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22ND Annual SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition

"Defense, Diplomacy, and Development: Translating Policy into Operational Capability"

Washington, DC

8 - 9 February 2011

Agenda

Essays:

"Redefining Intelligence Support in a Resource Constrained Environment", Capt Carrick Longley, USMC

"Foundations and Adaption: Transforming Policy into Operational Capability for Army Special Operations Forces", MAJ Ben Taylor, USA

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2011

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Defense, Diplomacy, Development, and Special Operations Forces

- ADM Eric T. Olson, USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

PANEL 1: Training and Employing SOF in Defense, Diplomacy, and Development Operations: Lessons from the Field

- Col Daniel Masur, USMC, G-3, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
- COL Joe Osborne, USA, Director, Irregular Warfare Directorate, U.S. Special Operations Command, Central
- CAPT Bill Wilson, USN, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Center
- COL Fitz Fitzpatrick, USA, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Joint, Interagency, and Multi-National Integration of SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development

- BG Simon Hutchinson, GBR Army, Deputy Commander, NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (PowerPoint, paper)

PANEL 2: Interagency Integration of SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development: Lessons from the Field

- Mr. Robert Cassilly, Senior Iraq Training Coordinator, U.S. Department of State
- Special Agent Richard Dobrich, Section Chief, Drug Enforcement Administration Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (DEA FAST)
- Mr. Bill Flavin, Directing Professor Doctrine, Concepts, Education Training, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College
- Mr. Bernard V. Moore, II, Chief, USSOCOM Special Operations Support Teams, National Capitol Region, U.S. Special Operations Command, Crystal City

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2011

PANEL 3: SOF Roles in Information Operations in Defense, Diplomacy, and Development

- Dr. Daniel Kuehl, Director, Information Operations Concentration, iCollege, National Defense University

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: DoD Initiatives for SOF in Defense, Diplomacy, and Development Operations

- Dr. Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, OUSD (Policy)-OSD, U.S. Department of Defense

PANEL 4: Adapting SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development Operations

- Ms. Sherri Goodman, Sr. Vice President and General Counsel, Center for Naval Analyses
- BG Christopher K. Haas, USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa
- COL Chris Miller, USA, Director, Special Operations & Irregular Warfare, OASD for Special Operations & Combating Terrorism

22ND ANNUAL

SO/LIC SYMPOSIUM & EXHIBITION



*“Defense, Diplomacy, and Development:
Translating Policy into Operational Capability”*



FEBRUARY 8–9, 2011

WWW.NDIA.ORG/MEETINGS/1880

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LOCATION & LODGING

Marriott Wardman Park Hotel
2660 Woodley Road NW
Washington, DC 20008
(202) 328-2000

REGISTRATION

Atrium - Exhibit Hall Foyer

GENERAL SESSION & AWARDS BANQUET

Thurgood Marshall Ballroom

EXHIBIT HALL

Exhibit Hall C & B South

SYMPOSIUM THEME

The 22nd Annual NDIA SO/LIC (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) Symposium & Exhibition will examine the operational constructs required to implement a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach to national security by considering the relationships and interaction of defense, diplomacy, and development in light of current and future engagements. The symposium asserts that accomplishing national security objectives increasingly requires multidimensional special operations forces capable of fusing defense, diplomacy, and development activities. Further, the present complex environments demand integration of these components to flow from policy through operations to industry to meet the needs of the defense and interagency actors addressing the challenges of our times. Speakers will discuss how to translate policy into the right balance and mix of defense, diplomacy, development, and ultimately, requirements.

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2011

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| 1:00 PM - 6:00 PM | Registration Open
<i>Atrium - Exhibit Hall Foyer</i> |
| 1:00 PM - 5:00 PM | Exhibit Hall Move In
<i>Exhibit Hall C & B South</i> |
| 5:00 PM - 6:00 PM | Networking Reception (Cash Bar)
<i>Atrium - Exhibit Hall Foyer</i> |

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2011

- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| 7:00 AM - 6:45 PM | Registration Open
<i>Atrium - Exhibit Hall Foyer</i> |
| 7:00 AM - 8:00 AM | Continental Breakfast
<i>Thurgood Marshall Ballroom Foyer</i> |
| 8:00 AM - 8:15 AM | Welcome Remarks
<i>Thurgood Marshall Ballroom</i> |
- ▶ MG Barry D. Bates, USA (Ret), Vice President, Operations, NDIA
 - ▶ Ms. Irene H. Sanders, Consultant, Irene Sanders, LLC; NDIA SO/LIC Division Chair

- 8:15 AM - 9:00 AM** **Keynote Address: Defense, Diplomacy, Development, and Special Operations Forces**
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom
- ▶ ADM Eric T. Olson, USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
- 9:00 AM - 6:45 PM** **Exhibit Hall Open**
Exhibit Hall C & B South
- 9:00 AM - 9:45 AM** **Networking Break**
Exhibit Hall C & B South
- 9:45 AM - 11:45 AM** **Panel 1: Training and Employing SOF in Defense, Diplomacy, and Development Operations: Lessons from the Field**
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom
- Moderator: Mr. Chris Perkins, Defense and Homeland Security Consultant, Legg, Perkins and Associates
- ▶ COL William Coultrup, USA, Former Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force, Philippines; Director, SOLA
 - ▶ Col Daniel Masur, USMC, G-3, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command
 - ▶ COL Joe Osborne, USA, Director, Irregular Warfare Directorate, U.S. Special Operations Command, Central
 - ▶ CAPT Bill Wilson, USN, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Center
 - ▶ COL Fitz Fitzpatrick, USA, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
- 11:45 AM - 1:15 PM** **Networking Lunch**
Exhibit Hall C & B South
- 1:15 PM - 2:00 PM** **Keynote Address: Joint, Interagency, and Multi-National Integration of SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development**
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom
- ▶ BG Simon Hutchinson, GBR Army, Deputy Commander, NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters
- 2:00 PM - 2:45 PM** **Networking Break**
Exhibit Hall C & B South

ATTIRE

Appropriate dress for the symposium and Awards Banquet is business for civilians and Class A uniform or uniform of the day for military personnel.

ID BADGE

During symposium registration and check-in, each attendee will be issued an identification badge. Please be prepared to present a valid picture ID. Badges must be worn at all symposium functions.

AWARDS BANQUET

The R. Lynn Rylander Award, DeProspero Lifetime Achievement Award and individual Achievement Awards will be presented at the Awards Banquet on February 8, 2011 in conjunction with this year's symposium. The winners of the 6th Annual SO/LIC Essay Contest will also be presented at the Awards Banquet.

SYMPOSIUM CONTACT

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2:45 PM - 4:45 PM

Panel 2: Interagency Integration of SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development: Lessons from the Field
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom

Moderator: Mr. Mike Kichman, Senior CT Advisor, U.S. Coast Guard

- ▶ Mr. Robert Cassilly, Senior Iraq Training Coordinator, U.S. Department of State
- ▶ Special Agent Richard Dobrich, Section Chief, Drug Enforcement Administration Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (DEA FAST)
- ▶ Mr. Bill Flavin, Directing Professor Doctrine, Concepts, Education Training, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College
- ▶ Mr. Bernard V. Moore, II, Chief, USSOCOM Special Operations Support Teams, National Capitol Region, U.S. Special Operations Command, Crystal City
- ▶ Mr. Arthur J. Zarone, Assistant Section Chief, Tactical Section/Hostage Rescue Team, FBI

4:45 PM - 5:45 PM

Session Adjourned - Free Time

5:45 PM - 6:45 PM

Networking Reception (Hosted Beer & Wine)
Exhibit Hall C & B South

6:45 PM - 9:45 PM

Awards Banquet with Guest Speaker
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom

- ▶ ADM Michael Mullen, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 2011

7:00 AM - 5:00 PM

Registration Open
Atrium - Exhibit Hall Foyer

7:00 AM - 8:00 AM

Continental Breakfast
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom Foyer

8:00 AM - 8:15 AM

Administrative Remarks
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom

- ▶ Ms. Irene H. Sanders, Consultant, Irene Sanders, LLC; NDIA SO/LIC Division Chair

8:15 AM - 9:00 AM

Keynote Address: Information Operations in Defense, Diplomacy, and Development
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom

- ▶ Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

9:00 AM - 2:45 PM

Exhibit Hall Open
Exhibit Hall C & B South

- 9:00 AM - 9:45 AM** **Networking Break**
Exhibit Hall C & B South
- 9:45 AM - 11:45 AM** **Panel 3: SOF Roles in Information Operations in Defense, Diplomacy, and Development**
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom
- Moderator: Mr. Glenn Ayers, Vice Chairman, Science Applications International Corporation
- ▶ COL Reginald Bostick, USA, Senior Army Fellow, The Institute of World Politics
 - ▶ Ms. Kimberly Dozier, Correspondent, Intelligence & CT, Associated Press
 - ▶ Dr. Daniel Kuehl, Director, Information Operations Concentration, iCollege, National Defense University
 - ▶ Mr. Robert Petersen, Contractor, Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication (CSCC), Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R), U.S. Department of State
- 11:45 AM - 1:15 PM** **Networking Lunch**
Exhibit Hall C & B South
- 1:15 PM - 2:00 PM** **Keynote Address: DoD Initiatives for SOF in Defense, Diplomacy, and Development Operations**
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom
- ▶ Dr. Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, OUSD (Policy)-OSD, U.S. Department of Defense
- 2:00 PM - 2:45 PM** **Networking Break**
(Last Chance to View Exhibits)
Exhibit Hall C & B South
- 2:45 PM - 4:45 PM** **Panel 4: Adapting SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development Operations**
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom
- Moderator: Mr. Sam Morthland, Manager, SOF Mobility Requirements, WBB Consulting, Inc.
- ▶ Ms. Sherri Goodman, Sr. Vice President and General Counsel, Center for Naval Analyses
 - ▶ BG Christopher K. Haas, USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa
 - ▶ COL Chris Miller, USA, Director, Special Operations & Irregular Warfare, OASD for Special Operations & Combating Terrorism
 - ▶ Mr. Mark I. Thompson, Deputy Coordinator, Operations, U.S. Department of State (S/CT)
- 4:45 PM - 5:00 PM** **Concluding Remarks**
Thurgood Marshall Ballroom
- ▶ Ms. Irene H. Sanders, Consultant, Irene Sanders, LLC; NDIA SO/LIC Division Chair

SPEAKER DONATION

As a “thank you” to our Speakers, a donation will be made to the Special Operations Warrior Foundation. For additional information, please visit <http://www.specialops.org>.

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Redefining intelligence support in a resource constrained environment

Carrick Longley

The intelligence community must embrace technology and an organizational restructuring to provide more accurate, effective, and efficient intelligence while reducing its resource footprint. With the establishment of permanent intelligence fusion centers stateside, reporters, analysts, linguists and watch officers can focus their energy on training a more professional, capable force while providing increasingly complex and sophisticated analysis to support operators on the ground.

Introduction

The intelligence community (IC) must embrace technology and an organizational restructuring to provide more accurate, effective, and efficient intelligence while reducing its resource footprint. The Department of Defense (DoD) faces drastic reductions in equipment and manning in the wake of an increasingly unstable global economic downturn and must reduce spending by nearly \$178 billion over the next five years aloneⁱ. Additionally, the recent report on intelligence in Afghanistan by Major General Flynnⁱⁱ is a stark reminder the IC isn't doing enough to provide the right kind of intelligence to the war fighter. In order to achieve both a reduction in cost and a refocus on providing the right kind of intelligence support, the IC must adopt radical new changes to become more effective and efficient while consuming fewer resources. These changes include the establishment of consolidated intelligence fusion centers; a reduction in the number of intelligence professionals deployed to combat zones; and a leveraging of information systems to manage intelligence collection, processing, reporting, and analysis. By adopting a reach-back model wherein consolidated intelligence fusion centers provide the majority of intelligence support to forward elements, the IC can

improve intelligence capability, reduce costs, and accomplish 'more with less' than the current model.

The Intelligence Fusion Center of yesterday and tomorrow

The Marine Corps introduced the concept of the Tactical Fusion Center (TFC) during Operation Iraqi Freedomⁱⁱⁱ (OIF) that brought together intelligence professionals in a variety of disciplines under a single roof to provide the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with all-source intelligence support. While the capabilities of the TFC were far reaching, the logistics support required to maintain this large footprint was not a small undertaking. Both the Marine Radio and Intelligence Battalions deployed with hundreds of individuals required to support their efforts - many of whom were not intelligence professionals themselves. Electronic maintenance, communications, logistics, administration, and motor transportation were among the many supporting elements required to support the needs of the TFC to function overseas. A majority of these individuals consumed information and material resources to support their efforts as well. Resource constraints and bandwidth limitations in forward outposts are often severely strained due to the large amount of non-essential and routine traffic pushed over the networks. Reducing the number of individuals using these networks in bandwidth constrained environments and transferring this demand to CONUS networks can significantly reduce the information bottlenecks that occur today. Additionally, a reduction in numbers of individuals deployed will also lead to a reduction in costs. Once these forces are reduced at the forward presence, they can continue to provide support while operating in combined intelligence fusion centers. Rather than deploy linguists,

analysts, report writers, and watch officers and the logistics burden that accompanies them to a large outpost in a forward environment, these same individuals will now work in permanent intelligence fusion centers providing the same level of intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination stateside.

Intelligence units require a high amount of connectivity and access to network resources to accomplish their mission. Information is often collected and transmitted using various networks and the reporting processes, tracking and sharing are all done using these same networks. With the capabilities of these information systems, physical proximity means less now than it has before. An interconnected network of networks has replaced the limitations once posed by line-of-site communication systems. Relying on a constellation of satellite and terrestrial communications systems, analysts located in the United States can watch real-time video of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and receive field reports, as they are collected. This information can in turn be processed, analyzed, and disseminated to operators in the field in a matter of minutes. With this ability to transfer information quickly from the point of capture to an analyst and back, the need to deploy thousands of individuals to a combat zone occupying large outposts is unnecessary.

Many problems such as occupational proficiency, strained family life, and lack of training affect intelligence support. Nearly every one of these problems can be attributed to the high deployment rates for soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen. While the majority of the operating forces experience much higher deployment to home station ratios, the intelligence occupational fields (at least in the Marine Corps) often experience ratios close to 1:1^{iv}. In other words, personnel are deployed as often as they are home

causing enormous strain on family life for these individuals. In addition to strained personal lives, units have difficulty providing their individuals with adequate training given the limited number of days spent in CONUS. Language proficiency for linguists trained in languages other than those spoken in target area of operations (AOR) have experienced difficulties with promotion due to their inability to work on their target languages given the deployment cycle. Basic intelligence analysts are often not well prepared to conduct meaningful analysis and often resort to the 'sports, news, and weather' presentations that merely discuss events and offer opinions as to why these events occurred with little empirical support for their arguments. If we can reduce the number of these individuals that must deploy, it is logical to presume that our ability to train these individuals and retain the quality needed to solve complex problems will improve. Our intelligence professionals can focus on their target environments in the course of their daily work and occupational proficiency will increase. The removal of the pre-deployment training process will reduce the number of hours devoted to non-intelligence focused activities. In other words, our intelligence professionals will spend more time doing intelligence work and less time focusing on non-essential work.

Analytic support from Monterey to Kandahar

In order to demonstrate that this model is not merely theoretical, the following section will discuss the implementation of an information collection tool used by Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams in Afghanistan during the fall of 2010 and the support provide by the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) lab at NPS in Monterey, California. By using an inexpensive, unclassified, open-source information system developed at the NPS, the lab demonstrated the ability to support

complex, tactical operations in remote villages thousands of miles away to include sociocultural analysis support to forward operators using free and open-source technology.

From August to November 2010, the Field Information Support Tool (FIST) was employed in Afghanistan in support of the Village Stability Platform (VSP). FIST was used as a means to expose operators to a more comprehensive analytic methodology for analyzing the complex, sociocultural environment in Afghanistan and demonstrate the capabilities of technology developed at the NPS. During this prototype employment of FIST, the Village Stability Operations (VSO) teams collected hundreds of unique reports, conducted analysis on a variety of metrics, and produced a number of analytical products focused on the sociocultural landscape in southern Afghanistan. In addition to their own organic collection and analysis, the teams used a web-based information repository to share their data. The combined dataset included over 421 unique collection reports containing several hundred individuals, organizations, locations and relational ties embedded therein. These reports were obtained using a framework specifically developed and tailored for the VSO mission in which the collection of relational information on business, kinship, organizational, personal, and tribal affiliations in addition to obtaining standard demographic data formed the preponderance of data collection.

Once the VSO data was collected, the CORE lab analyzed the dataset using geospatial, temporal, and using social network analysis in order to provide a coherent, logical, and useful analytic product based on empirical data while working in a laboratory in California. This analysis yielded results that confirmed the understanding of the

operational environment forward, but also provided unique insights not previously discovered by the units on the ground. The following section details how this analysis was conducted to demonstrate the ability to conduct reach back analysis and build products to support even small, tactical level units.




Figure 1 - Map of the Khazrek District

Source: *Afghanistan Information Management Services*

The analysis of the Khazrek district begins by taking a look at the district geospatially (see Figure 1) and then focusing on some of the high level observations that can be made about the data collected in the area. During the collection, interviewers recorded the location of the interview, asked about the location of the individuals' home

and their place of work. By recording these locations geospatially, we can use tools such as Google Fusion Tables to quickly display the resident's location on satellite imagery in Khazrek.



Figure 2 - Map showing the location of residents interviewed in the Khakrez District

After becoming oriented geospatially with the location of the district and the individuals interviewed (Figure 2), we continue to focus on general demographics in the area. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the occupations of the individuals in the district as a percentage of the total interviews. This table was built using the occupation data field collected from the VSO teams.




Table 1 - Occupation breakdown of Khazrek District

Of note, more than one third of the population held agricultural jobs suggesting that any efforts focused on agrarian matters would be of interest to a significant majority of the district. From general demographic breakdown, we continue to look at the organizational structure of the district as seen in Figure 3. The red nodes correspond to individuals and the green blocks are organizations. While there are other organizations in Khazrek, isolates (nodes with no ties to the network) and dyads were removed to clean up the visualization.




Figure 3 - Khazrek District Organizations Sociogram

From the organizational sociogram, we focus more specifically on the tribal affiliation network in Khazrek. Figure 4 is the tribal affiliation sociogram and Table 2 shows the breakdown of the dataset in terms of tribes in the area with individuals once again being represented by red circles and tribes by green squares.




Figure 4 - Tribal Affiliation Network in Khazrek




Table 2 - Tribal Composition in the Khazrek District

Now that we have looked at the Khazrek dataset with broad-brush strokes, we now focus more specifically on the common linkages between the two dominant tribes – the Popalzai and Alikozai.




Figure 5 - Common Linkages between Tribes

The four individuals highlighted in Figure 5 (made anonymous for purposes of this discussion) could prove useful, as they represent the ties common between both tribes in the area (from the data collected). These individuals serve as bridges between the two tribes that could serve as a means of improving communication or cooperation between the groups. Conversely, focusing on the same persons and reducing or eliminating the ties between the groups could sever ties. As the purpose of the VSO is to improve the security and livelihood in the area, the former is practice of interest.

After focusing on the organizational level data, we turned our attention to the individual level networks and analyzed a combination of personal, kinship, and business ties. For this network, isolates and pendant nodes were recursively hidden that yielded the sociogram seen in Figure 6.




Figure 6 - Individual Level Network Analysis

Interestingly, the procedures performed during the analysis brought to light the same network of Agent 106 and his role in the Khazrek District. The VSO team identified and focused their analysis on Agent 106 based on the identification from the detachment commander in Khazrek. In our analysis, we identified the same individual based on his unique position between two Mullahs and position in the network. Being able to identify key individuals like Agent 106 without prior knowledge of the village is critical in understanding and developing various strategies and lines of operation.

The above analysis demonstrates that it is not only feasible to conduct reach back analytic support, but it also demonstrates that insights normally thought to only be available at the forward edge can be observed from thousands of miles away with no prior knowledge of the operating environment.

Conclusion

Technology is readily available (in fact, a large amount of it is free to use) that can aid in transforming how we provide intelligence support from the strategic to the tactical level. The ability to transfer large amounts of information throughout the operating environment enables the IC to adopt a new construct wherein support is provided remotely with greater consistency at a reduction in cost. By standing up permanent intelligence fusion centers stateside, the ability to conduct long-term intelligence support will not be jeopardized by a decreasing budget and reduction of force structure. Soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen can spend more time at home, improve occupational proficiency, and continue to provide the support needed for the Long War ahead. Rather than exhaust our limited supply of highly specialized individuals over the next decade, we should instead focus on how we can maximize the output and quality of support while minimizing risk.

Captain Carrick Longley is a U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Officer. He submitted this paper while attending the Naval Postgraduate School for a Master of Science in Information Warfare Systems Engineering and working towards completing his Joint Professional Military Education Phase I at the Naval War College Distance Education Program. He is currently assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School where he is pursuing a Doctorate in Information Sciences.

ⁱ Gopal Ratnam, “*Gates Proposes Troop Cuts, \$78 Billion Budget Decrease*” *Bloomberg Businessweek*. Jan. 6, 2011 (<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-06/gates-proposes-troop-cuts-78-billion-budget-decrease.html>).

ⁱⁱ Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, *Fixing Intel: A blueprint for making intelligence relevant in Afghanistan*. (http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf).

ⁱⁱⁱ Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Oliver, “*A Blueprint for Success.*” *Marine Corps Gazette* (<http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/marine-corps-intelligence-operations-anbar>).

^{iv} Hope Hodge, “*Marines look to improve deployment-to-dwell ratios.*” *Jdnews*. Apr. 30, 2010 (<http://www.jdnews.com/articles/ratios-77803-increase-amid.html>).

Foundations and Adaptation: Transforming Policy into Operational Capability for Army Special Operations Forces

MAJ Ben Taylor

Abstract: The current and future security environments will require the United States to have versatile military forces able to operate throughout the spectrum of conflict. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) were created to provide this versatility. In order to have the strategic impact for which ARSOF was created, these forces must be remissioned from the tactical tasks which currently consume their availability, returned to the core competencies for which they were founded, and adapt their bureaucratic structure to maximize their strategic potential. This change will occur in a time of limited budgets and within the constant struggle of parochialism within and among the services. Through the Phase 0 operations for which ARSOF was tailored, they will provide policy makers with the capability to prevent future decisive engagements and maintain the US as a global power.

“A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehensive enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team.”

--General Peter J. Schoomaker, USA¹

History informs our present and provides insight to our future and the future appears bright for US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). Throughout ARSOF's history, the roles and missions of Civil Affairs (CA), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and Special Forces (SF) have expanded and contracted dependent upon the political climate and the security environment. This paper proposes that these ARSOF units should return to their core competencies in order to meet the present threat, while the future security environment will demand these same capabilities under a different organizational

structure. A growing body of literature from the military and academia suggests future US conflicts will trend toward irregular and unconventional threats, so the capabilities of Army Special Operations Forces seem destined for prominence in the Department of Defense. However, as GEN Schoomaker suggests in the quote above, ARSOF is not immune to the need to transform to remain relevant. ARSOF leaders must quickly translate current policy into tangible operational capability, while simultaneously keeping an eye on the future. This innovation must take place over the next two decades, in a time of continuing conflict, budgetary restrictions, and a globalizing international system. If transformed properly, ARSOF will provide national leaders with a unique range of capabilities in defense, diplomacy, and development which are suited to the threats of the future. This paper uses the term ARSOF to refer specifically to Army Civil Affairs, Military Information Support Operations, and Special Forces for the sake of brevity, realizing that Army Special Operations Forces also include other units such as Army Rangers and Special Operations Aviation.ⁱⁱ

ARSOF Beginnings

The current units that comprise the US Army Special Operations Forces originated in World War II. Civil Affairs units were first established early in the war to bridge the military-political gap found when governing occupied countries.ⁱⁱⁱ The larger Army was uncomfortable with this idea, as governance was not perceived as a military function. Immediately following V-E Day, President Truman announced that civil administration of occupied territories would transfer from the War Department to the State Department. There was a consensus that this was the right course of action, but the State Department lacked the resources to effectively administer the areas. So, despite concurrence on the ideal situation, the War Department continued to conduct civilian administration.^{iv} This case proved to be a harbinger of things to come.

Psychological Operations had an equally rocky beginning in World War II, with psychological warfare capabilities shuffled from the Army to the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS) and back again. Psychological activities were seen by military leadership as dishonorable and inherently 'un-military.'^v Although used extensively in World War II, military leadership was quick to disband psychological warfare capabilities following the war's conclusion. Fortunately, then-President Eisenhower recognized the value of psychological operations from his experience as the Allied Commander and sponsored its re-establishment as an effective tool in the fight against Communism.^{vi}

As with psychological operations, the confluence of the existential threat of Communism and the power of an influential sponsor, explains the establishment of Special Forces. A former OSS member, Aaron Bank, saw the need for a military unit that could, "develop, support; organize, train, or exploit indigenous guerilla"^{vii} forces within enemy territory. Originally, created within the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Special Forces units were staffed by former OSS members and European émigrés.^{viii}

In the years since the creation of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations (now MISO), and Special Forces, these specialized units have seen a constant cycle of growth and contraction in size, missions, and acceptance within the Army. The number of personnel and level of prominence within the military seem to be indirectly proportional to the number of missions ARSOF claims to be able to conduct at any period of time. During the conflict in Vietnam, when Special Forces was at the zenith of its personnel strength, SF units conducted indirect 'by, with, and through' operations and clandestine strikes, while their General Purpose Force (GPF) counterparts conducted extensive advisory missions with the South Vietnamese Army. In the years after Vietnam, ARSOF was drawn down in size and argued for a broader range of missions, until the operations in Somalia. During the late 1990's, another era of grasping for a concrete role, ARSOF again expanded its mission set, until it was called to complete the purpose for which it was created in Afghanistan.^{ix} Throughout its history, ARSOF is in a continuing struggle for acceptance in the Army. At other times, ARSOF is its own worst enemy, as it deviates from its core competencies in search of tasks to remain relevant. The last nine years of conflict have seen ARSOF reduced to

tactical support of GPF in contrast to having the strategic impact for which it was organized, trained, and equipped. For example, Army Special Forces, after leading the classic unconventional warfare overthrow of the Taliban regime, transitioned to a direct-action tactical method in support of GPF. Civil Affairs units working either with Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or independently, are finding themselves—as they did in post-WWII Europe—trying to hand over governance and stability operations to US government agencies that do not have the capacity to conduct them. Military Information Support Operators are enmeshed in supporting the GPF population-centric COIN campaign. While there are key supporting roles that ARSOF should fill in Iraq and Afghanistan—training of Afghan Commandos and Iraqi Counter-Terrorist Forces, as well as MISO operations in support of COIN—there is an opportunity cost associated with the large amount of ARSOF personnel that these missions currently occupy. That cost is felt in places where ARSOF should, and would traditionally, be conducting the operations for which they were formed. The following analysis uses the above history, coupled with the scope provided by ARSOF capstone documents and national security policy statements, to propose a roadmap for immediate and long-term change.

The Near Future (5-10 Years)

In its recent history of expanding and contracting core missions and roles, ARSOF has done itself a disservice in not firmly establishing its roles and limitations. However, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may provide an excellent backdrop for the reestablishment of these standards. The last seven years of both conflicts have shown the utility of ARSOF support to GPF operations. With the GPF-supporting role of ARSOF displayed, now is the time to reestablish ARSOFs independent role in achieving strategic goals—the unconventional warfare and influence missions for which ARSOF was created. What makes ARSOF uniquely suited to conduct these missions is the training and organization of the personnel that includes regional specialization and

language ability. Ironically though, there currently exists a contradiction between the renewed ARSOF focus on language capability and its deployment of forces. For instance, 3rd Special Forces Group retains the primary responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, and the accompanying Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) training missions in the former soviet republics. Yet, the personnel assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group are trained in French and Arabic languages, for use in Africa. Meanwhile, 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, with its core of Russian language-trained soldiers, is headquartered near USAFRICOM, and therefore is conducting training missions in Africa. Although ARSOF purports to be refocusing on language capability, it is deploying French and Arabic-trained operators to Russian-speaking countries, and Russian-trained operators to Africa. An immediate re-alignment of forces to their traditional AORs would truly place priority on language and regional specialty. In addition, forces gained by the drawdown dividend—ARSOF personnel that are able to be repurposed from the current conflicts and applied towards more strategic goals—must refocus training and mindsets to the long-term view inherent in strategic operations in support of national policy. This refocus must take place in the context of national and military political realities: current national security policy and military infighting over roles and functions, and future budgetary constraints.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) helps define the US defense strategy for the near-term future. The QDR lists strategic priorities in the following order: prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force.^x ARSOF units have a role in all of these priorities, but particularly in the 'prevent and deter conflict' role. As the 'prevail in today's wars' priority begins to decline, one can assume a comparable decline in ARSOF requirements. The ARSOF units freed from this priority can reassume their intended roles in Phase 0 operations—namely, preventing the next decisive engagement by building the capacity of our allies and disrupting, defeating, and deterring current and future enemies. These operations will take place in regions of political and social unrest that affect the interests of the US and our allies.

This renewed focus on Phase 0 operations, will take the form of increased bilateral military exchanges in support of the Theater Security Cooperation Plans as well as MISO and CA support to country teams' long-range development plans.

An additional factor affecting the need for ARSOF to adapt is the shrinking of the capability gap between SOF units and GPF units who are becoming 'more SOF-like.' Many transformations in GPF have allowed them to take on missions usually considered the exclusive domain of ARSOF, and ARSOF must redefine its capabilities to remain relevant.^{xi} GPF units are currently involved in the training of both Iraqi and Afghan Army units—the type of FID operation that once was the exclusive domain of Army SF. In addition, as GPF commanders have realized the power of information operations, the use of tactics to influence popular perceptions have become a component of all military operations—no longer the sole purview of psychological operations specialists. Instead of trying to protect ARSOF's role as the 'primary capability' in FID and influence operations, leaders should define the strategic and politically-sensitive operations which ARSOF is uniquely suited to conduct and use the GPF capabilities to compliment them at the tactical and operational levels. The GPF have a history of advisory and stabilization experience—from post-World War II, through Korea, to Vietnam—and the future security environment will provide enough work in developing nations to occupy the full range of US military capabilities.

Military innovation and adaptation does not occur in a vacuum, and the current fiscal situation in the US means that ARSOF decision-makers must argue every recommendation in budgetary terms. President Dwight Eisenhower once said, "the patriot today is the fellow who can do the job with less money."^{xii} ARSOF leaders must be these patriots. Fortunately, budgetary constraints are an area where ARSOF has a strong argument for prominence and growth. Personnel costs are the largest portion of the DoD budget,^{xiii} and SOF units are inherently smaller organizations than GPF. Although the development and sustainment costs for an individual ARSOF soldier is higher than a GPF soldier,

the comparative personnel numbers of ARSOF units are lower. Also, training and equipping is only a small portion of personnel cost, the largest portion is in healthcare and retirement—areas where there is no distinction between ARSOF and GPF individuals. In addition, the ARSOF focus on exceptionally enabled individuals and units, which places priority on training the human platform over purchasing expensive technological platforms,^{xiv} will yield a greater return on investment than equipment that has a finite life cycle. Finally in the personnel vein, ARSOF has seen rapid growth in the last four years, especially in the indirect action forces of SF, CA, and MISO. These personnel increases are already allocated and paid for, so the cost associated with their repurposing is minimal compared to having to create military structure. The argument for force structure in the future becomes one of capabilities as compared to cost, as Defense Secretary Gates notes, “an effective, affordable, and sustainable U.S. defense posture requires a broad portfolio of military capabilities.”^{xv} Therefore, in a future defined by maintaining the maximum capability at the lowest cost, ARSOF presents decision-makers with a great return on their investment—high-capacity forces with low personnel numbers that are, by design, capable of strategic impact.

The Distant Future (15+ Years)

Although it is difficult to forecast the future security environment, some effort at prediction is necessary in order to prevent any major bureaucracy from becoming irrelevant. Using the military axiom that intelligence drives operations, this paper uses the *Global Trends 2025* document, produced by the National Intelligence Council and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as a ‘crystal ball.’ Several of the predictions made in the *Global Trends* report have significant impact on the military, and specifically ARSOF. China and India will continue to rise in power, along with non-state actors such as businesses, religious organizations, and super-powered individuals, resulting in a redefined international system. Additionally, the increasing diffusion of technology will make terrorists groups and rogue states more dangerous as they potentially

acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.^{xvi} The overall tone of the *Global Trends* report, as well as the writings of other military and diplomatic strategists suggests that a confrontation with the rising powers of China or India is unlikely, but that the US will remain engaged in regional conflicts in developing parts of the world, and under threat from terrorist organizations.^{xvii} These strategic predictions place priority on forces that are able to operate independently in developing nations, with indigenous counterparts, in order to build their capacity to handle their own problems. This is the very mission set for which ARSOF was created.

The future security environment will be rife with continuing regional conflicts as traditional societies in the developing world collide with the effects of globalization. When the US is no longer the dominant global power, the nation will no longer have the latitude to conduct unilateral conventional military operations in regional conflicts. Military intervention will either take the form of coalition operations with regional and/or other global powers, or will require small-scale operations. As language and culturally trained and attuned soldiers, operating in small autonomous units, ARSOF is uniquely suited for both coalition and small-scale operations in developing nations. In addition, the diffusing technologies associated with WMDs will place preeminence on not only surgical, counter-proliferation direct action capabilities, but also on a global human intelligence network that can stop these technologies from getting into the wrong hands. The threats of the future validate the need for capabilities ARSOF currently possesses. However, most of these threats call for an architecture that places priority on indirect operations—operating by, with, and through local security forces—over the direct action missions, which currently occupy a majority of SOF structure and budget. Therefore, this paper proposes the following top-down changes to meet this future threat.

The United States Special Operations Command should be divided into two directorates—the indirect action and direct action directorates. In the foreseeable future, Army SF, CA, and MISO, could feasibly join with the forces of

Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC), to form the core of SOCOM's indirect action (IA) directorate.^{xviii} This directorate would be separate from the direct action capabilities, such as Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, and special mission direct action units. The transformation to joint doctrine and training in the IA directorate would shift this organization towards the global scouts program. This program would place SOF operators—often individuals or small teams—in key developing countries where there are US interests. Personnel would retain their functional specialty and become experts in the area to which they are assigned. IA teams would assist the country team and the intelligence community by providing ground-level human intelligence. This capability is not currently the focus of either Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or defense attaché personnel assigned to embassies. Furthermore, the IA directorate should strengthen ties with both the CIA and Department of State to nest its operations in the country plans of State and the requirements of the intelligence community. Additionally, the IA directorate would need an innovative personnel management system, mirroring the specialization of Foreign Service Officers and CIA Case Officers. In this way, IA personnel, truly become the 'global scouts' that they claim; providing not only ground-level human intelligence, but also strategic reconnaissance for future unconventional warfare (UW) and foreign internal defense (FID) operations.

In conjunction with the creation of the IA directorate, Army Special Forces should remove direct action from its core tasks. Direct action operations are performed to a higher capability by other SOF units and to an acceptable capacity by most US military ground forces—they are not what make Special Forces 'special.' Instead, the ability to conduct unconventional warfare—the guerilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion involved in supporting an insurgency against an enemy government—is what makes Special Forces unique. While Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is often considered 'the other side of UW,' it should remain a secondary task for Army SF. Marine Special Operations are uniquely suited, and have a culture better attuned to conducting FID. This should remain the primary mission of MARSOC. Army Civil Affairs and Military

Information Support Operations should continue to do their core missions, but with a radical shift in timing—from ‘picking up the pieces’ in the aftermath of large conventional campaigns to conducting operations in support of Phase 0, long before conflict occurs.

Some will argue that the separation of SOCOM into direct and indirect directorates will further stovepipe an already divided organization. While there is merit to the argument that both direct and indirect actions should be intertwined, the functional stovepipes already exist within the current organizational structure. Formalization of this de facto split has more advantages than disadvantages. This split will refocus ARSOF on its core tasks, and prevents the trend of SF focusing too heavily on direct action missions and CA and MISO focusing at the tactical level of operations only. Finally, the formation of directorates creates the synergistic effect of grouping units with similar focus, so that doctrine and training can be aligned to truly move towards joint operations—whether direct or indirect in nature. In this proposal, SOCOM facilitates the interagency cooperation so integral to both direct and indirect operations.

Army Special Operations Forces are at a unique point in their history. They currently occupy a position of distinction within the military that they have not previously enjoyed. While some may argue that this is a period to just enjoy the new-found acceptance of ARSOF, this would be a missed opportunity. In a future security environment defined by a globalizing international system, diffusion of dangerous technologies, constrained budgets, and general purpose forces closing the capability gap with ARSOF, this is precisely the time to develop a long-range plan for ARSOF transformation. Change begins with the drawdown of ARSOF in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the repurposing of these forces to their traditional roles—conducting Phase 0 operations worldwide. However, the future security environment demands more than a ‘return to the basics’—it will demand ARSOF units that are adaptable, flexible, and always on the cutting edge of technological and doctrinal changes. In order to fully maximize their capability and facilitate the strategic impact for which ARSOF was

created, the bureaucratic structure above ARSOF units must be drastically reshaped. If this return to core competencies and adaptation of organizational structure is done properly, ARSOF will prove that successful prosecution of indirect action can prevent the need for direct action and large-scale conflicts.

Major Ben Taylor is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. He submitted this paper while attending the Naval Postgraduate School, where he is currently studying to earn his Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. He would like to thank LTC Michael Richardson, Military Faculty, NPS, for his help in editing the paper.

ⁱ Peter Schoemaker, found in US Naval War College, *Joint Maritime Operations Syllabus and Study Guide*, Academic Year 2010-2011, 3-50.

ⁱⁱ This paper uses ARSOF to refer to the 'warrior-diplomat' skills inherent in Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations. It does not intend to discount the role of Army Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, or other Special Operations elements, but rather to use one term for the sake of brevity. As discussed later in the paper, the direct action roles of other ARSOF elements distinguish them from the warrior-diplomat skills of the three branches above. There is an argument to be made for new terminology to describe the type of skills in the three focus branches, as they are more closely aligned with other SOF units (such as MARSOC) than with the DA skills of fellow Army SOF units.

ⁱⁱⁱ David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, *United States Special Operations Forces*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 75.

^{iv} Tucker and Lamb, *USSOF*, 77.

^v Tucker and Lamb, *USSOF*, 77.

^{vi} Tucker and Lamb, *USSOF*, 81.

^{vii} Department of the Army, FM 31-20, *U.S. Army Special Forces Group*, (1955), 7.

^{viii} Tucker and Lamb, *USSOF*, 87.

^{ix} Table 5.3 from Tucker and Lamb's, *United States Special Operations Forces*, 166, shows the 'mission creep' that takes place when SOF elements are not engaged in combat operations (1993-2003) and how the number of primary missions consolidate during combat operations (Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan). This reflects both the tendency of SOF to 'do it all' in times of relative peace and the 'return to basics' mission contraction during times of conflict. This paper posits that, as a subset of total all Special Operations Forces, the same is true for Army SOF units, and the 'return to basics' is required throughout the conflict spectrum.

^x Robert Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), v-vi.

^{xi} Tucker and Lamb, *USSOF*, 234.

^{xii} Dwight Eisenhower, as quoted by Robert Gates, in a Speech at the Eisenhower Library on Defense Spending, Abilene, KS, May 08, 2010.

^{xiii} Robert Gates, Speech at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, September 29, 2010.

^{xiv} Thomas Csrnko and Michael Repass, "Special Forces 2025," White Paper (Fort Bragg, NC, June 2010), 8.

^{xv} Robert Gates, Speech to International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, June 05, 2010.

^{xvi} Director of National Intelligence, *Global Trends 2025*, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008), iv.

^{xvii} Thomas Barnett, Secretary of the Navy Guest Lecture Series: Speech to Naval Postgraduate School, 26 October 2010, Monterey, CA; and CAPT Wayne Porter, Cebrowski Institute Speech to NPS Faculty and Students, Naval Postgraduate School, 30 November 2010, Monterey, CA.

^{xviii} This concept is derived from ideas in Tucker and Lamb's, *United States Special Operations Forces*. However, Tucker and Lamb, do not include MARSOC in the indirect action component, nor do they assign priority for tasks to specific units. They also suggest the establishment of a new command, which this paper argues is unnecessary.



SWCS TODAY



3,400 **Students**



**U.S. Army Special Operations
Command (USASOC)**



TRADOC



**Special Operations
Recruiting Battalion**

**U. S. Army John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School
(USAJFKSWCS)**



**1st Special Warfare Training Group
(Airborne) (SWTG)**



**Directorate of Regional Studies and
Education (DRS&E)**



**Special Warfare Medical Group
(Airborne) (SWMG)**



**Army Special Operations Capabilities
Integration Center (ARSOCIC)**



**Non-Commissioned Officers
Academy (NCOA)**



**Directorate of Training and Doctrine
(DOTD)**



**SF Warrant Officer Institute
(WOI)**



**Directorate of Special Operations
Proponency (DSOP)**



SWCS Roadmap



Where do we want to go?

We will build a well-educated and professionally trained force with the intuitive abilities to work through or with indigenous partner forces.

We will develop innovative, relevant doctrine, informed by insightful future concepts, to produce an agile, adaptive force.

We will ensure that our country has a full-spectrum special-operations force prepared to address the diverse range of threats posed by an uncertain 21st-century environment.

Vision

What must we do?

Professionalize our Force. This will involve creating a climate where our Soldiers and civilians have a demonstrated willingness to learn, accept new responsibilities and a sincere belief that there is always a better way of doing business.

END-STATE:

We have created an environment where the best, the brightest and the most creative Soldiers and civilians are attracted, retained and empowered.

Intent

How will we do it?

1. Provide quality instruction by quality instructors. (hand-picked and well prepared)
2. Be more proactive in battlefield relevant/regionally focused curriculum design.
3. Develop new courses and eliminate old ones. Identify redundancies in training and POIs.
4. Identify future Force Modernization capabilities. (What should the force look like in 2018)
5. Better synchronize our efforts & efficiencies. Eliminate redundancies.

Priorities

What (specific) actions must we do?

- Develop a nominative process for assignments to SWCS.
- Refine our Instructor Training Course.
- Develop a training review process with our regiments input.
- Empower our NCOs to effect POI change.
- Constant collaboration with the operational force. (Our regiments, the TSOC, country teams and IA).
- Determine ARSOF-specific capabilities and capacities.
- TSOC exploration initiative.
- Enhanced knowledge management processes.
- Divest ourselves of low priority activities.

Key Tasks

How do we measure success?

- Non-punitive quality assurance program.
- Life-long learning & continuous improvement culture.
- Structured CTSSB at regiments for input.
- Instructor blogs and course websites.
- CDRs/CSMs input on new/revised curriculum
- Training strategies aligned with TSCP and ongoing operations.
- Empirical evidence validates (or modifies) SOCOM's projected force structure.
- Collaborative & integrated work flow.
- Eliminate duplicate work & capabilities.

Metrics

Change and Transformation



An agile and adaptive organization

- We must all understand that, without change, just about everything will become obsolete and useless to the operational force.
 - Tactics, techniques, technology and organizational constructs.
 - We must identify our own obsolescence before our enemy and environments do.
- “If it’s not broke, why fix it?”
 - That attitude instills a sense of complacency and is a perfect excuse for inaction.
 - It’s a dangerous mindset that assumes that the realities of today’s battlefields will magically reappear in a nice, linear and predictable fashion.
- The Special Warfare Center and School must embrace change.
 - Experience suggests that the more senior we are the more adverse to change we become and, by default, we will stifle great ideas by clinging to our antiquated rice bowls and outdated duty descriptions.
- Reorganization only creates the illusion of progress and is not CHANGE

Pillars of SOF Leader Development



TRAINING + EDUCATION + EXPERIENCE



TACTICAL



OPERATIONAL



STRATEGIC

SWCS will produce leaders who are highly trained in warrior skills and broadly educated with leadership qualities based upon humility, critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity, acceptance of prudent but calculated risks and the ability to make rapid adjustments based upon a continuous assessment of the situation.

Core Attributes (The Character of our Regiments)



Integrity	Being trustworthy and honest; acting with honor and unwavering adherence to ethical standards
Courage	Acts on own convictions despite consequences; is willing to sacrifice for a larger cause; not paralyzed by fear of failure
Perseverance	Works toward an end; has commitment; physical or mental resolve; motivated; gives effort to the cause; does not quit
Personal Responsibility	Is self-motivated and an autonomous self-starter; anticipates tasks and acts accordingly; takes accountability for his actions
Professionalism	Is a standard-bearer for the regiment; has a professional image, to include a level of maturity and judgment mixed with confidence and humility; forms sound opinions and makes own decisions; stands behind his sensible decisions based on his experiences
Adaptability	The ability to maintain composure while responding to or adjusting one's own thinking and actions to fit a changing environment; the ability to think and solve problems in unconventional ways; the ability to recognize, understand and navigate within multiple social networks; the ability to proactively shape the environment or circumstances in anticipation of desired outcomes
Team Player	Able to work on a team for a greater purpose than himself; dependable and loyal; works selflessly with a sense of duty; respects others and recognizes diversity
Capability	Has physical fitness, to include strength and agility; has operational knowledge, able to plan and communicate effectively

Special Forces Qualification Course



Course Orientation And History

Phase I (2 Weeks)

- » SF Culture
- » SF Core Tasks & Command and Control (C2)
- » SF History
- » Adaptive Leader Methodology
- » Cross Culture Communications
- » Wellness Screening and Assessment
- » Family Programs
- » IODA mentors assigned
- » ARSOF Core Attributes

Language and Culture

Phase II (18-24 Weeks)

- » Cat I & II -18 weeks:
 - French, Indonesian-Bahasa and Spanish
- » Cat III & IV – 24 weeks:
 - Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Czech, Dari, Hungarian, Korean, Pashto, Persian-Farsi, Polish, Russian, Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, and Urdu
- » Use of Interpreters
- » Must pass Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) before beginning Phase III
- » Progressive PT Program

SF Tactical Combat Skills

Phase III (13 Weeks)

- » Special Forces Tactical Combat Skills
- » Advanced Marksmanship
- » Mounted Operations
- » Special Forces Common Tasks
- » Urban Operations
- » Mission Analysis
- » Advanced Special Operations Level 1
- » Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE)
- » Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)
- » Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE)

MOS Training

Phase IV (14-50 Weeks)

- » MOS – 14 WEEKS:
 - 18 A, Detachment Officer Course
 - 18 B, Weapons Sergeant
 - 18 C, Engineer Sergeant
 - 18 E, Communications Sergeant
- » MOS – 46 weeks:
 - 18 D SF Medical Sergeant

UW Culex (Robin Sage)

Phase V (4 Weeks)

- » Unconventional Warfare Practicum
 - Guerrilla Warfare
 - Support of a Resistance Movement
 - Air Operations
 - Deliberate UW Mission Analysis and Planning
 - SF Infiltration and Exfiltration Techniques
 - Rapport Building
 - Negotiation and Mediation
 - Advanced Special Operations Level 1 (PE)
 - ASO Application Exercises
 - Language and Culture Application

Graduation

Phase VI (1 Week)

- » Regimental Indoctrination
- » Operational Group Assignment
- » Introduction to Group Command Team
- » Individual Academic Achievement Awards
- » Award of the Special Forces Tab and “Green Beret”
- » *Credentialed as a SF Officer or NCO*

Average Course Completion
51-57 Weeks

Civil Affairs Qualification Course (Active)



In-Processing (2 Weeks)

- » In-process to qualification course after PCS to Ft. Bragg

Introduction to CA Phase I (2 Weeks)

- » Introduction to Civil Affairs
- » CA History
- » CA Core Tasks
- » Civil Affairs Operations
- » Whole of Government and NGO
- » Family Programs

Language and Culture Phase II (18-24 Weeks)

- » Cat I & II -18 weeks:
 - French, Indonesian-Bahasa and Spanish
- » Cat III & IV – 24 weeks:
 - Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Czech, Dari, Hungarian, Korean, Pashto, Persian-Farsi, Polish, Russian, Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, and Urdu
- » Use of Interpreters
- » Must pass Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) before beginning Phase III
- » Progressive PT Program

CA Core Phase III (11 Weeks)

- » Branch and MOS
 - Core Competencies and Tasks
 - Adaptive Leader Methodology
 - Negotiation and Mediation
 - Link Analysis Processes
 - Civil System Analysis
 - POLMIL Analysis
 - CA Mission Analysis and Deliberate Planning

Culex Phase IV (3 Weeks)

- » CA Culmination Exercise
 - Deliberate Mission Planning and Analysis
 - CA Assessment Practical Exercises
 - Adaptive Leader Application
 - Negotiation and Mediation with Cultural Role Players
 - Language and Culture Application

Graduation Phase V (1 Week)

- » Regimental Indoctrination
- » Operational Assignment
- » Individual Academic Achievement Awards
- » Graduation
- » *Credentialed as a CA Officer or NCO*

**Average Course Completion
37-43 Weeks**

MISO Qualification Course (Active)



In-Processing (2 Weeks)

- » In-process to qualification course after PCS to Ft. Bragg

Introduction to MISO Phase I (2 Weeks)

- » Introduction to MISO
- » MISO History
- » MISO Core Tasks
- » MISO Planning and Operations
- » Whole of Government and NGO
- » Information Operations
- » Family Programs

Language and Culture Phase II (18-24 Weeks)

- » Cat I & II -18 weeks:
 - French, Indonesian-Bahasa and Spanish
- » Cat III & IV – 24 weeks:
 - Arabic, Chinese-Mandarin, Czech, Dari, Hungarian, Korean, Pashto, Persian-Farsi, Polish, Russian, Tagalog, Thai, Turkish, and Urdu
- » Use of Interpreters
- » Must pass Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) before beginning Phase III
- » Progressive PT Program

MISO Core Phase III (11 Weeks)

- » Branch and MOS
 - Core Competencies and Tasks
 - Adaptive Leader Methodology
 - Negotiation, Mediation, and Influence
 - Target audience Analysis
 - Social-Cultural analysis and understanding
 - Inter/Intra/Cross Cultural Communication
 - Media production and dissemination management
 - Psychological effects of military activities
 - Information Management

Culex Phase IV (3 Weeks)

- » MISO Culmination Exercise
 - Deliberate Mission Planning and Analysis
 - Target Audience Analysis Application
 - Social-Cultural Analysis Application
 - Information Management Application
 - Adaptive Leader Application
 - Negotiation and Mediation with Cultural Role Players
 - Language and Culture Application

Graduation Phase V (1 Week)

- » Regimental indoctrination
- » Operational Assignment
- » Individual Academic Achievement Awards
- » Graduation
- » *Credentialed as a MISO Officer or NCO*

**Average Course Completion
37-43 Weeks**

SWCS' Education Degree Initiatives



Associate's Degree

- Fayetteville Technical Community College pilot program underway (Global Studies) with 23 students enrolled
- Other Service Members Opportunity College – Army Degrees (SOCAD) and ACE Partners on case-by-case basis

Bachelor's Degree (dL BA curriculum through Norwich)

- Norwich University pilot program (projected 15 Students) scheduled for JAN 11 (Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis)
- Other Service Members Opportunity College – Army Degrees (SOCAD) and ACE Partners on case-by-case basis as pilot program validates concept

Masters Degree

- National Defense University (Strategic Security Studies) – 20 students enrolled
- University of Kansas (Interagency Studies) – 17 students enrolled
- Naval Postgraduate School (Defense Analysis) – 74 students enrolled
- Sister Service Schools
- War College

Doctorate Degree

- Currently researching requirements and opportunities
- Modify the USAJFKSWCS TDA to include billets requiring a doctoral degree (e.g. permanent professorship)
- Will require re-coded positions within USSOCOM (currently one billet required/authorized)



Language and Culture Program



Directorate of Regional Studies & Education, USAJFKSWCS, has developed three distinct levels of instruction in 17 core languages:

- **Basic** - Our basic level of instruction (embedded into our qualification courses) is designed for students to achieve a minimum Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) rating of 1 to 1 (listening and speaking) capability.
- **Intermediate** – Students enrolled in the basic language course who demonstrate the highest foreign language proficiency (approximately the top 15%) will be enrolled in the intermediate course upon graduation. This course is designed to give students a minimum OPI rating of 2 to 2 (listening and speaking), prior to reporting to their units. (28-week course).
- **Advanced** – The advanced program of language instruction is designed for those service members who have demonstrated the highest aptitude in language proficiency in the execution of their duties. Those selected will return to the Directorate of Regional Studies and Education, USAJFKSWCS, where they will enroll into a DLI-modeled curriculum designed to achieve a rating of 3 in all of the following: listening, speaking and reading capability.
- For those low-density languages, not identified as core languages, we will partner with other institutions that specialize in a broader variety of less commonly taught languages.

Regional Studies and Culture Program



Directorate of Regional Studies & Education, USAJFKSWCS, is developing three distinct levels of instruction in Regional Studies comprising the
Regional Expertise Program:

- **Basic** – (Initial Acquisition) Our basic level of instruction (currently embedded into our qualification courses) is designed for students to achieve a minimum understanding of foundational culture and regional analysis with Civil Affairs and Military Information support qualification course students engaging in further analysis using the PMSE-II-PT construct (systems of systems approach with regional flavor)
- **Intermediate** – (In development) – Currently imbedded within the Intermediate Language Course. Instructional outcomes focus on expertise specific to a region or country using the system of systems analysis approach, building on the expertise gained in the basic course as the vehicle to achieve informational dominance
- **Advanced** – (In development) Reapplication of the former Advanced Regional Analysis Course with updated and relevant learning outcome modules. Graduates will be able to demonstrate country and regional knowledge, analyze regional events and issues and apply cultural awareness to major cultural patterns in focus region
- **Cultural Support Team** – Basic cultural orientation for female operational support personnel assigned to support ARSOF operational units. Current emphasis is for the Afghanistan Theater of Operations.

If we don't do this **who will?**


The future of our regiments is predicated upon our ability to produce adaptive SOF leaders who have leadership qualities based upon humility, critical thinking, comfort with ambiguity, acceptance of prudent but calculated risks and the ability to make rapid adjustments based upon a continuous assessment of the situation. These leaders must be highly trained in warrior skills and highly educated.





MARSOC Distributed Operations

Span of influence and control exceeds traditional definition





Training & Certification

Continuum:


- Recruiting
- Assessment & Selection
 - Pipeline
 - Education
 - PMT
- Lessons Learned


EVALUATION & CERTIFICATION:

- ITS/CTS/PTP (Trng Continuum)
- MSOT/MSOC/SOTF
- Intel/Ops Fusion
- Direct & Indirect Operations
- Problem Framing
- Decision Making/Assessment
- Leader Coaching & Mentorship
- Capabilities Integration

MISSION REHEARSAL OF FULL SPECTRUM DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS:

- Fusion of Enablers & Advanced Skills
- Environmental/Cultural Experience
- Integration of CF, IA, Joint & Special Activities
- Modification through Lessons Learned





*Special Operations Command
Central (SOCCENT)*

COL Joe Osborne



Mission

Special Operations Command Central / Combined Forces Special Operations

Component Command executes full spectrum special operations in the

USCENTCOM AOR in order to neutralize the insurgencies in Iraq and

Afghanistan, and disrupt designated violent extremist organizations and

state sponsored asymmetric threats.

Goals

- Counter violent extremist influence and expansion.
- Develop, enable, and maintain viable host nation partnerships and capability.
- Develop and support strategic and regional access.
- Develop infrastructure to support future operations.
- Maintain/expand Coalition contributions.
- Fighting, winning, and dominating in the human domain.



End State

Sustain current operations in Iraq , Afghanistan, and in Chief of Mission environments, expand appropriate partner nation security force capability through persistent SOF command forward and remain poised to conduct contingency operations when the Nation calls.



Theater Special Operations Command...



5 Mission Sets

Unconventional Warfare / Foreign Internal Defense, Military Information Support Operations, Selected Intelligence Activities, Civil Military Operations and providing the CENTCOM Commander a rapidly deployable Joint Task Force.

4 Functions

Identify SOF requirements for the Theater, Develop SOF Operational Design, Build SOF Operational Architecture and Develop, Execute, and Assess SOF Campaigns.

3 Customers

Joint Task Force Commander, the Intelligence Community and the Partner Nation.

2 Bosses

Commander, U.S. Central Command and Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command .

1 TSOC

The Organization that synchronizes Special Operations activities for the GCC.



SOCCENT Focus Areas

Develop, Execute, Assess SOF Campaigns

- Weaving the effects of UW/FID Capability Building, Military Information Support, Civil-Military Operations and select SOF Intelligence Activities.
- Persistent SOF engagement with Country Teams & friendly nations.

Command and Control of Deployed SOF

- SOF C4I for a geographic region.
- TSOC Operational Control .
- Extends TSOC Commander's operational reach/capability to influence in Country of Interest.

Set the Conditions for Future Efforts & Expansion

- Conduct Preparation of the Environment .
- Conduct Capabilities Building with selected SOF for Expeditionary Operations.
- Build a network with regional SOF leaders .

Invest in Forces, Resources, and Gain Authorities


- Multi-year plan achieves flexibility, speed and agility in execution of current and future operations.
- Scalable for country-specific plans.



SOCCENT Operational Architecture

Commander's Guidance

- *"Be proactive and aggressive in countering VEO's and state sponsored asymmetric threats."*
- *"No one looks at the theater the way we do."*
- *"Don't confuse what you can do with what you should Do."*
- *"Fight the Command forward in both GCC and Chief of Mission environments."*
- *"Partner throughout the AOR with appropriate Security Forces and USG Agencies."*
- *"Don't worry about the credit."*








Back-up slides



SOF Operational Environment

"Campaigning Right and Left of the Line"



“Theater SOF”

What we’ve accomplished...

Strategy for Theater SOF

- Nested in CENTCOM and JTF plans
- Sub-regional supporting plans
- “SOF Campaigns”

Unique AOR-Wide Posture

- Supporting JTFs
- Leading, “Left of the Line”...

Programmatic Initiatives

- HQ expansion construction progress
- SOCOM working group on SOF C2 Joint Pub
- JIEDDO support for non-materiel solutions



Across the AOR

What we’re working on...

Campaign Plan Maintenance

- Operational continuity
- Continue regional SOF assessments
- Invested forward

DOTMLPF Change Proposal

- Codify proven / emerging TSOC roles
- Authorities “Left of the Line”
- Resource the architecture

Crisis Response Preparation

- Mission analysis / Troops-to-task
- Collateral benefits / Opportunities
- No degradation to the Joint Task Forces



Commanders Vision Statement




Build, command and fight the finest multi-discipline Joint/Combined Special Operations Command in the Department of Defense that proactively seeks out, counters or defeats threats to the U.S. and its interests in the CENTCOM AOR by executing SOF campaigns which maximize Partner Nation and Interagency capabilities and U.S. Unconventional Warfare means; and when required rapidly forms a JTF HQ capable of commanding SOF and conventional forces.



SOCCENT COMMAND & CONTROL



SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND - CENTRAL
(SOCCENT)





Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) Role: Who We Are...



- The Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) is a subordinate unified command that reports and responds to the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC).
- Special Operations Command – Central (SOCCENT) is the Special Operations Component Command for the Commander, US Central Command (USCENTCOM).
- SOCCENT is responsible for the planning, preparation and command and control (C2) of all theater special operations forces (SOF) in the Central Command Area of Responsibility.
- The SOCCENT Commander is the principal advisor to the Commander, US Central Command on Special Operations.



Naval Special Warfare

**Selecting and training operators
that will be prepared to simultaneously serve as
shooters, diplomats and aid workers**

Naval Special Warfare Community

7,252 ~ Active Duty Personnel

3,204 Operators (SEAL/SWCC)

4,048 Support Personnel

1021 ~ Civilian Personnel

696 ~ Reserve Personnel

8,273 Total ~ 1.8% of Total Navy Manpower

NSW Operational Units

SEAL Teams

(10 / 2)



- Special Reconnaissance
- Direct Action
- Unconventional Warfare
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Combating Terrorism
- Limited sustainment
- Light armament & firepower
- Require infil / exfil support

SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams

(Active / Reserve) (1 / 0)

Dry Deck Shelter (DDS)



ASDS

SDV



SDV / ASDS:

- Direct Action
- Special Reconnaissance
- Infil / Exfil
- True clandestine insertion capability
- Limited speed & distance (SDV-wet submersible)
- Environmental limitations (sea state, temp, - SDV)
- Requires detailed coordination

Special Boat Teams

(3 / 0)

Rigid Inflatable Boat (RIB)



SOC-R




Mk V

- Infil / Exfil / Support / ISR
- RIB: Primarily Short Range
- Mk V: Medium Range
- SOC-R: Riverine Craft
- Range (Type dependent)
- Fuel requirements
- Support base required - extended deployments

NSW Task Organization



NAVSPECWARCOM



*Blue = Active

*Grey = Reserve

***Each SEAL Team has 7 Platoons**

Naval Special Warfare Center Mission



1. **Select, train, and qualify men to become SEALs and SWCC**
2. **Provide advanced individual skills training to the NSW community**

Naval Special Warfare Center


- 700+ Command Members
- 2 Subordinate O-5 Commands
- 16 Geographic locations
- 1500+ Basic students/FY
- 4000+ Advanced students/FY
- 80 Courses of Instruction
- O-5 Education Directorate



NSWCEN Mission: SEAL and SWCC Production

- **SEAL:**

- Historic highs in recruiting (~1300) and production (~220)
- Prolific production projection (340 / FY11)




- **SWCC: Making Goal annually (80-100 SBs)**



SEAL Qualification Timeline

Pipeline Training: 58 wks




After graduation every new SEAL attends 3 months of language and cultural training



SWCC Qualification Timeline

Pipeline Training: 28 wks



Formal SWCC NEC training established in 2001.

NSWCEN Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Program

- **SOCOM Commander's Guidance**
- Regain ability to communicate directly with indigenous people.
- Basic linguistic skill throughout deployed force.
- High skill in small numbers.
- Increased cultural sensitivity and knowledge.
- All SEAL and SWCC graduates attend 12 week course in San Diego:
 - Initial Acquisition (IAT) determined by NSWRON deployment location
 - Level-II based on aptitude and operational requirements (return after deployments)

Key Concepts in Second Language Acquisition

- Sustainment needs to be consistent and actively supported.
- Need a motivating factor (fiscal, operational, career).
- Grammar is important, but not the only way to start learning a language.
- CAT I & II languages: 1/1 = 360 hrs; 2/2 = 720 hrs
- CAT III & IV languages: 1/1 = 480 hrs; 2/2 = 1080 hrs

Civil Affairs Soldiers and the DOS PRTs in Iraq 2009-2010

**Implementing Policy Through an
Effective Integration of
Defense, Diplomacy, and Development**

Bob Cassilly
Senior Strategic Planner
Office of Provincial Affairs
Embassy Baghdad
2009-10

This brief discusses events, processes, and structures that existed in Iraq during all or a portion of the period from April 2009 to September 2010.

PRTs in Iraq 2009-10



The 16 Iraq PRTs serve as interagency platforms in each of Iraq's 18 provinces. Under DOS leadership, the interagency partners on the PRTs include: DOS, DOD, USAID, DOJ, USACE, USDA and others. The team makeup includes experts in diplomacy and development subject matter experts, including: Governance, Rule of Law, Economic Development, Infrastructure Development, and Programmatic Management. To complete the 3rd D of Diplomacy, Development and Defense, each PRT is partnered with a U.S. Division and/or Brigade.

Whole of Government Approach and the PRTs in Iraq

•PRTs “*integrate the collaborative efforts* of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government (Defense, Diplomacy, and Development) to achieve unity of effort towards a *shared goal.*” FM 3-07

The PRTs’ mission is to support the Whole of Government approach to stability operations through the **effective integration of collaborative efforts towards shared goals**. Effective integration of these interagency teams requires far more than a direct support relationship, contractor relationship, or other part time or on-call relationship. The full potential of these teams can be achieved only where the expertise and capabilities of the many parts are truly integrated at all levels and not simply paired from time to time.

Achieving a Whole of Government Approach Through The PRT “Interagency Platforms”

- The Right People
 - The Right Processes
 - The Right Structures
- } **Success**



Achieving the necessary level of interagency integration through the PRT platform requires the right people, the right processes, and the right structures.


Civil Affairs Soldiers Are the Right People

- Trained and Experienced in the Stability Operations environment
- Appreciate the unique benefits and challenges of each of the 3Ds
- Experienced in each of the 3Ds
- Understand potential for conflicting priorities among the 3Ds
- Comfortable working with both civilian and military partners
- Operationally oriented
- Planners
- Flexible
- Team players, team builders, team leaders
- Leaders

Civil Affairs Soldiers have demonstrated their immense value in the success of the PRT program. These multidimensional individuals serve in a variety of critical positions, including: Deputy Team Leaders, planners, program managers, subject matter experts, logistical and administrative support, and more. Their expertise in stability operations, fluency in both military and civilian operations, and other characteristics make the CA soldiers invaluable to the mission.


The Right Structures

- 16 Interagency Provincial Teams
- Each team partnered with a DIV/AAB with co-responsibility for Lines of Operation




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The PRT is structured as an integrated team of equals. The mix of interagency subject matter experts on the PRTs mirrors the interagency initiatives at the national level. The team operates under DOS leadership with a Civil Affairs Deputy. The Deputy provides critical expertise in leadership, management, and planning in a hostile environment.




At the PRT operational level, the Civil Affairs soldiers on the PRT facilitate integration of the PRT based experts on Diplomacy and Development with the Division and/or Brigade based Defense expertise and capability. The CA soldiers also coordinate the military support for the PRTs' Diplomatic and Development efforts.

Embassy Based CA Support the PRTs



At the strategic level, the proper mix of Defense, Diplomacy and Development is achieved through the integrated interpretation and application of the Joint Campaign Plan (JCP). The Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) is the parent entity for the PRTs and is the Embassy element responsible PRT implementation of the JCP. To facilitate a unified approach to the implementation of JCP, OPA staff includes a Civil Affairs Senior Military Advisor, two Civil Affairs Planners, and three Civil Affairs coordinators. The Coordinators are responsible for unity of effort in three key lines of operation: Rule of Law, Governance, and Economic Development.



The Civil Affairs Soldiers' command of technology has been particularly valuable in the PRT Program. A great example is the support provided by the CA Civil Information Management (CIM) Cell located at Victory Base. The CIM Cell supports the PRT program through the automated dissemination of PRT reporting. All PRT reports are completed on Microsoft templates and sent by the PRTs via email to the CIM Cell. The automated process allows the CIM Cell to instantly reconstruct the individual reports into a series of topic specific reports that are distributed via email to the USG interagency stakeholders throughout Iraq and the U.S.

END

Drug Enforcement Administration Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team



DEA FAST

NDIA SO/LIC Symposium

Richard Dobrich

Section Chief



DEA FAST



MISSION STATEMENT

Plan and conduct special enforcement operations; train, mentor, and advise foreign narcotics law enforcement units; collect and assess evidence and intelligence in support of US and bilateral investigations.



Drug Flow Attack Strategy (DFAS)

DEA's DFAS is used globally in order to develop sustained, intelligence-driven interdiction operations which disrupt and seize shipments of drugs, precursor chemicals, and operating capital. DFAS uses sequential operations and predictive intelligence in order to disrupt Drug Trafficking Organization activity and identify trafficker reaction.



Drugs/Terrorism Nexus

DEA Integration with SOF

- DOS, Foreign Terrorist Organizations
47 FTO's => 18 linked Drugs (39%)
- DOJ, Consolidated Priority Organization Targets
69 CPOT's => 33 linked FTO's (49%)
- Global Reach, Global Influence:
FARC, AUC, Hizballah,
 Hamas, al-Qa'ida, Al-Shabaab
=> Political/Religious Extremists

Why Drugs? ...\$\$\$

“The first need is financial. There are hundreds wishing to carry out martyrdom-seeking operations but they can't find the funds to equip themselves. So funding is the mainstay of jihad”

- Sheik Saeed, Middle East Research Institute





Drugs/Terrorism Nexus

(DTO vs FTO a/k/a 21st Century Piracy)

Commonalities

- Opposed to any Nation's sovereignty, disregard Human Rights
- Seek to operate in ungoverned space
 - exploit weak Nation States
- Shadow facilitators:
 - Money Launderers, Arms Traffickers, Smugglers
- Rely heavily on corruption, intimidation, & violence
- Sophisticated C2, clandestine operations, red-vetting
- Utilize latest technology
 - Communications, Navigation, Financial
- Require large amounts of money
- Able to quickly regenerate following losses

Differences

FTO –
Ideology

DTO –
Greed

(symbiotic)

DEA Integration with SOF iso SO/LIC

- F3EAD: Targeting thru Actions on Objective
- DEA has 82 Offices in 62 Foreign Countries
- Shared Intelligence
 - Financial Attack, Judicial Intercepts & Extradition,
 - HVT, SIU & Vetted Programs, SOD
 - FAST – embed with SOF



FAST TRAINING

FAST Training Supported by SOCOM

Phase 1: Physical & Tactical Assessment

Phase 2: Specialized Training

Phase 3: Advanced SOF TTPs



- Mission Planning; Small Unit Tactics
- Heavy/Foreign Weapons
- Close Quarter Combat Shooting
- IED and Demolitions Familiarization
- Surveillance Detection
- Counter- Threat Driving
- Combat Lifesaving
- Communication and NVG
- Land Warfare; MOUT/SOUC
- Escape and Evade Techniques
- Airmobile/Maritime Operations
- Convoy Operations
- Counterdrug Tactical Police Operations



Counter-Narcotics & Counter-Insurgency

CN/COIN Strategy must not ignore Narcotics (CP/CI)

DEA Attacks DTO's (networks); Leverage CN laws

Interdiction vs. Eradication

- **The insurgency relies on drug trafficking as a significant source of revenue to fund transportation of fighters, training facilities, communications, weapons, and logistics;**
- **Operations and intelligence have proven that many narcotics traffickers and insurgents are one in the same;**
- **Narcotics trafficking feeds corruption and threatens the Afghan government's legitimacy and is a strategic threat to USG policy and goals in Afghanistan;**
- **Government legitimacy and stabilization depends on the rule of law;**

Counter-Narcotics & Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan

DEA Strategy & Mechanism

- **Identify and Target HVT's and key nexus nodes**
Use informants, UC operations, interdiction operations, financial investigations, and telephone intercepts to develop prosecutable Afghan Bi-lateral, 959, and 960a cases
- **Synchronize and Conduct Operations with US/ISAF SOF**
Transparent and shared targets, intelligence, investigative priorities, and resources throughout theatre
- **Capacity Building**
DEA expansion and integration into ISAF Regional Commands. Continue to train, mentor, and advise specialized units of the CNP-A
- **Strategic Communications**
Impact local Afghan mindset by enforcing rule of law, support Afghan-led operations, targeting corrupt officials and high-level insurgents & traffickers, and sustain dialog with tribal elders



Drugs/Terrorism Nexus

DEA Integration with SOF

FORECAST:

- More DTO/FTO **hybrids** will appear: 21st Century OC
- FARC is *the* case study
- DTO/FTO's operate in same spaces
- Each vying for same money generated from same illicit enterprises
- Reliance on same shadow facilitators for logistics, finance, \$, arms
- **RED** forces in compressed 'space/time' scenario become allies

Is it a law enforcement mission or is it a military mission?

Both!!!—U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Military, and the Intelligence Community have no choice but to work closer together.

- **GREEN** and **BLUE** forces must have unity of effort to prevail

“When your job takes you into the swamp to hunt snakes, you’ll have opportunities to kill or capture some crocs as well — cause they live and multiply in the same, nasty surroundings.”

Mr. Frankie Shroyer, IATF Director USSOCOM



PKSOI



U.S. Army

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute

<http://PKSOI.army.mil>

Civil Military Teaming Future SOF Challenges and Opportunities.

By
William Flavin

Need for Interagency Teaming

Needs:



- Military Operations might be necessary but not sufficient
- Success depends on Civ/Mil action

WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH



SOF Advantages

- Experience
- Doctrine
- Attitudes
- Training and Education
- Flexibility
- Employment Concepts



Examples

- MALAYA
- CORDS Viet Nam
- County Team Laos, El Salvador, Afghanistan
- JIATF-SOUTH
- TSCTP
- PRT



Special Action Force: SAF

Background

- 1963 Established by Dept of Army Around a SF Group to complement the US Governments Development Programs (FID/ IDAD)
- Organization:
 - CA
 - PSYOP
 - MI
 - Eng
 - ASA
 - Medical
 - Military Police
 - Signal



Future

Beyond PRTs

Interagency Management System Future

ACT/ FACT

SAF Interagency

Integrated UN

Assessments



Austere Challenge



Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework



Planning Support



Judicious Response



Haiti MINUSTAH



APL Handbook

Sponsors:

- U.S. Special Operations Command
- U.S. Joint Forces Command
- Army Asymmetric Warfare Group

Purpose: to provide the interagency team leader and team member at the field or operational level with a basic understanding of the interagency environment.

The handbook is:

Intended as a resource to provide insight into the interagency process for DoD field commanders, interagency team leaders and team members engaged in countering irregular threats.



Conclusion

- Whole of Government and Comprehensive Approach is the future
- SOF needs to consider embracing this concept through
 - Structures
 - Education
 - Processes



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YouTube: www.youtube.com/USArmyPKSOI

SOLLIMS: sollims.pksoi.org



pksoi.army.mil



sollims.pksoi.org



US Special Operations Command



USSOCOM Special Operations Support Teams (“SOSTs”)

8 February 2011

Briefing Unclassified



SOCOM's Special Operations Support Teams


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What's a "SOST?"

Special Operations Support Teams are made up of USSOCOM personnel who serve at DOD and non-DOD agencies where HQ USSOCOM has an enduring requirement to synchronize DOD planning for global operations against terrorist networks.

UNCLASSIFIED





SOCOM's Inter-agency Network

- After 9/11 immediate recognition within SOCOM that non-DOD agencies would play major, if not primary, role in Global War on Terrorism
- Peak of national focus on Global War on Terrorism
- Numerous non-military action officer representatives were established within HQ SOCOM (DOS, FBI, CIA, NGA, NSA, USAID, DIA, DEA, DHS/ICE, NRO)
- In 2004 LTG Dell Daley, then Director of SOCOM Center for Special Operations, proposed to place liaison officers in key non-DOD agencies in Washington DC
- Joint Staff initially blocked SOCOM initiative – In conjunction with OSD, inter-agency liaison and coordination was a key Joint Staff responsibility



SOCOM's Inter-agency Network

UNCLASSIFIED



- **LTG Daley persisted, dropped idea of “Liaison Officers” (“LNOs”), adopted idea of Special Operations Support Teams (“SOSTs”) – “A SOST is not an LNO”**
- **UCP and DOD Directive give SOCOM authority to conduct inter-agency collaboration/coordination**
- **In 2005 an enhanced “Inter-Agency Task Force” created within HQ SOCOM in Tampa**
- **By 2006 Joint Staff was welcoming SOCOM assistance with inter-agency activities**
- **As of Feb 2011 SOCOM had 30 SOSTs at 18 “agencies” in National Capitol Region – 2 more possible**

UNCLASSIFIED

US Special Operations Command



Questions?

Joint, Interagency and
Multinational Integration
of SOF for Defense,
Diplomacy and
Development



Brigadier

Simon Hutchinson

NSHQ

NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS





Madeleine K. Albright

*Chair of the NATO Group of Experts
New Strategic Concept*

“NATO is not just the world’s most successful military and political alliance, it is also the only organization of its kind. NATO is a unique and indispensable contributor to global security and it’s continued effectiveness should be a matter of urgent concern to us all.”





NATO SOF





Communiqué Language and the NSHQ

- At the November 2006 Riga Summit, the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative (NSTI) was unveiled as part of the summit communiqué:

“The adaptation of our forces must continue. We have endorsed a set of initiatives to increase the capacity of our forces to address contemporary threats and challenges. These include...The launch of a special operations forces transformation initiative aimed at increasing their ability to train and operate together, including through improving equipment capabilities.”

UNCLASSIFIED



NSHQ Mission

NSHQ is the primary point of **development, direction and coordination** for all NATO Special Operations related activities in order to **optimise employment** of Special Operations Forces, to include providing an **operational command capability** when directed by SACEUR.

Tasks

Advise NATO on SOF employment
Strengthen the NATO SOF Component
Engage nations and partners
Develop a secure SOF network
Develop SOF policy, doctrine and standards

Support capability generation
Support education and training
Support force generation
Provide a deployable C2 capability



NATO Special Operations Headquarters

NSHQ, SHAPE



SOF Training Campus



- 3-star HQ
- 24+ nations
- ~150 staff
- Growing to 215



UNCLASSIFIED



NSHQ - Effect

- An established SOF identity in NATO
- ISAF SOF enabled, and effective
- Enduring transformation of interoperability and capability in NATO SOF
- A secure SOF network as the basis for more to come...

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NATO SOF - Realities

- National SOF versus NATO SOF
- Different approaches
- Language
- Ability to share, and the culture to do so
- Money

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So What?

- Realise the Strategic Concept, especially in respect of Military Assistance
- Challenge interagency assumptions
- Enhance our capabilities to share, manage and exploit information
- Define minimum essential SOF enabling capabilities, and consider novel ways to provide them
- Promote interoperability



NSHQ

NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS



Joint, Interagency, and Multi-National Integration of SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development.

(or - how to translate policy into the right balance and mix of defense, diplomacy, development, and ultimately requirements)

Opening remarks...

In addressing the question on the screen I offer one perspective on how we, NATO, are trying to evolve the multi-national aspect of SOF to deal with the security challenges we face today. In doing so my particular aim is twofold:

Firstly to tell you that we exist, and why;
and secondly to explain why we should be supported, and how

As for any military officer in search of inspiration, I find it both diplomatic and instructive to start with a look at the higher commander's intent. In this case I shall rather blandly label higher command simply as NATO given that we have many fathers. Whilst I am sure it needs little explanation, there are a few observations worth making as a start-point.

First, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is the world's most successful military alliance, bringing together 28 nations from Europe and North America. It has also forged substantive partnerships and engagements of various kinds with that number of countries again.

Despite this somewhat comfortable assertion, my second observation is that NATO is having to confront some significant existential challenges following the certainties of the Cold War. It has been perceived not to be doing enough to counter new threats; that it lacks a civil-military approach; that it has lost political confidence; that it has a narrow policy focus which ignores crisis prevention; and that it has lost a clear role in the public mind.

The response has been the New Strategic Concept launched at the Lisbon Summit in November last year. This reaffirmed the three core tasks of Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security. It interpreted these to embrace the Comprehensive Approach to a greater degree, to further develop expeditionary capabilities and to employ military and political forces before and after conflicts, as well as during them. Specifically, from the SOF perspective, NATO will develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable forces, and will enhance its capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism. This will include the development of appropriate military capabilities, including those required to help train local forces to fight terrorism overseas and improve their security situation. This is significant new language for NATO, particularly the stronger references to terrorism, conflict prevention and capacity building.

Whilst NATO has few permanently assigned forces and a limited budget of its own, it has access to the collective capabilities and resources of our nations. These nations cooperate to a remarkable degree in the field of security and defence, and are committed to the Alliance remaining relevant in the face of modern day threats and challenges, including international terrorism. NATO therefore provides – or at least seeks to provide – a very mature, uniquely structured and relevant tool for military collaboration. My third point about NATO, therefore, is that despite its challenges, its history and institutional strengths make it an exceptional start-point if you want to work with

Allies in the military domain. Thereafter it is what we make of it.

So what of SOF in NATO? Firstly, I ought to offer a personal definition of the term NATO SOF. It is not just 'everyone else' or 'European SOF', or even necessarily the sum of separate SOF capabilities in NATO. It is instead the sum of those bits of SOF resident in the nations – all the nations – that are placed in the NATO domain. For operations, this may be limited by time and mission set. I shall come back to this point later.

For those with no direct or current experience beyond US SOF, whilst individual nation's SOF cannot compete with the sheer scale of SOCOM and its attendant capabilities, you would recognise the raw material – men and women who are carefully selected by their nations, are well trained, highly motivated, innovative, trusted and empowered to varying degrees. In turn, they very much recognise the US SOCOM Strategy, the 3-D Warrior, or the Guidance for 2011. Therefore, behind language and cultural differences you are dealing with what you would expect and hope for. NATO's non-US SOF are different through circumstance, not DNA.

However, they have lacked an identity and presence in NATO and in some cases in the individual nations as well. In 2006 SOF in NATO was represented by little more than isolated individuals in NATO posts across parts of the command structure whilst the SOF capabilities resided in the nations and was connected by *ad hoc* bi-laterals. Clear gaps were exposed in Bosnia, Kosovo and the early years in Afghanistan where SOF found they lacked the structures and habits to work together effectively under NATO, or under OEF for that matter. This therefore led in 2006 to the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative, intended to enhance the ability of SOF to train and operate together, improve equipment capability, remedy specific shortfalls and – in the future – provide the core of a deployable component level headquarters if required. These efforts are intended to enable the timely deployment and direction of NATO SOF, fully integrated from the start into the operational commander's plan.

The result initially was the NATO SOF Coordination Centre in 2007, with the US as the Framework Nation and driving force. The NSCC set about transforming the landscape with a speed, energy and resourcefulness that impressed many in NATO where transformation is often a rather slower process. In 2010, recognising the early success of the NSCC, this matured naturally into the NATO Special Operations Headquarters, or NSHQ (explain SO, not SOF).

The mission is on the slide. I think it speaks for itself. The key tasks that fall out of this, and which we are actively pursuing, are – to provide SOF advice to the NATO chain of command; to drive cohesion into the SOF component; to engage partners and nations in support of SOF development; to develop a secure network for collaboration and operations; to define the necessary policy, doctrine, standards and other essential parts of the conceptual framework; to improve the development of capability and force generation for operations; and to develop the Core of a deployable SOF component command. It is a big list, and we are not yet on top of all of it, but we will be.

Some facts. We are based in Belgium at the NATO military headquarters, otherwise known as SHAPE. Commanded by a US 3-Star General we number about 150 people from 24 NATO nations, with 2 non-NATO partners also represented. A further 6 nations are in varying stages of signing up. We will grow over the next 18 months to about 215 people, and also move into the best new HQ building in NATO. We already have a substantial, modern and expanding training campus in the

locality. We have also developed our own enclave on BICES as a secure collaborative SOF CIS network that is also highly deployable. The vision is for a collaborative foundation for NATO SOF, recognised by NATO nations and empowered by their capable personnel, acting as a dynamic catalyst for evolutionary transformation of the required SOF capabilities, and acknowledged as the operational core for NATO SOF. In short, SOF has arrived in NATO, rather than just in its nations. For this we owe you the US a huge amount as the nation that has shown the necessary vision and leadership, matched these with resources, and gripped the problem by the scruff of the neck.

Has this achieved anything? The short and emphatic answer is yes – very much so. SOF now exist in NATO policy, doctrine and force standards. We most assuredly have a voice – a very senior one at that – and are increasingly capable of expressing it coherently in the Alliance chain of command and national capitals.

The most significant expression of NATO SOF is in ISAF. Over the period SOF in ISAF have trebled in size, and includes some US SOF. ISAF SOF are linked coherently into the campaign plan, and to the other SOF entities. They have expanded their mission, and are now an independent command answering directly to General Petraeus. You will be well aware of the significance he attaches to the effect that SOF are having. Whilst we must recognise that the lion's share of the SOF effort and effect is from the US, a notable amount of the significant effect frequently cited by Gen Petraeus is created by ISAF SOF. Some nations are at similar scales of effort to the US when expressed as a proportion of their available capabilities.

ISAF SOF is not just an attempt at imitation either – you get something extra and not just more of the same. Perhaps this is best illustrated in the partnerships that have been developed with Afghan institutions. Whilst US SOF have focused very much on raising and partnering their Afghan counterparts, ISAF SOF have – sometimes haphazardly – built a series of relationships with parts of the Ministry of Interior. Both are necessary – indeed it may be that an analysis of campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan might conclude that COIN requires us to prioritise capability and capacity building of the police and interior ministry ahead of that of the army – but I sense that we are each most effective in our current lanes. That said, the current Afghan Local Police initiative, which is MOI focused, could not have been initiated by ISAF SOF. There are too many what one might term 'edges' to it, and operational urgency, to allow for the NATO consensus approach to work. ISAF SOF and the US SOF not under ISAF have therefore become complementary and not competing, and are maybe even stronger as a whole than the sum of the parts?

It is not axiomatic that any improvements in ISAF SOF are the result of NSHQ, but I contend that it is NSHQ that has made much of the difference. It is the enduring mechanism for the new concepts and capabilities in ISAF SOF. It has also improved SOF force generation, with NSHQ providing an opening for the willing but less-experienced nations to contribute effectively and with confidence. With significant US support, NSHQ has directly enabled ISAF SOF through the creation of a multi-national and inter-agency bespoke intelligence fusion capability, and rolled out a biometric capability that leads the way in ISAF. ISAF SOF is conducting the full spectrum of SOF tasks, including an increasing amount of Military Assistance – (or 'MA', but what you would describe as Foreign Internal Defence) – which is breaking new ground for many NATO nations. The development of MA concepts and the requisite capabilities is being led by NSHQ at the behest of ISAF SOF.

To achieve all this, back home NSHQ has rapidly developed and provided courses and training

optimised to enhance ISAF SOF capability and interoperability. It is establishing an increasingly effective network for routine SOF dialogue and collaboration. It advises nascent SOF nations. It conducts senior engagement activity, up to and including Defence Ministers, to promote the SOF component. It is the gearing for accelerated and focused SOF development, and – I venture – it is making a difference.

I would not want, nor expect you to believe that it is all plain sailing. There are constraints upon what we do, and on what can be achieved. A small number of NATO nations are more ambivalent about SOF capability than we would like. Others are not very far down the road of growing what we would recognise as SOF. Many hold significant domestic Counter Terrorist response commitments, or other national responsibilities, limiting their expeditionary capability and experience – although very often size means that they are pretty good at being Joint. (And I should point out that NSHQ is very firmly a Joint headquarters). All this must be respected, and it places some limits on capacity, collaboration and ambition.

There is also a complex mix of inputs. There are different approaches on engagement in law-enforcement activity, including counter-narcotics, and collaboration with the corresponding agencies. As we are finding now there are also very different perspectives on the SOF task of Military Assistance (FID), and whether it is a task for some NATO SOF. On the other side, NATO recognises the sensitivities of hostage rescue operations and therefore leaves this thorny issue largely to the national domain. The effect of all this – as I alluded to in defining NATO SOF at the start – is to limit the area of SOF activity open to NATO-driven collaboration to what one might oddly call ‘collective conventional SOF activity’ – although much still goes on bi-laterally between nations. This aperture will widen over time, aided by the network being put in place by NSHQ. It means, however, that we must be very careful with applying templates and are best served by looking for ways to develop or unlock existing potential rather than attempting to order things too neatly.

There are, of course, more traditional constraints. We have a common language but sometimes forget to use it in a way that accommodates those who do not speak it every day. (Even those who do have it as their first language can struggle to understand each other – comment). We compensate with common and detailed NATO terms of reference, which mean that interoperability is actually much less of a constraint than it might be supposed.

Most significantly, perhaps, we are constrained by our ability to share information of all sorts – lessons, intelligence or just our experiences. The reasons are many – secrecy, security, systems, habit and plain capacity among them. It is difficult, often requiring busy people to do even more. Whenever this comes up it is often assumed to be a veiled criticism of the US, but on this occasion I really don’t mean it that way. Whilst there are issues, such as the often used example of NOFORN to label information that was provided by Allies in the first place, it is remarkable how far the US has come, how bold some commanders have been, and how many sacred cows have been slaughtered to enable a good degree of sharing. Instead, I am referring to all of us. We all need to see sharing as the start-point rather than the by-product, and limit only that which truly needs to be limited. We also need simply to make the effort to share rather than stick to the established and easy means of distribution just because that is the way we have always done it. (Wikileaks). Of course, were we to achieve this enhanced information exchange we would also need the means to manage it better, and to protect us from the volume.

And, in the background, there is always money – or a lack of it. NATO itself has little of it, employs byzantine processes, and as latecomers to the party there is almost nothing available in NATO for SOF capability. NATO nations' resourcing of their SOF varies, but you can be sure that none matches SOCOM, even per capita. Generally, reflecting our times, SOF is attracting more of what is available, but of course that is itself reducing in the current financial climate. Smaller SOF nations lack the economies of scale too. The result is severe pressure on budgets, which is usually expressed by a lack of the critical enabling capabilities. These are often very expensive to develop and maintain. There is no doubt that NATO SOF potential is under-exploited because of a lack of enablers.

All of these constraints – differing approaches, a limited range of SOF activity in NATO, language, the lack of a sharing culture, and money – are to varying degrees the job of NSHQ to overcome, but it also means there is a limit on the collaborative model and we would be deluding ourselves if we did not recognise that. However, I have absolutely no doubt that NSHQ will create an ever-deepening network of increasingly capable and collaborative national SOF within NATO and beyond, and will continue to test the limit of what is achievable.

I hope I have succeeded in informing you that we exist, and why. I hope also that I have said enough to persuade you that this US-led SOF experiment in the heart of NATO is worth continued support and investment, at least for now. (Churchill - 'you can always count on Americans to do the right thing, after they have tried everything else'. In this context NSHQ is 'the right thing'.) But what might it all mean in a forum such as this?

I interpret the question as how do we get the most effective capability, willing and able to face the challenges of the 3D environment, from the collaborative efforts of SOF across NATO?

Firstly, we need to realise that part of the New Strategic Concept that talks about crisis prevention, and about generating the policy, capacity and skills to train local forces to fight terrorism themselves. SOF needs to institutionalise the conduct of Military Assistance – and possibly even re-define the term – recognising that MA it is not just about training but about building genuine capacity and, if necessary institutions and concepts up to the national level to make that training effective. Such activity can also be used as a significant door-opener, by SOF or by others, to achieve an influence and effect that goes beyond its mere mechanics. It is at the heart of defence, diplomacy and development for SOF, being the vehicle it uses for interaction with a target audience as part of the Comprehensive Approach. You can challenge us to live up to the rhetoric, consider the optimisation of equipment and procurement with MA in mind, and force the greater professionalisation of this skill-set.

Secondly, whilst NATO SOF are a long way down the road of Joint and Multi-National we need to challenge how we do Inter-agency, and widen the discussion to include more of that which is currently regarded as national business. Counter terrorism demands it, as does support to Development. Whilst recognising that this starts to tread on some very sensitive issues, including constitutional ones in some countries, we should not be afraid of debate and discovery even if we know that the potential deductions are unpalatable or currently unenforceable. We should be clear on the potential benefits to be had, the efficiencies to be made and the attendant risks of both action and inaction. You can help expose these deductions and opportunities as well as promote the greater standardisation of interagency systems, although I can see that it may not always be in commercial interests to do so

Switching to requirements, NATO SOF unsurprisingly has the same aspirations for 'kit' as anyone else – sensors of every kind, lighter equipment, more flexible and capable mobility options, better information and communications systems and so on. As with any SOF, the list can be demanding, endless and very expensive. You will understand much of this better than I – but will also recognise that nations and not NATO (and certainly not NSHQ) hold the significant purse-strings – so I will express NSHQ requirements more generally and from the perspective of what may be additional or different.

The over-riding requirement for us is to promote and enable sharing of information, and its exploitation routinely and in real-time. Interoperable (or ideally common) CIS; the wider use of commercial encryption; more flexible gateways; better data-mining tools; and more accurate translation tools – and all of this supporting and enabling processes and an approach that guides an originator towards production aimed at sharing in the first place. Industry can force us to be more coherent, as well as benefit from us being the opposite.

The second requirement is the improvement of enabling capabilities for expeditionary SOF operations. This is partly addressed by improved sharing and dissemination of information, but it is mostly about SOF capable ISR and rotary wing. We need to understand the minimum levels of capability required, build-in modularity and find novel and affordable ways of resourcing this or making it available to SOF that would otherwise not be able to reach what might be regarded as a theatre-entry standard. This must push us to distinguish the essential from the desirable, to make maximum use of commercial-off-the-shelf products, to seek economies of scale across borders and to find new models for sharing and for service provision.

The third requirement is simply interoperability in all its forms - whether it is the formal aspect of this, such as radios and IT systems that can talk to each other; the more informal aspect such as reversing the proliferation of batteries and other simple commodities; or harmonising the more sophisticated proprietary systems that challenge the effectiveness of an application programming interface. Standardisation and innovation may be enemies in some circumstances, but we must always ask ourselves if something optimises its actual employment or simply its notional capability. Good fielded capability can be better than awesome potential. Simplicity, modularity and standardisation are good for multi-national operations as well as capacity building abroad.

It is time to conclude. I hope I have managed to convey that there is a very active line of development for Joint Multi-National SOF, in NATO, led by the US and strongly supported by the other NATO nations. It is generating the collaborative SOF capability and network required for Defense, Diplomacy and Development operations. It is showing that in ISAF today. It doesn't lack much in the way of policy freedoms, but there are bespoke requirements to get right – conceptual, cultural and technical. It has considerable potential and I hope you will be able to find new ways to support us.


Closing remarks....

United States Special Operations Command



Proven † Vigilant † Prepared

The World at Night





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
December 2010

United States Special Operations Command



Proven ↑ Vigilant ↑ Prepared

INFORMATION OPERATIONS



Dr Dan Kuehl kuehd@ndu.edu

iCollege of the NDU

NDIA-SO/LIC, 9 February 2011

MY Opinions...not NDU's, or DOD's, or the USG!

Information Power

- “Combination of information content and technology used as a strategic instrument to shape fundamental political, economic, military and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global behavior of governments, supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security strategies & objectives”
 - Drs Dan Kuehl/Bob Neilson, Georgetown’s *NSSQ* 1999
 - President Ronald Reagan: NSDD 130 (1984), National Security Strategy (1987)
- “The relative ability to operate in and exploit the information environment — the aggregated and synergistic combination of **CONNECTIVITY, CONTENT, & COGNITION.**”
 - Dan Kuehl, “The Information Revolution & the Transformation of Warfare” (2007)

Information Environment

- **Physical/Electronic Connectivity: Cyberspace/"eSpace"**
 - Infrastructures, wires, networks, etc: a means of delivery
 - Cyberspace
 - Includes human (non-technical) connectivity
- **Information Content:**
 - Words, images, databases, 11010111000s
 - Deeds/Actions are content (an inaction is a deed)
 - **Context**: identical content may be understood differently
- **Cognitive: "influence/perception"**
 - **Meaning and the Mind**: "most important"
 - Example: Serbian TV vs NATO cohesion 1999
 - Losing the battle here may negate winning kinetically
 - Al Q'aida using kinetic ops to create cognitive effects

Cyber operations are...

- “the employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Such operations include **Computer Network Operations** and activities to operate and defend the **Global Information Grid**” [our “base” in cyberspace]
 - CJCS Memo of 19 August 2009
- CNO has three components
 - Attack & Defense (military); Exploitation (intelligence)
- What of other uses of the Electromagnetic Spectrum?
 - Electronic Warfare? EMP? Directed Energy? RF Weaponry?
 - ELINT/SIGINT?
 - **Broadcasting? (in Strategic Communication/Public Diplomacy)**

Information Operations (US) - Old

- **OLDER:** "Integrated use of **OPSEC, Military Deception (MiDec), PSYOP, Electronic Warfare (EW), and physical destruction**, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly capabilities against such actions."
 - JCS Memo of Policy 30, 1993
- **OLD:** "Integrated employment of the core capabilities of **Electronic Warfare, Computer Network Operations, Psychological Operations, Military Deception, and Operations Security**, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own"
 - IO Roadmap of 2003; Joint IO Doctrine 3-13 of 2006

Psychological Operations whoops...MISO

- Psyop: "convey selected information and indicators to **foreign** audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of **foreign** governments, organizations, groups and individuals....to induce or reinforce **foreign** attitudes and behavior..."
 - Jt Pub 3-53 (2003)
 - Does NOT say lies, deceptions, falsehoods
 - MORE than "leaflets, loudspeakers"; music?
 - Must exploit new technologies
 - Twitter, YouTube, "Now Media"
 - All levels, tactical-strategic, peace-war



Information Operations (US) - New

- **NEW:** "The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operations to influence, corrupt, disrupt or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own."
 - SECDEF Memo of 25 January 2011
 - "Don't need to own it to integrate it" Who does the integrating? (Commanders)
 - To follow: new Joint Pub 3-13 IO Doctrine (2011?)
 - NO "Core Competencies/Stovepipes"
- Also NEW: MISO
 - Military Information Support [to] Operations
 - Same as the old Psyop? (IMHO, yes)
 - And how is this different from Propaganda, Public Affairs, Strategic Communication, etc?

Combatant Commander's Role

- Commanders and Diplomats must coordinate and share
 - Neither one "owns" this space
- Cannot do this "afterwards"...**MUST** plan **BEFORE**
 - Every plan you have **MUST** have an influence/Strategic Communication element within it
- Must take advantage of civilian, allied, non-hostile, and NGO capabilities
 - This includes "The Media"
- Information Space and Cyberspace are inseparably linked
 - Jeff Jones, et al, "Strategic Communication and the Combatant Commander" *JFQ* 55

Issues

- Psyop/MISO operates across the conflict and audience spectrums
- Bring it back? Did it ever leave? Where?
- Media: both an operational space and an actor/actors IN that space
- Cyber is a critical (but not the only) means of creating Content that the Connectivity delivers to achieve Cognitive—ie psychological—effects.

Because
the world
HAS changed!



"Twitter" circa 1914

The Comprehensive Approach: Results of the QDR Independent Panel

Ms. Sherri Goodman
Senior Vice President & General Counsel

NATIONAL DEFENSE INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
22nd ANNUAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT SYMPOSIUM
Panel #4: Adapting SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and Development Operations
9 February 2011

QDR Independent Panel Members

Stephen J. Hadley, Co-Chairman

- **Richard Armitage**
- **J.D. Crouch**
- **Charles Curtis**
- **Rudy deLeon**
- **Joan Dempsey**
- **Eric Edelman**
- **Sherri Goodman**
- **David Jeremiah**
- **George Joulwan**

William J. Perry, Co-Chairman

- **Richard Kohn**
- **John Lehman**
- **John Keane**
- **Alice Maroni**
- **John Nagl**
- **Robert Scales**
- **James Talent**
- **Paul Van Riper**
- **Larry Welch**

2010 QDR Independent Panel Review

- Need for “Comprehensive Approach”
 - National Security Strategy and the 2010 QDR use the term “whole of government”
 - 2010 QDR highlighted:
 - Military missions of future are multi-stakeholder
 - Complex operating conditions
 - Civil-military interface critical
 - US in supporting role to host nation.
- Current federal government structures – both executive and legislative in need of reform
 - Legacy structures from the 1940s
 - U.S. defense framework adopted after World War II structured to address the Soviet Union in a bipolar world
 - Different threats and operating environment today .


President Obama's State of the Union, 2011



- *“We cannot win the future with a government of the past. We live and do business in the information age, but the last major reorganization of the government happened in the age of black and white TV. . . In the coming months, my administration will develop a proposal to merge, consolidate, and reorganize the federal government in a way that best serves the goal of a more competitive America.”*

It's like the Sears Catalog of the 50's competing with Amazon!


Sears Roebuck - 1950




Amazon.com - Today

- 1** Customers shop on your website and add items to shopping cart.
- 2** Customers can view, edit, or remove the items.
- 3** When your customers are ready to checkout, they choose a shipping address and click the 1-Click button to place the order.
- 4** Customers are returned to a URL that you specify. Amazon Payments sends confirmation e-mail to you and the customer.


The (Notional) Operational Environment



The Comprehensive Approach: Relative Military vs. Civil Level of Effort



Recommendations of QDR Independent Panel



1. Reconvene Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress
 - Make recommendations to improve organization and oversight of Congress
 - Make Congress a more effective body in performing its role to “provide for the common defense.”
2. Executive Order signed by the President on Whole of Government
 - Clarify interagency roles and responsibilities for whole of government missions.
3. Establish a National Commission on Building Civil Force of the Future
 - Increase capability and capacity of civilian departments to move promptly overseas and cooperate effectively with military forces in insecure security environments.

The Way Ahead: Adapting SOF in a “3D+” World

- How is the “3D+” world likely to affect SOF’s approach to future missions?
- How will the new environment affect SOF’s ways of operating?
 - Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq
 - Implications of the current turbulence in the Middle East
 - Budgetary constraints and limitations.
- What role will be effective for SOF to play in that environment?
 - **Broker**
 - **“Lean and mean”**
 - **The Comprehensive Approach:** Build up core competencies while leveraging opportunities found in collaboration and cooperation with other stakeholders.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AFRICA

22nd Annual SO/LIC Symposium & Exhibition

09 Feb 2011



Procedimus Una
"We go forward together"

BG Christopher K. Haas
Commander



Bottom Line Up Front About U.S. Africa Command

- Provides dedicated focus on Africa
 - Single geographic combatant command responsible for all Department of Defense programs and activities in Africa
 - Continent, island nations, maritime zones, and airspace
- Supports U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives
- Protect American lives and interests in Africa and in the homeland
 - Performs military-to military activities that help build capacity of African partners to counter transnational threats
 - Foster increased security and stability
 - Support peacekeeping operations
 - Address consequences of humanitarian disasters





African Problems are Global Security Challenges

- Trafficking
- Piracy
- Irregular Militaries
- Terrorism & Extremism
- Ethnic Strife
- Undergoverned Areas
- Pilferation of Resources (e.g., Illegal Fishing)
- Pandemic Disease – HIV/AIDS
- Insufficient Means to Confront Challenges
- Dependence on Foreign Assistance



**Large
Diverse
Complex**

11.7 million square miles
3-1/2 times the Continental United States
53 Nations, 1 Billion people
Over 800 ethnic groups and 1000 languages



Many and Increasing Opportunities

“Africans must solve Africa’s problems, but with a little help from our friends” -- Nelson Mandela

- Growing political will to confront challenges
- Promising regional security & economic communities
- Increasing democratization
- Growing economies



The key is *Stability* that allows Africans to leverage their opportunities



What Resources and Authorities are Changing for SOF?

- Conventional budget and manpower reductions translate to less BOS/Logistics Support for SOF.
- Special Operations requires non SOF Support assistance.
- On the verge of setting the precedent that SOF supports itself.

What TSOC Needs

- Logistical Support and BOS for enduring and episodic SOF activities:
 - Rapid
 - Durable and expeditionary
 - Small footprint that is tailorable
 - BOS Providers who understand the human terrain

TSOC Activities, Way Ahead

- To register the demands of SOCAFRICA with interagency and DoD partners in an effort to expand the scope and quality of support for SOF requirements.
- Focus efforts in key partner nations in order to achieve regional effects
- Prepare and rapidly respond to crisis events on the Continent

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
**Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent
Capabilities (SO/LIC&IC)**



***Adapting SOF for Defense, Diplomacy, and
Development Operations***

**Colonel Christopher Miller
Director, Special Operations and Irregular Warfare**

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- Counter Terrorism
- Special Operations
- Information Operations
- Strategic Documents (QDR, Global Employment of Forces, etc.)
- Security Force Assistance (SFA)
- Irregular Warfare (IW)
- Directed Energy Weapons (DEW)
- Urban Operations
- Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aviation
- 1208 / 1206
- Resource Oversight and Authorities Coordination
- Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office

As of July 14



POLICY

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SO/LIC & IC “Main Effort” for FY 11

- **Implement DoD Instruction 5000.68, “Security Force Assistance,” October 27, 2010**
- **Establish OSD-level Coordination and Synchronization Mechanisms for Irregular Warfare (DoD Directive 3000.07, “Irregular Warfare,” December 1, 2008)**
- **Support Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) Language Study**
- **Unconventional Warfare Department of Defense Directive**
- **Monitor/support Maritime Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Efforts**
- **Assist SOCOM “Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) to Base” budget transition efforts**
- **Increase Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Capacity**
- **Support US Special Operations Command “Talent Management” Initiatives**

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DASD Davidson Speech for SOLIC/NDIA Symposium

“Defense Initiative for Defense, Diplomacy & Development Operations”

9 Feb 2011

Introduction

Thank you Irene for that kind introduction. I was honored to be invited to speak to this audience.

Also, special thanks to:

NDIA, Meredith Geary, and Jim Gavrilis for their efforts to make this a successful conference.

All of you for your efforts in the current fights and to make the SOF community as potent and effective as possible.

I am humbled by the opportunity to address you today. I have a soft spot and a great deal of respect for the SOF community – and not just because I spent 2 years working in SO/LIC. My first introduction to this community was as a Navy brat, fresh out of college, living in Coronado, CA. I had a few friends in the SEAL team training there – a few who made it through and a few who did not. So I learned then what it takes to earn one’s way onto these teams. Meanwhile, I worked part time at an art gallery – owned by 2 former Navy Seals. These guys were really cool. They took me on the SEAL obstacle course on the beach, taught me about Vietnam and world politics, and they almost convinced me to jump out of an airplane in the months before I started pilot training (my dad convinced me that arriving with a broken leg would be a bad idea). But they also taught me about art and

culture – so I learned that there were many many sides to this special community and the individuals who comprise it.

Most people know that the SOF community has been absolutely essential to the work that's been done in the last ten years -- from the initial fight in Afghanistan to civil affairs, SFA, and direct action today. What people don't always appreciate is how much you have learned – and how much the rest of the force has learned from you. It was the SOF community who kept the intellectual candle burning on ideas like FID, COIN, and UW – well before FM3-24. While we were all learning Air Land Battle Doctrine in the '80's and practicing "big war" at the NTC, SOF was fine-tuning the concepts that would be rapidly leveraged by the rest of the military during the Iraq and Afghanistan fights. I know this would have been a much steeper learning curve without the knowledge brought to bear by SOF. Now, and in the coming years, as we pursue the Secretary's priorities that he laid out in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, SOF will continue to play an indispensable role as operators and as a source for new ideas and concepts.

My current vantage point:

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans, I preside over a relatively new office in the OSD structure, an office dedicated assisting the Secretary in fulfilling the his Title 10 responsibility to issue planning guidance and review military plans.. The fact that my office exists at all speaks to how seriously the Secretary and my boss, Undersecretary for Policy, Michele Flournoy, view the planning process and their duties to personally

review high priority plans. My office also sets the OSD's long range guidance for contingency plans, and facilitates interagency coordination on planning. It is through that lens that I see the steady demand for SOF carrying us through the current conflicts and well into a future in which, preventing future conflict is a top priority and operating with a complex array of partners is an imperative.

The Quadrennial Defense Review lays out the need to prevail in today's fights, prevent and deter, prepare for future conflicts, and preserve the force. Last night, Admiral Mullen discussed the challenges we face in carrying out the last "P" – preserving the force. Today, I would like to unpack the two middle "p's" – prevent and prepare and discuss how SOF will be critical to both of those core priorities.

So what kind of conflicts are we trying to prepare for and prevent?

Our Evolving Security Challenges

We live in a time of sweeping global change. New actors, good and bad, have the power to affect our national security like never before. The challenges we face—nuclear proliferation, global pandemics, climate change, transnational criminal organizations, and terrorism—are more complex than ever. We also have a larger threat from non-state actors than we could have ever expected – they are less predictable than traditional state actors and increasingly empowered. Some transnational criminal organizations are becoming equally destabilizing to the countries in which they operate.

This array of challenges means that future conflict will look more like the fights we are in today than the fights we used to like to

prepare for. Like Afghanistan and Iraq, they will be complex and population-centric. They will require, as both of the conference's award winning papers made clear, savvy, culturally aware, fighters as well as a 21st century approach to intel. They will require delicate approaches to transitioning to peace – may or may not be the same as a handoff to civilian agencies or the host nation. The lessons we have learned over the last 10 years must not be forgotten.

These complexities are compounded, as Admiral Mullen also discussed, by an emerging period of fiscal constraint for our federal government. Therefore, we must ask “what can we do smarter, more effectively, and more efficiently while still meeting our defense priorities to protect the American people?”

As this community well knows, this type of conflict requires constant vigilance and an increased understanding of the context in which we operate. In our approach, we must emphasize unity of effort with the entire US government and beyond. This concept is something that the SOF community is familiar with, and that this community has refined with different interagency stakeholders at different times. I will come back to the idea of interagency (3D) coordination, but let me highlight the fact that dealing with increasingly savvy adversaries in fighting and preventing conflict will require more than just **coordination** with our interagency partners. Coordination and planning is necessary, but not sufficient. We need insight and knowledge.

Just as SOF studied and developed concepts for UW, FID, and COIN, so this community will need to put their brains around these new challenges. For instance, the nexus between crime and security is a key challenge. Our bureaucratic structures and

our cultural pre-disposition to bifurcate military power from law enforcement, has created a security gap – one that is being exploited by insurgents in the field as well as increasingly sophisticated transnational drug cartels and traffickers regionally, and on a global scale. We need to understand better how these bad guys operate and develop game-changing approaches to counter them. Yes, this will be a whole of government effort, but it begins with the hard intellectual work. [social science and case studies as well as intel]

So, unity of effort in a 3D context will require new thinking and serious ‘brain power’ in order to truly understand the best means for collaboration. The military need not become experts in diplomacy and development – but neither can they be ignorant of the basic tenets of these other two “D’s”. In order to be effective, we must know enough to know what we don’t know – and know enough to know when doing nothing may actually be better than doing your part.

Let me say a few words about the Diplomacy and Development and how it applies to prevention.

The other two D’s:

The thinking of USAID and State Department leadership continues to evolve.

The Secretary of State has pledged that her department will be the spearhead for civilian agencies in working in a “more unified, more focused, and more efficient” manner. She is championing the idea of the importance of “civilian power.” As we transition in Afghanistan and Iraq, this is an important theme. These transitions mean we in DoD will have to determine down to the

tactical level, what “support” to civilian power means. Work is ongoing and evolving on this. Primary step is to ensure we have a shared understanding of the problem and tasks at hand.

A few months ago, USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah addressed a group of national security professionals at the National Defense University. He said:

“Much of the divide that exists between development practitioners and members of the military occurs not because of a difference in philosophy or in goals, but because of a difference in perceptions.”

He highlighted the evolving discipline and profession of development and made it clear that there are no set answers. The development community has learned a lot in the past 2 decades as well – especially about the nexus between development/economics and conflict. He highlights how theories and approaches have evolved and the current focus on: good governance; monitoring and evaluation (evidenced based approaches); the importance of context; and the need for approaches that are sustainable.

Still there are debates in this field about whether and in what circumstances outside aid and intervention could actually make things worse. [example – flooding a place with money when the economy can’t handle the influx of cash; over-paying locals; building unsustainable schools; empowering wrong actors with other projects; etc] All can have perverse economic effects that can also sometimes catalyze conflict.

Similarly, there are instances from a whole of government perspectives when we need to know what NOT to do.

Let me move onto the idea of prevention to explain what this mean for us.

Preventing Conflict

While the QDR prioritizes the importance of winning the fights we are currently in (prevail), it also clearly emphasizes prevention. As we come down from Afghanistan and Iraq, we will be able to devote more resources to preventing conflict. This is important, since the flip side of prevention is sustainable peace – ensuring that the gains we make in our current fights are sustainable by the host nations we have been assisting. Both of these types of tasks – sustainment and prevention - will require similar approaches, intellectually and with respect to interagency coordination – all the way to the tactical level.

Our whole of government approach to Colombia is an excellent case to examine. We have been working with the Colombians for decades on countering narcotics because we know the instability that accompanies the drug trade fosters a dangerous mix of trafficking and other illegal activities that impacts U.S. security.

This was not solely a military campaign. USAID, in partnership with the Colombian government, has launched several successful programs aimed at directing farmers away from coca cultivation. We've seen coca cultivation plummet by as much as 85% since 2005, with minimal replanting. This is of course in addition to the significant military assistance we've provided to Colombia. Stability and clam has come to villages across the country.

The importance of a dedicated and active host nation cannot be dismissed. While the US's Plan Colombia is probably a “best case” for our own efforts in demonstrating how to apply all

elements of power, collaboratively and (importantly) with the support of Congress, to enable multi-year funding; the Colombians were clearly and rightly in the lead. Now, as they look to not only sustain the peace they have won, but also to rebuild the economic foundations of their society, we have a different type of partnership with them.

Assisting a country facing internal conflicts (SFA 1.0) might require different skills and approaches than SFA 2.0, which would be aimed at helping partners help others. If we can enable stronger regional partners to lead and to enable others in their neighborhoods, we might just work ourselves out of these jobs. SOF can play a key role here in line with our national security strategy, which emphasizes the role the US plays in catalyzing multilateral activity toward shared problems.

Warning:

As we increasingly focus on preventing conflict, we should pause to consider the **promise and peril** of outside assistance – from our security role, similar to USAID’s challenges.

The fundamental challenge will be to ensure that the 3 legs of the 3D stool are balanced. Just as misapplied economic aid can have perverse effects, so is history filled with examples of how well trained and educated militaries can become sources of instability or lead coups in weak states. Without the balancing force of a stable and competent government or economy, focusing on “our part” in the security sector might have a negative effect.

At the tactical level, you can appreciate this. Let’s say your unit is tasked to spend some CERP money to build a road or a school.

Then your state or USAID partner comes to you and says that the host nation is not on board with those projects and are unable to work on them. Thus, having an outside military complete the projects might actually have the opposite effect as it will make the government look ineffective and undermine its legitimacy -- and the government's legitimacy is the ultimate objective to create lasting stability. As T.E. Lawrence said of his partners: “ **Better** the Arabs **do** it tolerably **than** you **do** it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help **them**, not to win it for **them**.” This applies at the strategic and operational level as well.

...in sum: “Do No Harm...”

In a way, we need to incorporate the adage of the medical community and “first, do no harm.” By “do no harm” I do not mean that you stop doing what you do so well; but that you begin by understanding that actions can have repercussions that we may not intend, and those actions fit together within the larger context of U.S. foreign policy interests. In some cases it might just, as with the USAID example, it might be that doing nothing rather than doing your part well is the better course of action.

With that in mind, let me finish by talking about how I think planning fits into this:

TCP's as a start point –

One way to improve our ability to synchronize efforts for prevention is to focus on steady state, whole of government planning.

One of the things that the Secretary has required of the combatant commands, and a key area of my portfolio, is the

theater campaign plan, or TCP. These plans are meant to operationalize COCOM strategies and link regional near term and mid-range goals to their contingency plan requirements and their country engagement plans. Further, these plans require annual assessment to inform us whether we are expending resources in a way that is helpful. So, if done right, the TCP's can provide the backbone for this interagency/WoG approach.

We are making some progress here. As part of the State Department's QDDR, State and USAID are committed to participating in this theater campaign planning process to synchronize efforts across the interagency. We have stood up a 3D working group focused on planning, and taken on this steady state issue as our first task. We are looking at best practices in the current operations – where IA coordination has had some success – to see what might work at the strategic and operational levels for prevention planning.

Many of the contributing factors in TCP development, such as economic development and rule of law, are beyond DoD's scope and require interagency involvement. Linking the TCPs to State and USAID steady state processes and the country level and up is a grand undertaking, requiring significant 'brain power.' It will link in SOF at the strategic and operational levels as these plans are fully fleshed out and put into motion. We are on the right track here, but it will be an evolving process to get this right, and I think it will take constant fine-tuning with our interagency partners.

Within these plans SOF could be asked to play in a variety of traditional Security Force Assistance Roles, with the added task of developing goals that track with those of development experts

who operate in the same environment, and who may have greater depth of knowledge than the military.

This means we will all be placing increased reliance on the country team—an emphasis already highlighted by the Secretary of State in the QDDR. Our interagency counterparts –specifically State and USAID --do not plan in the same manner as we do in Defense, but they do have their own planning mechanisms and resource allocation processes focused on the country level, which is an area where the defense community should seek to better educate themselves so we can synch objectives at the start.

“So... What’s Next...”

As ADM Olson commented at the opening of this symposium, we also need to take the time to understand the potential future environment -- this includes giving serious thought to what SOF might be called upon to do, and how SOF can help our nation to prevent conflict as well as prevail against whatever national security challenges lie ahead.

The essence of what has made SOF such a valuable asset to our military over the past twenty years remains valid to this very day and is known to you all as the “five Special Operations Forces Truths”:

1. Humans are more important than hardware.
2. Quality is better than quantity.
3. Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.
4. Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.
5. Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.

This first and last of these truths – “humans are more important than hardware” and “..special operations require non-SOF assistance” -- will be more important as the 3Ds work toward a whole-of-government approach.

Conclusion

The clarity and the perspective of State and USAID will be particularly important in the area of transition from U.S. military to civilian-led activities abroad (such as Iraq). The differences in the understanding of roles and responsibilities that serve as the foundation for terms of art such as “military support to diplomacy” and “support to development” will be thoroughly examined – and tested. This experience will provide indicators of where the future may be taking SOF and how the defense community will have to adapt in years to come. Some may have expectations of what it means to ‘transition’ certain missions to “civilian lead” which we know realistically does not mean the military exits altogether or is absent – they will continue in a supporting role.

As we move into planning for prevention activities, SOF can help shape this discourse by giving careful thought as to where they are value-added in the 3D environment given their specialized skills sets and talent for bridging gaps among certain populations and communities. I ask that you start by asking **yourselves “what don’t we know about the art of diplomacy and development?”** What unintended outcomes might we be overlooking? Only through this heavy thinking is where SOF - and indeed the USG – will succeed.

Thank you again for having me here to address you today. I’d be happy to take a few questions as time allows.