

The United States Humanitarian Demining Program: Civil-military Relations in Humanitarian Demining

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

The United States Humanitarian Demining Program: Civil-military Relations in Humanitarian Demining, by MAJ Paul Stelzer, 62 pages.

Civil-military relations are a result of the simultaneous presence of military, governmental, and humanitarian organizations on a common battlefield. At its heart, the problem in civil-military relations is synchronizing three fundamentally different groups not only to coexist, but to work together with complementary effects. Created in 1993, the US Humanitarian Demining Program is a collaboration between the US Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the US Agency for International Development establishing support to an international response to the global threat of landmines.

The changing security environment following the end of the Cold War increased military commitment to humanitarian operations and exacerbated the challenge when coupled with a downsizing of the United States military capability. The problem for the US military is addressing the persistent global threat of landmines during a time of increasing military commitments and decreasing military resources.

Multiple theories of civil-military relations allow a critical analysis of the Humanitarian Demining Program in cases in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Perceptions from the people, government, and military add greater depth to the understanding of tensions in civil-military relations. This understanding leads to the conclusion that focusing on civil-military relations allows the Department of Defense to leverage interorganizational capabilities to mitigate increasing military requirements in times of decreasing resources while increasing the effectiveness of the HDP.

Contents

Acronyms	v
Figures	vi
Introduction	1
Section I: Overview of the Humanitarian Demining Program	4
Historical Context.....	4
The Humanitarian Demining Program	8
Theoretical Framework for Analysis.....	12
The Problem with the Humanitarian Demining Program.....	17
The HDP Through the Lens of the People	17
The HDP Through the Lens of the Government	19
The HDP Through the Lens of the Military	21
Section II: Case Studies in Afghanistan and Kosovo	25
Demining in Afghanistan	25
Background Information	25
Afghan Mine Action Through the Lens of the People	26
Afghan Mine Action Through the Lens of the Government	29
Afghan Mine Action Through the Lens of the Military	32
Demining in Kosovo	36
Background Information	37
Kosovo Mine Action Through the Lens of the People.....	37
Kosovo Mine Action Through the Lens of the Government.....	38
Kosovo Mine Action Through the Lens of the Military.....	39
Section III: Recommendations/Conclusions	43
Recommendations	43
Focus on Developing Mine Action Centers and Doctrine.....	43
Develop a Strategic Humanitarian Demining Plan for Actors to Execute	45
Conduct Demining Training.....	46
Conclusions	48

Acronyms

APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CMOC	Civil-military Operations Center
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
HDP	Humanitarian Demining Program
HD R&D	Humanitarian Demining Research and Development
HDTC	Humanitarian Demining Training Center
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
KFOR	Kosovo Stabilization Force
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan
NGO	non-governmental organization
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	US Agency for International Development

Figures

Figure 1. Visions, Goals, and Objectives of the Humanitarian Demining Program.....	9
Figure 2. Theories of Civil-military Relations.....	16
Figure 3. Perceptions of the Humanitarian Demining Program.....	23
Figure 4. Civil-military Relations in the HDP in Afghanistan.....	35
Figure 5. Civil-military Relations in the HDP in Kosovo.....	41

Introduction

Earlier this year, a 10-year-old boy was collecting scrap metal...when he stepped on a land mine, which killed him instantly. The mine was planted during a war of which the boy had no memory. Days later, a man met a similar fate only a few miles away. He had left home to gather firewood. Land mines and other unexploded ordnance continue to endanger civilians in more than 60 countries. Decades after soldiers have laid down their weapons and leaders have made peace, these grim legacies of war kill and maim local populations. For more than two decades, the United States has been at the forefront of international efforts to remove these deadly devices and to address the humanitarian effects that these weapons can have on civilian populations.¹

-John Kerry, 68th US Secretary of State

The use of landmines² on the modern battlefield has complicated winning the peace much more than winning the war. Created as a cheap response to technical overmatch, mines can effectively deny access to land but also indiscriminately kill whatever crosses into their path. Because these “dumb” killers remain lethal long after the cessation of hostilities, they continue to kill innocent civilians, hinder economic growth, and prevent the local populace from fully recovering from war, landmines are of great concern to more than just the military. The increasing liberalization of international relations has given humanitarian concerns greater influence on governmental actions before, during, and after war. Because the problem of clearing landmines transcends pure military responsibility, the inclusion of humanitarian demining has been codified in an expanding body of international law, resulting in increased requirements for military coordination with non-governmental organizations.

Because of growing humanitarian demands both in war and the subsequent peace, the dominant theory of civil-military relations in the United States, as proposed by Samuel Huntington, has proven to be less adequate in defining appropriate responses to the complexities

¹ John Kerry, “Clear Land Mines Off the Earth,” *DIPNOTE US Department of State Official Blog*, December 8, 2014, accessed March 8, 2015, <http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2014/12/08/clear-land-mines-earth>.

² Though typically referred to as “land mine” in the United States and within US military doctrine, this paper uses the spelling commonly associated with international law, landmine.

of the modern battlefield and the longer-term consequences of war. In the case of the landmine problem, the US government's 'Huntington-esque' response was the establishment of the Humanitarian Demining Program (HDP) in 1993. The US intended the HDP to create an efficient solution to the landmine problem, by establishing interagency collaboration between the Department of State (DOS), Department of Defense (DOD), and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). DOD's specific role was to develop indigenous landmine clearance capability by training local populations in mine affected countries. The DOD, however, has been limited in its ability to effectively participate in the program because the policy was not written in such a way as to reconcile conflicting authorities, roles, and interests between the DOD and other agencies.

To better understand why the HDP has generally been ineffective to date, this study examines the development of the program from the perspective of civil-military relations, using the framework of people, government, and military inspired by Carl von Clausewitz. The program's pursuit of policy goals is also examined using Samuel Huntington's institutional model, which promoted objective control of the military by civilian authorities. Case studies in Afghanistan and Kosovo illustrate how civil-military relationships have either contributed to, or detracted from the effectiveness of the HDP. Afghanistan has the oldest and largest humanitarian demining program in the world. Tensions between the military and the government have caused the military to distance itself from humanitarian demining and to rely instead on commercial demining, both of which conflict with the policy goals of the HDP. Kosovo has a nationalized demining program due in large part to the successful integration of the military, governmental, and non-governmental organizations into a national demining program while simultaneously building local national capacity. In both scenarios, the effectiveness of civil-military relations directly contributed to the success or failure of the HDP.

The purpose of this study is not to illuminate the need for increased humanitarian demining in military operations, but to use the HDP to illustrate the importance of strengthening relations between the military and civilians. Developing a strategic demining plan, conducting demining training, and developing demining doctrine are ways of improving military competencies in those areas. More importantly, they can improve the integration of the military into the broader civilian aspects of winning a sustainable peace, of which humanitarian demining is an important part. *Focusing on fostering good civil-military relations allows the DOD to leverage interorganizational capabilities to effectively mitigate increasing military requirements in times of decreasing resources while increasing the effectiveness of the HDP.*

Section I: Overview of the Humanitarian Demining Program

Historical Context

The HDP was created in the context of the changing security environment following the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought a perceived end to military competition which allowed the US government to concentrate on the so-called “peace dividend,”³ that is, the economic benefit that countries expected to gain from decreasing military spending to create opportunities for internal programs, humanitarian projects and foreign aid.⁴ With the peace dividend in mind, the government increasingly shifted the role of the military towards stability operations, which included preventative diplomacy, humanitarian aid, and post-conflict reconstruction.⁵ Adding to the complexity of the situation, the increasing focus on non-combat missions created space for increased influence by interagency groups along with international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) representing the people.⁶ Described by some as “war amongst the people”, modern military conflicts have increasingly demonstrated a trend of intrastate conflict rather than interstate.⁷ Examples of governmental involvement in Bosnia and Somalia supported this shift, but showed that landmines were an obstacle to achieving stability in developing states.⁸ The changing security environment shifted the role of the military to address the landmine challenge.

³ Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (New York: Vintage Books, 2007), 270.

⁴ Andrew Marshall, “What Happened to the Peace Dividend? The End of the Cold War Cost Thousands of Jobs.” *Independent*, 3 January 1993, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/what-happened-to-the-peace-dividend-the-end-of-the-cold-war-cost-thousands-of-jobs-andrew-marshall-looks-at-how-the-world-squandered-an-opportunity-1476221.html>.

⁵ Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, eds., *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (Milton Park Abingdon Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 5.

⁶ Paris and Sisk, *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding*, 55.

⁷ Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 269.

⁸ “The Issues: Landmines,” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, accessed October 27, 2014, <http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/The-Issues/Landmines>.

Landmines are a source of multiple problems both inside and outside the conduct of war. The history of landmines began in ancient Roman times, but World War II marked the point where landmines resemble the threat we recognize today.⁹ In war, defending armies used mines to mitigate the lethality of tanks of attacking armies by denying land and controlling the attacker's approach. Adding another layer of lethality and complexity, armies used anti personnel mines to stop the removal of anti tank mines. Outside the conduct of war, problems arose when armies left mines on the battlefield without marking minefields or providing any record of their locations. Conflicts since World War II have continually expanded the global threat by leaving behind millions of landmines from independence wars, civil wars, rebel insurgencies, and forgotten international conflicts of the cold war era. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that landmines killed or maimed approximately 26,000 civilians every year throughout the early 1990s.¹⁰ Over time, the problems posed by landmines achieved such levels as to demand international attention.

In response to the global landmine threat, humanitarian actors, led by groups like the ICRC, formed powerful NGOs to represent the needs of the people. Initially, these humanitarian actors viewed landmines as a military problem but necessity caused them to incorporate military expertise within the humanitarian aims of impartial relief of human suffering. The result was 'humanitarian demining', a new term which involves the removal of emplaced mines and provides information and education activities aimed at preventing injuries to the civilian populace. The term 'demining' distinguished the humanitarian intent from the military term 'breaching', whose scope is limited to clearing paths through minefields to attain military

⁹ Mike Croll, *The History of Landmines* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1998), 52.

¹⁰ Integrated Regional Information Networks, "Humanitarian Mine Clearance, and the Growth of the Mine Action Sector," *IRIN Web Special on Humanitarian Mine Action*, November 2004, 1, accessed March 3, 2015, <http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/in-depth/humanitarian-mine-action-irin-in-depth.pdf>.

objectives.¹¹ Gradually, humanitarian relief agencies, exceeding 1,400 different groups in over 90 countries, gained enough interest to garner international attention with the formation of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1992.¹² For example, President Clinton announced that the United States would “lead a global effort” to ban mines while Princess Diana spoke out for an international ban on landmines after a visit to Angola with the International Committee of the Red Cross.¹³¹⁴ The United Nations responded by forming the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in October 1997.¹⁵ The UNMAS is responsible for coordinating all aspects of mine action within the United Nations construct and ensures an effective and proactive response to landmine contamination. By 2003, the UNMAS continued to adapt by supporting 25 mine action centers across the world to develop indigenous capacities to deal with the landmine problem.¹⁶ The growing influence of NGOs representing basic human needs illustrate how the passions of the people drew international attention.

What emerged from the international clamor on landmines was a number of international humanitarian and disarmament laws that demonstrate the power of the people in influencing the government and military. International humanitarian law sought to restrict the conduct of warfare to protect combatants from unnecessary suffering and civilians from the risk from military operations, while disarmament laws focused on the regulation or elimination of certain weapons

¹¹ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, *Guide to Mine Action 2014*, 5th ed. (Geneva: GICHD, 2014), 28.

¹² Humanitarian Demining Training Center, *Mobile Training Team HMA Briefing* (Fort Leonard Wood: HDTC, 2013).

¹³ International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “United States Mine Ban Policy,” *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, November 30, 2014, accessed March 16, 2015, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3973#_ftn12.

¹⁴ “Princess Diana Sparks Landmines Row,” *BBC News*, 15 January 1997, accessed March 16, 2015, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/15/newsid_2530000/2530603.stm.

¹⁵ Integrated Regional Information Networks, “Humanitarian Mine Clearance”.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

of war.¹⁷ The two laws that govern humanitarian demining are the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC). The CCW represents the shift from traditional disarmament to humanitarian disarmament. In 1980, the CCW regulated warfare to relieve unnecessary suffering to combatants by limiting weapons with fragments not detectable by X-Ray, booby traps, and incendiary weapons.¹⁸ The amendment of the CCW in 1996 included provisions to prevent states from using weapons indiscriminately or target civilians marked a shift in international law towards humanitarian interests.¹⁹ Evolving views of warfare with respect to civilian casualties, and more specifically, concerns over civilian casualties in Kosovo, caused lawmakers to amend the CCW again in 2003 to address the dangers of cluster munitions.²⁰ The 1997 APMBC, also known as the Ottawa Treaty, specifically prohibited the use of antipersonnel landmines in order to protect civilians.²¹ The APMBC required signatories to cease the production, stockpiling, trade and use of antipersonnel landmines; to mark all minefields on their territories within four years; and to clear all minefields

¹⁷ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, *Guide to Mine Action*, 57.

¹⁸ United Nations, “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” (convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, New York, 10 October 1980), accessed March 14, 2015, [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/51609D467F95DD5EC12571DE00602AED/\\$file/CONVENTION.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/51609D467F95DD5EC12571DE00602AED/$file/CONVENTION.pdf).

¹⁹ United Nations, “Protocol On Prohibitions or Restrictions On the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices” (convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 3 May 1996), accessed March 14, 2015, [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/8B3DCD52D33DCC59C12571DE005D8A28/\\$file/AMENDED+PROTOCOL+II.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8B3DCD52D33DCC59C12571DE005D8A28/$file/AMENDED+PROTOCOL+II.pdf).

²⁰ United Nations, “Protocol On Explosive Remnants of War” (convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol V, Geneva, November 2003), accessed March 14, 2015, [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/8B3DCD52D33DCC59C12571DE005D8A28/\\$file/AMENDED+PROTOCOL+V.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/8B3DCD52D33DCC59C12571DE005D8A28/$file/AMENDED+PROTOCOL+V.pdf).

²¹ United Nations, “Convention On the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction” (protocol on Ban of Anti-Personnel Landmines, Ottawa, Canada, 5 December 1997), accessed March 14, 2015, http://www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/text_status/Ottawa_Convention_English.pdf.

within 10 years of accession to the treaty.²² To date 162 countries, or 80% of the world's nations, signed the treaty.²³ While the US is not a signatory of the APMBC because of the widespread use of mines along Korea's Demilitarized Zone, the US has increased its adherence to the convention--as demonstrated by the September 2014 announcement that the US will cease using antipersonnel landmines outside of Korea.²⁴ The emergence of restrictions on the use and clearance of landmines in international law marked a shift towards humanitarian interests and created obligations for a shared response between the government, the military, and the people.²⁵

The Humanitarian Demining Program

Adapting to the international focus on landmines, the US Government created the HDP in 1993, in order to "relieve suffering from the adverse effects of landmines while promoting US interests".²⁶ Multiple actors participated in the HDP as an interagency collaboration between the DOS, the DOD and the USAID.²⁷ Largely described as a smart power, the HDP combines the

²² United Nations, "Convention On Anti-Personnel Mines".

²³ Robert Keeley, *Understanding Landmines and Mine Action* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology., 2003), accessed December 20, 2014, <http://web.mit.edu/demining/assignments/understanding-landmines.pdf>.

²⁴ Jen Psaki, "US Landmine Policy," US Department of State, September 23, 2014, accessed October 20, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/09/231995.htm>.

²⁵ Michael Polkinghorne and James Cockayne, "Dealing with the Risks and Responsibilities of Landmines and Their Clearance," *Fordham International Law Journal* 25, no. 5 (2001): 1189.

²⁶ The Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, *US Government Interagency Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan* (Washington DC: Department of Defense and Department of State, 1996), Chapter 2, Page 1.

²⁷ "To Walk the Earth in Safety," US Department of State, accessed October 20, 2014, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/index.htm>.

hard power of military expertise with the soft power influence of humanitarian assistance.²⁸

Figure 1 lists the visions, goals, and objectives of the HDP.

VISION, GOALS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAM
VISION —Relieve suffering from the adverse effects of landmines while promoting U.S. interests.
GOAL 1 —Promote human welfare through mine awareness and training. <ul style="list-style-type: none">•Objective 1: Reduce civilian casualties.•Objective 2: Allow refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes and pursue lives free from fear of landmines.•Objective 3: Encourage international efforts to assist in medical infrastructure development programs.
GOAL 2 —Promote U.S. foreign policy, security, and economic interests. <ul style="list-style-type: none">•Objective 1: Enhance the host country's stability.•Objective 2: Establish sustainable indigenous demining programs.•Objective 3: Encourage international cooperation and participation.

Figure 1. Visions, Goals, and Objectives of the Humanitarian Demining Program

Source: The Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, *US Government Interagency Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan* (Washington DC: Department of Defense and Department of State, 1996), Chapter 2, Pages 1-3.

Guided by the visions, goals and objectives of the HDP, the government created a framework for cooperation between existing civilian and military organizations, establishing unique roles for each in implementation. The role of the DOS was to coordinate US humanitarian demining programs worldwide while the USAID promoted sustainable development by coordinating with NGOs and providing humanitarian services in post-conflict situations.²⁹ The DOD's role was to conduct "train-the-trainer" programs of instruction designed to develop

²⁸ Joseph Nye Jr., *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 23. Hard power is the use of force, payment, and some agenda setting while soft power is the ability to affect others through co-optive means to obtain preferred outcomes. Smart power is the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategies.

²⁹ US Department of State, "Overview of US Humanitarian Demining Program," US Department of State, September, 2002, accessed March 16, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2002/14867.htm>.

indigenous mine removal capabilities for nations plagued by landmines.³⁰ Under HDP, help would begin when a state requested demining assistance through the US embassy to the DOS. The HDP's supporting organizations would first conduct an in-country evaluation and determine whether to approve the request. If approved, the HDP would design a demining/land mine education program to meet the requesting nation's needs.³¹ This approach served as the foundation for building the HDP to meet the demand emerging from the growing focus on the global landmine threat.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States sought ways to improve its own response to the landmine problem by adjusting the military's role in implementing policies designed to stop American contributions to the sheer numbers of landmines present in the world and to expand humanitarian demining efforts.³² Even before the establishment of the HDP, the US ceased its own use of antipersonnel landmines in 1991 and stopped the export of them in 1992. President Clinton announced a policy in 1996 to increase the level of US assistance to nations suffering from landmines, and this announcement required additional changes to DOD's role in the HDP. Following the president's statement, the US stopped all production of antipersonnel landmines in 1997.³³ The Secretary of Defense, William Perry, directed research of alternatives to antipersonnel landmines and modifications to war plans and doctrine to reduce reliance on antipersonnel landmines.³⁴ To expand humanitarian demining, Congress directed that the

³⁰ Joint Staff, *Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action* (Washington DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), 1.

³¹ Nina M. Serafino, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress*, CRS Report RL34639 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2008), 46.

³² The Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, *Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan*, Appendix F, Page 5.

³³ Patrick Leahy, "The Way Forward On Anti-Personnel Landmines" (lecture, Congress, Washington DC, May 18, 2010).

³⁴ The Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, *Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan*, Appendix F, Page 5.

Secretary of Defense establish a program to educate, train, and advise other nations on the establishment of humanitarian demining programs, under the authority of Title 10 United States Code Section 407.³⁵ In order to ensure that DOD remained in an advisory role, Congress further directed that “no member of the US armed forces participating in this program engages in the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines unless...supporting a United States military operation.”³⁶ This indirect approach to humanitarian demining protected DOD from escalating requirements, but also served as a constraint which limited the extent of military participation. Nonetheless, DOD’s expanded role to meet the president’s policy required DOD to develop their own organizations.

What emerged from the military’s expansion of humanitarian demining efforts were the Humanitarian Demining Training Center (HDTC) and the Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (HD R&D), both established in 1996. The HDTC located at Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri is the single location to train US military forces for humanitarian missions in mine-affected countries throughout the world. Its mission is to “train US military personnel in accordance with International Mine Action Standards to assist mine-affected countries in establishing and building a self-sustained, indigenous HMA capacity.”³⁷ With this train-the-trainer approach, the HDTC leverages multidisciplinary, multinational, and contractor expertise to train 18 classes a year of predominantly special forces soldiers on humanitarian demining.³⁸ The DOD manages the HD R&D Program to develop technology that counters humanitarian demining challenges, by using commercial, mature, and military technology to “increase the

³⁵ Serafino, *The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance*, 46.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 47.

³⁷ US Department of Defense, “The US Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Training Center”, accessed October 20, 2014, <http://www.wood.army.mil/hdtdc/default.html>.

³⁸ Steve Grzyb, “The US Army Leads in Humanitarian Demining Training at Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri,” *The DISAM Journal* (Winter 2001): 25.

efficiency and enhance the safety of deminers”.³⁹ The benefits of this second program are twofold: the research contributes to solving problems in humanitarian demining while the military advances research in countermine technology. The emergence of DOD programs to address the increasing influence of humanitarian actors constituted a significant shift in the role of the military.

The shift in the role of the military towards humanitarian efforts created unintended challenges for the military. This changing role followed a trend in international responses around the world and suggested increasing military requirements, as demonstrated by eight major United Nations deployments between 1989 and 1993.⁴⁰ However, the recent downturn in the global economy and a population weary of the protracted so-called war on terror has forced a downsizing of many Western militaries, including the United States. The problem, then, for the US military is addressing the global threat of landmines during a time of increasing military commitments and decreasing military resources. To solve this problem, the military needs to leverage the expertise of civilian organizations, which underscores the importance of understanding and promoting healthy civil-military relations.

Theoretical Framework for Analysis

Before moving into analysis of the HDP, it is useful to define the phenomenon of interest: civil-military relations. Military doctrine does not specifically define civil-military relations, but defines ‘interorganizational coordination’ as the interaction that occurs among elements of the DOD; engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces

³⁹ The United States Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program, “Research and Development Program Overview,” accessed March 18, 2015, http://www.humanitarian-demining.org/2010Design/Program_Overview.asp.

⁴⁰ Paris and Sisk, *Dilemmas*, 5.

and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; NGOs; and the private sector.⁴¹ For the purposes of this analysis of the HDP, civil-military relations is defined as the interaction of the military with both the government and the people, in which *the government* is meant to include engaged USG agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; and intergovernmental organizations. *The people*, is meant to include NGOs, the private sector, and members of the local population. This framework suggests three perspectives which require analysis to understand civil-military relations.

The first perspective in understanding civil-military relations is the relationship between the military and the government. The most common classical theory of civilian control of the military is based on Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. Written in 1957, Huntington focuses his theory on civil-military relations as an explanation to military effectiveness.

According to Huntington, the tension between the soldier and statesman is rooted in the essence of professionalism. Military professionals and political leaders focus their efforts in distinct areas of expertise; professionalism in one area precludes competence in the other. For Huntington, the optimal means of control over the military—termed objective civilian control—is to separate the military from the political system and allow the military to focus solely on developing expertise in the profession of arms. For this reason, Huntington's ideas are often described as a 'separatist theory.'⁴² The alternative to objective civilian control is subjective civil control, which involves placing legal and institutional restrictions on the military's autonomy while the military is closely integrated with and participates in the political and social system.⁴³ Many recent works on civil-military relations build on Huntington's model. For example, Peter Feaver's use of the principal-

⁴¹ Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 2011), x.

⁴² Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), 81.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 84.

agent framework explains that the military ‘shirks’ or purposefully fails to diligently execute what the civilian asks when the military preference diverges from the civilian preference.⁴⁴ Still, Huntington’s model is the foundation of current understanding of civilian control of the military and provides one perspective for understanding the relationship between the military and the government.⁴⁵

The second perspective in understanding civil-military relations is the relationship between the military and the people. While there are multiple theories to explain civilian control of the military, there are few that explain the military’s relationship with the people. Morris Janowitz’s *The Professional Soldier* overlaps with Huntington’s model of civilian control of the military but then expands upon the idea of military interaction with the civilian populace. Written in 1964, Janowitz focuses on how broader societal trends manifest themselves in the military and that an apolitical military is an unrealistic goal.⁴⁶ Earning the title ‘convergence theory’, Janowitz maintains that the military will remain a distinct group, but predicts the integration of civilian values into the military.⁴⁷ Known as the father of military sociology, Janowitz’s model provides the perspective on understanding the relationship between the military and the people.⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Harvard University Press, 2005), 192.

⁴⁵ There are numerous other models for civilian control of the military. Michael Desch’s work, in *Civilian Control of the Military*, explains the strength of civil military relations as a function of internal and external threat faced by a society. Deborah Avant’s work in “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the US Military is Averse to Responding to post-Cold War Low-Level Threats”, explains the military’s reluctance to commit to small-scale contingencies as a function of disagreement within the ‘principle’, in the case of a disagreement between the Congress and the President.

⁴⁶ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 7-16.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 420.

⁴⁸ The debate over the gap between the people and the military continues. One recent work is *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*. This book is a collection of works from dozens of authors that attempt to determine the source of the gap between the people and the military.

The third perspective in understanding civil-military relations is the tripartite interrelationship between the military, the government and the people. Classical military theory offers a framework of people, government, and military. Known as the ‘secondary trinity’, the theory is a derivative of the work of Carl von Clausewitz and suggests that policy must maintain a balance between the interests of the people, government, and military.⁴⁹ More recently, Rebecca Schiff introduces the theory of ‘concordance’ which “argues for agreement between the military, the political elites, and the citizenry with respect to four indicators that are relevant to determining the role and function of the armed forces in society: (1) social composition of the officer corps, (2) political decision-making process, (3) recruitment method, and (4) military style.”⁵⁰ Concordance theory is an alternative to the separatist theory by explaining certain conditions where the people, government, and military can act together for mutual benefit. Building on this theory, Schiff offers the idea of targeted partnerships which forms a temporary agreement setting aside predefined roles to customize an appropriate approach for a specific objective.⁵¹ Schiff’s model provides the perspective on understanding the relationship between the military, government and the people.

⁴⁹ Christopher Bassford, “Teaching the Clausewitzian Trinity,” The Clausewitz Homepage, January 3, 2003, accessed April 16, 2015, <http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm>; Carl von Clausewitz, trans., *On War*, Indexed., ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.

⁵⁰ Rebecca Schiff, “Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy,” *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no. 2 (April 2012): 318-39, 319.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 320.




Figure 2. Theories of Civil-military Relations

Source: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), 81; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 7-16; Rebecca Schiff, "Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no. 2 (April 2012): 318-39, 319.

Recognition of multiple perspectives according to the framework of the people, government and military gives a greater understanding of civil-military relations. Theories explain these perspectives and are essential to understanding the causes and effects of tensions in civil-military relations. Successful civil-military relations must encompass civilian control of the military as well as military interaction with civilians on the battlefield. Each of these relationships, as well as the combined effects of them, impacts the effectiveness of the military in the HDP.

The Problem with the Humanitarian Demining Program

The committee [on armed services] remains concerned that the...efforts of the Department of Defense are potentially out of balance with larger US Government Humanitarian Mine Action and security force assistance goals.⁵²

-House Report 113-102, 113th Congress (2013-2014)

Analyzing the HDP through a theoretical perspective can help to explain why the military appears out of balance with the goals of the HDP. The people view the landmine threat as a source of mistrust in a social contract with the government and the inadequacy of the military to clear the remnants of war. The government views landmines as part of a new trend in the security environment requiring a coordinated effort from between DOD, USAID, and DOS. The military views humanitarian demining as a threat to their professionalism. Examining the HDP through the lenses of the people, government, and military demonstrates why the failure of civil-military relations prevented the DOD from being in balance with the larger goals of the HDP.

The HDP Through the Lens of the People

From the perspective of the people, the HDP represents an attempt at the convergence theory of civil-military relations. Since the government derives its power from the people for upholding a social contract, the government risks instability in allowing the threat of mines to continue.⁵³ The problem for the people is that countries most affected by landmines often have new, rejuvenated, or dysfunctional governmental systems as the result of conflict. These states lack the capacity to uphold the obligation to protect the welfare of its citizens for a number of reasons, such as the absence of an army, lack of funding, or lack of interest.⁵⁴ Whatever the reason, a lack of action by the government means that people must then turn to the military for

⁵² House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, 113th Cong., 1st sess., 2013, H. Rep. 102, 225.

⁵³ John Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government", para 124.

⁵⁴ Polkinghorne and Cockayne, "Dealing with the Risks", 1195.

relief from the dangers of landmines. Likewise, policies like the HDP put the military in the position to relive this suffering by deliberately aligning interests of the people—the populace, NGOs, and the private sector—with those of the military.

These aligned interests are not without their own tensions. One such tension is the difference in time horizons between the military and the people. Military organizations train to be mission-oriented and to complete missions as quickly and efficiently as possible while NGOs or organizations such as DOS and USAID work to establish a long-term approach to creating a national mine action program. The rapid turnover rate of military teaching assistants—typically six months—reinforces perceptions of the military’s commitment as too short to make an effective contribution to the program.⁵⁵ The principles that guide minefield clearance are another tension. The military conducts humanitarian demining in obedience to governmental leaders to promote state interests whereas humanitarian actors follow the four principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence when conducting operations.⁵⁶ In many cases, the interaction of these organizations with the military is in direct violation of three of the four principles of humanitarian action because of perceptions of aligning interests with the military. The result is that humanitarian organizations risk losing access to areas where the military is not accepted. A third tension is the distinction between mine clearance and demining. The military trains for mine clearance which includes expedient means of finding, avoiding or clearing paths through minefields in a severely time constrained environment—often in the face of an armed opposition. This approach focuses on mitigating the threat of mines, without ensuring 100% clearance, in order to accomplish military missions other than minefield clearance. In contrast,

⁵⁵ Ian Mansfield, “The Role of the Military in Mine Action,” *Journal of Mine Action* 8, no. 1 (June 2004): 1, accessed October 17, 2014, <http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/8.1/focus/mansfield/mansfield.htm>.

⁵⁶ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *OCHA On Message: Humanitarian Principles* (United Nations, 2012), accessed December 20, 2014, https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OOM-humanitarianprinciples_eng_June12.pdf.

standards for demining focus on completely eliminating the threat of mines in the absence of an enemy and without a time constraint. When attempting to work together, studies found that the military often neglects the International Mine Action Standards resulting in the need to re-clear the area before safe use by civilians.⁵⁷ The re-clearance requires additional time and money but more importantly causes both humanitarian organizations and the local populace to question the military's competency in minefield clearance. The tensions caused by different approaches to minefield clearance prevent the military from meeting the HDP's vision of relieving the suffering from landmines because the people do not trust the military.

The HDP Through the Lens of the Government

From the perspective of the government, the HDP represents an attempt at the targeted partnership theory of civil-military relations. The government leveraged representatives of all actors in civil-military relations in a 'whole of government approach' to coordinate US humanitarian demining programs globally. On the surface, the HDP appears to have a balanced approach to achieving its vision of "relieving suffering from the adverse effects of landmines while promoting US interests" by combining the hard power of military expertise with the soft power influence of humanitarian assistance.⁵⁸ The government assumed that the military and the people, as represented by the Department of State and USAID, agreed upon the conditions of the HDP.

Instead of adhering to the ideas of targeted partnership, the government's reaction to the HDP created tensions that resembled the separatist theory of subjective civilian control. While drafting the provisions of the HDP, Congress placed legal and institutional restrictions on the

⁵⁷ Ted Paterson, "The Performance of Militaries in Humanitarian Demining," *The Journal of ERW and Mine Action* 14, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 1, accessed October 17, 2014, <http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/14.1/Feature/Paterson.shtml>.

⁵⁸ The Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, *Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan*, Chapter 2, Page 1.

military's autonomy while the military closely integrated and participated in the political and social system. The provisions of the HDP restricted the military from “the physical detection, lifting, or destroying of landmines” in addition to restricting the location of demining operations to mine-affected countries where “hostilities have ceased and a workable peace agreement is in place”.⁵⁹ As anticipated by Huntington’s description of subjective civilian control, the restrictions emplaced by the government degraded the military’s expertise on mine warfare training. The creation of the HDTC as the only location for humanitarian demining training in lieu of Army wide unit level demining training limited the capacity for the military to broadly integrate with the people. Concurrently, the CCW and APMBC in international law caused the military to cease minefield emplacement training. Taken together, the military’s ability to conduct mine warfare significantly decreased to a point where civilian organizations are the repository for expertise in humanitarian demining which puts US forces at risk to mines. The government viewed the limited expertise in the military as a form of shirking. At the same time, the government recognized the huge expense of conducting demining. Landmines produced for three to four US dollars costed somewhere between \$200 and \$2000 to clear.⁶⁰ Facing this problem, both USAID and DOS recognized the cost savings of contracting civilians to work under commercial incentives. Commercial organizations were more skilled and cheaper than using the military because the government did not incur the cost of training the deminers. The barrier to civil-military relations imposed by governmental restrictions caused the government to rely on commercial deminers which detracted from the objectives of the HDP—namely the creation of indigenous demining programs.

⁵⁹ The Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Demining, *Humanitarian Demining Strategic Plan*, Appendix A, Page 5.

⁶⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Anti-Personnel Landmines Friend or Foe? A Study of the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996).

The HDP Through the Lens of the Military

From the perspective of the military, the HDP represents a threat to the preferred separatist theory of civil-military relations. The unpredictable nature of the new security environment following the Cold War caused the military to anticipate a choice between two ideals of future warfare: conventional interstate war or stability operations. Military proponents for conventional warfare acknowledged the frequency and persistent nature of irregular warfare, but believed that these conflicts do not require military intervention and stability operations does not match the skillset of the military.⁶¹ Instead, the military needed to focus on maintaining autonomy and expertise focused on interstate warfare. For the military, the success of the Gulf War served as confirmation that the military was correct in its belief that large-scale maneuver warfare was the likely norm of future warfare.⁶² With respect to the landmine threat, the military viewed the HDP as “a form of humanitarian assistance [that] normally does not support military operations.”⁶³ Understanding that the military cannot prepare for everything, the military chose to take the chance on conventional war in lieu of focusing on stability operations. The HDP, and its limits on DOD’s participation, gave the military reason to continue to distance itself from humanitarian actions.

The military’s reaction to the HDP created tensions that resembled separatist theory of objective civilian control. The risk of objective civil control is that civil-military operations will be out of synch. With respect to the people, the military does not prioritize cooperation and coordination with civilian structures, which leads to the compartmentalization of information. Information stove-piping causes military organizations to execute certain missions without direct knowledge of the civilian organizations operating in the same theatre. One reason for this is that

⁶¹ Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict,” *Strategic Forum* 240 (April 2009): 3.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Joint Staff, *Department of Defense Support to Humanitarian Mine Action*, 1.

information classification for operational security often results in over-classification preventing the flow of information with civilian counterparts.⁶⁴ This over classification results in the military working off on the side, not providing information to mine action partners which prevents collaboration and prevents information from getting into the central mine plan.⁶⁵ With respect to the government, the military executes the HDP as an additional mission outside the conduct of warfare and a tool to maintain “access to geographical areas otherwise not easily available to US forces.”⁶⁶ This results in military efforts that are focused in locations other than areas where the DOS and DOD operate. This description shows the limited scope of the HDP from the perception of the military caused by tensions in civil-military relations, which limits the collaborative and synchronized effort intended by the HDP.

⁶⁴ Nicole Kreger, “Humanitarian Vs. Military Mine Action,” *Journal of Mine Action* 8, no. 1 (June 2004): 1, accessed October 17, 2014, <http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/8.1/focus/kreger2/kreger2.htm>.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance and Humanitarian Mine Action Programs of the Department of Defense* (Washington, DC: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 2007).




Figure 3. Perceptions of the Humanitarian Demining Program

Source: Ideas adapted from Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), 81; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 7-16; Rebecca Schiff, “Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy,” *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no. 2 (April 2012): 318-39, 319.

Examining the HDP through the lenses of the people, government, and military using multiple theories explains why the failure of civil-military relations prevented the DOD from being in balance with the larger goals of the HDP. Convergence theory explains the perception of the people where aligning interests created a problem of mistrust because of the lack of military competency and violation of humanitarian principles. The government perceived the HDP as a whole of government program in line with the ideas of targeted partnership theory, but the legal and institutional restrictions imposed on the military reduced the expertise of the military causing the government to rely on commercial organizations. The military perceived the HDP as a threat to military autonomy and separated their efforts from civilian organizations which separatist theory explains. Together, these effects caused the national response to humanitarian demining to

be unsynchronized. Case studies in Afghanistan give specific examples of the HDP in practice and bridge the gap between the world of theory and experience.

Section II: Case Studies in Afghanistan and Kosovo

Demining in Afghanistan

The case study in Afghanistan offers examples of strained civil-military relations and their effects on the integration of DOD into humanitarian demining. Over decades of conflict, Afghanistan had one of the highest concentrations of minefields and explosive remnants of war in the world. Accordingly, Afghanistan is home to the world's oldest and largest demining program, but this is hardly a measure of success. The strained relationships between the Afghan people, the United Nations, the Afghan and US governments, and the Afghan and US militaries contribute to the unsuccessful mine action efforts in Afghanistan. Viewing mine action in Afghanistan through the lens of the people, government, and military show how the lack of effective civil-military relations prevented DOD's effective integration into demining in Afghanistan.

Background Information

The history of the Afghan mine action program followed three periods of time: civil war, post 9/11, and Afghan nationalization. The civil war period, from 1988 until 2001, started with the power vacuum left in the absence of the Soviet Union where various factions struggled in numerous iterations of intense conflict.⁶⁷ The result of infighting was a large number of refugees and additions to the landmine problem left from Soviet occupation.⁶⁸ The post 9/11 period saw the US lead a coalition attack against the Afghanistan in 2001, after the bombing of the World Trade Center was linked to terrorists residing there. The war against Afghanistan's Taliban government, which had sheltered the 9/11 attacker's parent organization, Al Qaeda contributed to the already dangerous landmine contamination in the country through the widespread use of

⁶⁷ United Nations, "Afghanistan and the United Nations," United Nations, accessed March 20, 2015, <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml>.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

cluster bombs strikes and the creation of large numbers of displaced persons moving across a landscape littered with explosive hazards.⁶⁹ The Afghan nationalization period, which began in 2007, started with a UN restructuring of the Afghan mine action program and followed with the peak of international support to Afghanistan during the coalition surge. This period marked a progressive shift in strategy towards Afghan nationalization of mine action and performance oriented goals.⁷⁰ While the Government of Afghanistan took great steps towards the nationalization of mine action, the Government of Afghanistan now faces the problem of continuing the trend of success in a difficult operational environment while international funding and security assistance decreases.⁷¹

Afghan Mine Action Through the Lens of the People

The continuous fighting during the civil war period caused the Afghan people to lose confidence in the government and turn their support to international NGOs. By 1990, the fighting resulted in 6.3 million Afghans leaving their homes—3.3 million to Pakistan and 3 million to Iran.⁷² The United Nations was the first to respond by coordinating an emergency relief program called “Operation Salam” which attempted to provide agricultural assistance, food aid, public and maternal health services and economic recovery to the growing number of refugees.⁷³ USAID, as part of Operation Salam, began smuggling humanitarian aid from Pakistan on pack mules, but

⁶⁹ Ted Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership* (Geneva: GICHD, 2012), 1.

⁷⁰ Noorullah Elham and Bríd Sheehan, *Mine Action Program Afghanistan: Annual Report 1392 (2013 - 2014)* (Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan, 2014), www.macca.org.af.

⁷¹ Samuel Hall, *Mine Action in Afghanistan: A Success Story in Danger. An Evaluation of UNMAS in Afghanistan* (Kabul: United Nations Mine Action Service, 2014).

⁷² United Nations, “Afghanistan and the United Nations”.

⁷³ Hall, *Mine Action in Afghanistan*.

found that the mine threat was a significant obstacle on their supply lines.⁷⁴ This led the United Nations to establish the first generation mine action program designed to fund mine risk education using Western militaries to train refugees on basic clearance techniques. This effort failed however, because of a lack of coordination and planning as part of a combined effort.⁷⁵ Changing strategies, the United Nations created the Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (MACCA) based in Islamabad, Pakistan for security reasons. Acting as a ‘conglomerate model’ organization, the MACCA served as the corporate headquarters, using established international NGOs and Afghan national NGOs to function like divisions that operated within the corporate strategy.⁷⁶ This strategy worked well for two reasons. First, the MACCA had no demining capabilities of their own and acted largely as a routing headquarters for international donor funding. Second, the people perceived the United Nations as a neutral third party by using NGOs instead of self interested militaries. This neutrality allowed NGOs to operate in areas controlled by each of the warring Afghan factions because of their humanitarian motivation-even serving the international community at times to channel faction leadership.⁷⁷ The result of the civil war period on the people was the increased confidence in international actors in the absence of a stable national government, the growth of Afghan mine action NGOs into a large and capable demining force, and the increased dependence on donor countries.

The rapid influx of international actors during the post 9/11 period caused the Afghan people to lose confidence in international NGOs. The United Nations mine action program grew rapidly with the increased international interest in Afghanistan. Responding to the increase in

⁷⁴ Matthew Bolton, *Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance: Governance, Politics and Security in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 89.

⁷⁵ G.P. Wilson, *1990 Annual Reports Demining Headquarters Peshawar and Quetta* (Quetta: Demining HQ, 1991).

⁷⁶ Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 3.

⁷⁷ Harold W. Geisel, *Report of Inspection Humanitarian Mine Action Programs in Afghanistan* (Washington DC: Office of Inspector General, 2009).

demand for mine action due to coalition strikes and increased displaced persons, the United Nations needed to quickly increase demining capacity. The United Nations transferred the coordination center from Islamabad to Kabul and an influx of international mine action personnel poured into Afghanistan.⁷⁸ The increase in international mine experts had two unintended consequences. First, international mine action managers pushed capable Afghan managers aside reducing the opportunities for Afghans to gain managerial and leadership experience. Second, as International Security Assistance Forces focused on development and engaging the local population, the distinction between military and civilian aid actors eroded.⁷⁹ This resulted in attacks against deminers for numerous reasons: financial incentives, political motivations, and a general opposition to “outsiders”.⁸⁰ These attacks illustrate that the people no longer perceived deminers as neutral or non-political and led to tensions between NGOs and the military where many agencies avoided interaction with the military altogether.⁸¹ The result of the post 9/11 period on the people was the perceived militarization of humanitarian aid, the loss of trust in international actors, and the missed opportunity for Afghan managerial experience.

The shift away from international actors and towards Afghan ownership during the nationalization period caused the Afghan people to embrace community involvement in mine action. The United Nations changed the management structure of the mine action coordination center in mid-2007 by appointing an Afghan national as the coordination center director and another Afghan national as the operations manager.⁸² By focusing more on Afghan leadership,

⁷⁸ Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 5.

⁷⁹ Ashley Jackson and Simone Haysom, “The Search for Common Ground Civil–military Relations in Afghanistan, 2002–13” (paper presented at the Humanitarian Policy Group, London, April 2013).

⁸⁰ Samuel Hall, *Community Based Approaches for Improving MRE and Perceptions of Deminers* (Kabul: Mine Action Co-ordination Center of Afghanistan, 2012).

⁸¹ Jackson and Haysom, “The Search for Common Ground”.

⁸² Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 7.

the United Nations fully nationalized the management structure with the remaining international staff reverting to advisory roles. Under Afghan leadership, the coordination center published transition objectives in its annual plan for 2009-10 to include reducing contamination by 70% by 2011, being ‘impact free’ from landmines by 2013, and a 2018 target date for transition.⁸³ Along with new leadership came a new approach termed “community based demining”. The core concept of community based demining was that Afghan NGOs work with local community leaders as a liason to develop mine risk education programs and recruit the teams of deminers from the community to conduct clearance operations.⁸⁴ The approach mitigated the risk of local perceptions of deminers as outsiders while directly supporting the economic situation of the people. The results showed that security incidents involving NGOs rose by 20% in 2011 while security incidents against mine action operations decreased 26%.⁸⁵ The program was similar in the train the trainer approach of the HDP, but effectively cut out the military by using local nationals to train local nationals rather than creating a parallel military system and therefore reducing the dependence on outside intervention.⁸⁶ Nationalizing the leadership of the mine action center and community based demining were both successful changes but were also outside the responsibility of the Afghan government. The result of the nationalization period on the people was the increased separation from the government and military while developing mine action capacity through community involvement.

Afghan Mine Action Through the Lens of the Government

The lack of governmental control during the civil war period caused the government to divert control of mine action to NGOs. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, a pro

⁸³ Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 20.

⁸⁴ Elham and Sheehan, *Mine Action Program Afghanistan*.

⁸⁵ Hall, *Community Based Approaches*.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Soviet Afghan government created the Department of Mine Clearance to plan and coordinate mine action activity within the country.⁸⁷ However, continuing instability limited the control of the government and the pro Soviet regime fell in 1992 while marginalizing the Department of Mine Clearance.⁸⁸ The new government was an Islamist regime with linkages to international terrorism which caused donor governments to lose interest in Afghan sponsored mine action.⁸⁹ These reasons caused international funding to the Afghan government to decrease substantially from averaging over \$20 million per year to just over \$13 million in 2001.⁹⁰ Instead, donor governments, including the United States, felt more comfortable bypassing the Afghan government and directly contributing to the United Nations and their groups of NGOs to address the growing landmine threat.⁹¹ Reinforcing the separation of mine action responsibility from the government, the United Nations coordination center did nothing to coordinate with or build the capacity of the Department of Mine Clearance. The result of the civil war period on the government was the increased dependency on NGOs and donor funding while the government decreased their responsibility for mine action.

The flood of international interest and support during the post 9/11 period showed the government's over-reliance on external mine action funding, but also exposed their inability to manage mine action. Following the removal of the Taliban, the new government of Afghanistan became a State Party to the APMBC in 2003. This caused international donors to increase funding almost five times to the government of Afghanistan.⁹² Seeing an opportunity, the United Nations launched a 'mine action transition project' in 2004 to accelerate the transfer of ownership

⁸⁷ Geisel, *Humanitarian Mine Action Programs in Afghanistan*.

⁸⁸ Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 8.

⁸⁹ Bolton, *Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance*, 96.

⁹⁰ Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 4.

⁹¹ Geisel, *Humanitarian Mine Action Programs in Afghanistan*.

⁹² Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 5.

to the Afghans. However, the Afghan government, largely dependent upon international aid from the beginning of mine action in 1988, refused the proposal because there was no need to change a working program and the Department of Mine Clearance never built the capacity to manage mine action because of the over reliance on NGOs.⁹³ External to the Afghan government, the US government failed to coordinate mine action responses outside of funding. The interagency group responsible for leading and planning responses as part of the HDP stopped meeting in 2001 while the US ceased providing a US Ambassador for Humanitarian Mine Action.⁹⁴ This lack of leadership within the HDP made it impossible to coordinate a unified US response to mine action while the lack of an agent to coordinate mine action outside the the US made it impossible to coordinate efforts with allied embassies. The result of the post 9/11 period on the government was the breakdown of governmental systems for mine action.

The increased pressure on Afghan ownership during the nationalization period caused the US government to find alternative means to build Afghan capacity. The announcement of the Afghan government's full assumption of responsibility for security by the end of 2014 gave increased motivation for international governments to transition mine action ownership to the Afghan government.⁹⁵ Influenced by the changes in the United Nations structure, the government of Afghanistan hosted a national mine action symposium in December 2007, involving Afghan government ministries, donor governments, NGOs, and the United Nations.⁹⁶ The symposium resulted in the Afghan government naming the Department of Mine Clearance as the inter-ministerial body to oversee the mine action program with a date of national ownership in 2013 which coincided with the APMBC Article 5 requirement to be 'impact free'.⁹⁷ As the 2013

⁹³ Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 11.

⁹⁴ Geisel, *Humanitarian Mine Action Programs in Afghanistan*.

⁹⁵ Jackson and Haysom, "The Search for Common Ground".

⁹⁶ Paterson, *Transitioning Mine Action Programmes*, 12.

⁹⁷ Geisel, *Humanitarian Mine Action Programs in Afghanistan*.

APMBC Article 5 deadline approached, the Afghan government realized that the demining objective was unattainable and that the Department of Mine Clearance was not ready to assume responsibility for mine action. Instead the Afghan government relied on the United Nations to file an extension to the APMBC deadline. In view of this weakness, the DOS bypassed the Afghan government and diverted financial assistance to community based demining which puts funding directly to work in getting mines and explosive ordnance out of the ground, and builds Afghan capacity.⁹⁸ While the program did well to reinforce local governance as well as promote humanitarian objectives, acting outside the Afghan government without military support prevented a unified ‘whole of government’ approach intended by the HDP in the first place. The result of the nationalization period on the government was the realization of the HDPs weakness in creating an indigenous mine action managerial organization while reinforcing action outside the vision of the HDP.

Afghan Mine Action Through the Lens of the Military

Military support to mine action during the civil war period caused the military to form the train-the-trainer model for the HDP. In coordination with the United Nations’ Operation Salam, the US provided military personnel to train Afghan refugees to clear mines when they returned home.⁹⁹ The military mission during Operation Salam was “to make Afghan refugees aware of mines and to teach them demining techniques with a view to make it possible for them to both avoid casualties and to demine their homeland.”¹⁰⁰ Reports showed that the military’s hasty planning and execution resulted in confusion on the part of the military as well as failed

⁹⁸ Andrew J. Shapiro, “Afghanistan: US Humanitarian Mine Action Helps Revive Deserted Town,” *DIPNOTE US Department of State Official Blog*, April 5, 2010, accessed December 20, 2014, <https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2010/04/05/afghanistan-us-humanitarian-mine-action-helps-revive-deserted-town>.

⁹⁹ Bolton, *Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance*, 92.

¹⁰⁰ Wilson, *1990 Annual Reports Demining Headquarters Peshawar and Quetta*.

coordination with the United Nations. Afghan refugees were not flocking back to their homes as originally thought and the military overestimated their ability to communicate with a large number of refugees with “14th century communications”.¹⁰¹ Underscoring the lack of civil-military relations, the communication situation did not improve over nine months of operations and resulted in only 1,901 Afghan graduates, a minute number compared to the millions of refugees displaced by the violence.¹⁰² The report concluded that the program failed because of ‘a good deal of confusion’, ‘lack of communication’ and a ‘lack of planning at all levels’.¹⁰³ Still, the precedence was set and the military found the limited response in lieu of large scale military intervention in support of humanitarian objectives as acceptable. The result of the civil war period on the military was the first test of the train-the-trainer program which led to the formation of the HDP.

The large scale military intervention during the post 9/11 period showed the military’s atrophied mine action capacity while blurring the lines between civilian and military aid.¹⁰⁴ When occupying former Soviet military bases at Bagram and Kandahar, US forces found high levels of mine and unexploded ordinance contamination. Removing demining from military training as a result of the legal and institutional restrictions imposed by Congress contributed to the deaths of four US Soldiers conducting demining operations in 2002.¹⁰⁵ The military’s inability to conduct demining caused the DOS and USAID to hire commercial deminers with proven efficiency and reliability.¹⁰⁶ Meanwhile, the military focused on civil-military operations through the actions of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Described as “civil-military institutions”, the teams were ad

¹⁰¹ Wilson, *1990 Annual Reports Demining Headquarters Peshawar and Quetta*.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Bolton, *Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance*, 92.

¹⁰⁴ Jackson and Haysom, “The Search for Common Ground”.

¹⁰⁵ Bolton, *Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance*, 97.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 98.

hoc constructions of military members lacking specific pre-deployment training and development skills.¹⁰⁷ In practice, the reconstruction teams attempted to enable the Afghan government to establish itself while delivering services to the people. The unintended consequence was the Afghan perception of militarized humanitarian aid which increased the risk to civilian aid actors. These actions increased the tensions between the military, NGOs, and the people while creating a self defeating approach-the more the military tried to help the people, the more they rejected both the military and the civilian NGOs with the same objectives.¹⁰⁸ The result of the post 9/11 period on the military was the increased reliance on commercial deminers while increasing tensions with NGOs by perception of militarized humanitarian action.

The focus on an exit strategy during the nationalization period caused the military to increase efforts in areas other than demining. The success of the US surge in Iraq in 2007 supported the decision for a US troop surge in Afghanistan in 2010. The military committed an additional 30,000 troops intended to enforce the US exit strategy by training an effective Afghan security force.¹⁰⁹ Development funding also increased as the annual budget for the US Commander's Emergency Response Fund, the primary funding mechanism for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, rose from \$200 million in 2007 to \$1 billion in 2010.¹¹⁰ Instead of focusing on decreasing the landmine contamination problem or developing indigenous demining capacity, the military contributed to the landmine problem by leaving abandoned firing ranges around vacated bases.¹¹¹ The military acknowledged this problem and hired commercial deminers

¹⁰⁷ Jackson and Haysom, "The Search for Common Ground".

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Robert M Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York, USA: Knopf, 2014), 477.

¹¹⁰ Jackson and Haysom, "The Search for Common Ground".

¹¹¹ Elham and Sheehan, *Mine Action Program Afghanistan*.

to clear the firing ranges at an estimated \$250 million.¹¹² However, this continued unwillingness of the military to develop indigenous demining, by hiring commercial companies rather than partnering with Afghan deminers, was another missed opportunity to build the capacity of Afghan deminers and contradicted the vision of the HDP. The result of the nationalization period on the military was the reinforcement that humanitarian demining was outside the scope of the military.




Figure 4. Civil-military Relations in the HDP in Afghanistan

Source: Ideas adapted from Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), 81; Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), 7-16.

The conditions in Afghanistan illustrate the difficulties in civil-military relations with respect to the HDP. Actions during the civil war period were unsynchronized because the United

¹¹² Alice Speri, “Departing Troops Are Leaving Behind an Explosive Mess in Afghanistan,” *VICE News*, April 19, 2014, accessed March 4, 2015, <https://news.vice.com/article/departing-troops-are-leaving-behind-an-explosive-mess-in-afghanistan>.

Nations acted independently of the government and military, which resembles the problems described in the separatist theory. During the post 9/11 period, the aligned interests of the United Nations and the US military blurred the distinction between humanitarian and military aid which resembles the convergence theory. The result was the rejection of military aid in the form of attacks on deminers. The flood of international actors also pushed aside Afghan leadership which prevented the development of Afghan managerial capacity. The nationalization period marked a return to the separatist theory where the United Nations, the US government, and the military recognized the weakness of Afghan managerial capacity and all focused on independent exit strategies outside the scope of the Afghan government. The result of the HDP in Afghanistan was the successful development of local demining capacity, predominantly through the efforts of NGOs, with the absence of a governmental organization to coordinate their efforts. In many respects, the conditions in Afghanistan mirror conditions in other post conflict scenarios. The case of the HDP in Kosovo faced many of the same challenges as Afghanistan; however, the DOD succeeded in contributing to humanitarian demining in Kosovo where it failed in Afghanistan.

Demining in Kosovo

Kosovo is a mine action success story where a whole of government approach eliminated the major threat of landmines and unexploded ordinance within two and a half years. Kosovo is a unique case for two reasons. It receives consistent aid from its neighbors due to its proximity to wealthy Western European countries and its mere 10,000 sq km in size makes it 1/65th the size of Afghanistan.¹¹³ Nonetheless, the case study has lessons that are applicable to other post-war rehabilitation scenarios. Viewing mine action in Kosovo through the lens of the people,

¹¹³ JJ Scott, "The Kosovo MACC: The Most Successful Mine Action Program Ever," *Journal of Mine Action* 6, no. 1 (April 2002): 1, accessed October 17, 2014, <http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/6.1/focus/scott/scott.htm>.

government, and military shows how effective civil-military relations facilitates an effective mine action program.

Background Information

Mine action in Kosovo developed during a period of hostile actions in an extremely complex environment. Following the hostilities and subsequent NATO-led bombing campaign, Yugoslavian and Serbian forces withdrew from Kosovo on June 10, 1999 leaving the province contaminated with mines and unexploded cluster bomb sub-munitions dropped by coalition air forces.¹¹⁴ The withdrawal of Serbian forces allowed the United Nations to enter the province at the same time as 30,000 military personnel, numerous aid agencies, and as many as 50,000 displaced persons returned daily.¹¹⁵ The United Nations recognized the threat that landmines and unexploded ordinance posed to the security mission and held a high level meeting in Geneva on 13 May 1999, paving the way for a cooperative relationship between the United Nations and Kosovo Stabilization Force (KFOR) on the mine issue.¹¹⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 of 10 June 1999 allowed the United Nations to act as the interim administrative authority in Kosovo.¹¹⁷ The United Nations then created a mine action coordination center to oversee all mine action activities in the Province. The initial cooperation between all actors at a complex time allowed the success of mine action in Kosovo.

Kosovo Mine Action Through the Lens of the People

The United Nations represented the interests of the people following the Serbian withdrawal by establishing and enhancing relationships between numerous actors through the

¹¹⁴ Phil Bean and Vera Bohle, *Assessment Into Operational Mine/UXO Clearance Activities in Kosovo* (Geneva: GICHD, 2006), 31.

¹¹⁵ Dirk Salomons, *Willing to Listen: An Evaluation of the United Nations Mine Action Programme in Kosovo 1999-2001* (Geneva: The Praxis Group, Ltd., 2002), 36.

¹¹⁶ Bean and Bohle, *Mine/UXO Clearance Activities in Kosovo*, 29.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

mine action center. Following hostilities in June 1999, the major concern for the people was returning to their homes before the early Balkan winter—snowfall often occurred in September giving the United Nations three to four months to resettle the large number of refugees.¹¹⁸ The mine action center directed donor funding to NGOs and commercial companies while coordinating all humanitarian mine action in Kosovo.¹¹⁹ The United Nations formalized the relationship with NGOs through an NGO Agreement document where signatories agreed to give “their full support to coordination of the mine and ordnance clearance efforts by the United Nations, in particular the UN Mine Action Centre in Kosovo”.¹²⁰ To support the relationship with the military, the United Nations placed two liaison officers with KFOR to maintain continual communication. The liaison officers were crucial for interfacing with KFOR as they gave general awareness briefings to KFOR, educated the KFOR staff on humanitarian mine action, and maintained continuity in the KFOR headquarters for their ever-changing KFOR counterparts, who changed every 4-6 months.¹²¹ The result of the United Nations coordination allowed 800,000 refugees to return safely to their homes with few casualties from mines during the winter period and gaining the trust of the people.¹²²

Kosovo Mine Action Through the Lens of the Government

The US Government focused its efforts through the mine action center which resulted in the nationalization of a Kosovar mine action program. The US government coordinated for

¹¹⁸ Larry Wentz, *Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience* (Washington, DC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2013), 221.

¹¹⁹ Mark W. Adams, “The US Humanitarian Demining Program in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo” (lecture, Address to the Reserve Officers Association of the United States, Springfield, Virginia, October 15, 1999), accessed March 20, 2015, http://www.state.gov/1997-2001-NOPDFS/policy_remarks/1999/991015_adams_demining.html.

¹²⁰ Salomons, *Willing to Listen*, 38.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹²² Wentz, *Lessons from Kosovo*, 279.

commercial mine education train-the-trainer programs in neighboring countries through multiple means to include Superman comics.¹²³ Focusing on clearance of residential areas and locating cluster bomb sites, the US established the Kosovo Emergency Demining Force consisting of eight civilian clearance teams trained by commercial deminers.¹²⁴ To coordinate these efforts with other demining actors, the US provided two liaisons to support the United Nations mine action center. These actions led to the declaration of Kosovo as an “impact free” country in December 2001 meaning mines and unexploded ordinance present no serious threats to human life.¹²⁵ The absence of a Kosovar government following hostilities meant there was no residual governmental program competing for support from the United Nations mine action center. Declaring its independence in 2008, the government of Kosovo assumed full control of mine action by adopting the United Nations mine action center. The government of Kosovo then solidified its responsibility by passing Law No. 04/L-089 on 15 March 2012 which regulated all activities related to humanitarian demining in the Republic of Kosovo.¹²⁶ The US government’s support to the mine action center directly translated to the eventual Kosovar mine action program and resulted in a nationalized Kosovar mine action program that was successful in clearing mines while retaining a positive relationship with the US—effectively achieving the vision of the HDP.

Kosovo Mine Action Through the Lens of the Military

The military’s greatest contribution to mine action in Kosovo was developing an information management system in support of the mine action center. KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June 1999. The UN found that engaged military forces had greater knowledge of contaminated

¹²³ Adams, “Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo”.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Phil Bean and Vera Bohle, *Assessment Into Operational Mine/UXO Clearance Activities in Kosovo* (Geneva: GICHD, 2006), 35.

¹²⁶ Jakup Krasniqi, *Law On Humanitarian Demining* (Kosovo: Assembly of Republic of Kosovo, 2012), 3.

areas than local residents did, a unique situation to Kosovo, and that cluster bombs dropped during the air campaign caused considerable casualties amongst the returning civilian population.¹²⁷ The United Nations directed KFOR to initially supervise demining until the mine action center could takeover. This put KFOR in an unfamiliar situation because KFOR lacked humanitarian demining expertise and now controlled the coordination of almost 40 different mine clearance organizations with independent plans. KFOR solved this issue by focusing on developing a common mine action picture amongst all demining actors-the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).¹²⁸ The intent was to provide compatible data sets to share amongst major civilian and military actors in Kosovo to achieve unity of effort.¹²⁹ The IMSMA mapping capability allowed all users to view mine contamination spatially which gave an incentive for multiple mine actors to share information. This incentive made it possible for military and governmental organizations to make bombing data, satellite and aerial imagery available in significant quantities for the first time.¹³⁰ With all actors on board, the military collected and collated all available information on mine and unexploded ordnance contamination within the IMSMA, collecting as many as 4,000 reports on dangerous areas and reducing them to just under 2,000 after confirming and removing duplicate or erroneous reports.¹³¹ Tensions still arose with the military's participation in humanitarian demining. The military openly voiced their dissatisfaction when Defense Secretary Cohen complained that "professional soldiers should not be expected to adopt policing, administrative, and judicial roles whilst grappling with huge

¹²⁷ Salomons, *Willing to Listen*, 27.

¹²⁸ EOD Management Section, *Multi Year Strategic Plan for the Kosovo Mine Action Programme 2008-2010* (Kosovo: UNMIK, 2008), 9.

¹²⁹ Wentz, *Lessons from Kosovo*, 278.

¹³⁰ Shawn Messick, *Decision Support for Mine Action* (Washington, DC: Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 2002), 7.

¹³¹ Messick, *Decision Support for Mine Action*, 7.

population flows, de-mining and aid distribution”.¹³² Despite the growing pains, the military laid the groundwork for a single source of information amongst multiple actors and promoted a climate of future cooperation leading to the success of the mine action program.




Figure 5. Civil-military Relations in the HDP in Kosovo

Source: Ideas adapted from Rebecca Schiff, “Concordance Theory, Targeted Partnership, and Counterinsurgency Strategy,” *Armed Forces and Society* 38, no. 2 (April 2012): 318-39, 319.

Effective civil-military relations in Kosovo resulted in an effective mine action program as viewed through the lenses of the people, government, and military. The successes in Kosovo demonstrate the effects explained by the targeted partnership theory of civil military relations. In this case, the people, the government, and the military all focused their efforts towards the success of the mine action center. All organizations subordinated themselves to the greater cause of mine action and contributed to the needs of the specific situation rather than serving a predefined role. These efforts combined through effective relationships achieving the vision of

¹³² Wentz, *Lessons from Kosovo*, 223.

the HDP in under two years and serving as a model for future mine action programs. Though a unique situation, the lessons in civil-military relations in Kosovo apply to other mine action scenarios.

Section III: Recommendations/Conclusions

Recommendations

“[T]he committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to submit a report to the congressional defense committees... that outlines... ways to improve interagency coordination with [mine action] programs under way in the Department of State and the US Agency for International Development.”

-House Report 113-102, 113th Congress (2013-2014)

One of the main difficulties in solving a problem such as the effectiveness of the HDP is that critics often place responsibility on the individual parts rather than the relationships between them.¹³³ As identified earlier, the HDP is a complex system that illustrates the importance of the interdependence, communication, and integration of the people, government, and military. Similar to the metaphor of the forest and the trees, observers risk missing the larger picture when focusing on the small scale details of a system, such as the development of a specific technology. Instead, observers need to focus on the relationships between actors and make recommendations to strengthen these relationships to improve the system. To strengthen civil-military relations and improve DOD’s integration into the HDP, the DOD needs to focus on developing mine action centers and doctrine, a strategic humanitarian demining plan, and increasing demining capability through demining training.

Focus on Developing Mine Action Centers and Doctrine

The military’s execution of a train-the-trainer approach prevented DOD’s integration into the HDP. Focusing on the train-the-trainer approach failed in both Afghanistan and Kosovo. In Afghanistan, the military failed to reach a majority of the affected people during Operation Salam and later abandoned the approach altogether because military outreach was perceived as

¹³³ Yaneer Bar-Yam, *Making Things Work: Solving Complex Problems in a Complex World* (US: NECSI Knowledge Press, 2004), 24.

militarization of humanitarian aid and was rejected. Community-based demining essentially replicated the train-the-trainer approach while cutting the military out of the equation. The results in Afghanistan showed that NGOs were very successful in developing indigenous demining capacity, but less successful in developing long-term managerial capacity. In Kosovo, the government hired commercial contractors to train demining teams who trained the people to great effect. Perhaps civilians are better suited for personal interaction with the local populace to avoid the perception of militarized humanitarian aid. The success of civilian programs in Afghanistan and Kosovo suggested that the presence of the military forces risked fears of militarization of humanitarian aid and rejection by the people.

Instead, the military needs to focus on leadership and management of mine action centers. As shown in Afghanistan, the Department of Mine Action lacked the managerial capacity to assume responsibility for the Afghan mine action program. The military's leadership in starting the mine action center while managing the IMSMA database was crucial to the success of the program in Kosovo. Focusing on developing mine action centers allows the military to project a more limited footprint that both the government and the military desire while mitigating the risk of militarizing humanitarian aid since the mine action center is not visible to a majority of the people. The responsibility of the mine action center is to ensure that capable mine-action managers are in place, along with incentives for these managers to deliver safe, efficient and effective demining services.¹³⁴ One problem is neither NATO nor US doctrine provides specific guidelines for coordinating operational-level civil-military operations for a combined staff that is largely inexperienced or untrained.¹³⁵ The closest thing in joint doctrine is the civil-military operations center (CMOC), which serves as the hub of coordination for civil-military operations

¹³⁴ Paterson, "The Performance of Militaries".

¹³⁵ Wentz, *Lessons from Kosovo*, 282.

but this lacks the specificity required to lead and manage a mine action center.¹³⁶ Developing doctrine for executing a mine action center needs to serve as an operational reference for planning, coordination, and execution of civilian-lead interagency civil administration while including interagency operational lines of coordination and protocols.¹³⁷ Focusing on developing mine action centers during humanitarian demining operations leverages DODs leadership and managerial strengths while meeting the needs of host nation countries.

Develop a Strategic Humanitarian Demining Plan for Actors to Execute

The lack of planning for demining operations at the strategic level prevents DOD from integrating effectively into the HDP. The lack of leadership and ownership within the HDP results in the lack of a comprehensive, coordinated, and multi-year plan for humanitarian demining.¹³⁸ The Department of State as the lead agency is responsible for this plan by chairing an interagency working group, but all actors share this responsibility. Perhaps the successful actions of the United Nations Kosovo gave reason for the interagency working group to stop meeting in 2001, but their absence in Afghanistan resulted in uncoordinated efforts. The current process for implementing the HDP is essentially reactive where host nation countries initiate humanitarian demining requests and organizations form ad hoc civil-military relationships once plans are approved. While tensions always arise when bringing organizations together for the first time, tensions significantly increase when organizations have different perspectives and agendas. Understanding that the contributing organizations have different agendas, a key component of a strategic mine action plan is to find consensus on defining success in terms of

¹³⁶ Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2013), xii.

¹³⁷ Wentz, *Lessons from Kosovo*, 273.

¹³⁸ Humanitarian Demining Training Center, *HMA Briefing*.

accomplishments.¹³⁹ Developing a strategic mine action plan that explains how military humanitarian demining fits into the larger mine action picture facilitates shared understanding between organizations, strengthens civil-military relations, and allows DOD to translate strategic objectives into tactical plans nested with other actors in the HDP.

Conduct Demining Training

The lack of military preparation for demining operations also limits DOD integration into the HDP. Experiences in both Afghanistan and Kosovo illustrate how military deminer's do not match the competency of their civilian counterparts. Studies of U.N. Peacekeeping forces in 2010 concluded that military units were less productive, far more expensive, and worked to lower safety standards.¹⁴⁰ Often the areas cleared by military deminers require re-clearance before they are safe for civilian use. Additionally, military demining costs 25 to 60 times more than demining by civilian contractors working in the same country, at the same time, and on similar tasks.¹⁴¹ In response to these inefficiencies, the military and the government increasingly contracts commercial organizations to conduct minefield clearance which compounds the deficiency of insufficient training.¹⁴² Unfortunately, the reliance on commercial demining creates a negative feedback loop where the military increasingly becomes incompetent at a military task, causing an increased reliance on third party organizations, and ultimately disconnects the military from the people that the HDP intends to assist.

To reverse this loop, the military needs to return minefield clearance back into its training tasks. While mission essential tasks serve as a guide for units to plan training, the absence of demining as a training task illuminates the narrow perception that the Army only conducts

¹³⁹ Wentz, *Lessons from Kosovo*, 273.

¹⁴⁰ Paterson, "The Performance of Militaries".

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

expedient means of minefield clearance in support of its own objectives. Placing minefield clearance as a “mission essential task” forces the military to increase their competency which serves a dual purpose. First, the training serves a military purpose that decreases the over-reliance on commercial organizations while ensuring that the military can conduct demining tasks in austere environments where civilian organizations cannot follow. Second, recognizing the weakness of the military conducting demining, the intent is not to duplicate efforts or induce competition with civilian agencies, but to create institutional knowledge that assists in higher level planning and integration into the demining institutions led by the government or the people. Along these lines, demining training also ensures that military organizations can act as a quality control over those commercial organizations that contribute to humanitarian demining. To build interagency relations, the training needs to include both military and civilian actors in environments that allow the creation of joint procedures and plans for future deployments.¹⁴³ Preparing for demining operations by conducting interdisciplinary training builds the resident knowledge that DOD needs to integrate into the HDP as well as facilitating interagency interaction required to build working relationships.

Focusing on developing mine action centers and doctrine, a strategic humanitarian demining plan, and increasing demining capability through demining training allows DOD to strengthen civil-military relations and improve DOD’s integration into the HDP. Focusing on developing mine action centers plays to the strengths of DOD while developing mine action doctrine gives a reference document and common framework for DOD to interact with other actors. Developing a comprehensive demining strategy gives direction for all actors within the HDP while allowing DOD to visualize how it fits into the larger plan. Increasing DOD’s competency in demining through training provides the resident knowledge for DOD to integrate with interagency partners. These recommendations are not dependent upon one another but offer

¹⁴³ Wentz, *Lessons from Kosovo*, 299.

options to improve civil-military relations. Combined, they options offer complementary effects to improve DOD integration into the HDP.

Conclusions

The landmine threat will not go away. Despite the efforts of international humanitarian law and disarmament law banning the emplacement of antipersonnel mines, there are enough countries that are not signatories such as the United States. Other countries that follow the US lead, still produce and employ landmines. US agreement to the APMBC and the CCW is not the problem since the US stopped using AP mines in 1991 and stopped producing them in 1997. The US agreement serves more of a symbolic role to other countries that look to the US's lead. Nonetheless, landmines continue to thrive and increasingly find their way into modern warfare or war amongst the people in the form of improvised explosive devices (IED)s. The success of IEDs in the Global War on Terror demonstrate the ability for non-military personnel to achieve great affect against the US Army. In this respect, the landmines are still performing their original function as a cheap means to counter military overmatch and will remain an obstacle for the US military in one form or another for years to come.

Civil-military relations theory allows a critical analysis of the relationships between the military and both the government and the people. Samuel Huntington's model of objective control of the military continues to provide a solid basis for explaining the relationship between the government and the military as a struggle over professionalism in light of the demands imposed by the changing nature of warfare. Demining operations in Afghanistan support the idea that the military tends to shirk areas that it deems unimportant—in this case, humanitarian action—which required the government to rely on commercial deminers and ad hoc management arrangements. Theoretical explanations of the relationship between the military and the people are less authoritative. Examples in Afghanistan during the civil war and post 9/11 periods show a range of interaction, from excessively limited to overbearing assistance. During the civil war

period in Afghanistan, Operation Salam used the separatist theory and illustrated an extremely limited interaction where both the people and the military gained very little. During the post 9/11 period in Afghanistan, provincial reconstruction teams used convergence theory and illustrated an overbearing assistance where the military blurred the distinction between humanitarian aid and military operations resulting in the people rejecting outside humanitarian assistance altogether.

The most successful example of the military's support to the HDP was the case of Kosovo, which used a targeted partnership and illustrated how the people, government, and military can work for mutual benefit in the short term to achieve national goals. While even here, the DOD did not provide direct support to the removal of mines, it did leverage its expertise in other areas. The military used its capability in coordinating actions over a wide area and managing intelligence information—in this case, data related to the location, composition, and status of minefields—to aid in building indigenous capabilities to manage these efforts in the long term. Further, the military focused on using commercial deminers only a short-term basis as a means to build local capacity rather than to replace it.

While civil-military relations theory is not new, the nature of today's dynamic and rapidly changing environment requires an updating to the classical works, especially in the context of future wars amongst the people. Examining the people, government, and military and their respective lenses in the context of mine action allows a critical analysis of the HDP. A better understanding of the motivations behind actors in the HDP leads to better communications, strengthening the relationships between the actors, and shared understanding. Strengthening the relationships between the actors leads to confidence in the HDP and the ultimate goal of relieving suffering from the threat of landmines. In order to integrate into the HDP the DOD needs to strengthen its relationship with both the government and the people affected by mines. By focusing on the strengthening relationships between the actors and setting conditions for solutions

to emerge, the DOD will gain efficiencies in dealing with increasing military requirements in times of decreasing resources.

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