many organizations, authors, and researchers have concentrated their studies on the economic cost of piracy, perhaps because of the impact of piracy on commercial profits. Also, studies on the costs of piracy have concentrated mainly on Gulf of Aden/Somali pirates. Perhaps this is due to the sophistication and temerity of these pirates and the strategic significance of the theater in which they operate to international maritime commerce and global welfare. This lopsided attention by researchers and organizations to the economic costs of Somali pirates has created a paucity of literature and data on the subject matter with regards to other pirate hotspots. Nevertheless, efforts shall as much as possible be made to balance the studies on the three regions under review.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) categorizes the costs and trade-related implications of maritime piracy into first and second order costs. First order costs feature ransom, insurance costs, shipping networks and re-routing of fleets, security deterrence equipment and armed guards, fuel consumption, additional labor, naval forces, and piracy prosecutions, among others. Second order costs include fisheries, food security and food price inflation, tourism, and environmental pollution, among others. Peter Chalk, an analyst at the RAND

Corporation, divides the economic costs of piracy into direct and indirect costs.¹⁰⁶ This case study categorizes the costs of piracy into real and virtual costs. The real costs are those that can be assigned numerical values, while the virtual costs are those that cannot be attributed numerical values or otherwise quantified.

Calculating the global cost of piracy has been a difficult and elusive venture among researchers for certain reasons. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,

The global cost of piracy ... remains uncertain, with existing assessments providing divergent estimates and conclusions. Existing studies tend to primarily focus on calculating first order costs such as the cost of ransoms, security deterrence equipment and naval forces deployment. The secondary costs of piracy, such as the effects on foreign investment in the affected and neighbouring regions, or on commodity prices appear so far to have benefited from much less attention. Existing studies differ in terms of their methodology and approach and, therefore, are neither directly comparable, nor provide a definite authoritative assessment of piracy related costs.¹⁰⁷

For each of the maritime regions under review, this case study discusses the different costs of piracy as it affects that region. Since different pirates employ different modes of operation and business models, each region's costs of piracy cannot be compared directly. Even when some of the costs of piracy are similar, the process or manner in which they are incurred is different. For example, ransom is common among Somali and Gulf of Guinea pirates, but not with Malacca Strait pirates. Even between Somali and Gulf of Guinea pirates, the former ransom everything—ships, cargoes, and crews—while the latter only kidnap crews for ransom, sell off part or all of the cargo, and are not really interested in ships (although there are a few cases of “phantom ships or

¹⁰⁶ Chalk, *The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges for the United States*.

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Maritime Piracy Part 1: Overview of Trends, Costs and Trade-Related Implications* (Studies in Transport Law and Policy – 2014 no. 1) (New York: United Nations, 2014), 13, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtl1b2013d1_en.pdf

ghost ships”¹⁰⁸). Similarly, while the cost of insurance is common to all three pirate hotspots under review, the parameters for arriving at their insurance premiums are not entirely the same, and these details are not usually completely divulged by insurance companies. Consequently, different insurance premiums are paid for different pirate hotspots and therefore cannot be used as a basis for comparison.

In view of the foregoing considerations, certain indicators of the severity of the costs of piracy in the three regions under investigation are used as a basis for comparison and are measured by the number of attacks within the same time frame. This is because without pirate attacks, no costs—whether human, psychological, economic, or social—would be incurred. Furthermore, the growth of pirate attacks in a region is another indicator of the costs of piracy. The larger a region’s share of pirate attacks, the higher the costs of piracy for that region. The outcome of the comparisons show if the Gulf of Guinea pirates create as much cost as the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Strait pirates.

B. HUMAN AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COSTS OF PIRACY

Pirate attacks most times result in severe human costs such as death, torture, harassment, permanent injury, disfigurement, psychological and emotional trauma, and hostage-taking.¹⁰⁹ Generally, some of the costs such as fear, trauma, stress, and the like are unquantifiable, but their impact is global. This is true because the global maritime commons are transited by ships of different nations and ownership, and bear crew members from a multiplicity of countries, nationalities, ethnicities, religions, races, and colors.

¹⁰⁸ This is an operational model adopted by pirates where an entire ship is stolen, renamed, reregistered, and sold on the spot market—sometimes with its cargo, other times separately. This model is mostly adopted by Southeast Asian pirates and occasionally by Gulf of Guinea pirates. These ships are called “phantom” or “ghost” ships because when law enforcement agents set out in search of a missing ship, the ship could be seen but not found because it is under a different name, registration documents, and appearance (all or part of its external paintwork may have been altered to disguise it). For Somali pirates, everything—crews, cargoes, and ships—are all ransomed.

¹⁰⁹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Maritime Piracy Part 1: Overview of Trends, Costs and Trade-Related Implications*.

Hostage-taking and ransoming of crew members is common among the modes of operation of pirates of the three regions under review, albeit with different degrees and scope (see Table 1). While incarcerated, crew members could be subjected to different forms of psychological and physical maltreatment, as well as violence. Some seafarers who survive the initial violence and risk associated with the take-over of ships by pirates eventually die as hostages due to unhealthy conditions and torture inflicted by the pirates or their networks. This section of the study presents some data on the human costs of piracy in the three piracy hotspots under review based mainly on costs that are real (i.e., quantifiable in numerical terms), specifically the number of seafarers taken hostage or killed.

Table 1 gives the number of seafarers taken hostage or killed by Somali, Malacca, and Gulf of Guinea pirates from 2000 to 2014. Somali pirates have taken a total of 3,230 seafarers as hostages, while Malacca Strait and Gulf of Guinea pirates have recorded 238 and 718 hostage takings, respectively.¹¹⁰ Also, in their course of operation, Somali pirates have killed 26 seafarers between 2000 and 2014, dwarfing the records of Malacca and Gulf of Guinea pirates, who have killed 7 and 13 seafarers, respectively, within the same period.¹¹¹ Apart from these human costs, there are other losses and sufferings, such as threats, intimidation, assault, and missing seafarers, which are not included in Table 1.

¹¹⁰ International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports 2000–2014,” <https://icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre>.

¹¹¹ International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports 2000–2014”

Table 1. Number of Seafarers taken Hostage or Killed by Somali, Malacca, and Gulf of Guinea Pirates from 2000 to 2014.¹¹²

Year	2000		2001		2002		2003	
	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed
Gulf of Aden/Somali Piracy	9	-	48	-	47	-	26	-
Malacca Strait Piracy	71	-	25	-	33	2	12	4
Gulf of Guinea Piracy	6	-	6	-	4	-	28	-

Year	2004		2005		2006		2007	
	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed
Gulf of Aden/Somali Piracy	31	-	241	-	87	1	197	2
Malacca Strait Piracy	70	4	28	-	5	-	2	-
Gulf of Guinea Piracy	15	17	51	-	53	3	80	2

Year	2008		2009		2010		2011	
	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed
Gulf of Aden/Somali Piracy	818	18	857	5	1,016	8	510	8
Malacca Strait Piracy	-	-	2	-	-	-	19	-
Gulf of Guinea Piracy	55	-	91	-	52	-	185	-

Year	2012		2013		2014	
	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed	Hostage	Killed
Gulf of Aden/Somali Piracy	250	2	34	-	-	-
Malacca Strait Piracy	6	-	-	-	21	-
Gulf of Guinea Piracy	219	4	169	1	150	1

Source: Data extracted and computed by author from the International Maritime Bureau "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports 2000 to 2014."

¹¹² Hostage taking includes the number of seafarers kidnapped during the period under review. This is because they are both incarcerated and both require payment and receipt of ransom money before victims are released. Crews killed shall include those that are missing.

C. ECONOMIC COSTS OF PIRACY

Piracy poses economic costs among stakeholders in the maritime industry as well as among governments within and around affected maritime spaces. Based on a study conducted by Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP), piracy collectively costs national economies between US\$7 billion and US\$12 billion.¹¹³ This cost is grossly infinitesimal compared to US\$18.8 trillion, the dollar value of the world's merchandise trade in 2013 (between 0.04 to 0.05 percent).¹¹⁴ With an average increase of 5.3 percent of the world's merchandise trade between 1993 and 2013, it means that the economic cost of piracy had been a miniature fraction of the value of international merchandise trade. This perhaps is why the commercial world is slow in taking decisive and lasting action against piracy.

However, while the global economic cost of piracy may appear very small when compared to the value of the world's international trade, it does not negate the severity or significance of the piracy burden in the different piracy hotspots. Besides, piracy is increasingly becoming a potential threat to global energy security. Considering the fact that crude oil and gas are still the fundamental prime movers of most economies of the world, any sustained disruption in energy flow by pirates has the potential to cripple most economies of the world with multifarious ripples.

1. Economic Cost of Somali Piracy

A World Bank study conducted in 2013 by the Regional Vice-Presidency for Africa succinctly captures the many-sided impact of the cost of Somali piracy. The study reveals that:

[Between 2005 and 2012], pirates from Somalia have carried out 1,068 attacks. Of these, 218 resulted in successful hijackings with abduction of at least 3,741 crewmembers of 125 different nationalities, and payment of

¹¹³ Anna Bowden et al., *The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy* (One Earth Future Foundation Working Paper December 2010) (Broomfield, CO: Oceans Beyond Piracy, December 2010), <http://www.steamshipmutual.com/Downloads/Piracy/EconomicCostPiracyOEFReport.pdf>.

¹¹⁴ World Trade Organization, *World Trade Report 2014: Trade and Development: Recent Trends and the Role of the WTO* (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2014), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/world_trade_report14_e.pdf.

US\$315million–US\$385 million in ransoms. Between 82 and 97 non-Somali seafarers are believed to have died in attacks, detention, or rescue operations.”¹¹⁵

The study also reveals that between 300 and 500 Somali pirates have died within the period under review and suggests that Somali piracy has negatively impacted the global economy in several ways.¹¹⁶

In 2008, the Joint Hull Committee of the Lloyd’s Market Association listed the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space as a war risk region. Consequently, the cost of insurance for ships transiting the Gulf of Aden immediately shot up from \$500 per ship/per voyage to \$20,000 per ship/per voyage.¹¹⁷ In 2010, the cost of war risk premiums increased again from \$20,000 to \$150,000 per ship/per voyage.¹¹⁸ The marked rise in the cost of insurance for vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden and Somali maritime space necessitated seafarers and ship owners to seek alternatives against the pirates, either to avoid the high risk area by routing vessels via the southern tip of Africa (see Figure 7), or “accepting the risk of sailing ships through the area and enhancing vessel security.”¹¹⁹

An alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa is not only longer and more time consuming, but adds significant cost in terms of logistics, structural and machinery wear and tear, crew fatigue, and extra emolument. It also results in a substantial additional cost in fuel, additional vessels and hires, and significant delays in delivery time, possibly causing second-order effects in industries and further implications, especially for perishable goods.¹²⁰ The United States Maritime

¹¹⁵ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2013, “The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation.”

¹¹⁶ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2013, “The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation.”

¹¹⁷ U.S. Maritime Administration, *Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global Trade* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Maritime Administration, 2012), http://www.marad.dot.gov/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/Economic_Impact_of_Piracy_2010.pdf.

¹¹⁸ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Maritime Piracy Part 1: Overview of Trends, Costs and Trade-Related Implications*, 18.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Maritime Administration, *Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global Trade*.

¹²⁰ Alessandro Scheffler, *Piracy–Threat or Nuisance?* (NATO Research Paper no. 56) (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010), 7.

Administration (MARAD) succinctly captures the cost of rerouting vessels engaged in East-West trade through the Cape of Good Hope as follows:


Routing a tanker from Saudi Arabia to the United States via the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 2,700 miles to the voyage. This longer distance will increase the annual operating cost of the vessel by reducing the delivery capacity for the ship from about six round-trip voyages to five voyages, or a drop of about 26 per cent. The additional fuel cost of traveling via the Cape of Good Hope is about \$3.5 million annually ... a routing from Europe to the Far East via the Cape of Good Hope, rather than through the Suez Canal, would incur an estimated additional \$89 million annually, which includes \$74.4 million in fuel and \$14.6 million in charter expenses. In addition, the rerouting would increase transit times by about 5.7 days per ship. This would result in the need for an additional vessel to maintain the service frequency. However, these costs do not consider the disruption in the logistics chains.¹²¹

Re-routing vessel traffic through the southern tip of Africa portends collateral economic implications for the economies of neighboring countries within the region. For example, due to the activities of Somali pirates, Egypt loses huge sums of foreign currency that are accruable as passage fees when vessels transit the Suez Canal. Related to this is reduction in the strength of the work force in line with the Canal's reduced earnings. Additionally, reduced port calls to the Mediterranean ports amounts to colossal economic losses annually. The following illustrates the enormous losses Egypt suffers because of the re-routing of vessels through the Cape of Good Hope. Vessels are charged between US\$200,000 and US\$600,000 for the use of the Suez Canal, depending on their tonnage and displacement. If 10 percent of ships decide to make a detour through the Cape of Good Hope instead of the more direct and economical Suez Canal, Egypt loses as much as US\$642 million annually as collateral economic cost.¹²²

¹²¹ U.S. Maritime Administration, *Economic Impact of Piracy in the Gulf of Aden on Global Trade*.

¹²² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, *Maritime Piracy Part 1: Overview of Trends, Costs and Trade-Related Implications*, 19.

Figure 7. Alternative Sailing Route through the Cape of Good Hope



Source: "Pirates Seize another Ship in the Gulf of Aden," *The Financial Times Limited 2015, Middle East & North Africa*, accessed September 18, 2015, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e10892ba-b4a8-11dd-b780-0000779fd18c.html#axzz3tNYqeUyV>.

Apart from the costs associated with re-routing, the interconnected nature of piracy has led to Somali piracy causing an indirect collateral decline in tourism and fishing, as well as in other economic maritime activities in neighboring countries, since 2006.¹²³

2. Economic Cost of Malacca Strait Piracy

Malacca Strait piracy mostly occurs in territorial waters while vessels are at anchor or berthed and are usually swift, non-confrontational operations targeted at

¹²³ The World Bank, "Ending Somali Piracy: Go after the System, Not Just the Pirates," April 11, 2013, <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/04/11/ending-somali-piracy-go-after-the-system-not-just-the-pirates>.

stealing ships' stores or crew members' personal belongings.¹²⁴ Hijacking, hostage-taking, and ransoming are not as common as in Somali and Gulf of Aden piracy. However, occasionally crew members are kidnapped and released after payment of ransoms, and oil tankers are briefly hijacked and part of their products siphoned. This latter case is gradually becoming more frequent and thus emerging as the predominant business model of Malacca Strait pirates.

The geostrategic significance of the Malacca Strait, which provides a thoroughfare to over 90,000 ships annually and access to about 75 percent of all the oil imported by China and Japan, makes the economic cost of piracy there even more profound. Disruptive activities of pirates in the Malacca Strait have created serious concern for the Chinese and other Far East Asian governments over the security of oil supply through the Malacca Strait. China fears that any interruption of the free flow of energy resources into China—whether due to piracy or national security crises—“could derail the economic growth on which it depends for its legitimacy and pursuit of its great power ambition.”¹²⁵

Piratical activities in the Malacca Strait had, after a risk assessment on the area in 2005, compelled the Lloyd's Market Association's Joint War Committee to declare it a war zone.¹²⁶ This declaration had correspondingly resulted in increased insurance premiums with associated ripple effects for vessels that transited the region until August 7, 2006, when the increased insurance surcharge was removed.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Department of the Navy Presentation to the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, Efforts to Combat Piracy, 113th Cong. 1 (April 10, 2013) (testimony of Joseph W. Kuzmick), http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/antipiracy/images/gallery/testimony.pdf.

¹²⁵ Ian Storey, “China's Malacca Dilemma,” *The Jamestown Foundation*, accessed October 7, 2015, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3943&no_cache=1#.VhWdQyGFPIU.

¹²⁶ Vanitha Ndaraj, “Piracy in the Malacca Straits: Pirates likely to bring end to Historic Trade Route,” October 9, 2013, *The Establishment Post*, accessed October 7, 2015, <http://www.establishmentpost.com/piracy-in-the-malacca-straits-pirates-likely-to-bring-quick-end-to-historic-trade-route/>.

¹²⁷ Vijay Sakhujia, “Malacca: Who's to pay for smooth sailing?,” *Asia Times Online*, May 16, 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IE16Ae01.html. Also see Peter J. Rimmer and Paul T.W. Lee, “Repercussions of Impeding Shipping in the Malacca and Singapore Straits,” *Journal of International Logistics and Trade* 5, no. 1 (2007): 10.

3. Economic Cost of Gulf of Guinea Piracy

Crimes and other illicit activities in the Gulf of Guinea negatively impact the business activities of millions of people in the region and the safe transportation of millions of barrels of oil per day as well as other commercial maritime activities involving the oil industry.¹²⁸ The business model in the Gulf of Guinea is focused on stealing petroleum products. Accordingly, oil tankers laden with finished or crude petroleum products are the main targets of Gulf of Guinea pirates and other criminal networks in that maritime environment.¹²⁹ The overriding aim of their attacks is to hijack oil tankers, steal some or all of their cargoes and sell them to pre-arranged buyers or at spot markets. These attacks usually take place in territorial waters and anchorages, although there are occasions when Gulf of Guinea pirates have ventured far afield to capture victim vessels. Gulf of Guinea pirates also engage in armed robbery, kidnapping, and hostage-taking of ships' crew, oil workers, and expatriates, who are released after the payment of ransom (see Table 1).

Furthermore, proliferation of piracy and armed robbery against ships as well as other illicit maritime crimes due to ungoverned maritime spaces in the Gulf of Guinea has caused states significant losses in revenue.¹³⁰ Also adversely affected are berthing fees, custom duties, and other charges for port services and facilities, which sometimes collectively generate a very large proportion of annual budgetary needs.¹³¹ Despite efforts by the Gulf of Guinea states at improving port services and facilities, hikes in piratical activities within territorial waters, anchorages, roadsteads (calm areas of water near harbors where ships await their turn to enter into harbor), and other maritime spaces under states' jurisdiction have correspondingly hiked insurance premiums, which has in turn reduced vessel traffic to ports in the Gulf of Guinea.

¹²⁸ Thierry Vircoulon, "Gulf of Guinea: A Regional Solution to Piracy?" *International Crisis Group*, September 4, 2014, <http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/2014/09/04/gulf-of-guinea-a-regional-solution-to-piracy/>.

¹²⁹ Maritime Piracy Part 1: Overview of Trends, Costs and Trade-Related Implications." 11.

¹³⁰ Oshinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," 2.

¹³¹ Oshinowo, "Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," 2.

For example, the activities of pirates have negatively impacted the number of vessel calls to Cotonou Port in the Gulf of Guinea. Despite upgrades, expansion of port facilities, and improvements in port services, Cotonou Port, which generates about half of the total annual Beninese government revenue, experienced a 70 percent drop in vessel port calls after piratical attacks surged in Beninese waters in 2011. Although actual economic losses in numerical terms are difficult to ascertain because of poor data collection and record keeping, Admiral Oshinowo, a maritime security expert estimates that the “annual cost of piracy to the Gulf of Guinea ranges from \$565 million to \$2 billion.”¹³²

D. POLITICAL COST OF PIRACY

Corruption among political leaders helps breed poverty in a society, which in turn encourages piracy and armed robbery against ships as sources of livelihood, especially among coastal dwellers. As pirates’ confidence increases and their skills get sharpened over time, their success rate also increases. With an increasing success rate, pirates are better empowered to give more financial inducements to power brokers for more space to perpetrate their nefarious acts. Financial inducements by pirates make politicians corrupt and lose the will to govern effectively. Chronic corruption helps breed pervasive poverty within a society and the attraction of more coastal dwellers and the rural poor to piracy. The foregoing suggests that the pirates-politicians relationship is a vicious or virtuous cycle, depending on which side one looks at it—either from the side of the well-meaning public or from the perspective of the criminals.

1. Political Cost of Somali Piracy

There is a symbiotic relationship between Somali politicians and Somali pirates. According to the World Bank,

The solution to Somali piracy is first and foremost political. Pirates rely on onshore support to conduct negotiations and to secure safe access to

¹³² Oshinowo, “Combating Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea,” 2.

coastal territories. In turn, politically powerful figures capture large portions of the profits associated with piracy.¹³³

Specifically, pirates use a combination of carrots-and-sticks in their relationship with government officials, businessmen, clan heads, and religious leaders. A large percentage of piracy proceeds (sometimes as much as \$300,000 per vessel) go to these political figures as bribes, “anchorage fees,” and “development fees” to make sure the pirates have a free hand and space to operate without any interference. “Given the local custom of resource sharing, piracy proceeds trickle down to local residents and other stakeholders, creating a favorable political environment in which the pirates can operate.”¹³⁴ Also, ports and coastal towns benefit from pirate activity, creating a cultural tolerance of piracy and making it a significant part of Somalia’s informal economy. Sometimes members of the community contribute weapons, funding and personnel to facilitate piracy operations in return for a portion of the ransom monies.¹³⁵

The foregoing indicates that Somali piracy reduces government legitimacy by fostering corruption. As long as politicians, clan heads, religious leaders, and other power brokers in the society continue to enjoy financial inducements from pirates, they might not be able to muster the political will to combat the scourge. Also, the piracy business model, which appears to benefit all strata of the society, might make it nearly impossible to eradicate piracy because all strata of the society – from politicians through the middle class to the commoners – gain from the piracy business model. However, there are some concomitant negative implications of the corrupt practices between pirates and the people in the society. One such implication is continuous instability within the polity. With its negative socio-political and economic credentials, Somalia will retain its poor rating on the State Fragility Index with associated lack of trust, reputation, and capacity to conduct political negotiation, or transact business among the comity of nations.

¹³³ The World Bank Regional Vice-Presidency for Africa, *The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/06/000333037_20130506120556/Rendered/PDF/767130WP0REPLA0alia0main0report0web.pdf.

¹³⁴ The World Bank, “Ending Somali Piracy: Go after the System, Not Just the Pirates.”

¹³⁵ Miles G. Kellerman, “Somali Piracy: Causes and Consequences,” *Student Pulse* 3, no. 9 (2011), <http://www.studentpulse.com/articles/579/2/somali-piracy-causes-and-consequences>

2. Political Cost of Malacca Strait Piracy

Observers have pointed out that corruption within the Malacca Littoral States, particularly Indonesia, plays a major role in the origin and proliferation of piracy in the Malacca Strait. The piratical activities in the Malacca Strait and the concurrent quest for seaborne energy security and need for energy supply routes have repeatedly occasioned political negotiations that have sometimes led to impasse among countries in Southeast and Far East Asia. The Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) proposed by the United States and the response of Indonesia, Malaysia, and China is an example. Threats of terrorism and proliferation of piracy in the Strait presented the United States with good reasons and an opportunity to both propose a partnership of willing nations (the RMSI) to address the threats and to increase monitoring of activities within and around the Strait. While the United States government repeatedly stated that the objective of the RMSI was information-sharing rather than troop deployment, Indonesia and Malaysia insisted that apart from sovereignty concerns, the proposal represented “a challenge to regional self-management of security issues.”¹³⁶ The Indonesian governments also “needed to appease a large nationalist, Islamic, and anti-American domestic political audience.”¹³⁷

China also opposed the RMSI. This position was made manifest when the Chinese president, Hu Jintao, posited that “certain major powers” were working towards asserting control over the Malacca Strait, and therefore, demanded innovative counter strategies against the perceived threat.¹³⁸ The fact that over 80 percent of China’s energy imports pass through the Strait of Malacca makes it a strategic interest of the first order.¹³⁹ For China, this interest must be protected, as the Malacca Strait could be blocked by any capable maritime power averse to China, especially in a time of crisis.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁶ Yann-huei Song, “Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and Enhancing Security in the Strait of Malacca: Littoral States’ and Regional Responses,” 113.

¹³⁷ Yann-huei Song, “Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) and Enhancing Security in the Strait of Malacca: Littoral States’ and Regional Responses,” 112.

¹³⁸ Storey, “China’s Malacca Dilemma.”

¹³⁹ Yann-huei Song, “Security in the Strait of Malacca and the Regional Maritime Security Initiative: Responses to the U.S. Proposal.”

¹⁴⁰ Storey, “China’s Malacca Dilemma.”

This aspect of the Strait's strategic significance could be one of the compelling interests of the United States, the European Union, and NATO.

Despite the opposition of Indonesia and Malaysia to the RMSI, the fact remains that maritime threats, mainly piracy and terrorism, and the need for seaborne energy security compel the United States and Japan to maintain some naval presence in and around the Strait. Similarly, India increased its activities in the area by modernizing its military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands located very close to the Malacca Strait.¹⁴¹

3. Political Cost of Gulf of Guinea Piracy

There is yet no concrete evidence that politicians in the Gulf of Guinea benefit from the proceeds of piracy, or are instrumental in perpetrating incidents of piracy as obtainable in Somalia. Perhaps the only traceable relationship between politicians and pirates in the Gulf of Guinea is that bad governance and corruption can contribute to the emergence and proliferation of piracy. It is also speculated that law enforcement agents in the Gulf of Guinea are complicit in the activities of pirates by accepting bribes and other financial inducements. While there is no documented evidence to prove these speculative allegations beyond reasonable doubt, the possibility of some law enforcement agents compromising their profession could exist, given the pervasiveness of poverty in the countries abutting the Gulf of Guinea.


It is also speculated that the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND), an insurgent/militant group in southern Nigeria, which agitated for control of that nation's oil and gas resources between the late 1990s and early 2000s, had carried out piracy as one of its means of generating revenue. MEND employed terrorist tactics in pursuit of its course throughout those years, and in some cases, their activities spread to neighboring countries. The close tie that existed between piracy and terrorism (tactics employed by the militants) suggests that there was a cost of political instability to the Gulf of Guinea region.

¹⁴¹ Storey, "China's Malacca Dilemma."

E. COMPARING THE COSTS OF PIRACY

The International Maritime Bureau data as computed and plotted in Figure 8 suggests that Somali piracy represented 4.7 percent of attacks reported in 2000. By 2005, its share of worldwide attacks had risen to 16.3 percent, which more than tripled its share of attacks in 2000. By 2011, it had climbed to 53.8 percent, which again more than tripled its share of attacks in 2005. But a thorough observation of Figure 8 reveals that until 2007, the Gulf of Guinea consistently recorded more piratical incidents—sometimes doubling or tripling that of the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space except in 2005. This implies that the Gulf of Guinea suffered more costs of piracy than the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space. In 2008, the number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space surpassed that of the Gulf of Guinea. Interestingly, that same year, CTF 150 was established to check terrorism in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space, with implicit concurrent accreditation to conduct counter-piracy.

Figure 8. Share of Somali, Malacca, and Gulf of Guinea Piracy Attacks (2000–2014)¹⁴²




Adapted from ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report*. This graph compiles data from 2000 to 2014 annual reports. Full citation information for each report can be found in the List of References.¹⁴³

¹⁴² “Attack” represents both actual and attempted attacks.

¹⁴³ Making a complete citation in this part of the thesis could create clumsiness and distort flow, hence, the decision to move the complete citations to the List of References.

Despite the evidence that acts of piracy were disproportionately greater in the Gulf of Guinea until 2007 (see Figure 9), counter-piracy task forces were instead set up in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space by the United States and later joined by a partnership of other maritime powers. While an attempt to take up the security of the Malacca Strait by the United States and other regional powers is understandable in view of the incessant piratical attacks prior to 2005, this does not explain their engagement in the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space. The answer would seem to be that in view of its strategic significance, the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space was assessed as imposing more costs due to piracy, despite having fewer piracy attacks.

Figure 9. Comparison of Actual and Attempted Attacks for Somali, Malacca, and Gulf of Guinea Piracy (2000–2014)¹⁴⁴



Adapted from ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report*. This graph compiles data from 2000 to 2014 annual reports. Full citation information for each report can be found in the List of References.

Although the frequency of Gulf of Guinea piracy was consistently higher than that of the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space until 2007, the relatively lower volume of trade transiting the Gulf of Guinea meant a much lower overall cost of piracy. Accordingly, interests of the major maritime powers were less affected by the piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, as compared to the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space and the Malacca Strait. Those maritime hotspots incur much higher costs of piracy due to the

¹⁴⁴ Somali piracy is taken here to mean all pirate attacks carried out by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Oman.

much higher volume of trade transiting them. Accordingly, there is an absence of impetus for the major maritime powers to initiate and physically participate in counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. This means that for the major maritime powers, increase in the costs of piracy is a motivation for the establishment of counter-piracy initiatives.

F. CHAPTER SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

How to calculate the costs of piracy has been a controversial issue in the global maritime industry.¹⁴⁵ Questions range from what constitutes its definition and what methodology to employ in calculating it, to the multivariate opinions of its current global cost in quantitative terms. Acknowledging the methodological difficulty of comparing activities in different regions, the study analyzed the number of piratical attacks in the selected hotspots and their percentage share in total global attacks from 2000 to 2014.

Based on available literature and data obtained from the International Maritime Bureau's "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Reports" for the aforementioned period, one can justifiably conclude that: 1) the higher the cost of piracy, the more likely the formation and sustainment of multinational counter-piracy initiatives and, 2) because the cost of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is not as high as those of the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden, the possibility of a multinational counter-piracy initiative that is maintained, supported, and managed by the major maritime powers is very remote.

¹⁴⁵ Anna Bowden et al., "The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy."

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Gulf of Guinea is indisputably one of the most important maritime arteries facilitating international trade and global welfare. As long as international shipping remains interdependent and the world increasingly depends on crude oil and gas, this fact will remain so. Like other maritime spaces where commercial activities flourish, the Gulf of Guinea is bedeviled by piracy and armed robbery, as well as other maritime crimes. The scale and scope of modern piratical activities have necessitated an international coalition of maritime powers to physically undertake and micromanage the security of some maritime corridors in the world. But such physical participation has never been attempted or muted for the Gulf of Guinea despite a higher share of global acts of piracy between 2001 and 2007, the same period some other counter-piracy operations were initiated by the major maritime powers. The reason for this was found in comparing the Gulf of Guinea with the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space using two parameters—strategic maritime significance and the costs of piracy.

From the case studies, it was found that the Gulf of Guinea does not possess the kind of geostrategic maritime credentials possessed by the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden/Somali maritime space that motivated the United States to attempt taking over the physical security of the Malacca Strait or spearhead a multinational counterpiracy initiative in the Gulf of Guinea/Somali maritime space. It was also found that the Gulf of Guinea does not have the capacity to create the costly losses to pirates that could attract the material presence of the major maritime powers to participate in counter-piracy operations in the region. Consequently, there is no overwhelming incentive, interest, or obligation for the major maritime powers to attempt a counter-piracy coalition, or to physically micromanage counter-piracy initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea.

However, the comparatively low maritime significance of the Gulf of Guinea does not negate the fact that piracy is serious within the region and its impact on regional stakeholders is enormous. Also, as long as energy and its supply networks still form part of the major determinants of the global economy, the threat posed by piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will continue to remain a challenge to stakeholders outside the region. But

since the possibility of attracting physical participation of the major maritime powers in counter-piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is unlikely, at best remote, it means the Gulf of Guinea states are on their own to manage their maritime affairs and the future of their maritime environment to a conclusive success. Therefore, regional actors and stakeholders must start to eschew the unrealistic hype that the Gulf of Guinea is overwhelmingly strategically significant. They must come to terms with the reality that it is not a major maritime trading route and, hence, does not portend as much strategic significance or create as much costs of piracy as the major maritime trading routes. This unrealistic hype has pervaded the region and has ingrained in the minds of regional actors a sense of complacency that if things really get worse, the major maritime powers would always come to the region's rescue. Things might not necessarily always work out that way, and in the face of dwindling resources and other competing strategic obligations, the maritime security assistance currently received from the major maritime powers might dry up or reduce significantly. Accordingly, political masters in the Gulf of Guinea and regional maritime stakeholders must brace up to search for unique regional solutions to regional maritime security problems.

It is strongly believed that the Gulf of Guinea states have the resources, or could provide the resources, to adequately sponsor the security of their maritime environment if the political masters could be more committed, honest, and receptive to constructive ideas. Any proposed solution to the Gulf of Guinea piracy problem must include a strategy that can bring about significant improvements in maritime regime governance, security, safety, and development. Such a result-oriented strategy would require mutually reinforcing actions at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical.

A. STRATEGIC LEVEL

The strategic level would involve governments and intergovernmental actions at the national and international levels. Actors at this level would be required to do everything possible to make piracy unattractive to perpetrators and potential perpetrators. Since socio-economic cum political factors have been identified as the root underlying causes of piracy, strategic level actors are to come up with proactive measures, plans, and

strategies that would create disincentives among pirates and would-be pirates. For the national governments of the Gulf of Guinea states, this entails good governance and grassroots-oriented socio-economic policies that would improve the lot of the masses and bridge the economic inequality between the rich and the poor. Job creation and infrastructural development that would accompany sound socio-economic policies would make coastal community dwellers detest piracy as an interesting occupational venture.

Piracy and armed robbery against ships have exposed poor regulatory capacity as well as inadequate cooperation among the Gulf of Guinea states on maritime security. The ripple effect of these deficiencies has been the existence of weak, and in some cases, near-absent maritime law enforcement enablers such as maritime law enforcement institutions, tools, facilities, and resources. The absence of these enablers has created incentives for people to not only engage in piracy, but to also carry it out with naked impunity. Therefore, it behooves the political masters to project the right political will and resolve to curb maritime crimes in the Gulf of Guinea. Since most of the Gulf of Guinea states are economies that depend mainly on offshore crude oil mining as their major source of foreign exchange earnings, the economic implication of such piratical activities are enormous. In view of the economic strength the maritime environment provides, it is imperative for political masters of the countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea to balance their attention between continental issues and maritime security matters.

B. OPERATIONAL LEVEL


The operational level of strategy will be geared towards interdicting pirates—from planning to execution stages. This level of the strategy requires effective networking and intelligence gathering and sharing among the Gulf of Guinea states to interrupt and terminate piracy even before execution. Also, the strategy should be aimed at finding out pirates' safe havens in coastal communities in order to root them out and subsequently establish government presence in the ungoverned spaces where pirates hide. In this regard, the strategy requires the establishment and operationalization of an overarching regional maritime security organization that will conduct counter-piracy

operations as one of its main mandates. Such an organization will focus on collaboration among the maritime security agencies of the Gulf of Guinea states to work together across their geographical and sub-regional boundaries. In order to succeed, the organization must have the capacity to properly coordinate effective use of intelligence, personnel, and materiel to deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

It is perhaps in pursuit of this kind of counter-piracy strategy that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) developed the ongoing collaborative maritime security strategy to address the diverse maritime threats across the Gulf of Guinea region. In the ongoing arrangement (see Figure 10), the Gulf of Guinea states are grouped into zones headed by a commander from one of the countries in each zone. Each zone is to formulate and operationalize strategies for the security of its maritime space, with provision for liaison with adjacent zones. Although this initiative appears to be a welcome development, it might not be the panacea to the Gulf of Guinea piracy predicament. This is because rather than encourage joint and combined patrols, it encourages only coordinated patrol arrangements among the zones where, for example, Zone A's patrol units cannot cross into Zone B and have to coordinate their patrols through communication with liaison arrangements ashore. What the Gulf of Guinea needs is a more robust but fluid structure under a single overall command with a combined patrols arrangement within and among participating units. Regional actors of the Malacca Strait Security Patrol (MSSP), which the current Gulf of Guinea maritime security architecture is modelled after, accepts that inability to transition fully from a coordinated to a combined patrols arrangement is one of its major albatrosses.

Figure 10. Ongoing Maritime Security Arrangement in the Gulf of Guinea

The Maritime Regional Architecture in the Gulf of Guinea



Source: Thierry Vircoulon, “Gulf of Guinea: A Regional Solution to Piracy?” *International Crisis Group*, September 4, 2014, <http://blog.crisisgroup.org/africa/2014/09/04/gulf-of-guinea-a-regional-solution-to-piracy/>

It is important to state that successful implementation of the proposed arrangement would greatly depend on deliverables such as effective organizational structure, integrated logistics, the right number and mix of platforms, repair/maintenance facilities and bases, training and doctrinal integration, sufficient maritime domain awareness infrastructures, equipment interoperability and compatibility, an effective motivation and reward system for law enforcement personnel, adequate funding and, above all, commitment and mutual trust among the political leaders in the region. Additionally, the success of such an arrangement requires effective prosecution of pirates with penalties capable of deterring would-be pirates. Since some of the Gulf of Guinea states might not have provisions for piracy in their penal codes, and since there might be marked differences in the penal codes of those that do have them, it would be necessary

to develop, streamline, and operationalize a common judicial code within the international legal framework for resolving piracy cases.


Ancillary to a common Gulf of Guinea counter-piracy judicial system is the need for the development of regional antipiracy agreements that would create and foster a common understanding among the Gulf of Guinea states. While paying particular attention to regional peculiarities, such antipiracy agreements would be focused on promoting existing international antipiracy agreements within the region. Also, since the possibility of adequately and effectively dispensing justice without a prison system does not exist, there is the need to build in the proposed arrangement prisons with common conditions, rules, and regulations in at least four evenly dispersed countries within the Gulf of Guinea where pirates could serve jail terms and be rehabilitated.

The proposed arrangement would require the Gulf of Guinea states to integrate and coordinate the security of their maritime space against illicit activities through a centralized headquarters. This collective maritime security arrangement will place the entire expanse of the Gulf of Guinea maritime environment under a common security umbrella, which could be termed the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command (GGMGC) as part of a restructured, expanded, and strengthened Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) that is truly committed and empowered to achieve its set objectives. The operations of the GGMGC shall be directed by a commander, who shall be a naval or coast guard officer from any of the member states with requisite seniority, experience, knowledge, and capacity. He shall be administratively assisted by a staff comprising all ranks of maritime law enforcement representatives from member states, and operationally by a deputy and two strategic regional commanders (one each for ECCAS and ECOWAS states). The appointment of Commander GGMGC shall be tenured and rotated regularly among member states after an agreed duration.

The Commander GGMGC shall retain operational control, while the strategic regional commanders shall retain tactical command of their respective regions. Operational command shall be retained by a Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Committee (GGMSC), which shall be established and shall comprise chiefs of defense staff of member countries. They are to meet frequently to consult, make decisions on

various maritime security issues, and give collective policy and strategic directives/guidance to the Commander GGMGC. Overall command shall lie with the heads of state forum through the Chairman of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. Figure 11 shows an organizational schematic of the proposed Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command.

Figure 11. Organizational Schematic of Proposed Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command



The Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command is not to be a military alliance. It is to be run strictly as an intergovernmental maritime security alliance against illicit maritime activities, particularly piracy and armed robbery against ships. Apart from the strategic regional commands, the arrangement shall also include a Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security Training Command and a Research and Development (R&D) Command. The Training Command would provide education and training of staff in order to facilitate interoperability and common understanding among the international staff at all levels. The R&D structure will provide innovative and cost-effective ways the

Guard Command could go about achieving its set objectives in line with global best practices.

Funding the Guard Command can be achieved in two ways: a compulsory common funding and a voluntary asset contribution. The Guard Command could start initial operations with assets volunteered by states. Within the compulsory common funding, the share of each member state's contribution is to be based on a predetermined burden-sharing formula, which represents a small percentage of each member's Gross National Income. All maritime stakeholders—private or public—in each member state are to contribute to the compulsory common funding. Excesses, if any, from the monies accrued from the common funding after taking care of recurrent expenditure could be saved until they have reached a reasonable amount for the purchase of maritime security assets, including vessels. The idea is to make the Guard Command completely independent of member states' maritime security assets as time goes on.

Since funding could pose a serious problem for the survival and sustainment of the Guard Command to run its operations and programs and the necessary capabilities to meet its operational mandates, it would be part of the R&D's mandate to work out modalities for cooperating with and receiving assistance from extra-regional powers. But primarily, these resources and capabilities will have to be provided by the Gulf of Guinea states even though some are poor and most, if not all, hardly have enough assets to monitor their respective maritime environments.

Regional commanders are to ensure that they take full control of their operational domain through the arrangements of their forces. Efforts should be directed at establishing outposts at all river towns located near the mouths of inlets to the Atlantic Ocean. Although the logistics for achieving this is beyond the regional commanders, this 'order of battle' should fundamentally be their focus if the logistics are provided. With such outposts put in place, lower tactical commanders would be able to monitor traffic in and out of the mouths of inlets.

C. TACTICAL LEVEL

Tactical deployment of forces is the prerogative of the tactical commander. For effective deployment, a tactical commander takes several factors into consideration, such as terrain, the adversary's known and likely movements, and the adversary's strength and disposition, among several others. In line with mission command philosophy, this section of the thesis is not intended to tell tactical commanders how and where to deploy their forces, but to highlight certain factors a tactical commander of maritime forces in the Gulf of Guinea must take into cognizance.

More than 2,500 nautical miles in length, about 500,000 square nautical miles, the sea area of the Gulf of Guinea is enormous and therefore requires that tactical deployments be made consistent with the principle of economy of force. This means that forces are to be deployed effectively in a manner that achieves maximum results at decisive points and times despite the enormous expanse of the Gulf of Guinea. The coast of the Gulf of Guinea is characterized by inlets to several interconnected rivers, tributaries, and creeks that give access to several coastal towns and villages. These inlets are either close to one another or are far apart. Since pirates must come out to sea through these inlets and return to their bases through the same inlets after carrying out their nefarious acts, deployments could be made in a style that takes maximum advantage of the knowledge of pirates' movements, the nature of the coastline bordering the Gulf of Guinea, and the morphology of the topographic features along the coast and inlets.

Instead of burning fuel and other logistical wastage incurred while conducting random patrols at sea in search of pirates or armed robbers, patrol units could be deployed to conduct fixed station patrols in or around river/creek inlets. All speedboats going out to sea or entering the creeks should be subjected to a thorough search before they are allowed to proceed. Any speedboat that flouts this rule should be decisively dealt with in line with the extant rules of engagement to deter others who might want to do the same. This patrol arrangement should form the foundation from which other complex arrangements could emerge.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

From the foregoing discussion, a sustainable strategy to solve the Gulf of Guinea piracy predicament would require mutually reinforcing actions at three levels—strategic, operational, and tactical.

1. Before any meaningful achievements could be made with respect to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea at the strategic level, responsible political leaders in the region must see the importance and necessity of a regional maritime security community where efforts could be concerted and burden shared to achieve sustainable results. The Gulf of Guinea Commission, as a maritime security community, is far from achieving this desired objective. Therefore, the current leadership of the Commission must commence efforts towards achieving a strengthened, expanded, and focused Gulf of Guinea Commission that is committed to achieving its set objectives.
2. Political leaders in the Gulf of Guinea and regional maritime stakeholders should search for regional solutions to regional maritime security problems that would bring about significant improvements in maritime regime governance, security, safety, and development. This would require more commitment, honesty, and receptiveness to constructive ideas by the political leaders.
3. National governments of the Gulf of Guinea states should embrace good governance and grassroots socio-economic policies that would make piracy unattractive to perpetrators and potential perpetrators in coastal communities as an economic occupational venture.
4. In view of the economic strength the maritime environment provides for the Gulf of Guinea states, political leaders should balance their attention in allocating resources between continental issues and maritime security matters.
5. At the operational level of the strategy, the Gulf of Guinea Commission should establish the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command that would focus on collaboration among the maritime security agencies to work together across their territorial and sub-regional boundaries. This organization should have the capacity to properly coordinate effective use of intelligence, personnel, and materiel to deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The current arrangement, which encourages only coordinated patrolling among the zones, should be discouraged in favor of a more robust but fluid structure under a single overall command.
6. In setting up the Gulf of Guinea Maritime Guard Command, regional leaders should particularly bear in mind that its success would greatly

depend on effective organizational structure, integrated logistics, the right number and mix of platforms, repair/maintenance facilities and bases, training and doctrinal integration, sufficient maritime domain awareness infrastructure, equipment interoperability and compatibility, an effective motivation and reward system for law enforcement personnel, adequate funding and, above all, commitment and mutual trust among the political leaders in the region. Also, the proposed arrangement would require developing, streamlining, and operationalizing common agreements, judicial codes, and a prison system for resolving maritime offences.

7. The GGMGC should be headed by an experienced senior naval or coast guard officer from any of the member states for a specified duration. The officer should be assisted administratively by a staff of maritime law enforcement representatives and operationally by a deputy and two strategic commanders. He should be directed by a Maritime Security Committee comprising Chiefs of Defense staff of member countries, which should in turn be guided by the heads of state forum through the chairman of the Gulf of Guinea Commission. The arrangement should also include a Maritime Security Training Command and a research and development organization.
8. Member states should fund the Maritime Guard Command concurrently through a compulsory common funding based on a predetermined formula and a voluntary asset contribution. Excesses from the common funds after recurrent expenditure could be accumulated to purchase maritime security assets, including vessels to make the Guard Command independent of states as time goes on.
9. The research and development organ of the proposed Guard Command should work out modalities for cooperating with and receiving assistance from extra-regional powers and organizations. But primarily, these resources and capabilities would have to be provided by the Gulf of Guinea states even though some are poor and most, if not all, hardly have enough assets to monitor their respective maritime environments.
10. At the tactical level, commanders should be able to deploy forces independently, but this should be consistent with the principle of economy of force because of the vast extent of the Gulf of Guinea. Since pirates must come out to sea and return to their bases after their operations, deployments should be made in a manner that takes maximum advantage of the knowledge of pirates' movements and the nature of the coastline bordering the Gulf of Guinea. Accordingly, deployments should be made to cover all river inlets that lead to the Atlantic Ocean. Such effective deployment would prevent random patrols and logistical wastages, including personnel stress and loss of alertness.

Although the foregoing recommendations are not by any means exhaustive, they are respectfully offered with a view to achieving a safe, secure, and economically viable Gulf of Guinea maritime space. It is believed that organizing the security structure of the Gulf of Guinea maritime space along these recommendations should serve as a good starting point towards achieving a panacea to the region's maritime security predicament.

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