

Operation Slipper: The Australian Defence Force and Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

Operation Slipper: The Australian Defence Force and Private Military Contractors in Afghanistan
by MAJ Meegan B. Olding, 68 pages.

The Australian Defence Force has employed private military contractors in the majority of overseas operations since the Cold War. The number of contractors in a specified area of operations is increasing exponentially. Although the rise in the reliance of private military contractors is not a new phenomenon, the absence of a theory to explain the rise has led to the ad hoc and late integration of contractors in military planning. This research analyzes the Australian Defence Force's employment of private military contractors in Afghanistan during Operation Slipper using the existing framework of supply-demand theory. This study seeks to ascertain the factors that lead to the employment of private military contractor to enable more effective military planning.

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Acronyms

ADF	Australian Defence Force
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANZUS	Australian New Zealand United States
ANZUS	Australian New Zealand United States
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PMC	Private Military Contractors
PSC	Private Security Company
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

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Introduction

On 1 November 1914, less than ninety days after the start of World War I, the initial Australian and New Zealand contingent of 21,529 men and 7,882 horses departed Fremantle aboard thirty-eight merchantmen that had hastily been converted into transports.

The point of this historical snippet is that every one of those transports was a civilian-crewed merchant vessel, as were the ships that six months later took the same troops from Palestine to Gallipoli, where many were landed in lifeboats manned by merchant sailors. Australia has always relied on private assets and civilians to directly support its military endeavours, especially in the mass mobilisations of the 20th century.

— Peter Jennings, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Strategy Paper

Following the devastating terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, the Australian Prime Minister John Howard invoked Article IV of the Australian New Zealand United States (ANZUS) Treaty cementing Australia's commitment to support the United States alliance. Shortly after the Prime Minister's announcement, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) deployed a contingent to Afghanistan alongside the United States. The force structure and scope of the ADF involvement fluctuated from 2001 to 2013, peaking at over 1550 personnel in 2009. The changing nature of Australia's involvement in Afghanistan highlights the uncertainty in the anticipated duration and scope of the commitment. As the conflict continued to exceed original prediction, so to, did the requirements of the ADF. To bridge the capability gap, policy makers and operational planners incorporated the use of private military contractors (PMC) to provide services such as logistics and strategic lift. The use of PMCs steadily increased throughout the duration of the ADF commitment to Afghanistan. The use of PMCs enhanced ADF's capability by allowing strategic planners to reduce the number of combat service support personnel. This provided flexibility for the ADF in terms of the ability to increase the number of combat personnel within the constraints of the Australian Government imposed force caps. The *2009 Defence White Paper* supported this notion, "The greater use of contractors through such methods as support contracts and Sponsored Reserves, for longer-term stabilization and reconstruction

operations will potentially give the ADF more flexibility . . .”¹ Further, it provides the Australian Government the ability to incorporate PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy. The research question framing this paper asks: What factors attributed to the ADF’s increased use of PMCs in Afghanistan during the period 2001 to 2013? To answer this question, the researcher used a theory developed by Dr Bruce Stanley in 2012, a professor at the United States School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Stanley’s theory encapsulates the phenomenon of the increased use of PMCs via his doctoral dissertation. The researcher tested the eight hypotheses contained in Stanley’s theory through the lens of the ADF involvement in Afghanistan. Although the supply and demand methodology provides a framework to examine the use of PMCs, it neglects to analyze the phenomenon systemically. When the Australian Government elects to reduce the ADF structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. As such decision-makers are left with no choice but to legalize and legitimize the use of PMCs resulting in the increased use of PMCs as a deliberate tool of foreign policy.

As identified in the *Defence White Paper 2009*, the ADF has used PMCs in a series of recent deployments.² ADF strategic planners are responsible for developing force structure proposals for governmental approval. The consistent use of PMCs in ADF operational deployments justifies the development of a theoretical framework to enable planners to effectively integrate the use of PMCs into military planning and strategy. Furthermore, the Australian Government has increased the use of PMCs to protect government officials overseas.

¹ Australian Government: Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), 92.

² David Mulhall, *Combat Service Support Effects – Contingency Contracting* (Sydney: Headquarters 17th Combat Service Support Brigade, 2012), Foreword.

As James Brown states “In the past five years, the Australian Government has procured more than \$180 million worth of services from private security companies.”³

As Stephen Van Evera’s asserted in his book *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, “applying theories to evaluate past and present policies and to solve historical puzzles is also worth doing.”⁴ Stanley’s research provides a theory explaining the phenomenon of PMC use in previous conflicts from the perspective of the United States (US) Army. One of Van Evera’s seven prime attributes to govern a theory’s quality is “large explanatory power.”⁵ Widening the case studies to include a broader range of perspectives strengthens and further legitimizes Stanley’s theory. Several military officers have tested Stanley’s theory using the case studies of Canada, the United Kingdom (UK) and the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. This research contributes to this body of work by extending the perspective to Australia. Moreover, this research provides the Australian Government and the ADF with a theoretical framework for policy makers and military planners.

This research focuses on the ADF as a complete organization, comprising the Royal Australian Navy, Australian Regular Army, and the Royal Australian Air Force, including the respective reserve components. The ADF’s operational planning headquarters, Headquarters Joint Operations Command, is a joint organization responsible for planning, commanding, and

³ James Brown, “Guns for Hire,” *The Monthly: Australian Politics, Society and Culture* (May 2014), accessed August 4, 2014, www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2014/may/1398866400/james-brown/guns-hire.

⁴ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 17-18. (Large explanatory power: The theory’s independent variable has a large effect on a wide range of phenomena under a wide range of conditions. One such variable is explanatory range: The wider range of affected phenomena, the greater the theory’s explanatory power.)

managing the financial aspects of ADF operations. All significant ADF operations over the past decade have included representation from all three services.

An Internet search of PMCs yields many results. The terms private military companies and private security companies are often interchangeable. For the purpose of this study, the researcher adopted Stanley's definition; "The term PMC is used when referring to private firms that offer security and military related services."⁶ Further, for the purposes of this study, the use of PMC incorporates all military services contracted by the ADF inclusive of logistics and strategic lift.

The operating environment for this case study comprises Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). ADF force elements and PMCs operate in both Afghanistan and the UAE. The Australian National Command Element is located in the UAE, which also serves as the Intermediate Staging Base. The majority of the combat personnel operate within Afghanistan. Within the Afghanistan Area of Operations, the ADF operates from three major bases, Kabul, Kandahar, and Tarin Kowt. The official Operation Slipper Area of Operations comprises both Afghanistan and UAE.

Sharan Merriam, a professor of adult education, defines a theoretical framework as "derived from the orientation or stance that you bring to your study."⁷ The theoretical framework for this research incorporates the microeconomic principles of the supply-demand. The supply-demand theory provides a useful theoretical framework for the study involving the rise of PMCs employed by the ADF in Afghanistan. For the purpose of this research, PMCs are the supplier and the demand is the requirement for activities and services in support of ADF operations.

⁶ Bruce Edwin Stanley, "Selective Privatization of Security: Why American Strategic Leaders Choose to Substitute Private Security Contractors for National Military Force" (PhD diss., Kansas State University, 2012), 7.

⁷ Sharan B. Merriam, *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass), 45.

As with all research projects, this study has limitations. First, the availability of unclassified material relating to the ADF involvement in Afghanistan posed an issue during data collection. A selection of the information pertaining to the employment of PMCs is classified and thus cannot be included in this study. Further, the researcher was unable to source accurate contracting data from Headquarters Joint Operations Command, therefore used a combination of open source data and broad information derived from a previous information presentation provided by Headquarters Joint Logistics Command. Further, the information obtained only included data from 2005; there was limited data available on PMC use before 2005. This can be attributed to either the lack of PMC use in the early phase of ADF involvement, or a lack of accessible information. Finally, as the researcher is residing in the United States this study is limited to empirical data accessible from the United States.

The delimitation to this research centers on the scope of the study. This research examined the ADF's use of PMCs in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2013. The research does not include other ADF operations where PMCs were used. Although the ADF also supported the US-led mission in Iraq, this research does not incorporate this operation. Further, it is noted that the Australian Government employs PMCs for security of government employees overseas. In fact, AUD \$180 million was spent on private security contracts from 2009 to 2014.⁸ However this research does not incorporate the use of contractors by non-ADF organizations. It is also outside the scope of this research to examine other theoretical issues surrounding the employment of PMCs such as ethical considerations.

This study is arranged in six sections. This first section serves as the introduction. The next section provides a literature review categorized into literature relating to military contracting and supply-demand theory. Section three describes the methodology adopted for this study.

⁸ Brown, "Guns for Hire."

Section four presents the case studies and answers to the structured focused questions. Section five provides the findings and analysis in terms of the answers to the questions as they relate to the eight hypotheses. The final section concludes the research, provides a summary of the findings, and recommends further study.

Literature Review

This section provides the justification for the conduct of this research on the increased use of PMCs by the Australian Defence Force (ADF). As Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman asserted, “a thoughtful and insightful discussion of related literature builds a logical framework for the research that sets it within a tradition of inquiry and context of related studies.”⁹ The researcher collected a wide range of literature from a combination of the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, and the Internet. The researcher used statistics relating to the use of PMCs obtained from Australian governmental departments, including the Department of Defence and the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Research revealed a wide range of literature discussing the use of PMCs in theaters of operation comprising scholarly writings, journal and online articles, and published books. The literature provides analysis on the moral issues, legal concerns, the impact of the use of PMCs, and theoretical frameworks relating to PMCs.

As outlined in the previous section, this research analyzes the validity of Stanley’s theory on the use of PMCs through the lens of the ADF. By the development of a theoretical framework, Stanley’s research took a significant departure from previous scholarly work. Unlike the previous commentary and analysis on the employment of PMCs, Stanley developed five (later increased to eight) hypotheses that can be used for future analysis and planning. Further, his research provided three case studies to support his posited theory. In his book *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Stephen Van Evera offers the following definition of a theory: “Theories are general statements that describe and explain the cause or effects of classes of phenomena.”¹⁰ By

⁹ Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, *Designing Qualitative Research*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), 28.

¹⁰ Van Evera, *Guide To Methods For Students Of Political Science*, 7-8.

using this definition, Stanley's research falls within this domain and thus one can consider it a theory.

Stanley's theory identified in his dissertation, *Selective Privatization of Security: Why American Strategic Leaders Choose to Substitute Private Security Contractors for National Military Force*, provides the central idea to this research. His divergence from previous scholarly research enabled the development of a theory, which both policy makers and military planners can use. Stanley's use of three case studies strengthens and legitimizes his theory and provides the reader with contextual evidence to explain the causal relationships inherent in the phenomena of private security use. The purpose of his dissertation is "to analyze the causes of the growth of PMCs during the late 20th century and early 21st century US experience by relying on the demand for and supply of PMCs."¹¹ Further, Stanley's research provides an insight into the use of PMCs from a global perspective using the supply and demand framework. Stanley demonstrated three main points: first, the use of private security contractors by the United States is not a new phenomenon; second, the recent increased use of private security as an instrument of military policy or foreign policy may in fact be a consequence of deliberate policy decisions of successive presidential administrations. Finally, that the security environment in the target state of an intervention is a factor that results in an increase of private security contractors.¹²

The 2003 publication of Peter Singer's *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* was the inception point for the study of the private security industry. Singer introduces the relationship between the use of PMCs and the supply-demand theory. Further, he discusses a multitude of reasons for the rise, however fails to unite the reasons into an intelligible theory. Singer's seminal work is both historical and global while providing a holistic overview of

¹¹ Stanley, "Selective Privatization of Security," 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, 169.

the industry. Singer identified the end of the Cold War as the emergence of the private military industry to fill a “security gap.” He posits the effect of the supply and demand of military services drives the increase in the private security market.¹³ Moreover, Singer identified the dichotomous relationship between public and private sectors. His research describes the transferring back and forth of previous governmental roles between the public and private sectors such as health care, police prison, education, etc. However, Singer recognizes the lack of debate over traditional military roles, “providing for national, and hence their citizens, security was one of the most essential tasks of a government.”¹⁴ Stanley builds on Singer’s research by developing a theory based on the supply and demand theoretical framework. Singer and Stanley’s research did not incorporate the ADF’s use of PMCs.

Economics is an important factor in the study of PMCs, as budgetary constraints can drive military strategy. In the *2013 Defence White Paper*, the previous Defence Minister posited: “The Global Financial Crisis showed that strategic circumstances can change with little warning and can have significant implications for the Australian Defence Force.”¹⁵ The Strategic Reform Program was introduced in 2009 and is a decade long initiative aimed at conducting Defence business more effectively and efficiently. The program’s overall objective is to reduce spending in order to re-invest in capability.¹⁶ One of the stated aims is to reduce demand for goods and services.¹⁷ Goods and services can relate directly to the types of services the ADF has elected to

¹³ P. W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 49.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁵ Australian Government: Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper* (Canberra: Australian Government, 2013), ix.

¹⁶ Department of Defence, *The Strategic Reform Program: Making It Happen* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2010), v.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

contract out in Afghanistan. Military planners examined new ways to deliver goods and services in Afghanistan, thus a pivot towards contracted solutions in the form of PMCs. The Strategic Reform Program directly influences the Defence budget and the subsequent allocation of resources to a specific operation. Overseas military operations are historically expensive on a nation; therefore, the allocation of resources and the commitment of capability are closely scrutinized by the Australian Government.

The microeconomics supply-demand theory provides a theoretical framework for this research. “Economics is concerned with the way in which resources are allocated among alternative uses to satisfy human wants.”¹⁸ For the purposes of this research, resources pertain to PMCs, whereas to “satisfy human wants,” correlates with the capability requirements of the ADF. Simply, the ADF required certain capabilities to achieve the Operation Slipper mission; PMCs were used to satisfy a perceived gap in capability. Therefore, the supply-demand theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for the study of the ADF’s use of PMCs in Afghanistan.

Edwin Mansfield asserts, “The market for every good has a demand side and a supply side.”¹⁹ The law of demand is directly linked to the function of price, as the demand of a product or service increases, the price subsequently falls. Therefore, within an active market, multiple suppliers and consumers force the demand curve to slope downward to the right. There are factors that influence the demand curve including, a particular period of time, taste of the consumers, level of consumer incomes, and levels of other prices of similar goods and services.²⁰

Similar to the law of demand, the law of supply is also linked to the function of price; however, in a normal competitive market the supply curve is inverse to the demand curve. The

¹⁸ Edwin Mansfield, *Microeconomics; Theory and Applications*, 5th ed. (New York: Norton, 1985), 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.

supply curve generally slopes upwards to the right, relating to the quantity supplied increases as the price rises. The factors affecting the supply curve include state of technology, input prices, the period of time to which the curve pertains.²¹

Monopsony is another element of economics that provides context and a theoretical framework for the study of PMCs. The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines “Monopsony” as “an oligopsony limited to one buyer.”²² As discussed in supply-demand theory, in a competitive market price shapes purchases. However, in certain circumstances demand can control purchases, this is referred to as a monopsony market.²³ For the purposes of this research, the one buyer refers to the ADF.

James Brown, a former Australian Army Officer, now a Military Fellow at the Lowy Institute, writes extensively on issues affecting both military and foreign policy.²⁴ Two of his recent articles directly relate to private security contracting. In his article “Guns for Hire: The Surprising Role of Australians in the Rise of Private Security Companies,” Brown identified the confusing taxonomies associated with the term private security contractor. He discussed the common link with the idea of mercenaries in 1960 fighting illicit dirty wars in the African jungles. Brown continued his quest to encapsulate the wide definitions with reference to the bureaucrats in Afghanistan referring to “private security providers” to include a doorman in Kabul and locally armed militia. As discussed in the previous section, this research adopts Stanley’s definition for PMCs, “The term private military contractor is used when referring to

²¹ Ibid.

²² Merriam-webster.com, Dictionary and Thesaurus - Merriam-Webster Online, last modified 2015, accessed January 25, 2015, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary>.

²³ Stanley, “Selective Privatization of Security,” 30.

²⁴ The Lowy Institute is an independent, nonpartisan international policy think tank, located in Sydney, Australia.

private firms that offer security and military related services.”²⁵ It is important to make the clear delineation between the use of PMCs for security related tasks and the use of an external contract to supplement a military logistical function. Internal to ADF business is the heavy reliance on logistic related contracting such as transportation, catering, and supply. This use of contracting occurs both in the garrison environment and within the operational environment. Brown’s research provides an important contribution due to the Australian centric focus. This research builds on Brown’s past work by incorporating the ADF use of PMCs.

In a 2009 report for PRIV-WAR, Professor Tim McCormack considered the Australian approach to the national legal regulation of Private Military Companies and Private Security Companies.²⁶ McCormack posited that the Australian private military and security industry is a relative small player in the global market. He continued by relating the small size of the ADF with the limited scale of military support services available for contract. Moreover, McCormack discussed the perceived resistance of the Australian Government to contract out direct military services. The ADF takes a more cautious approach to the services it is prepared to contract out, in stark contrast to the militaries of the United States, UK, and Canada. The report discussed the ADF-only resort to lethal force on overseas deployments and the associated limitations on the range of services the ADF is willing to contract out. The preponderance of contracts are for logistics comprising services such as air and sea transportation, rotary wing aviation, catering and accommodation, fuel procurement, storage and handling, and dental and medical services.²⁷

²⁵ Stanley, “Selective Privatization of Security,” 7.

²⁶ PRIV-WAR was a collaborative research project coordinate by the European University Institute through the Academy of European Law. The project assessed the impact of the increasing use of private military companies and security companies in situations of armed conflict.

²⁷ Tim McCormack, National Reports Series 10/09, *PRIV-WAR Report Australia* (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Law School, 2009), 4-5.

Previous research that has tested Stanley's theory includes case studies from the perspective of Canada, the UK, and the United States. Major Steve D. Noel's monograph titled *Canadian Forces Use of Private Security in Afghanistan: A Consequence of National Decisions*, tested Stanley's theory from the perspective of the Canadian Forces during the period 2005 to 2011. Noel's research asserted that Canada's use of PSCs, as an instrument of military or foreign policy was a consequence of deliberate policy decisions of successive governments. Noel's summary of findings identified evidence to support five out of the eight hypotheses posited by Stanley, with one yielding mixed results, and two not supported. Noel concluded his research highlighting the significance of his findings in terms of its potential use for operational planners.²⁸

Similar to Noel's research, Major Ryan J. Scott tested Stanley's theory through the lens of the UK during the period 2003 to 2011. Scott's research, *The Use of Private Security by the United Kingdom and the Subsequent Impacts on Operational Planning*, asserts that the UK has used PMCs as an instrument of policy since entering the war in 2003. Scott's research uses the same theoretical framework as Noel; however at the time of his research there were only five hypotheses to test. Scott's summary of findings supported four out of five of Stanley's hypotheses. Scott's conclusion takes a similar context to Noel's research; however he highlights a different perspective on military budgeting, structure, and civil-military relations.²⁹

Major Kevin Clarke's study, *Microeconomics, Private Security, and the Significance to Operational Planning*, "analyzes the use of military-related services contracted by the United

²⁸ Steve D. Noel, "The Canadian Forces Use of Private Security in Afghanistan: A Consequence of National Decisions" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2013), 43-44.

²⁹ Ryan J. Scott, "The Use of Private Security by the United Kingdom and the Subsequent impacts on Operational Planning" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2014), 44-46.

States Government over the course of OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] from 2001-2012 to further test Stanley's theory for validity, and robustness."³⁰ Clarke's research asserts the rise of private contractors with both the reduction of Defense spending and the unplanned scope and scale of Operation Enduring Freedom. Similar to Scott, Clarke's research tested five of Stanley's hypotheses. Although Clarke's research was parallel to Stanley's in terms of the US lens, his analysis supported only two of the five hypotheses. Clarke concluded his research positing that the underlying influences to the increased reliance and use of the private security industry are insufficient. Clarke, Scott, and Noel conclude their research with two similar suppositions; the evidential need for further research in the area of private contractors and the strong possibility that the use of private contractors will continue.

This section presented the literature pertinent to this study and introduced the justification for the research. The literature review serves as an important component to the research, as Merriam assert, "A literature review is a narrative essay that integrates, synthesizes, and critiques the important thinking and research on a particular topic."³¹ The next section presents the methodology that underpins this research.

³⁰ Kevin Clarke, "Microeconomics, Private Security, and the Significance to Operational Planning" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2013), 3.

³¹ Merriam, *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education*, 55.

Methodology

The main purpose of this paper is to answer the primary research question: What factors attributed to the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) increased use of private military contractors (PMCs) in Afghanistan during the period 2001 to 2013? The researcher used Stanley's eight hypotheses to answer the primary research question. Furthermore, nine structured focused questions served as the means by which to test the hypotheses.

The researcher conducted qualitative analysis against one case study as opposed to conducting a comparative analysis between two or more case studies. This was a deliberate decision in order to answer the primary research question from the perspective of the ADF's experience with PMCs. Although Australia is similar to the United States in terms of "western ideology," the two nations diverge in a number of areas. The first area of divergence is their respective positions on the global stage. The United States is the global hegemon, thus creating a greater expectation and impetus for using its military as an instrument of national power. In his book, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*, Noam Chomsky discussed the relationship with the 2002 *National Security Strategy* and US foreign policy in terms of an increased responsibility to react to global conflict. Within the *National Security Strategy* it stated, "the right to resort to force to eliminate any perceived challenge to US global hegemony."³² In contrast, Australia's *Defence White Paper of 2013* is less offensive in nature, "on occasion, Australia will use the ADF's capabilities to assist the international community in dealing with these risks and threats."³³ This contrasting global responsibility drives the significant difference in military expenditure of the two nations. In 2013, the US military expenditure was 3.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP); in contrast, Australia spent 1.6 percent, less than half the

³² Noam Chomsky, *Hegemony or Survival* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003), 3.

³³ Australian Government: Department of Defence, *Defence White Paper* (2013), 26.

United States. However, both nations' military expenditure is trending down.³⁴ The contrasting global responsibilities between the two nations coupled with significant difference in military expenditure, provides for an interesting case study analysis against Stanley's theory.

Another point of divergence between the two nations is the willingness to use PMCs during operational commitments. In a 2009 PRIV-WAR report on Australia's use of PMCs, Professor McCormack identifies Australia's reluctance in using PMCs in contrast to Australia's military allies, "there has been governmental resistance in this country to contract out direct military services—in contrast to the readiness of some of Australia's major military allies to do so."³⁵ This difference in mindset further strengthens the utility in including the ADF as another case study to test Stanley's theory.

The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a case study as, "an intensive analysis of an individual unit (as a person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment."³⁶ The three case studies used in Stanley's research were the United States use of PSCs in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), and Iraq (2003). Noel's research centered on the Canadian use of PMCs in Afghanistan over the period 2005 to 2011, specifically on the International Security Assistance Force Canada. Scott selected the role of British PMCs during the UK's contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2003 and 2011. Clarke expanded on Stanley's research by examining the role of PMCs during US military operations in Afghanistan. By selecting Australia's involvement in Afghanistan, this research builds on and continues the work

³⁴ Worldbank, "Military Expenditure (% of GDP)," accessed September 13, 2014, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS>.

³⁵ McCormack, *PRIV-WAR Report Australia*, 3.

³⁶ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, "Case Study," accessed August 13, 2014, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/case%20study>.

of Stanley, Noel, Scott, and Clarke, while widening the lens to include a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization member.

In order to answer the primary research question and to test Stanley's theory, this study uses a structured focused approach in the single case study framework. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett describe this method in two parts. First, the structured component involves the researcher developing questions that reflect the research objective in order to standardize data collection. The focused component deals specifically with certain aspects of a case study.³⁷

Tested in this research are Stanley's eight hypotheses, which form the foundation for answering the primary research question:

H1: When military outlays decrease there is an increase use of private security.

H2: When the size of a national military decreased there is an increase in the use of private military security.

H3: When the number of a military disputes, military engagements and militarized conflicts increase there is an increase in the use of private security.

H4: When the duration of a military conflict increases there is an increased use of private security.

H5: When there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security.

H6: When there is a force cap placed in the size of the military force there is an increase in the use of private security.

H7: When there is no host nation supporting the intervention there is an increase use of private security.

³⁷ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2005).

H8: When the security environment is non-permissive there is an increase in private security.

Nine structured focused questions guide the data collection to test the eight hypotheses. The structured focused questions assisted in ensuring the study remained focused on answering the primary research question and dovetailed into Stanley's theory. Moreover, the questions guided the collection of data and subsequent synthesis to determine the supportability of the hypotheses through the lens of another case study. The structured focused questions guiding this study are:

Q1: How many PMCs by service type did Australia use in Afghanistan?

Q2: What laws, regulations, and controls were in place to govern the use of PMCs?

Q3: What was the duration of the conflict?

Q4: What was the scope of the conflict?

Q5: What other conflicts were the ADF committed to at the same time as Afghanistan?

Q6: What is the size of the ADF?

Q7: What percentage of the national budget do the military outlays in Afghanistan represent?

Q8: What was the role of the Host Nation Support in the intervention?

Q9: Was the security environment in Afghanistan permissive or non-permissive?

The questions assisted in ensuring the study remained focused towards answering the primary research question and dovetailed into Stanley's theory. The first question seeks to determine how many PMCs by service type, did Australia use in Afghanistan. This raw data is imperative to the supply-demand theory and to subsequently determine the validity of Stanley's theory. The second question seeks to determine what laws, regulations, and controls were in place to govern the use of PMCs. This information assists in determining whether the laws, regulations, and controls influence the use of PMCs.

Question three relates to the duration of the conflict. The duration of the conflict is directly related to supply-demand theory and can determine whether over time the need for military services exceeded the available capability. Further, if the duration of the operation exceeds anticipation, resource availability may pose a significant issue for both policy makers and military planners. Question four scopes the conflict to provide the reader with a contextual framework and to determine whether the scope of the conflict can determine the requirement for PMCs. Scope is significant when comparing case studies. Although the United States, UK, and Canada all provided a commitment to Afghanistan, their respective strategic objectives are where the nations diverge. Australia had a very specific role, which at times differed from other coalition nations. The scope may drive the appetite of a government to commit resources. Questions five and six relate to the capability versus requirement of the ADF. Question five discusses the ADF's simultaneous commitment to other conflicts, whereas question six determines the size of the ADF. These two questions seek to determine whether the ADF, and more specifically the Australian Government, were over committed in terms of available resources.

Question seven discusses what percentage of the national budget did the military outlays in Afghanistan represent. This information determines the initial budget for Afghanistan and whether an increase or decrease in the budget, over the duration of the conflict, is related to the increased reliance of PMCs. The role of the Host Nation Support in the intervention serves as question nine. This information provides an insight as to whether there were alternative options other than PMCs available to the ADF. The final question seeks to determine whether the security environment in Afghanistan was permissive or non-permissive. The security environment may affect the desire of the ADF to employ PMCs.

As discussed in the previous section, political scientist and military officers have conducted research on the phenomenon of the rise of the private security industry. Prior scholarly

work provided context and an inception point for this research. Moreover, previous research contributed to the development of this research and in some cases negated requirement to conduct certain aspects of data collection. The lens from the Australian perspective provides the divergent point from previous research. This section introduced the structured focused approach to this research, providing justification for using a single case study to test Stanley's theory. Further, the section provided the applicability for using the case study of Australia's involvement in Afghanistan. The next section introduces the case study for this research.

Case Study: Operation Slipper 2001 TO 2013

This section introduces the single case study centered on the Australian Defence Force (ADF) involvement in Afghanistan over the period of 2001 to 2013. The case study analysis adopts a qualitative approach in order to answer the primary research question. The researcher uses the nine structured focused questions to support the hypotheses, and to ultimately answer the primary research question using data specific to the ADF involvement in Afghanistan. This section is organized in three parts commencing with an introduction of the case study. The second part is an in-depth examination of the nine structured focused questions as they pertain to the ADF involvement in Afghanistan. A summary of the case study concludes the section.

Following the Australian Prime Minister John Howard invoking Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in 2001, the ADF deployed a Special Forces Task Group to Afghanistan to assist the US-led International Coalition against Terrorism. The ensuing 18 months saw the ADF involvement increase to over 1000 personnel under the codename Operation Slipper.³⁸ The initial ADF mission for Operation Slipper was in direct support and nested with the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, the US response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The mission of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was to overthrow the Taliban regime in order to pursue Osama bin Laden and eliminate the al-Qaeda training facilities within Afghanistan.³⁹ Essentially, Australia's aim was to enhance national security by ensuring Afghanistan did not remain a safe haven for terrorist organizations. The overall purpose of Operation Slipper was to defend Australia's ANZUS Treaty partner.

³⁸ Australian Government: Department of Defence, "Operations: Afghanistan," accessed September 30, 2014, <http://www.defence.gov.au/operations/afghanistan/home.asp>.

³⁹ Lowy Institute, "Afghanistan War", accessed October 5, 2014, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/afghanistan-war>.

In 2003, the ADF transitioned its focus to Iraq to assist the US-led Multinational Force effort to reduce Iraq's potential threat to the region. Operation Catalyst was the codename for the ADF contribution to the international coalition efforts to secure and stabilize Iraq and facilitate recovery operations. The mission evolved to include key security and training role to assist the people of Iraq to take responsibility for their own internal security and governance.⁴⁰

By mid 2005, the ADF returned to Afghanistan. During the period of 2005 to 2009 a single National Command Element initially based in Baghdad and later redeployed to the UAE commanded both theaters. By 2007, the preponderance of ADF personnel were operating within Afghanistan, although a small element remained in Iraq. Although the ADF were committed to both the Afghanistan and Iraq theaters, the focus of this research is Afghanistan.⁴¹

The scope and size of the ADF involvement in Afghanistan was not contiguous, it varied considerably over the period 2001 to 2013. For the purposes of this research, the ADF involvement in Afghanistan is broken down into three phases. Phase one commenced in October 2001 and concluded February 2003 and comprised an initial ADF commitment of a Special Forces Task Group, F/A 18 Hornets crew, and B707 aircrew. The role was to assist the US-led OEF in overthrowing the Taliban regime and eliminate terrorist training facilities. The ADF ceased operations in Afghanistan during the period of February 2003 to July 2005 in order to transition to Iraq.⁴²

The second phase commenced with the redeployment of a Special Forces Task Group to Afghanistan in July 2005 and concluded with the withdrawal of the majority of ADF elements in

⁴⁰ Australian Government: Department of Defence, *The War in Iraq: ADF Operations in The Middle East in 2003*, accessed September 30, 2014, <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/lessons.pdf>.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

December 2013. The ADF initially worked in partnership with the Netherlands in Uruzgan Province with an emphasis on reconstruction and mentoring activities. During this phase, the ADF commitment increased and widened in scope to include the deployment of aviation assets, a Reconstruction Task Force comprising of engineers and security personnel, logistic elements, and a command element. This phase also saw the ADF's scope decisively transition from reconstruction to predominately a mentoring and advising role.⁴³

The final phase of ADF involvement in Afghanistan commenced December 2013 and is ongoing.⁴⁴ The new ADF mission in Afghanistan is primarily focused on a training and advisory role with approximately 400 personnel remaining in theater.⁴⁵ Parallel to this mission is the ADF's final retrograde actions. The ADF is now operating predominately from Kabul, with the UAE remaining as the Intermediate Staging Base. This research focuses on the first two phases of Operation Slipper.

As the scope and duration of Operation Slipper exceeded initial expectations, strategic and military planners were forced to stringently manage the ADF commitment within both budget and manning constraints. These constraints, coupled with the requirement to maintain commitment to other operational theaters, saw a shift towards integrating contracting solutions with ADF capabilities. Therefore, the selection of this case study is a logical choice to extend Stanley's theoretical study.

The first structured focused question asks: How many PMCs the ADF used in Afghanistan? Figure 1 depicts the expenditure of contracts captured over the period of 2005 to 2013. Precise numbers of PMCs used in Afghanistan are difficult to ascertain due to the ADF's

⁴³ Australian Government: Department of Defence, "Operations: Afghanistan."

⁴⁴ Operation Slipper officially ceased on 31 December 2013. Operation Highroad is the new codename for the ADF support to Afghanistan.

⁴⁵ Australian Government: Department of Defence, "Operations: Afghanistan."

method for managing PMCs. Further, limited data was available for contracts before 2005. This is in part due to the lack of demand for contracts. The ADF had minimal soldiers deployed in a single location. Since 2005, the ADF contracted PMCs for services in the area of logistics, strategic lift, theater airlift, and training related activities. Partner nations conducted services for the ADF such as private site security; however this is not included in this research. An example includes the use of Slovakian Defence Forces for the provision of security within Tarin Kowt. Although the responsibility for financing contracts remains with Headquarters Joint Operations Command, there is not a single organization that manages all Afghanistan PMCs. Joint Logistics Command is the ADF's primary organization that manages operational logistic contracts. Joint Logistics Command's method for contract management is by monetary value as opposed to the number of contractors used. Headquarters 1st Joint Movement Group manages operational contracts for movement and transportation of ADF personnel and equipment. Similar to Joint Logistics Command, Headquarters 1st Joint Movement Group captures monetary figures as opposed to contractor numbers. Obtaining accurate and succinct contracting data from ADF organizations proved problematic, and further exacerbated the issue with answering this question. At times, the researcher was forced to make assumptions due to the inability of the organizations to assist in the provision of accurate data. Therefore, summarizing PMCs in Afghanistan by contractor number is not achievable for this research. The data collected is in the form of monetary value of contracts for the two categories of PMCs, from 2005 to 2013.




Figure 1. Total Expenditure of ADF Contracts 2005 to 2013

Source: Created by author.

The data collected illustrates a steady rise of expenditure on logistic related services and strategic lift from 2005 to 2010. The logistic data comprises services such as catering, cleaning, gate security, and local level transport. The logistic contracts sharply increase from 2007, with a constant and steady rise from 2011. This rise can be attributed to two reasons, the increased number of troops and the increase in the number of operating bases from two to four. There were various logistic contracts established from the period 2005 to 2011, which subsequently increased the management burden of the PMCs. In 2011, Middle East Logistics and Base Support was established to provide holistic logistics services under the one contract. SERCO was first company to be awarded the Middle East Logistics and Base Support contract. Middle East Logistics and Base Support comprised the following services: (1) Management and Admin; (2) Health Services; (3) Warehouse Services; (4) Waste Management; (5) Catering Services; (6) Accommodation and Reception; (7) Laundry Services; (8) Maintenance Services; (9) Local

Procurement; (10) Gymnasium Services; (11) Facilities Cleaning; (12) Canteen and Retail; (13) Locally Employed Labour Hire.⁴⁶

Other logistic contracts established for Operation Slipper include; Seven Seas (2007 to 2008)–Provision of Logistic Services. Patrick Defence Logistics (2006 to 2009)–Provision of comprehensive logistic support. TOLL Remote Logistics (2011 to 2015)–Provision of vehicle and equipment cleaning services. Aspen Medical (2011 to 2014)–Provision of training and delivery of First Aid Training. As outlined in a presentation by the Joint Logistics Command, the reliance on contracted solutions for logistics reduces the ADF footprint on operations and allows ADF personnel to focus on their core role.⁴⁷

The strategic lift includes inter-theater transport, intra-theater rotary wing, and intra-theater road transport. The strategic lift data is less predictable with a spike in 2008, decrease in 2010 and a steady rise in 2011 to 2013. The reliance on contracted strategic airlift can be attributed to the increase in the demand for airlift, due to the increase in operational tempo and the retirement of the Royal Australian Air Force Boeing 707 aircraft.⁴⁸ Similar to logistic services, prior to 2005 strategic airlift was provided through a combination of contracts. In 2005, the ADF transitioned to a single contract for air sustainment services. The preponderance of the strategic airlift budget was apportioned to the contracted Afghanistan Air Sustainment, which comprised an A330 (later increased to an A340) combination aircraft. The two main companies awarded this contract were Strategic Aviation (2005 to 2010) and Adagold (2010 to 2013). The purpose of this contract was to provide a weekly (twice a week during a major relief in place)

⁴⁶ JLC Staff Officers, “JLC - SCB Directorate of Supply Chain Contracting (DSCC) OPERATIONAL CONTRACTS,” (Presentation, 2014).

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, *Defence’s Request for Tender for Aviation Contracts* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2011), 9-11.

sustainment air charter between Australia and the UAE for both passengers and palletized cargo.⁴⁹

In 2011, the contract for intra-theater rotary wing was awarded to PME International-Vertical T. The contract comprised a Mi26 rotary wing platform providing movement of stores, vehicles, and equipment between Kandahar, Tarin Kowt, and the Forward Operating Bases. The ADF contracted the rotary wing asset to reduce reliance on road transport, freeing up road transport assets for other tasks, and reducing the risk to ADF personnel. Intra-theater road transport was provided by a combination of ADF assets, coalition assets, and through a US managed contract for local transport (Jingle trucks).⁵⁰

The second structured focused question discusses the laws, regulations, and controls that were in place to govern the use of PMCs in Afghanistan by the ADF. The majority of ADF overseas operations involved PMCs, therefore it stands to reason that it is in the Australian Government's best interest to regulate the employment of PMCs.⁵¹ There are three levels by which PMCs employed by the ADF are regulated. First is by international law. The 2008 Montreux Document is a joint initiative between the Swiss Government and the International Committee of the Red Cross and was the first international document to articulate the international legal obligations surrounding the employment of PMCs. The Montreux Document put to rest the misconception that there were no international regulations of PMCs.⁵² However,

⁴⁹ Benjamin Barber, Email, November 11, 2014 (7:03 p.m.).

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Bruce Oswald, "Developing Accountability Regimes For Military Contractors: An Australian Approach?," Isenberg Institute Of Strategic Satire, April 27, 2013, accessed November 4, 2014, <http://iisonline.net/developing-accountability-regimes-for-military-contractors-an-australian-approach/>.

⁵² International Committee of the Red Cross, "Private Military and Security Companies: Implementation of Montreux Document," December 16, 2014, accessed January 19, 2015,

the document is not legally binding, rather an “intergovernmental document intended to promote respect for international humanitarian law and human rights laws whenever PMCs are employed in an armed conflict.”⁵³ Australia was one of the founding signatories of the 2008 Montreux Document. The Professor McCormack’s 2009 report for PRIVWAR, posits that Australian Government agencies have reviewed their respective procurement contracting processes in line with the Montreux Document. “Australia’s participation in the Montreux Process has certainly galvanised attention on the issue of Australian utilisation of the services of PMCs and PSCs.”⁵⁴ Further, an Australian diplomat, David Dutton, conducted work on an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, an ensuing initiative to the Montreux Document. Released in September 2013, the multinational agreement seeks to provide a level of regulation to the private security industry. Dutton assisted in securing 600 Non-Governmental Organizations, governments, international organizations, and companies.⁵⁵

The next level by which PMCs are regulated by the ADF in Afghanistan is through domestic law. Bruce Oswald posits in a 2013 paper titled, *Developing Accountability Regimes for Military Contractors: An Australian Approach*, that the Australian Government faces the challenge of balancing commercial reality and the need to adhere to government requirements.⁵⁶ His paper discusses the legal framework in place to regulate Australian Military Contractors overseas. Oswald’s central idea is the accountability and safety of Australian Military

<https://www.icrc.org/en/document/private-military-and-security-companies-implementation-montreux-document#.VMosO4v7KfQ>.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ McCormack, *PRIV-WAR Report Australia*, 5-6.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Bruce Oswald is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Melbourne and a previous Legal Officer with the Australian Army.

Contractors, and whether the contractors should be self-regulated (from their own industry), or government regulated. Oswald outlines three legislative frameworks that exist to allow the Australian Government to manage accountability of Australian Military Contractors. The Defence Force Discipline Act 1985, the Crimes (Overseas) Act 1964, and the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Code).⁵⁷

The Defence Force Discipline Act 1985 only applies to those contractors designated as “Defence Civilians.”⁵⁸ This research does not incorporate the employment of Defence Civilians. The Crimes (Overseas) Act 1964 applies to Australian Military Contractors working overseas in an area deemed as a “declared foreign country” or “under an agreement between the Australian Government and the UN, may be subject to Federal criminal law jurisdiction by the application of the Overseas Act.” Currently, Afghanistan is a declared foreign country.⁵⁹ The Criminal Code Act 1995 (Code) is the final legislative framework regulating Australian Military Contractors. The Code allows the Australian Government to regulate the behavior of Australians, particularly in relation to serious offences such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. The above three legislative frameworks are only pertinent for Australian citizens working as PMCs in Afghanistan, and does not cover other nationalities.

The final level by which PMCs employed by the ADF are regulated is through the host nation. In 2008, the Karzai Government released a policy in an attempt to fill the existing legal gaps for regulating and controlling the private security industry. The policy created a regulatory

⁵⁷ Oswald, “Developing Accountability Regimes for Military Contractors.”

⁵⁸ A Defence Civilian is defined as a person, other than a defence member, who with the authority of the ADF accompanies the ADF outside Australia or on operations against the enemy, and who has consented in writing to subject himself or herself to Defence Force discipline.

⁵⁹ Australian Government, “Crimes (Overseas) (Declared Foreign Countries) Amendment Regulation 2014,” Comlaw.gov.au, accessed November 4, 2014, <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2014L00718/Explanatory%20Statement/Text>.

law that PSCs had to register by 2010 in order to operate in Afghanistan. The goal of the policy was to ensure “transparency, accountability and quality services by private security companies in accordance with the laws of Afghanistan.”⁶⁰

The research indicates that the Australian Government appears to be committed to the regulation of PMCs and the adherence of international law in respect to the activities of PMCs. Furthermore, there is an existing domestic legislative framework to regulate Australian PMCs, however this is specific to Australian citizens. Professor McCormack discusses the Australian approach, in a 2009 report for PRIV-WAR, “the existing Australian legislative framework is far from comprehensive. Substantial legislative reform will be required if the Australian Government wants to ensure comprehensive regulation of the activities of PMCs and PSCs.” He continues in the paper by asserting that the Australian Government is hesitant to contract out direct military services and is far more cautious than the militaries of the United States, UK, and Canada.⁶¹

Structured focused question three explores the duration of the conflict. The ADF commitment to Afghanistan commenced in 2001 and is ongoing; however, there was a temporary pause in operations from 2002 to 2005 as the ADF’s focus shifted to Iraq. For the purpose of this research, the ADF involvement in Afghanistan is essentially 11 years, from 2001 to 2002 and 2005 to 2013. The Australian Government did not anticipate that the Afghanistan commitment would extend past a decade, thus were forced to continually provide periodic updates to both military planners and the public on the revised commitment to Afghanistan.⁶²

⁶⁰ Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, *Procedure For Regulating Activities of Private Security Companies in Afghanistan* (Kabul: Ministry of Interior, 2008).

⁶¹ McCormack, *PRIV-WAR Report Australia*, 18.

⁶² Parliament of Australia, “About Parliament,” accessed October 5, 2014, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/1011/MilitaryInvolvementAfghanistan.

The scope of the conflict serves as the fourth structured focused question. Although the initial objective for the ADF involvement was to contribute to the overthrowing of the Taliban Regime, solidifying Australia's commitment to the ANZUS Treaty, the scope evolved considerably in the ensuing years. The initial period of 2001 to 2002 was centered largely on a Special Forces Task Group mission alongside the US-led coalition. The Special Forces contributed to the establishment of the US-led coalition Forward Operating Base southwest of Kandahar.⁶³ In early 2002, the then Defence Minister, Senator Robert Hill released a media statement on the ADF's contribution:

While we have achieved considerable success on the ground in Afghanistan, the broader war against terrorism will be a long one . . . Australia is in for the long haul. Part of our commitment is ensuring that our defence forces are ready to meet any new challenges that may arise. We need to rest our personnel, maintain our equipment and re-group ready for possible future operations.⁶⁴

With this media release, Hill effectively committed the ADF to a long-term war against terrorism. The ADF troop numbers in Afghanistan during this period did not exceed 200 personnel. At the end of 2002, the ADF withdrew its forces from Afghanistan leaving a single officer assigned to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Parallel to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the ADF deployed to Iraq to support the enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq.⁶⁵

The ADF returned to Afghanistan in 2005 with approximately 190 personnel. Similar to 2001, the initial mission centered on a Special Operations Task Group conducting combat patrols

⁶³ Australian War Memorial, "Afghanistan, 2001–Present," accessed January 21, 2015, <http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/afghanistan/>.

⁶⁴ Parliament of Australia, *Australian Defence Force Contribution to the War against Terrorism*, 2014, accessed October 5, 2014, <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fpressrel%2FK6D66%22>.

⁶⁵ Parliament of Australia, *Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan*, 2010, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/1011/MilitaryInvolvementAfghanistan.

and reconnaissance and surveillance missions in the Kandahar region. The deployment of the first Reconstruction Task Force in mid 2006 marked the inception point for the changing nature of the ADF commitment. The Reconstruction Task Force formed part of a Dutch-led Provincial Reconstruction Team operation outside of Tarin Kowt in the Uruzgan Province, essentially increasing the ADF footprint to two main Forward Operating Bases. The same year saw the formalization and centralization of logistics elements in support of both the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. In 2007, the Special Operations Task Group and Reconstruction Task Force were joined by a Royal Australian Air Force element, to provide air surveillance radar capability to assume control of a portion of Afghan operational air space. The following year, the scope of the deployment changed again. The Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force replaced the Reconstruction Task Force, with the additional task of capacity building and mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA). By the end of 2008, the ADF commitment comprised a national headquarters, Special Operations Task Group, Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force, Royal Australian Air Force radar element, logistic element, and a CH-47 detachment. The total ADF presence was approximately 1000 personnel operating from three main bases within Afghanistan, Kabul, Kandahar, and Tarin Kowt and the National Command Element remaining in UAE.⁶⁶

Early 2009 saw the deployment of an Election Support Force in support of the Afghan national elections. The Mentoring Task Force replaced the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force in 2010 removing the term reconstruction from the title. The deployment of the first Mentoring Task Force marked another transition in the ADF commitment. Parallel to the mentoring and training role, the Mentoring Task Force was responsible for working closely with officers from other Australian Government agencies, with the purpose of setting the conditions

⁶⁶ Parliament of Australia, *Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan*, 2010, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/1011/MilitaryInvolvementAfghanistan.

for retrograde operations.⁶⁷ Following the withdrawal of the Dutch in 2010, Australia assumed control of the Provincial Reconstruction Team, an organization responsible for the support of the reconstruction effort. At the peak of the ADF involvement in 2009, personnel numbers were 1550. The ADF remained in Kabul, Kandahar, Tarin Kowt, and the UAE.⁶⁸

The final change in scope occurred in October 2012, with the ADF assuming control of the Combined Team–Uruzgan, which essentially put Australia in control of the ADF’s primary effort in Afghanistan. The Combined Team–Uruzgan’s primary role was to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the provision of governance, development, and security. Retrograde operations commenced in 2013 with the majority of forces withdrawn by the end of that year.⁶⁹ By the end of 2013, the ADF had completed withdrawal with approximately 400 personnel remaining in an advisory role.⁷⁰ As evident from the timeline of ADF involvement on Afghanistan, policy makers and ADF planners continually reframed the Afghanistan problem and subsequently adjusted the ADF size and scope.

While conducting planning for the changing nature of the ADF commitment in Afghanistan, military planners were constrained to operate within government imposed force caps. The Australian Government regularly reassessed the strategic context of the Afghanistan conflict, which subsequently led to periodic amendments to the force cap. The force caps were stipulated to military planners through official means and to the public via media announcements. In 2010, a Parliamentary Brief was released outlining the current and future ADF commitment in

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Parliament of Australia, *Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan*, 2010, accessed January 21, 2015, http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/1011/MilitaryInvolvementAfghanistan.

⁶⁹ Lowy Institute, “Afghanistan War.”

⁷⁰ Australian Government: Department of Defence, “Operations: Afghanistan.”

Afghanistan. The Brief identified that the ADF commitment was comprised of approximately 1550 ADF personnel and outlined the specific role the ADF was performing in Afghanistan.⁷¹ The various iterations of government imposed force caps throughout Operation Slipper reflected the changing nature of the ADF commitment in Afghanistan.

When analyzing the ADF commitment in Afghanistan, it is constructive to increase the aperture to include other operational deployments occurring simultaneously. This serves as the fifth structured focused question; what other global or regional conflicts were the ADFs committed simultaneously to the Afghanistan commitment? The answer is categorized into two discrete groups; Afghanistan and other deployments. The Afghanistan component comprises ADF elements deployed within the borders of Afghanistan and the support elements stationed within the UAE. The “other deployments” group comprises non-Afghanistan global conflicts, regional conflicts, and humanitarian relief operations. ADF elements deployed domestically under the banner of Defence Aid to the Civil Community, in support of domestic emergencies such as bush fires, floods, and cyclones are also included in the statistics. The decade following the commencement of ADF support to Afghanistan marked an inception point in terms of the demand of the ADF. The ADF saw itself supporting the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, a continued and steady support to UN operations, and an increase in support to regional humanitarian relief operations. Figure 2 illustrates troop numbers committed to both the Afghanistan conflict and other operations. It is clear from the data that the Afghanistan commitment was the primary focus in both 2001 and the period 2005 to 2013, however it was not the ADF’s only focus.

Support to UN operations commenced in 1948 with the deployment of ADF military observers and staff officers to the Middle East, in support to the UN Truce Supervision

⁷¹ Parliament of Australia, *Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan*.

Organization (UNTSO). “The UNTSO was established in 1948 to supervise the truce agreed at the conclusion of the first Arab-Israeli War.”⁷² The ADF commitment to the UNTSO is ongoing and comprises twelve officers under the codename Operation Paladin. From the period 2001, the ADF has supported no less than ten UN Operations. Support to UN Operations is comprised of small contingents of ADF personnel deployed to various locations around the globe. Support to Operation Mazurka is one of the larger continuing single contingent of troop numbers in support of the UN, with twenty-five personnel on a rotational basis.⁷³ During the period from 2001 to 2013, the largest deployment of troops in support of the UN was the ADF-led commitment to East Timor. At the commencement of this mission in 1999, the ADF’s commitment comprised 5700 personnel, which reduced to approximately 1600, by 2002.⁷⁴ Throughout the duration of the Afghanistan commitment, the ADF continued to lead the UN Operation in East Timor, with the scope and troop numbers fluctuating from year to year.

With the exception of Afghanistan and East Timor, the only other significant global conflicts supported by the ADF were Operation Catalyst (Iraq) and Operation Anode (Solomon

⁷² Australian Government: Department of Defence, *Global Operations: Middle East*, 2014, accessed November 11, 2014, <http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/MiddleEast/>

⁷³ Operation Mazurka is the ADF’s contribution to the Multinational peacekeeping force based in the Sinai Peninsula, with the role of overseeing the terms of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty; Australian Government: Department of Defence, *Operations: Egypt*, 2014, accessed November 11, 2014. <http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/Egypt/>.

⁷⁴ Australian Government: Department of Defence, *Global Operations: Timor Leste*, 2014, accessed November 11, 2014, <http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/PastOperations/timorleste/default.asp>.

Islands). The commitment to Iraq was in support of the US-led invasion; the ADF numbers peaked at 1500, in 2006.⁷⁵ The ADF commitment to Operation Anode peaked at 1400, in 2003.⁷⁶

Humanitarian relief operations comprises of support to natural disasters both domestic and overseas. During the period 2001 to 2013, the ADF supported over ten natural disasters ranging from the 2005 Indonesian Tsunami to the 2011 floods that devastated Brisbane, Queensland. Operation Sumatra Assist was an ADF-led disaster relief operation following the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake. The ADF contingent was approximately 1000 personnel operating from three major locations. The ADF has provided support to numerous natural disasters within Australia, including cyclones, fires, and floods. Generally, a Task Force is established from both the active and reserve forces. The recent 2011 support to the Queensland floods comprised of over 1900 ADF personnel as a part of Joint Task Force 637.⁷⁷ Shortly after the devastating floods, Tropical Cyclone Yasi crossed the North Queensland Coast, the ADF responded with over 1200 personnel forming Joint Task Force 664.⁷⁸ During the period of the Afghanistan deployment, over 5000 ADF personnel were deployed throughout Australia for disaster relief missions.

Figure 2 summarizes the ADF commitment to overseas and domestic operations from 2001 to 2013. The figure identifies that the number of ADF troops deployed on operations peaked at approximately 6062 personnel in 2011, which equates to just over 10 percent of the total force.

⁷⁵ Australian Government: Department of Defence, Global Operations: Iraq, 2014, accessed November 11, 2014, <http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/PastOperations/Iraq/>.

⁷⁶ Australian Government: Department of Defence, Global Operations: Solomon Islands, 2014, accessed November 11, 2014, <http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/PastOperations/SolomonIslands/default.asp>

⁷⁷ Australian Army, "Operation QUEENSLAND FLOOD ASSIST 2011 - Australian Army," accessed January 22, 2015, <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Community-engagement/Disaster-relief-at-home/Operation-QUEENSLAND-FLOOD-ASSIST-2011>.

⁷⁸ Australian Army, "Operation YASI ASSIST 2011 - Australian Army," accessed January 22, 2015, <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Community-engagement/Disaster-relief-at-home/Operation-YASI-ASSIST-2011>.




Figure 2. ADF Support to Operations 2001 to 2013

Source: Created by author.

Structured focused question six discusses the size of the ADF. Figure 3 outlines the permanent ADF force from 1990 to 2013. The researcher elected to include data from 1990 to illustrate the downward trend of ADF numbers leading up to the commencement of the Afghanistan commitment. During the 1990s the ADF budget decreased, resulting in a reduction of the permanent workforce from approximately 70,000 to 50,000 personnel, representing a reduction of over 25 percent. The significant decrease in the permanent force from 1990 to 2000 can be attributed to two initiatives, the Force Structure Review and the Commercial Support Program. The initiatives comprised of commercialization, outsourcing, and increased labour productivity.⁷⁹ The *2000 Defence White Paper* highlighted the mismatch that existed between strategic objectives, Defence capabilities, and Defence spending, subsequently leading to an

⁷⁹ Justine Greig, "The Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) Personnel Environment Scan 2020: Recruitment and Retention Issues," IAMPS.ORG, accessed December 7, 2014, http://www.iamps.org/IAMPS_2001_Workshop_Greig.pdf.

increase in ADF capability.⁸⁰ By the commencement of the Afghanistan commitment, the strength of the ADF, comprising permanent personnel, was just over 50,000. During the period of the Afghanistan deployment, the ADF permanent force steadily rose with a peak of 59,257 personnel in 2011. By the end of 2013, the permanent force decreased to a strength of 56,570 personnel.⁸¹ This equates to an increase of 11.4 percent from the start of the Afghanistan commitment to the end of 2013.




Figure 3. Number of Permanent ADF Personnel 1990 to 2013

Source: Created by author.

The seventh structured focused question pertains to the ADF budget. What percentage of the national budget did the military outlays in Afghanistan represent? Figure 4 shows the Defence

⁸⁰ Australian Government: Department of Defence, “Budget,” last modified 2000, accessed October 19, 2014, <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/>.

⁸¹ Ibid.

budget by year in real terms, in relation to the GDP percentage. This question seeks to determine whether the ADF budget increased, decreased, or remained constant over the period 2001 to 2013. Moreover, the research question determines the apportionment of the Defence budget to the Afghanistan operation. Since the mid-1990s, Australia’s Defence budget has hovered around 2 percent of the GDP. The Defence budget for 2001 and 2002 financial year was \$18.81 billion with an increase to \$28.59 billion by 2009 and 2010. The budget represented 1.9 percent of GDP during this period. From 2011 to 2013 the budget decreased by 0.1 percent of GDP annually, with the final Defence budget for financial year 2012 and 2013 at \$25.78 billion or 1.6 percent of GDP.⁸²




Figure 4. Australian Defence Budget 2001 to 2013

Source: Created by author.

The Afghanistan component of the Defence budget was not as constant. Figure 5 illustrates the increase in defense spending specific to the Afghanistan conflict. The expenditure

⁸² Worldbank, “Military Expenditure (% of GDP).”

in the 2002 and 2003 financial year was approximately AUD \$176 million. The budget for the next two financial years was negligible due to the transition to Iraq. From 2005 and 2006 through the 2009 and 2010 financial years, the Afghanistan budget increased from AUD \$91 million to AUD \$1125.3 million. A steady decrease is seen from the 2010/2011 to the 2012/2013 budget.⁸³ The steady increase in the budget from 2005 to 2010 can be attributed to the increase in both troop numbers and operating bases.




Figure 5. ADF Defence Spending (Afghanistan) 2001 to 2013

Source: Created by author.

Structured focused question eight asks: What role did the Host Nation play in the intervention? There is an expectation that the Afghanistan Government provide an element of

⁸³ Parliament of Australia, "About Parliament."

security through the Afghan National Security Forces, which is comprised of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police, and the Afghan Air Force. Although the ANA is a nascent organization, it has steadily grown in both size and capability throughout the period of ADF involvement. The ANA was redesigned in 2003 and incremental goals were established in order to build an army capable of establishing and maintaining internal security. The size of the ANA in 2013 was approximately 183,000 a significant increase from the 79,000, in 2009.⁸⁴ A key objective of the ANA is contributing to a stable and secure environment.⁸⁵ Although the provision of security for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) bases in Afghanistan could fall within the ANA's remit, private security companies and other national militaries have historically provided this function. ANA's focus remains the conduct of combat operations against the Taliban; therefore, the provision of base security for coalition forces remains a low priority.

Finally, Host Nation Support can also include the provision of logistic services. Afghanistan has suffered years of instability and conflict, resulting in a ruined economy and infrastructure.⁸⁶ Therefore, the ADF and coalition partners were unable to source appropriate host nation logistic services. As mentioned in structured focused question one, the ADF contracted out logistic services to either coalition partners or global companies. One such contract was the provision of road transport support between Tarin Kowt and Kandahar. Although Afghanistan transport companies were regularly used between the two locations, the ADF contracted through

⁸⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "ISAF", accessed January 12, 2015, http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2013_06/20130604_130604-mb-ansf.pdf

⁸⁵ Obaid Younossi, Peter Dahl Thruelsen, Jonathan Vaccaro, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Brian Grady, "The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army" (Monograph, RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009), accessed October 20, 2014, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG845.html>.

⁸⁶ BBC News, "Afghanistan Country Profile," accessed January 22, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12011352>.

a standing US Military contract and did not enter into contracts directly with Afghanistan companies.

The final structured focused question asks: Whether the security environment in Afghanistan was permissive or non-permissive? The determination of a security environment is not definitive as experts fail to agree on the typology of conflict. In US Military doctrine, a permissive environment is defined as, “an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct.”⁸⁷ Conversely, a non-permissive environment can be defined as one in which the host nation does not have control. Semi-permissive is a further term quite often used to describe an environment that fits somewhere in the middle of the two definitions. The ADF deployed throughout Afghanistan with the three main operating bases being Kabul, Kandahar, and Tarin Kowt. Noel asserted, “The security situation in Kandahar was non-permissive in 2005 and remained that way as of 2011.”⁸⁸ In a NATO Defense College Forum Paper, Christopher M. Schnaubelt posits, “semi-permissive environments, such as Afghanistan and Iraq . . . the level of conflict is generally less than full-scale combat but high enough to present a security threat to civilians engaged in governance and economic development efforts.”⁸⁹ The type of violence and the number of ISAF deaths in Afghanistan is another lens by which to analyze the security environment. Table 1 displays the total coalition deaths and injuries per year. As evident in the table, there was a steady increase in the number of deaths during the period 2001 to 2013, peaking at 711 in 2010. Despite the various definitions offered by scholars, the ADF adopted

⁸⁷ Department of Defense, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, 2010), 122.

⁸⁸ Noel, “The Canadian Forces Use of Private Security in Afghanistan,” 35.

⁸⁹ Christopher M. Schnaubelt, ed., “Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-Permissive Environments” (NDC Forum Paper 9, NATO Defense College, Research Division, Rome, June 2009), 13.

security measures commensurate with a non-permissive environment. ADF assets were not permitted to conduct road movement between the three operating bases within Afghanistan and ADF personnel were banned from travelling on aircraft not fitted with Early Warfare Self-protection. Furthermore, ADF personnel were directed to wear both ballistic Kevlar helmet and body armor while travelling by air within Afghanistan air space. These force protection measures indicate that the ADF considered Afghanistan a non-permissive environment.

Table 1. Coalition Casualties in Afghanistan 2001 to 2013

Year	ADF Deaths	ADF Injuries	US Injuries	US Deaths	Coalition Deaths
2001		4	33	12	12
2002	1		74	49	70
2003			99	48	58
2004			218	52	60
2005		2	268	99	131
2006		10	411	98	191
2007	3	19	750	117	232
2008	4	26	795	155	295
2009	4	37	2144	317	521
2010	10	65	5276	499	711
2011	11	50	5199	418	566
2012	7	33	2747	310	402
2013	1	15	1522	127	161
Total	41	261	19536	2301	3410

Source: Icasualties.org, “Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casualties,” accessed November 4, 2014, <http://www.icasualties.org>; Australian Government: Department of Defence, “Operations: Afghanistan.” <http://www.defence.gov.au/operations/afghanistan/personnel.asp>

In summary, the number of PMCs employed by the ADF in Afghanistan in terms of the monetary value grew significantly in parallel with the number of ADF troops deployed and the expansion of operating bases. During this period, there were attempts to regulate the use of PMCs both from an international and host nation perspective. The ADF’s involvement in Afghanistan fluctuated in terms of size and scope over the period of 2001 to 2013. During this period, there

was an increase in the demand for the ADF, including support to UN, humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The size of the ADF grew marginally, however the Defence budget remained relatively constant at approximately 1.9 percent of the GDP until a decrease is seen from 2011. Throughout the period of 2001 to 2013, the ADF considered Afghanistan a non-permissive security environment.

This section presented a new case study of the ADF's involvement in Afghanistan over the period of 2001 to 2013, which contributes to the growing number of case studies that have tested Stanley's theory. The data obtained from the structured focused questions is required to conduct an analysis of the validity of the eight hypotheses posited in Stanley's theory. The next section will present the analysis in relation to the hypotheses to determine whether this case study supports Stanley's theory and to answer the primary research question.

Findings and Analysis

This section determines the validity of each hypothesis in terms of whether the evidence supports, does not support, or indicates mixed results. Table 2 summarizes the findings and compares the results with previous research. The collective results of each hypothesis, determines whether the case study of the ADF involvement in Afghanistan supports Stanley's theory. The analysis is conducted comparing and contrasting the results of the focused questions against the hypotheses posited by Stanley and against the results from previous case studies of the United States, UK, and Canada.

Hypothesis one stated that when military outlays decrease there is an increase in the use of private security. The ADF budget did in fact increase during the period of 2001 to 2013, therefore; the evidence gathered during the case study analysis does not support this hypothesis. All three of the previous case studies presented the same findings.

Hypothesis two states that when the size of a national military decreased there is an increase in the use of private military security. The ADF experienced a steady increase of 11.4 percent from the commencement of the Afghanistan conflict. The evidence does not support this hypothesis. However, when you widen the scope to include the decade leading up to the Afghanistan operation, there is a clear reduction in the size of the military. One can argue that the decrease in the military size leading up to the Afghanistan deployment forced an increase use of PMCs during the conflict. Therefore, the widened evidence suggests a mixed result. Clarke's case study involving the United States did not support this hypothesis, however if the researcher expanded the lens to include the decade leading up to the war, the results may have differed.⁹⁰

The third hypothesis states that when the number of a military disputes, military engagements, and militarized conflicts increase there is a rise in the use of private security. The

⁹⁰ Clarke, "Microeconomics, Private Security, and the Significant to Operational Planning," 40.

evidence supports this hypothesis. The ADF experienced a high level of demand in the decade following the commencement of the Afghanistan conflict. In 2011, the number of ADF deployed either overseas or engaged in a domestic response peaked at 6062. With the demand exceeding the capability of the ADF, particularly in terms of logistic related services, it appears that policy makers and operational planners made a deliberate decision to employ PMCs in Afghanistan. All three of the other case studies yielded the same result, commensurate with the supply-demand theory.

Hypothesis four asserts that when the duration of a military conflict increased there is increase in the use of private security. From the evidence presented, this hypothesis is supported. There is a clear increase in the use of PMCs parallel with the extended commitment of the ADF in Afghanistan; again this is commensurate with the supply-demand theory. All three case studies supported this hypothesis.

Hypothesis five states that when there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is supported. Although Australia is considered a leader in the desire to regulate the use of private security companies, and is a signatory to the Montreaux Convention, the current Australian legislative framework is far from comprehensive. The domestic regulations only cover Australian citizens working overseas. Further, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan did not enforce the regulations of PMCs until 2010. Clarke's case study of the United States did not support this hypothesis. His evidence indicated that the increased bureaucratic controls failed to stymie the expansion and increased reliance of contractors on the battlefield.⁹¹

⁹¹ Clarke, "Microeconomics, Private Security, and the Significance to Operational Planning," 41.

Hypothesis six states when there is a force cap placed on the size of the military force there is an increase in the use of private security. The evidence supports this hypothesis. The Australian Government imposed strict force caps on ADF troop numbers in Afghanistan. Military planners were forced to balance the requirement of the task against the imposed force caps as opposed to the ADF mission. This in turn created a capability gap, with demand exceeding supply, forcing military planners to look at alternative options. Noel's research supported this hypothesis, however Stanley introduced this hypothesis after Clarke and Scott's research, therefore it is not included in their respective case studies.⁹²

Hypothesis seven suggests that when there is no host nation supporting the intervention there is an increase use of private security. The evidence collected indicates a mixed result for this hypothesis. Arguably, if the ANA or Afghan National Security Forces were capable of providing both combat operations and base security, the requirement to use partner nations for base security would not have existed. However, this requirement can also be attributed to the imposed force caps. Further, an increase of ANA and Afghan National Security Forces capability may equate to a decrease in the requirement for ISAF, therefore negating the requirement for base security for coalition forces. The 2010 Afghan Government imposed control of PSCs does not correlate with a decrease in the ADF's use of PMCs. Noel's research did not support this hypothesis for similar reasons as the findings in this research.⁹³

The final hypothesis posited in Stanley's theory states that when the security environment is non-permissive there is an increase in private security. The evidence indicates that this hypothesis is supported. The ADF adopted stringent force protection measures due to the volatility of the environment. Noel's research also supported this hypothesis. Noel posited two

⁹² Noel, "The Canadian Forces use of Private Security in Afghanistan: A Consequence of National Decisions," 41.

⁹³ Ibid.

factors that may explain the relationship of non-permissive environment and the increase use of PSCs. First, Noel offers the supply-demand theory as a possible explanation, “if an organization is willing to pay the price of the service of the PSC then essentially all options are open.”⁹⁴ Secondly, the reality of force protection measures and priority of effort may contribute to the rise of PSCs in hostile environments. Noel uses the example of counterinsurgency operations versus static protection of camps and security of convoys, where the priority is low and worth the risk of employing PSCs.⁹⁵ The second factor is more in line with the ADF’s use of PMCs in Afghanistan.

Table 2. Summary of Findings

Hypothesis	Stanley’s Findings	Clarke’s Findings	Noel’s Findings	Scott’s Findings	Researcher’s Findings
When military outlays decrease there is an increase in the use of private security.	Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported	Not Supported
When the size of a national military decreases there is an increase in the use of PMC.	Supported	Not Supported	Supported	Supported	Mixed Results
When the number of a military disputes, military engagements, and militarized conflicts increases, there is an increase in the use of PMC.	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
When the duration of a military conflict increases, there is an increase in the use of PMC.	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
When there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of PMC.	Supported	Not Supported	Supported	Supported	Supported
When there is a force cap placed on the size of the military, there is an increase in the use of PMC.	Supported		Supported		Supported

⁹⁴ Noel, “The Canadian Forces use of Private Security in Afghanistan,” 42.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

When there is no host nation supporting the intervention there is an increase in the use of PMC.	Supported		Not Supported		Mixed Results
When the security environment is non-permissive, there is an increase of PMC.	Supported		Supported		Supported

Source: Created by author.

The primary research question framing this paper asks: What factors attribute to the ADF's increase use of PMCs in Afghanistan over the period of 2001 to 2013? From the findings of the focused structured questions, five of the eight hypotheses are supported. From the supported hypotheses, the researcher conducted an analysis to answer the primary research question. The first supported hypothesis is: When the number of a military disputes, military engagements, and militarized conflicts increase, there is an increase in the use of private security internationally. The demand for the ADF spiked from 1999 with the deployment of 5500 troops into East Timor. Shortly after this period, the Prime Minister invoked the ANZUS Treaty and the ADF commenced a length commitment in Afghanistan. Parallel to the commitment to East Timor, Afghanistan, and other regional conflicts, the ADF assumed the lead for the 2005 and 2006 humanitarian operation in support of the devastating regional Tsunami. With the demand exceeding capacity (suuply), military planners were forced to seek alternative means to close the gap in capability. Therefore, requirement versus capability is a factor that is attributed to the increase use of PMCs.

The next supported hypothesis is: When the duration of a military conflict increases, there is an increase in the use of private security. As discussed previously, the ADF increased the use of PMCs as the duration of the conflict increased. This is partly explained with the increase understanding of the requirement, coupled with an increase in the skills and experience in managing contractors. The longer the deployment extends, the greater the ability for organizations such as Headquarters 1st Joint Movement Group and Headquarters Joint Logistics

Command to develop comprehensive and value for money contracts. Comprehensive contracts require extensive planning and timeframes of up to eighteen months, therefore it may not be viable to incorporate the use of contracts in short notice and duration conflicts.⁹⁶ Duration of the conflict is another factor that attributed to the ADF's increase use of PMCs. It is difficult to anticipate the duration of ADF commitment, thus deeming it problematic for military planners to determine the future requirement for PMCs. However, as history has demonstrated, ADF commitment to combat operations is seldom short in duration. Therefore, military planners should incorporate PMCs early in the planning, allowing robust contracts to be established and subsequently reducing the cost of the contract.

The next supported hypothesis is: When there is a decrease in bureaucratic controls and regulations there is an increase in the use of private security. Although this hypothesis is supported and can thus be considered a factor in the increased use of PMCs, the emerging bureaucratic controls and regulation framework, such as the Montreux Document may affect a government's use of PMCs in the future. Further, the host nation regulation and controls on the use of PMCs will differ from conflict to conflict; therefore this hypothesis depends on the host nation.

When there is a force cap placed on the size of the military, there is an increase in the use of private security, is another supported hypothesis. Although the ADF has been relatively cautious in incorporating PMCs in operational plans, the scarce ADF logistics and strategic lift capabilities coupled with the government imposed force caps forced military planners to use PMCs. When there is an imposed force cap, military planners must first determine the ADF mission then develop ways to achieve the mission that capitalizes on maximizing the number of

⁹⁶ Mulhall, *Combat Service Support Effects – Contingency Contracting*, 3.

combat troops. The ADF is more inclined to contract logistics and strategic lift services as opposed to combat related services.

The final hypothesis supported is: When the security environment is non-permissive, there is an increase in private security. The ADF may be considered a relatively risk adverse military compared to the US Army. Evidence of this is the force protection measures adopted within Afghanistan. The security environment is a factor attributed to the increase use of PMCs. Military planners can consider this when developing military options for operations within a semi or non-permissive environment.

In summary, military planners incorporate the employment of PMCs when there is an increased demand for the ADF and the duration of the military conflict extends. The ADF is a relatively small military, therefore when the demand exceeds capability (supply); alternative solutions are employed, such as the employment of PMCs. However, the results indicate that while the ADF is comfortable contracting out logistic services, there is a reluctance to contract out security related services. Further, when there is a force cap imposed on a military, PMCs are employed to fill a capability gap to ensure there is no risk to achieving the assigned mission. When there are decreased bureaucratic controls and regulations, the ADF's reliance of PMCs increases. Finally, the security environment influences the number of PMCs employed by the ADF. In the case of Afghanistan, the security environment was considered non-permissive, driving the increase use of PMCs for high-risk tasks such as road transportation within Afghanistan.

This section presented the analysis associated with the case study and the structured focused questions against Stanley's eight hypotheses and the supply-demand theory. The evidence supports five of the eight hypotheses, with two yielding mixed results and one not supported. In the case study involving the ADF commitment in Afghanistan, military planners used PMCs to bridge the gap between requirement and capability. This is particularly pertinent

for services such as logistics and transportation. The ADF contracted out catering and ground transport, which negated the requirement to include military personnel to perform these functions within the mandated force caps. This provided military planners with a degree of flexibility in developing military options for the ADF mission in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to determine the factors attributed to the increase use of PMCs by the ADF in Afghanistan over the period of 2001 to 2013. The research identified a number of factors including; increased demand for the ADF, extended duration of the conflict, decreased bureaucratic controls and regulations, imposed force cap, and a non-permissive security environment. Military planners can use this research to integrate the use of PMCs into operational plans. The research postulated that the supply-demand theory is a suitable theoretical framework for the study of PMCs. Moreover, the research determined that the Australian Government and the private security industry operate in a monopsony market, where demand, not price, controls purchases. This research contributed to the existing body of work that has tested Stanley's theory. Stanley's theory can be partially used to explain the growth of the private security industry, and provide military planners the framework to incorporate PMCs early in planning.

When the Australian Government elects to reduce the ADF structure, they may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration. From the period of 1990 to 2001, the ADF reduced from approximately 70,000 to around 52,000. In contrast, the number of ADF personnel deployed increased exponentially from 1999. From the analysis it is evident that the Australian Government did not anticipate the level that the ADF would be committed commencing from the East Timor conflict in 1999. The Australian Government was forced to rapidly build capability to meet the requirements. In other words, the demand significantly outweighed the supply, thus requiring PMCs to bridge the gap. Other case studies used against Stanley's methodology made the same assertions as this research; governments who elect to reduce the size of their military may face conflicts beyond their anticipated scope and duration.⁹⁷ Clarke's research, which

⁹⁷ Stanley, "Selective Privatization of Security," 169.

centered on the US intervention in Afghanistan, determined that there was a substantial reliance on private security contracting by the United States to augment or support military operations.⁹⁸ Similarly, Noel researched the Canadian commitment in Afghanistan and concluded that defense spending, the size of the military, and number of conflicts all contribute to the increased use of PMCs.⁹⁹

The primary research question remained the main focal point for this study and the researcher used Stanley's methodology to reach the answer. The nine structured focused questions assisted in answering the primary research question by using the ADF commitment in Afghanistan as the case study. The questions allowed the author to systematically conduct research and analysis and provided a common framework consistent with the previous case studies of the United States, UK, and Canada. The researcher elected to use one case study as opposed to conducting a comparative analysis between two or more case studies. This was a deliberate decision in order to test Stanley's theory from the perspective of the ADF's experience with PMCs. A comparative analysis against the various case studies would enhance the study.

The findings extrapolated from this research serve as a significant planning tool for military planners. The findings provide a planning framework, which can assist in the development of operational plans inclusive of the use of PMCs. This is particularly pertinent when juxtaposing the supported hypotheses against the current ADF reality. The demand for the ADF is unlikely to reduce given the volatility of the immediate region; Timor Leste, Solomon Islands, Papa New Guinea, and Fiji are all considered fragile states and are positioned within

⁹⁸ Clarke, "Microeconomics, Private Security, and the Significance to Operational Planning," 42.

⁹⁹ Noel, "The Canadian Forces Use of Private Security in Afghanistan," 45-46.

Australia's strategic interest.¹⁰⁰ Recent conflicts have proven protracted in nature; East Timor extended beyond thirteen years, Solomon Islands ten years, and Afghanistan is still ongoing.¹⁰¹ Humanitarian assistance operations appear to be the only ADF activities that military planners have the ability to anticipate the duration. From the research, it appears that bureaucratic controls and regulations will increase, thus military planners will need to understand and operate within the framework. Budget constraints within the current fiscal environment are unlikely to ease; therefore, force caps will continue to pose limitations for military planners. The contemporary operating environment will continue to be predominately asymmetric, unpredictable, and semi to non-permissive. An understanding of these factors will assist military planners in anticipating the demand for PMCs. Furthermore; the research adds to the existing body of work that attempts to explain the increase rise of private security phenomenon. Future coalitions formed to react to global conflicts will likely comprise the same countries used as case studies that previously tested Stanley's theory. Understanding the various factors that contribute to the rise of private security will assist in integration of ADF forces and PMCs. Finally, with the findings and analysis indicating a continued use of PMCs, ADF doctrine will need to incorporate both the planning for and the management of contractors.

The research conducted for this case study may contain errors in the data portrayed. This is in part due to the inability to obtain accurate data from the responsible ADF organizations that manage contracts. Future research in the use of PMCs is both warranted and necessary given the increased rise of the use of PMCs. Contracting is essentially emerging as a permanent aspect of ADF operations. From an Australian perspective, expanding the study to include ADF involvement in other conflicts to determine if the hypotheses remain valid would further

¹⁰⁰ Fund for Peace, "Fragile State Index 2014," accessed November 23, 2014, <http://ffp.statesindex.org>.

¹⁰¹ Australian Government: Department of Defence, "Operations: Afghanistan."

strengthen Stanley's theory. Similarly, the study could be extended to include a more diverse range of militaries, such as Germany, Netherlands, or New Zealand.

It is evident from this research that the rise of the private security industry has occurred to meet the demand of over committed militaries coupled with an increase in global hostilities. Furthermore, the current fiscal environment may necessitate the need to fill gaps in military capability, thus increasing the demand for PMCs. The use of PMCs is not a new phenomenon; rather a factor that has affected militaries for decades. Although, there is an existing body of work examining the rise of PMCs, Stanley's research took a significant departure from previous scholarly work. Unlike the previous commentary and analysis on the employment of PMCs, Stanley developed a theory that can be used for future analysis and planning.

As this research indicates, the use of PMCs will continue to be incorporated as a deliberate planning tool for current and future conflicts, thus the ADF would benefit from gaining a holistic understanding of the PMC phenomenon. Although it is noted that the ADF has made significant progress towards greater efficacy when managing contracts for operations. The next step in ensuring the PMC lessons learned from Afghanistan are incorporated in doctrine and integrated into the planning for the next ADF mission.

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